Contributed By Rogério Alves & Associados
Portuguese legislation and policy documents more commonly refer to economic and financial crime (criminalidade económica e financeira), including in framework statutes such as Law 36/94 of 29 September, which establishes measures to combat corruption and economic and financial crime.
“Financial crime” in Portugal is understood to cover fraud, bribery and corruption, money laundering, sanctions breaches, market abuse, tax evasion, cyber‑enabled crime and related misconduct.
As regards the general principles of criminal liability, financial‑crime offences are subject to the ordinary rules of Portuguese criminal law.
Portuguese doctrine and case law describe an offence as comprising:
Essentially only unlawful conduct committed with intent (dolo) is punishable. In some cases, however, the law expressly provides for punishment of negligent conduct. These principles apply across economic and financial crime.
Core financial‑crime offences (such as corruption, classic fraud and money laundering) are typically intent‑based. An attempt is generally punishable where the completed offence carries a statutory minimum of more than three years’ imprisonment. However, in some financial‑crime‑related regimes, such as corruption by public officials, the attempt is punishable irrespective of the underlying penalty threshold (Article 4 of Law 34/87 of 16 July).
The Penal Code and sectoral legislation establish corporate criminal liability in a broad range of offences. Article 11 of the Penal Code provides that legal persons and equivalent entities (with specific exceptions, such as the state) are liable for numerous crimes, including many at the core of economic and financial crime (criminal association, influence peddling, corruption, embezzlement, participation in economic business, money laundering, market abuse and others), where they are committed in the entity’s name or on its behalf and in its direct or indirect interest by persons in a leading position, or by persons under their authority where there has been a breach of supervision or control.
Under the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 32 of the Constitution, Portuguese case law consistently holds that the burden of proof in criminal proceedings lies with the accuser: it is for the prosecution (Ministério Público) to prove all elements of the offence, and the presumption of innocence entails a prohibition on inverting the burden of proof to the detriment of the defendant – the accused does not have to prove their innocence.
In the field of organised and economic‑financial crime, however, Law 5/2002 of 11 January introduces a regime of “extended loss” (perda alargada). In short, once a person has been constituted as a defendant (arguido) in respect of one of the catalogue offences covered by that statute, their overall assets are assessed. The total value of those assets is then compared with the income of proven lawful origin earned by the defendant over the legally defined reference period. If this comparison reveals an “inconsistent amount” – ie, a discrepancy that is unjustified and incompatible with lawful income – that amount may be declared forfeited to the state as an advantage of criminal activity.
In practice, once the prosecution has proved a relevant predicate offence and established a significant incongruity between assets and declared lawful income, a strong statutory presumption operates, shifting to the defendant the evidential burden of providing a credible lawful explanation for that wealth.
The Constitutional Court (through Constitutional Court Judgment No 392/2015) has upheld the constitutionality of this mechanism, treating extended loss as an autonomous confiscation measure built on prior proof of a serious predicate offence and asset incongruity, even though it continues to spark controversy within the legal community.
A person can be held secondarily liable in Portugal if they conspire to, or assist the principal offender in, committing an offence.
Under the Penal Code, the basic distinction is between:
The Penal Code adopts an “extended” concept of authorship in Article 26: a person is punishable as an author if they execute the act themselves, execute it through another, take a direct part in its execution together with others (co‑authorship) or, acting with intent, encourage another person to commit the act (instigation).
Article 27 of the Penal Code defines an accomplice as anyone who, intentionally and by any means, provides material or moral assistance to the commission by another of a crime.
In economic and financial crimes, limitation periods follow the general regime of the Penal Code: as a rule, proceedings are time-barred after two, five, ten or 15 years, depending on the maximum statutory penalty applicable. Many offences involving corruption, embezzlement and other qualified economic and financial crimes are currently subject to an extended limitation period of 15 years, irrespective of the applicable penalty range.
As a general rule, the limitation period runs from the completion of the offence; in the case of continuing offences, it runs from the cessation of the unlawful situation, and in the case of continued or habitual offences, from the last act, which is particularly relevant for schemes of fraud or money laundering carried out over an extended period.
In civil recovery actions (compensation, restitution, unjust enrichment), the ordinary limitation period is 20 years; however, the right to compensation based on civil liability is, as a rule, subject to a limitation period of three years from the moment the injured party becomes aware of the infringement and of the person responsible.
Portuguese criminal law applies, as a rule, to acts committed within national territory, but it also provides for broad extraterritorial jurisdiction, particularly in relation to various economic and financial crimes and corruption offences. The Penal Code extends the application of Portuguese law to acts committed abroad whenever there is a qualified territorial nexus; for example, where:
International cooperation in matters of financial crime is based on a framework law on international judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which governs extradition, mutual legal assistance (including searches, seizures, asset freezing and the gathering of evidence), transfer of proceedings and the enforcement of criminal judgments, operating in conjunction with Council of Europe conventions, United Nations instruments and EU instruments.
