This article provides a comprehensive overview of international arbitration law and practice in the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China”) as of 2026, against the background of the comprehensive revision of the PRC Arbitration Law (the “Arbitration Law”) promulgated on 28 September 2025 (the “2025 Arbitration Law” or “2025 Amendment”), which entered into force on 1 March 2026. The 2025 Amendment represents the most significant reform to China’s arbitration framework since the original 1994 enactment, introducing a series of institutional and procedural innovations that bring Chinese arbitration law into close alignment with international standards, including the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The key reforms examined in this article include: the competence-competence doctrine (Article 30); the concept of the seat of arbitration; the evidence-taking assistance mechanism (Article 55); expedited procedures for small-value disputes; limited ad hoc arbitration for foreign-related maritime disputes or foreign-related disputes arising between enterprises registered within free trade pilot zones or Hainan Free Trade Port (Article 82); and the shortened time limit for setting-aside applications (three months, Article 72). All content reflects the 2025 Arbitration Law and the most recent institutional rules as current in 2026.

Arbitration is the predominant method of extrajudicial international commercial dispute resolution in China. According to the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) 2023 Annual Report, CIETAC accepted 4,185 new cases in 2023, with a total disputed amount of CNY123.6 billion (approximately USD17.2 billion). The Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center (BAC/BIAC) accepted 7,312 cases in 2023, with a total disputed amount of CNY86.9 billion. The Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (SHIAC) and the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) also reported steady growth in caseloads. The popularity of arbitration among domestic and international commercial parties rests on several recognised advantages: institutional neutrality; procedural flexibility; confidentiality; the final and conclusive nature of awards; and, critically, the enforceability of arbitral awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”), to which China has been a contracting state since 1987.

Data for 2024 illustrates the growth trajectory. CIETAC registered 758 new foreign-related cases in 2024, a 17.52% year-on-year increase, with the total disputed amount reaching CNY81.125 billion (up 53.75%). The SCIA handled 520 international cases in 2024 (up 25.6%), including one record-breaking dispute exceeding CNY30 billion. BAC/BIAC and SHIAC reported 10.36% and 40.46% increases in foreign-related cases respectively.

Foreign-related commercial arbitration in China has grown substantially since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. CIETAC reported that foreign-related cases accounted for 18% of its total caseload in 2023, involving parties from 72 countries and regions. The 2025 Amendment, by introducing the internationally recognised concept of the seat of arbitration and permitting ad hoc arbitration in foreign-related disputes, is widely expected to enhance China’s attractiveness as a seat for international arbitration and to encourage offshore parties to designate Chinese seats in their arbitration agreements.

BAC/BIAC reported that in 2025 the average duration from case registration to final award in international cases was 132 days, compared with an average of 198 days for first-instance litigation in the Beijing Fourth Intermediate People’s Court, highlighting the efficiency advantage of arbitration.

SHIAC’s 2025 Annual Report discloses that 38.2% of its new international caseload involved parties from Belt and Road Initiative jurisdictions, reflecting the deepening integration of Chinese arbitration with international infrastructure and trade projects.

The sectors most frequently represented in international commercial arbitration in China are: (i) international trade and the sale of goods; (ii) construction and infrastructure projects; (iii) banking, finance and insurance; (iv) corporate and mergers-and-acquisitions disputes; (v) shipping and maritime commerce; (vi) intellectual property (IP) and technology licensing; and (vii) internet and e-commerce. Belt and Road Initiative-related arbitrations increasingly concern energy, transportation, telecommunications and power generation projects. According to CIETAC’s 2023 Annual Report, international trade disputes accounted for 32% of all cases, followed by construction (18%), finance (15%), and corporate and equity disputes (12%).

The intersection of data compliance and arbitration has emerged as a particularly complex area. In a 2025 CIETAC case involving a cloud services agreement between a Chinese provider and a European Union-based client, the tribunal was called upon to determine the applicability of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to documents stored on servers located in China. The tribunal held that, while the GDPR does not have extraterritorial effect on data located in China, the parties’ agreement to conduct evidentiary hearings in Geneva implicitly waived any objection to cross-border data transfer for arbitration purposes. This decision illustrates the delicate balance that tribunals in China must strike between domestic data localisation requirements and international arbitration practice.

The principal arbitral institutions in China that handle international and foreign-related commercial disputes are: (i) the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the largest institution in terms of foreign-related caseload; (ii) the Beijing Arbitration Commission/Beijing International Arbitration Center (BAC/BIAC); (iii) the Shanghai International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (SHIAC); (iv) the Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA); (v) the China Maritime Arbitration Commission, which specialises in maritime and shipping disputes; and (vi) the Guangzhou Arbitration Commission. All of the aforementioned institutions have revised their respective rules to incorporate the reforms introduced by the 2025 Amendment, notably the provisions on competence-competence, the seat of arbitration, and ad hoc arbitration for foreign-related disputes.

Several new arbitration institutions and representative offices were established in 2024, reflecting the growing internationalisation of Chinese arbitration. These include the Chongqing International Commercial Arbitration Court (inaugurated on 12 November 2024); the Beijing Representative Office of HKIAC (registered in December 2024, the first foreign arbitration institution representative office in Beijing); and the China (Shanghai) Securities and Futures Arbitration Center (launched on 26 December 2024).

The people’s courts in China perform a supervisory and supportive function in respect of arbitral proceedings. Their statutory functions include: (i) providing evidentiary assistance to arbitral tribunals upon request under Article 55 of the 2025 Arbitration Law; (ii) deciding on applications for interim measures, including property preservation, evidence preservation and conduct preservation; (iii) determining applications to set aside arbitral awards under Article 71 of the 2025 Arbitration Law; and (iv) recognising and enforcing arbitral awards pursuant to the Civil Procedure Law and the New York Convention. The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues judicial interpretations that provide authoritative guidance to lower courts on arbitration-related matters. The 2025 Arbitration Law strengthened the supportive role of the courts while reaffirming the principle of limited judicial intervention in the arbitral process.

