Defamation & Reputation Management 2026

Last Updated February 10, 2026

Canada

Law and Practice

Author



Mark Donald Law was opened in 2016 and focuses on libel and wider media law, including privacy and injunction litigation. The firm assists individuals and media entities of all sizes with providing pre-publication advice, litigation, urgent injunctive proceedings, and appeals/judicial reviews. The firm is particularly experienced in anti-SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) motions and publication ban/media exclusion motions. The firm is regularly called upon to provide its insights on the media law landscape to other practitioners at media and legal industry events.

Common law privacy breach cases require a claimant to show:

  • a defendant intentionally disseminated the claimant’s private information;
  • this dissemination constituted an invasion, without lawful justification, of the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns; and
  • this invasion would be regarded by a reasonable person as highly offensive, causing distress, humiliation or anguish.

The tort of “invasion of privacy” is relatively new in Ontario – and Canada more generally – with the court’s conceptualisation of privacy developing year on year. The Ontario tort of privacy breach was originally developed in the late 2010s to counter unlawful disclosure of personal information (such as medical or banking information by third parties); however, it has grown to encompass concepts such as “false light” breach of privacy, where the unlawful disclosure paints the plaintiff in a light that does not accurately reflect them. In this sense, “false light” privacy breach cases bear some similarity to defamation – although the case law in this area is relatively sparse and will likely develop in the coming years.

A plaintiff in a civil case may seek pre-publication injunctive relief to embargo private information – although the threshold is relatively high and Ontario courts are alive to the imperative that free expression/a free press plays in a democratic society. The result is that a claimant seeking such relief must have grounds that go beyond mere embarrassment from the disclosure and instead show an interest that is more pressing than free expression/a free press/the presumptive openness of the court process. This is done on a case-by-case basis and generally a claimant must show that:

  • court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
  • the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
  • as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Recent Supreme Court of Canada rulings establish that for disclosure to be enjoined, the impugned information must go to the “biographical core” of the individual seeking the publication ban. This means that the information must be truly unique to the moving party. Common examples might be disclosure of a stigmatised fact about the individual, such as occupation, medical diagnosis or prior emotional trauma.

It is worth noting that – civil cases aside – the Criminal Code of Canada has its own well-established statutory regime for presumptive publication bans of information that may identify the victims of sexual assault. The result is that media organisations seeking to report on sexual assault cases will often face a number of presumptive publication bans that must be navigated.

Also notable is that corporations and governmental and medical entities in the province are also bound by their own privacy legislation, which sets out a number of statutory penalties that are focused more on compliance than strict monetary compensation (which would be the general goal of a civil action). 

Damages for breach of privacy in Ontario tend to be relatively modest – at least to date. The original case law in Ontario that created civil breach of privacy as a tort suggested that damages for privacy breaches should be limited to around CAD20,000.

That being said, this guideline is now approximately a decade old. With the advent of increasingly egregious and pervasive forms of privacy breach such as “revenge pornography”, it is possible – indeed, likely – that this informal cap on damages will have less relevance as the case law develops.

Under Ontario’s Limitations Act, the general limitation period for a civil breach of privacy case is two years from the date that the plaintiff either knew or should reasonably have known that it was appropriate to bring a claim.

This is not a standard of perfect knowledge and the question of when it is “appropriate” to bring a claim can often be a subject of some contention. As a general rule, it is often better to commence litigation promptly – if only to put defendants on notice and begin the process of preserving evidence.

Civil and Criminal Proceedings

A victim of a privacy breach has the ability to pursue both civil and criminal proceedings against an individual who has breached their privacy. In the former case, the plaintiff will drive the process, whereas – in the latter – the question of whether to lay charges under the Canadian Criminal Code will be up to the police and/or the Crown prosecutor’s office, depending on the province.

The main distinction is that, whereas a civil case can be brought and controlled by the plaintiff, a criminal proceeding places the Crown (ie, the State) in the “driver’s seat” and treats the victim of a privacy breach as more of a “key witness”. For this reason, victims of so-called revenge porn breaches of privacy are often called upon to consider whether they wish to pursue and be a part of criminal proceedings, as one criticism is that such proceedings deprive them of agency or a voice.

Civil cases are focused on monetary compensation, whereas criminal proceedings are focused on remedies such as probation, jail terms, and/or community service.

