Grounds for Divorce

There is only one ground for divorce that may be relied on by a married couple in Singapore – that of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. In addition to this ground, the court would also need to be satisfied that it would be just and reasonable to grant the divorce, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and how the divorce would affect any children of the marriage. 

As a threshold requirement, an individual is generally permitted to file for divorce after three years have passed since the registration of the marriage.

In special circumstances, such as exceptional hardship suffered by an applicant or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent, the court may allow an application for divorce to be made within the first three years of marriage. The requirement enshrines the sanctity of marriage in Singapore, and the representation of marriage as a serious obligation undertaken by both parties. 

With the passing of the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Bill No 43/2021 on 10 January 2022, and from 1 July 2024 onwards, there are now presently six “facts” that parties may rely on to establish an irretrievable breakdown of their marriage:

• one party (“X”) has committed adultery, and the other party (“Y”) finds it intolerable to live with X;
• X has behaved in such a way that Y cannot reasonably be expected to live with X;
• X has deserted Y for a continuous period of two or more years immediately before the application for divorce;
• the parties have lived apart for a continuous period of three or more years and consent to a divorce being granted by the court;
• the parties have lived apart for a continuous period of four or more years (regardless of either party’s consent); or
• the parties agree that the marriage has irretrievably broken down, subject to the court’s discretion should it consider that there remains a reasonable possibility that the parties may reconcile. 

It is important to mention that proof of adultery would require Y to establish that sexual intercourse has taken place between X and a third party. In this respect, intimate messages or improper conduct between X and a third party may be insufficient, unless the circumstances of the case are such that adultery might reasonably be assumed as a result of an opportunity presented for its occurrence. Nonetheless, the improper association of a husband/wife with a third party may be relied on as a circumstance giving rise to the allegation that one has behaved in such a way that the other cannot reasonably be expected to live with them.

The party commencing the divorce should also take note of the six-month “grace period” afforded by the Women’s Charter 1961. Should the parties continue to live together as husband and wife for a period exceeding six months following the incidents (of adultery or unreasonable behaviour) relied on, other (more recent) incidents may need to be provided and relied on.

The introduction of the sixth fact – that is, allowing for divorce by mutual agreement – illustrates the further commitment and emphasis placed on the concept of therapeutic justice (in the family justice courts) and facilitating amicable divorces by placing less focus on the “fault” of a party for the breakdown of the marriage.

As Singapore presently does not recognise same-sex marriages or civil unions, the above-mentioned ground would only apply to registered marriages between a man and a woman.

Processes and Timelines for Divorce

Parties filing for divorce would need to commence an action in the family justice courts of the Republic of Singapore (pursuant to Part 10 of the Women’s Charter 1961), on the basis of an irretrievable breakdown of their marriage (as detailed in the preceding subsection) in order to obtain a divorce. No mandatory periods of separation between the parties are required, prior to the commencement of the action, unless a party intends to rely on one of the three facts that stipulate periods in which one party has deserted the other and/or the parties have lived apart. 

Pursuant to Section 94A of the Women’s Charter 1961 and Section 3 of the Women’s Charter (Parenting Programme) Rules 2016, all parents with children under the age of 21 are required to attend the mandatory co-parenting programme before filing for divorce. This applies even to parties who are able to reach an agreement with their spouse on the facts to be relied on to support the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and/or all ancillary matters. Attendance of this programme has been mandatory for all parents with children under the age of 21 since 1 July 2024.

Divorce proceedings formally begin when an applicant files their originating application for divorce. The originating application is to be filed in accordance with Form 2A of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024, and may include: 

• a certificate of completion of the mandatory co-parenting programme (if applicable);
• an affidavit of split care and control (where the parties have agreed that each will care for different children);
• a draft ancillary reliefs order;
• a copy of the parties’ marriage certificate (and any translations);
• a copy of the children’s birth certificates (and any translations);
• an agreement that the marriage has irretrievably broken down (for parties relying on divorce by mutual agreement); and
• bankruptcy search results.

The new Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 critically remove the need for a statement of claim or statement of particulars to be filed – instead, the information that was previously contained in both documents is now included in Form 2A. Form 2A, which is a combination of both multiple-choice options and open-ended questions, is intended to be more accessible and user-friendly for litigants in person.

