While international arbitration is not yet especially prevalent as a method of resolving disputes in The Bahamas, it is well-positioned to grow to become more prevalent. In June 2023, The Bahamas enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (“Model Law”) by virtue of the International Commercial Arbitration Act 2023 (“ICAA 2023”). Besides the adoption of the “gold standard” in international commercial arbitration, The Bahamas’ Arbitration Act 2009 (modelled after the English Arbitration Act 1996) can be described as “Model Law compliant”. In addition to the aforesaid legislation, The Bahamas has also incorporated the 1958 New York Convention into domestic law by virtue of the Arbitration (Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2009. This allows for the cross-border recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Domestic parties do resort to the use of international commercial arbitration where there is provision for it by arbitral clause in contracts. While litigation is still largely favoured, it is evident from recent jurisprudence, such as the Gabriele Volpi v Delanson Services Limited and RAV Bahamas Ltd v Therapy Beach Club Incorporated cases as well as the arbitration between the Government of The Bahamas and the Grand Bahama Port Authority, that arbitration is increasingly being used to resolve high-stakes disputes. International arbitration has mostly been used by domestic parties in contracts as a method of dispute resolution (as seen with the arbitration between the Government of The Bahamas and the Grand Bahama Port Authority) and where The Bahamas is the seat of the arbitration (as seen with the RAV Bahamas Ltd v Therapy Beach Club Incorporated case).
The construction industry and the financial services industry have experienced significant international arbitration activity in recent years. The construction industry has benefited tremendously from the Construction Contractors Act 2016, which provides for dispute resolution through mediation and arbitration before resorting to litigation, and for dispute resolution agreements to be included in a written contract between the client and the contractor in the event that a dispute arises regarding the performance of construction work. The financial services industry has seen growth in the niche area of trusts. The Trustee (Amendment) Act 2011 first introduced legislative provisions to support the arbitration of trust disputes. These legislative provisions have since been strengthened by the 2023 and 2025 amendments to the Arbitration Act 2009, which not only transposed trust arbitration provisions from the Trustee (Amendment) Act 2011 but also expanded defined terms and certain powers to protect the arbitrability of trust disputes. In addition to the construction and financial services industries, the maritime and shipping industry has seen an increase in international arbitration activity, with most related contracts (eg, employment) including arbitral clauses.
At present, international arbitrations are usually conducted on an ad hoc basis in The Bahamas (typically under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules), and when conducted under arbitral institutions, those arbitrations are usually conducted under the American Arbitration Association’s International Centre for Dispute Resolution, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). The Bahamas has fledgling arbitral institutions: (i) the International and Western Hemisphere Arbitration, Adjudication and Mediation Centre (IWHAAM); and (ii) the Mid-Atlantic Caribbean Alternative Dispute Resolution Institute (MACADRI). Neither IWHAAM nor MACADRI has been utilised with any frequency for international arbitrations in The Bahamas. There have been no arbitral institutions established in The Bahamas in the last 12 months as IWHAAM and MACADRI have both been in operation for several years.
The Supreme Court of The Bahamas has general supervisory jurisdiction over arbitration-related applications and can hear disputes relating to international arbitrations if they relate to trust arbitration under the Arbitration Act 2009 and its amendments and in relation to domestic arbitrations. If the decision of the Supreme Court is appealed, then it will be heard by the Court of Appeal. The final appellate court of The Bahamas is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and, as seen in RAV Bahamas Ltd v Therapy Beach Club Incorporated [2021] UKPC 8, a Privy Council decision emanating from The Bahamas. There are no separate specialist commercial or arbitration courts. Under the Arbitration Act 2009, applications concerning stays of proceedings, interim relief, enforcement and challenges to awards are heard by the Supreme Court with reference to the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules 2022, which include rules for arbitration-related applications. Under the ICAA 2023, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is designated to perform certain supervisory and assistance functions such as arbitrator appointments where parties cannot agree, etc.
The ICAA 2023 governs international commercial arbitration in The Bahamas, while aspects of trust arbitration (international in nature) are governed by the Arbitration Act 2009 and its amendments. The ICAA 2023 closely mirrors the Model Law, while the Arbitration Act 2009 is materially similar to the English Arbitration Act 1996 and often described as “Model Law compliant”. Bahamian national legislation based on the Model Law – the ICAA 2023 – diverges to the extent that it explicitly assigns roles to the Permanent Court of Arbitration for assistance and supervision, incorporates confidentiality provisions, introduces a specific regime for preliminary orders, and excludes trust arbitration because it is provided for under the Arbitration Act 2009 and its amendments. Recognition and enforcement of foreign awards is separately addressed under the Arbitration (Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2009, which gives effect to the 1958 New York Convention.
