Exempt Versus Non-Exempt Workers
“Exempt” employees include those in “administrative, executive or professional capacities”. These workers are exempt from certain protections if they earn a salary of at least twice the minimum wage. The classification is based on actual job duties, not mere titles. All other employees are “non-exempt”.
Employees Versus Independent Contractors
Workers are employees unless they:
This is called the “ABC” test.
App-Based Transportation and Delivery Drivers
Drivers for statutorily defined “network companies” meeting specified conditions are deemed independent contractors entitled to unique benefits, including a minimum earnings guarantee. Which kinds of app-based work qualify is being actively litigated.
“At-Will” Versus “Definite-Duration” Contracts
At-will employees can be terminated, or quit, “at will”, while those with contracts for a definite term of more than one month can only be terminated for cause. While at-will is the default, courts recognise oral and implied contracts for employment which may render an employment relationship one for “definite duration” despite no written contract. See Eisenberg v Alameda Newspapers, Inc, 74 Cal App 4th 1359, 1386 (1999).
Employment Contracts
California does not require a written contract for employment, and parties have considerable latitude to determine the terms of employment within mandatory state standards – such as minimum wage – that effectively become part of the employment agreement whether written or otherwise. However, certain waivers of waivable state standards must be in signed writing.
Wage Statements
Employers must provide an accurate itemised statement detailing numerous aspects of the employment, including gross wages earned and total hours worked. Employees injured as a result of a knowing and intentional failure to comply with the wage statement requirements can sue for actual damages or statutory penalties, plus costs and attorney fees.
A reasonable good faith mistake is a defence. However, since employers who fail to adhere to state standards – such as on matters of pay or rest – will often therefore provide inaccurate wage statements, the wage statement rules may provide an additional avenue of recovery for workers.
Eight-Hour Workday as State Policy
California does not set a hard limit on the number of hours that may be worked in a week or day. However, the Labor Code does specify that “[e]ight hours of labor constitutes a day’s work” and work in excess of eight hours in a day, or 40 hours in a workweek, must be compensated by at least 150% of the regular rate of pay, as must the first eight hours worked on the seventh consecutive day of work. Additionally, any work in excess of 12 hours in one day must be compensated by at least 200% of the regular rate, as must any work in excess of eight hours on any seventh day of a workweek.
Alternative Workweeks
While employers are “discouraged” from imposing work beyond the eight/40-hour state baseline (Alvarado v Dart Container Corp of California, 4 Cal 5th 542, 561 (2018), as modified (25 April 2018)), they may propose an “alternative workweek” up to ten hours per day without the extra compensation usually required. The proposal must win two thirds of a secret vote of employees to become effective. Employees must still be compensated at 150% for work in excess of the alternative workweek hours up to 12 hours in a day, and at 200% for work in excess of the alternative workweek hours of more than 12 hours in a day.
Part-Time Employment
California imposes no particular requirements on part-time employment contracts, which are subject to the same hours requirements and “at will” assumption as other employment contracts.
State Minimum Wage
Since 2023, the minimum wage has been at least USD15 per hour, plus inflation adjustments, which consist of an increase of the lesser of:
Thus, in 2026 the state minimum is USD16.90 per hour for all employers. Certain industries have their own minimum wage requirements, such as healthcare workers who may be entitled to up to USD25 per hour after 1 July 2026.
Local Minimum Wage
Localities may set their own minimum wages, enforceable by employees via the Labor Code to the same extent as state minimums. For example, in Los Angeles as of 1 July 2026, the minimum wage is USD18.42 per hour, and an employee paid less than this in Los Angeles could bring a claim against their employer for minimum wage violations even if the wage is higher than the state minimum.
Bonuses
California treats bonuses – like almost all payments for labour – as wages, subject to the same requirements of prompt payment that apply to other wages.
Leave Entitlements
Paid vacation
While not legally required, where provided, vacation pay is considered “deferred compensation for services rendered” rather than a gratuity or gift, meaning that once earned it becomes part of an employee’s wages and is entitled to the same protections. See Suastez v Plastic Dress-Up Co, 31 Cal 3d 774, 779 (1982). Vacation pay vests as labour is performed, and once vested it becomes wages protected from forfeiture.
Upon termination or resignation, all vested vacation time must be promptly paid to the employee as wages at the employee’s usual rate. While accrued vacation cannot be subject to forfeiture, such that “use it or lose it” policies are unlawful in California, employers may set limits beyond which no further vacation will accrue. See Boothby v Atlas Mech, Inc, 6 Cal App 4th 1595, 1597 (1992).
Paid sick leave
Paid sick leave is mandatory and accrues at a rate of at least one hour every 30 hours worked, with exempt employees deemed to work 40 hours a week. An employee cannot use paid sick leave until the 90th day of employment but then may use it as it is accrued. Accrued sick leave carries over to the following year of employment, but usage can be limited by the employer to the greater of five days or 40 hours per year of employment. Paid sick leave must be compensated at the employee’s regular rate of pay, but employers are not required to compensate employees for accrued unused sick days upon termination.
The California Family Rights Act (CFRA)
Employees who have worked for an employer for at least 12 months and have completed at least 1,250 hours of work may request up to 12 workweeks in any 12-month period for family care and/or medical leave. Employers must ensure that the employee can return to the same or a comparable position after the leave. Family care and medical leave is defined broadly to include things such as birth, care of close family, the employee’s own health, and exigencies related to military service.
CFRA leave does not accrue. Employers may also require that the employee substitute paid leave to run concurrently with CFRA leave, such that the CFRA leave will exhaust accrued leave but be paid for as long as the accrued paid leave lasts. The employer can require this substitution of paid leave in the form of vacation pay and, if the CFRA leave is sought for the employee’s own health condition, the employer may also require substitution of accrued sick days.
Pregnancy disability leave
Pregnancy disability leave provides up to four months of unpaid leave for employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth or related conditions. This leave does not accrue but is available as needed during the period of disability. Employers must maintain and pay for group health insurance during the leave. Employees eligible for CFRA leave may take both pregnancy disability leave and an additional 12 weeks of CFRA leave for baby bonding.
Paid family leave
Paid family leave provides wage replacement benefits for up to eight weeks within a 12-month period. This leave can be taken to care for seriously ill close family, to bond with a new child, or in the event of a call to military service. This is an insurance benefit of the state, not employer-provided leave, and it does not accrue. Additionally, the statute does not guarantee job protection unless the employee also qualifies for protected leave.
Confidentiality
Settlement agreements
Settlement agreements in employment litigation cannot restrict the disclosure of factual information related to claims of sexual assault, harassment or discrimination filed in civil or administrative actions.