Private or Anonymised Court Proceedings

Canadian courts will be loath to permit cases to be pursued entirely in private (in camera). Such draconian measures go against the presumption of an open court in Canadian law and extensive publication bans over large swaths of a case are reserved usually for matters involving national security and/or confidential intelligence gathering. Even in these “hot-button” cases, Canadian judges in civil and criminal cases will not grant publication bans beyond what is strictly necessary.

In terms of what is deemed “necessary”, it is worth noting that there is an entire architecture of presumptive, statutory publication bans on the identities of complainants and victims in criminal proceedings, as well as the identity of children in family and youth criminal justice proceedings. The extent of these is too detailed and extensive for the purpose of this summary.

Parties hoping for complete confidentiality to mediate private civil disputes are better served by seeking agreement on the appointment of a private arbitrator in Ontario, as these arrangements can include robust privacy positions. (However, the appointment of a private arbitrator may well add significantly to the parties’ litigation expenses.)

Establishing Grounds to Bring Proceedings

Establishing jurisdiction in Ontario for a civil breach of privacy claim is relatively easy, in the sense that any number of factors can ground jurisdiction under Ontario’s “real and substantial connection” test, including the place where the tort was committed and the residence of the plaintiff or defendant. Ultimately, an Ontario court will adopt a two-step approach to a jurisdiction challenge, asking:

  • whether or not Ontario has legal jurisdiction in the sense that there is a “real and substantial connection” to the province; and
  • if it does, whether or not there is another jurisdiction that is more convenient as the true locus of the case.

Put simply, a court will determine first if it can exercise jurisdiction and, then, whether it should. This is a far-ranging analysis, and the court will look at the full factual matrix of the case.

In the privacy context, a claimant may face a jurisdiction challenge where the connection to Ontario is merely nominal or technical (such as where perhaps only computers or servers were located in Ontario) and/or where there is another forum that is clearly more connected to the facts in issue (ie, where the majority of consumption of the impugned material was in another jurisdiction). As a result, courts in Ontario will be alive to allegations of “forum shopping”.

Ontario law presumes that a successful claimant will have a portion of their legal costs paid. The general rule is that a successful party will receive “partial indemnity” costs – approximately 60-70% of their overall fees and expenses for the litigation.

In cases where the unsuccessful party acts improperly, or where its position was particularly tenuous, a court can award “substantial indemnity” or “full indemnity” – that being 80–100% of the successful party’s legal fees.

The foregoing is always subject to the fact that an Ontario judge has full discretion over whether to award costs in a proceeding. The upshot is that a successful party that acts egregiously in litigation may find their costs award diminished by a displeased judge.

Perhaps the most unusual feature of privacy claims in Ontario is their relatively slow development in terms of case law and damages. One suspects that this will change as the locus of privacy disputes shifts to the online world, where harm can be much more pervasive, and as victims of the disclosure of intimate images bring more cases in the jurisdiction.

In addition, it is worth noting that a number of pieces of legislation address the requirements for government, medical and corporate actors to maintain and secure private personal information. These acts can have applicability to a civil breach of privacy claim, but they are mainly applicable to mass data breach cases involving hackers and the like.

Canadian defamation law is largely built upon the historical law from the UK. To prove defamation, a claimant must prove that:

  • the defendant has made a publication to a third party;
  • this publication concerns the plaintiff; and
  • this publication would lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the community.

This is a low threshold and the vast majority of cases will revolve around whether the defendant can successfully rely on one of the available defences to defamation. These defences include:

  • truth – that the allegation was true or substantially true;
  • honest opinion – that the defendant was expressing an honestly held opinion on a matter of public interest with sufficient factual context;
  • responsible communication – that the defendant made the publication responsibly under all the circumstances (a defence most often attributed to and applied by the news media); and
  • qualified privilege – that the publisher had a social, legal or moral obligation to make the publication to the recipient at the time the publication was made (for example, a complaint to a regulatory body).

Damages/Remedies

Damages are the usual remedy in Canadian defamation cases. Damages are awarded using two general measures (which can be awarded simultaneously):

  • special damages – “out-of-pocket” damages that the plaintiff can show as arising from the defamation (ie, a large drop in commercial sales as a result of a defamatory article); and
  • general or “at large” damages – damages awarded by the judge or jury for the otherwise unquantifiable damage to the plaintiff’s reputation (given that the effect of defamation is often insidious and hard to quantify, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs to rely upon this measure of damages, as special damages can be difficult to prove).