There have been significant changes by virtue of the 2025 amendments to the Arbitration Act 2009. Section 2 introduces new definitions including of “administration question” (relief or questions relating to trust administration, execution or variation), “arbitration agreement”, “dispute”, “person under a disability” (minors or patients), “protector”, “minor”, “patient” and “trust subsection establishes that matters typically agreed between parties shall, in trust arbitrations, be determined by the written terms of the trust. Section 6A creates a new provision whereby written trust terms providing for arbitration shall have effect as an arbitration agreement between parties to the trust. Section 49A grants tribunals power to appoint representatives for persons (including unborn or unascertained persons) in trust arbitrations, with provisions for arbitration guardians for persons under disability. Awards bind represented persons unless obtained by fraud or non-disclosure. Section 49 is amended to grant tribunals all powers of court regarding trust administration, execution and variation, or exercise of powers. Section 18 is replaced to provide that arbitration agreements are deemed to prohibit disclosure of confidential information unless expressly stated otherwise, while Section 22 is substantially revised to require court proceedings under the Act to be conducted in private upon application by any party, unless objection is made. Sections 23, 24, 25 and 47A are repealed. Second 89 is replaced by provisions for challenging awards on grounds of lack of substantive jurisdiction. Section 90 is replaced from the 2023 amendments and addresses challenges based on serious irregularity affecting the tribunal proceedings or award, defining nine categories of serious irregularity. Section 91 permits appeals on points of law with leave of the court, subject to strict criteria including that the tribunal’s decision is obviously wrong or involves questions of general public importance. Section 92 introduces supplementary provisions requiring exhaustion of arbitral remedies before court applications and imposing a 28-day time limit for applications or appeals. Section 9 is amended to clarify that legal proceedings include applications concerning administration questions and permits stays to be sought by any party to the trust. Section 83 is amended regarding trustees’ entitlement to costs from trust funds. Mandatory provisions in Section 5 are updated to reflect the new and amended provisions. There are draft bills for domestic and international mediation which may impact the arbitration landscape in The Bahamas in the future.
For an arbitration agreement to be enforceable under the laws of The Bahamas, the arbitration agreement must be in writing. Section 6 of the Arbitration Act 2009 details what constitutes “in writing”, with a broad interpretation that includes exchange of communications and any record evidencing the agreement, and includes electronic communication and data messages. The arbitration agreement must comply with general contractual principles and must contemplate a final and binding decision by the arbitral tribunal. Under the laws of The Bahamas, the doctrine of separability is applicable, except insofar as it relates to the arbitration of trust disputes. Finally, the arbitration agreement must not violate public policy or legal requirements specific to The Bahamas.
Criminal matters cannot be submitted to arbitration, in addition to certain family law matters such as adoption, marriage, divorce and devolution of property on death, which are all excluded from arbitration in The Bahamas. A catch-all is anything where an award would be contrary to Bahamian public policy, but it is important to remember that Bahamian law has made legislative provision for the arbitration of trust disputes, which could, on its face, be seen as contrary to public policy. Essentially, the general approach used in The Bahamas to determine whether or not a dispute is “arbitrable” is, firstly, a consideration of whether the subject matter is capable of being settled by arbitration and, secondly, a residual public policy check.
Consistently, Bahamian courts have shown a pro-arbitration approach, most notably in the 2023 Supreme Court decision in Gabriele Volpi v Delanson Services Limited et al, which upheld and enforced an arbitration clause in the trust instruments and stayed related litigation. Courts generally apply Bahamian law as the law of the arbitration agreement in the absence of an express or implied choice, following the established common-law approach of looking first to an express choice, then secondly to an implied choice, and lastly to the law with the closest connection to the agreement. Arbitration agreements are, in practice, usually enforced by Bahamian courts.
Both the Arbitration Act 2009 and its amendments as well as the ICAA 2023 adopt express provisions on the doctrine of separability. This means that an arbitration clause is treated as a distinct agreement from the underlying contract and survives even if the main contract is found to be invalid or void or to have never come into existence, unless the arbitration clause itself is independently impugned. The doctrine of separability is disapplied insofar as it relates to the arbitration of trust disputes under legislation.
Party autonomy in selecting arbitrators is broad, subject only to the overriding requirements of independence and impartiality and to any restrictions the parties themselves adopt (eg, institutional rules on nationality or qualifications). There is no general Bahamian law restriction on foreign nationals or foreign-qualified practitioners sitting as arbitrators, reflecting the jurisdiction’s aim of positioning itself as an international arbitration seat.
If the parties’ chosen appointment mechanism fails, both the ICAA 2023 (Model Law-based) and the Arbitration Act 2009 empower the Supreme Court to make the necessary appointment on application by a party. Where the parties have not agreed a number of arbitrators, a sole arbitrator is typically appointed by default. Multiparty appointment issues are generally addressed through the parties’ own procedural agreement or institutional rules, with the Supreme Court retaining a residual default power where the appointment machinery breaks down.
The Supreme Court can intervene to appoint arbitrators where the agreed procedure fails, but its power is limited to filling gaps in the parties’ chosen procedure; it will not interfere where that mechanism is functioning, reflecting the policy of minimal court intervention that runs through both the Arbitration Act 2009 and the ICAA 2023.