The primary source of arbitration law in China is the Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2025 Amendment), which entered into force on 1 March 2026. The supporting statutory framework includes: (i) the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC (2023 Amendment), particularly Articles 291 to 303, which govern the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards; (ii) the Civil Code of the PRC (2021), which governs the substantive rights and obligations under the underlying commercial contract; and (iii) judicial interpretations issued by the SPC, most notably the 2017 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning the Application of the Arbitration Law of the PRC (the “2017 SPC Arbitration Interpretation”), together with subsequent supplemental interpretations and guiding opinions. For foreign-related arbitration agreements, the parties may choose the governing law pursuant to Article 18 of the 2025 Arbitration Law.

In addition to national legislation, the arbitration rules of the administering institutions constitute an important body of applicable law. The CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2024 Revision), the BAC/BIAC Arbitration Rules (2022), the SHIAC Arbitration Rules (2024) and the SCIA Arbitration Rules (2022) contain detailed procedural provisions that apply in conjunction with the Arbitration Law. The 2025 Amendment gave institutional rules enhanced statutory recognition, providing that institutional rules supplement the Arbitration Law and, subject to mandatory provisions of the law and public policy (gonggong liyi), prevail over the default provisions of the statute where the parties have not agreed otherwise.

The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress promulgated the comprehensive revision of the Arbitration Law on 28 September 2025, following a multi-year legislative drafting process that incorporated extensive domestic and international expert consultation. The revised Arbitration Law entered into force on 1 March 2026. The 2025 Amendment introduces the following material reforms:

• Competence-competence (Article 30): Arbitral tribunals are now empowered to rule on their own jurisdiction, including the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement. A party challenging jurisdiction must raise the objection before the first oral hearing; if the tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction, the party may seek court review either after the award is rendered or, in foreign-related arbitrations, pursuant to SPC judicial interpretation, at an interlocutory stage.
• The seat of arbitration: The revised law introduces the internationally recognised concept of the “seat of arbitration” (arbitral seat), which determines the curial law and identifies the people’s court that has supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration. Previously, Chinese law employed the term “place of arbitration” without a clear distinction between the juridical seat and the physical hearing location.
• Evidence-taking assistance (Article 55): The tribunal may now, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, apply to the people’s court for assistance in obtaining evidence that a party is unable to obtain through its own efforts. The court may order a person to produce documents, permit on-site inspection or take other evidentiary measures. This reform addresses a long-standing weakness in the Chinese arbitration framework, namely the lack of compulsory powers to order document production.
• Expedited procedures: The revised law introduces a simplified procedure for disputes where the amount in dispute does not exceed CNY5 million (or such higher amount as the parties may agree or as provided in institutional rules). The tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, and the award must be rendered within three months of the tribunal’s constitution.
• Ad hoc arbitration (Article 82): The revised law permits parties to a foreign-related maritime dispute or a foreign-related dispute arising between enterprises registered within free trade pilot zones or Hainan Free Trade Port to agree to ad hoc arbitration, provided that the arbitration agreement is in writing, the arbitral seat is located within the territory of China, and the arbitrators possess the qualifications required by law. This reform fills a significant gap in the prior law, under which ad hoc arbitration was not legally recognised for commercial disputes.
• Shortened time limit for setting-aside applications: Under Article 72 of the revised law, an application to set aside an arbitral award must now be filed within three months of the date on which the award is received by the applicant, reduced from the previous six-month period. This change reflects the legislative policy of promoting the final and conclusive nature of arbitral awards and reducing prolonged post-award litigation.
• Enhanced confidentiality provisions: The revised law codifies the confidential nature of arbitration proceedings and awards, providing that arbitration hearings are not open to the public and that the parties, arbitrators and institution personnel must maintain the confidentiality of all information relating to the arbitration, subject to limited statutory exceptions.

The legislative process for the 2025 Amendment was notably transparent by Chinese standards. The Standing Committee of the NPC published three draft versions for public comment, receiving a total of approximately 4,200 written submissions from stakeholders. Notably, the second draft (published in October 2024) contained a provision that would have permitted ad hoc arbitration for all foreign-related disputes, but this was narrowed in the final version to maritime disputes and free trade zone enterprise disputes following objections from certain judicial administrative authorities. This legislative history is relevant to the interpretation of Article 82, as it clarifies that the limitation of ad hoc arbitration was a deliberate policy choice rather than an oversight.

Under Article 16 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, an arbitration agreement must be in writing and take the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or a separate written agreement to arbitrate. The agreement must manifest a clear and unambiguous intention to refer disputes to arbitration. The 2025 Amendment abolished the prior statutory requirement that the name of the arbitral institution be expressly specified. Under the revised law, an arbitration agreement that identifies a city (for example, “arbitration in Beijing”) or that provides for ad hoc arbitration in a foreign-related dispute is valid, provided that the parties’ intention to arbitrate is clear and the arbitral seat can be ascertained. This reform resolves a persistent source of invalidation of arbitration agreements on formalistic grounds and brings Chinese law into closer alignment with international practice.

The 2017 SPC Arbitration Interpretation (Article 3) had already established a pro-arbitration presumption, providing that an arbitration agreement is valid if it identifies the arbitration institution or provides a reasonable basis for determining the institution. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies this approach. Additionally, the 2025 Amendment expressly provides that an arbitration agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration in a foreign-related maritime dispute or a foreign-related dispute arising between enterprises registered within free trade pilot zones or Hainan Free Trade Port is valid, subject to the requirements of Article 82 (written form, identified arbitral seat within China, and qualified arbitrators).

Under Article 3 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, disputes that are arbitrable are those involving the rights and obligations of citizens, legal persons and other organisations in respect of contractual relationships, property and other property-related matters. Disputes that are not arbitrable include: (i) disputes concerning marriage, adoption, guardianship and support (personal status matters); (ii) administrative disputes; and (iii) matters that are expressly excluded from arbitration by other laws or administrative regulations. The 2025 Arbitration Law expanded the scope of arbitrability to include certain IP disputes and anti-monopoly (antitrust) disputes, subject to the condition that the dispute involves enforceable property rights or contractual obligations.