The extent of damages can vary widely and will depend on the specific facts of each case, including:

  • the nature of the defamation and whether it implies criminality or moral turpitude;
  • the nature and size of the community to whom the defamation was published;
  • the extent to which propriety is a hallmark of the community to which the plaintiff belongs (eg, lawyers, doctors);
  • the anguish caused to the plaintiff; and
  • the overall conduct of the defendant, and whether the defendant was particularly malicious or punitive in making or publicising the defamation.

The smaller the community or the more mundane the defamation, the more the damages are likely to be in the low thousands or mid-five figures. The wider the publication and the more harmful the defamatory statement, the more likely it is that a damages award will be in the low-to-mid six figures. The highest damages awards to date (from the late 1990s/early 2000s) tend to be in the mid-six figures for serious defamation arising in large national broadcasts or publications.

Injunctions

Defamation injunctions are available in Ontario courts, but they are extremely difficult to obtain. This stems from the fact that Canadian courts are unwilling to limit free expression and essentially “pre-judge” a case by enjoining expression prior to trial. A plaintiff seeking to enjoin a defendant from making defamatory statements prior to trial must have a case of such strength that the matter is essentially predetermined. The test is as follows.

  • The publication complained of must be clearly defamatory and impossible to justify.
  • If the defendant states an intention to rely on common law defences to defamation, the injunction must be refused unless it is clear that any such defence will inevitably fail.
  • The plaintiff must establish irreparable harm if the injunction is refused.

These sorts of injunctions are rarely granted and are usually reserved for the most egregious cases – ie, cases of extreme online “trolling” or harassment with allegations of criminality or extreme moral turpitude.

In addition, a plaintiff can apply for a post-judgment order enjoining the defendant from further publishing. However, in addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff must also show that the defendant is likely to continue to defame the plaintiff and be ungovernable by further damages awards.

Limitation Periods in Ontario

The general Ontario limitation period for defamation is two years from the date that the publication came to the plaintiff’s attention. The general limitation period in other Canadian provinces depends on the specific limitations act of that province or territory.

However, in cases that involve “newspapers” or “broadcasters” in Ontario, the preconditions and limitations to bring a defamation action are short and stringent thanks to Sections 5 and 6 of Ontario’s Libel and Slander Act. The plaintiff is obliged to deliver a notice of libel to all defendants involved in the publication that they wish to sue within six weeks of the libel coming to the plaintiff’s attention and a claim must be commenced within three months. The purpose of this short timeline is twofold: it permits the media defendant to issue an expeditious retraction and apology while the matter is fresh and it ensures that journalists are not forced to “look over their shoulders” for prolonged periods of time for the articles they have published.

While television, radio, newspaper and online newspaper/magazine outlets are clearly covered by these truncated timelines under Sections 5 and 6, it remains an open question as to whether online mediums such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook are “broadcasters” under the Libel and Slander Act and therefore able to avail themselves of these sections. Ontario case law from approximately a decade ago held that this question could not be decided without suitable expert evidence on the issue and, to date, no case has taken up or resolved that challenge. As a result, the question remains important, albeit uncertain at this point.

That said, recent Ontario decisions appear to have more expansively considered the kinds of factors that influence what it means for an online newspaper to be “published” in Ontario (see, for example, Massoudi v Vice Media LLC, 2025 ONSC 5210). This can include: the location of journalists, sources, editing, the locale of readers and the locale of the intended audience.

It is submitted that these same factors could soon be used as substantive tools to influence the trajectory of the separate legal question of whether a matter is “broadcast” in Ontario, meaning that the apparent need for expert evidence to prove the point described above may soon be obviated, and may well make a broader cross-section of online forums subject to the Libel and Slander Act. As a practical point, plaintiffs suing in Ontario should consider adhering to the Libel and Slander Act’s timelines out of an abundance of caution. 

Protections for Media

Much like in the UK, Canadian law has enshrined a “reasonable communication” defence that is often employed by media defendants in defamation claims. The defence employs a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine whether an otherwise defamatory publication is defensible. Those non-exhaustive factors are:

  • the seriousness of the allegation;
  • the public importance of the matter;
  • the urgency of the matter;
  • the status and reliability of the source;
  • whether the plaintiff’s side of the story was sought and accurately reported;
  • whether the inclusion of the defamatory statement was justifiable;
  • whether the defamatory statement’s public interest lay in the fact that it was made rather than in its truth; and
  • any other relevant circumstances.

