Commercial companies in Senegal are governed by the Uniform Act on Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups (Acte Uniforme révisé relatif au droit des Sociétés Commerciales et du Groupement d’Intérêt Économique or AUSCGIE), published on 30 January 2014. The most commonly used commercial forms are, in order:
SARL
The SARL is the simplest type of commercial company, in which shareholders’ liability is limited to their contributions. A SARL may be established by one natural or legal person or between two or more natural or legal persons. A SARL does not require any minimum share capital for its creation and its capital is divided into shares.
The SARL is often characterised by a fairly strong intuitu personae, which is why transfers of shares are often governed by specific authorisation rules given by the non-transferring shareholder. The SARL is managed by one or more natural persons, associated or not.
In addition, a SARL is not required to appoint an auditor unless it meets two of the following conditions at the end of the financial year:
The shareholders of the SARL meet in a general meeting, either ordinary (each year to approve the accounts of the closed financial year) or extraordinary (for any modification of the articles of association).
The SARL is a suitable corporate structure for greenfield projects, commercial activities and services. It is also suitable for young entrepreneurs with few resources, due to its low formation cost.
SA
The SA under the AUSCGIE may be held by a single shareholder. In terms of management and administration, the founder(s) must choose unequivocally in the articles of association between:
The minimum share capital of an SA is XOF10 million. It must be fully subscribed by the shareholders and at least one quarter of the total share capital must be paid up at the time of incorporation.
The founders of an SA must appoint a statutory auditor and an alternative auditor, chosen from among experts who are members of the National Institute of Chartered Accountants of Senegal (Ordre National des Experts Comptables et Comptables Agréés du Sénégal or ONECCA).
SA with a board of directors
The board of directors is composed of a minimum of three persons and a maximum of 12 members, shareholders or not. The articles of association may require each director to own a number of shares of the company over which they preside. It is possible to appoint corporate directors, who appoint a permanent representative to the board.
The board appoints the chairperson of the board of directors from among the natural persons who are members of the board and also appoints the CEO of the company, who may be one-third of the board. It may also be decided to appoint a chairperson and CEO who will combine both roles.
The board of directors determines the company’s strategic objectives and ensures their implementation. It controls and verifies the proper functioning of the company and settles matters regarding the company through its deliberations. The chair of the board of directors presides over board meetings and general meetings. The chairperson must ensure that the board assumes control of the company’s management, which is entrusted to the CEO under the board’s oversight.
The CEO is responsible for the general management of the company and represents the company in its relations with third parties. At the suggestion of the CEO or the chairperson/CEO, the board of directors may appoint one or more individuals to assist the CEO or the chairperson/CEO as deputy CEO.
The SA with a managing director (administrateur général)
The managing director assumes responsibility for the administration and general management of the company. They represent it in its relations with third parties and convene and chair the general meetings of shareholders. The managing director is vested with the broadest powers to act in all circumstances on behalf of the company, but must exercise these powers within the limits of the corporate purpose and subject to those powers expressly attributed to shareholders’ meetings by the AUSCGIE and, where applicable, by the articles of association.
At the suggestion of the managing director, the general meeting may mandate one or more deputy managing directors to assist the director and determine any other powers to be delegated to them.
The SA is a suitable form of company for establishing joint ventures, for companies making significant investments and for companies engaged in regulated banking or financial activities.
SAS
Introduced in the AUSCGIE in 2014, the SAS is a company set up by one or more shareholders where the articles of association determine the organisation and operation of the company, subject to certain mandatory rules (eg, competence of the shareholders’ general meeting to approve the accounts or amend the articles of association).
The liability of the shareholders is limited to their contributions and no minimum share capital is required to create an SAS. When created by a single shareholder, it is called a single-person simplified joint stock company (société par actions simplifiée unipersonnelle or SASU).
The company is represented by a chairperson appointed in accordance with the conditions set out in the articles of association. The chairperson is vested with the broadest powers to act on behalf of the company within the limits of the corporate purpose.
The articles of association freely determine the decisions that must be taken collectively by the shareholders and stipulate the conditions and forms in which the shareholders must take these decisions. Decisions taken in violation of the statutory clauses are null and void.
The appointment of one or more auditors is optional unless the SAS meets two of the following conditions at the end of the financial year:
An SAS that controls or is controlled by one or more companies is also required to appoint at least one auditor.
This form of commercial company is appropriate for companies with diverse shareholder profiles, particularly when investors, project leaders, equity companies and companies operating in services and new technologies are among the company’s shareholders.
As Senegal is a member state of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires or OHADA), company law in Senegal is subject to OHADA law – more specifically, to the AUSCGIE. The articles of association and the shareholders’ agreement are also sources of corporate governance.
Companies making a public offering of their shares in one or more OHADA contracting states or whose shares are listed on the stock exchange of one or more OHADA contracting states are required to have a board of directors. The boards of directors of the companies must comprise at least three and at most 15 members at the time a company’s shares are admitted to the stock exchange.
However, in the event of a merger involving one or more companies whose shares are admitted to the stock exchange of one or more “party states”, the number of members may exceed 15 (up to the total number of directors who have been in office for more than six months in the merged companies) but may not exceed 20. When the shares of the company are admitted to the stock exchange of one or more of the state parties, no new directors may be appointed, nor may directors who have died or ceased to hold office be replaced, until the number of directors has been reduced to 15. If a company admitted to the stock exchange of one or more party states is delisted from that stock exchange, the number of directors must be reduced to 12 as soon as possible.
Within the various limits set out here, the number of directors is freely determined in the articles of association.
The company’s board of directors is required to have an audit committee (comité d’audit). The audit committee is composed exclusively of directors who are not employees of the company or who do not hold a position as chairperson/CEO, CEO or deputy CEO within the company. The board of directors ensures the competence of the directors it appoints to the audit committee.