Both the Arbitration Act 2009 and the ICAA 2023 allow a party to challenge or seek removal of an arbitrator on grounds of justifiable doubts as to independence or impartiality, failure to possess agreed qualifications, physical or mental incapacity, or refusal or failure properly to conduct the proceedings causing substantial injustice. Challenges are generally made first under any agreed challenge procedure or applicable institutional rules, with recourse to the Supreme Court only if that internal procedure does not resolve the challenge.
Arbitrators are required to be and remain independent and impartial throughout the proceedings and must disclose, promptly and on an ongoing basis, any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. In some instances, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest can be used as a reference point in determining independence and impartiality by Bahamian tribunals and counsel.
The principle of competence-competence is expressly recognised in the Bahamian arbitral framework. An arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including objections to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, either as a preliminary matter or in its final award.
The courts may address jurisdictional issues at the pre-arbitration stage, when asked to stay court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement, and post-award, on an application to set aside or resist enforcement of an award on jurisdictional grounds. Bahamian courts have shown a marked reluctance to intervene prematurely, generally preferring to let the tribunal rule on its own jurisdiction first and confining court review to a supervisory role at the award stage. Negative jurisdictional rulings by a tribunal can also be reviewed by the court on the application of the party affected.
Parties may challenge jurisdiction before the tribunal at the outset of proceedings (no later than the statement of defence) and, following a tribunal ruling on jurisdiction as a preliminary question, may apply promptly to the Supreme Court for a ruling on that question. Otherwise, jurisdictional objections are ordinarily addressed by the courts only after the award is rendered, by way of a challenge to, or resistance of enforcement of, the award.
Where a tribunal’s positive ruling on jurisdiction is challenged as a preliminary question, the Supreme Court exercises a full, de novo review rather than simply deferring to the tribunal’s own assessment, consistent with the Model Law approach adopted by the ICAA 2023. At the post-award stage, however, courts exercise a supervisory rather than appellate function, examining jurisdiction only to the extent necessary to determine the specific statutory ground raised.
Bahamian courts will ordinarily stay proceedings commenced in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, provided that a timely application is made and there is no ground establishing that the agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. This reflects a strong and consistently applied pro-arbitration policy, reinforced in decisions such as Volpi.
Bahamian arbitration legislation does not generally permit tribunals to bind non-signatories, save in limited circumstances recognised at common law, such as where a party has become bound by assignment, novation, agency or estoppel, or, in appropriate cases, through the “group of companies” doctrine. These principles apply equally to foreign and domestic third parties, since jurisdiction turns on substantive contractual or equitable doctrine rather than nationality or domicile.
Tribunals may award interim measures including orders preserving assets, maintaining the status quo, preventing harm to the arbitral process, and preserving evidence. Interim measures granted by a tribunal are binding on the parties and, under the ICAA 2023, are directly enforceable through the Supreme Court in the same manner as an award, subject to limited grounds for refusal.
Bahamian courts retain a supportive role in granting interim relief in aid of arbitration, including in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations, where a tribunal has not yet been constituted or lacks effective power to grant the relief sought. Available court-ordered interim relief mirrors that available to a tribunal, and includes freezing orders, security for costs, and orders for the preservation of property or evidence. Emergency arbitrator mechanisms are recognised where the parties’ institutional rules provide for them. Decisions of an emergency arbitrator are treated as binding pending confirmation, variation or revocation by the constituted tribunal, and the courts retain a residual power to grant urgent interim relief even after an emergency arbitrator has been appointed, where necessary.
Both the Supreme Court and an arbitral tribunal have power to order security for costs, having regard to the same general principles applied in domestic litigation, including the claimant’s ability to satisfy an adverse costs order, though a tribunal will not order security solely on the ground that a claimant is foreign or resident abroad.
Domestic arbitration procedure is governed by the Arbitration Act 2009 and extends to the arbitration of trust disputes, while the procedure for international commercial arbitrations seated in The Bahamas is governed by the ICAA 2023 (incorporating the Model Law). Parties otherwise retain considerable autonomy to adopt institutional rules (eg, ICC, LCIA, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
Beyond the requirement that proceedings be conducted with equal treatment of the parties and a reasonable opportunity to present a case, Bahamian law imposes few mandatory procedural steps, leaving the tribunal and parties considerable flexibility to design a procedure appropriate to the dispute. Formal notice requirements apply to the commencement of arbitral proceedings, and specific statutory time limits apply to certain post-award applications.
Arbitrators are under a general statutory duty to act fairly and impartially, to give each party a reasonable opportunity to put its case, and to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense. Tribunals have wide case-management powers, including to determine procedural and evidential matters, order consolidation where agreed by the parties, and grant interim measures.