Confidentiality agreements cannot restrain trade
Confidentiality agreements must not be structured to prevent the employee from practising their profession, or they will be deemed unlawful non-compete agreements.
Confidentiality in arbitration agreements
Courts have found that confidentiality requirements in employment arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable and should be severed where possible.
Releases
Waiver of civil rights and non-disparagement agreements
It is illegal for an employer to condition raises, bonuses, hiring or continued employment on the employee either releasing civil rights claims or signing a non-disparagement agreement. Any agreement restricting disclosure of facts pertaining to unlawful workplace conduct must notify employees that they are not prevented from discussing unlawful acts such as harassment or discrimination.
Employer Liability for Employee Torts
Employer vicarious liability
Employers are liable for most employee torts committed within the scope of employment without proof of fault, such as negligence. See Sunderland v Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Sys Support Co, 130 Cal App 4th 1, 8 (2005). This liability extends to fraudulent, malicious and even criminal torts of employees, so long as they are committed within the scope of employment.
The “scope of employment” test for employee liability
There are two tests for “scope of employment”. Under one test, the employer is liable if the dangerous activities were undertaken with the employer’s permission and were of some benefit to the employer or inherent in the work. See Perez v City & Cnty of San Francisco, 75 Cal App 5th 826, 833 (2022). Under the other test, the employer is liable if:
Limitations on employer liability
Torts outside the “scope of employment”
A major restriction on employer liability exists where the employee has substantially deviated from employment duties for personal purposes unrelated to the employment. If the tort is of such a personal, non-work-related nature, the employer will not be liable even if the tort is committed on employer property and/or during work hours. See Farmers Ins Grp v Cnty of Santa Clara, 11 Cal 4th 992, 1005 (1995).
Independent contractors
California generally does not impose vicarious liability on employers for the torts of their independent contractors. See Bostrom v Cnty of San Bernardino, 35 Cal App 4th 1654, 1665 (1995). However, under the “peculiar risk doctrine”, an employer may be liable where the independent contractor is hired to perform inherently dangerous work. Additionally, under the “non-delegable duty doctrine” an employer may be liable for failures to perform certain duties by independent contractors, based on the notion that certain duties simply cannot be delegated.
Employee Direct Liability
Employees are also personally liable for torts they commit at work. Thus, where an employee commits a tort within the scope of employment, both the employer and the employee may be liable.
Non-Competes Generally Void
California voids non-compete agreements in employment contexts, with narrow exceptions. California does not recognise independent consideration as a basis for validating non-compete agreements in the employment context, and any contract void under the non-compete prohibition is unenforceable regardless of where and when the contract was signed. Should an employer either enter into or attempt to enforce an illegal non-compete, the employee may sue for injunctive relief, damages or both, and recover attorney fees and costs.
Exception for Sale of Business Goodwill
A business owner selling the goodwill of a business may agree to non-competition with the buyer within a limited geographic area.
Customer Non-Solicits
Customer non-solicitation agreements are illegal restraints of trade. Should an employer either enter into or attempt to enforce an illegal non-solicitation agreement, the employee may sue for injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees and costs.
There is a narrowly construed exception that may apply when such an agreement is necessary to protect a trade secret of the employer. See Gordon v Landau, 49 Cal 2d 690, 694 (1958). However, following AMN Healthcare, Inc v Aya Healthcare Services, Inc, there is doubt as to whether even this limited exception survives (28 Cal App 5th 923 (2018)).
Employee Non-Solicits
Employee non-solicits are presumptively void, even when narrowly drawn or otherwise limited. See California Business and Professions Code Section 16600. AMN Healthcare, Inc v Aya Healthcare Services, Inc took the position that Section 16600 has no exception for “narrow” or “limited” restrictions, but found that even if such exceptions existed they would not save an agreement that “restrained individual [workers] from engaging in their chosen profession, even in a ‘narrow’ manner or a ‘limited’ way”. Id at 939.
Employer Obligations to Protect Employee Data
The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA)
Employers who receive employee medical information, defined broadly, must establish “appropriate procedures” to ensure confidentiality. California prohibits disclosure or use of such information without authorisation in most cases that do not pertain to benefits administration. Employers who violate the CMIA can face civil penalties up to USD250,000 per violation and may be guilty of a misdemeanour.
Sunset of California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) exemption
As of 1 January 2023, California employers are no longer exempt from the CCPA and must therefore protect the personal information of employees and applicants from disclosure. Covered employers must provide a notice at collection and privacy policy to workers, honour certain employee data-related requests, and limit use of sensitive information. There is no private right of action except in the case of a data breach.
Genetic and biometric information
Genetic data and biometric data are classified as “sensitive” and subject to heightened protections.
Social security numbers
Employers may not publicly post or display an individual’s social security number, including on any access card, and may not:
However, employers may, and often must, obtain these numbers from employees, and can be required to disclose these numbers, including to federal agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service. See, for example, Overhill Farms, Inc v Lopez, 190 Cal App 4th 1248 (2010).
Employee Privacy Rights
The California Constitution
The California Constitution contains an explicit right to privacy. See California Constitution, Article I, Section 1. This right applies to private entities, including employers, and the California Supreme Court has cautioned that the “diverse” and “complex” employment context requires careful attention by courts.
A plaintiff seeking recovery for a privacy violation under the California Constitution must establish:
See Hill v Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn, 7 Cal 4th 1, 37 (1994).
Disclosure of application data
The California Supreme Court has stated that a “job applicant who provides personal information to a prospective employer can reasonably expect that the employer will not divulge the information outside the entity except in very limited circumstances”. See Cnty of Los Angeles v Los Angeles Cnty Emp Rels Com, 56 Cal 4th 905, 928 (2013) (holding that certain disclosures to a union were justified).
Privacy in the workplace
The California Supreme Court has stated that “the same analysis applies in the workplace as in other settings; consequently, an employee may, under some circumstances, have a reasonable expectation of visual or aural privacy against electronic intrusion by a stranger to the workplace, despite the possibility that the conversations and interactions at issue could be witnessed by coworkers or the employer”. See Sanders v Am Broad Cos, Inc, 20 Cal 4th 907, 918 (1999).
Specific facts are important, such as the use of technology to conduct surveillance, and the location where the observation occurred (eg, in a private versus public space). See Hernandez v Hillsides, Inc, 47 Cal 4th 272, 291 (2009).
Employers should ensure that any privacy notices, such as those informing employees of the monitoring of internet use or email, are sufficient to notify employees as to all potential privacy-intruding practices, as an effective notice may prevent the employee from being able to establish a “reasonable expectation of privacy”.
