Enforcement of Judgments 2024

Last Updated August 06, 2024

EU

Law and Practice

Authors



Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is a global law firm with a long history of successfully assisting the world's leading industrial and financial companies, institutions and governments with their complex projects, transactions and challenges. It has 29 offices in the world's major business and financial centres, and works with leading local law firms to field more than 2,800 lawyers who provide comprehensive business law advice and combine their expertise to deliver decisive legal and industry solutions for clients.

Identifying another party’s asset position within the EU can be challenging due to the diverse legal systems and privacy regulations. However, there are several methods and tools available to creditors and other interested parties.

Registers and Databases

Several EU member states have public registers and databases that often prove useful in identifying another party’s assets. By way of illustration, member states may have the following:

  • land registers, providing information on ownership of immovable assets and mortgages;
  • company registers, providing information on annual accounts, ownership structure and the identity of directors;
  • vehicle registers, providing information on vehicle ownership;
  • insolvency registers, providing information on bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings debtors may be caught up in;
  • intellectual property registers, providing information on ownership of registered IP rights; and
  • registers of the member states’ national banks.

European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) Regulation

Regulation No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters (the “EAPO Regulation”) allows for a creditor who holds an enforceable judgment to formulate a request to obtain information on the accounts the debtor presumably holds in a member state. Even if the judgment is not yet enforceable, such a request can still be made if the creditor substantiates that there is an urgent need for the account information because the subsequent enforcement could be in jeopardy. Furthermore, this Regulation allows a creditor to freeze a debtor’s bank accounts across member states. It can be obtained without the debtor’s prior knowledge to prevent the transfer or withdrawal of funds.

Domestic Particularities

For domestic particularities (eg, insolvency proceedings, credit reporting agencies, private investigators, court orders such as asset disclosure orders and freezing orders), please refer to the relevant national chapters of this Guide.

In Europe, types of domestic judgments vary by country, but they generally fall into a few broad categories. For the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the following categories are particularly important.

  • A final judgment, which is the decision on the merits of the case.
  • Conversely to a judgment rendered by adversarial hearings, a default judgment is issued if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing in the proceedings. In some jurisdictions, default judgments are deemed to be contradictory in particular circumstances and/or give rise to an additional means of redress known as opposition.
  • Interim measure judgments (such as injunctions or temporary restraining orders that are intended to preserve the status quo until the final judgment is issued) are decisions issued in anticipation of or during the course of ongoing proceedings including provisional measures, without prejudgment of the decision on the merits.

EU Particularities

At the EU level, there are certain instruments that may be used to obtain orders facilitating enforcement, as follows.

  • The European Payment Order (Regulation (EU) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure) grants an enforceable title. Its primary goal is to facilitate cross-border debt recovery by providing a uniform and efficient method for creditors to enforce claims without needing to navigate the various national legal systems. Concerning the application process, the creditor submits a standard application form to the competent courts, including details about the parties involved, the amount claimed and the basis for the claim.
  • The EAPO Regulation facilitates cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters within the EU. It allows a creditor to freeze funds held in a debtor’s bank account(s) in a member state other than the member state where the creditor is domiciled or where the court is located (not applicable to Denmark). This instrument is issued by domestic courts and allows for the freezing of bank accounts within the EU. It can be used either as an interim relief by securing the enforcement of a yet to be pronounced judgment, or as a way to enforce an already rendered judgment.
  • The European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims) simplifies the cross-border recognition and enforcement of EU judgments, court settlements and authentic instruments without intermediate proceedings for claims that are no longer contested by the debtor. This Regulation is applicable to judgments from all EU member states, except for Denmark. It abolishes the requirement for specific enforceability proceedings (exequatur) for judgments falling within the scope of the Regulation, allowing for swift and efficient cross-border recognition and enforcement.

Enforcing a domestic judgment within the same domestic state involves using the mechanisms and procedures available within that jurisdiction. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

However, instruments at the EU level have led to certain harmonisation in this field (eg, Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights).

The costs and time required to enforce domestic judgments will significantly depend on the national jurisdiction in which the judgment is being enforced, primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

Post-judgment procedures for determining defendants’ assets are mainly regulated at the national level. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

However, next to national asset disclosure procedures, the European Account Preservation Order introduced in Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 includes provisions for obtaining information about the defendant’s assets. Creditors can request the court to obtain information about the defendant’s bank accounts.

