Grounds
Grounds for divorce are set forth in NY DRL §170(1)-(7), as follows.
These grounds apply to same-sex spouses, but they do not apply to civil partners. It is possible to enter into a domestic partnership; however, domestic partnerships provide limited rights and can be terminated by either partner at any time by filing a termination statement in person at the city or county office in which the couple registered their partnership. Domestic partnerships are not dissolved by divorce courts.
Process and Timeline
There is no mandatory timeline for divorce and courts maintain discretion with respect to the length of individual proceedings.
The parties do not need to attend court, provided that the necessary submissions have been filed with the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in the county where the parties are divorcing. It is not possible to procure a divorce without the Supreme Court’s entry of a Judgment of Divorce, even if the matter is resolved without court intervention.
There is no period of separation required before commencing a divorce action in New York State.
Rules for Service
New York State law requires that the defendant in a divorce action be personally served with the summons with notice or summons and verified complaint. To have your spouse served in any other way, you must get permission from the court, or, if your spouse has legal representation, that attorney may agree to accept service of the summons with notice or summons and verified complaint on behalf of the defendant.
Religious Marriages and Divorces
In certain cases, New York courts may recognise a marriage as valid even if no marriage licence or marriage certificate was issued. If the couple has a religious ceremony and genuinely intends to enter into a legal marriage, their marriage may be recognised under New York law. DRL §25 provides that a properly solemnised marriage ceremony will not be void based on the failure to obtain a marriage licence. DRL §12 requires that the parties to the marriage solemnly declare each other as husband and wife (or other spousal arrangement) in the presence of an officiant or clergyman and a witness. In the absence of a licence, the court will balance various factors to determine whether the marriage is legitimate and enforceable. These cases are rare and highly fact-specific.
As for divorces in cases where the spouses were married in a religious ceremony but with a legitimate marriage certificate, once a divorce is finalised, the Supreme Court issues a decree, and then either party is free to remarry. Some consideration given to the fact that spouses may be bound under religious marriages unless certain steps are taken to release that spouse from marriage under religious law.
Other Processes in Relation to Ending a Marriage
New York Domestic Relations Law provides for other actions to void a marriage, for annulment or separation (NY DRL §§5, 6 and 7, 140 and 200, respectively). While a married couple may enter into a separation agreement, which is intended to be enforceable on its own, and which may be So Ordered by a court, thus making it enforceable as a court order, that agreement must be incorporated into (but not merged with) a judgment of divorce in order to formally dissolve a marriage.
Jurisdictional Grounds
The parties must meet jurisdictional requirements, found in New York Domestic Relations Law (NY DRL) §230, as follows.
The foregoing apply to same-sex spouses but not civil partners.
Domicile, Residence and Nationality
Domicile and nationality are not relevant for jurisdictional purposes where the residency requirements above are met.
A person is a “resident” of New York State when they have a significant connection with some locality in the state as the result of living there for some length of time during the course of a year. Deazle v Miles, 77 A.D.3d 660,908 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dep’t 2010).
Contesting Jurisdiction
A party to divorce proceedings can contest jurisdiction.
Stay of Proceedings
A party can apply to stay proceedings in order to pursue divorce proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction. See jurisdiction discussion above.
Grounds
See response to 1.2 Choice of Jurisdiction.
If a separate child or spousal support action is commenced under the Family Court Act, then the following provisions may apply.
Contesting Jurisdiction
A party to financial proceedings can contest jurisdiction.
Stay of Proceedings
A party is able to apply to stay proceedings in order to pursue financial proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.
Some factors that the court may consider are which party files first in time, whether there is ongoing litigation in another forum, whether New York is an inconvenient forum, and whether the parties have contacts in a particular jurisdiction.
Hearing Financial Claims After a Foreign Divorce
Financial claims can be made following a foreign divorce, to the extent that issues are left open by the foreign judgment for enforcement and/or modification by another jurisdiction or where the laws of the State of New York allow for enforcement and/or modification of the foreign judgment.
New York’s Civil Procedure Law and Rules provide for the enforcement of foreign money judgments in New York, pursuant to the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgments Act (2021), provided certain due process standards have been met in the obtaining of the foreign judgment.
Other provisions of the NY Domestic Relations Law (DRL §§75 and 236) and Family Court Act (FCA § 115 and Article 5-B) provide for the recognition and enforcement/modification of foreign divorce judgments, child custody and child support orders.