Privacy of employee communications
Employees are entitled only to the privacy they might reasonably expect. Even emails sent by an employee to their attorney regarding potential legal action against the employer are not confidential attorney-client communications if:
See Holmes v Petrovich Dev Co, LLC, 191 Cal App 4th 1047, 1051 (2011).
Under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA), it is illegal to “intercept” (ie, wiretap) communications, or record confidential communications, without consent. A party to a communication cannot be sued for interception, but they can be sued for recording without consent. As such, employers must obtain consent from all parties before recording a communication, including through the use of transcription and recording services provided by third-party vendors, and must be cautious not to “aid and abet” the wiretapping of a conversation by such vendors.
Employee Right to Personnel Records
Current and former employees have a right to inspect and receive a copy of certain personnel records, including records of any grievance. Records must generally be provided within 30 days of a valid employee request and must be maintained for at least three years after termination of employment under the Labor Code and for four years under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).
Federal immigration policy has experienced significant shifts since 2025, and California has responded with new legislation to protect foreign workers. Practitioners should verify current requirements.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) prohibits US employers from hiring workers who are unauthorised to work in the USA, and requires employers to verify work eligibility by completing a Form I-9 for each employee, retained for three years from hire or one year after separation, whichever is longer. On 16 March 2026, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) published a fact sheet that elevated several Form I-9 violations from technical to substantive violations, which may lead to additional penalties for non-compliant employers without a corrections period.
California law extends employment protections to all workers regardless of immigration status, and immigration-related retaliation (eg, threatening to report status, misusing E-Verify) is independently actionable, supporting both Labor Commissioner enforcement and private claims. Under the Immigrant Worker Protection Act, employers may not voluntarily consent to immigration agents entering non-public worksite areas or accessing employee records without a judicial warrant or subpoena. Effective 2026, the Workplace Know Your Rights Act requires an annual notice of employees’ rights during immigration enforcement encounters and employee designation of an emergency contact to be notified upon workplace arrest or detention. Non-compliance carries civil penalties of up to USD500 per employee per violation (and, for emergency-contact violations, up to USD500 per employee per day, capped at USD10,000 per employee).
Employers seeking to hire foreign workers must first seek certification through the US Department of Labor, then petition the US Citizenship and Immigration Services for a visa, which varies based on the circumstances. Applicants must establish that they are admissible to the USA.
One category of non-immigrant visa, H-1B, which focuses on specialty occupations, has faced particular challenges in the past year. In September 2025, Presidential Proclamation 10973 imposed a USD100,000 fee on certain new H-1B petitions. A federal judge in Massachusetts struck down the requirement in June 2026, but the decision is stayed pending appeal, so the fee is currently collectible.
California largely prohibits agreements entered into on or after 1 January 2026 that require employees to repay costs associated with sponsoring immigrant and non-immigrant visas and permanent resident status.
Application of General Employment Laws
California’s general employment laws apply to remote workers when California is the “physical location where the worker presents himself or herself to begin work”. See Ward v United Airlines, Inc, 9 Cal 5th 732, 755 (2020). Ward determined that the legislature intended the wage statement laws to apply “to workers whose work is not performed predominantly in any one state, provided that California is the state that has the most significant relationship to the work”. Id. This was satisfied for “interstate transportation workers and others who do not work more than half the time in any one state” so long as “the worker performs some work [in California] and is based in California”. Id. For remote workers based entirely within California, there is complete protection under California employment law.
Specific Rules for Certain Employees
State employee telecommuting programme
California law has a policy in favour of remote work by state employees, and every state agency must develop a remote work policy where it is favourable to the agency’s objectives.
Financial services employees
Certain financial services employees are subject to specific restrictions on remote work, which require the employer to enforce certain policies, such as prohibiting in-person consumer interactions and ensuring that remote employees have adequate equipment.
Data Privacy for Remote Workers
Other than covered financial services employees, remote workers are generally subject to, and protected by, the same data privacy laws that apply to on-site workers.
Workplace Injuries
Injuries and illnesses that occur while an employee is working from home are considered work-related if the injury or illness occurs while the employee is performing work for pay or compensation in the home, and the injury or illness is directly related to the performance of work rather than to the general home environment or setting. The regulations provide examples, including an employee dropping a box of work documents on their foot (work-related), and tripping over the family dog while answering a work call (not work-related).
Tax
For employers with employees who work partially or entirely outside California, it is important to determine whether the employee’s presence in a non-California state triggers tax withholding requirements for the employer. An employer may have tax obligations in a state based on their employee’s presence in that state even if the employer otherwise has no business contacts with that state. With international employees, the employer must further ensure that they are complying with any laws of the foreign jurisdiction in which the employee is located.
A remote employee must pay California taxes even on work performed outside California so long as the employee is deemed to be a California resident. For non-residents, California will tax only gross income sourced from within California.
Sabbaticals for Employees in Education
A leave of absence of up to one year may be granted for the purpose of study or travel that will benefit the school/university and its students.
Sabbaticals for Other Employees
In the private employment context, California courts distinguish between “legitimate” sabbaticals, in which “the leave is designed as an incentive for continued and improved performance”, and mere vacations, which include so-called sabbaticals that are “merely as a reward for a prior period of service”. See Paton v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, 197 Cal App 4th 1505, 1521 (2011). Courts consider several factors to distinguish between sabbaticals and vacation, including the frequency and length of leave. Id. Vacation, but not sabbaticals, must be paid out on termination. Id. In addition to the factors discussed in Paton, courts will consider the extent to which the programme resembles recognised sabbatical programmes, such as in education.
High-Risk Automated Decision Systems in Employment
California Government Code Section 11546.45.5 defines a “high-risk automated decision system” as “an automated decision system that is used to assist or replace human discretionary decisions that have a legal or similarly significant effect, including decisions that materially impact access to… employment”. State agencies are required to maintain comprehensive inventories of such systems, but private employers are not implicated.
Artificial Intelligence-Related Employment Discrimination
California’s existing discrimination laws under FEHA apply to artificial intelligence-assisted employment decisions.
Ongoing Developments
In 2026 the California Senate proposed Senate Bill 951, imposing notice and other obligations on some employers who fire employees or restrict hiring due to automated decision-making technology. The statute would require at least 60 days’ written notice ahead of any layoffs, or cessation of hiring, affecting 25 or more workers (or 25% of workers), and provide for penalties up to USD500 per day for violations, plus back pay where appropriate. Employers would also be required to give notice to the state and identify the specific technology and vendor at issue. The proposed statute would be enforceable through private lawsuits.
Federal and State Regulation
The federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs private-sector unions, whereas California law covers public-sector employees and is administered by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). Both the federal and state schemes encourage the use of collective bargaining by employees and strictly curtail employer interference with this protected collective activity.