Securities and futures disputes are arbitrable if the parties have concluded a written arbitration agreement. However, certain investor protection disputes must be submitted to specialised regulatory dispute resolution mechanisms (for example, the Securities Investor Protection Fund). The 2025 Arbitration Law did not fundamentally alter the arbitrability framework, but SPC judicial interpretations have progressively expanded the scope of arbitrable subject matters in a manner consistent with international practice.

Chinese courts have consistently adopted a pro-arbitration approach in the interpretation of arbitration agreements. The SPC has held in multiple guiding cases that an arbitration agreement should be declared invalid only when it is impossible to give effect to the parties’ expressed intention to arbitrate. In the 2019 CU, Power and Sino-Environment line of cases, the SPC reinforced the principle of validating arbitration agreements where the parties’ intention is clear, even if the agreement contains minor defects in formulation. The 2025 Arbitration Law reinforces this pro-arbitration policy, providing that any ambiguity in an arbitration agreement shall be resolved in favour of validity where the parties’ intention to arbitrate can be ascertained from the agreement as a whole.

An arbitration agreement is invalid if: (i) the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable; (ii) the agreement was concluded by a person lacking legal capacity; (iii) the consent to arbitrate was obtained through fraud, coercion, or the exploitation of the other party’s distressed circumstances; or (iv) the arbitration agreement does not comply with the statutory written form requirement. The 2025 Arbitration Law adds a further ground: an arbitration agreement providing for ad hoc arbitration in a non-foreign-related dispute is invalid, because Article 82 limits ad hoc arbitration to foreign-related maritime disputes or foreign-related disputes arising between enterprises registered within free trade pilot zones or Hainan Free Trade Port.

Separability (sometimes referred to as “severability”) is a long-standing principle under Chinese law. Article 19 of the 2025 Arbitration Law provides that the arbitration clause is separable from the underlying contract. Even if the underlying contract is determined to be invalid, revoked or terminated, the arbitration clause remains valid unless the clause itself is invalid. This principle, which is well established in Chinese case law and international arbitration practice, ensures that a party cannot evade the arbitration obligation by challenging the validity of the underlying contract. The 2025 Amendment reaffirmed and strengthened the separability principle.

From a practical drafting perspective, the following points warrant emphasis. First, where the parties intend to designate a Chinese arbitration institution, the clause should specify both the institution’s name and the seat of arbitration. The model clause recommended by CIETAC provides: “Any dispute arising from or in connection with this contract shall be submitted to China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for arbitration in accordance with its Arbitration Rules in effect at the time of applying for arbitration. The seat of arbitration shall be [Beijing/Shanghai/Shenzhen]. The arbitral award is final and binding upon both parties.” Second, where the contract is bilingual, the arbitration clause should expressly provide which language version prevails in the event of inconsistency. Third, for contracts involving Belt and Road Initiative projects, practitioners should consider designating the “Belt and Road Arbitration Centre” (a specialised division of CIETAC) as the administering institution, as its rules incorporate specific provisions on multiparty and multi-contract disputes common in infrastructure projects.

The parties are free to agree on the number of arbitrators and the method of appointment. In the absence of agreement, the default composition is a tribunal of three arbitrators (one presiding arbitrator/chairperson and two co-arbitrators). The 2025 Arbitration Law expanded party autonomy in arbitrator selection, permitting the parties to select arbitrators from outside the administering institution’s panel with the agreement of all parties. For foreign-related arbitration, the parties enjoy even greater freedom: the 2025 Amendment allows the parties to a foreign-related dispute to agree on ad hoc arbitration and to select arbitrators without institutional constraints, provided that the selected arbitrators possess the legal qualifications and satisfy the impartiality and independence requirements of the law, and that the arbitration agreement is in writing.

If the parties fail to agree on the method of composing the tribunal, the arbitral institution appoints the tribunal in accordance with its rules. Under the CIETAC Arbitration Rules (2024 Revision), for a three-arbitrator tribunal, each party appoints one co-arbitrator, and the two co-arbitrators jointly appoint the chairperson. If a party fails to make an appointment within the prescribed time limit (15 days of receiving the notice of arbitration), the institution makes the appointment on its behalf. If the two co-arbitrators fail to agree on the chairperson within the prescribed time limit, the institution appoints the chairperson. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies these default procedures and provides that institutional rules supplement the provisions of the law.

Court intervention in the composition of the arbitral tribunal is strictly limited under the 2025 Arbitration Law. The court may intervene only to: (i) decide on challenges to arbitrators if the institution fails to decide within the prescribed timeframe; (ii) provide evidentiary assistance pursuant to Article 55; and (iii) set aside or enforce awards. The court is not permitted to interfere with the tribunal’s composition during the arbitration proceedings unless there is a clear violation of the law or the arbitration agreement that cannot be remedied through the institutional challenge mechanism. This limitation reflects the 2025 Amendment’s legislative policy of respecting party autonomy and minimising unnecessary judicial interference in the arbitral process.

A party may challenge an arbitrator on the following grounds: (i) lack of impartiality or independence; (ii) existence of a disqualifying conflict of interest; (iii) failure to disclose circumstances that give rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality or independence; or (iv) inability to perform arbitral duties due to illness, withdrawal or other reasons. The challenge must be raised before the first oral hearing or, for document-only proceedings, before the exchange of the first substantive submission after the constitution of the tribunal. The challenge must be brought within 15 days of the party becoming aware of the grounds. The institution decides on the challenge. If the challenge is denied, the party may seek court review in foreign-related arbitration pursuant to SPC judicial interpretation. The 2025 Arbitration Law strengthened the disclosure requirements: arbitrators must disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, and the duty of disclosure is ongoing throughout the proceedings.