Media defendants in Canada do not have a blanket/presumptive privilege for the protection of journalistic sources. Rather, they can avail themselves of a common law privilege (known as a “Wigmore privilege”) that allows a media defendant to assert confidentiality on a case-by-case basis. In addition, and more recently, a privilege analysis has been codified by Section 39.1 of Canada’s Federal Evidence Act, which provides that confidentiality over a confidential journalistic source can be overcome if the moving party can show that:

  • the information or document sought cannot be produced in evidence by any other reasonable means; and
  • the public interest in the administration of justice outweighs the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of the journalistic source, having regard to, among other things:
    1. the importance of the information or document to a central issue in the proceeding;
    2. freedom of the press; and
    3. the impact of disclosure on the journalistic source and the journalist.

Criminal and Civil Procedures

Canada’s federal Criminal Code has provision for defamation, but it is rarely – if ever – employed. Civil courts are the primary forum for defamation in Canada.

Defamation Proceedings in Private or Anonymised Court Proceedings

Anonymisation of parties in defamation proceedings is possible, but the party seeking anonymisation must assert something more than mere financial harm or embarrassment and instead show an interest that is more pressing than free expression/a free press/the presumptive openness of the court process. This is done on a case-by-case basis and generally a claimant must show that:

  • court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;
  • the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and
  • as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Recent Supreme Court of Canada rulings establish that for disclosure to be enjoined, the impugned information must go to the “biographical core” of the individual seeking the publication ban. This means that the information must be truly unique to the moving party. Common examples might be disclosure of a stigmatised fact about the individual such as occupation, medical diagnosis or prior emotional trauma.

Establishing Grounds to Bring Proceedings

The fact that a plaintiff or defendant is based in Canada or that publication took place in Canada may be enough to ground jurisdiction. The larger question in cases involving online defamation to the entire world is more often whether a Canadian province would be the “most appropriate” forum for the litigation.

In cases of online defamation where jurisdiction is disputed, courts will often consider issues such as:

  • the comparative convenience of Canada assuming jurisdiction of the case versus another forum (considering things such as costs and the availability of witnesses);
  • the locale of the parties’ assets; and
  • where the locus of the plaintiff’s reputation is found.

See 1.5 Privacy Costs.

Canadian law traditionally tracks along the same general lines as that of the UK.

“Harassment” is a relatively recent standalone tort in Canada. Courts in the province of Alberta have recently determined that such a tort exists, whereas the issue has not yet been firmly decided in Ontario.

That being said, Ontario does have an established tort of “internet harassment”, but this tort was developed in light of a particularly egregious case of internet harassment that spanned several years and numerous unsavoury allegations such that the facts disclosed a significant campaign of harassment. The upshot is that while “internet harassment” is available to be pleaded, it will require very specific facts to be successful. In general, the plaintiff must show that:

  • the defendant maliciously or recklessly engaged in communications conduct so outrageous in character and duration, and so extreme in degree, so as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and tolerance;
  • the defendant intended to cause fear, anxiety, and emotional upset or to impugn the dignity of the plaintiff; and
  • the plaintiff suffered such harm.

Given the relatively new status of civil harassment remedies in Canada, seeking criminal sanction for such conduct is the more usual route.

Given the relatively new status of harassment as an independent tort in Canada, damages estimations are difficult to discern at this point. 

That being said, as described in 2. Defamation, courts in Canada will be open to pre- and post-trial injunctions to restrain harassing conduct where it is particularly egregious and where the defendant demonstrates that they will likely not be governable by damages awards.

Given the recent nature of this tort, a range of damages is difficult to theorise. However, it can be stated that the greater the emotional or medical harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of a sustained campaign of harassment, the more likely a court will be to award damages in the five- or six-figure range. This is particularly true when considering heads of damage such as therapy costs, loss of competitive advantage, and other related factors.

Pursuant to Ontario’s Limitations Act, the general limitation period for a harassment claim would be two years from the date that the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known about the claim.

A victim in a civil harassment case can seek anonymisation using the same tests described in 1.4 Privacy.

See 3.2 Harassment Remedies.

There are a number of pieces of data protection legislation in Ontario relating to the collection and storage of data by government, commercial, and medical care providers.