Federal law
The NLRA declares a federal policy of encouraging and protecting collective bargaining activity by employees. Employees under the NLRA have the right to:
The Supreme Court has held, however, that the right to engage in “concerted activities” does not include a right to sue as a class where there is an applicable arbitration agreement. See Epic Sys Corp v Lewis, 584 US 497 (2018). The NLRA covers collective bargaining in private-sector employment but permits states to regulate labour relations with their own employees.
California law
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)
California’s MMBA, administered by PERB, governs labour relations between local governments and their employees to promote communication between such employers and employees by providing procedures to resolve disputes relating to terms and conditions of employment, and to provide a uniform method for recognising the organisational rights of public employees.
The Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) and Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA)
The EERA governs public school employees and promotes the right of such employees to join labour organisations and be represented in employment disputes by representatives of their choice. The HEERA governs labour relations in the California State University and University of California systems.
California Labor Code Sections 922–23
California Labor Code Sections 922–923 operate as a foundational declaration of state policy for private-sector workers, finding that such workers have full freedom of association to self-organise and designate representatives to negotiate employment terms without employer interference. It is a crime for any person to coerce or compel any person to agree not to join a union as a condition of employment. However, because most conduct that is illegal under Section 922 is also covered by the NLRA, which pre-empts state law, most employer disruptions of protected union activity are challenged under the NLRA rather than the Labor Code.
The California Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA)
The ALRA provides collective bargaining rights for agricultural workers who are excluded from coverage under the federal NLRA. The ALRA mirrors California Labor Code Sections 922–23 in encouraging and protecting union activity, and is administered by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (ALRB).
The term “employee organisation” encompasses traditional unions and other employee groups. In practice, most recognised employee bodies in California are traditional labour unions, and courts frequently use “union” and “employee organisation” interchangeably.
Federal Law Is Primary
The primary scheme applicable in California is the federal scheme. In the case of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) governs the enforcement of such agreements in federal court.
California Specifics
CBAs are generally enforced the same as other contracts, and breaches are subject to the same remedies, including injunctive relief. However, in certain cases the existence of a valid CBA will exclude a covered worker from the right to statutory sick days under the Labor Code, so long as the CBA provides for certain minimum protections, including a wage of at least 30% more than the state minimum wage. Additionally, for agricultural workers, California mandates mediation and a conciliation process when the parties fail to reach a CBA.
Grounds for Termination
At-will employees
At-will employees can be fired at almost any time and for almost any non-discriminatory reason, or no reason at all, with no minimum notice period. Despite this, the employer cannot terminate for an illegal reason, such as illegal discrimination, or one contrary to fundamental public policy recognised in a constitutional or statutory provision.
Definite-duration employees
Employees subject to a contract for a definite term can only be terminated for specific statutory or contractual grounds. See California Labor Code Section 2924. In other words, employees subject to a definite-duration contract can only be fired “for cause”. However, when a definite-duration contract reaches the end of its term, the employment terminates automatically without need for cause.
All employees
Every employment – both at-will and for a definite duration – is terminated by any of the following:
Collective Redundancies
The California Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (the “Cal/WARN Act”)
The Cal/WARN Act imposes advance notice requirements on employers conducting mass layoffs, plant closures, or relocations, and provides greater protections than the federal counterpart, which may also apply.
Notice requirements
An employer cannot execute a mass layoff, relocation or termination at a covered establishment without providing 60 days’ advance written notice to affected employees and specified government agencies, which must include all of the contents required by the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, with additional state requirements. Notice requirements are waived if the layoff/relocation/termination is necessitated by a “physical calamity or act of war”.
Liability
An employer who fails to give notice must pay affected employees back pay at the average regular rate of compensation received during the last three years of employment, or the final rate (whichever is higher), as well as the value of any benefits that would have been received. An employer who fails to pay is subject to a civil penalty of up to USD500 per day of violation unless the employer pays all applicable employees the amounts owed within three weeks from the date of the layoff/relocation/termination.
At-Will Employees
At-will employees can be terminated at any time without cause or minimum notice.
Definite-Duration Employees
Employees with contractual employment terms are entitled to any notice provided in the employment contract. Courts have approved employment contracts that permit termination without cause on 60 days’ written notice, and with cause with no notice. However, there are no minimum notice terms for termination for cause in a contractual employment.
Employees Subject to a CBA
CBAs are highly customisable by the parties, and unions may negotiate for notice periods in the applicable CBAs, which become enforceable once executed.
Severance
The requirement to pay “severance” will only arise from a contract between the employer and employee, when required by a CBA, or when an employer violates the Cal/WARN Act and is liable for quasi-severance penalties.
Employees subject to a definite-duration contract can be terminated on grounds agreed in the contract, as well as for specific statutory reasons:
Similarly, an employee subject to a CBA may be dismissed based on grounds agreed between the union and the employer.
Release of Claims
Courts enforce even very broad releases that cover known and unknown state and federal claims arising from employment or its termination. Releases often require explicit waiver of California Civil Code Section 1542, which generally prevents the release of unknown claims. The question of whether future claims can be released is complex, as California generally prohibits contracts that excuse a party from their own future lawbreaking.
Claims under FEHA can be released, but such releases are subject to court scrutiny to ensure that the release was knowing and voluntary and not itself the product of discrimination.
Other Limitations
Certain provisions in termination agreements are simply unlawful. These chiefly relate to employee non-solicits, customer non-solicits, and non-compete agreements, which are strictly limited.
Protected Characteristics Under FEHA
Under FEHA, it is illegal to discriminate against any employee because of race, religious creed, gender expression, sexual orientation, reproductive health decision-making, veteran or military status, colour, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity or age.
Whistle-Blowers
Employers are prohibited from retaliating against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency, to a supervisor or to a public investigatory body, hearing or inquiry where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information reveals a violation of law. Retaliation against employees who refuse to participate in illegal activities is also unlawful.
Occupational safety complaints
It is unlawful to discharge or discriminate against an employee due to that employee’s institution of a proceeding relating to their rights, their testifying in such a proceeding, or due to the employee’s exercise of any right afforded by the occupational safety laws.
Labor rights and wage complaints
Employers may not take any adverse action against an employee because of the employee’s engaging in conduct protected by the Labor Code, filing a bona fide complaint or claim with the Labor Commissioner, making a complaint that they are owed wages, or exercising any rights.
Immigrant Employees
Reporting – or threatening to report – an employee’s immigration status (or that of their family), real or suspected, to the authorities because the employee has exercised their rights constitutes an “adverse action” for the purpose of determining a violation of the employee’s rights.
At-Will Employees
Even for at-will employees, California courts recognise a tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and in some cases courts will impute an implied contract to an otherwise at-will relationship based on the parties’ conduct.