After service of the originating application (when served within Singapore), the respondent has to file the following documents: 

• a notice to contest (within 14 days);
• a reply to the originating application for dissolution of the marriage (if any) (within 28 days); and
• a cross-application (within 28 days).

Service of Divorce Proceedings

The applicant is to serve the originating application personally on the respondent within 14 days after the issuance of the originating application. Alternatively, service may be properly effected on a party via their solicitors, who have indicated that they have instructions to accept service on the party’s behalf. 

Despite personal service of the originating application not having been properly effected, personal service may be deemed to have been effected on a person if:

• the person to be served files a notice to contest;
• the person to be served files a reply; or
• the applicant –
1. files an affidavit of service exhibiting any document to indicate that the person to be served has received the originating application; and
2. the court is satisfied that the document exhibited indicates that the person to be served has received the originating application.

In civil proceedings, the court’s approval is generally required for service of the originating application out of Singapore. However, Part 7 Rule 10 of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 states that the court’s approval is not required for service of an originating application or other court documents relating to any proceedings under Part 10 of the Women’s Charter 1961 out of Singapore.

Religious Marriages and Divorces

The Women’s Charter 1961 does not apply to marriages solemnised or registered under Muslim law. Instead, the Administration of Muslim Law Act 1966 governs Muslim marriages, with the Syariah Court deciding matters concerning divorces in Muslim marriages.

Customary marriages entered into before 2 June 1967 are also recognised as valid marriages. Post 2 June 1967, marriages solemnised in Singapore are only recognised as valid marriages if they are in accordance with the Women’s Charter 1961.

Judicial Separation/Annulment

An individual may file an originating application for judicial separation based on any of the six ‘“facts” as set out in “Grounds for Divorce”. Parties may file for judicial separation prior to the three-year time limit. Thereafter, they may commence divorce proceedings on the basis of an irretrievable breakdown of their marriage (as detailed previously) in order to obtain a divorce. 

Following a judgment of judicial separation, the parties are no longer obliged to cohabit with each other. Where parties are judicially separated (but remain married) and one party passes away intestate, the other party is not entitled to claim part of the deceased spouse’s estate. 

Parties may also choose to annul their marriage if it fulfils the requirements for annulment under Sections 105 or 106 of the Women’s Charter 1961.

There are two types of annullable marriages: “void” or “voidable marriages”. The following civil marriages are void under Section 105 of the Women’s Charter 1961:

• a marriage between persons who are Muslims; 
• a marriage between persons who, at the date of the marriage, are not respectively male and female; 
• a marriage where one party is already lawfully married to a spouse under any law, religion, custom or usage; 
• a marriage where one party is below the age of 18 years (and there is no authorisation by a special marriage licence); 
• a marriage within specific degrees of kindred relationship and affinity (as set out in the First Schedule of the Women’s Charter 1961); 
• a marriage that has not been solemnised with a valid marriage licence and by a registrar or a licensed solemniser; and 
• a marriage of convenience. 

The following marriages are voidable under Section 106 of the Women’s Charter 1961:

• a marriage that has not been consummated owing to the incapacity of either party or wilful refusal by one party to consummate it; 
• a marriage where one party did not validly consent to it; 
• a marriage where, at the time of the marriage, a party who is capable of giving valid consent was suffering from a mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to make them unfit for marriage; 
• a marriage where, at the time of the marriage, one party was suffering from a venereal disease in a communicable form; and 
• a marriage where, at the time of the marriage, one party was pregnant by some person other than the spouse. 

An applicant commencing a legal action to annul a marriage must file their originating application in accordance with Form 2B of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024. 

Singapore as the Jurisdiction for Divorce

A Singapore court has jurisdiction to hear an application for divorce where either or both of the parties:

• are domiciled in Singapore at the time of commencement of proceedings; or
• have been habitually resident in Singapore for a period of three years immediately prior to the commencement of proceedings. 

A Singapore citizen is deemed, until the contrary is proved, to be domiciled in Singapore. A person’s domicile of origin (ie, their place of birth) would prevail when determining domicile, unless that person acquires a new domicile of choice or dependence subsequently. The party who alleges that a domicile has been changed would bear the burden of proving the claim. A person cannot have more than one domicile at any one time (Peter Rogers May v Pinder Lillian Gek Lian (2006) SGHC 39).