An arbitrator may be removed by agreement of all parties, or by the institution if the challenge is upheld. The 2025 Arbitration Law also provides for automatic removal if the arbitrator fails to disclose a conflict of interest that subsequently comes to light and affects impartiality. Failure to make required disclosures may also constitute a ground for setting aside the award under Article 71(3) (composition of the tribunal violated the agreement of the parties or the provisions of the law).

Arbitrators must satisfy the following requirements: (i) full legal capacity; (ii) impartiality and independence from the parties and the dispute; (iii) relevant expertise, which may be legal, technical or industry-specific depending on the nature of the dispute; and (iv) no unpardoned criminal conviction (or such other disqualification as provided by law). For foreign-related arbitration, arbitrators with expertise in international law, foreign languages and cross-border commercial practice are preferred. The 2025 Arbitration Law permits foreign nationals to serve as arbitrators in foreign-related disputes, subject to the principle of reciprocity and the rules of the administering institution. Major institutions maintain panels of arbitrators, but the parties are free to select arbitrators from outside the panel with the agreement of all parties, pursuant to the expanded party autonomy under the 2025 Amendment.

The internationalisation of arbitrator rosters has progressed significantly since 2023. As of March 2026, CIETAC’s roster included 346 arbitrators from 89 foreign jurisdictions, representing 18.3% of the total roster. BAC/BIAC’s roster included 197 foreign arbitrators (19.2% of the total). SHIAC and SCIA have similarly expanded their international rosters. Notably, the 2025 Amendment’s provision permitting foreign nationals to serve as arbitrators has facilitated the appointment of practitioners from civil-law jurisdictions (eg, France, Germany, Japan) who were previously ineligible due to the “senior professional title” requirement, which has now been interpreted to include foreign legal practitioners with equivalent qualifications.

Article 30 of the 2025 Arbitration Law introduces the competence-competence doctrine, which empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement. A party that challenges the jurisdiction of the tribunal must raise the objection before the first oral hearing (or, in document-only proceedings, before the exchange of the first substantive submission). If the tribunal rules that it has jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may seek court review after the award is rendered. In foreign-related arbitrations, pursuant to SPC judicial interpretation, the party may also apply for interlocutory court review in limited circumstances. The competence-competence doctrine, newly codified by the 2025 Amendment, aligns China with international arbitration practice and reduces the prevalence of pre-arbitration court challenges that delay proceedings.

Under the 2025 Arbitration Law, court intervention in jurisdictional matters is confined to: (i) setting-aside or enforcement proceedings, in which the court reviews the tribunal’s jurisdictional ruling; and (ii) evidentiary assistance under Article 55. The court is not permitted to intervene during the pending arbitration to review jurisdictional determinations unless expressly provided by law. This limitation is intended to prevent parties from using court challenges as a tactical device to delay arbitration. The SPC reporting system for foreign-related awards provides an additional safeguard against incorrect or inconsistent jurisdictional rulings by lower courts.

A jurisdictional challenge must be raised before the first oral hearing. If the challenge is raised after the first oral hearing, it will be rejected unless the grounds for challenge arose or became known to the challenging party after the first hearing. This rule is designed to prevent parties from using jurisdictional challenges as a dilatory tactic. If a party participates in the arbitration proceedings without raising a timely jurisdictional challenge, that party is deemed to have waived the objection. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies the waiver principle and provides that a waiver, once made, cannot be retracted.

In setting-aside or enforcement proceedings, the court reviews jurisdictional determinations on the basis of the grounds listed in Article 71 (setting aside) and Article 63 (refusal of enforcement). The standard of review is generally de novo on legal issues, but deferential on factual determinations. The 2025 Arbitration Law narrows the scope of judicial review to align with international practice, providing that the court shall not review the merits of the dispute under the guise of reviewing jurisdiction. The distinction between jurisdiction (competence) and admissibility is recognised in Chinese arbitration law: jurisdiction concerns the tribunal’s power to hear the case; admissibility concerns whether the claim has been properly brought before the tribunal. The 2025 Amendment clarifies that the court’s review in setting-aside proceedings is limited to jurisdictional and procedural defects, not the substantive correctness of the award.

If a party commences court proceedings in breach of a valid arbitration agreement, the other party may apply to the court to dismiss the case and refer the parties to arbitration. The application must be made before the first oral hearing (or, in some courts, before the first substantive submission). If the court finds that a valid arbitration agreement exists, it must dismiss the case and refer the parties to arbitration. If the court incorrectly retains jurisdiction and renders a judgment, the aggrieved party may challenge the judgment on appeal. The 2025 Arbitration Law strengthened the referral mechanism, providing that courts must examine the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement at the outset of litigation and must refer the parties to arbitration where a valid agreement is found.

As a general principle, an arbitration agreement and any resulting award bind only the signatories to the agreement. Non-signatory third parties may be bound in limited and narrowly defined circumstances, including: (i) assignment or novation of the contract (the assignee or novatee is bound by the arbitration clause); (ii) piercing the corporate veil (in cases of abuse of corporate form to evade arbitration); (iii) agency (where the agent had actual or apparent authority to bind the principal); and (iv) equitable estoppel (where a non-signatory actively participates in the arbitration and later seeks to avoid the award). Chinese courts apply a strict and restrictive standard for binding non-signatories. The 2025 Arbitration Law does not substantially alter the third-party binding rules, leaving them to be developed through case law and SPC judicial interpretations.

Under Article 53 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to order the following types of interim measure: (i) property preservation (freezing of bank accounts, seizure of assets); (ii) evidence preservation (preserving documents or things that are at risk of being lost, destroyed or altered); (iii) conduct preservation (injunctive relief prohibiting or compelling certain acts); and (iv) preliminary measures (measures to prevent irreparable harm pending the final determination of the dispute). These measures are available upon the application of a party and are subject to the tribunal’s determination that the measure is necessary and urgent. The tribunal’s power to order interim measures aligns China with international arbitration practice and addresses a significant gap in the prior arbitration framework, which confined the power to order interim measures to the people’s courts.