Wrongful termination in violation of public policy
The primary theory requires the employee to prove four elements:
See Diego v Pilgrim United Church of Christ, 231 Cal App 4th 913, 920 (2014).
Additionally, the policy providing the basis of the claim must meet the following requirements (Id):
Breach of implied contract
A terminated at-will employee who can prove that the employer breached an implied-in-fact covenant to terminate only for good cause may be able to recover on tort and contract theories. In other words, even where there is no written contract at issue, sufficient evidence of an intent to make the employee terminable only for cause can overcome the presumption of at-will employment and entitle the employee to assert wrongful termination as though they were definite-duration employees. See Foley v Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal 3d 654, 677 (1988).
Definite-Duration Employees
Breach of the employment contract
To establish wrongful dismissal under a definite-duration contract, the employee must prove that the employer terminated the employment prior to the term’s expiry, without the good cause required by California Labor Code Section 2924. This is treated as a breach-of-contract action.
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
The “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing” applies to all contracts and requires the parties to prosecute the contractual relationship without interfering with the other party’s ability to receive their benefits under the contract. In practice, this means that the employer cannot frustrate the employee’s ability to benefit under the contract, even if this does not rise to a breach of any particular contractual term.
Remedies for Wrongful Dismissal
At-will employees proceeding on a public policy theory
For at-will employees proceeding under a public policy theory, the remedy is tort damages, and a victorious employee may recover compensatory damages for lost wages as well as potentially punitive damages where the employer’s conduct was particularly egregious. See Freund v Nycomed Amersham, 347 F3d 752, 760 (9th Cir 2003).
Definite-duration employees
Definite-duration employees wrongfully discharged are entitled to expectation damages representing the wages and benefits they would have received under the remainder of the contract term. Definite-duration employees may not sue for tort damages under the implied covenant and may not claim under both the implied covenant and the written contract for the same employer conduct. Definite-duration employees proceeding on an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory are restricted to contract remedies and cannot seek tort remedies. See Foley v Interactive Data Corp, 47 Cal 3d 654, 693 (1988).
Discriminatory discharge
Discharging an employee on a discriminatory or retaliatory basis is prohibited by FEHA. Such workers may recover any relief available in civil actions. Employees may also seek tort damages, including punitive damages for public policy violations based on FEHA’s policy, while FEHA itself gives rise to the full range of statutory remedies. See Stevenson v Superior Ct, 16 Cal 4th 880, 895 (1997).
The “same-decision” defence
If an employer can prove that it would have made the same employment decision without the discriminatory motive, the court cannot award economic damages, back pay or reinstatement, but may still award declaratory relief, injunctive relief (to end the discrimination) and attorney fees. See Harris v City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal 4th 203, 235 (2013).
Whistle-Blowers
Employees subject to adverse action, including termination, for reporting suspected lawbreaking can recover all available remedies, plus a civil penalty of up to USD10,000 per employee per violation for the benefit of the employee, not the state. Additionally, employees discharged for making bona fide safety complaints are entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and benefits. These statutory remedies are cumulative, and employees may also pursue common law and/or FEHA claims based on the same conduct. See Prue v Brady Co/San Diego, 242 Cal App 4th 1367, 1381 (2015).
Constructive Discharge
Where the former employee can establish that the employer’s conduct effectively forced their resignation, such as by making work intolerable, they may be able to establish “constructive discharge”. The employee must still prove the other elements of a wrongful dismissal claim, but the doctrine can transform a resignation into a “firing” for purposes of wrongful dismissal.
Discrimination in employment is prohibited at both the state and federal level, with California’s FEHA working alongside several important federal statutes to prohibit employment discrimination.
FEHA
California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination in employment based on protected characteristics such as race or sex. FEHA also requires employers, labour organisations, employment agencies and training programmes to take reasonably necessary steps to prevent discrimination and harassment from occurring. FEHA prohibits retaliation against employees who have opposed discriminatory practices or have filed complaints and/or given testimony to that effect.
The exhaustion requirement for FEHA claims
A person claiming to be subject to employment discrimination must file a verified complaint with the Civil Rights Department, setting forth the details of the claim, and obtain a “right-to-sue” letter. Failure to comply with this requirement can lead to dismissal of a FEHA claim.
Remedies
Courts may grant any relief available in a civil action for a violation of FEHA, including injunctive relief, hiring, reinstatement, upgrading, back pay, front pay and other equitable relief.
While California has no specific requirements for digitalisation in employment disputes, California courts and agencies are typically at or near the forefront of the use of digital technology in dispute resolution. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, remote court access has become common, and many arbitration agreements permit remote hearings. In addition, under California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, electronic records and signatures are given the same legal effect as paper versions.
The Berman Hearing
Scope and procedure
Berman hearings are limited to wages, overtime, meal/rest break pay, final pay and related compensation-based claims. The Berman hearing is designed to provide quick, informal and affordable resolution to claims, and is held within 90 days of the matter being accepted by the Labor Commissioner, who must file an order, decision or award within 15 days of the hearing. Pleadings are limited to a complaint and an answer; there are relaxed rules of evidence, and there is no right to formal discovery and no need for a party to be represented by a lawyer.
Employee election of forum: court or Labor Commissioner
When an employer fails to pay due wages, the employee has a choice between filing a civil claim in court or filing a wage claim with the Labor Commissioner under the Berman hearing procedure – there is no requirement of exhaustion as exists for discrimination claims. See Arias v Kardoulias, 207 Cal App 4th 1429, 1434 (2012).
Appeals
An employer must post a bond for any appeal that covers the amount of the award. Further, employers are liable for employee attorney fees if the employee wins anything above zero after the appeal, but employees are only liable for employer fees if they are awarded zero – even employees whose claims are dismissed on jurisdictional grounds are not liable. Id at 1438. Appeals of Berman orders are de novo, essentially providing for a complete redo of the hearing. If no appeal is filed, the order becomes a “final order” which is enforceable as a civil judgment.
The Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA)
PAGA authorises employees who have personally suffered an enumerated Labor Code violation within a year to recover civil penalties for Labor Code violations on behalf of themselves, other employees and the State of California itself. Under PAGA, the employee is “deputised” by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and brings a civil action in court. Any provision of the Labor Code that provides for a civil penalty assessed by the LWDA can instead be enforced through a PAGA action. PAGA has a one-year statute of limitations.
Remedies
To incentivise public actions in furtherance of PAGA’s pro-enforcement goals, the statute provides that 35% of the penalty assessed can be awarded to the workers, and these awards can be substantial. No other monetary remedies are available, but workers may be awarded injunctive relief and attorney fees.