The concept of habitual residence is distinct from that of domicile. An individual would be habitually resident in a place that they are ordinarily or normally resident in, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration. The residence should also be one that is voluntarily adopted, with a degree of settled purpose (Lee Mei-Chih v Chang Kuo Yuan (2012) SGHC 180). 

Given that Singapore does not recognise same-sex marriages or civil unions, queries as to the jurisdictional grounds for divorce in these categories would be a non-starter in Singapore.

Contesting Jurisdiction

The applicant who commences an originating application for divorce would need to state, in Form 2A, the basis on which the court has jurisdiction to hear the matter – that is, whether reliance is placed on the parties’ domicile or habitual residence. 

If a respondent wishes to contest the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts to hear the matter, they will have to indicate this intention in the reply to the originating application for dissolution of the marriage. The respondent should also file a summons to apply for the Singapore proceedings to be stayed pending a determination on the appropriate forum for divorce proceedings. In such an application based on the ground of forum non conveniens, the court of appeal has affirmed that the principles laid out in the seminal case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (1987) AC 460 are applicable.

In brief, these principles are as follows.

• The court may grant a stay on the ground of forum non conveniens when there is an available forum, having competent jurisdiction, that is the appropriate forum.
• Generally, the respondent would bear the burden of proving that a stay should be granted. If the court is satisfied on a prima facie basis that another forum would be the appropriate forum, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish that there are special circumstances that warrant a continuation of proceedings in Singapore.
• The burden on the respondent extends to establishing that the alternative forum is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the present forum.
• The natural forum is the place in which there is the most real and substantial connection to the action. The court will examine connecting factors such as convenience, the law governing the matter, the location of assets, and nationality. 
• An application for a stay would typically be refused in situations where the court determines there is no other available forum that is clearly more appropriate.
• Conversely, a stay would usually be granted where there is an available forum that – at face value – is clearly more appropriate for the action, unless there are other countervailing considerations that conflict with the grant of a stay. 

In situations where the court’s jurisdiction may be a point of contention, parties should be wary of filing further pleadings and/or applications, as this may be seen as a submission to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts (VH v VI and another (2008) 1 SLR 742.

Jurisdiction in Financial Claims

As the court’s power to order the division of matrimonial assets upon divorce flows from the granting of a judgment of divorce, the court’s jurisdiction to hear the parties’ financial claims follows from a grant of interim judgment of divorce. Contesting the court’s jurisdiction, at this late stage, would likely be seen as extremely belated and might not be entertained. Financial claims are often dealt with at the ancillary matters’ stage of the divorce proceedings – that is, after the interim judgment of divorce has been granted. 

While a party is at liberty, at any stage, to make an application for a stay of proceedings, an application made on the basis of pursuing financial proceedings in an alternative jurisdiction is likely to require exceptional circumstances before it would be granted. Further, if the application is deemed frivolous or vexatious, it may also be dismissed with an adverse costs order against the party making the application. Generally, if there is any challenge to the appropriate forum for the proceedings, this should be made expeditiously and as early as possible.

Financial Claims in Foreign Divorces

Parties who have obtained a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction may apply to the court for leave to apply for financial relief consequential to said foreign matrimonial proceedings, in accordance with Sections 121A–121G of the Women’s Charter 1961. 

As a pre-condition to the granting of financial relief, either one of the following two conditions must be satisfied:

• one of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in Singapore:
1. on the date of the application for leave; or
2. on the date on which the divorce, annulment or judicial separation took effect in the foreign jurisdiction; or
• one of the parties to the marriage was habitually resident in Singapore for a continuous period of one year: 
1. immediately preceding the date of the application for leave; or
2. on the date on which the divorce, annulment, or judicial separation took effect in the foreign jurisdiction. 

Should this jurisdictional threshold be met, the party will need to apply for leave from the court for the application. Singapore should also be the appropriate forum for the relief to be granted. 