There is no requirement that legal representatives appearing in a Bahamian-seated arbitration hold local rights of audience; parties are generally free to be represented by counsel of their choice, whether Bahamian-qualified or foreign-qualified, reflecting the international character of the ICAA 2023 regime, in contrast to the position for Bahamian court litigation, which generally requires representation by a locally admitted attorney except by special admission, which is only granted in limited circumstances.
Bahamian-seated arbitrations typically follow an approach influenced by the jurisdiction’s common-law heritage, combined with the flexibility afforded by the applicable arbitration legislation and institutional rules. Tribunals commonly adopt document disclosure narrower than full common-law discovery, rely on written witness statements taken as evidence-in-chief, and permit cross-examination at the hearing. Privilege is respected in accordance with general common-law principles, and tribunals frequently draw on the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration as guidance rather than binding rules.
Strict domestic rules of evidence, such as those governing admissibility before the Bahamian courts, do not generally apply to arbitral proceedings; instead, the tribunal determines the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence, subject to the parties’ agreement and any applicable institutional rules.
Under Bahamian law, an arbitral tribunal lacks coercive or penal powers, but it can direct that a party comply with document production and witness attendance. Otherwise, the Supreme Court can assist by ordering the production of documents and the attendance of witnesses, including non-parties, in support of arbitral proceedings, on application by a party with the permission of the tribunal or the agreement of the other parties. As against parties to the arbitration agreement, tribunals have their own contractual powers to order disclosure; compulsion of non-parties, however, requires recourse to the court’s coercive powers.
Arbitral proceedings seated in The Bahamas are private, and the Arbitration Act 2009 (as amended in 2023) contains express confidentiality provisions restricting disclosure of information relating to the proceedings and the award, subject to specified exceptions (eg, disclosure required by law, to protect a party’s legal rights, or with the consent of the other party). Confidential information may not generally be relied upon in subsequent proceedings save within these exceptions.
An award must be made in writing, signed by the arbitrator(s), state the seat of arbitration and the date, and give reasons unless the parties have agreed reasons are unnecessary or the award is by consent. Neither the Arbitration Act 2009 nor the ICAA 2023 imposes a fixed statutory time limit for delivery of an award, though the tribunal is expected to proceed without unnecessary delay, and the parties or the tribunal’s own procedural timetable may impose one.
Tribunals have wide remedial powers equivalent to those of the Supreme Court, including declarations, specific performance (other than in respect of land), rectification, and orders for the payment of money and interest, unless the arbitration agreement provides otherwise. Punitive or exemplary damages are not generally regarded as available in the absence of an express agreement, consistent with the common law’s general reluctance to award punitive damages in a contractual context.
Parties are generally entitled to recover both pre- and post-award interest, and legal and arbitration costs, as the tribunal considers appropriate, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. The default approach follows the “costs follow the event” principle familiar from Bahamian court practice, subject to the tribunal’s discretion to depart from that default where a party’s conduct, or the manner in which it has pursued or defended the case, justifies a different allocation.
There is no general right of appeal on the merits of an international arbitration award under the ICAA 2023, which follows the Model Law’s exhaustive and narrow grounds for setting aside an award (broadly mirroring the 1958 New York Convention grounds for refusal of enforcement). Domestic awards under the Arbitration Act 2009 may, in more limited circumstances and only where the parties have not excluded the right, be appealed to the Supreme Court on a point of law, in addition to being challengeable for serious irregularity or lack of substantive jurisdiction.
Parties may agree to exclude the limited right of appeal on a point of law available under the Arbitration Act 2009 but they cannot exclude the mandatory, non-derogable grounds for challenging an award for serious irregularity or lack of substantive jurisdiction, nor the equivalent mandatory setting-aside grounds under the ICAA 2023.
Where a point of law appeal is available and has not been excluded, the Supreme Court applies a de novo standard to the legal question at issue. On applications to set aside for serious irregularity or lack of jurisdiction, or under the ICAA 2023’s Model Law grounds, the court applies a supervisory, deferential standard, and does not review the tribunal’s findings of fact or its assessment of the merits.
The Bahamas acceded to the 1958 New York Convention with effect from 20 March 2007, without material reservations affecting its general application, and gave it domestic effect through the Arbitration (Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2009. The Bahamas is also a member of the ICSID Convention.
An application for recognition and enforcement is made to the Supreme Court, supported by the award and the arbitration agreement (or certified copies), following which the award is enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the court, subject only to the limited grounds for refusal recognised under the 1958 New York Convention and mirrored in the Arbitration (Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2009 and the ICAA 2023. An award set aside by a competent court at the seat will generally not be enforced in The Bahamas, since this is itself a recognised ground for refusal, although the Bahamian court retains a discretion in appropriate cases. Where set-aside proceedings are pending at the seat, the Bahamian court may adjourn the enforcement application and, if it so orders, require the party opposing enforcement to provide suitable security.