Notice requirement
PAGA requires written notice, which must include some factual basis for the claims rather than mere recitation of statutory violations, filed online with the LWDA and mailed to the employer, and a fee of USD75 (which may be waived). The plaintiff cannot sue under PAGA for 65 days, during which the LWDA must either take the case or permit the employee to proceed. However, employees are not barred from suing under the Labor Code in court before, or contemporaneously with, notice to the LWDA, and can amend such lawsuits to add PAGA claims following the LWDA’s declination or expiry of the notice period. See Brown v Ralphs Grocery Co, 28 Cal App 5th 824, 835 (2018). The LWDA very rarely decides to investigate a case.
FEHA
An employee bringing employment discrimination claims under FEHA must exhaust administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the Civil Rights Department and obtaining a “right-to-sue” letter. Unlike Labor Code claims subject to the Berman hearing procedure, there is no dedicated tribunal responsible for FEHA disputes; upon exhausting administrative remedies, the plaintiff may sue in court.
Class Actions
California has a state policy in favour of class actions to resolve disputes. See Marler v EM Johansing, LLC, 199 Cal App 4th 1450, 1462 (2011). Almost all employment claims can theoretically be resolved on a classwide basis, but class action plaintiffs may not seek the civil penalties available under PAGA.
Generally Available Arbitration
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable unless they are:
This is occasionally phrased as a “policy in favour” of arbitration, though in recent years courts have been clear that this “policy” does not permit courts to actually favour arbitration, requiring “equal treatment” instead. See Morgan v Sundance, Inc, 596 US 411 (2022); Quach v California Com Club, Inc, 16 Cal 5th 562 (2024).
Challenges to Arbitration Agreements
Unconscionability is the most common challenge to arbitration agreements, and requires both “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability, evaluated on a “sliding scale” such that a great deal of one will excuse a small amount of the other.
Procedural unconscionability concerns the process of forming the contract. Factors such as the font size, the complexity and length of the agreement, and the extent of negotiation, if any, bear upon this inquiry. Substantive unconscionability concerns the unfairness of the terms themselves.
In California, arbitration agreements between employers and their workers are subject to minimum requirements. See Armendariz v Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc, 24 Cal 4th 83 (2000). To avoid unconscionability, an agreement that requires employees to arbitrate statutory employment claims must provide for:
The baseline assumption in California employment litigation is that each party is responsible for their own attorney fees. However, in the employment context this is subject to numerous exceptions. A prevailing plaintiff in a FEHA action will ordinarily recover attorney fees, but a prevailing employer defendant can only recover attorney fees if the plaintiff’s case was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation or brought in bad faith.
The law provides for attorney fees and costs for prevailing employees alleging payment below the minimum wage. Unlike under FEHA, the award is not discretionary. There is one-way fee-shifting in favour of workers who prevail in whistle-blower retaliation claims.
Finally, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5 allows courts to award attorney fees to a successful party in any action that results in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, which can apply in employment litigation.
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The most significant developments in California employment law in recent years have concerned the ever-changing area of arbitration enforcement and, particularly:
The prohibition of case-aggregation devices, such as class actions and PAGA, favours employers and businesses. The reason is primarily practical: prosecuting a lawsuit successfully requires commitments of attorney time and resources, and, where the maximum recovery is limited to that of a single employee, the cost is typically too great to make an individual case economically viable. In other words, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for [USD30].” See Carnegie v Household Int’l, Inc, 376 F3d 656, 661 (7th Cir 2004).
Crucially, the Supreme Court has held that, in the context of arbitration, claimants can be required to waive the right to participate in a class action. See AT&T Mobility LLC v Concepcion, 563 US 333, 344 (2011). As class actions are the primary case-aggregation vehicle for employees, the ability to pre-emptively shut down class actions is a powerful draw for employers drafting such agreements.
Arbitration Basics
Arbitration is a private dispute-resolution forum. While arbitration is supposedly less formal than court litigation (Concepcion, 563 US at 348), the system will be basically familiar to a litigator. Almost any dispute can be contractually assigned to arbitration via an arbitration clause, often within the employment contract or presented at hiring. Even the question of whether a dispute can be arbitrated can itself be sent to arbitration pursuant to a clear and unmistakable “delegation clause” in the arbitration agreement. See Aanderud v Superior Ct, 13 Cal App 5th 880, 892 (2017).
Arbitration is very customisable, with most of the process subject to contractual modification, but also subject to generally applicable contract defences such as unconscionability. Owing to the take-it-or-leave-it nature of most employment agreements (OTO, LLC v Kho, 8 Cal 5th 111, 126 (2019)), most customisation in practice is at the direction of the drafting employer. Arbitration is governed primarily by the FAA and state arbitration acts. The FAA pre-empts state laws that discriminate against arbitration.
Arbitration is widely perceived as less favourable to employees than court, with empirical research suggesting lower win rates and recoveries and a claim-suppressing effect from the mere presence of an arbitration agreement. See, eg, Alexander JS Colvin & Mark D Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR Rev. 1019 (2015); Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration: Access to the Courts Is Now Barred for More Than 60 Million American Workers, Econ Pol’y Inst (6 April 2018). Additionally, there are structural features of arbitration that may systematically disadvantage employees, such as limitations on discovery, confidentiality of awards and proceedings, and opportunities for employer parties to delay or prolong the proceedings.
PAGA
California’s PAGA is a unique statutory scheme that permits “aggrieved” employees to sue employers for Labor Code violations on behalf of the State of California and seek a portion of the civil penalties awarded. PAGA was created to address the gulf between the state resources available to address Labor Code violations and the prevalence of such violations. See Arias v Superior Ct, 46 Cal 4th 969, 980 (2009). This is achieved by “deputising” the aggrieved employee as a private attorney general who prosecutes the claims on behalf of the other aggrieved employees. The State, which remains the real party in interest in the suit, takes 65% of the civil penalty. See Arias, 46 Cal 4th at 980-81. So long as the employee bringing the action has suffered at least one Labor Code violation within the limitations period, they may seek penalties for violations suffered by other employees. See ZB, NA v Superior Ct, 8 Cal 5th 175, 185 (2019); but see discussion of Assembly Bill 2288 in the Lingering questions section.
PAGA has had a troubled relationship with arbitration due to its inherently aggregative (the aggrieved employee stands in the shoes of other aggrieved employees in a manner similar to a class action) and representative (the aggrieved employee stands in the shoes of the State in a manner similar to a qui tam action) nature. This means that certain questions at the heart of arbitration enforcement require unique answers in the PAGA context.