Regarding money laundering and terrorist financing, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the Criminal Police (Polícia Judiciária) carries out the exchange of information between FIUs and competent authorities of different member states, as well as with European co-operative structures such as Eurojust and Europol.
The law permits extradition for the purposes of criminal proceedings or the enforcement of a sentence/security measure, provided that the act is punishable under both legal systems by a custodial sentence (or equivalent measure) with a maximum term of not less than one year; where extradition is sought for enforcement purposes, the remaining sentence to be served must be at least four months. The decision to extradite is always a judicial one.
Portugal admits, under strict conditions, the extradition of its own nationals, but only where such possibility is provided for in a treaty, where the offences concern terrorism or international organised crime, and where the requesting state guarantees a fair and equitable trial.
Extradition is not permitted, in particular, where the offence has been committed in Portuguese territory or where the person is a Portuguese national, in which cases criminal proceedings must be initiated in Portugal, provided this is legally possible.
The investigation and prosecution of financial and economic crime are, as a rule, conducted by the Public Prosecution Service, which is responsible for directing the investigation and bringing criminal proceedings, with the assistance of the criminal police authorities – most notably the Criminal Police, which, by law, holds general jurisdiction over the investigation of complex and organised criminal activity.
Within the scope of its powers, the Public Prosecution Service is also responsible for co-ordinating reports and inputs from administrative and supervisory authorities, through legally established mechanisms for information exchange and cooperation, together with the intelligence gathered by the FIU of the Criminal Police.
The Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the Public Prosecution Service or the criminal police authorities must open a criminal investigation whenever they become aware of a criminal offence, which may result from complaints lodged by victims, reports submitted by supervisory authorities, reports in the media or information obtained in preventive operations specifically targeting corruption and economic and financial crime.
At all times, the principle of legality applies, under which the Public Prosecution Service is required to bring charges where, following the investigation, sufficient evidence of the commission of an offence has been gathered, and to discontinue the proceedings only in the absence of such evidence or where the proceedings are legally inadmissible.
Investigative authorities and the Public Prosecution Service may order the collection of documents and information, as well as carry out searches and seizures, which are generally subject to prior judicial authorisation, particularly where they concern private residences, correspondence, law firms or banking institutions. Any objects or assets that have been used in, or are intended for use in, the commission of a crime – or that constitute its proceeds, price or reward – may be seized, including assets held by third parties, subject to judicial validation where the police have acted on grounds of urgency.
In parallel, supervisory authorities such as the Bank of Portugal and the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM) are vested, within their sanctioning proceedings, with broad powers of inspection, information gathering, and the seizure or freezing of assets and documents related to infringements in the financial sector.
Within the scope of investigative powers granted by the Public Prosecution Service, criminal police authorities are empowered to question suspects and witnesses. However, where a suspect has been detained, he or she must be brought before a judge for an initial judicial interrogation, during which statements are given in the presence of a judge, with the participation of both defence counsel and the Prosecutor.
Portuguese enforcement and supervisory authorities increasingly rely on data driven tools in financial crime matters. In the AML/CTF space, obliged entities are required to deploy IT systems capable of risk scoring clients, monitoring transactions and automatically flagging unusual or suspicious activity, which in turn feeds into the Judiciary Police’s FIU and prosecutorial work.
The National AML Strategy explicitly calls for supervisors and the FIU to use risk analysis models, regulatory technology (regtech) tools and the goAML platform to enhance detection and investigation. In the virtual assets space, the Bank of Portugal expects obliged entities to rely on information recorded in distributed ledger networks as part of their risk assessments.
More broadly, criminal enforcement relies on large, centralised datasets – such as passenger name records and bank account registers – which are accessed and searched electronically under specific statutes and the dedicated law on law enforcement data protection.
The use of these technologies is constrained by a layered framework of data protection and fundamental rights rules. For financial regulators and private entities, the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulamento Geral sobre a Proteção de Dados – RGPD) and Law 58/2019 apply; for law enforcement authorities, EU Directive No 2016/680 is implemented by Law 59/2019, which, among other things, prohibits decisions based solely on automated processing (including profiling) that adversely affect individuals, absent a specific legal basis and human review.
Internal investigations now play a central role in the prevention and enforcement of financial crime in Portugal, particularly within the AML framework and whistle-blowing mechanisms. In practice, they consist of structured fact-finding processes aimed at analysing suspicious transactions, deciding on disclosures to authorities and identifying control failures, and are often conducted under the direction of legal counsel for defence and strategic purposes.
However, such investigations are significantly constrained by legal privilege, data protection and employment law. Legal professional secrecy may cover a substantial part of the investigative activity, while data protection and labour legislation impose strict limits on the collection and use of data, particularly through surveillance mechanisms. It is therefore essential to structure investigations on clear legal grounds, ensuring respect for employees’ privacy and maintaining a clear separation between privileged and potentially disclosable material.