Bahamian courts have adopted a strongly pro-enforcement approach, treating the grounds for refusal narrowly and construing “public policy” restrictively, limited to fundamental principles of justice and morality rather than mere disagreement with the tribunal’s reasoning or the substantive law applied. A state or state entity may raise sovereign immunity, but Bahamian common law recognises a restrictive doctrine of immunity, meaning immunity will not usually shield a state from enforcement of an award arising from commercial activity, particularly where the state has agreed to arbitrate.
Bahamian arbitration legislation does not contain specific provision for class or group arbitration, and, consistent with the consensual nature of arbitration, such claims may only be arbitrated together where all affected parties have agreed, whether in a single arbitration agreement or through subsequent consolidation.
Bahamian counsel appearing in arbitration remain subject to the professional conduct rules of the Bahamas Bar Association. Arbitrators are commonly expected to observe internationally recognised standards such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest and the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, or the relevant rules of any international institution under which the arbitration is administered.
There is no dedicated statutory regime specifically regulating third-party funding of arbitration in The Bahamas; funding arrangements are assessed against the ordinary common-law doctrines of maintenance and champerty, which have historically restricted the funding of litigation but have been relaxed in many common-law jurisdictions in the arbitration context. Bahamian courts have not yet definitively ruled on the point, but touched on it briefly in the April 2026 Court of Appeal ruling in Delanson Services Limited v Matteo Volpi et al in considering litigation funding arrangements against maintenance and champerty. Prudent practitioners should structure funding arrangements carefully with reference to these doctrines.
Consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings is only possible with the agreement of all parties concerned, whether recorded in the arbitration agreements themselves or subsequently; neither the Arbitration Act 2009 nor the ICAA 2023 confers a general power on the Supreme Court or a tribunal to consolidate proceedings absent such agreement, reflecting the strictly consensual basis of arbitration under Bahamian law.
Third parties may be bound by an arbitration agreement or award in limited circumstances recognised at common law, including succession (eg, on death, insolvency or assignment), agency, and equitable doctrines such as estoppel, as well as, in the trust context, where a trust instrument itself incorporates a valid arbitration clause binding trustees, beneficiaries and other interested parties, as recognised in the Volpi litigation. Bahamian courts have not to date exercised any general power to bind foreign third parties beyond these established doctrines.
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Tested by the Courts, Trusted by Statute: The Bahamas’ Arbitration Regime Comes Into Its Own
Introduction
Over the past few years, arbitration in The Bahamas has developed considerably, transitioning from an overlooked dispute resolution mechanism in the shadow of the national court system, to one that is at the forefront and part of both local and global commentary. The Bahamas, a jurisdiction long known for its arsenal of financial services products, has become the setting for two of the most closely watched disputes in the offshore arbitration world involving (i) a headline confrontation between the Government of The Bahamas and the quasi-governmental and municipal authority of The Bahamas’ second city – Freeport, and (ii) a family battle over a multibillion-dollar trust. These matters, together with recent Supreme Court and Privy Council jurisprudence and legislative updates in 2023 and 2025, give The Bahamas something rare among small offshore financial centres – a genuine, tested body of arbitration-related jurisprudence and a position as a jurisdiction actively shaping modern arbitration jurisprudence in several important respects. This Trends and Developments article considers what the courts and tribunals have decided, legislative improvements and key takeaways for those doing business in or through The Bahamas.
The Government of The Bahamas (GoB) versus the Grand Bahama Port Authority (GBPA) arbitration: public authorities under the microscope
While arbitration is most frequently utilised as a dispute resolution mechanism for private commercial contracts, the most consequential development in 2026 has nothing to do with private parties at all. The arbitration between the GoB and the GBPA concerned the Hawksbill Creek Agreement (HCA), the 1955 agreement between the GoB and the GBPA that not only created the city of Freeport as a 50,000-acre free trade zone, but also granted the GBPA wide-ranging authority over licensing, immigration, customs, utilities and development approvals within Freeport. The long-brewing dispute arose from the GBPA’s disagreement with the GoB as to the scope of the GBPA’s rights under the HCA (particularly in relation to the imposition and collection of fees), the extent of the GoB’s regulatory powers, and the financial obligations between the GBPA and the GoB.
In 2024, the dispute came to a head, and under the Arbitration Act 2009, the GoB commenced arbitral proceedings against the GBPA seeking, inter alia, BSD357.144 million (by the GoB’s account) from the GBPA for administrative expenses incurred in the Port Area (Freeport) between 2018 and 2022 along with pre- and post-award interest. The GBPA denied any liability to the GoB and made a substantial counterclaim against the GoB with allegations that the GoB (through successive administrations) had breached various provisions of the HCA, either through legislation or through its policies, ultimately affecting the rights of the GBPA, and as a result, the GBPA was entitled to damages and/or declaratory relief.