Emergency Arbitrator

The 2025 Arbitration Law and the rules of major institutions (CIETAC Rules 2024, BAC/BIAC Rules 2022, SCIA Rules 2022) provide for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator to grant urgent interim relief prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The emergency arbitrator’s decision is binding on the parties and enforceable through the people’s court. The emergency arbitrator procedure, initially introduced by major Chinese institutions in or around 2020 and now codified by the 2025 Amendment, addresses the practical problem that urgent relief is often required before the tribunal is formally constituted, particularly in cases involving the risk of asset dissipation.

Although the arbitral tribunal has the power to order interim measures, the enforcement of such measures requires court involvement. The standard procedure is as follows: (i) the party submits an application for interim measures to the arbitral institution; (ii) the institution reviews the application for compliance with formal requirements and forwards it to the competent Intermediate People’s Court; and (iii) the court reviews the application and renders a decision within a short statutory timeframe (typically five to 15 days for urgent preservation measures). The 2025 Arbitration Law streamlines the procedure, providing that the application may be submitted directly to the court in urgent circumstances, with a copy forwarded to the arbitral institution. This reform reduces delay in urgent cases.

The cross-border enforceability of interim measures has been significantly enhanced by judicial assistance arrangements between Mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao. Pursuant to the 2019 Mainland–Hong Kong Arrangement, parties to Hong Kong-seated arbitration may apply to competent Mainland courts for property, evidence or conduct preservation. CIETAC Hong Kong Arbitration Center data shows successful property preservation applications to multiple courts, with an average amount of approximately CNY23.39 million per case. A similar Mainland–Macao arrangement entered into force in March 2024.

The arbitral tribunal may require a party applying for interim measures to provide security. The amount and form of security (cash deposit, bank guarantee, or other form acceptable to the tribunal) are determined by the tribunal in its discretion. If the applicant fails to provide the required security within the prescribed time limit, the application may be rejected. This requirement is designed to prevent abusive or speculative applications for interim measures and to provide the respondent with a remedy in the event that the interim measure causes loss. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies the security requirement and provides that the tribunal’s decision on security is binding and enforceable through the people’s court.

Judicial statistics for 2025 indicate that Chinese courts handled approximately 28,000 applications for property preservation in support of arbitration, with an approval rate of 82.3%. The average processing time from the institution’s transmission of the application to the court’s order was 4.8 days for applications submitted through the arbitration institution, and 2.3 days for urgent ex parte applications submitted directly to the court prior to the commencement of arbitration. These statistics reflect the high level of court support for arbitration-related interim measures in China, which compares favourably with the experience in many other jurisdictions.

Arbitral proceedings are governed by: (i) the arbitration agreement; (ii) the arbitration rules of the administering institution; and (iii) the Arbitration Law. The principle of party autonomy is paramount, subject to the mandatory provisions of the law. The 2025 Arbitration Law reaffirms the principle of party autonomy while introducing default procedural rules for matters not agreed by the parties. The institution’s rules have the force of contract as between the parties and the institution, and the tribunal is bound to apply the agreed rules unless the parties agree to disapply or modify them, subject to mandatory legal provisions.

A typical institutional arbitration in China proceeds through the following procedural steps: (i) the claimant files a notice of arbitration (or request for arbitration) with the selected arbitral institution; (ii) the institution reviews the request for compliance with formal requirements and, if satisfied, registers the case and notifies the parties; (iii) the respondent files a response (submission of defence), which is optional in most institutional rules; (iv) the parties appoint arbitrators in accordance with the agreement or the institutional rules; (v) the parties exchange written pleadings (statement of claim and statement of defence); (vi) the parties exchange evidential submissions; (vii) an oral hearing is convened (or, if the parties agree or the tribunal determines, the proceedings are conducted on a documents-only basis); (viii) the parties may submit post-hearing briefs (optional, depending on the rules and the tribunal’s directions); (ix) the tribunal deliberates in private; and (x) the tribunal renders the arbitral award. The 2025 Arbitration Law introduces expedited procedures for claims where the amount in dispute does not exceed CNY5 million, with simplified steps and a shortened timeline (the award must be rendered within three months of the tribunal’s constitution).

Arbitrators have the power and duty to: (i) conduct the proceedings fairly, efficiently, and in accordance with the law and the parties’ agreement; (ii) ensure the equal treatment of the parties and afford each party a reasonable opportunity to present its case and to respond to the other party’s case; (iii) determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence; (iv) rule on jurisdictional objections pursuant to the competence-competence doctrine under Article 30 of the 2025 Arbitration Law; and (v) render the arbitral award within the timeframe prescribed by law or the institutional rules. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies these powers and introduces a duty to render the award within six months of the tribunal’s constitution (or such shorter period as may be agreed by the parties or provided in the institutional rules).

Arbitrators must also disclose conflicts of interest, maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration, and avoid ex parte communications with any party. A violation of these duties may result in the challenge, removal or setting aside of the award, or liability for damages. The 2025 Arbitration Law strengthens arbitrator accountability, providing for compensation liability if an arbitrator’s intentional misconduct or gross negligence causes loss to a party. This provision, which was not present in the prior law, is intended to enhance arbitrator professionalism and party confidence in the arbitral process.

The interaction between Chinese arbitration procedure and the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration merits particular attention. While the IBA Rules are not directly applicable as a matter of Chinese law, several leading Chinese institutions have incorporated them as a “guide” or “reference” in their rules. In practice, tribunals in China tend to adopt a more document-centric approach to evidence than their common-law counterparts, reflecting the civil-law tradition. However, the 2025 ’s reinforcement of the right to cross-examine evidence, combined with the increasing appointment of arbitrators with common-law backgrounds, is gradually shifting Chinese arbitration practice towards a more adversarial model. Parties should nevertheless expect that document production requests will be scrutinised more rigorously than under the IBA Rules, and that the tribunal may be reluctant to order broad document disclosure.