Finally, co-operation with authorities may have a meaningful impact on both criminal and regulatory liability. In certain cases, active co-operation, remediation and voluntary disclosure may lead to mitigation or even exemption from penalties, or to more corrective rather than punitive regulatory responses. Nevertheless, such benefits are not automatic and depend on the transparency, timeliness and effectiveness of the measures adopted following the internal investigation.
Investigations into economic and financial crime in Portugal may involve the detention and questioning of suspects under the general framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Detention may occur in flagrante delito (caught in the act) or where there are strong indications of an intentional offence punishable by more than three years’ imprisonment, with the suspect being brought before an investigating judge within 48 hours for an initial hearing. The accused has the right to remain silent and not to self-incriminate, meaning they may refuse to answer questions concerning the alleged facts without such silence being held against them, as enshrined in the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This right is not absolute, as the accused is required to appear, to truthfully provide identification details (and, in certain circumstances, information on prior convictions) and to comply with legally prescribed investigative measures and coercive actions; refusal or false statements may constitute a criminal offence. Third parties – such as witnesses, holders of documents or system administrators – may be compelled to co-operate by appearing, testifying or providing access to documents or technical information necessary for searches and seizures, including access credentials, subject to criminal liability in case of non-compliance, while preserving the privilege against self-incrimination.
In parallel, at the regulatory level, the right to silence does not operate in the same manner. Supervised entities are subject to extensive duties of information and co-operation with authorities such as the Bank of Portugal, Portuguese Securities Market Commission (Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários – CMVM) and Insurance Supervisory Authority (Autoridade de Supervisão de Seguros e Fundos de Pensões – ASF), including inspections, document requests and the summoning of individuals. Failure to co-operate or the provision of false information typically constitutes a serious administrative offence, punishable by substantial fines and ancillary sanctions, such as restrictions on activities, disqualification of managers and the public disclosure of decisions.
Several pre-charge mechanisms exist to freeze or restrain assets belonging to individual or corporate suspects. The Code of Criminal Procedure allows for the seizure of instrumentalities, proceeds or benefits of crime, as well as any assets relevant for evidentiary purposes, based on strong indications of a criminal offence. This includes immediate action by law enforcement in cases where there is a risk of dissipation or disappearance of assets, subject to judicial validation within 72 hours.
Asset-preservation measures (preventive attachment) may also be ordered by a judge, at the request of the Public Prosecutor or the injured party, to secure fines, costs and compensation, requiring the suspect to have been formally constituted as a defendant and subject to principles of necessity and proportionality, and generally a substantiated risk of loss of patrimonial guarantees. In the context of organised and economic-financial crime, Law No 5/2002 establishes a “special” attachment regime linked to extended confiscation, allowing assets to be frozen up to the value of illicit advantages, based on disproportionate wealth and strong indications of criminal activity, without the need to demonstrate risk as required under civil law.
In parallel, financial-sector mechanisms provide additional means of restraint. Under the AML framework (Law No 83/2017), obliged entities must refrain from executing suspicious transactions and report them to the competent authorities, while the Public Prosecutor may order the temporary suspension of transactions linked to specific accounts or business relationships. Such measures may be converted by an investigating judge into a freezing of funds or assets where there are indications of criminal origin and a risk of integration into the legitimate economy.
Law No 5/2002 also allows for judicial control of bank accounts, including the suspension of specific transactions where necessary to prevent money laundering. In the context of UN and EU sanctions, Law No 97/2017 provides for the direct freezing of funds and economic resources under restrictive measures, implemented immediately by relevant entities without the need for additional acts, with breaches constituting a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.
Regarding cross-border reach, Regulation (EU) 2018/1805 establishes a system of mandatory mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders among member states, enabling Portugal both to request and to execute such measures across the EU on the basis of standardised certificates and with limited grounds for refusal.
The principal offences involving patrimonial fraud are primarily set out in the Penal Code. The central offence is fraud (burla), which requires that the perpetrator, with the intent of obtaining unlawful enrichment, deceitfully induces the victim into error, thereby leading them to perform acts that cause patrimonial loss to themselves or to a third party. Basic fraud is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, while aggravated fraud – namely where the loss is of significant or particularly significant value, where the offence constitutes a way of life or where the offender exploits the victim’s particular vulnerability or places them in a difficult economic situation – carries penalties of up to five years or between two and eight years’ imprisonment.
A second group of offences concerns misappropriation and abuse of position. Criminal breach of trust (abuso de confiança) covers the unlawful appropriation of movable property entrusted to the offender under a non-transfer of ownership arrangement, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, with aggravated forms depending on the value involved or the fiduciary position of the offender.
The offence of breach of fiduciary duty (infidelidade) applies to directors, agents or other fiduciaries who, in managing or disposing of another’s assets, intentionally and in serious breach of their duties cause significant patrimonial damage, and is likewise punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine. In the public sector, the offence of harmful management (administração danosa) addresses intentional mismanagement in violation of legal or rational management standards resulting in significant financial damage to public or co-operative entities, and carries penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine.
