International arbitration has gained significant popularity of late amongst foreign and Indian entities facing commercial disputes, considering the ever-evolving global trends in law and commerce. It is no surprise that most commercial contracts now include arbitration clauses, reflecting a strong shift towards this method of dispute resolution.

The Indian arbitration scenario offers reverence to party autonomy, leading to a general shift towards international arbitration. If both parties are Indian and have opted for a foreign seat, the arbitration is classified as a foreign-seated arbitration and not international arbitration.

As a result, financially robust Indian companies often choose to resolve their disputes through international arbitration seated outside India, thereby minimising their exposure to the Indian court system.

In recent years, the maritime and construction industries in India have witnessed a marked increase in international arbitration activity. This surge can be attributed to the inherently cross-border nature of these sectors, the frequent involvement of foreign investors, and the high value and complexity of contracts. These factors make arbitration an appealing choice, as it offers neutrality and efficiency in resolving disputes.

Moreover, the rise in foreign investment, acquisitions and joint ventures in these sectors has resulted in more complex contractual arrangements, which in turn has led to a greater number of disputes being referred to international arbitration.

The Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) remains the most popular arbitral institution for Indian parties involved in international arbitration. SIAC’s strong reputation, close geographical proximity to India and proactive engagement with the Indian legal and business communities have made it the institution of choice.

Indian parties also frequently opt for other leading international arbitration centres, including those in Dubai, London, Zurich, Hong Kong and Paris. While domestic institutions such as the Mumbai Centre For International Arbitration (MCIA) and the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) are gaining traction, they have yet to achieve the same level of global recognition as SIAC and other established international centres.

No new arbitral institutions have been established in India over the past year. The last arbitration centre established in India was the India International Arbitration Centre in 2022, indicating continued reliance on established international centres for high-value and complex disputes.

Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (ACA) governs the appointment of arbitrators in India. India’s judiciary is structured into three tiers:

• the Supreme Court;
• High Courts; and
• Subordinate Courts.

In international commercial arbitration seated in India, if the parties' agreed procedure for appointing arbitrators fails, the Supreme Court holds exclusive jurisdiction to make such appointments. All other applications related to international commercial arbitration are heard by the High Courts.

For domestic arbitrations, the High Courts have exclusive authority to appoint arbitrators when the parties' chosen procedure fails. Other applications involving domestic arbitrations are determined by the courts based on their pecuniary jurisdiction, meaning the appropriate court is selected according to the value of the dispute.

The ACA is the primary legislation governing international arbitration in India, and is structured into four distinct parts:

• Part I deals mainly with domestic arbitration and does not generally apply to international or foreign-seated arbitrations;
• Part II addresses the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and international arbitration;
• Part III covers conciliation; and
• Part IV contains supplementary provisions.

The preamble of the ACA explicitly states that the Act is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, aiming to implement its principles within the Indian legal framework. The Act adopts the Model Law not only for arbitration but also for conciliation, thereby aligning India’s arbitration regime with international standards.

While the ACA largely mirrors the UNCITRAL Model Law, it also introduces several notable differences. For instance, the ACA imposes a strict time limit for making awards in domestic arbitrations, of 12 months from the completion of pleadings. This is extendable by six months with party consent, and further only by court approval. No such limit applies to international arbitrations.

After several amendments, Section 8 of the ACA restricts Indian courts from refusing referral only if there is prima facie no valid arbitration agreement, thus narrowing the scope of judicial inquiry compared to the Model Law, Article 8 of which allows courts to refer parties to arbitration unless the agreement is found to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.

The ACA also imposes a broader duty of disclosure on prospective arbitrators. Arbitrators must disclose not only any circumstances that could raise doubts about their impartiality, but also any factors that might affect their ability to dedicate sufficient time and complete the proceedings within a 12-month period; this obligation is not found in the Model Law.

There has been a significant shift in the extent of judicial intervention allowed in arbitral awards following the landmark April 2025 Supreme Court judgment in Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited. In this decision, a five-judge Constitution Bench, by a 4:1 majority, clarified that Indian courts now have limited power to modify arbitral awards under Sections 34 and 37 of the ACA. This marks a departure from the earlier position, where courts were generally restricted to either setting aside or upholding an award, without the ability to alter its terms.

The Supreme Court emphasised that this power of modification is to be exercised only in exceptional and narrowly defined circumstances, ensuring that the autonomy of the arbitral process is largely preserved while allowing courts to correct manifest errors or injustices in awards.

The 2024 Amendment Bill to amend the ACA is still pending before the Indian legislature, proposing the following changes.

• Introduction of emergency arbitration: the Bill formally recognises emergency arbitrators and permits parties to seek interim relief from them before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Orders from emergency arbitrators will be enforceable as those of a regular tribunal.
• Establishment of an Appellate Arbitral Tribunal: a new Appellate Arbitral Tribunal is proposed to hear challenges to arbitral awards, offering parties an alternative to court proceedings for such challenges. However, if parties opt for this tribunal, recourse to the courts is not available.

• Enhanced role for arbitral institutions: the Bill empowers arbitral institutions to perform several functions previously vested in courts, such as extending timelines for issuing awards, adjusting arbitrators’ fees in case of delays, and substituting arbitrators.
• Removal of Arbitration Council of India’s grading role: the responsibility of the Arbitration Council of India (ACI) to grade arbitral institutions is proposed to be removed, focusing the ACI more on policy development.
• Clearer timelines: the following time limits are proposed:
1. 60 days for courts to dispose of applications to refer disputes to arbitration (Section 8);
2. 30 days for arbitral tribunals to dispose of jurisdictional objections (Section 16); and
3. 60 days for appeals against orders related to arbitration (Section 37).
• Limiting the court’s role in interim measures: courts may grant interim measures only before arbitration begins or after the award is rendered, with arbitral tribunals handling such requests during proceedings.