The legislation relating to privacy breaches for information held by large media corporations contains a modest statutory penalty of CAD10,000 for less serious “summary” offences, but this can rise to fines as high as CAD100,000 for an indictable offence, but data breaches are generally remedied by actions for breach of privacy in the civil courts. Damages for breach of privacy tend to be modest, except in the most personalised cases, which have tangible effects on specific individuals. As a result, it is most common for large-scale data breach cases to proceed by way of class action, as this is often the only way that such cases can be pursued economically.

Each of the various regulatory regimes involving data protection has its own sanctions that can include imprisonment or fines reaching into the hundreds of thousands of dollars for each offence. These complaints are often initially taken up by federal or provincial privacy commissioners.

However, given that these are regulatory sanctions, monetary penalties are not the property of data breach victims. Instead, victims will usually have to resort to the civil courts to obtain meaningful monetary redress.

Although damages and settlements can be substantial – sometimes amounting to hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars – it is important to recognise that such large sums often arise in the context of class actions. As a result, individual claimants within a large class typically receive only nominal amounts.

Generally speaking, at common law in Ontario, a claim for breach of privacy would often (which is not to say always) be governed by Section 4 of the province’s Limitations Act (with some provinces and territories having similar limitations periods, and others much longer periods).

Common law aside, some statutes specifically related to privacy in the corporate, healthcare and governmental data collection context have their own statutory schemes for particular kinds of damages that can be shorter, such as:

  • one year under Sections 14 and 16 of Ontario’s corporate data collection act, known as the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) to commence a court proceeding if the claimant does not agree with the Privacy Commissioner’s findings;
  • similarly, one year under Sections 14 and 16 of the companion federal PIPEDA for the same variety of court proceeding described above; and
  • one year under Section 56 of Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act 

While recent Canadian case law has ruled that common law privacy claims are generally not ousted by those statutory privacy causes of action (in the absence of very clear legislative intent), litigants seeking to sue parties in the corporate, governmental and healthcare spheres should remain cognisant of these statutory causes of action and retain counsel promptly to determine if any of the statutory causes of action are available.

See “Establishing Grounds to Bring Proceedings” in 1.4 Privacy Proceedings Forum Choice

In the data protection sphere, it is also worth noting that the Supreme Court of Canada recently refused to give effect to a forum selection clause in a privacy breach case brought by social media users against Facebook. Facebook had sought to rely on such a clause in a standard form consumer agreement to try and oust the claim’s jurisdiction from the province of British Columbia and situate it in California.

The Supreme Court held, among other things, that – although the clause was enforceable – the inequality in bargaining power between Facebook and its users and the quasi-constitutional importance of privacy rights meant that the plaintiff had an interest in seeing her case decided in a local court. Canadian courts have recently been reticent to enforce forum selection clauses in standard form “clickwrap” agreements, but the courts’ particular highlighting of the very personal importance of privacy rights means that large corporate entities may find it particularly difficult to enforce forum selection clauses in privacy cases.

Damages for these sorts of cases tend to be quite modest (particularly in class action cases). Damages are only likely to reach five- or six-figure amounts where the information was highly personal and its disclosure had an extremely significant personal effect on the plaintiff.

Canada’s national broadcasters all have robust newsroom ethics policies that they traditionally adhere to. Successful claims against major broadcasters are relatively rare, given the number of cases that are commenced against them.

The five most influential providers are:

  • The Globe and Mail;
  • The Toronto Star;
  • the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation;
  • The National Post; and
  • CTV.

Canada does not have any binding press regulatory bodies. The National NewsMedia Council is a voluntary organisation – of which many of Canada’s major newspapers and broadcasters are members – but its powers are extremely limited and not analogous to those of the courts. Its main power comes from the ability to publish its decisions in response to complaints made by members of the public and to compel its members to do likewise. The organisation functions more like a non-binding ombudsman than a court.

Canada’s present government has previously discussed legislation to regulate hate speech online, but that discussion has been largely quiet for the past few years.

Given the niche role that the National NewsMedia Council plays in legal debates about the media, its impact is limited largely to those individuals who make complaints.

The only sanction that the National NewsMedia Council can impose is the publication of its decisions, as well as the requirement that – if a complaint is upheld – the offending media organisation must publish the decision.