The main tasks of the audit committee are to:
Senegalese-listed companies are admitted to trading on the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières (BRVM), the regional stock exchange of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), based in Abidjan. The BRVM is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers de l’Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (AMF-UMOA), formerly known as the Conseil Régional de l’Épargne Publique et des Marchés Financiers (CREPMF). Listed issuers are also subject to the corporate governance rules set out in the OHADA Uniform Act on Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups (AUSCGIE), as detailed in 1.3 Companies With Publicly Traded Shares.
There have been no major changes to BRVM listing requirements over the past year that materially modify the corporate governance framework applicable to listed companies. The existing rules continue to require, among other things, the adoption of a board structure (with a minimum of three and a maximum of fifteen directors at the time of admission), the appointment of one or more statutory auditors, the publication of audited annual and half-yearly financial statements and ongoing disclosure of material information likely to affect the share price. Listed companies must also comply with the AMF-UMOA’s general regulation and instructions, which set out detailed obligations on prospectus content, periodic and ongoing disclosure and the prevention of market abuse.
In general, in Senegal, in commercial companies:
SARL Management
A SARL is managed by one or more managers (gérants), who must be natural persons. Managers may or may not be shareholders of the company. The managers are appointed by the shareholders in the articles of association or by a decision of the shareholders’ general meeting. In the absence of specific provisions in the articles of association, the manager(s) are appointed for four years and are re-electable. There are no nationality or residence requirements for managers.
SA Management
The articles of association must specify under which of the following management structures the SA will be managed:
In both scenarios, directors may or may not be shareholders of the company, unless otherwise provided in the articles of association. The board must have at least three and no more than 12 directors.
Companies having fewer than three shareholders may choose not to form a board of directors and instead appoint a general manager (administrateur général, who may or may not be a shareholder of the company) who will be responsible for the administration and direction of the company.
SAS Management
An SAS is represented towards third parties by a president, who may be a natural or legal person and who may or may not be a shareholder of the company. The articles of association may provide for the conditions under which one or more individuals other than the president, with the title of general manager or deputy general manager, may exercise the powers entrusted to them by the articles of association. Restrictions on the powers of the president, general manager or deputy general manager, as detailed in the articles of association and the decisions of legal representatives, are not enforceable against third parties.
It is also possible for an SAS to set up a board of directors.
SARL Decision-Making
In relation to the shareholders and in the absence of a determination of the manager’s powers in the articles of association, the manager may carry out all acts of management in the company’s interest. Where there is more than one manager, they shall hold separately the powers provided for in the articles of association, except for the right of each of them to object to any transaction before it is concluded. Opposition by one manager to the acts of another manager is without effect with regard to third parties, unless it is established that the third parties have knowledge of it.
SA Decision-Making
SA with a board of directors
The board of directors determines the SA’s strategic objectives and ensures their implementation. Within the limits of the company’s purpose and subject to any decision-making powers expressly delegated to the shareholders’ meetings, the board of directors deals with any issue concerning the proper operation of the company and, through the board members’ deliberations, settles matters that concern the SA.
The board of directors carries out any such controls and verifications as it deems appropriate. The board of directors may entrust one or more of its members with special mandates for specific purposes.
The chairperson of the board of directors chairs the board of directors’ meetings and general meetings. The chairperson must ensure that the board of directors assumes control of the company’s management, which is entrusted to the general manager. At any time, the chairperson of the board of directors may carry out the verifications the chairperson deems appropriate and may obtain from the general manager, who is obliged to comply, all the documents the chairperson deems useful for that purpose.
The general manager is responsible for the company’s overall management. They represent the company in its relations with third parties.
SA with a managing director
The managing director is responsible for the administration and general management of the company. They represent the company in its relations with third parties and convene and chair the shareholders’ meetings. The managing director is vested with the broadest powers to act in all circumstances in the name of the company, but must exercise them within the limits of the corporate purpose and subject to those powers expressly conferred on shareholders’ meetings by the AUSCGIE and, where applicable, by the articles of association.
Meetings in the SA
Extraordinary general meeting
The extraordinary general meeting is the only body empowered to modify the statutes in all their provisions. The extraordinary general meeting is also competent to:
Special meeting
The special meeting brings together the holders of shares of a given category. The special meeting approves or disapproves of the decisions of the general meetings when these decisions modify the rights of its members.
Ordinary general meeting
The ordinary general meeting takes all decisions other than those expressly reserved for extraordinary general meetings and those reserved for special meetings (see 4.2 Role of Shareholders).
SAS Decision-Making
The SAS is a company set up by one or more shareholders and whose articles of association freely provide for the organisation and operation of the company. The company is represented with regard to third parties by a president appointed in accordance with the conditions provided for in the articles of association. The president is vested with the broadest powers to act in all circumstances on behalf of the company, within the limits of the corporate purpose. The articles of association may provide for the conditions under which one or more persons other than the president, bearing the title of chief executive officer or deputy chief executive officer, may exercise the powers conferred on the latter by the articles of association.
The articles of association determine which decisions must be taken collectively by the shareholders and stipulate the forms and conditions under which those decisions must be made. However, the powers vested in the extraordinary and ordinary general meetings of joint stock companies are, under the conditions stipulated by the articles of association, exercised collectively by the shareholders in matters of:
Decisions are taken by general meetings, which may be ordinary or extraordinary and which decide according to the majority and quorum rules set out in the AUSCGIE or, in the case of the SAS, in the articles of association. These rules differ according to the corporate form (see 4.3 Shareholder Meetings for the majority and the type of decision). The general meetings are convened by the corporate representatives in accordance with a formal procedure prescribed by the AUSCGIE.