• Expedited commencement of arbitration: the 90-day period to commence arbitration after a court’s interim order now starts from the filing of the application, not the court order, to prevent delays.
• Mandatory stamping of awards: following the landmark judgment In Re Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1889 (2024), where the apex court mandated the stamping of arbitration agreements and deemed it to be a curable defect, the new Amendment Bill has also included that arbitration awards must be stamped in accordance with the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, at the time of issuance, to avoid enforcement delays.
• Removal of the fourth schedule: the fixed fee schedule for arbitrators is proposed to be replaced with a more nuanced fee structure considering case complexity and time spent, rather than just the value of the claim.
• Full and partial setting aside of awards: the Bill introduces a bifurcated structure for setting aside arbitral awards, allowing for both complete and partial annulment, which is not explicitly provided for in the current Act.

These reforms collectively aim to align India’s arbitration regime with global best practices, increase efficiency, reduce delays and make India a more attractive destination for international arbitration.

Section 8 of the ACA clearly stipulates that an arbitration agreement must be prima facie valid either as a standalone agreement or as a clause within a broader contract in order to be enforceable. If a dispute covered by such an agreement is brought before a judicial authority, the court is mandated to refer the parties to arbitration, provided an application is made before the party submits its first substantive statement in the dispute. The only exception is if the court finds that no valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.

In Tarun Dhameja v Sunil Dhameja, 2024 the Supreme Court also clarified that the word “optional” in the arbitration clause does not make arbitration dependent on mutual consent. Any party can independently invoke arbitration, and mutual consent is only required for choosing arbitrators.

Indian courts have consistently adopted a pro-enforcement approach towards arbitration agreements. This approach minimises judicial intervention and ensures that parties’ intentions to resolve disputes through arbitration are upheld, reflecting the legislative intent to promote arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution in India.

While the ACA does not provide any list of matters that can or cannot be considered for arbitration, its definition provision regarding international arbitration provides that only those matters that are considered to be commercial in nature under Indian law can be referred for arbitration.

The Supreme Court’s 2011 judgment in Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc. v SBI Home Finance Ltd. established the foundational test for arbitrability, focusing on the nature of rights involved in the dispute. According to the Booz Allen test, disputes involving rights in rem (rights against the world at large) are generally non-arbitrable, while those involving rights in personam (rights against specific individuals) are arbitrable.

The Supreme Court has identified the following six categories of disputes as not being arbitrable under Indian law:

• disputes arising from criminal offences;
• matrimonial disputes (such as divorce or judicial separation);
• guardianship matters;
• insolvency and winding-up proceedings;
• testamentary matters (eg, validity of wills, probate); and
• eviction or tenancy matters governed by special statutes.

The Supreme Court further refined the approach in Vidya Drolia v Durga Trading Corporation, articulating a four-fold test for non-arbitrability:

• disputes relating to actions in rem that do not pertain to subordinate rights in personam arising from rights in rem;
• disputes affecting third-party rights, requiring centralised adjudication;
• disputes relating to inalienable sovereign and public interest functions of the State; and
• disputes expressly or by necessary implication rendered non-arbitrable under specific statutes.

In simple words, under Indian law, subject matters that are typically not arbitrable include:

• criminal offences;
• matrimonial and guardianship issues;
• insolvency;
• testamentary matters;
• certain tenancy disputes;
• company law disputes reserved for specialised tribunals; and
• matters involving sovereign or public interest functions.

This framework ensures that issues requiring judicial or centralised adjudication, or those implicating public policy, remain outside the scope of private arbitration.

Indian courts have adopted a pro-enforcement stance towards arbitration agreements. When it comes to determining the governing law of the arbitration agreement, Indian courts have consistently favoured party autonomy. In cases where the parties have not specified a governing law, the Supreme Court has held that the proper law expressly chosen by the parties for the contract would also govern the arbitration agreement, unless there is an unmistakable intention to the contrary. The Court further observed that if the parties have not expressly chosen either the proper law of the contract or the law governing the arbitration agreement, there is a presumption that they intended both to be governed by the law of the seat.

The law is further developed by the Supreme Court in Disortho S.A.S. v Meril Life Sciences Private Limited (2025), in which the Court highlighted that the law applicable to the main contract (lex contractus) generally serves as a strong indication of the law that should govern the arbitration agreement, particularly when the arbitration clause is embedded within the main contract. This presumption stands unless there is explicit evidence suggesting a different intention.

Under normal circumstances, Indian courts interpret arbitration agreements liberally and tend to enforce them rather than declare them void or unenforceable. There are only two circumstances in which a court may be approached for the enforcement of an arbitration agreement:

• for the appointment of arbitrators if the parties fail to do so; and
• to refer the matter to arbitration.

The court may deny enforcement only if it finds that there is no valid arbitration agreement or if the subject matter is non-arbitrable.