Parties may be represented in arbitration by qualified lawyers, legal representatives or authorised agents. For foreign-related arbitration, parties may be represented by foreign-qualified lawyers for procedural matters (for example, the submission of documents), but representation on the merits may be restricted to qualified PRC lawyers if the governing law is PRC law or if the proceedings involve the application of PRC law. The 2025 Arbitration Law does not substantially change the rules on legal representation. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules, Article 9) require parties to notify the institution and the other party of the identity and authority of their authorised representatives.

The parties bear the primary responsibility for collecting and submitting evidence in support of their respective claims, defences and factual contentions. The 2025 Arbitration Law introduces Article 55 (Evidence-Taking Assistance), which permits the arbitral tribunal, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, to apply to the people’s court for assistance in obtaining evidence that a party is unable to obtain through its own efforts. This reform significantly strengthens the evidentiary regime in Chinese arbitration, addressing the prior problem that arbitrators lacked compulsory powers to order document production or witness attendance. Under Article 55, the tribunal may request the people’s court to order a person to (i) produce documents; (ii) permit the inspection of documents or premises; or (iii) take such other evidentiary measures as may be necessary.

Document production in Chinese arbitration does not follow the broad, US-style discovery model. Document production is confined to documents that are relevant, material and in the possession, custody or control of the opposing party. The tribunal has discretion to order document production, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the parties’ agreement. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules, Articles 42–43) provide a structured framework for document production applications. A party seeking document production must specify: (i) the documents to be produced; (ii) the relevance and materiality of the requested documents; and (iii) the efforts made to obtain the documents through its own means.

The arbitral tribunal determines the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence. Chinese arbitration does not apply the strict exclusionary rules that characterise common-law court proceedings. The tribunal applies the principles of procedural fairness and equality of the parties. Electronic evidence, including emails, instant messaging records (for example, WeChat messages) and digital documents, is admissible if properly authenticated. The 2025 Arbitration Law expressly recognises electronic communications and digital evidence as valid forms of evidence. The tribunal may also appoint independent expert witnesses to assist in the determination of technical or specialised matters.

Under Article 55 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, the tribunal may request the people’s court to assist in evidence-taking. The court may order a person to produce documents, permit on-site inspection or take other evidentiary measures. Failure to comply with a tribunal-ordered document production may result in the tribunal drawing adverse inferences (that is, the tribunal may draw such factual inferences as are unfavourable to the non-complying party). The 2025 Arbitration Law strengthens the compulsion powers of the tribunal with court assistance, addressing a key weakness in the prior arbitration framework.

Several jurisdictions have introduced local measures to strengthen evidentiary powers. The Regulations on Optimizing the Business Environment of Shanghai (2023) provide a basis for courts to issue investigation orders. On 19 June 2025, the Guangdong High People’s Court issued similar Measures for Issuing Investigation Orders to Assist Arbitral Institutions in Evidence Collection. While not yet uniform nationwide, these measures represent an important trend.

Witness Testimony

Witnesses may provide written witness statements or testify orally at an oral hearing. The tribunal may, with court assistance, compel a witness’s attendance if the witness fails to appear voluntarily. The 2025 Arbitration Law provides that witnesses who give false testimony before the tribunal or the court may be subject to court sanctions, including fines or administrative detention. These measures are intended to enhance the reliability and integrity of witness evidence in arbitration.

Confidentiality

Confidentiality in arbitration proceedings in China is governed by a combination of statutory provisions and institutional rules. Article 52 of the 2025 Arbitration Law provides that arbitration proceedings shall not be conducted in public, unless the parties agree to public proceedings and the matter does not involve state secrets, trade secrets or personal privacy. This default confidentiality aligns with international commercial arbitration practice. However, certain institutional rules (eg, the Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC)) provide for greater transparency in certain circumstances, such as the publication of anonymised awards. Parties desiring maximum confidentiality should specify in the arbitration agreement that the proceedings and the award shall be kept confidential, and that the tribunal shall not publish the award or any procedural orders.

Arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards are confidential in China. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies the confidentiality obligation, providing that: (i) oral arbitration hearings are not open to the public; (ii) the parties, the arbitrators and the institution’s personnel must keep confidential all information relating to the arbitration, including the evidence, witness statements and the text of the award; and (iii) arbitral awards are not to be published without the express consent of all parties. Confidentiality is a key comparative advantage of arbitration over litigation and is strictly enforced by Chinese arbitral institutions.

The 2025 Arbitration Law specifies the following exceptions to the confidentiality obligation: (i) disclosure required by law (for example, to the people’s court in setting-aside or enforcement proceedings); (ii) disclosure to professional advisers (legal counsel, expert witnesses); and (iii) disclosure for the purpose of enforcing or challenging an arbitral award. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules, Article 52) provide more detailed confidentiality provisions. The 2025 Arbitration Law also provides that the tribunal may, on its own initiative or upon application by a party, order the confidentiality of trade secrets and other sensitive commercial information even in the absence of a party request, thereby protecting confidential commercial information throughout the proceedings and thereafter.

In practice, confidentiality is subject to exceptions beyond those in the 2025 Arbitration Law. Listed companies must disclose significant arbitration cases under information disclosure rules. Confidentiality may be overridden by court orders in setting-aside or enforcement proceedings. Practitioners should advise clients of these exceptions when drafting confidentiality provisions.

Under Article 57 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, an arbitral award must: (i) be made in writing; (ii) state the reasons on which it is based (unless the parties have agreed that no reasons are to be given, or the dispute has been settled by consent of the parties); (iii) be signed by the arbitrators; and (iv) state the date and the seat of arbitration. The 2025 Amendment adds the requirement to state the seat of arbitration, aligning with international practice. The award must also state the names of the parties, the claims and relief sought, the facts found, the reasons for the decision, and the decision itself. If an arbitrator dissents from the majority decision, that arbitrator may refuse to sign the award. In such a case, the award must state the reason for the absence of the arbitrator’s signature.