Initially, the law in California was that PAGA claims could not be compelled to arbitration at all, with the California Supreme Court reasoning that PAGA disputes are not the kind of bilateral contract-based disputes that the FAA was designed to encompass. See Iskanian v CLS Transp Los Angeles, LLC, 59 Cal 4th 348, 388 (2014). Thus, PAGA claims operated essentially as an exception to the general enforceability of employment arbitration agreements. Id at 388–89.
Viking River
In Viking River Cruises, Inc v Moriana, the US Supreme Court agreed with Iskanian that the prohibition on “wholesale” waivers of PAGA rights is not pre-empted. See 596 US 639, 662 (2022). However, the Supreme Court held that the FAA does pre-empt the so-called “indivisibility rule” set forth in Iskanian. See Viking River, 596 US at 662. This rule of Iskanian prohibited the splitting of PAGA actions into “individual” and “non-individual” (ie, on behalf of other employees) portions for purposes of arbitration. Viking River further held that, once an employee’s “individual” PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration, the employee loses statutory standing for “non-individual” claims, which must be dismissed. Id at 663.
Post-Viking River: California responds
While FAA pre-emption is a question of federal law for the US Supreme Court to resolve, the statutory standing question is a question of California law. See 596 US at 664 (Sotomayor, J concurring). In Adolph v Uber Technologies, Inc, the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Viking River standing analysis, holding that an employee compelled to arbitrate individual PAGA claims nonetheless “maintains statutory standing to pursue PAGA claims arising out of events involving other employees”. See 14 Cal 5th 1104, 1114 (2023) (citation modified).
Thus, in 2026, the law of PAGA is as follows:
Lingering questions
Leeper v Shipt, Inc and “PAGA Standing”
One important question that remains unsettled is whether PAGA requires an aggrieved employee to bring individual claims at all, or whether they may seek penalties only on behalf of other employees in a so-called “headless” PAGA action. The court in Leeper v Shipt, Inc held that “headless” PAGA actions cannot exist as there is “an individual PAGA claim in every PAGA action”. See 107 Cal App 5th 1001, 1010 (2024). However, the same appellate district in an earlier case also held the reverse. See Balderas v Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc, 101 Cal App 5th 533, 536 (2024), as modified (18 April 2024). The California Supreme Court has granted review of Leeper, and a decision is expected in 2026.
Additionally, pursuant to Assembly Bill 2288, the definition of an “aggrieved employee” under PAGA now requires that the employee suffer “each of the violations alleged” within a one-year limitations period established by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340. While these modifications to the definition have been described as non-material by a court (Williams v Alacrity Sols Grp, LLC, 110 Cal App 5th 932, 942 n6 (2025)), it remains to be seen whether Assembly Bill 2288 will alter the standing requirements under PAGA as a matter of practice.
Mass Arbitration
Concepcion was the culmination of a series of decisions taking increasingly restrictive positions on the availability of class actions when an arbitration agreement is at issue, making clear that in such cases companies can require waiver of the right to class actions and that, conversely, class arbitration is unavailable unless specifically contracted for. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 559 US 662, 687 (2010).
The plaintiffs’ bar responded with a procedure that has become known as “mass arbitration”, in which claimants bring large numbers of arbitration demands at once, with each demand requesting individual arbitration under the agreement. Unlike a class or PAGA action, a mass arbitration does not inherently involve representation of others or aggregation of claims into a single procedure – each case stands or falls on its own merits in its own proceeding.
Early legal challenges fail to curtail the procedure
Despite the apparent win-win aspect of mass arbitration, with employers winning one-on-one arbitrations and employees winning the ability to viably bring cases, the emergence of the phenomenon has been a cause of considerable alarm among the defence bar, with the US Chamber of Commerce publishing reports condemning the process as a “shakedown”. See Andrew J. Pincus, Archis A. Parasharami, Kevin Ranlett & Carmen Longoria-Green, Mass Arbitration Shakedown: Coercing Unjustified Settlements, US Chamber of Com Inst for Legal Reform (February 2023). Courts have noted the apparent tension. See Abernathy v DoorDash, Inc, 438 F Supp 3d 1062, 1068 (ND Cal 2020) (“This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order.”).
There were several early and largely unsuccessful attempts to defeat mass arbitration campaigns in court. These included attempts to label mass arbitration procedures “de facto class actions” barred by the agreement’s class action waiver (Adams v Postmates, Inc, 414 F Supp 3d 1246, 1254 (ND Cal 2019), aff’d, 823 F App’x 535 (9th Cir 2020)), with some corporate defendants even suing their own customers on this theory to attempt to curtail mass arbitration campaigns. See Intuit Inc v 9,933 Individuals, No B308417, 2021 WL 3204816, at *2 (Cal Ct App 29 July 2021) (this case is unpublished and cannot be cited in California courts). Seeing little promise in court challenges, many large employers have responded by attempting to modify their arbitration agreements to prevent practically a mass arbitration from occurring by increasing the cost and time commitments required to successfully prosecute such campaigns.
Some employers abandon arbitration agreements entirely
Some large businesses have removed their arbitration agreements entirely, apparently determining the threat of mass arbitration to be more serious than that of class actions. This may be because in a mass arbitration the drafting business is often responsible for arbitration costs in addition to the cost of any recovery obtained. Removing agreements entirely is the only reliable way to avoid mass arbitration, but it exposes the employer to potential class action liability.
Defining mass arbitration
Many modern agreements define mass arbitration within the agreement, typically as more than a certain number of “similar” claims (often 25) brought by “the same or coordinated counsel”. Notably, such definitions, when paired with terms that impede the prosecution of mass arbitration, can interfere with claimants’ right to counsel of their choosing. One court noted that “[f]orcing claimants to avoid experienced counsel in favor of less qualified or experienced representation – simply to sidestep mass arbitration delays – imposes an unjustifiable cost” for the defendant’s sole benefit and is therefore unconscionable. See Rios v HRB Digital LLC, 807 F Supp 3d 975, 991 (ND Cal 2025).
Batching
In a batching system, mass-filed demands are divided into tranches that are arbitrated in a specific order agreed by the parties. In Rios, the court noted that due to the batching scheme even if the arbitrator completed each arbitration within the 120 days “encouraged” by the agreement, it would take 13 years to resolve just 2,000 claims. See 807 F Supp 3d at 990. Given that, in reality, very few arbitrations are concluded within 120 days, this estimate is likely extremely conservative. Similarly, in the seminal case of MacClelland v Cellco P’ship, the court found that the batching system could delay resolution of a legal claim by as much as 156 years. See 609 F Supp 3d 1024, 1042 (ND Cal 2022). In both cases, the courts recognised that the potential for delay was substantively unconscionable and could itself chill otherwise viable claims.