There is no legislation in Canada that is analogous to the US Communications Decency Act. As a result, websites that host user-generated content are subject to the possibility of civil liability, and must avail themselves of common law defences if they are made defendants in a defamation or privacy actions.

Ontario and other Canadian jurisdictions have enacted anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation) legislation. This legislation has been in force for approximately ten years and there is a growing body of case law.

Ontario’s anti-SLAPP legislation allows a defendant to bring a motion to have a SLAPP case dismissed before a defence is even filed. The legislation provides that such a motion should be heard within 60 days of being brought; however, given the present backlog in the Ontario court system, this timetable is rarely adhered to.

Initially, Ontario’s anti-SLAPP legislation was intended to deal with SLAPP cases quickly and efficiently. However, in recent years, Ontario courts have expressed increasing frustration with the number of these motions being brought. In addition, while the original intention of the legislation was to decide these motions on a limited evidentiary record, both the judiciary and lawyers alike now charge that anti-SLAPP motions in Ontario often resemble “trials in a box” in that they involve a front-loading of evidence and extensive effort at the outset of a case. The result is that the short-term prognosis for anti-SLAPP cases in Ontario is that they will be heavily scrutinised by the judiciary.

Indeed, Ontario’s anti-SLAPP law will likely be going before the Supreme Court of Canada in 2026 as the Ontario Court of Appeal has called for the law’s significant amendment or outright appeal. 

There is no applicable information in this jurisdiction.

Mark Donald Law Professional Corporation

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Trends and Developments


Author



Mark Donald Law was opened in 2016 and focuses on libel and wider media law, including privacy and injunction litigation. The firm assists individuals and media entities of all sizes with providing pre-publication advice, litigation, urgent injunctive proceedings, and appeals/judicial reviews. The firm is particularly experienced in anti-SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) motions and publication ban/media exclusion motions. The firm is regularly called upon to provide its insights on the media law landscape to other practitioners at media and legal industry events.

The state of media law in Canadian common law jurisdictions (ie, with the exception of Quebec – a separate system with its own French-inspired civil law system) remains relatively static from the perspective of new jurisprudence or legislation. “Ground-breaking” decisions are few and far between. However, where important decisions have been made, they call into question some of the key premises of Canadian media law that have developed over the past decade.

Whither, Anti-SLAPP Proceedings?

The general law of defamation, libel and privacy remains untouched, with a few notable exceptions – particularly in respect of Ontario’s approach to anti-SLAPP (“strategic litigation against public participation”) proceedings. While anti-SLAPP legislative regimes have become a welcome feature of many common law jurisdictions over the past 20 years, pressures on litigants’ ability to access prompt justice may well be forcing a retrenchment of anti-SLAPP law in Canada.

Ontario’s provincial courts have become increasingly critical, if not arguably hostile, to the province’s anti-SLAPP regime – calling for the amendment, or possibly the repeal, of the present legislation. The two most likely factors in this increasing circumspection are the significant wait times for trial and motion scheduling, along with the fact that anti-SLAPPs have increasingly been seen by the Ontario judiciary as more of a procedural delay tactic by defendants, as opposed to a principled way to weed out unmeritorious claims.

While Ontario is but one of Canada’s provinces and territories, it is Canada’s largest and therefore arguably most influential province when it comes to the development of libel law.

The starting point for this retrenchment of anti-SLAPP law was Benchwood Builders, Inc. v Prescott, 2025 ONCA 171, a decision released by the Ontario Court of Appeal in early 2025, which overturned a motion decision to grant an anti-SLAPP motion and dismiss a defamation action brought by a construction contractor against a dissatisfied former client. On the appeal, the Court called the governing legislation – Section 137.1 of Ontario’s Courts of Justice Act:

“...poorly drafted and confusing. It has led to much litigation, which is ironic since its express purposes are to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest and to promote public participation in debates on such matters... The Byzantine operation of the section has been criticized. In short, s. 137.1 is in desperate need of a makeover, if not repeal and replacement”.

This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of Ontario’s anti-SLAPP regime, and portends a storm brewing over just how anti-SLAPP law is to be interpreted in Ontario, and Canada more generally. As one might expect given the importance of the issues at stake, leave to appeal was granted by the Supreme Court of Canada in October 2025, meaning that the nation’s highest court will soon be weighing in on just how anti-SLAPP law should be interpreted. While the Supreme Court will be interpreting Ontario’s legislation, the decision will no doubt have implications for other Canadian provinces with their own anti-SLAPP regimes (British Columbia, Manitoba and Quebec), as well as those provinces that might consider such legislation in the future.