The award becomes effective upon being signed by the arbitrators (or, in the case of a majority signature, upon the date of signature by the last arbitrator signing). The institution serves the award on the parties. The 2025 Arbitration Law clarifies that the award is effective as of the date of signature by the majority of the tribunal, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.

Institutional rules prescribe time limits for rendering awards. Under CIETAC Rules, the time limit is six months for standard procedures and three months for expedited procedures. For domestic arbitrations, the limit is four months, with possible extensions. The 2025 Arbitration Law leaves time limits to institutional rules and party agreement.

The arbitral tribunal may grant the following reliefs: (i) monetary damages (compensation for proved loss and damage); (ii) specific performance (an order requiring a party to perform its contractual or other legal obligations); (iii) declaratory relief (a declaration of the rights or obligations of the parties); (iv) injunctive relief (conduct preservation under Article 53 of the 2025 Arbitration Law); and (v) an award of interest. Punitive damages are generally not available in arbitration unless expressly provided by applicable law (for example, in certain consumer protection or anti-monopoly contexts). The tribunal may also allocate costs, including arbitration fees and legal costs, in accordance with the institutional rules and the principle that the unsuccessful party bears the costs, unless the tribunal determines otherwise having regard to the circumstances of the case.

The tribunal may award pre-award interest (from the date of breach or non-performance to the date of the award) and post-award interest (from the date of the award to the date of actual payment). The rate of interest may be agreed by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, determined by the tribunal having regard to the law governing the contract. If the parties do not agree on the interest rate, the tribunal may apply the Loan Prime Rate published by the People’s Bank of China or such other reasonable commercial rate as the tribunal considers appropriate. Legal costs include arbitration fees, counsel fees and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses. The 2025 Arbitration Law and institutional rules provide for cost allocation on the basis that the losing party bears the costs, unless the tribunal determines otherwise having regard to the conduct of the parties and other relevant circumstances.

Under Article 71 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, a party may apply to the Intermediate People’s Court at the seat of arbitration to set aside the award. The application must be filed within three months of the date on which the award is received by the applicant, reduced from the previous six-month period under the pre-2025 Arbitration Law. The grounds for setting aside are: (i) a party to the arbitration agreement lacked legal capacity; (ii) the arbitration agreement is invalid; (iii) a party was not given proper notice of the arbitration proceedings or of the appointment of an arbitrator, or was otherwise unable to present its case; (iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, with the provisions of the law; (v) the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable; and/or (vi) the award violates public policy. The 2025 Amendment narrows the public policy ground, aligning with the international pro-enforcement trend.

If the court finds that one or more of the grounds for setting aside are established, it may: (i) set aside the award in whole or in part; or (ii) remand the case to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration (a new procedure introduced by the 2025 Amendment). The remand procedure allows the tribunal to correct errors without invalidating the entire award, thereby promoting procedural efficiency and reducing costs. The court’s setting-aside decision is subject to appeal to the Higher People’s Court within the timeframe prescribed by the Civil Procedure Law.

Statistical analysis of setting-aside decisions in 2025, based on published court decisions, indicates that Chinese courts set aside arbitral awards in approximately 3.2% of cases where an application is filed. This rate has remained relatively stable over the past five years (ranging from 2.8% to 3.5%), suggesting that the setting-aside mechanism serves as a genuine but limited safeguard rather than a routine avenue for re-litigating the merits. The most common ground for setting aside in 2025 was “violation of arbitration procedure” (accounting for 44.7% of successful applications), followed by “forged evidence” (21.3%) and “arbitrator misconduct” (18.5%). Applications based on “no valid arbitration agreement” accounted for 15.5% of successful settings-aside.

The parties cannot exclude the mandatory grounds for setting aside by agreement. The 2025 Arbitration Law expressly prohibits any agreement from waiving the right to apply for setting aside, providing that such a waiver agreement is invalid as it is contrary to public policy. However, the parties may agree to expand the scope of court review in limited circumstances, subject to the requirement that the expanded scope does not violate mandatory provisions of the law or public policy. In practice, Chinese courts do not give effect to agreements that purport to contract out of the setting-aside regime, ensuring minimum procedural safeguards and the integrity of the arbitral process.

The court reviews setting-aside applications on the basis of the grounds set out in Article 71 of the 2025 Arbitration Law. The review is generally conducted on the record, and the court does not rehear the dispute on the merits. The 2025 Arbitration Law narrows the scope of judicial review, particularly in relation to the public policy ground, to align with the pro-enforcement trend. The SPC has consistently held that “public policy” should be narrowly construed and applied only when the award violates fundamental legal principles or the essential interests of the state or the public. The standard of review is deferential to the tribunal’s factual findings and legal rulings, and the court may interfere only when a clear and expressly provided ground for setting aside is demonstrated.

China has been a contracting state to the New York Convention since 22 April 1987. Chinese courts recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards made in the territory of another contracting state, subject to the grounds for refusal set out in Article V of the Convention. The 2025 Arbitration Law reaffirms China’s commitment to the Convention. According to SPC statistics, Chinese courts have refused enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in less than 10% of cases since 2020, demonstrating a consistently pro-enforcement attitude. The SPC’s reporting system requires lower courts to report to the SPC before refusing enforcement of a foreign-related award, ensuring uniformity and correctness across different jurisdictions.

Upon acceding to the Convention in 1987, China made two reservations: the reciprocity reservation and the commercial reservation. A significant development is the shift from the “institution standard” to the “seat standard” for determining award nationality. Under the seat standard (adopted in recent SPC guidance), an ICC arbitration seated in Beijing is treated as a Chinese award subject to Chinese law, not a foreign award. This shift aligns Chinese practice with international norms.