The shareholders are convened at least 15 days before the meeting by hand-delivered letter against a receipt or by registered letter with a request for acknowledgement of receipt or by fax or email. The notice of meeting indicates the date, place and agenda of the meeting. The meeting cannot deliberate on a question that is not registered on its agenda.
These decisions of the shareholders must be recorded in the minutes, which indicate the date and the place of the meeting, the names and first names of the shareholders present, the agenda, the documents and reports submitted for discussion, a summary of the debates, the text of the resolutions put to the vote and the results of the votes.
An SA may be managed by a board of directors consisting of at least three and not more than 12 members, who may or may not be shareholders. The articles of association may require that each director own a number of shares in the company for which they make determinations. This provision shall not apply in the case of employees appointed as directors. Every director must hold the number of shares required by the articles of association:
In the case of an infringement, the director must resign from their office within three months of their appointment or, if the infringement occurs during their term of office, within three months of the date of the transfer of shares giving rise to the infringement. At the end of this period, the director shall be deemed to have resigned from their mandate and must return the remuneration received (in whatever form) without the validity of the deliberations in which they took part being called into question.
The auditors exercise a supervisory role and must disclose any violations in their report to the annual general meeting. The first directors are appointed by the articles of association or, where appropriate, by the constituent general meeting.
During the company’s life, the directors shall be appointed by the ordinary general meeting. However, in the event of a merger, the extraordinary general meeting may appoint new directors.
Any appointment made in violation of the provisions of the articles of association is null and void. The term of office of the directors is freely determined by the articles of association, but may not exceed six years in the case of appointment during the life of the company and two years in the case of appointment by the articles of association or by the constituent general meeting.
The board of directors determines the company’s strategic objectives and ensures their implementation. The board of directors has a chairperson and may entrust one or more of its members with special mandates for one or more specific purposes.
The choice of directors is freely determined by the shareholders. There is no longer a quota rule requiring a balance between shareholder and non-shareholder directors, as was the case under the pre-2014 AUSCGIE. However, the articles of association may require that each director own a number of shares of the company for which they make decisions. In practice, the composition of the board of directors often mirrors the composition of the company’s shareholding.
The directors or officers are appointed by the articles of association at the time of the company’s incorporation or by the general meeting during the company’s life. The terms of appointment, re-election, replacement and dismissal are freely determined by the articles of association. The directors may be re-elected unless the articles of association state otherwise. In an SA, the terms of office of the president and the managing director are aligned with those of the directors. The termination of directors’ functions must be published in the commercial register.
Two mechanisms are provided by the AUSCGIE to prevent conflicts of interest between the company and its directors.
The Rules of Non-Cumulation of the Roles of Legal Representatives (in an SA)
For directors (in an SA with a board of directors)
Subject to certain reservations, a natural person – either directly or as a permanent representative of a legal entity director ‒ may not simultaneously belong to more than five boards of directors of SA companies that have their registered office in the territory of the same state party. Any natural person who, upon taking up a new term of office, finds themselves in breach of this rule must resign from one of their terms of office within three months of their appointment.
For the president and managing director
No person may simultaneously hold more than three offices as president and managing director of an SA that has its registered office in the territory of the same party state.
Likewise, the role of president and managing director may not be held concurrently with more than two roles as general director or general manager of an SA that has its registered office in the territory of the same contracting state. Any natural person who, upon taking up a new term of office, finds themselves in breach of this rule must resign from one of their terms of office within three months of their appointment.
For the general director
No person may simultaneously hold more than three offices as a general director of corporations that have their headquarters in the territory of the same state party. Similarly, the office of general director may not be held concurrently with more than two offices of president and general manager or general manager of an SA which has its registered office in the territory of the same contracting state. A director who, upon taking up a new term of office, is in violation of this rule must, within three months of their appointment, resign from one of their offices.
Procedure for Regulated Agreements (in an SARL, an SA and an SAS)
According to Article 438 of the AUSCGIE, the following agreements must be subject to prior authorisation by the board of directors of an SA:
Similar provisions apply to the SARL and the SA; regulated agreements must be approved by the ordinary general meeting (Articles 350 and 853-14 of the AUSCGIE).
There are no specific provisions in the law regarding the principal legal duties of a company’s directors and officers. However, Article 480, Section 2 of the AUSCGIE provides that the chairperson must ensure that the board of directors assumes control of the company’s management, which is entrusted to the general manager. Thus, the chairperson and the board of directors each have a role.
SARL Managers
The managers will be liable – individually or jointly and severally – as the case may be, to the company or to third parties, either:
If several managers have co-operated in the same acts, the competent court determines the contributory share of each of them in the remedy of the damage (Article 330 of the AUSCGIE).
SA Directors
The directors will be individually or jointly and severally liable to the company or to third parties, either for infringements of the legal or regulatory provisions applicable to an SA or for violations of the provisions of the articles of association or for faults committed under their management.
Where several directors have co-operated in the same acts, the competent court will determine the contributory share of each of them in the remedy of the damage (Article 740 of the AUSCGIE).
In an SAS
The rules governing the liability of the members of the board of directors of an SA apply to the chairperson and officers of an SAS (Article 853-10 of the AUSCGIE).
Liability Actions
Two types of actions are provided by the AUSCGIE.
Individual action
Pursuant to Articles 161 et seq of the AUSCGIE, third parties or shareholders may take individual action to hold a corporate officer liable for misconduct in the performance of their duties, without prejudice to the company’s potential liability. If several corporate officers have participated in the same acts, they are jointly and severally liable to third parties.