Service Requirements
The Family Court Act §427 lays out the manner of service of process for support proceedings in New York Family Courts.
If the financial requests for relief are part of a divorce action in Supreme Court, then the summons with notice/summons with verified complaint are to be served personally on the defendant spouse unless there is permission from the court to serve that spouse using an alternative method, or if the defendant spouse agrees to have an attorney accept service on their behalf. (Note: There may be alternative methods of service available where a NY action is being served in a foreign jurisdiction.)
Process and Timeline
There is no mandatory timeline and courts maintain discretion as to the length of individual proceedings, as well as the process, from the initial appearance, status and compliance conferences, and through and after trial.
New York law applies the principles of equitable distribution, which does not necessarily mean an equal distribution of marital assets. The court will take into account 16 factors, including but not limited to:
Financial Orders to Regulate or Reallocate Assets or Resources
The court will typically determine whether a division of property occurs on an in-kind basis or whether it is appraised and a credit is given to the spouse who is not retaining the property post-divorce. The court considers the factors set forth in the response above.
Identifying the Assets
There is a financial discovery process whereby each spouse prepares a net worth statement identifying all assets and liabilities, as well as broad exchange of financial documentation in discovery, including income tax returns, bank account statements, brokerage and investment account statements, real property records, business records and so on. Parties may also engage in depositions, exchange interrogatories and serve discovery subpoenas for information and/or deposition testimony.
A court may make orders for disclosure against third parties.
Property Regimes
New York is an equitable distribution state, meaning the division of assets upon divorce is not necessarily equal. Rather, a court will look to the 16 factors provided by statute to determine a fair and equitable division of assets.
Trusts
New York courts recognise trusts.
The court may consider distributions from a trust in determining a party’s income. To the extent that marital assets have been utilised to acquire property held by a trust, that property might, in certain circumstances, be deemed marital property or result in distribution credits.
The treatment of a trust depends largely on the circumstances surrounding the creation of the trust as well as the terms of the trust.
The case law is varied with regard to how trust assets are treated in the context of equitable distribution. For example, to the extent that a trust was created by a non-party for the benefit of one party as an estate planning mechanism, or both parties consented to and purposefully created a trust for the benefit of each other and/or their children, the trust assets are more likely to be considered outside of the marital estate, while the trust terms remain intact. See Oppenheim v Oppenheim, 168 A.D.3d 1085 (2nd Dept. 2019).
However, factors may be present which warrant piercing the trust or providing for an equitable distribution credit for marital assets that are contributed to a trust. This is especially so where marital assets have been placed into trust without one party’s consent, where marital assets are placed into a trust so as to defeat a spouse’s rights to access martial assets, or where the trust itself is invalid. See Riechers v Riechers, 267 A.D.2d 445 (2nd Dept. 1999); Surasi v Surasi, 2001 NY Slip Op 40408(U) (Supreme Court of Richmond County 2001).
Spousal maintenance is authorised by statute. It is regularly awarded in divorce actions and the parties may agree upon payment of spousal maintenance in written settlement agreements. There has been a shift to a more formulaic approach in recent years, especially as to duration.
Domestic Relations Law Section 236 (B) provides two methods for determining temporary and post-divorce maintenance, with a list of factors to be considered by a court for each.
New York courts are empowered by statute (DRL § 236 (B)) to award post-divorce maintenance. There are also durational guidelines for maintenance provided by statute, as follows:
Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements are recognised in New York State. New York Domestic Relations Law Section 236 (B) (3) explicitly provides: “An agreement of the parties made before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action if such agreement is in writing, subscribed by the parties and acknowledged or proven in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded.” Foreign agreements are largely enforced, provided that the necessary formalities are met for the agreement to be valid and enforceable. An agreement’s terms must not violate New York’s public policy; there are limited other bases that might render an agreement, or certain of its terms, unenforceable (eg, the agreement was procured by fraud, duress, coercion or contains unconscionable provisions).
New York courts will enforce the terms of prenuptial and postnuptial agreements so long as they are made in conformance with standards for contracts, meaning that the agreement cannot be the product of fraud, duress, or coercion, and cannot be unconscionable or violate public policy.
A New York marital agreement must be executed by the parties and acknowledged (as is required for a deed to be recorded, per the New York Real Property Law). Otherwise, a court will not be authorised to enforce the agreement. Child support and child custody terms are usually not included in prenuptial and postnuptial agreements.