To enforce an arbitral award, the prevailing party applies to the Intermediate People’s Court at the place where the respondent is domiciled or where the respondent’s property is located. The application must be filed within two years of the award becoming effective. The court examines the application and enforces the award unless it falls within the grounds for refusal set out in the law. For foreign awards under the New York Convention, the court applies Article V of the Convention. For domestic awards, the court applies Article 63 of the 2025 Arbitration Law, which mirrors the setting-aside grounds. The burden of proof rests on the party resisting enforcement to establish a ground for refusal.

The “reporting system” (baoshizhidu) merits particular attention in the context of enforcement. Under this system, where an Intermediate People’s Court intends to refuse enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award (whether made in China or abroad), it must report its proposed refusal to the Higher People’s Court of the relevant province. If the Higher People’s Court agrees with the proposed refusal, it must further report to the SPC for final determination. This centralised review mechanism is designed to ensure that refusals of enforcement are limited to cases that genuinely satisfy the statutory grounds, and to prevent local protectionism from undermining the enforceability of arbitral awards.

A notable development in 2025 was the SPC’s issuance of a “Guiding Opinion on the Application of the New York Convention in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” (document No. Fa Fa [2025] No. 12), which clarifies that: (i) the “more favourable law” principle applies in determining whether to enforce a foreign award; (ii) the court shall not review the merits of the award; and (iii) the “public policy” defence shall be strictly construed and applied only in exceptional circumstances.

The SPC consistently adopts a narrow approach to the “public policy” exception. In a 2024 guiding case (Reference No. 2024-10-2-463-001), the SPC reaffirmed that public policy is limited to situations violating fundamental principles of Chinese law, national sovereignty or public security. A mere violation of mandatory provisions does not constitute a public policy breach. The centralised reporting system further reinforces this pro-enforcement approach.

Chinese courts have adopted an increasingly pro-enforcement approach in recent years. The SPC has issued multiple judicial interpretations and guiding opinions to ensure consistent and correct application of the New York Convention and the Arbitration Law. The 2025 Arbitration Law’s alignment with international standards is expected to further improve enforcement outcomes. In a notable 2022 case, the SPC overturned a lower court’s refusal to enforce a SIAC award, reaffirming that procedural errors in the arbitration do not justify refusal of enforcement unless they violate due process or public policy. This line of authority reinforces the finality and enforceability of arbitral awards in China.

For domestic awards, the court examines the application on the basis of Article 63 of the 2025 Arbitration Law. The grounds for refusing enforcement of a domestic award are essentially the same as the setting-aside grounds. If the award has already been set aside by the competent court, the enforcement court will refuse enforcement. If a setting-aside application is pending before the competent court, the enforcement court may stay enforcement. The 2025 Arbitration Law provides that the court must decide on an enforcement application within six months of accepting the application, promoting timely enforcement.

Chinese arbitration law does not expressly provide for class arbitration or group arbitration. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules) permit multiparty arbitration but do not provide for class-wide representative arbitration. The 2025 Arbitration Law does not introduce class arbitration, maintaining the requirement that all parties to the arbitration must have consented to the arbitration agreement. Group arbitration (in which a representative brings claims on behalf of a defined group) is not available in Chinese arbitration, although multiparty arbitration in complex construction or joint venture disputes is common and well provided for in institutional rules.

Arbitrators are subject to ethical codes issued by arbitral institutions and the China Arbitration Association. The codes typically require: (i) impartiality and independence; (ii) ongoing disclosure of conflicts of interest; (iii) diligence and efficiency in the conduct of proceedings; and (iv) maintenance of confidentiality. The 2025 Arbitration Law references these ethical standards and provides for sanctions in cases of arbitrator misconduct, including removal, liability to pay compensation, and disqualification from serving as an arbitrator in the future. Major institutions have adopted detailed ethical rules, and failure to comply may result in disciplinary action by the institution.

Third-party funding of arbitration is not expressly regulated by national law in China but is widely practised in international arbitration involving Chinese parties. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules, Article 38) require the disclosure of third-party funding arrangements to ensure arbitrator impartiality and avoid conflicts of interest. The 2025 Arbitration Law does not directly address third-party funding, leaving the matter to institutional rules and future SPC judicial interpretations. The principal concerns relating to third-party funding are the potential impact on arbitrator impartiality (if the funder has a relationship with an arbitrator) and the enforceability of cost awards (if the funded party lacks the financial means to satisfy an adverse cost award). Disclosure requirements are the primary regulatory tool currently employed.

Third-party funding of arbitration has gained increasing attention in China, particularly in the context of high-value international commercial disputes. The 2025 Arbitration Law does not expressly regulate third-party funding, but several leading institutions have introduced disclosure requirements in their rules. The regulatory framework for third-party funding remains underdeveloped, and further legislative or regulatory action may be expected as third-party funding becomes more prevalent in China-seated arbitrations.

Consolidation of separate arbitrations is permitted if: (i) the parties agree to consolidation; or (ii) the arbitrations involve the same subject matter or closely related subject matters, and the tribunal determines that consolidation is appropriate to avoid conflicting awards and to promote efficiency. Institutional rules (for example, CIETAC Rules, Article 40) provide for consolidation in multi-contract or multiparty disputes. The 2025 Arbitration Law codifies the consolidation power, providing that the tribunal may consolidate arbitrations with the agreement of all parties or if the arbitrations arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Consolidation is particularly valuable in complex construction, infrastructure and investment disputes involving multiple contracts and multiple parties.

As a general principle, an arbitration agreement and the resulting award bind only the signatories. Non-signatory third parties may be bound in limited circumstances, such as: (i) assignment or novation of the contract (the assignee or novatee is bound by the arbitration clause); (ii) piercing the corporate veil (in cases of abuse of corporate form to avoid arbitration obligations); (iii) agency (where the agent had actual or apparent authority to bind the principal to the arbitration agreement); or (iv) equitable estoppel (where a non-signatory actively participates in the arbitration and later seeks to avoid the award). Chinese courts apply a strict and demanding standard for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements or awards, requiring clear evidence of consent or equitable estoppel.