In practice, complex economic and financial crime cases tend to involve multiple overlapping offences, whether in real or apparent concurrence, with the Public Prosecutor typically structuring charges around the most serious offence, and the courts resolving issues of legal classification through doctrines of concurrence or absorption.
The core offences relating to corruption in public office are set out in the Penal Code. The offence of undue receipt or offer of an advantage operates as a “gateway” provision: a public official who, in the exercise of their functions or by reason thereof, solicits or accepts an undue advantage (whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary), or any person who offers or promises such advantage, is subject to criminal sanctions. The official faces up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine, while the offeror is punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, with only socially adequate and customary conduct excluded.
Passive corruption requires a quid pro quo: the solicitation or acceptance of an advantage in exchange for an act or omission. This includes acts contrary to the duties of office (so-called improper corruption), punishable by one to eight years’ imprisonment, and lawful but undue acts within the scope of official functions, punishable by one to five years’ imprisonment. Active corruption mirrors these scenarios for the party offering or promising the advantage, with penalties of one to five years’ imprisonment where the purpose is an unlawful act, and up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine where the act is lawful but undue; attempts are also punishable. For holders of political office, Law No 34/87 replicates these offences with generally more severe penalties.
Regarding foreign public officials and international organisations, the legal framework focuses primarily on active corruption in international business (Law No 20/2008). This offence criminalises the act of offering or promising an undue advantage to national or foreign public officials, officials of international organisations, or domestic or foreign political office holders, with the aim of obtaining or retaining business or any improper advantage in international trade, and is punishable by one to eight years’ imprisonment.
In the private sector, the same statute establishes offences of passive and active corruption: employees who solicit or accept undue advantages in breach of their professional duties face penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment or a fine, increased to one to eight years where the conduct is capable of distorting competition or causing financial harm; those who offer or promise such advantages are subject to penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine, rising to up to five years or a fine where similar aggravating effects are present.
The offence of money laundering is set out in Article 368-A of the Penal Code. It encompasses the conversion, transfer, concealment or disguise of assets (“proceeds”) obtained by oneself or by a third party, as well as their acquisition, possession or use, with knowledge of their unlawful origin. The offence is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 12 years, which may be aggravated in cases of habitual conduct or where the offender is an entity subject to the preventive regime.
“Proceeds” are deemed to include assets derived from any unlawful act typified as a criminal offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment exceeding six months or a maximum term exceeding five years, as well as from a broad catalogue of offences, including cybercrime, corruption and capital markets offences.
In parallel, Law No 83/2017 establishes an extensive preventive framework, imposing on financial institutions and a range of non-financial entities (including, under certain conditions, lawyers and other professionals) duties relating to internal control, customer identification and due diligence, reporting of suspicious transactions, abstention from and refusal to carry out transactions, record-keeping, enhanced scrutiny, co-operation with the authorities, non-disclosure (“tipping off”) and training, as well as providing for a stringent administrative sanctions regime in non-compliant cases.
Insider dealing is criminalised as the offence of “abuse of information” under the Portuguese Securities Code (Código dos Valores Mobiliários – CVM). It covers any person who, being in possession of inside information by virtue of corporate functions, professional activity or an unlawful source, uses it to trade, recommend or order transactions, or discloses it outside the normal scope of their functions. The offence is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or a fine, with a mitigated penalty framework applicable to “tippees” who do not possess those specific qualifying attributes.
The concept of inside information directly refers to Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (the Market Abuse Regulation – MAR), which establishes the common framework prohibiting insider dealing and market manipulation within the EU.
Market manipulation is separately criminalised under the CVM. The dissemination of false, incomplete, exaggerated, biased or misleading information, and the execution of fictitious transactions or other fraudulent practices capable of artificially distorting the proper functioning of the market, is punishable by imprisonment of up to five years or a fine. This penalty may be increased to up to eight years’ imprisonment where the conduct causes or contributes to such artificial distortion.
In addition, there is a specific offence of “use of false or misleading information in the raising of investment”, applicable to members of management or governing bodies of issuers or intermediaries who resolve to raise investment, place securities or obtain financing based on false or misleading economic, financial or legal information. The applicable penalty generally ranges from one to six years’ imprisonment, increasing to two to eight years when the investment or financing is effectively secured. Negligent forms of the offence are also punishable, and there is significant mitigation where full reparation of the damage is made.
Furthermore, Law No 78/2021 establishes a horizontal framework aimed at the prevention and suppression of unauthorised financial activity, as well as the unauthorised establishment or operation of markets, particularly in their dealings with consumers. It provides for the imposition of significant administrative fines and, in cases of non-compliance with certain binding orders or determinations, classifies such conduct as the offence of aggravated disobedience.