The arbitral proceedings were presided over by a three-member arbitral tribunal comprising a former Chief Justice of the Cayman Islands and two senior English jurists. A Partial Final Award was issued on 27 February 2026, with the arbitral tribunal dismissing the GoB’s headline claim for BSD357.144 million in its entirety while the majority of the GBPA’s claims against the GoB were also dismissed save for one narrow point, namely that the GoB failed to approve proposed environmental bye-laws for Freeport that the GBPA had first proposed two decades ago. Even with this limited success, the arbitral tribunal limited any damages that the GBPA could claim for the GoB’s breach of the HCA to losses suffered after 5 May 2018 on the basis of the six-year limitation period and invited the parties to make further submissions on damages, leaving that and the allocation of costs to a later phase.
The public reaction to the GoB and GBPA arbitration illustrates why this case matters well beyond its monetary stakes. The Bahamas’ Prime Minister, the Hon. Philip E. Davis KC, described the arbitration to Parliament as a “game changer” that confirmed that Freeport’s licensees are ultimately subject to Bahamian sovereignty, while the GBPA told its own licensees that the award “did not fundamentally alter the status quo” and left the existing governance framework – the HCA – intact. Both perspectives of the arbitration can be true at once, but for arbitration practitioners, three things stand out. Firstly, the GBPA, created more than 70 years ago, was required to submit to binding arbitration over matters of public governance, signalling that, in The Bahamas, arbitration can be used for more than just purely commercial disputes. Secondly, the arbitral tribunal was prepared to dismiss a nine-figure sovereign claim in full, underscoring the fact that arbitrators seated in The Bahamas apply ordinary evidentiary rigour regardless of who the claimant is, even if it is the national government. Thirdly, the arbitration is a reminder that a “partial” award is exactly that; clients and counsel alike should be cautious about declaring victory or defeat before quantum and costs are finally resolved. More fundamentally, this arbitration demonstrates that The Bahamas possesses something many offshore jurisdictions do not – an arbitration framework capable of resolving disputes involving sovereign actors without compromising procedural independence.
Trust arbitration comes of age: the Volpi litigation
If the dispute between the GoB and the GBPA demonstrates arbitration’s reach into public law, the long-running Volpi litigation demonstrates its maturity in the context of the private trust, a specialist area in which The Bahamas has invested heavily in building a distinctive offering. At the heart of the Volpi litigation is a dispute concerning three family trusts settled by Italian-Nigerian businessman Gabriele Volpi between 2006 and 2012. These family trusts, which were discretionary trusts, held assets worth billions of dollars, including interests in African oil and gas ventures as well as European football clubs. Following a breakdown in family relations, the trustee, Delanson Services Limited, distributed the trust assets to Gabriele personally in 2016. This decision was later challenged by his son (and one of the beneficiaries of the said family trusts) in an arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and seated in The Bahamas.
In 2020, the arbitral tribunal found that the distributions made to Gabriele by the trustee had been made in breach of trust and for an improper purpose. Accordingly, those distributions were set aside. Subsequently, Gabriele then mounted what has been described as a “root and branch” challenge to that award before the Supreme Court of The Bahamas, resulting in the decision of Klein J in Gabriele Volpi v Delanson Services Limited et al, Ruling dated 28 December 2023 (the “Volpi case”). This case, which is the first case in which a Bahamian court had been asked to review a trust arbitration award on its merits, is a seminal ruling in arbitration-related jurisprudence. Klein J not only conducted a rigorous analysis of the legislative framework underpinning arbitration in The Bahamas, but the learned Judge also dismissed every ground of challenge (by Gabriele), holding that the Arbitration Act 2009 permits appeals on a point of law only where the parties have consented to that route, and that the competence-competence principle survives the Trustee (Amendment) Act 2011’s modification of the separability doctrine for the arbitration of trust disputes.
Of the utmost significance, the Volpi case cemented the pro-arbitration position of the Bahamian courts – “…in matters governed by this Act the court should not intervene except as provided in this Act. This represents a philosophy, now firmly rooted in international commercial arbitration, that has been adopted and enacted in the 2009 Act. It represents a deliberate shift by Parliament to curtail the high degree of court control and review of the arbitration processes…to promote an approach that is pro-arbitration” (Paragraph 78).
Even on appeal, the Bahamian Court of Appeal reinforced the principle of limited court intervention, holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a further appeal once the Supreme Court had refused leave, and rejecting an argument that the Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction over trusts had created some parallel route of challenge. While the Volpi litigation has continued to generate several procedural rulings since it first came before the courts, including a 2025 Supreme Court decision declining to stay a later phase of the arbitration despite a fresh challenge to the composition of the arbitral tribunal, the central message has not changed. Bahamian courts will scrutinise a trust arbitration award only within the narrow bounds set by Parliament and will not allow the general equitable jurisdiction of the court over trusts to be used as a backdoor means of relitigating the merits.