This individual action is an action for damages suffered by a third party or a shareholder, where the latter suffers a loss distinct from the loss suffered by the company, resulting from a fault committed individually or collectively by the corporate officers or directors in the exercise of their duties.
This action is brought by the person who suffers the damage.
Corporate action (action sociale) – Articles 165 et seq of the AUSCGIE
A corporate action is an action for compensation for the damage suffered by the company as a result of a fault committed by corporate officer(s) in the performance of their duties. The corporate action filed against one or several corporate officers can be initiated either by the company itself (through other officers who are not involved) or by one or several shareholders in the event of failure by the competent bodies. The corporate action is reserved only for shareholders who hold shares on the day it is implemented and who retain their status as shareholders throughout the duration of the procedure.
In the case of a SARL, Article 331 of the AUSCGIE provides that several shareholders may claim compensation for damage suffered by the company only if they represent one quarter of the shareholders and one quarter of the company’s shares. These two conditions are cumulative. However, in the case of an SA, shareholders can exercise the corporate action only if they represent at least one-twentieth of the share capital (Article 741 of the AUSCGIE).
Individual and corporate actions can be triggered and acted upon concurrently.
Grounds for Liability
A breach of directors’ duties would give rise to their liability. Similar provisions govern the rules pertaining to the liability of corporate officers and directors in the different types of companies that have been described: SARL, SA and SAS. A distinction must be made between civil and criminal liability.
Civil liability of the manager of a SARL and the directors of an SA
The liabilities are similar for the manager of a SARL and the directors of an SA. They are liable – individually or jointly and severally, as the case may be – to the company or to third parties, either for breaches of the laws or regulations applicable to companies or for breaches of the articles of association or for misconduct in their management. If several managers or directors have co-operated in the same acts, the competent court will determine the contribution of each of them to the compensation for the damage.
In addition to the action for compensation for the damage suffered personally, the shareholders representing one quarter of the shareholders and one quarter of the shares may (either individually or in a group) proceed with a social action for liability against the manager or director(s). No clause in the articles of association may make the exercise of the corporate action subject to the prior notice or authorisation of the meeting or entail a waiver in advance of the exercise of this action.
No decision of the meeting may have the effect of extinguishing an action for liability against the managers for misconduct committed in the performance of their duties. Any decision to the contrary is null and void.
Civil liability of the CEO of an SA
The same rules of individual and social responsibility apply to the CEO.
Civil liability of the directors of an SA
Directors are individually or jointly and severally liable to the company or to third parties, either for breaches of the laws or regulations applicable to an SA or for breaches of the provisions of the articles of association or for misconduct in their management.
Civil liability of the president/chairperson of an SAS
The same rules of individual and social responsibility as those mentioned for the manager and the CEO apply to the president.
Criminal liability
The AUSCGIE contains criminal provisions in the event of offences committed by corporate officers:
Law No 2018-13 of 27 April 2018 sets out the penalties for the offences referred to in the AUSCGIE.
Other bases for claims or enforcement against directors or officers for breaches of corporate governance requirements that exist in Senegal are as follows.
Management Expertise
Pursuant to Article 159 of the AUSCGIE, one or more shareholders representing at least one tenth of the share capital may ‒ either individually or by grouping together in any form whatsoever – request the competent court of the registered office, ruling within a short period of time, to appoint one or more experts to present a report on one or more management operations.
Provisional Administration
When the normal functioning of the company is made impossible, either because of the management, executive or administrative bodies or because of the shareholders, the competent court, ruling within a short period of time, may decide to appoint a provisional administrator for the purpose of temporarily managing the company’s affairs (Article 160-1 of the AUSCGIE).
Given that, according to the general law of civil liability, the potential liability of directors is likely to be implemented as soon as it can be established that they have committed errors in the performance of their duties and that these errors have had harmful consequences for the company, the shareholders or third parties, the liability of a director or officer can only be limited by proving that the damage results either from a force majeure or from a fault of the victim or of a third party.
Article 325 of the AUSCGIE
In a SARL, a manager's duties may be performed either free of charge or with remuneration, under the conditions set out in the articles of association or in a collective decision by the shareholders. The manager, when a shareholder, does not take part in the vote on deliberations relating to their remuneration, and their votes shall not be taken into account in calculating the majority. Any deliberation taken in violation of Article 325 of the AUSCGIE is void. The determination of the remuneration is not subject to the regime of related-party agreements.
In an SA, the ordinary general meeting may allocate to the directors, as remuneration for their activities, a fixed annual sum that it determines at its own discretion (commonly called “jetons de présence” in French).
Unless otherwise provided for in the articles of association, the board of directors is free to allocate the compensation among its members. The board of directors may also allocate exceptional remuneration to its members for the missions and mandates entrusted to them or authorise the reimbursement of travel expenses and expenses incurred in the company’s interest, subject to the provisions concerning regulated agreements.
A director may enter into an employment contract with the company if that contract corresponds to actual employment. Apart from sums received under an employment contract, the directors may not receive (in respect of their duties) any other remuneration (permanent or otherwise) than that provided for by the board of directors (Articles 430, 431 and 432 of the AUSCGIE).
The CEO may be bound to the company by a contract of employment. The terms and amount of the remuneration of the chairperson and managing director are fixed by the board of directors. Where necessary, the benefits in kind granted to them are fixed in the same manner as their remuneration. The CEO may not receive any other remuneration from the company (Article 466 of the AUSCGIE).
In an SAS, the remuneration and benefits of the chairperson and any other potential directors are determined by the articles of association and the shareholders.
Disclosure of Payments
No public disclosure obligations in relation to the remuneration, fees or benefits payable to directors and officers for companies have been identified, except for publicly traded companies. Indeed, Article 831-2 of the AUSCGIE requires disclosure of the report prepared by the chairperson of the board of directors, which, in addition to the composition of the board of directors and its operating conditions, includes the compensation allocated to the corporate officers.