The principal criminal offences relating to tax evasion in Portugal are set out in the General Regime of Tax Offences (Regime Geral das Infrações Tributárias – RGIT). Core offences include tax fraud and aggravated tax fraud, which encompass, inter alia, the concealment or falsification of facts or values that should be reflected in accounting records or tax returns, the omission of relevant facts and the use of sham transactions aimed at avoiding the payment of tax or obtaining undue tax advantages or refunds. Simple tax fraud is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years or a fine, while significantly higher penalties apply – reaching up to eight years – where qualifying circumstances and higher amounts are involved.
Another key offence is breach of trust in respect of tax (abuso de confiança fiscal), which penalises the failure to remit to the tax authorities amounts of tax withheld or collected (such as VAT or withholding taxes) exceeding EUR 7,500, after the applicable grace periods have elapsed.
The manipulation of accounting records will often, in itself, constitute tax fraud (for example, through the concealment or alteration of facts or values that should be recorded) and may also amount to the offence of document forgery where documents, including accounting records, are created or altered with intent to harm the state or to obtain an unlawful benefit.
Cartel conduct and other competition law infringements are generally treated as administrative offences rather than criminal offences. The main framework is set out in Law No 19/2012 (the Competition Act), which prohibits anti-competitive agreements such as price-fixing, market sharing, output limitation and bid rigging, as well as abuses of a dominant position.
These infringements are investigated and sanctioned by the Portuguese Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência), which may impose fines of up to 10% of the undertaking’s annual turnover. Individuals, including directors and managers, may also be fined and may face additional sanctions, such as disqualification from management roles.
Although cartel conduct is not in itself a criminal offence, the same facts may give rise to criminal liability where they overlap with offences under the Penal Code, such as corruption, fraud or falsification of accounts.
Criminal offences relating to counterfeiting and infringement of intellectual property rights are expressly provided for in the Industrial Property Code. These include the crimes of trade mark counterfeiting, imitation or unlawful use of a registered trade mark, as well as the manufacture, distribution or commercialisation of counterfeit goods (Articles 318 to 329 of the Industrial Property Code).
These offences are punishable by imprisonment (generally up to three years) or a fine, depending on the circumstances, and penalties may be aggravated where the conduct is carried out on a commercial scale or within an organised structure. Courts may also order the seizure and destruction of infringing goods.
In addition, the same conduct may, in certain cases, also constitute general criminal offences under the Penal Code, such as fraud, and may give rise to civil liability, including damages and injunctive relief.
Portuguese law recognises environmental pollution as both a criminal and administrative offence. The Penal Code expressly provides for several environmental crimes, including Article 278 (damage to nature), Article 279 (pollution) and Article 279-A (dangerous activities to the environment), such as the unlawful handling of hazardous substances or waste. These offences may be punishable by imprisonment and fines, with more severe penalties in aggravated cases, and legal persons may also be held criminally liable.
In parallel, a wide range of environmental infringements are treated as administrative offences, including breaches of environmental licences, emissions limits and waste management rules, as provided for in the Framework Law on Environmental Administrative Offences (Law No 50/2006).
In addition, the Legal Framework on Liability for Environmental Damage (established by Decree-Law No 147/2008, which transposes Directive 2004/35/EC) provides for both civil and administrative liability, under which the polluter is required to compensate individuals affected by environmental damage, and to bear the costs of preventing and remedying such damage, as a collective good.
Although greenwashing is not provided for under Portuguese law, and therefore is not defined as a specific criminal offence, misleading environmental claims fit within the unfair commercial practices’ regime, consumer protection laws (both provided for by Decree-Law No 57/2008) and advertising law (Decree-Law No 330/90), leading to administrative offences subject to fines and orders to cease or prohibit the practice. In addition, companies may also be held liable for unfair competition among themselves for including false descriptions or indications regarding the nature, quality or utility of the products or services marketed, pursuant to the Industrial Property Code.
Financial crime prosecutions are governed by the general procedural framework applicable to all criminal offences. Investigations are conducted under the direction of the Public Prosecution Service, which retains exclusive authority over the investigative phase and is responsible for determining whether charges should be brought.
In practice, proceedings relating to financial crime are often triggered by reports or referrals from supervisory authorities, particularly the Bank of Portugal, the Portuguese Securities Market Commission, and the Portuguese Tax and Customs Authority. These entities are vested with powers to detect irregularities within the banking, financial and tax sectors, and may conduct their own administrative investigations, including the imposition of sanctions for regulatory infringements. Where the underlying conduct may constitute a criminal offence – such as fraud, tax evasion, market manipulation or insider dealing – such matters are referred to the Public Prosecution Service.
The initiation of criminal proceedings is not contingent upon the arrest of a suspect. Individuals may be formally designated as defendants (arguidos) and summoned to participate in the proceedings without prior detention.
The decision to bring charges is governed by the principle of legality, pursuant to which the Public Prosecution Service is required to prosecute whenever sufficient evidence has been obtained.