In Europe, defendants have several avenues to challenge the enforcement of a domestic judgment within their own country, based on national rules. These mechanisms are generally designed to ensure fairness and due process, and the specific procedures can vary from country to country. Such mechanisms may include, for example, an appeal or revision of the enforcement measure itself, an application for a stay or suspension of enforcement pending an appeal of the original judgment, and a possibility for third parties to reclaim assets subject to enforcement by asserting objections based on their property rights over the property seized.

An appeal or revision of the measure may, for example, be based on substantive grounds (eg, the lack of a current and effective title further to a change in the relationship between the creditor and debtor) or procedural grounds (eg, use of the wrong attachment procedure).

Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

The EU primarily influences cross-border legal matters between its member states rather than purely domestic situations. The enforceability of judgments without cross-border elements is, in principle, governed by the national laws of the member states in question.

Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

There is no centralised register of domestic judgments across all member states. Nevertheless, in Europe, several countries have registers for judgments, which are publicly available.

Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

Enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU is governed by several EU regulations and international treaties.

Recognition and Enforceability of Judgments in General

Depending on the specific regulation or treaty applicable, foreign judgments may be recognised and considered enforceable automatically, meaning that there is immediate access to national means of enforcement in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.

In other instances, recognition may not be automatic, and specific proceedings may need to be followed in order to obtain access to national means of enforcement. Such proceedings are typically referred to as exequatur proceedings – ie, proceedings geared at obtaining a declaration of enforceability by the competent court.

Even under mutual recognition regimes, there are grounds upon which a member state can refuse to enforce a foreign judgment (see 3.6 Challenging Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).

Applicable Legislation

Multiple legal instruments can govern the enforcement of foreign judgments (eg, domestic law, multilateral conventions, bilateral conventions, EU regulations).

In the EU, the principal international treaties/conventions relevant to the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters are:

  • the Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Lugano Convention), which applies to judgments rendered in the EU and Norway, Switzerland and Iceland;
  • the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (the Hague Choice of Court Convention), which only applies to judgments in international cases rendered by courts that assumed jurisdiction based on an exclusive choice of court agreement concluded in civil or commercial matters; and
  • the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague Judgments Convention), which is complementary to the Hague Choice of Court Convention.

As for EU regulations, the principal legal instrument governing the recognition and enforceability of foreign judgments is Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (the Brussels I Recast Regulation). Other EU regulations are also of particular importance, such as:

  • Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims;
  • Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European Order for Payment Procedure;
  • Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure;
  • Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters; and
  • Regulation (EU) No 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency Proceedings (Recast).

Post-Brexit Considerations

Since Brexit, the legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the UK and the EU has changed (see 3.2 Variations in Approach to Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).

Enforcement of judgments varies depending on the type of judgment and the legal instruments governing its recognition and enforcement.

Generally, final judgments (decisions on the merits of the case) benefit from broader recognition and enforcement under international conventions and regulations (Brussels I Recast Regulation, Lugano Convention, Hague Choice of Court Convention and Hague Judgments Convention).

The situation is more complex for judicial decisions ordering provisional measures.

  • Under the Brussels I Recast Regulation and the Lugano Convention, except in certain instances, provisional measures may also benefit from recognition and enforceability.
  • The Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention do not govern interim measures of protection.

Judgments may of course only qualify for recognition and enforcement under the European and international enforcement regimes if they fall within the substantive scope of application. The instruments applicable in civil and commercial matters (which typically exclude, for instance, tax matters or administrative matters) are discussed herein. In addition, the European and international instruments include grounds allowing member states to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment (see 3.6 Challenging Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).

Furthermore, some types of foreign judgments do not qualify for recognition and enforceability under the European and international regimes.

In particular, under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the regime for interim measures is stricter than for final judgments, as the regime for the recognition of interim measures requires that the court issuing interim relief also has jurisdiction for the main proceedings on the merits. Moreover, interim measures will not benefit from the Regulation’s recognition regime if they were ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, unless the judgment containing the order is served on the defendant prior to enforcement.

The actual enforcement of foreign judgments shall be governed by the law of the member state involved, so domestic law applies in this regard.