Regarding other disclosures, pursuant to Article 432 of the AUSCGIE, the exceptional remuneration of directors for missions and mandates entrusted to them or the reimbursement of travel expenses and expenses incurred in the interest of the company, must be the subject of a special report by the auditor to the general meeting.
A shareholder is a natural or legal person who contributes (in kind, in cash or through industry) to the company. In return, the company delivers shares (Articles 7 and 51 of the AUSCGIE).
The status of a shareholder is regulated by Articles 7 to 9 of the AUSCGIE. Those persons who cannot be shareholders are:
Company shares are called “actions” (in French) in joint stock companies and “parts sociales” in other companies (Articles 7 and 51 of the AUSCGIE).
The contribution made by the shareholders determines their rights and obligations within the company:
The rights and obligations of the shareholders are proportional to their contributions.
In addition, according to Article 54 of the AUSCGIE, clauses that attribute to a shareholder all of the profit made by the company or exempt them from all of the losses, as well as clauses that exclude a shareholder entirely from the profit or make them responsible for all of the losses, are deemed unwritten.
Disagreement among shareholders constitutes grounds for the dissolution of commercial companies under Article 200 of the AUSCGIE.
In limited liability companies, shareholders are liable for the company’s debts only up to the amount of their contributions. The limited liability companies are:
In the case of debts of such a company, the liability of the shareholder is limited to the loss of the total amount of their share capital contributions and their contributions to the shareholders’ current account.
Shareholders who hold management positions within the company may also be liable (individually or jointly) to the company or third parties, either for breaches of the law or the articles of association (civil or criminal liability) or for faults committed in their management.
Shareholders have a certain degree of control over the company’s management, which varies by company type.
SARL Shareholders
Any non-managing shareholder can ask the manager in writing, twice a year, about any fact that could jeopardise the continuity of the business. The manager must then provide written answers to the shareholder’s questions within 15 days. Within the same time limit, they must send a copy of the questions and their answers to the auditor, if there is one (Article 157 of the AUSCGIE).
SA and SAS Shareholders
Any shareholder who does not have managerial status may, twice a year, ask the chairperson of the board of directors, the CEO or the managing director (as the case may be) in writing about any fact likely to jeopardise the continuity of the business. The chairperson of the board of directors or the CEO (as the case may be) must then reply, in writing, within 15 days to the questions asked by the shareholder. Within the same period, they must send the auditor a copy of the questions and their answers (Article 158 of the AUSCGIE).
The shareholder is also able to direct the actions of the corporate officers, thanks to:
All shareholders have the right to participate in the voting of collective decisions (Article 125 of the AUSCGIE). There are two kinds of collective decisions: ordinary decisions and extraordinary decisions (Article 132 of the AUSCGIE). These decisions can be made at general meetings or through written consultation (Article 133 of the AUSCGIE). All deliberations of the shareholders are recorded in the minutes (Article 134 of the AUSCGIE).
The manager is in charge of convening the general meeting. In the event of their failure to do so, the auditor may substitute for the manager. Failing this, the shareholders may request the convening of the meeting in court.
The methods of convening the meeting are set out in the articles of association. The ordinary general meeting congregates at least once a year (within six months of the end of the financial year). An extension of the deadline may be requested from the president of the competent court ruling on a petition. The purpose of the ordinary general meeting is:
In an SARL and an SA, the decisions are made by a majority of the votes present and represented.
The extraordinary general meeting takes extraordinary collective decisions (ie, decisions to amend the articles of association). It is decided by a three-quarters majority of the capital in an SARL and by a two-thirds majority of the capital in an SA.
However, unanimity is required in the case of:
In the event of a loss of half of the share capital, an extraordinary general meeting must be convened within four months of the general meeting that recorded this loss, on pain of penal sanctions or at the request of any interested party for dissolution of the company.
In an SAS, the rules of majority and quorum are set by the articles of association.
The bases of claim that exist for shareholders against the company or directors are as follows:
As far as is known, there are no disclosure or other obligations on shareholders in publicly traded companies.
However, the Ministerial Order of 2 September 2022 specifying the modalities of identification, declaration, conservation and control of information on beneficial owners imposes on legal persons and legal arrangements (ie, trusts and fiduciaries):
This dispositive has been reinforced by Decree No 2025-1354 of 27 August 2025, which has modified Decree No 2020-791 of 19 March 2020 relating to the Register of Beneficial Owners. This reform consecrates public access to certain key data on beneficial owners, in line with the EITI Standard 2023 and international transparency standards.
It is mandatory to file declarations with the tax authorities:
Any failure to comply with the above-mentioned provisions is subject to a fine of XOF1 million, payable as many times as there are documents or information that are either requested and not produced or omitted, incomplete or inaccurate.
Pursuant to Article 137 of the AUSCGIE, at the close of each fiscal year, the manager, the board of directors or the managing director (as the case may be) must prepare and close the financial statements in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Act on the Organisation and Harmonisation of Companies’ Accounting.
As required by the revised Article 140 of the AUSCGIE, for an SA, an SAS and ,where applicable, a SARL, the annual summary financial statements and the management report are sent to the auditors at least 45 days before the date of the ordinary general meeting. These documents are presented to the general meeting of the company approving the financial statements, which must be held within six months of the end of the financial year.
Pursuant to Article 138 of the AUSCGIE, the manager, the board of directors or the managing director (as the case may be) draws up a management report in which they describe the situation of the company during the past financial year, its foreseeable evolution, the important events that occurred between the closing date of the financial year and the date on which it is drawn up and, in particular, the prospects for the continuation of the activity, the evolution of the cash-flow situation and the financing plan.