When assessing whether there are “substantial grounds” for the application, the court will also review the merits and prospects of success of the application, in order to carry out the function of Section 121D of the Women’s Charter 1961 as a “filter” against unmeritorious or oppressive actions (Harjit Kaur d/o Kulwant Singh v Saroop Singh a/l Amar Singh (2015) 4 SLR 1216). 

Even after substantial grounds are shown, the courts will also consider the power of the foreign court to grant financial relief, as well as the orders already made and any other relevant circumstances – for example, why no orders were previously made. Further, in respecting international comity, Singapore courts are also reluctant to review and rewrite what a foreign court may already have decided. 

Service

For matrimonial proceedings, the applicant is to arrange for the originating application to be personally served on the respondent(s). There are other methods of service provided for under the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024, including under the requirements of any written law or in a manner agreed to between the parties (see 1.1 Grounds, Timeline, Service and Process).

Ancillary Matters Process

The first ancillary affidavit (FAA) is a sworn statement to be filed and served by each party 28 days after the interim judgment of divorce or judgment of judicial separation has been granted. The FAA was previously referred to as an “affidavit of assets and means” under the Family Justice Rules 2014. The new Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 also specify a default four-week timeline for the filing and exchange of FAAs, whereas previously timelines were left to the court’s discretion.

The FAA is to set out each party’s claim for ancillary relief and the particulars of the claim, as well as all relevant supporting evidence. 

Following the filing of the parties’ respective FAAs, a second ancillary affidavit in response to the matters raised in the FAA may be filed and served. This is also to be filed 28 days after the filing of the FAAs (assuming that both parties file their FAAs on the same day), unless one party files an application for disclosure against the other party.

This application for the discovery of documents or to administer interrogatories following the filing of the FAA may be made with the underlying objective of unearthing documents and information that may lead to assets previously undisclosed in the FAA. 

Approach to Division

The court’s approach to the division of matrimonial assets will largely depend on the nature and type of marriage. The two key criteria are whether it was a dual-income or single-income marriage and the length of the marriage. The court also considers the direct financial contributions and indirect contributions (both financial and non-financial) of the parties in ascertaining a just and equitable division. 

In dual-income marriages, the leading case is that of ANJ v ANK (2015) 4 SLR 1043, which sets out the following steps.

• Ascribe a ratio that represents each party’s direct contributions (ie, monetary contributions) to the acquisition or improvement of the matrimonial assets, relative to the other party.
• Ascribe a second ratio which represents each party’s indirect contribution (counting both indirect financial and indirect non-financial contributions) to the well-being of the family, relative to the other party. 
• Using both ratios, the court derives each party’s average percentage contribution to the family, which will form the basis to dividing the matrimonial assets (subject to any further adjustments depending on the circumstances of the case). 

In long, single-income marriages, the division of matrimonial assets would tend towards equality (TNL v TNK and another appeal, and another matter (2017) 1 SLR 609).

Financial Orders

The courts are afforded a wide range of options when deciding the financial orders to be made in regulating or reallocating marital assets. A non-exhaustive list of options includes:

• the sale of immovable property and division of net sale proceeds;
• the transfer of one spouse’s share in an immovable property to another upon payment of a specified sum;
• the transfer of financial assets (eg, shares) to the other spouse;
• the payment of a lump sum; and
• orders for maintenance (as discussed in 2.4 Spousal Maintenance).

The factors listed in Section 112(2) of the Women’s Charter 1961 are key considerations when deciding what orders should be made with respect to the division of matrimonial assets. These factors are:

• the contributions of each party in money, property or work done towards acquiring, improving or maintaining the matrimonial assets;
• any debts or obligations incurred by either party for the parties’ joint benefit or for the benefit of a child of the marriage;
• the needs of any children of the marriage;
• the contributions of each party to the welfare of the family;
• any agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce;
• the assistance or support one spouse provided to the other; and
• the factors considered in the granting of maintenance orders.

Identifying Assets

Matrimonial assets would include:

• any asset acquired during the marriage by one or both parties;
• any asset acquired before the marriage but ordinarily used or enjoyed during the marriage by both parties or their children for shelter, transportation, household, education, recreational, social or aesthetic purposes;
• any asset acquired before the marriage that has been substantially improved during the marriage by the other party or by both parties to the marriage; and
• the matrimonial home. 