As for the recognition and enforceability that precede actual enforcement, the main element to verify is whether a party seeking enforcement is required to initiate specific proceedings to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. This differs depending on the European or international instrument, as follows:

  • under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, a foreign judgment is automatically recognised and considered enforceable;
  • under the Lugano Convention, while recognition is automatic, a party will still have to obtain a prior declaration of enforceability to be able to proceed to actual enforcement; and
  • under the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention, there is no automatic recognition or enforcement.

If there is no applicable regulation or convention, the domestic laws of each country where enforcement is sought will govern the question of recognition and enforceability. They will typically provide for a requirement to initiate specific proceedings to obtain recognition and/or enforceability.

Similar to domestic judgments (see 2.3 Costs and Time Taken to Enforce Domestic Judgments), the costs and time required for the enforcement of foreign judgments will depend significantly on the national jurisdiction in which the judgment is being enforced, primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

Where recognition and/or enforceability is granted automatically under a European regulation or international instrument, this of course reduces the costs and time required. In addition, instruments such as the European Payment Order Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006) and the EAPO Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 655/2014) aid further in reducing the burden of enforcement.

Where European and international instruments such as the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the Lugano Convention, the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention facilitate enforcement, they each provide a limited list of grounds on which the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought may refuse recognition and enforcement.

Under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, recognition may be denied if:

  • such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the member state where enforcement is sought;
  • the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document that instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable them to arrange for their defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for them to do so;
  • the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment between the same parties pronounced in the member state where enforcement is sought;
  • the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a different state, including third states, involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that this earlier judgment is eligible for recognition; and
  • the judgment conflicts with the Brussels I Recast Regulation's specific jurisdictional grounds relating to insurance matters, consumer contracts and employment contracts where the policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the employee was the defendant, or with the Regulation’s exclusive jurisdiction grounds.

The conventions provide similar refusal grounds, with some slight variations.

Please refer to the national sections of this Guide for a detailed outline of the issues that could arise when enforcing arbitral awards in the respective national jurisdictions.

One of the key legislative instruments limiting issues regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). The New York Convention is adopted by numerous jurisdictions, including the member states of the European Union. Enforcement can only be refused on a limited number of grounds at the request of a party, or by the competent authority where enforcement is sought (see 4.6 Challenging Enforcement of Arbitral Awards).

Furthermore, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the UNCITRAL Model Law) constitutes a basis for the harmonisation and improvement of national legislation concerning international commercial arbitration. However, please refer to the national sections of this Guide on whether and to what extent the national jurisdictions have implemented this Model Law.

A distinction must be made between “domestic” or “national” awards and “international” or “foreign” awards, respectively rendered in and outside the state where enforcement is sought. For purposes of enforcement, some countries may treat these awards as equal, while other countries may provide for a separate set of rules for each type.

As for foreign arbitral awards, the New York Convention greatly facilitates recognition and enforcement due to the large number of countries that have ratified it.

Another difference in enforcement for different types of arbitral awards concerns the enforcement of interim awards. Since the New York Convention only applies to final awards, this would not serve as a solution for the enforcement of interim awards. The UNCITRAL Model Law, however, provides for specific rules for the enforcement of interim awards. These rules do not differ much from the rules regarding the enforcement of final arbitral awards, but several conditions were added, such as that the interim award cannot have been overruled. Of course, it is to be verified if and to what extent national law has implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law or otherwise provides for specific rules relating to interim awards.

National law determines the process to be followed for enforcing an arbitral award. Apart from providing for certain formalities (such as providing the original or duly certified copy of the arbitral award and arbitration agreement), the New York Convention itself does not provide for procedural rules.

Please therefore refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

As was mentioned for judgments (see 2.3 Costs and Time Taken to Enforce Domestic Judgments), the costs and time required for enforcing arbitral awards will also significantly depend on the national jurisdiction in which the arbitral award is being enforced, primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Guide.

Where the New York Convention applies, this of course reduces the costs and time required.

For the avenues under domestic law to challenge enforcement, please refer to the national chapters of this Guide.