This report is therefore financial, but the AUSCGIE allows the creation of committees, composed of directors on the board and under the direction of a director, to deal with particular aspects of the company’s operations (Article 437 of the AUSCGIE). Thus, according to Article 437 Section 2: “[The board of directors] may decide to create committees composed of directors to study the questions that it or its chair[person] submits to them for advice. It shall determine the composition and powers of the committees, which shall carry out their activities under its responsibility.”
The AUSCGIE also requires the mandatory presence of audit committees in companies issuing stock to the public to ensure better corporate governance. The audit committee must report regularly to the board of directors on the performance of its duties and must inform the board of directors without delay of any difficulties encountered (Article 829-1 of the AUSCGIE).
In addition, agreements entered into directly or through an intermediary between the company and one of its managers, directors or shareholders are the subject of a special report by the auditor at the general meeting.
Commercial companies are required to make filings with the Companies Registry of the registered office for the following:
The filings relating to the incorporation or the modification of the company (merger, liquidation of a company), as well as the pledges or the collective procedure, are publicly available upon request to the company’s registry. However, specific documents such as financial statements are not available. Failure to make these filings entails the unenforceability of the modifications/actions carried out.
Anti-money laundering (AML) requirements in Senegal derive primarily from the regional framework applicable across the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Uniform Law No 2024-04 of 14 February 2024 on the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction transposes into Senegalese law the most recent WAEMU directive harmonised with the FATF standards.
Reporting entities include financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions and – more broadly – any entity likely to be exposed to money-laundering or terrorism-financing risks. Key obligations include:
Personal Liability of Directors
Directors may incur civil, administrative and criminal liability for non-compliance with AML obligations. The applicable law provides for significant fines and imprisonment for individuals involved in money-laundering activities or who fail to comply with their reporting obligations. Professional sanctions may also be imposed.
In the SA, the appointment of an auditor is mandatory. It takes place during the constitutive general meeting (for the first appointment). An SA making a public appeal for savings must appoint at least two auditors and two deputies. An SA that does not make a public offering is required to appoint one auditor and one substitute.
As regards the other corporate forms, this appointment is optional, except where the company exceeds certain thresholds (see 1.1 Forms of Corporate/Business Organisations).
The auditor’s duties include:
The auditor is responsible, with respect to the company and third parties, for the harmful consequences of faults and negligence they may commit in performing their duties (insufficient investigation or certification of an inaccurate balance sheet, for example).
Risk Management and Related Disclosures
Management report (Article 138 of the AUSCGIE)
The manager, the board of directors or the managing director (as the case may be) is required to prepare a management report describing the company’s situation during the past financial year and its future outlook. This management report is submitted for the approval of the shareholders at the annual general meeting.
Agreements between the company’s directors and the company
In an SA with a board of directors (Article 438 of the AUSCGIE) and an SA with a managing director (Article 502 of the AUSCGIE), the regulated agreements are subject to the authorisation of the members of the board of directors and to the approval of the general meeting ruling on the summary financial statements. For a SARL (Article 350 of the AUSCGIE) and an SAS (Article 853-14 of the AUSCGIE), these agreements are subject to approval by the general meeting.
Prohibited agreements
The managers of a SARL (Article 356 of the AUSCGIE) and the directors of an SA (Article 450 of the AUSCGIE) are prohibited from contracting loans from the company in any form whatsoever, from being granted an overdraft on a current account or otherwise, as well as from being guaranteed or endorsed by the company in respect of their commitments to third parties. These acts are null and void.
Neither the AUSCGIE nor the Senegalese domestic legislation establishes a specific regulatory framework for board-level oversight of geopolitical risks or compliance with international sanctions. These issues are typically addressed through the board’s general risk management responsibilities and, where applicable, sector-specific regulations.
In addition to the above, Senegalese law establishes a specific criminal regime for the most serious breaches by executives. Law No 13/2018 of April 19, 2018, on the punishment of offences provided for in the Uniform Acts adopted pursuant to the OHADA Treaty, sets forth the penalties applicable to offences under seven Uniform Acts.
There are no regulations on ESG issues in OHADA law. These provisions will, for example, be set by the board of directors or by internal regulations on a case-by-case basis for companies that can draw on international regulations in this area.
In specific sectors such as extractive industries, the most recent legislation imposes transparency obligations with regard to revenues paid to the state.
Senegalese legislators have not yet adopted a cross-sectoral ESG reporting obligation.
Sector-Specific Transparency Reinforcement
In the extractive industries, the reform of the Beneficial Ownership Register through Decree No 2025-1354 of 27 August 2025 consecrates free public access to certain key data on beneficial owners, in line with EITI Standard 2023 requirements.
Parapublic Sector Governance
Law No 2022-08 of 19 April 2022 on the parapublic sector introduces a modern governance framework for state-owned enterprises and entities benefiting from public financial support. The law imposes independent directors, mandatory audit and remuneration committees and a Corporate Governance Code applicable to all parapublic entities. While not framed as ESG legislation, this strengthens the governance component applicable to entities that represent a significant share of the Senegalese economy.
As of today, Senegalese law does not contain specific legal or regulatory requirements relating to board oversight of artificial intelligence. There are no mandatory rules on AI-specific board composition, AI committee mandates, AI-related risk frameworks or AI controls.
In the absence of an AI-specific regime, board oversight of AI-related activities is governed by the general provisions of the AUSCGIE on board duties and by sector-specific frameworks. Directors remain bound by their general duty to identify and supervise material risks affecting the company, which, in practice, may include AI-related risks when AI systems are deployed at scale.