Financial crime proceedings in Portugal tend to be more protracted than other types of criminal cases, largely owing to their inherent complexity. This complexity typically arises from the significant volume of documentary evidence involved, the frequent need for expert analysis and, in many instances, the existence of cross-border elements requiring cooperation with foreign authorities.
As a rule, pre-trial detention is regarded as a measure of last resort (pursuant to Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In practice, the default measure applied is the identity and residence form (termo de identidade e residência), which essentially entails the formal identification of the defendant and the indication of their residence, together with an obligation to remain available to the authorities.
Notwithstanding this, additional coercive measures are often imposed depending on the circumstances of the case, such as periodic reporting obligations before the police, restrictions on travel (including a prohibition on leaving the country) or the provision of bail.
Where pre-trial detention is ordered, it is subject to strict statutory time limits. These limits vary according to both the stage of the proceedings and the seriousness of the offence, and any exceedance thereof results in the mandatory release of the defendant.
Public funding is available through the legal aid system (apoio judiciário), which is governed by Law No 34/2004 of 29 July. This regime is available to individuals who do not have sufficient financial means, with eligibility determined primarily on the basis of a means test assessing income and assets.
In criminal proceedings, the right to defence is strongly protected, and legal aid may include the appointment of a lawyer and exemption from or reduction of court fees. Depending on the applicant’s financial situation, a contribution may be required, including payment in instalments.
Portugal does not have fully specialised courts dedicated exclusively to financial crime. The competent court is determined by law, mainly based on the location and seriousness of the offence, and defendants do not have the right to choose the venue.
Trial by jury in criminal proceedings in Portugal is exceptional and, in practice, very rare. It is not automatic and depends on a formal request by the defendant, the assistant (victim) or the Public Prosecutor, which must be submitted within the procedural deadline following the investigation stage. Only where such a request is duly made will the case be heard by a mixed panel composed of three professional judges and four jurors, together with substitute jurors.
Jurors are selected at random from lists of citizens. This is followed by a specific jury selection hearing, during which the selected individuals are assessed to confirm their eligibility and impartiality, and may be challenged or excused in accordance with the applicable legal provisions.
Once constituted, the jury participates in the trial alongside the professional judges, contributing to the determination of both factual and legal issues. Notwithstanding this, the presiding judge retains a central role, particularly in directing the proceedings and ensuring compliance with procedural rules.
There are currently no significant reforms specifically addressing the use of jury trials in financial crime cases.
Portuguese law allows for the concurrent prosecution of companies and individuals in relation to the same underlying conduct. However, corporate criminal liability is not general: a legal person may only be held criminally liable for the offences expressly provided for in Article 11 of the Penal Code.
Under this provision, companies may be held liable only in relation to a closed list of offences, and provided that such offences are committed in their name and in their interest by individuals in a leading position (such as directors or managers), or by persons acting under their authority where there has been a failure of supervision or control.
Accordingly, even where individual criminal liability is established, a company will only be prosecuted if the relevant offence falls within the scope of Article 11 and the applicable attribution criteria are satisfied.
Within corporate groups, liability does not automatically extend to parent companies. Rather, it must be established on the basis of their own conduct, namely where they have exercised effective control, acted through their representatives or derived a benefit from the unlawful conduct in a manner that fulfils the requirements set out in Article 11. Therefore, a parent company may be criminally liable if the relevant conduct is carried out in the name of or on behalf of the parent and in its interest, regardless of its subsequent merger (in which case the entity resulting from or continuing in the merger is liable for the crimes previously attributable to the merged entity) or demerger (in which the predecessor entity remains liable for the crimes committed).
Companies are, in certain circumstances, required to implement compliance programmes. In particular, entities subject to AML/CTF obligations under Law No 83/2017 must establish an internal control system and risk management procedures, appoint a compliance officer, implement internal reporting channels and provide appropriate training, among other measures.
Additionally, legal persons, whether public or private, with 50 or more employees, as well as certain public or independent bodies, are required to adopt a comprehensive AML policy, including a code of conduct, training mechanisms, whistle-blowing channels and the designation of a compliance officer.
Although there is a strong expectation that smaller private companies falling outside these regimes will adopt compliance programmes, there is generally no formal legal duty for them to do so. Nevertheless, such programmes are recommended in light of reputational, contractual and banking or supervisory relationship risks.
From the perspective of criminal and administrative liability, a compliance programme does not, as a rule, operate as a “shield” excluding the liability of the legal person. However, it is expressly recognised as a factor that may justify the special mitigation of penalties applicable to legal persons, pursuant to Article 90-A(4) of the Penal Code. On the other hand, the absence or inadequacy of such a programme may justify the imposition of more severe ancillary penalties and higher fines.