Where the New York Convention applies, recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may still be denied based on a limitative list of refusal grounds, including that:

  • the parties were under some incapacity to enter into the arbitration agreement or the agreement is invalid;
  • the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case;
  • the award deals with matters that were not submitted to arbitration;
  • the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or the law where the arbitration took place;
  • the award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended;
  • the subject matter is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law where recognition and enforcement are sought; and
  • the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country where such recognition or enforcement is sought.
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

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Trends and Developments


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Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is a global law firm with a long history of successfully assisting the world's leading industrial and financial companies, institutions and governments with their complex projects, transactions and challenges. It has 29 offices in the world's major business and financial centres, and works with leading local law firms to field more than 2,800 lawyers who provide comprehensive business law advice and combine their expertise to deliver decisive legal and industry solutions for clients.

Enforcement of Judgments in the EU: An Introduction

Enhanced international judicial co-operation through the Hague Judgments Convention’s entry into force and the recent ratifications of the UK and Uruguay

The Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters of 2 July 2019 (the “Hague Judgments Convention” or the “Convention”) facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions, in civil and commercial matters, across international borders amongst contracting states, which reduces the risks and costs associated with cross-border litigation. With an increasing number of signatory countries, including Costa Rica, Israel, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Russian Federation, the United States and Uruguay, this may become a very important instrument in the sphere of international judicial co-operation.

Until recently, however, the Convention was not effective as it lacked the required ratifications/accessions to formally enter into force. The EU member states (excluding Denmark) and Ukraine have now ratified/acceded to the Convention, effectively bringing it into force on 1 September 2023 between these parties (the contracting states).

Following on from this, Uruguay and the UK have also ratified the Convention, which will enter into force on 1 October 2024 and 1 July 2025, respectively.

The next step toward closer co-operation between the UK and the EU post-Brexit

The UK’s ratification is the next step towards a post-Brexit EU-UK recognition and enforcement regime that aims to rebuild the judicial co-operation that was lost after Brexit.

The 2007 Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Lugano Convention) did not fill that gap as the UK’s accession to it was refused by the European Commission. This is because the Lugano Convention was a benefit granted to states that are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which the UK is not (albeit that Liechtenstein did not become part of the Lugano Convention). To date, only the 2005 Hague Choice of Courts Convention has brought about cross-border judicial co-operation between the EU and the UK post-Brexit, and that Convention is limited to judicial decisions rendered by courts based on an exclusive choice-of-court agreement.

Possible limitations

The Convention allows for contracting states to make reservations, by declaring certain provisions inapplicable to them. It remains to be seen whether the UK or the EU shall make any reservations in the relation between them.

In addition, the Convention permits that a contracting state may choose to opt out of the Convention’s application between it and any other contracting state. This opt-out possibility exists for the already existing contracting states when a new party joins the Convention with respect to that joining party, but also for the acceding contracting state with respect to the already existing contracting states.

Innovations of the Hague Judgments Convention compared to the Brussels I Recast Regulation

One of the main innovations of the Hague Judgments Convention is that it provides for an explicit refusal ground based on which recognition and enforcement of a judgment may be refused if the judgment awards damages that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered. On that basis, the recognition/enforcement of a judgment that awards punitive/exemplary damages may be refused in another contracting state.

Such an explicit refusal ground is absent in Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the Brussels I Recast Regulation); parties would rather have to seek refuge under the more generally worded public policy refusal ground in that Regulation when wanting to challenge a punitive/exemplary damages award.

The Hague Judgments Convention’s success will depend on further ratifications. In particular, the ratification by countries such as the United States and the Russian Federation is something to watch out for.

Recent ECJ case law on the Grounds of Refusal for Recognition and Enforcement

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently issued a number of judgments on the grounds of refusal for recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I Recast Regulation and its predecessor, the Brussels I Regulation.

Breach of jurisdiction clause is no ground to refuse recognition

In the case of Gjensidige (C-90/22), the ECJ was asked whether the breach of a jurisdiction clause can constitute sufficient justification to refuse the recognition of a judgment under the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

On 21 March 2024, the ECJ held that, under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the mere breach of a jurisdiction clause does not allow the court of a different member state to refuse recognition. The ECJ considered that such a circumstance is not included in the limited list of refusal grounds and, more particularly, that refusal of recognition cannot be justified under the public policy exception in that list. On the latter, the Court specified that the mere fact that an action is not heard by the court designated in an agreement conferring jurisdiction and that, as a result, is not ruled upon under the law of the member state to which that court belongs cannot be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach of the right to a fair trial to render recognition of the judgment in that action manifestly at odds with the public policy of the member state addressed.