It is possible to design a batching system that can be enforced, as in McGrath v DoorDash, Inc, No 19-CV-05279-EMC, 2020 WL 6526129, at *4 (ND Cal 5 November 2020), but certain requirements must be met. The MacClelland court pointed to several features of the McGrath agreement that rendered it enforceable, including a provision that the claims “will” be resolved within 120 days and an ability to opt out of arbitration and return to court following the expiry of the 120-day period plus a 90-day mediation period. See 609 F Supp 3d at 1043.
Bellwethers
In a bellwether system, a predetermined number of filings are selected as “test” cases, and the results of those cases inform subsequent cases. The court in Heckman v Live Nation Ent, Inc drew the key distinction between valid and invalid bellwether provisions: if subsequent claimants are bound by the results of the prior bellwethers, the provision is unconscionable. See 120 F4th 670, 684 (9th Cir 2024). By contrast, if subsequent claims are merely informed by the results of the bellwether, the due process concerns may be avoided. Additionally, the Heckman court suggested that a bellwether scheme, even a binding one, might be enforceable if it permitted claimants to opt out and provided an opportunity for notice and a hearing. Id.
Pre-arbitration conditions
Some employers impose individualised processes as a condition precedent to even filing an arbitration demand, with the goal of hindering the ability of employee counsel to bring the claims in an economically viable manner.
The most common of these devices is the “notice of dispute”, which requires, in addition and prior to the actual arbitration demand, a written notice setting forth details of the dispute. While this is generally enforceable and uncontroversial, many agreements further require that such notices be signed by hand by the claimant and not be sent in a batch with other similar notices, requiring individual mailings. Notice of dispute requirements are typically followed by a mandatory “informal dispute resolution” period in which the parties may negotiate a settlement of the dispute prior to arbitration. While the combination of notice requirements with other oppressive features may lead to unconscionability (Rios, 807 F Supp 3d at 993), courts rarely find notice requirements without more onerous requirements unenforceable, particularly when accompanied by a provision that tolls the statute of limitations for noticed claims.
More controversial is the requirement that the claimant personally attend a live (ie, in-person, telephonic or video) conference with a “representative” of the company, typically including the company’s lawyers. Crucially, these provisions require individualised conferences in which only a single claimant’s claims are discussed. This means that any employee advocate seeking to prosecute a mass arbitration must participate in a conference for every client they represent, even if representing thousands or tens of thousands of claimants with substantially identical claims. While these provisions have yet to be fully tested in court, counsel should be mindful of the risk of ethical breaches in administering such provisions, particularly under the prohibitions on communicating with represented parties, and on tactics that increase cost or delay. See, eg, California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (communicating with represented parties prohibited); Rule 3.2 (tactics to increase cost or delay prohibited).
The Transportation Worker Exemption
The FAA contains an exemption for so-called “transportation workers”. See Circuit City Stores, Inc v Adams, 532 US 105, 109 (2001). Notably, challenges to arbitration based on this exemption are decided by courts irrespective of the presence of a delegation clause, which generally delegates arbitrability disputes to the arbitrator. See New Prime Inc v Oliveira, 586 US 105, 111 (2019) (also ruling that “transportation workers” can be independent contractors).
“Transportation workers” generally
The question of just what distinguishes a “transportation worker” has been in flux in recent years. In Southwest Airlines Co v Saxon, the US Supreme Court clarified that “any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders” meets the definition. See 596 US 450, 457 (2022). The Court found that workers who “physically load and unload cargo” on and off planes travelling in interstate commerce are “transportation workers” entitled to the exemption. Id at 457. Notably, while the exemption is keyed to the “class” of worker at issue, the FAA does not require that the employee be employed by the transportation industry. See Bissonnette v LePage Bakeries Park St, LLC, 601 US 246, 252 (2024). Rather, the test focuses “on what [workers] do, not for whom they do it”. Id at 255. The rule of the Supreme Court is that an “exempt worker must at least play a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders”. Id at 256 (citation modified).
“Last mile” drivers and warehouse employees
While there is some uncertainty as to who constitutes a “transportation worker” even in industries directly concerned with interstate commerce, such as airlines (see Saxon), there is even greater controversy when it comes to workers who are engaged in so-called “last mile” delivery or who work solely within a warehouse.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the “last mile” issue directly in Rittmann v Amazon.com, Inc, in which it found that the drivers’ “transportation of goods wholly within a state are still part of a continuous interstate transportation, and those drivers are engaged in interstate commerce for [Section] 1’s purposes”. See 971 F3d 904, 916 (9th Cir 2020). Similarly, in Ortiz v Randstad Inhouse Servs, LLC, the Ninth Circuit found that a warehouse employee who worked entirely within an in-state warehouse was nonetheless a “transportation worker” entitled to the exemption, finding that “the relevant goods were still moving in interstate commerce when the employee interacted with them, and each employee played a necessary part in facilitating their continued movement”. See 95 F4th 1152, 1162 (9th Cir), cert denied, 145 S Ct 165 (2024). Notably, in both cases, the US Supreme Court declined to review the decision.
Recent developments: Flowers Foods, Inc v Brock
In October 2025, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari in Flowers Foods, Inc v Brock, 146 S Ct 1358 (2026), with the question being whether workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce – but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders – are “transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the FAA’s Section 1 exemption.
In answering the question presented, the Court noted that it had addressed the “transportation worker” exemption three times in recent years, each time refusing to limit its scope. Brock, 146 S Ct at 1363 (citing New Prime Inc v Oliveira, 586 US 105 (2019); Southwest Airlines Co v Saxon, 596 US 450 (2022); Bissonnette v LePage Bakeries Park St, LLC, 601 US 246 (2024)). In Brock, the Court answered the question presented in the affirmative, holding that “[a]t least sometimes, a worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg for an interstate journey can qualify for [Section] 1’s exemption without” either crossing state lines or interacting with (eg, loading or unloading) a vehicle that does. See Brock, 146 S Ct at 1363. The Court found that the requirement from Saxon that such workers play a “direct”, “necessary” and “active” role in moving goods across borders is legitimate, but that “individuals can sometimes be direct, necessary, and active participants in moving goods from points in one state to points in another state without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do”. Id at 1365 (citation modified).
The Court noted, but did not resolve, several issues that are likely to occupy future judges as they digest Brock. These include the question of whether a “transportation worker” who conducts business via a company they own is entitled to the exemption, and the question of whether a party who, like the Brock plaintiff, purchases and takes title to the goods prior to reselling to local stores is still entitled to the exemption. See Brock, 146 S Ct at 1366. Thus, while Brock went a long way towards clarifying the uncertainty surrounding the transportation worker exemption, it is unlikely to be the last word.
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