There is currently no cross-sectoral AI governance framework in Senegal. Companies operating in Senegal generally rely on internal policies, contractual safeguards and sector-specific regulations to address AI-use-related risks.
In the absence of a dedicated AI liability regime in Senegal, liability exposures for boards and officers arising from AI use are governed by the general framework applicable to directors’ and officers’ duties, combined with sector-specific rules.
Senegalese law does not currently impose specific disclosure requirements on companies with regard to AI use, strategy, governance, risks, incidents or controls. There is no dedicated reporting framework for AI in annual reports, sustainability reports or prospectuses.
66 boulevard de la République
Building Seydou Nourou Tall
1st Floor
Dakar
Senegal
+221 338 214 722
+221 338 214 543
houda@avocatshouda.com www.avocatshouda.com
Prevention and Management of Shareholder Disputes under OHADA Law: Contractual Tools and Exit Mechanisms
Shareholder conflict is one of the most damaging risks to a commercial company’s existence. Whether it takes the form of a deadlocked general meeting, a clash between majority and minority shareholders or a breakdown of trust within a family group, it directly threatens the company’s operations, profitability and sometimes its very survival. In the OHADA region, where economic activity is often structured around joint ventures between local and international partners or family companies with delicate capital structures, this issue takes on particular acuity.
The Uniform Act on the Law of Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Groups (AUSCGIE) has enriched the toolkit available to practitioners. Through the express recognition of extra-statutory agreements, the introduction of a provisional administrator and the strengthening of minority shareholders’ information rights, the OHADA legislator has sought to equip shareholders with the means to prevent and manage crises. Senegalese courts and the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) have since been refining, on a case-by-case basis, the legal regime applicable to these instruments.
This article provides a practical overview of the available tools, from upstream prevention to crisis exit mechanisms.
Building a Robust Contractual Framework
The best way to manage a shareholder dispute is to anticipate it. OHADA law offers considerable latitude to organise, in advance, relations between shareholders and the procedures for resolving conflicts.
Preventive Statutory Clauses
The articles of association constitute the first line of defence. Public limited companies and simplified joint-stock companies may include approval clauses allowing the board or the general meeting to control the admission of any new shareholder. The pre-emption clause gives existing shareholders priority rights in the event of a proposed share transfer, thereby preventing the entry of an unwelcome third party.
The lock-up clause, governed by Article 765-1 of the AUSCGIE, temporarily prohibits the transfer of shares for a period not exceeding ten years, provided it is justified by a serious and legitimate reason. These clauses, to be enforceable against the company and third parties when not contained in extra-statutory agreements, must appear in the articles of association and comply with the publication formalities required by the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register (RCCM). Their drafting requires particular care, as an imprecise or imbalanced clause may be rendered ineffective or may itself become a source of litigation.
Shareholders’ Agreements and Extra-Statutory Agreements
Article 2-1 of the AUSCGIE expressly recognises extra-statutory agreements. Such agreements allow shareholders or only some of them, to organise governance rules, share transfer procedures, conflict resolution mechanisms or exit from the shareholder structure. They typically include the classic:
The contractual framework offers two major advantages over the articles of association:
However, its scope is purely contractual: a breach of the agreement gives rise to damages, but a transfer carried out in disregard of the agreement remains in principle valid if the corporate formalities have been complied with.
Particular vigilance is required to ensure the agreement’s compatibility with the mandatory provisions of the AUSCGIE. Article 2 specifies that no derogation from the rules of the Uniform Act is permitted unless a freedom is expressly recognised. In practice, clauses aimed at circumventing the mandatory rules on quorum, majority or the jurisdiction of corporate bodies are without effect, at least at the corporate level.
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
It is generally advisable to include in shareholders’ agreements or articles of association clauses for amicable dispute resolution (mediation, conciliation) and arbitration. Arbitration offers the confidentiality, relative speed and technical expertise that judicial proceedings do not always guarantee. The parties may also include escalation clauses that require a negotiation or mediation phase before any referral to a court or arbitral tribunal.
In Senegal, this amicable recourse is all the more effective now that mediation is recognised. Including contractual mediation in a dispute resolution clause allows parties to attempt to resolve the conflict.
Detecting the Crisis: Information and Alert Rights
When prevention has not been sufficient, it is still necessary to identify the dysfunction. Information and alert tools allow shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, to shed light on the company’s difficulties.
Shareholders’ Right to Information
Every shareholder has a permanent right to information concerning corporate documents (articles of association, minutes, financial statements). Prior to the general meeting, they must receive the documents necessary to exercise their voting rights in an informed manner. In public limited companies, this right is reinforced and any obstruction to it gives rise to civil and criminal sanctions.
Written Questions and Management Audit
The AUSCGIE grants shareholders representing a significant fraction of the share capital the right to submit written questions to the chairman of the board of directors or the chief executive officer concerning any matter that could jeopardise the continuation of the company’s business. Where no satisfactory answer is provided or concerns persist, those same shareholders may apply to a court for the appointment of a management expert to investigate one or more specific management operations.
This procedure, more technical than a general judicial expert inquiry, enables an impartial assessment of suspicious transactions:
The resulting report often constitutes a decisive element in subsequent litigation. In practice, it is one of the most effective tools available to minority shareholders.
The Statutory Auditor’s Alert Procedure
Where the statutory auditor detects facts likely to jeopardise the continuation of the company’s business, a graduated alert procedure is available. The auditor first requests explanations from management and may then refer the matter to the board of directors, the general meeting or even the public authorities. This tool, often underused, nonetheless serves as a valuable warning signal for shareholders seeking to anticipate a deterioration in the company’s situation.