By still requiring the recognition of the foreign judgment under this circumstance, the ECJ remains aligned with its strict interpretation of the grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

“Quasi” anti-suit injunctions qualify for application of the public policy exception

In Charles Taylor Adjusting Ltd and FD v Starlight Shipping Co. and Overseas Marine Enterprises Inc. (C-590/21), the ECJ had the opportunity to issue a ruling in the sphere of anti-suit injunctions.

The case concerned a maritime accident whereby a vessel sank off the bay of Port Elizabeth in South Africa. At the time, Starlight Shipping Company and Overseas Marine Enterprises Inc. (respectively, the Shipping and Operating Companies) requested the insurers of the vessel to cover the insured incident. With judicial and arbitral proceedings in the background, the Shipping and Operating Companies on the one hand and the insurers on the other hand ultimately entered into settlement agreements, which were ratified by a UK court.

However, after a couple of years, the Shipping and Operating Companies, together with other parties, initiated new claims in Greece against the insurers and their representatives, in particular Charles Taylor and FD, for the harm they allegedly suffered because of false and defamatory allegations made by the latter.

While those claims were pending, the insurers and their representatives, including Charles Taylor and FD, brought another legal action against the Shipping and Operating Companies in the UK (while the UK was still an EU member state), seeking a declaration that the claims initiated in Greece had been brought in breach of the settlement agreements. In particular, the UK court issued an award granting provisional compensation to the insurers and their representatives in respect of the costs they were incurring because of the proceedings in Greece.

The Greek court submitted a preliminary question, asking the ECJ about the application of the public policy exception in respect of the recognition of the UK court judgment in Greece.

In a judgment of 7 September 2023, the ECJ ruled that a court may refuse recognition based on the public policy exception. The ECJ considered that the UK court judgment did not formally prohibit the commencement or continuation of proceedings before the Greek courts like a typical anti-suit injunction that is excluded under the Brussels I Regulation, based on its previous case law. However, the ECJ found that the UK court’s decision had – at the very least – a deterring effect by making it more difficult to commence and/or continue proceedings before the court of another member state. Accordingly, the ECJ qualified the UK court judgment as a “quasi” anti-suit injunction, the consequences of which contradict the principle of mutual trust upon which the Brussels I Regulation is based.

For these reasons, the ECJ considered that the Greek court is permitted to refuse recognition of the UK court’s decision for violation of public policy.

The ECJ’s judgment will serve as an important precedent to deter parties from seeking relief that is indirectly geared at preventing an opponent litigating in another jurisdiction.

Scope of recognition does not extend to effects of national procedural rules for sound administration of justice

In BNP Paribas SA v TR (C-567/21), the ECJ had to consider whether recognition of a judgment under the Brussels I Regulation goes as far as imposing the inadmissibility of new claims in the jurisdiction where recognition is sought, based on the existence of a national procedural rule requiring the centralisation of claims in the jurisdiction that rendered the judgment.

In particular, the case concerned a lawsuit filed in France (the jurisdiction of the employer) by a former employee of a French company seeking payment related to his dismissal. However, the former employee had already obtained a judgment in England (his place of work) ordering the French company to compensate him for unfair dismissal. As the UK had a procedural rule that required the parties to centralise all their claims relating to the same legal relationship within a single set of proceedings, the question was raised whether such a rule prevents the initiation of new claims in another jurisdiction (in this case, France) after a judgment is rendered in the UK.

Ultimately, the case came before the French Supreme Court, which raised the matter before the ECJ via a request for preliminary ruling.

In a judgment of 8 June 2023, the ECJ essentially ruled that such a national procedural rule does not have effect in the foreign jurisdiction through recognition of the foreign judgment. The ECJ reiterated that recognition is meant to give the foreign judgment, in the jurisdiction where the recognition is sought, the authority and effectiveness that the judgment has in the jurisdiction where it is rendered. The ECJ considered that the national procedural rule does not pertain to the authority and effectiveness of the judgment.