There are no financial rights that arise solely from cohabitation. Certain civil claims may be possible if the couple owns jointly titled property, or they have entered into a cohabitation agreement. A couple may also enter into a domestic partnership, but the financial rights associated with a domestic partnership are limited.
In New York State cohabitants do not acquire any rights by virtue of length of cohabitation or children, etc. New York State does not recognise common law marriages, and the length of cohabitation does not generate rights between the couple, regardless of whether there are children. The laws regarding child custody apply to both children of a married couple and children of unmarried couples.
A party may seek an order for numerous remedies, including, but not limited to, specific performance, contempt and a money judgment for unpaid distribution. Additionally, the court may award counsel fees and costs to the non-defaulting party.
Financial claims can be made following a foreign divorce, to the extent that issues are left open by the foreign judgment for enforcement and/or modification by another jurisdiction or where the laws of the State of New York allow for enforcement and/or modification of the foreign judgment.
The media and press may report on financial cases if there is an open courtroom for that matter. In rare instances, the court may close the courtroom, primarily where there are sensitive issues affecting children, or the court may issue a “gag” order, preventing the parties from disseminating certain information.
The court records for divorce and family matters in the New York Supreme and Family courts are sealed by default, and not made available to the public. Only the parties and their attorneys have access.
A party must make a motion for the use of an anonymous case caption. It is within the discretion of the court as to whether to grant such motion. There is a high burden of proof.
There are private options for alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, arbitration and/or collaborative law.
Some courts have established county-specific mediation and neutral evaluation programmes. Some mandate party participation and some are voluntary. The courts may also directly facilitate settlement conferences.
There are no material penalties for non-compliance, as most programmes are voluntary.
Status of Agreement Reached via a Non-court Process
Such agreements are enforceable. However, they may not be enforced using remedies applicable to court orders unless the agreement is So Ordered and/or incorporated into a judgment of divorce signed by a judge.
Jurisdictional Grounds
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (DRL Article 5-A; §75 et seq. (UCCJEA)) sets forth four available jurisdictional grounds: (i) the child’s home state; (ii) significant connection, which exists when a state has substantial evidence about a child as a result of the child’s significant connections to that state; (iii) emergency (abandonment or abuse); or (iv) a vacuum (when no other jurisdictional basis exists). Except in emergency cases, the UCCJEA eliminated a child’s physical presence in a state as grounds for exercising jurisdiction. DRL §76 (3).
If the proceeding concerns a child abduction, domestically, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act would apply; internationally, the United States is a treaty partner to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
Domicile, Residence and Nationality
See 1.2 Choice of Jurisdiction.
Application to Court
Either parent can file an application seeking a court order regarding the child’s residence and parenting access time, including the implementation of a parenting access schedule. There is no automatic right to primary custody in either parent. The courts’ determination of such applications is dictated by the “best interests of the child” standard.
The “best interest of the child” test means that the courts are required to balance the ability of each parent to meet the needs of the child or children.
The court will determine child custody based on the “best interest of the child” test by evaluating a number of factors. Courts will make a finding on custody based on the totality of the factors. These factors can include whether one of the parents has been the primary caretaker of the child, stability, the existence of any substance abuse issues, domestic violence, physical health of each parent, any history of abuse or neglect, and any interference with the parenting rights of the other parent. In matters where one parent has primary custody rather than joint custody with the other parent, the custodial parent is expected to encourage and foster the child’s relationship with the non-custodial parent.
A child’s preference may also be taken into consideration, depending on the age of the child.
Legal Approach to Custody and Parental Responsibility
New York courts make custody decisions based upon the “best interest of the child” standard. If there is no court order, then both parents are deemed to have equal rights to physical and legal custody of the child. A New York court can make orders concerning custody until the child is 18 years old.
Restrictions on the Court
There are no restrictions on the court’s ability to make an order as to a child’s living and contact arrangements with regard to parents, but there are restrictionswith regard to making orders relating to extended family and non-relatives seeking custody and/or guardianship.
Child Maintenance
Known as “child support” in New York State, it is defined by statute as “a sum to be paid pursuant to court order or decree by either or both parents or pursuant to a valid agreement between the parties for care, maintenance and education of any unemancipated child under the age of twenty-one years”. New York Family Court Act Section 413 (1) (b) (2); New York Domestic Relations Law Section 236 (B) (4).