In In Re Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1889 (2024), the Supreme Court of India firmly emphasised the validity of the doctrine of separability and held it to be a cornerstone of arbitrational law. This principle ensures that an arbitration clause remains valid and enforceable even if the main contract is found to be invalid. The courts have consistently held in multiple judgments that the arbitration agreement stands on its own, and any questions regarding the validity of the underlying contract are to be decided by the arbitral tribunal itself.

Indian law permits parties to choose arbitrators of their preference, but this right is subject to important restrictions designed to uphold the independence and impartiality of the arbitral tribunal. Notably, it is prohibited for any one party to unilaterally appoint an arbitrator, as this would violate the principles of equity and justice, as held by the Supreme Court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) (2024).

Following the 2015 amendments to the ACA, its fifth schedule specifies a range of relationships largely modelled on the IBA Guidelines’ Red List that disqualify individuals from serving as arbitrators if they have certain connections with the parties, counsel or the subject matter of the dispute – for example, if the arbitrator is a manager, director or part of the management, or has a similar controlling influence in one of the parties.

If the parties’ agreed method for appointing arbitrators breaks down, the responsibility for making such appointments shifts to the courts. In international commercial arbitration, this role is handled by the Supreme Court, while the High Courts oversee appointments in domestic cases.

A similar approach is reflected in the 2024 Amendment Bill, where Section 11 empowers recognised arbitral institutions to appoint arbitrators. The High Court will only step in in regions lacking such institutions, maintaining a panel of arbitrators for this purpose.

Courts generally refrain from interfering in the selection of arbitrators beyond the procedures outlined in 4.2 Default Procedures. However, they retain the authority to refuse the appointment of an arbitrator who has been unilaterally appointed by only one party, as such appointments are contrary to the principles of fairness and impartiality. This was held by the apex court in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV). However, in Bhadra International India v Airports Authority of India, the Delhi High Court upheld an arbitral award passed by a unilaterally appointed arbitrator without altering settled law on the illegality of unilateral appointments, citing the parties’ written waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.

The provisions governing the challenge and removal of arbitrators are set out in Sections 12 to 15 of the ACA. The main grounds for challenging or removing an arbitrator are a lack of independence or impartiality, or the absence of qualifications as agreed upon by the parties.

An arbitrator can be challenged if there are circumstances that raise justifiable doubts about their impartiality or independence, or if they do not meet the qualifications specified by the parties. Any party may challenge an arbitrator, but if a party has participated in the appointment, it can only challenge for reasons discovered after the appointment. Parties are free to decide on a procedure for challenging arbitrators; if they do not, a default procedure applies. Under this procedure, a challenge must be made within 15 days of learning about the tribunal's constitution or of any circumstances that could be grounds for challenge.

If the challenge is unsuccessful, the arbitral tribunal will proceed with the arbitration and issue an award, which can later be contested by the aggrieved party. An arbitrator’s mandate will also end if they are unable to perform their duties, fail to act without undue delay or withdraw from office, or if both parties agree to terminate their mandate. If there is a dispute about whether these conditions have been met, a party may apply to the court to resolve the issue.

Under the governing law, strict requirements are imposed to ensure the independence and impartiality of arbitrators in India. In Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), the apex court held that an impartial and independent arbitrator is necessary for any arbitration to be just and fair, and that the restrictions provided under Section 12 of the ACA must be followed.

When a person is approached for possible appointment as an arbitrator, they are required to make a written disclosure of any circumstances that could give rise to justifiable doubts about their independence or impartiality, such as past or present relationships or interests in any party or the subject matter of the dispute. This disclosure obligation also extends to any factors that might affect their ability to devote adequate time to the arbitration, including the ability to complete the proceedings within the prescribed timeframe.

The law offers guidance on what circumstances may give rise to such doubts. It lists specific relationships and situations that render an individual ineligible to serve as an arbitrator, regardless of any agreement to the contrary. However, parties may waive such ineligibility after a dispute has arisen, as in the case of Bhadra International India v Airports Authority of India, where the Delhi High Court upheld an arbitral award passed by a unilaterally appointed arbitrator, citing the parties’ written waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act.

Section 16 of the ACA expressly embodies the principle of competence-competence in Indian arbitration law, which empowers arbitral tribunals seated in India to determine their own jurisdiction, including the authority to rule on objections regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement itself. In practice, this means that the arbitral tribunal has the first opportunity to decide whether it has the competence to hear the dispute, thereby minimising early judicial intervention and streamlining the arbitration process.

Under Indian arbitration law, courts are generally not permitted to intervene in questions of jurisdiction until the arbitral tribunal has first considered and ruled on the matter. This approach is rooted in the principle of minimal judicial interference, ensuring that the tribunal – as the forum chosen by the parties – has the primary authority to decide its own jurisdiction.

If a party is dissatisfied with the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction, an appeal can be made under Section 37(2)(a) of the ACA. In the landmark case of SBP & Co. v Patel Engineering Ltd., the Supreme Court emphasised that judicial intervention in arbitration proceedings should be strictly limited to the specific situations provided for in the Act. The Court clarified that not every order of the arbitral tribunal is open to challenge under the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts (Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution). Instead, the Act provides a clear scheme: only certain orders are appealable under Section 37, and other grievances may be raised only after the final award is made, through an application to set aside the award under Section 34.

Parties cannot immediately approach the courts to challenge the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction once arbitration begins. Under the principle of competence-competence, the tribunal must first decide on its own jurisdiction. Section 16 of the ACA provides that a party must raise any challenge to jurisdiction before the tribunal. In M/S Vidyawati Construction Company v Union of India, the Supreme Court held that a party cannot challenge an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction after filing its statement of defence under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act.