That being said, the news for defendants’ counsel in anti-SLAPP law is not all bad: while Ontario may be going through its own provincial travails when it comes to anti-SLAPP, British Columbia’s courts (a large, west-coast, common law province) do not seem too engaged in the same soul-searching over that province’s anti-SLAPP Law; which is to say there have not been the same Benchwood-style decisions. The upshot is that depending on the outcome of Benchwood, media law litigants in Canada may start to see two different threads of jurisprudence arising on Canada’s west coast versus its largest, eastern province.

Subtext: the Court’s discomfort with characterising “commercial” issues as “public interest”

From a more granular perspective, Benchwood also shows the tension between the anti-SLAPP law’s desire to facilitate free expression on the one hand, and on the other, the question of whether expression relating to commercial disputes is really the sort of “public participation” that anti-SLAPP law should be protecting at all. In that respect, Benchwood is one of a number of recent examples where anti-SLAPP motions have been dismissed in cases where the expression has a commercial component (see, for example, Joseph et al. v McCue et al, 2024 ONSC 5791 and Solmar Inc. v Hall, 2025 ONSC 1703 (both cases in which the author was involved as counsel for the parties themselves, or for proposed media interveners before the Court of Appeal).

Other Notes: Libel Law, Malice and Echoes of the #MeToo Movement

Any defence-minded media lawyer will tell you that their client’s case may well live or die on the question of whether or not the plaintiff can prove that the defendant was inspired by “malice” in making a defamatory publication. Malice is an imperative concept when one considers that in Canadian common law, any defence besides truth/justification is defeated if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant acted maliciously. In libel law, malice may be established by “reckless disregard for, or indifference to, the truth, spite or ill-will, or any indirect or ulterior motive.

This is a wide definition, and a plaintiff will typically examine a defendant far and wide to discover any thread of evidence or testimony that might prove this ill will, indifference or recklessness. But nowhere is this concept perhaps more difficult to interpret than in civil cases arising from allegations of sexual assault or other sexual misfeasance where the defendant/alleged victim has taken to social media to air the allegations.

The reality is that social media and the internet is now society’s first forum for expression, and Canadian courts are starting to become more comfortable and understanding of this reality. In previous years, the alleged victim of sexual misfeasance who took to the internet was apt to be subject to extensive argument by a plaintiff that publishing such serious allegations to the “world at large” was grounds to find that the defendant was inspired by malice above all else. A welcome alternative interpretation came from the Ontario Superior Court in Smith v Nagy, 2025 ONSC 4629. In that case, the defendant accused the plaintiff of sexual battery arising from a lack of consent. The Plaintiff sued for libel.

What is important in this case is the careful way that the trial judge dealt with the issue of malice, particularly in the context of how the defendant published her claims. While the Court did find that the defendant was liable in defamation for some of the allegations made, it nevertheless stopped short of finding some of the posts malicious at law by finding that, for a defendant with post-traumatic stress disorder, a Facebook post, despite its serious content, might ultimately be seen as a form of therapeutic catharsis for the defendant (see paragraphs 130-135 of the decision).

This nuanced finding is a welcome one in the author’s opinion. In an age when courts are required to grapple with the psychological realities around issues of sexual assault and consent, Smith v Nagy creates a clearer opening – however small – for defendant’s counsel to argue that the mental state and possible emotional fragility of an alleged victim of assault could make social media posting about their experience something more sympathetic than the narrative usually advanced by plaintiffs seeking to impugn the defendant’s credibility.

Damages for Corporate Plaintiffs in Libel Law: Nominal or Significant – Are Both Routes Open?

It is a general principle in Canadian libel law that a corporate plaintiff is apt to collect only nominal damages unless the corporation can point to significant monetary losses as a result of the defendant’s defamation. The principle arises from the notion that, at law, a corporation does not have a “reputation” that needs to be preserved in the same way that a natural person does.

The result is that plaintiff’s counsel in Canada will often advise against bringing an action in the name of a corporate plaintiff, and instead focus on perhaps the directors and principals as more appropriate plaintiffs if the offending publications can be said to refer to these natural persons.