Gifts or inheritance monies received during the marriage and which have not been substantially improved on during the marriage would ordinarily not be classified as a matrimonial asset. A matrimonial home is the exception to the rule (subject to any third-party interests). 

Parties are expected to list all their assets in their FAA. In situations where a party has chosen not to participate in proceedings, the court may make orders for the Central Provident Fund (CPF) Board to provide disclosure of the non-participating spouse’s CPF monies or information pertaining to the use of the said CPF monies.

Property Regimes

Singapore adopts a “deferred community of property” approach, whereby all matrimonial property is treated as community property (unless otherwise taken out of the pool) upon the termination of the marriage (Lock Yeng Fun v Chua Hock Chye (2007) 3 SLR(R) 520). The regime is reflected in the provisions in Section 112 of the Women’s Charter 1961 and applied accordingly.

Trusts

Although the family justice courts remain open to concepts such as a resulting trust in favour of one spouse, where it is alleged that a third party holds a property on resulting trust for one spouse, a separate third-party civil action may need to be taken in order to ascertain the beneficial ownership of the property. 

Where the parties to the trust are the spouses themselves, the same may be more appropriately regarded and classified as a gift made by one spouse to the other – in which case, it will be returned to the matrimonial pool for division along with other significant gifts (Yeo Gim Tong Michael v Tianzon Lolita (1996) SGCA 14). 

If a trust property is held by one party for the benefit of the spouse or children, it is also likely that the same would be considered matrimonial property (subject to the nature of the trust – for example, whether the trust is revocable or otherwise). 

In Singapore, the only persons who may apply for maintenance are current or former wives, or incapacitated husbands. 

An incapacitated husband is defined in the Women’s Charter 1961 as a husband who:

• during the marriage, becomes:
1. incapable of earning a livelihood, owing to any physical or mental disability or illness; and
2. unable to maintain himself; and
• continues to be unable to maintain himself. 

The courts have interpreted the definition of an incapacitated husband to mean that the husband should be incapacitated from earning a livelihood before falling under the definition provided above (USA v USB (2020) 4 SLR 288). In this respect, a certain degree of permanence should be met before a husband would be deemed “incapacitated”. Nonetheless, other circumstances – such as the husband’s level of education and the corresponding type of work he is likely to perform – may also be taken into account (VJF v VJG (2020) SGFC 54) in determining whether maintenance would be payable. 

In addition to maintenance post-divorce, wives and incapacitated husbands may also apply for maintenance from their spouse during the subsistence of the marriage, pursuant to Section 69 of the Women’s Charter 1961.

Interim Maintenance

A wife or incapacitated husband would be able to make an application to the court for interim maintenance from a spouse, pending the final determination of the ancillary matters. The factors considered by the court when determining the quantum of interim maintenance granted (if any) are the same as those considered when deciding the quantum of maintenance post-divorce. Interim maintenance to provide for the needs of any children of the marriage may also be ordered while proceedings are pending. 

The key difference between interim and final maintenance orders is which factors are relevant, based on the facts at the time the application is made. As an order for interim maintenance would be based on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the application, the quantum of such interim maintenance (if ordered) would be affected by circumstances that may be fluid – for example, the ability of a former spouse to find employment or alternative accommodation, or where the children of the marriage are residing. With the objective of the interim maintenance order being to “tide over” the spouse and any children until the final ancillary matters hearing, a corresponding decrease or increase in this quantum may be ordered at the final ancillary matters hearing, depending on the circumstances.

Quantum of Maintenance Post-Divorce

The overarching consideration of the court when deciding the quantum of any maintenance to be awarded is to adequately provide for the needs of the spouse and any children of the marriage. In doing so, it will have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the factors listed in Section 114 of the Women’s Charter 1961 – namely: 

• the income, earning capacity and assets each of the parties has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
• the financial needs and responsibilities each party has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
• the standard of living enjoyed before the breakdown of the marriage;
• the age of each party and the duration of the marriage;
• any physical or mental disability of either party;
• the contributions of each party to the welfare of the family; and
• any benefits lost as a result of the divorce.

The parents are jointly responsible for the maintenance of their children up until the age of 21, or beyond that age if the court is satisfied maintenance is necessary – for example, because the child has enrolled in tertiary education or has special needs. 