For settlors and trustees alike, the Volpi case is now the leading authority on how far a trust arbitration clause in a Bahamian law trust instrument will actually be enforced. It confirms that disputes over the validity of distributions, and even challenges to the trust deed itself, fall within the scope of a properly drafted arbitration clause, and that Bahamian courts regard finality as a feature of the bargain rather than a technicality to be circumvented by a well-resourced party. The Volpi case matters because it confirms the enforceability of trust arbitration clauses, gives trustees confidence that awards will not easily be reopened, provides certainty for HNWI establishing Bahamian trusts, and positions The Bahamas as one of the leading jurisdictions for the arbitration of trust disputes. While other offshore jurisdictions have struggled with the arbitrability of trust disputes, The Bahamas, through its jurisprudence and legislative amendments (to be discussed below), has taken the lead.
Guidance from the Privy Council: RAV Bahamas v Therapy Beach Club
Another notable case emanating from Bahamian courts and forming part of arbitration-related jurisprudence is the case of RAV Bahamas Ltd v Therapy Beach Club Incorporated [2021] UKPC 8 (the “RAV Bahamas case”). In this case, RAV Bahamas leased land on the island of Bimini to Therapy Beach Club for a restaurant and beach club for a period of three years with an option to renew for three years subject to rents being agreed. RAV Bahamas constructed the restaurant and beach club, but Therapy Beach Club alleged that the work was not properly completed. Prior to the expiration of the lease, RAV Bahamas demolished the restaurant and beach club and evicted Therapy Beach Club while related court proceedings were still pending. The parties referred the resulting dispute to ad hoc arbitration before a sole arbitrator, who was a Retired Justice of the Bahamian Supreme Court.
The sole arbitrator found that RAV Bahamas had wrongfully evicted Therapy Beach Club and awarded the latter damages totalling BSD9,670,000, comprising BSD6.8 million for consequential loss of profits over six years (including the three-year optional renewal period), BSD370,000 in special damages and BSD2.5 million in exemplary damages. The sole arbitrator calculated the loss of profits by accepting the expert evidence submitted by Therapy Beach Club which calculated the loss at BSD12 million. The sole arbitrator then reduced it by one-third to exclude a rejected claim, and by a further 15% because the expert’s figures were based on memory without documentary support. Consequently, RAV Bahamas challenged this award.
RAV Bahamas challenged the award under Section 90 of the Arbitration Act 2009 (which is the Bahamian equivalent of Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act 1996) on the grounds of serious irregularity. The main complaints were that (i) the arbitrator failed to address whether Therapy Beach Club was entitled to damages for the renewal period, given that no notice of renewal had been given and the renewal clause was arguably uncertain and unenforceable, and (ii) the sole arbitrator’s one-third and 15% deductions were not supported by evidence and the parties were not given the opportunity to make representations in relation to the quantum of damages.
In the Privy Council’s decision, the challenge by RAV Bahamas was allowed. The Privy Council held that, while it is good practice to make separate and express allegations, consideration and findings of substantial injustice, this is not a mandatory requirement of Section 90 of the Act – “Undue formalism should not be required” (Paragraph 72). It was further held that it is sufficient that substantial injustice be established and found as a matter of substance. Thus, it was found that the sole arbitrator’s failure to address the lease renewal issue constituted a serious irregularity causing substantial injustice. Similarly, the fact that the one-third deduction was made without giving parties an opportunity to address it also constituted an irregularity. While the 15% deduction was acceptable as the weakness in the expert evidence was apparent, the matter was remitted to the sole arbitrator accordingly.
As Section 90 of the Arbitration Act 2009 is materially identical to Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, the RAV Bahamas case has become required reading well beyond The Bahamas – it is now the leading modern statement on serious irregularity challenges generally and cited regularly in English-seated arbitrations. For Bahamian practitioners, the case is a useful two-sided lesson: it lowers the pleading bar for a genuinely meritorious serious irregularity challenge, while confirming that the substantive threshold – an irregularity that is self-evidently unfair, not merely an alleged error of law dressed up as procedural unfairness – remains a high one. To the global community, it signals that The Bahamas’ jurisprudence applies with equal force to Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, which is particularly relevant as London is one of the leading arbitral seats.
Legislative modernisation: the 2023 and 2025 Arbitration Act amendments and the enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Alongside this case law, the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2023 and the Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2025 (both amending the Arbitration Act 2009), as well as the International Commercial Arbitration Act 2023, have quietly strengthened the statutory foundation for arbitration in The Bahamas, representing a deliberate legislative policy of reducing judicial intervention while expanding arbitration into specialist fields, such as trusts. The amendments consolidate provisions on trust arbitration that were previously in the Trustee Act, while expanding provisions to further buttress the use of arbitration to resolve trust disputes. Significantly, the 2023 amendments enhanced confidentiality, making it an offence for a party to knowingly and unlawfully disclose confidential information, with damages payable to the other party as determined by the arbitral tribunal, and an arbitrator who breaches confidentiality may forfeit the usual indemnity against suit and see fees withheld.