Sanctioning Disloyal Conduct: Abuse of Rights
The recognition by OHADA law of majority and minority abuse makes it possible to sanction disloyal conduct before the crisis degenerates into paralysis. These concepts, developed by case law, have been consolidated through the practice of the CCJA.
Majority Abuse
Majority abuse is established when the majority makes a decision contrary to the company’s general interests, solely to favour the majority shareholders at the expense of the minority.
The sanction is twofold: annulment of the abusive resolution and an order for the majority shareholders to pay damages to the company or the affected minority shareholders. This action, often dissuasive, allows minority shareholders to restore a balance where they are victims of captured governance.
Minority Abuse
Conversely, minority abuse is recognised where a minority shareholder, through a negative vote or abstention, prevents the adoption of a decision essential to the corporate interest without legitimate justification. This is notably the case where a capital increase necessary for the company’s survival is refused. The court may then appoint an ad hoc representative authorised to vote on behalf of the recalcitrant minority shareholder in a manner consistent with the corporate interest.
Criminal Sanctions Against Directors
Beyond civil sanctions arising from abuse of rights, Senegalese law establishes a specific criminal regime for the most serious misconduct by directors. Law No 13/2018 of 19 April 2018 on the prosecution of offences provided for in the Uniform Acts adopted pursuant to the OHADA Treaty sets out the penalties applicable to offences under seven Uniform Acts.
Among the offences that may be established in a shareholder dispute context are, notably, misuse of corporate assets and credit, distribution of fictitious dividends, presentation of misleading accounts, failure to convene annual general meetings and obstruction of shareholders’ and the statutory auditor’s information rights. Penalties range from fines (from CFA250,000 to CFA5,000,000 depending on the case) to imprisonment of up to five years for the most serious offences.
In practice, the initiation of criminal proceedings is sometimes used alongside civil actions to increase pressure on defaulting directors or to obtain information that the company refuses to disclose. However, this tool must be used with caution, as the instrumentalisation of criminal proceedings for purely strategic purposes exposes the party to counterclaims and may further entrench the conflict between shareholders.
Crisis Exit Mechanisms
When the deadlock becomes structural and paralyses the company, crisis exit tools are available. They range from the least to the most intrusive, depending on the severity of the situation and the shareholders’ willingness or otherwise to preserve the corporate structure.
The Provisional Administrator
A provisional administrator may be appointed by a court at the request of any shareholder or interested party in the event of a shareholder dispute that renders normal operation of the company impossible and threatens it with imminent harm. Two cumulative conditions are therefore required: a demonstrated breakdown and a risk to the company.
The president of the court rules by way of summary proceedings or on application. The provisional administrator holds extensive powers that, for the duration of the mission, replace those of the normally competent corporate bodies. The mission is temporary and strictly defined in scope by the appointing decision. Its role is to ensure continuity of operations organise mediation between shareholders and, where appropriate, convene general meetings with a view to breaking the deadlock.
This is a powerful tool, but it must be used with caution. A court will only order it in cases of proven deadlock and actual danger and will refuse to make such an order merely as a means of pressure in a latent conflict. The CCJA’s case law tends to strictly circumscribe the conditions for its grant.
The Ad Hoc Representative
Less intrusive than the provisional administrator, an ad hoc representative may be appointed to carry out a specific task: convening a meeting, exercising a voting right, negotiating a transfer. This solution is often preferred when the dispute is limited to a particular decision and the company’s general operations are not compromised.
Judicial Dissolution for Serious Deadlock
As a last resort, Article 200 of the AUSCGIE allows for judicial dissolution on just grounds, notably in the event of a serious breakdown between shareholders paralysing the company’s operations. This radical solution is rarely ordered by Senegalese courts, which prefer intermediate mechanisms. It nonetheless remains a dissuasive threat in negotiations.
An alternative, more balanced mechanism is the judicial or contractual exclusion of a shareholder, allowing the company to continue its activities without being dissolved. However, such exclusion requires a solid statutory or contractual basis, as OHADA law does not, in principle, recognise outright exclusion outside such frameworks.
Recommendations
Experience shows that shareholder disputes, while rarely entirely avoidable, can be considerably mitigated by a few best practices that international investors and local operators would do well to integrate into their legal strategy.
Careful drafting of the articles of association and shareholders’ agreements is paramount. These should include appropriate quorum and majority rules, exit clauses such as drag-along, tag-along and buy-or-sell, amicable settlement mechanisms and arbitration clauses. A generic agreement copied from another jurisdiction without adaptation to OHADA law is a frequent source of difficulties and unenforceable clauses.
Rigorous maintenance of corporate life (minutes, registers and regulated agreements properly submitted for approval) deprives opponents of many procedural arguments. Many disputes originate in formal irregularities that companies too often underestimate. Periodic legal audits are, in this respect, a modest investment relative to the risks avoided.
Finally, in the event of emerging tensions, it is often wise to resort promptly to professional mediation or an independent audit. These tools can sometimes restore dialogue before the crisis degenerates and positions become so entrenched that recourse to a court or arbitral tribunal becomes inevitable.
Conclusion
The prevention and management of shareholder disputes in the OHADA region rests on a substantial legal arsenal. The provisional administrator, the recognition of extra-statutory agreements and the development of case law on abuse of rights provide practitioners with robust tools. Their effectiveness, however, depends on careful contractual engineering at the outset and, subsequently, on an intelligent articulation of the relationship among negotiation, arbitration and judicial action.
For foreign investors and local operators alike, anticipation remains the key. A well-structured company is not one that hopes never to face a crisis: it is one that has contractually organised the prevention and resolution of crises.
66 boulevard de la République
Building Seydou Nourou Tall
1st Floor
Dakar
Senegal
+221 338 214 722
+221 338 214 543
houda@avocatshouda.com www.avocatshouda.com