The standard of judicial review for questions of admissibility and jurisdiction is not de novo. Courts do not examine the merits of the case; rather, they rely on the reasoning provided by the arbitral tribunal when deciding such questions. If the court finds that the tribunal’s reasoning is unsound, it may intervene.

However, under normal circumstances, once the arbitrator has ruled on jurisdiction under Section 16 of the ACA, the court will usually wait for the final arbitral award before entertaining any challenge. This approach upholds the principle of minimal judicial intervention in arbitral proceedings.

Indian courts generally show a strong reluctance to permit court proceedings that are initiated in breach of a valid arbitration agreement. If a party files a suit in court despite an arbitration clause being in effect, the opposing party must promptly apply to refer the dispute to arbitration before submitting its first substantive statement in court. If the court finds, on a prima facie basis, that a valid arbitration agreement exists and the dispute is arbitrable, it is required to refer the parties to arbitration and stay the court proceedings.

If the party seeking referral to arbitration fails to act before filing its first statement of defence in court, it is deemed to have waived its right to object, and the court proceedings will continue. The court will only refuse to refer the matter to arbitration if it finds that no valid arbitration agreement exists or that the dispute is manifestly non-arbitrable.

Indian law is clear that consent is the cornerstone of arbitration: arbitral tribunals ordinarily cannot assume jurisdiction over individuals or entities that are not parties to, or signatories of, the arbitration agreement. However, an exception exists under the “group of companies” doctrine, which is now firmly recognised by the Supreme Court and allows arbitral tribunals to bind non-signatory companies within a corporate group to an arbitration agreement, but only in rare and specific circumstances.

For the doctrine to apply, it must be established that the parties – through their conduct, the structure of their commercial relationship or other relevant factors – intended for the non-signatory company to be bound by the arbitration agreement. In Cox & Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt. Ltd. (2023), the Supreme Court emphasised that this is not a matter of simply piercing the corporate veil or disregarding corporate separateness; rather, the focus is on discerning the true intention of the parties involved in complex transactions and group structures. Furthermore, in Ajay Madhusudan Patel v Jyotrindra S. Patel (2024), the Supreme Court held that a non-signatory’s inclusion must be decided by the arbitral tribunal and not the court.

The doctrine is applied with caution and only where it is clear that the non-signatory’s involvement in the underlying transaction and relationship with the signatories demonstrates mutual intent to arbitrate disputes together. Furthermore, in ASF Buildtech Private Limited v Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited (2025), the Supreme Court held that an arbitral tribunal has the authority to implead non-signatories to an arbitration agreement on its own, provided it applies established legal doctrines like the group of companies, alter ego or composite transaction. In this case, ASF entities were impleaded based on their economic unity and involvement in the contract.

Arbitral tribunals in India have the authority to grant interim measures during the course of arbitration proceedings, as provided under Section 17 of the ACA. These interim orders are binding on the parties and are enforceable as if they were orders of the court. The powers of the arbitral tribunal to grant interim relief are on a par with those of the courts, following amendments to the ACA.

Tribunals can issue a broad range of interim measures that they consider just and convenient, including:

• appointing a guardian for a minor or person of unsound mind for the arbitration;
• ordering the preservation, interim custody or sale of goods involved in the dispute;
• securing the amount in dispute;
• requiring the detention, preservation or inspection of property or items relevant to the dispute;
• granting interim injunctions; and
• appointing receivers.

Role of Courts in Interim Relief

Indian courts are empowered under Section 9 of the ACA to grant interim relief before, during and even after arbitral proceedings, but before the enforcement of an award. This relief can include a wide range of measures, such as injunctions, the preservation or custody of goods, securing the disputed amount, appointing guardians and appointing receivers. Courts may grant such relief when the arbitral tribunal is not yet constituted, or when relief from the tribunal would be impractical or ineffective, especially in cases involving third parties or situations where the tribunal’s orders cannot be enforced against non-signatories.

Interim Relief in Foreign-Seated Arbitrations

Indian courts can also grant interim relief in support of arbitrations seated outside India. The scope of relief is similar to that available in domestic arbitrations, including injunctions, the preservation of assets and other protective measures.

Emergency Arbitrators

Indian courts have enforced emergency arbitrator orders in practice, as seen in the Supreme Court’s decision in Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v Future Retail Ltd., where an emergency arbitrator’s order under SIAC Rules was treated as enforceable in India. The Delhi International Arbitration Centre Rules, 2023, provide for the appointment of emergency arbitrators and outline detailed procedures, including the types of relief they can grant and the enforceability of their orders.

The 2024 Amendment Bill proposes to formally recognise emergency arbitrators and their orders. It allows courts to confirm, modify or vacate ad interim measures granted by emergency arbitrators, aligning with the evolving practice of treating emergency arbitrator orders similarly to those of regular tribunals.

Binding Nature and Court Intervention

Orders of emergency arbitrators under institutional rules are intended to be binding and enforceable, although the current ACA does not expressly clarify their status. The 2024 Amendment Bill aims to remove this ambiguity by giving statutory recognition to emergency arbitrators and their orders.

There is no mention of security for costs in the ACA.

India strongly upholds the principle of party autonomy in arbitration. Under Indian law, parties are free to determine the procedure that the arbitral tribunal will follow during the proceedings. This autonomy is limited only by certain mandatory provisions set out in Part I of the ACA, which cannot be overridden by agreement.