The distinction between a criminal offence and a mere economic or financial administrative offence is generally drawn by reference to the amounts involved and to the specific intent of the perpetrator. Defences in financial crime cases may rely on the absence of the legally required minimum threshold – for example, amounts below EUR7,500 in cases of tax breach of trust (according to Article 105 of the Legal Framework for Tax Offences) – or on the lack of specific constituent elements of the offence, including the effective receipt of the tax or the presence of specific intent. In this context, it may further be argued that the conduct in question does not amount to a criminal offence but rather constitutes a mere economic or tax administrative offence.
As to fault and intent, the defence may invoke a relevant mistake either as to the factual circumstances or as to the unlawfulness of the conduct. It may also argue the absence of intent, bearing in mind that many financial crimes do not provide for a negligent form of commission.
With regard to objective conditions of criminal liability and regularisation, reliance may be placed on the fulfilment of payment obligations within the statutory time limits following notification, pursuant to Article 105 of the Legal Framework for Tax Offences, as well as on other regularisation mechanisms provided for under the applicable special regimes.
Finally, with respect to material atypicality or insignificance, this may be invoked as a negative element of the offence. However, its likelihood of success is generally lower in the context of tax and financial crimes, given the enhanced protection afforded to the legal interest at stake and the existence of statutory thresholds.
Both general and sector-specific frameworks establish the existence of mandatory internal and external whistle-blowing channels, which must ensure confidentiality and anonymity. These regimes also provide for a strict prohibition of retaliation against whistle-blowers, accompanied by significant administrative sanctions in the event of breach.
Furthermore, in many legal frameworks, namely under Law No 93/2021, the Securities Code and AML legislation, whistle-blowers benefit from immunity or exemption from liability where reports are made in good faith. In certain contexts, particularly under the Securities Code, there is also a presumption that any detrimental measures adopted following a report constitute retaliation.
As regards incentives, these are essentially of a negative or protective nature, consisting primarily of the prohibition of retaliation, immunity from liability and procedural support mechanisms. Although EU law allows member states to establish incentive schemes for internal whistle-blowers in areas such as auditing, there does not appear to be, under Portuguese law, a generalised regime providing for financial rewards or bonuses.
Finally, anonymous reporting is expressly permitted. Mechanisms for anonymous reporting exist both internally within organisations – under Law No 93/2021, AML frameworks and regulatory notices issued by Bank of Portugal – and externally, through competent authorities such as the Portuguese Securities Market Commission, Bank of Portugal and other sectoral regulators, in accordance with the applicable legal regimes.
In Portugal, the scope for procedural flexibility in economic and financial crime is structured within a legal framework that balances the principle of legality with mechanisms of procedural consensus and efficiency.
As regards the decision between discontinuance and indictment, the Public Prosecutor is under a duty to bring charges where sufficient evidence exists. Conversely, proceedings may be discontinued where such evidence is lacking, where the offence has been extinguished – such as by limitation or tax regularisation – or where the legal requirements for a waiver of penalty are met, subject to judicial approval.
A central instrument of consensual resolution is the provisional suspension of proceedings (suspensão provisória do processo), whereby the Public Prosecutor proposes the suspension subject to the defendant’s acceptance of certain obligations – such as payments or regularisation measures – with the agreement of both the injured party and the judge. Upon full compliance with such obligations, the proceedings are ultimately discontinued. However, recourse to this mechanism is only permissible at the early stages of criminal proceedings and only in respect of offences punishable with no more than five years’ imprisonment.
In tax and social security offences, the applicable legal framework provides for objective conditions of criminal liability and opportunities for regularisation such as payment following notification, which may prevent prosecution or lead to the extinction of criminal liability, in addition to allowing for waiver or special mitigation of penalties. In offences such as corruption, embezzlement and money laundering, provisions of a “reward-based” nature exist, whereby decisive co-operation with the authorities and the restitution of illicit advantages may result in a waiver of penalty or significant mitigation.
Overall, the Public Prosecutor enjoys a considerable margin of discretion within the bounds of the law, including the choice between bringing charges, proposing provisional suspension, discontinuing proceedings with a waiver of penalty or resorting to simplified procedural forms. The judge, in turn, exercises control over legality and the fulfilment of the relevant requirements, including the validation of provisional suspensions, discontinuances based on waiver of penalty, summary penalty agreements and the determination of the appropriate sentence.
Although there is no broad system of plea bargaining, the combination of mechanisms, such as regularisation, co-operation, provisional suspension and waiver or mitigation of penalties, effectively enables negotiated solutions and significant reductions in sanctions within the Portuguese legal system.
The Portuguese sentencing system for economic crimes distinguishes between individuals and legal entities, combining principal penalties with ancillary measures and confiscation regimes. For individuals, penalties are primarily based on imprisonment and daily fines adjusted to their financial circumstances. Legal entities are criminally liable for acts committed in their interest and may face substantial fines, prohibition of activities, exclusion from public subsidies or procurement, and, in extreme cases, judicial dissolution.
This framework is supplemented by a rigorous asset forfeiture regime covering the instruments and proceeds of crime. It further allows for extended confiscation where an unjustified discrepancy exists between an offender’s assets and declared income. In determining sanctions, courts weigh the financial scale and complexity of the offence; however, significant mitigation – or even the waiver of penalties – is possible through decisive co-operation with authorities or the implementation of effective compliance programmes.