And indeed, the Ontario courts saw an example of these principles in action in James Bay Resources Limited v Mak Mera Nigeria Limited, 2025 ONCA 448, where the court overturned a trial court’s award of CAD200,000 in general damages to a corporate plaintiff. The dispute involved defamatory statements made about the company by the defendant in a letter to Nigeria’s oil extraction authorities to the effect that the corporate plaintiff had engaged in fraud and deceptive practice. According to the plaintiff, these allegations destroyed its chance to obtain certain oil rights that it was seeking. On appeal, the damages award was revised down to a mere CAD1,000 on the basis that:

  • there was no direct evidence of harm (ie, no witnesses that gave direct evidence on the effect of the defamation;
  • there was no wider publication of the letter; and
  • the trial court had erred in finding that the lack of an apology had aggravated the plaintiff’s damages.

In substituting the trial court’s decision on damages with its own nominal amount, the Court reached the right conclusion in the author’s opinion. The advent of the internet – and particularly virulent comment that can swirl around the internet unabated – has led some Canadian courts over the past decade to lean on higher damages awards as a way to sanction particularly ungovernable defendants who seem dedicated to unabated internet trolling. However, this new breed of defendant should not lead Canadian jurisprudence to forget certain foundational principles, such as the limited damages that usually accrue to a corporate plaintiff in the absence of clear and cogent evidence of specified harm.

However, defendants found to be acting as internet trolls may still find themselves on the sharp end of a damages award to a corporate plaintiff in the right circumstances. In Canadian Aids Treatment Information Exchange (CATIE) et al. v Blackwell, the Defendant, Blackwell, engaged in a long, vociferous defamation campaign against a not-for-profit corporation and eight of its workers who were providing treatment and education about HIV. The Defendant referred to the plaintiffs as groomers, paedophiles and all manner of sexual deviants – going so far as to feature the workers and corporate logos prominently on a defamatory website.

Interestingly – and in contrast to the conclusion reached in Mak Mera above – the corporate plaintiff was awarded CAD350,000 in general damages and CAD100,000 in aggravated damages. Now, it must be noted that this decision was a default judgment, meaning that it was not defended by the defendant. Nonetheless, the Court in this instance was comfortable giving hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages to a corporate plaintiff (alongside five- and six-figure damages awards to the worker-plaintiffs, no less) apparently on the basis that the defamatory website was followed by about 4,000 people, and the defamatory allegations reinforced harmful myths and stereotypes about HIV and the LGBTQ community (although, to be clear, the extent of evidence given on behalf of the corporate plaintiff is uncertain). What is clear is that the aggravated damages award was made on the finding that the defendant’s conduct would harm the corporation’s future outreach efforts.

The defendant’s conduct in this case was particularly egregious, but it is open to question how, or indeed whether, a corporate plaintiff without proof of a specific loss in income/donations etc, can or should be entitled to a six-figure damages award in a defamation action (especially in light of the approach to damages taken in Mak Mera). It is submitted that while the facts of each case vary greatly, they do not sit entirely easily with each other on a philosophical level.

If anything, it would appear that CATIE v Blackwell et al. reveals a damages award that is the product of its particular facts, and that Mak Mera is the more “correct” philosophical approach. Nonetheless, Blackwell demonstrates that corporate libel plaintiffs may still have grounds for substantial libel damages awards where the defamation goes far beyond principled debate and into outright and extensive “trolling”. While there may be a certain dissonance of principle if one tries to apply traditional defamation damage principles to the Blackwell case, it nevertheless shows that sometimes Canada’s judiciary will find a basis for an extreme damages award in an extreme case.

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Mark Donald Law was opened in 2016 and focuses on libel and wider media law, including privacy and injunction litigation. The firm assists individuals and media entities of all sizes with providing pre-publication advice, litigation, urgent injunctive proceedings, and appeals/judicial reviews. The firm is particularly experienced in anti-SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) motions and publication ban/media exclusion motions. The firm is regularly called upon to provide its insights on the media law landscape to other practitioners at media and legal industry events.

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Mark Donald Law was opened in 2016 and focuses on libel and wider media law, including privacy and injunction litigation. The firm assists individuals and media entities of all sizes with providing pre-publication advice, litigation, urgent injunctive proceedings, and appeals/judicial reviews. The firm is particularly experienced in anti-SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) motions and publication ban/media exclusion motions. The firm is regularly called upon to provide its insights on the media law landscape to other practitioners at media and legal industry events.

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