Spousal maintenance is also often complementary to the division of matrimonial assets, which may be used to even out financial inequalities between spouses, taking into account any economic prejudice suffered by the wife or incapacitated husband during the marriage (BG v BF (2007) 3 SLR 233).

An order for maintenance may be in one lump sum in order to provide parties with a “clean break” from the marriage or may be in monthly instalments. However, the court in TDT v TDS and another appeal, and another matter (2016) 4 SLR 145 has cautioned that the purpose of spousal maintenance is not for the husband to act as an “insurer” for the former wife – in line with this approach, the courts have previously ordered no maintenance for wives who are employed and able to provide for their own needs.

Prenuptial and postnuptial agreements are not automatically enforceable/recognised by the Singapore courts. Such agreements will be subject to the scrutiny of the court.

The Singapore courts have the overarching power to divide the matrimonial assets in such proportions as the court thinks just and equitable (Section 112(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961). In determining what is “just and equitable”, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, and this includes whether there is “any agreement between the parties with respect to the ownership and division of the matrimonial assets made in contemplation of divorce” (Section 112(2)(e) of the Women’s Charter 1961). Ultimately, the court will decide how much weight ought to be accorded to the prenuptial or postnuptial agreement.

In the case of postnuptial agreements, the court may accord them more weight than prenuptial agreements in the exercise of its discretion (TQ v TR (2009) 2 SLR (R) 961). Nevertheless, how much weight the court accords to such agreements will depend on the precise circumstances of the case – for example, whether the parties knew the legal consequences of entering into the agreement and whether the circumstances have changed since the parties entered into the agreement. The court is unlikely to accord significant weight to a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement if doing so would result in an outcome that is not just and equitable.

For prenuptial agreements relating to children’s issues, the court would be especially vigilant and would be reluctant to enforce agreements that are not apparently in the best interests of the child or the children concerned (TQ v TR (2009) 2 SLR (R) 961). 

The paramount consideration in determining custody, care and control, and access arrangements for a child/children is the welfare of the child/children. Therefore, prenuptial agreements relating to the custody, care and control of a child are presumed to be unenforceable unless it can be clearly demonstrated by the party relying on the agreement that the agreement is in the best interests of the child/children involved (TQ v TR (2009) 2 SLR (R) 961).

If a prenuptial agreement is entered into by foreign nationals and governed by (as well as valid according to) a foreign law (and assuming the foreign law is not repugnant to the public policy of Singapore), then the court may afford significant weight to the terms of that agreement, in order to avoid forum shopping. However, the court has maintained that it retains the overall discretion in determining the division of matrimonial assets.

Singapore does not recognise de facto relationships or cohabitation under the matrimonial law regime. For unmarried couples, the assets would be governed by principles of contract, trust or property law. Parties also do not acquire additional rights by virtue of the length of cohabitation. Children born of unmarried couples are considered illegitimate. 

Assets acquired during premarital cohabitation are not subject to division unless they have been transformed into matrimonial assets by meeting certain statutory criteria. Similarly, the court should not take into account parties’ indirect contributions during the period of premarital cohabitation when determining the extent of each party’s contribution to the marriage (USB v USA and another appeal (2020) 2 SLR 588).

A party may apply for the following enforcement orders:        

• an enforcement order for attachment of debt;
• an enforcement order for seizure and sale of property; and
• an enforcement order for delivery or possession of property. 

Naturally, if the other party fails to comply with a court order, then an application for committal may also be commenced against the defaulting party. 

A party may also apply for the following to enforce maintenance orders:

• sentencing of the respondent to imprisonment;
• a warrant directing that maintenance arrears be levied in the manner provided by law for levying fines imposed by a magistrate’s court;
• an enforcement order for attachment of debt, which could include an order for the respondent’s employer to deduct the portion of maintenance from the respondent’s salary and make direct payment to the applicant; 
• an order for the respondent to give a banker’s guarantee against future defaults;
• an order for the respondent to undergo financial counselling; and/or
• an order for the respondent to perform community service.

The media and press are allowed to report on family justice court proceedings, save that Section 10 of the Family Justice Act 2014 provides that all hearings in the family justice courts are generally heard in camera, and Section 112 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1993 prohibits the publishing or broadcasting of any information that could lead to the identification of any child or young person concerned in the proceedings. 