In Portuguese law, there are judicial mechanisms, both during proceedings and after conviction, aimed at depriving offenders of the proceeds and economic advantages derived from criminal activity.
The relevant legal framework includes:
Under the general regime, confiscation is based on the existence of an unlawful act and does not necessarily depend on a criminal conviction of a specific individual. It may cover instruments used in the offence, proceeds directly obtained from it and any economic advantages arising from it, including indirect benefits. Although third-party property is generally protected, this does not apply where the third party acted in bad faith or was otherwise involved in or benefited from the offence. Where recovery in kind is not possible, confiscation is replaced by an obligation to pay an equivalent monetary value.
From a procedural standpoint, assets may be seized or frozen at an early stage in order to secure confiscation or compensation. Third parties are entitled to challenge such measures and benefit from procedural safeguards.
After conviction, enforcement may take the form of forfeiture of seized assets or the payment of a corresponding sum. Victims may seek compensation either within the criminal process or, in certain cases, through separate civil actions. Precautionary civil measures, such as asset freezing, may also be employed.
The victim (injured party) may lodge a civil claim for damages within the criminal proceedings themselves, in accordance with the principle of joinder, as set out in Articles 71 et seq of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This constitutes the fundamental basis: the court determines the amount of compensation, which may subsequently be enforced against any assets of the convicted person, including those that have been recovered.
The Penal Code expressly provides that assets and sums forfeited to the state may be allocated towards compensating the victim. Specific legislation may establish that the state ensures compensation where the offender is unable to pay. Outside such cases, the court may award the injured party the seized objects or the proceeds from their sale, as well as the price or equivalent value of advantages derived from the offence that have been paid to or transferred in favour of the state under Articles 109 to 111 of the Penal Code.
The restitution of assets to the rightful owner must take place as soon as the seizure is no longer necessary, and, in any event, after the judgment becomes final, unless the assets are declared forfeited in favour of the state, in accordance with Article 186 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Confiscation or forfeiture does not prejudice the rights of the injured party, and assets belonging to bona fide third parties are, as a rule, not subject to forfeiture, under Articles 110 and 111 of the Penal Code. Furthermore, transformed or reinvested assets, as well as any associated gains, may also be subject to forfeiture. However, such assets may be allocated towards compensating the victim, in accordance with Articles 110 and 129 of the Penal Code.
Portugal’s current enforcement priorities for economic crime focus on a dual-track strategy that balances rigorous prevention with specialised repression. Central to this approach is the fight against corruption and money laundering, guided by the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and focused on strengthening transparency across both public and private sectors. This is complemented by a strict protection of state and EU financial interests, specifically targeting subsidy fraud, serious tax evasion and complex VAT schemes involving the informal economy or offshore jurisdictions.
Additionally, the framework monitors social security fraud and enforces mandatory compliance programmes, requiring entities to implement robust risk prevention plans and internal controls. These efforts are underpinned by enhanced institutional co-operation and the use of specialised financial forensics and cross-referenced databases. Ultimately, the system prioritises the detection of complex schemes and the effective recovery of assets through specialised investigation and extended confiscation.
The Portuguese legal framework on white-collar crime has undergone significant development through legislative reform, criminal policy, case law and alignment with European standards. The full implementation of the National Anti-Corruption Mechanism (Mecanismo Nacional Anticorrupção – MENAC), alongside the enforcement of the General Framework for the Prevention of Corruption (Regime Geral de Prevenção da Corrupção – RGPC), marks a significant advancement towards a more co-ordinated and preventive anti-corruption framework.
Under the RGPC, public and private entities employing 50 or more individuals are required to adopt robust compliance systems, including risk prevention plans, codes of conduct, training initiatives, whistle-blowing mechanisms and designated compliance officers. MENAC plays a central role in supervising adherence to these obligations, auditing internal procedures and issuing guidance to ensure that preventive measures are effectively embedded in organisational practice.
In parallel, Law No 26/2025 of 19 March introduces reforms in a distinct yet complementary domain.
Building on these developments, the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2025–30 seeks to further entrench a culture of transparency and accountability. Its focus on prevention, monitoring of compliance and public awareness aims to integrate principles of integrity across both the public and private sectors. By combining institutional strengthening with the legal protections introduced by Law No 26/2025, Portugal is promoting an environment in which misconduct can be detected at an early stage, investigated effectively and consistently discouraged.
Taken together, the RGPC, MENAC and Law No 26/2025 reflect a dual-track approach: on the one hand, preventive measures and compliance oversight directly address corruption risks; and on the other hand, enhanced legal protections for public servants contribute to the resilience and stability of public institutions. If fully and effectively implemented, this framework is likely to strengthen public confidence, reinforce institutional integrity, and support a more transparent and accountable society.
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