The Child Support Standards Act statute (Domestic Relations Law Section 240 (1-b) and the Family Court Act Section 413 (1)) provides a formula for calculation of child support. The formula takes into account the income of both parents and the number of children being supported. The combined income is multiplied by a percentage based on the number of children: 17% for one child; 25% for two children; 29% for three children; 31% for four children; and no less than 35% for five or more children. The amount of support to be paid by a parent is determined based on that parent’s pro rata percentage of the total combined parental income.
There is a statutory “cap” on income which is adjusted each year based upon inflation. When the combined parental income amount exceeds the then current cap, a court is not required to consider the total parental income for child support purposes; however, the court may use its discretion to increase the total parental income to be used for the child support calculation, which is referred to as “deviating”, by considering a number of factors set forth in the statute.
Parties can come to an agreement on child support outside of court by entering into a written agreement signed by the parties and acknowledged by notaries public. Such an agreement may be enforceable on its own but it may also be incorporated into a judgment of divorce or it may be So Ordered by a court such that additional legal remedies would be available for enforcement.
Both Family and Supreme Courts in New York State are empowered to make child support orders. Those made during the course of a pending proceeding are known as “pendente lite” orders. Those that concern “permanent” child support are applicable through the child/children reaching age 21.
A child who is not emancipated (meaning under the age of 21) may file a petition against their parents asking for an order of child support. However, applications brought by children are highly atypical.
Courts’ Power in Case of Disagreement
The New York courts are empowered to rule on applications filed by a party seeking an award of decision-making authority with respect to a decision concerning a child, and to issue decisions after trial concerning these issues.
Parental Alienation
New York State is cognisant of the significance of maintaining a healthy relationship between a child and both parents. New York courts can make modifications to custody and parenting access orders (or even issue contempt of court orders) in cases where a parent interferes with/frustrates the other parent’s relationship with the child/reasonable right of access to a child.
In these cases, sometimes a court-appointed attorney for the child, who will meet with the child and with each parent and/or a forensic evaluator who then issues a report following evaluation of both parents and collateral sources may shed light on a potential parental alienation situation.
There are no enumerated factors to consider per se. These matters are handed on a case-by-case basis.
A custodial parent’s interference with the relationship between a child and a noncustodial parent has been said to be “an act so inconsistent with the best interests of the child as to per se raise a strong probability that the offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent”. Young v Young, 212 A.D.2d 114, 628 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1995) (quoting Maloney v Maloney, 208 A.D.2d 603, 617 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (1994)).
Children’s Evidence
New York judges do not generally call children to the witness stand. Rather, they hold what is known as in camera “Lincoln hearings” where the children speak without the presence of the parties or counsel to the judge (only the attorney for the child(ren) is present), and what is said during these “Lincoln hearings” may weigh upon the judge’s ultimate determination of custody. The transcript of the Lincoln hearing is sealed, such that the parties do not have access to the child’s testimony.
Mechanisms Outside the Court Process
There are private options for alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, arbitration and/or collaborative law.
ADR Methods Mandated by Court
Some courts have established county-specific mediation and neutral evaluation programmes. Some mandate party participation and some are voluntary. The courts may also directly facilitate settlement conferences.
There are no material penalties for non-compliance, as most programmes are voluntary.
Status of Agreement Reached via a Non-court Process
Such agreements are enforceable. However, they may not be enforced using remedies applicable to court orders unless the agreement is So Ordered and/or incorporated into a judgment of divorce signed by a judge.
Requirements Imposed by Statute
There are no requirements imposed by statute for parties to engage in alternative dispute resolution.
Media and Press Reporting
The media and press are able to report on child cases, however, the records of divorce and family matters in the New York Supreme and Family courts are sealed by default, and not made available to the public. Only the parties and their attorneys have access.
Anonymising the Child
A child’s initials are used in court decisions regarding custody and child support.
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gschumann@rsaplaw.com www.rsaplaw.comNew York practitioners in high net worth divorces are regularly faced with the issues and hurdles of dividing a marital estate when trusts have been established during the marriage. These issues are not only present in New York but in many states across the country. In recent years, these hurdles have been at the forefront of legal reporting due to high profile and high net worth divorces wherein trusts were or may have been established without the knowledge or consent of the other spouse.