In M/s Isc Projects v Steel Authority of India, the Delhi High Court set aside an arbitral award for lacking the signature of one arbitrator, with no explanation provided, holding that signatures are a substantive requirement under the ACA as well.

If the parties do not agree on a specific procedure, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to conduct the proceedings in a manner it deems appropriate, again subject only to the mandatory requirements of the ACA. Importantly, arbitral tribunals in India are not required to strictly adhere to the national rules of evidence or civil procedure, allowing for greater flexibility and efficiency in the arbitration process.

The ACA sets out several procedural steps for arbitration in India, many of which are non-mandatory and can be modified by party agreement or by adopting institutional rules such as those of the DIAC or MIAC. The process typically begins when the respondent receives a notice of arbitration, formally commencing the proceedings.

After initiation, the parties attempt to constitute the arbitral tribunal according to their agreed procedure. If they are unable to do so, the default mechanism under the ACA allows for court intervention to appoint the arbitrator. If the parties have not specified the number of arbitrators, the tribunal will consist of a sole arbitrator by default.

Once the tribunal is in place, the claimant submits a statement of claim. This is followed by the respondent’s statement of defence, which may include counterclaims or set-offs. Both parties may attach supporting documents. The ACA requires pleadings to be completed within six months from the date the arbitrators receive written notice of their appointment.

Following the completion of pleadings, the tribunal conducts oral hearings for evidence and arguments. In domestic arbitrations, the tribunal must deliver its award within 12 months of the completion of pleadings, with the possibility of a six-month extension by party agreement. Any further extension requires court approval.

The flexibility of the ACA allows parties significant control over the procedure, subject only to a few mandatory provisions.

Under the ACA, an arbitrator in India possesses a range of powers to ensure effective dispute resolution, including the authority to make binding awards, grant interest where a debt is payable and rule on their own jurisdiction, as provided by Section 16, which is derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law. In Olympus Superstructures Pvt. Ltd. v Meena Vijay Khetan, the Supreme Court affirmed that arbitrators can determine their jurisdiction, including objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and that the arbitration clause is treated as independent from the rest of the contract. Arbitrators can also:

• grant interim relief (Section 17);
• determine procedural rules (Section 19);
• decide the place and language of arbitration (Sections 20 and 22);
• manage statements of claim and defence (Section 23);
• conduct hearings and written proceedings (Section 24);
• address party defaults (Section 25);
• appoint experts (Section 26); and
• seek court assistance for evidence (Section 27).

They have powers related to awards and settlements (Section 30), terminating proceedings (Section 32), correcting and interpreting awards (Section 33), imposing interest and handling deposits (Section 38), setting remuneration, and exercising a lien on awards and costs (Section 39).

Alongside these powers, arbitrators have essential duties. They must treat parties equally and remain impartial (Section 18), focus solely on the dispute at hand, adhere to the Act’s provisions, respect public policy, observe time limitations, and ensure proper remuneration. Arbitrators are obliged to provide reasoned awards, uphold principles of natural justice, recuse themselves when necessary, act within their jurisdiction, avoid fraud or misconduct, and ensure finality and reasonableness in their decisions. They must act judicially, follow justice equity and good conscience (Section 28), decide disputes according to law, render accounts (Section 38), consider trade usages (Section 28(3)) and facilitate settlements (Section 30), and may decide ex aequo et bono if so empowered (Section 28).

Indian law does not require parties appearing before arbitral tribunals to be represented by lawyers, nor does it prescribe any specific qualifications for representatives. This means parties can choose to represent themselves or appoint anyone to act on their behalf during arbitration proceedings, including individuals with subject matter expertise.

Recent regulatory changes have clarified and formalised the participation of foreign lawyers in Indian-seated arbitrations. The Bar Council of India now allows foreign lawyers and law firms to practise in India, but strictly for non-litigious matters involving foreign law, international law and arbitration, especially in the context of international commercial arbitration. Foreign lawyers may represent clients in such arbitrations, provided the dispute involves foreign or international law, or the party they represent has a principal office or address outside India. However, foreign lawyers are expressly prohibited from practising Indian law, appearing before Indian courts, or engaging in litigation or statutory proceedings in India.

In Indian arbitration, the procedure for collecting and submitting evidence is largely governed by party autonomy. For ad hoc arbitrations, parties are free to agree on the process; for institutional arbitrations, the applicable rules of the chosen institution (such as DIAC) will apply. If the parties do not specify a procedure, the arbitral tribunal determines the process, ensuring flexibility and efficiency.

Section 19 of the ACA expressly states that arbitral tribunals are not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure or the Indian Evidence Act. This gives tribunals considerable discretion to decide on the admissibility, relevance and weight of evidence, and to tailor the process to the needs of the dispute.

Pleadings Stage

Parties typically submit all relevant documents and evidence along with their statement of claim or defence. The burden of proof lies with the party asserting a claim or defence (as per DIAC Rule 25.1). The tribunal can require parties to produce additional documents, exhibits or evidence at any stage, and may also undertake site visits if necessary.

Hearing Stage

The tribunal decides whether to hold oral hearings for evidence and arguments, unless the parties agree otherwise. Witness evidence may be presented via written statements, which are then confirmed by direct examination and may be subject to cross-examination. The tribunal has discretion to allow, refuse or limit the number of witnesses, restrict oral testimony time, and determine the manner of examination (including remote hearings).