Judgments for matrimonial proceedings that involve children below the age of 21 years are also redacted and/or anonymised to adhere to Section 112 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1993. 

There has been significant push for parties to resolve matters amicably. To this end, parties have the option to commence pre-writ mediation, and there are bodies (eg, the Singapore Mediation Centre, the Law Society of Singapore, and the Singapore International Mediation Institute) and numerous private practitioners in Singapore who provide mediation services for family proceedings. 

In the court system, mediation is mandatory for divorcing couples with children under the age of 21 years. Mediation can also be ordered in all other cases (including probate and mental capacity cases), if the court deems fit. The court may also order parties to attend private mediation for an amicable resolution. Practitioners are also expected to inform their clients about ADR options, such as mediation. If the parties do not make reasonable attempts at resolving their disputes through ADR mechanisms, then the court retains the right to make costs orders against the defaulting party. 

If an agreement is arrived at via a non-court process, then such agreement can be recorded as an order of court (if there are pending court proceedings). Alternatively, a signed settlement agreement can also bind the parties. Generally, such mediated agreements are enforceable.

The jurisdiction requirements for matrimonial proceedings are set out in 1.2 Choice of Jurisdiction in Divorce Proceedings. Generally, matters related to children in divorce proceedings are dealt with at the ancillary matters stage, after the granting of the interim judgment of divorce. The factors which the court would consider are also set out therein. 

If the parents cannot agree on a child’s living arrangements, then a party can apply for the court to determine the same under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934 (if no divorce proceedings have been commenced). For all matters concerning child-related issues, the principle is that the welfare of the child is paramount (BNS v BNT (2015) 3 SLR 973) and the court will strive to make decisions which are in the best interests of the child. This is encapsulated in Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1934. In divorce proceedings, the same principle is set out at Section 125 of the Women’s Charter 1961. In deciding a child’s living arrangements, the court can consider the wishes of the parents of the child and the wishes of the child, where they are of an age to express an independent opinion. 

In considering the best interests of the child, the court will consider the following factors (which are non-exhaustive):

• the current status quo; 
• the age of the child; 
• the parties’ respective financial abilities; 
• the support and environment each party is able to provide; 
• the preservation of a mother–child bond if the child is young; and 
• the general approach that siblings should not be separated. 

The courts have the power to decide on the following matters pertaining to a child:

• custody; 
• care and control; and 
• access. 

Custody relates to the power to make major decisions regarding the child, such as education, religion and healthcare matters. Care and control relates to the day-to-day care of the child. The party that is not granted care and control of the child would have access (ie, contact time with the child). Access arrangements include considerations as to whether the contact time would include overnight or overseas access, as well as the terms of holiday, public holidays or special occasions access.

For child maintenance, Section 68 of the Women’s Charter 1961 mandates that it is the duty of a parent to maintain their child. The court must take into account the following factors in deciding on the quantum of maintenance to order:

• the financial needs of the child;
• the income and earning capacity of the parents; 
• the age of the parents; 
• the assets and financial resources of the parents; 
• the standard of living enjoyed by the family; 
• the manner in which the parents expect the child to be educated; and 
• the conduct of the parents. 

Generally, if the child is over 21 years, then the child would have to make the application in their personal capacity. Children over the age of 21 may apply for maintenance if they:

• have a mental or physical disability; 
• are or will be serving full-time national service; 
• are still in education or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation; or 
• if there are special circumstances such that the court is satisfied that the provision of maintenance is necessary. 

Parties can (and are encouraged to) resolve matters amicably and also come to an agreement on maintenance matters. If there is a settlement, the same can be recorded as an order of court (if there are pending court proceedings) or be encapsulated in a settlement agreement. 

See 3.2 Living/Contact Arrangements and Child Maintenance.

See 2.9 ADR in Financial Matters. 

Further, for legal proceedings involving children’s issues, the courts may also:

• appoint child representatives in highly acrimonious cases;
• call for appropriate reports to assist the court in coming to its decision; or
• appoint a parenting co-ordinator to provide assistance in resolving access issues. 

See 2.8 Media Access and Transparency in Financial Proceedings.