In one New York headline-making, high-profile divorce, a spouse of over 20 years alleges that she discovered that during the marriage her husband transferred billions of dollars, including the parties’ Manhattan apartment and home in Colorado, to three separate trusts without her knowledge and consent. These assets, which she claims would have been considered as marital assets prior to the transfer, are potentially now not subject to equitable distribution. The wife further claims that her husband strategically established these trusts to significantly decrease the amount of assets she would receive in the event the parties divorced, while maintaining certain benefits for himself under the trusts. He, on the other hand, maintains that his wife must have been aware of the establishment of the three trusts as they were identified on the parties’ joint tax returns and established for the benefit of the parties’ children.
Determining Whether Trust Assets May be Subject to Equitable Distribution
While establishing irrevocable or revocable trusts during a marriage when the parties obtain significant wealth (or plan to obtain significant wealth) is not uncommon and may indeed serve legitimate estate planning purposes, the issue that may be presented to the court is whether these estate planning mechanisms were established without the consent or knowledge of one spouse, and whether such trust or trusts were used to circumvent the property distribution rights to each spouse provided under the New York Domestic Relations Law.
In these cases, the courts examine what type of trust was established (irrevocable, revocable, etc), the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the trust, and what assets were transferred to the trust. In addition, the court will also examine where the trust was established (state or country), who the beneficiary or the beneficiaries of the trust is, as well as the roles of each individual party as set forth in the trust document. The examination and, ultimately, the determination by the court is often very fact specific as seen in the reported cases cited throughout this article.
When two parties are happily married, these trust instruments can make sense and typically, neither party contests the establishment of the trusts or terms. It is common for both parties to be involved in the creation of the trusts or one party may keep the other party apprised of the trust’s terms and assets. In Oppenheim v Oppenheim, 168 A.D.3d 1085, 93 N.Y.S. 3d 92 (2d Dep’t 2019), despite the wife’s claims that the husband had engaged in “inequitable conduct in the establishment of” the trust, the trial court found that the “circumstances surrounding, among other things, the creation of the family trust” do not substantiate the defendant’s claims and the trust was legitimately created. Id. at 1086–1088. In Oppenheim, the husband kept the wife informed of the creation of the trust and she was aware of the source of the funding and its tax implications, as well as that the trust was created before any “indication of marital discord”. Id .at 1086. The court declined further inquiry into the trust and declined dividing the assets or the value of the assets between the parties.
When a party transfers marital assets to such a trust (whether or not both parties are considered beneficiaries), the trust now owns the assets and such assets are removed from personal ownership, just as in Oppenheim. However, a party may not necessarily need their spouse to consent to the establishment of a trust and may do so without notice or disclosure at the time of establishment. The corpus of the trust may not be able to be considered for equitable distribution unless there is a determination that the trust was created for fraudulent or other improper purposes, such as in Surasi cited below, posing a difficult feat for practitioners.
In Surasi v Surasi, 2001 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 1117, 2001 NY Slip Op 40408(U) (Co. of Richmond, November 20, 2001), the trial court held that the trust created by the husband during the pendency of the divorce, was a revocable trust and therefore, the trust was to be set aside and all property was to be transferred back to the marital estate. Id. at 19–21. Specifically, in Surasi, the husband created a revocable trust after the divorce action had commenced with the clear intent to defraud the wife of certain claims to marital property and prevent the trial court from having jurisdiction. The husband established trusts created in New Jersey and listing the domicile of the beneficiaries (the children of the marriage) as Virginia. The children never resided in Virginia. The trial court determined that the creation of this revocable trust was a sham and a fraud and therefore the trial court had jurisdiction over the transferred assets. Id.
However, in Villi v O’Caining-Villi, 2005 NYLJ LEXIS 1385 (Co. of Westchester, December 30, 2005), where there was no finding of fraud, the court declined to terminate the trust. The trial court rejected the wife’s request to revoke and terminate the revocable trust established during the marriage. The parties’ home was transferred to a revocable trust of which their son was the beneficiary. The terms of the trust permitted the parties to continue to reside in the home during their respective lifetimes. The court determined that the home did not constitute marital property and it was validly transferred to the trust. Id. at 11–12. In the alternative, the wife argued that the trust was in fact revocable if the court directed the husband and the son to consent to the revocation of the trust (as the wife declared she would consent to the revocation). The Court declined the wife’s demand to direct the husband and son to consent to the termination of the trust. First, the husband expressly refused to consent and there was no indication that the son would consent. And since there was no finding of fraud the court did not have the authority to “order the creator of a trust to execute a consent to its revocation”. Id. at 15.