The 2025 amendments went further on trust arbitration by giving trust arbitration clearer statutory footing than the 2023 amendments through the introduction of new definitions – including of “administration question”, “arbitration agreement”, “person under a disability” and “protector”, as well as deeming an arbitration to be binding between the settlor, trustee, beneficiaries and other related parties. Trust arbitration is further supported by provisions which mirror the powers of the court in trust litigation; that is to say, there is provision now to allow arbitral tribunals to appoint representatives or arbitration guardians for minors, unborn persons or persons under a disability. Similarly to the 2023 amendments, the 2025 amendments again enhanced confidentiality/privacy protection by repealing the detailed public interest balancing test and replacing it with a rule requiring private hearings for arbitration-related court proceedings, unless there is an objection, in which case the court decides whether justice requires a public hearing.
Complemented by the Arbitration (Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act 2009, which incorporates the 1958 New York Convention into Bahamian law, the enactment of the International Commercial Arbitration Act 2023 was long overdue, incorporating the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration into The Bahamas’ arbitration regime. The International Commercial Arbitration Act 2023 provides a comprehensive legal framework for international commercial arbitration in The Bahamas and applies where the seat of arbitration is in The Bahamas, with certain provisions applying regardless of location. This Act reinforces The Bahamas’ position as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction by limiting court intervention to instances expressly provided for, affirming tribunals’ competence to rule on their own jurisdiction, and empowering tribunals to grant a broad range of interim measures and preliminary orders – including ex parte relief – alongside a clear regime for cross-border recognition and enforcement. The legislation also designates the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague as the default appointing and supervisory authority for functions such as arbitrator appointments, challenges and time-limit extensions, thus signalling an intention on the part of Parliament to align with internationally recognised institutions.
Taken together, the 2023 and 2025 amendments, in addition to the International Commercial Arbitration Act 2023, represent a deliberate legislative effort, coupled with Parliamentary intention, to bring The Bahamas’ arbitration regime in line with leading global standards in international commercial arbitration, while setting its own standard for trust arbitration.
Global currents with local relevance
The Bahamas has not developed its arbitration practice in isolation, and several international trends will likely shape how disputes with a Bahamian nexus are conducted:
None of these trends are unique to The Bahamas. Even the trend of third-party funding has already (and as recently as 2024 and 2025) been raised (in the context of champerty) in the Volpi litigation as part of the settlor’s challenge to costs orders made against him. Notwithstanding, each of these trends – third-party funding, AI and ESG – intersect with The Bahamas’ particular strengths and vulnerabilities as (i) a sophisticated, well-resourced trust and financial services jurisdiction, (ii) a jurisdiction with a small pool of arbitrators and practitioners alike, and (iii) an economy still working through the practical consequences of the GoB v GBPA Partial Final Award. Moreover, although Bahamian legislation does not yet expressly regulate AI in arbitration, increasing reliance on AI-assisted document review by practitioners raises important questions concerning confidentiality and privilege, which are particularly relevant given the enhanced confidentiality protections introduced by the 2023 amendments.
Outlook
For clients, the practical takeaways are straightforward. Three threads run through the fabric of developments in Bahamian arbitration of the past several years. Firstly, the courts have shown a consistent willingness to hold parties, however powerful, to their arbitration agreements, and to resist expansive supervisory review. This has been the case whether the party was a billionaire settlor or the Government itself. Secondly, the Privy Council has given Bahamian-seated arbitration a body of appellate authority that is cited well beyond the jurisdiction’s borders, which in turn enhances confidence in choosing The Bahamas as an arbitral seat. Finally, the legislative regime has moved, deliberately, to match that judicial direction with statutory reinforcement.
These domestic threads do not run in isolation from the global currents described above. As third-party funding becomes more routine, Bahamian tribunals and courts will increasingly be asked to apply the same rigour to funding disclosure and costs as they have applied to the merits, a question already previewed by the champerty arguments raised in the Volpi litigation. As institutions elsewhere pilot the use of AI in case management and evaluation, The Bahamas’ small, closely networked arbitration community is well placed to adopt a clear, early guidance on disclosure of such tools, rather than legislating reactively after a dispute exposes a gap. Additionally, as ESG-inflected disputes become more common internationally, the GoB v GBPA award is a preview, rather than an outlier, of the kind of public-private regulation-heavy disputes that a jurisdiction built on licensing and concession arrangements (like The Bahamas) should expect to keep seeing.
Some questions remain open and there are some challenges to resolve. The GoB v GBPA tribunal has yet to determine quantum and costs, while the Volpi litigation continues to generate fresh procedural challenges. Both are worth watching closely, as either could add nuance to the picture painted above. Further, The Bahamas continues to grapple with a relatively small pool of experienced arbitrators, limited institutional arbitration and the need for the continued development of arbitration practitioners. However, at least for now, the direction of travel is clear. The Bahamas has moved within the space of a few years from a jurisdiction where arbitration was a contractual afterthought to one where it has been tested by the courts and trusted by statute. Thus, if the present trajectory continues, the next stage of development is likely to involve an increase in international commercial arbitrations selecting The Bahamas as a seat, as well as an increase in trust arbitrations seated in The Bahamas.
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