The tribunal may appoint experts to report on specific issues, with parties being given the opportunity to question the expert.

Discovery, Disclosure and Privilege

There is no formal discovery process as in common law courts. However, the tribunal can direct parties to make specific disclosures or produce documents relevant to the dispute.

Sensitive documents may be subject to special disclosure terms by tribunal order (DIAC Rule 26.4). Privilege issues are generally respected as per party agreement or tribunal discretion.

Court Assistance

If a party refuses to comply with the tribunal’s direction to produce evidence, the tribunal or a party (with the tribunal’s approval) may seek court assistance under Section 27 of the ACA. The court can then compel the production of evidence or witnesses, similar to its powers in civil litigation.

Please see 8.1 Collection and Submission of Evidence regarding the applicability of the Indian Evidence Act to arbitral proceedings. Arbitral tribunals are not bound by the strict and formal rules of evidence as prescribed under national law, but they are nonetheless expected to evaluate all evidence impartially and with due diligence.

Furthermore, arbitral tribunals must ensure that witnesses are treated fairly during examination. This includes protecting witnesses from unnecessary pressure or discomfort, and maintaining the integrity of the proceedings. The tribunal’s approach should balance flexibility with fairness, ensuring that the process remains just and equitable for all parties involved.

Section 27 of the ACA empowers arbitral tribunals – or parties with the tribunal’s consent – to request assistance from courts in collecting evidence during arbitration. Courts may be approached to summon witnesses, order the production of documents, or otherwise help gather evidence, using the same procedures as in regular litigation. In certain cases, courts have even appointed commissions to record testimony from witnesses based outside India.

This provision applies to both domestic and internationally seated arbitrations, unless the parties have agreed to exclude it. Before seeking judicial assistance, a party must obtain approval from the arbitral tribunal. The court will then assess whether it has the authority to act and whether the request is appropriate before granting any assistance. Orders issued by the court under Section 27 are binding; failure to comply can result in penalties similar to those imposed in standard court proceedings.

A Redfern Schedule is a structured table used in international arbitration to manage and organise requests for the production of documents. It typically includes columns for the requesting party to specify the documents sought and the reasons for their relevance, the responding party’s objections, and the arbitral tribunal’s decision on each request

Following the 2019 amendments to the ACA, Indian law expressly mandates that all parties involved in arbitration must uphold the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings, including the arbitrators, arbitral institutions and the parties themselves. However, there is an exception: the arbitral award may be disclosed if such disclosure is necessary for the purpose of implementing or enforcing the award.

It is important to note that, while Section 42A of the ACA imposes a duty of confidentiality, the Act does not specify any penalties or sanctions for breaches of this obligation. Therefore, although confidentiality is a legal requirement, the ACA does not provide for punitive measures in the event of non-compliance.

Under Indian law, the definition of an arbitral award includes interim awards, which are recognised as such within the jurisdiction. Arbitral awards in India must adhere to several formal requirements provided under Section 31 of the ACA, including the following:

• the award must be in writing and signed by all members of the arbitral tribunal, or by the majority, provided the reason for any missing signature is recorded;
• it must include the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are necessary, or if the award is based on a settlement under Section 30; and
• the award must state both the date and place of arbitration, with the place being either as agreed by the parties or determined by the tribunal – the award is deemed to have been made at that place.

All domestic arbitrations in India are to be concluded within 12 months from the date on which pleadings are completed. This period can be extended by another six months with the consent of the parties, but any further extension requires court approval.

The ACA does not set out an exhaustive list of remedies that arbitral tribunals in India may grant. Nevertheless, arbitrators possess the authority to award various forms of relief, including:

• the payment of damages, interest and costs;
• specific performance of contractual obligations; and
• temporary and permanent injunctive relief.

While some arbitration agreements include clauses restricting the tribunal’s power to award punitive damages, there is currently no judicial precedent that categorically prohibits tribunals from granting such relief. As a result, the issue of punitive damages in Indian arbitration remains unsettled. Indian law does not definitively state whether arbitrators can award punitive damages, and the legal framework regarding such damages is still at a nascent stage.

Arbitral tribunals in India have the authority to award both pre-award and post-award interest when the arbitral award involves the payment of money. For pre-award interest, parties are free to agree on its applicability and rate. If there is no agreement, the tribunal may grant interest at a rate it considers reasonable, for the period between when the cause of action arose and the date of the award.

The tribunal may award interest on the principal sum as well as on any pre-award interest included in the award, and the Supreme Court in D. Khosla & Co. v Union of India has upheld the power to grant compound interest if the contract or statute allows it.

The regime for costs was clarified and strengthened by the 2015 amendment, introducing Section 31A to the ACA.

Under Section 31A, the tribunal or court has broad discretion to determine:

• whether costs are payable by one party to another; and
• the amount and timing of such costs.

The general rule is that costs follow the event: the unsuccessful party is typically ordered to pay the costs of the successful party. However, the tribunal or court may depart from this rule for recorded reasons, such as partial success, frivolous claims or unreasonable refusal to settle.

Under Indian law, there is no provision for a direct appeal against an arbitral award. A party dissatisfied with an award can only seek to have it set aside by filing an application under Section 34 of the ACA. The grounds for setting aside an award are narrowly defined, as follows, and mirror the standards in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law:

• a party was under incapacity;
• the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law chosen by the parties or, failing that, under Indian law;
• the party applying to set aside the award was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present its case;
• the award addresses disputes not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement;

• the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement or applicable law;
• the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under Indian law;
• the award is in conflict with the public policy of India, which includes awards induced by fraud or corruption and those contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law or in conflict with the most basic notions of morality and justice; and
• patent illegality was apparent on the face of the award.