It reasoned that the English national procedural rule on the centralisation of claims merely intends to prevent claims relating to a single legal relationship between parties from giving rise to a plethora of proceedings. According to the ECJ, this is a rule in the interest of both the sound administration of justice and the parties concerned, but it is not intended to govern the authority and effectiveness accorded to a judgment rendered by English courts. Hence, once the judgment is recognised, it was up to the French court to determine whether new claims were prevented based on the French procedural rules rather than the English procedural rules.

While the ECJ attempts to bring clarity, the approach remains rather vague and will likely lead to further requests for preliminary ruling.

Upcoming ECJ case law: public policy exception and freedom of expression

Real Madrid Club de Fútbol v Le Monde (C-633/22) constitutes an occasion for the ECJ to redefine its principle of mutual trust and the recourse to the public policy exception under the refusal grounds of the Brussels I Recast Regulation in light of substantive fundamental rights.

Background

In 2006, a journalist for Le Monde newspaper published an article claiming that the football clubs Real Madrid and FC Barcelona had retained the services of a doctor involved in a doping scandal in the field of cycling. Real Madrid and a member of its medical team brought an action for reputational damages in Spain against Société Editrice du Monde (Le Monde’s owner) and the journalist. The Spanish court ordered the defendants to pay damages to Real Madrid and the member of its medical team. The decision was upheld in appeal and before the Supreme Court.

Next, Real Madrid applied for enforcement of this decision in France. In 2020, the Paris Court of Appeal decided that the recognition or enforcement of the Spanish decision would be contrary to the French international public policy as it would interfere with the freedom of expression (Article 11 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights). The plaintiffs subsequently lodged an appeal before the French Court of Cassation, which referred preliminary questions to the ECJ with the aim of clarifying whether the freedom of expression constitutes a fundamental principle the breach of which can justify recourse to the public policy clause.

Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar

Advocate General (AG) Szpunar delivered his opinion on 8 February 2024. He considered that a member state in which enforcement of another member state’s judgment concerning reputational damages imposed on a newspaper publishing house and a journalist is sought may refuse the enforcement of this judgment where it would give rise to a manifest breach of the freedom of expression.

To assess the existence of such a breach, the AG referred to the potential deterrent effect that may occur where the overall sum claimed is manifestly unreasonable, having regard to the nature and the economic situation of the person concerned. However, the AG makes it clear that the court of the jurisdiction where recognition is sought is not supposed to review the case on the merits again. In that regard, he specifies that the serious nature of the wrong and the extent of the harm may only be taken into account to determine whether it is appropriate for counteracting the effects of defamatory statements, even though the overall sum of a penalty is a priori manifestly unreasonable.

Prospects

The ECJ has not yet rendered its preliminary ruling in the Real Madrid v Le Monde case. According to settled ECJ case law, recourse to the public policy exception is possible if the recognition of a judgment constitutes a manifest infringement of a rule of law that is regarded as essential in the legal order of the state in which recognition is sought or of a fundamental right.

While the ECJ has typically dealt with violations of procedural rights under the heading of fundamental rights, as AG Szpunar explains in his opinion, the ECJ may very well also consider that freedom of expression is a domain in which the public policy exception may find application. On the other hand, and as recalled by AG Szpunar, the ECJ is traditionally reluctant to accept a broad interpretation of exceptions to the principle of mutual trust between member states. The Real Madrid v Le Monde case will therefore be an opportunity for the ECJ to further define its principles in the context of heightened attention on freedom of expression and public debate.

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

Bastion Tower
Place du Champ de Mars/
Marsveldplein 5
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

+32 2 504 70 86

+32 2 404 70 86

nathalie.colin@freshfields.com www.freshfields.com
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Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is a global law firm with a long history of successfully assisting the world's leading industrial and financial companies, institutions and governments with their complex projects, transactions and challenges. It has 29 offices in the world's major business and financial centres, and works with leading local law firms to field more than 2,800 lawyers who provide comprehensive business law advice and combine their expertise to deliver decisive legal and industry solutions for clients.

Trends and Developments

Authors



Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer is a global law firm with a long history of successfully assisting the world's leading industrial and financial companies, institutions and governments with their complex projects, transactions and challenges. It has 29 offices in the world's major business and financial centres, and works with leading local law firms to field more than 2,800 lawyers who provide comprehensive business law advice and combine their expertise to deliver decisive legal and industry solutions for clients.

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