In some cases, if a revocable trust was established, it is more likely that a spouse’s distribution rights have not been altered. If marital assets were placed in a revocable trust, those assets can more easily be removed by a court or the parties for equitable division. Revocable trusts established during a marriage may still be considered part of the marital estate and subject to equitable distribution in New York.
Irrevocable trusts, which are the trusts primarily subject to litigation, can rarely be altered by the court, and the court often has no jurisdiction over the assets held by such trust. These assets are considered to be removed from the marital estate. Irrevocable trusts are common tools to secure generational wealth and avoid costly estate taxes and are frequently legitimate estate planning tools subject to strict guidelines and laws and can provide extensive benefits that meet the goals of a particular family.
A trust’s specific terms and the role of the parties may also be considered by a New York court when properly distributing marital assets. For example, a court will examine whether a spouse would have been a beneficiary of a trust and/or whether one spouse has a fiduciary role.
In at least one case, it has been held that where one party was a beneficiary of a trust established during the marriage, that, in certain circumstances, that spouse can be awarded the equivalent of one half of the value of the assets held in the trust, as a credit from other marital assets, if the court does not have jurisdiction over the trust or the trust cannot be terminated. Specifically in that case, the husband established an irrevocable trust in the Cook Islands. Both spouses and the children were named as beneficiaries; however, the wife was not personally named and only referred to as “Spouse of the Settlor”. Upon divorce, she lost her rights as a beneficiary. The trial court raised the question that, in the absence of finding fraud or fault, are the value of the marital assets placed transferred to an irrevocable trust subject to equitable distribution. The court answered in the affirmative. See Riechers v Riechers, 178 Misc. 2d 170, 679 N.Y.S.2d 233 (Co. of Westchester, June 30, 1998); see also Yerushalmi v Yerushalmi, 136 A.D. 3d 812, 26 N.Y.S.3d 114 (2 Dep’t 2016) (the court held that the marital residence, which was transferred by the husband to a qualified personal residence trust (QPRT) during the marriage and the parties continued to reside at the marital residence, did not lose its marital character).
Consideration of Trusts for Other Purposes in a Divorce Action
Even if marital assets removed from the marital estate and placed into trust are not subject to equitable distribution, it does not prevent the courts from considering it for other purposes. For example, in Goldberg v Goldberg, 172 A.D.2d 316, 568 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1 Dep’t 1991), the wife was awarded a distributive award in lieu of distribution of marital property that was secretly diverted to various trusts by the husband during the marriage. The court found that the husband “deliberately dissipated marital funds and secreted marital assets”, which constituted economic fault and necessitated an award to the wife. Id. at 316–317.
In addition, when considering an award of interim or final maintenance to one spouse, a court may also consider the payee’s loss of inheritance rights and distributions the payor party may receive. Distributions from a trust or the ability to access trust assets or income may be attributed to the payor party as income for child or spousal support purposes.
Discovery Into Trust Vehicles and Terms in Divorce Actions
Divorce practitioners are often confronted with a client who may be completely in the dark about family finances. Further, one spouse may be completely unaware of the financial decisions the other spouse has made and/or what is specifically included on a joint tax return. Through the broad divorce discovery process in New York, the divorce action may be the first time a spouse learns that a significant portion of assets that would otherwise have been included in the marital estate was removed and deposited into a trust. Or a spouse may also discover that by initiating a divorce, the divorce filing has triggered terms that immediately remove that spouse from benefitting from the trust and they lost their entitlement to receive anything pursuant to the trust terms.
In New York, when a divorce is initiated, financial disclosure is not limited to only those assets included in the marital estate. New York has a strong policy favouring broad financial disclosure in divorce actions which benefits both parties, but particularly a party who has been removed from the financial decisions throughout the marriage. Trust assets are not necessarily precluded from discovery. Over the years, New York courts have required disclosure into the creation and operation of trusts even if those trusts are not considered part of the marital estate over one spouse’s or the trust’s objections. See Trafelet v Trafelet, 150 A.D.3d 483, 56 N.Y.S.3d 10 (1 Dep’t 2017).
With the recent headlines highlighting the establishment of trusts during the marriage and the consequences post-divorce, one thing remains clear – it is worth paying attention to how the court weighs in on various arguments surrounding trust vehicles, as they apply to a particular family.
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