Only two grounds are available for setting aside a foreign award:

• the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of India; or
• the enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of India.

Recent judicial developments, such as the Gayatri Balasamy v ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited case, have clarified that parties may also seek specific reliefs under Section 34, such as modification of the post-award interest rate or partial setting aside of the award, rather than a complete annulment. Courts may also adjourn proceedings and remit the matter back to the arbitral tribunal to eliminate grounds for setting aside, as provided under Section 34(4).

The Act does not permit a review of the merits of the case or an appeal on questions of law or fact. The court’s intervention is strictly limited to the grounds enumerated in Section 34, reinforcing the finality and binding nature of arbitral awards.

The provisions of the ACA that govern applications to set aside arbitral awards are both mandatory and non-derogable. This means that parties do not have the freedom to contractually exclude, limit or expand these statutory grounds for challenging an award. The legal framework ensures that the grounds for setting aside an award, as specified in the Act, remain uniform and cannot be altered by party agreement.

However, the proposed 2024 Amendment Bill to the ACA introduces a significant development, contemplating the establishment of an appellate arbitral tribunal. Under this proposal, parties may agree to refer disputes to an appellate arbitral tribunal for review before approaching the courts with an application to set aside the award. This introduces an additional layer of review within the arbitral process itself, allowing parties to seek an appellate remedy by mutual agreement prior to judicial intervention.

Indian courts maintain a deferential stance towards the findings and conclusions of arbitral tribunals. They do not undertake a fresh evaluation of the case, nor do they re-examine the evidence or reassess the merits: courts respect the tribunal’s authority and refrain from substituting their own judgment for that of the arbitrators.

When it comes to foreign arbitral awards, the scope of judicial intervention is even narrower. Courts are expressly prohibited from reviewing the merits of the dispute and may only examine the award within the strictly limited grounds set out in Section 48 of the ACA.

Importantly, Indian courts do not possess the power to substantially modify arbitral awards. Their authority is confined to either setting aside an award (for domestic arbitrations) or refusing enforcement (for foreign awards), and even these actions are permissible only within the narrow parameters established by the ACA.

India was one of the earliest signatories to the New York Convention, signing it in June 1958 and officially ratifying it on 13 July 1960. Upon ratification, India made two key reservations:

• first, it would recognise and enforce arbitral awards only if they were made in another state that is also a party to the Convention; and
• second, it would apply the Convention only to disputes arising out of legal relationships – whether contractual or not – that are considered commercial under Indian law.

Section 44 of the ACA reflects these reservations, limiting enforcement to awards from Convention countries and to commercial matters as defined by Indian law.

India has also ratified the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Awards, 1927. Both the New York and Geneva Conventions are reproduced in the Schedules to the ACA, thereby forming an integral part of Indian arbitration law.

To enforce an arbitral award made in India (whether in domestic or international commercial arbitration seated in India), a party must file an application under the ACA. If no application for stopping the enforcement is filed or if such an application is rejected, the award shall be enforced as if it were a decree of the court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The enforcement process is commonly referred to as execution proceedings, and the enforcing court does not have the power to modify the terms of the award.

For foreign awards (ie, awards made in international arbitrations seated outside India), enforcement is governed by Part II of the ACA, which incorporates the New York Convention standards. In DLF Ltd. v Koncar Generators & Motors Ltd (2025), the Supreme Court decided that conversion for foreign currency awards will be based on the forex conversion rate on the date of the award’s enforceability (ie, after all objections are dismissed), with any partial payments being converted at the date of deposit.

Indian courts may not enforce a foreign arbitral award that has been set aside by a competent court at the seat of arbitration. This is a recognised ground for refusing enforcement under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, which mirrors Section 48(1)(e) of the ACA. Examples include the following.

• Bharat Aluminium Co. v Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.: the Supreme Court held that Indian courts would recognise a valid defence to enforcement if the award has been set aside by a court either at the seat of arbitration or in the country whose law governs the arbitration.
• Gemini Bay Transcription (P) Ltd. v Integrated Sales Service Ltd.: the Supreme Court reiterated that an award being annulled at the seat is a valid ground for refusing enforcement in India, unless the refusal would itself be contrary to Indian public policy.

If set-aside proceedings are pending at the seat of arbitration, Indian courts have discretion on how to proceed:

• they may adjourn the enforcement proceedings until the foreign court decides on the set-aside application; or
• they may proceed with the enforcement if they deem it appropriate.

The Delhi High Court proceeded to enforce a Singapore-seated ICC award even while set-aside proceedings were pending in Singapore, demonstrating that Indian courts have discretion to continue enforcement unless there is a compelling reason to adjourn (Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd. v Malvinder Mohan Singh & Ors. (2018)).

Indian courts apply the principle of restrictive sovereign immunity. This means that foreign states and their instrumentalities cannot claim immunity from enforcement of arbitral awards arising out of commercial transactions as opposed to sovereign acts.

It is settled law that there is no sovereign immunity for foreign states in commercial matters (Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011, Supreme Court)). Furthermore, in the context of waivers of state immunity from jurisdiction, while there is no waiver of privileged immunity solely on the basis of an arbitration clause in the contract, the Supreme Court has consistently held that, at the stage of enforcement proceedings, states cannot claim immunity from such proceedings.

Indian courts have adopted a strongly pro-enforcement stance when it comes to foreign arbitral awards. The grounds for refusing enforcement on the basis of public policy have been deliberately narrowed, and are now limited only to violations of the fundamental policy of Indian law or acts that are fundamentally against justice and morality.

In Vijay Karia v Prysmian Cavi E Sistemi SRL (2020), the Supreme Court emphasised that courts should approach foreign awards with a presumption in favour of enforcement, intervening only in the rarest of cases. This minimal-interference policy is particularly evident in the context of public policy objections. For instance, in Avitel Post Studioz Limited v Hsbc Pi Holdings (Mauritius) Limited (2024), the Supreme Court rejected Avitel’s attempt to block the enforcement of a SIAC arbitral award by alleging bias. It held that “bias” under Section 48 must meet a very high threshold of violating the “most basic notions of morality and justice” and that awards should be read supportively with an inclination to uphold rather than destroy. Importantly, the ACA expressly prohibits courts from reviewing the merits of the dispute when considering whether an award violates the fundamental policy of Indian law.

The ACA does not specifically provide for class actions or group arbitration. However, it is possible for multiple claimants to bring their claims together against the same respondent before a single arbitral tribunal, provided certain conditions are met. Each claimant must have a similar claim and must be party to an arbitration agreement with the respondent that is identical in all essential terms. If these requirements are fulfilled, Indian courts are likely to support a consolidated arbitration, to avoid the inefficiency and risk of inconsistent outcomes that could arise from separate proceedings.

This approach was affirmed by the Supreme Court in P.R. Shah, Shares and Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Ltd. (2011), in which it ruled a party's claims against multiple parties under separate but similar arbitration agreements can be resolved in a single arbitration. The Court reasoned that refusing to allow consolidation would result in unnecessary duplication of proceedings and potentially conflicting decisions, which would be unjust.

There is no specific ethical code dedicated to arbitrators in India; their duties are confined to those set out under the powers and duties of arbitrators as specified in the ACA.

India currently has no statutory regime specifically regulating third-party funding in arbitration. The ACA does not address third-party funding, and the 2024 Amendment Bill does not introduce any provisions concerning it.

In Tomorrow Sales Agency Pvt. Ltd. v SBS Holdings Inc. (2023), the Delhi High Court clarified the legal position to be the judgment acknowledged the important role of third-party funders in facilitating access to justice, but emphasised that funders are not liable under the award unless they are expressly party to the arbitration agreement or proceedings.

Indian advocates, however, are expressly prohibited from funding litigation for their clients under the Bar Council of India’s Rules of Professional Conduct and Etiquette.

While there is no statutory regime, some arbitral institutions in India have begun to address third-party funding through their rules. For example, the MCIA Rules (3rd Edition, effective May 2025) require parties to disclose:

• the existence of a funding agreement;
• the identity of the funder; and
• whether the funder has agreed to cover adverse costs.

These disclosures must be made promptly, either with initial pleadings or within seven days of entering into a funding agreement, and parties must update the tribunal and other parties if there are changes.

The ACA does not contain any explicit provisions regarding the consolidation of arbitral proceedings. Nevertheless, it is common practice in India for disputes arising under multiple contracts between the same parties to be heard together by a single arbitral tribunal, provided the parties agree. Depending on their preferences, the tribunal may issue a single consolidated award or separate awards for each contract.

The Supreme Court has endorsed this approach in P.R. Shah, Shares and Stock Brokers Pvt. Ltd. v B.H.H. Securities Pvt. Ltd. (2011), in which it held that a party's claims against multiple parties under separate arbitration agreements can be consolidated and resolved in a single arbitration. The Court reasoned that refusing consolidation would result in unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings, potential for conflicting decisions and overall injustice.

Furthermore, in Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v Severn Trent Water Purification Inc., the Supreme Court recognised the principle of making a composite reference to arbitration under Section 11 of the ACA. This is particularly relevant in situations involving a single economic transaction or a principal contract with related ancillary contracts, or where the “group of companies” doctrine applies, allowing even non-signatories to be bound by the arbitration clause. The Court clarified that such a composite reference would lead to a single arbitral tribunal delivering a composite award, thereby streamlining the adjudication process and avoiding fragmented litigation.

Under Indian law, third parties who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement are generally not bound by either the arbitration agreement or the resulting award. This follows the doctrine of privity of contract, which holds that only parties to a contract are bound by its terms.

However, Indian courts have recognised exceptions, most notably through the group of companies doctrine, according to which a non-signatory can be bound by an arbitration agreement if:

• there is a close legal relationship between the signatory and the non-signatory (such as being part of the same corporate group);
• the non-signatory has played a significant role in the negotiation, performance or termination of the contract; or
• the intention to bind the non-signatory can be inferred from the circumstances, including the composite nature of the transaction and the conduct of the parties.

In Cox & Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt. Ltd. (2023), the Supreme Court affirmed that the group of companies doctrine is part of Indian arbitration law, allowing non-signatories to be compelled to arbitrate if the facts show they were intended to be bound by the agreement. The arbitral tribunal, rather than the court, is generally the proper forum to decide whether a non-signatory should be joined, based on the evidence and the parties’ conduct.

Assignment and Novation

A third party may also be bound if the arbitration agreement is expressly assigned to them along with the contract, provided there is clear consent to such assignment.