There has been a continual rise in the use of international arbitration to resolve disputes in the Philippines, in line with the public policy of favouring arbitration and increasing efforts to incorporate arbitration agreements in commercial contracts. While disputes between only domestic parties are still largely resolved through court litigation, there is now a preference to resort to international arbitration in matters involving foreign counterparties or transactions with an offshore element, in the interests of expeditiousness, predictability and ensuring minimal court intervention. International arbitration results from a combination of being the selected mode of dispute resolution (where there is a foreign counterparty) and in relation to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
There does not appear to be any particular industry that has experienced a significant increase or decrease in international arbitration activity in recent years. Although there was a slowdown in international arbitration in the Philippines at the beginning of the pandemic, probably owing to economic uncertainty, international arbitration activity has since normalised, and even improved.
Among domestic arbitration institutions, the one most used for international arbitration involving construction disputes is the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). However, the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center, Inc (PDRCI) is used the most for other commercial disputes.
Under a unique Philippine construction arbitration law, the CIAC is granted original and exclusive jurisdiction over construction disputes in which the parties have agreed to arbitration. Where the parties have named another arbitration institution in their arbitration agreement, the Supreme Court has interpreted the law to still incorporate the CIAC into the agreement as an alternative choice of arbitration institution. On the other hand, the PDRCI is the most established arbitration institution in the country for commercial disputes, having been founded in 1996.
Although no new arbitration institutions were established in the Philippines in 2024, Philippine advocates and practitioners continue to promote the use of the Philippine International Center for Conflict Resolution (PICCR), which was only established in 2019 by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
There are no specific courts in the Philippines that are designated to hear disputes related to international arbitrations and/or domestic arbitrations. The regional trial courts, which are the regular trial courts in the Philippines, have original jurisdiction over petitions relating to arbitration under the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (the “Special ADR Rules”).
Republic Act No 9285, or the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 (the “ADR Act”), is the national legislation governing arbitration in the Philippines. It provides that international commercial arbitration will primarily be governed by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”). The ADR Act does not diverge in any significant way from the UNCITRAL Model Law.
There have been no significant changes to the ADR Act and related issuances, although there was a proposed bill in the Senate (Senate Bill No 1308, filed 12 September 2022) to adopt the 2006 amendments to the UNICTRAL Model Law “to update the commercial arbitration practices in the Philippines in conformity with international standards”. And while there has been some interest in ratifying the Singapore Convention on Mediation in 2020, there is no Senate concurrence yet to this effect.
Philippine case law has repeatedly affirmed the public policy favouring arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution. In 2025, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals may only conduct a factual review of a final award in a CIAC arbitration if it is sufficiently shown that the arbitral tribunal’s integrity is compromised or if it committed unconstitutional or illegal acts. This is grounded on the principle that courts are called to exercise judicial restraint and deference when asked to review the findings of arbitral tribunals, to avoid defeating the purpose of arbitration (Grand Exploit Builder Development, Inc v Hoegaarden Realty Corp, GR No 267541, 2 April 2025).
Consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, Philippine law requires that an arbitration agreement must be in writing. This requirement is satisfied if the arbitration agreement is:
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has ruled that an arbitration agreement is a contract in itself – a separate agreement independent of the main contract. As such, it must comply with the Philippine Civil Code’s requirements for a valid contract, which are consent, object and cause or consideration.
Commercial disputes in the Philippines are generally arbitrable. However, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the ADR Act provide that the following matters cannot be referred to arbitration:
The Supreme Court has ruled that the law agreed upon by the parties in the arbitration agreement will govern, considering that party autonomy is the essence of arbitration. In the absence of such designation, the law determined by the applicable conflict of law rules will govern.
Courts are mandated to favour arbitration. The Supreme Court has ruled that arbitration agreements are to be liberally construed in favour of proceeding to arbitration and that courts should generally adopt the interpretation that renders an arbitration clause effective if the terms of an agreement allow for such interpretation.
As such, courts must refer matters to arbitration if the case was improperly or prematurely referred to them, despite an arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of an arbitration clause despite the invalidity of the main contract, consistent with the rule of separability. It is settled that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract, and it does not automatically terminate when the contract of which it is a part comes to an end.
It is a recognised state policy to respect party autonomy in the resolution of disputes. Thus, there are no limitations on the parties’ freedom to select arbitrators in international commercial arbitration or to agree on the qualifications of the arbitrators. In a similar vein, the ADR Act’s IRR provides that no person will be precluded from acting as an arbitrator because of their nationality, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators but, in the absence of such an agreement, there will be three arbitrators.
The parties are also free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators. In the absence of such an agreement, if the parties had agreed to have a sole arbitrator but are unable to agree on the arbitrator, one party may request that the arbitrator be appointed by the appointing authority.
If the parties agree to have three arbitrators, each party will appoint an arbitrator, and then the two appointed arbitrators will appoint the third arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of receiving a request to do so from the other party – or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days of their appointment – the appointing authority will make the appointment upon request of the other party.
The appointing authority is the person or institution named as such in the arbitration agreement, or else the regular arbitration institution under the rules of which the arbitration is being conducted. Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to institutional arbitration rules, they are deemed to have agreed for arbitrators to be selected and appointed under those rules – unless they have agreed to a different procedure.
In ad hoc arbitration, the default appointment of an arbitrator will be made by the national president of the IBP or their duly authorised representative.
However, there is no default procedure specifically for multi-party arbitrations.
The court intervenes in the selection of arbitrators and may act as the appointing authority at the request of a party in the following circumstances:
In an ad hoc arbitration, the court may intervene in the following circumstances.
An arbitrator may be challenged on any of the grounds provided for in the ADR Act and its IRR, Republic Act No 876 or the UNCITRAL Model Law. The nationality and professional qualification of an arbitrator are not grounds to challenge an arbitrator unless the parties have specified the arbitrator’s nationality and/or professional qualification in their arbitration agreement.
An arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence, or if they do not possess qualifications agreed to by the parties. A party may challenge an arbitrator appointed by them, or in whose appointment they have participated, only for reasons of which they become aware after the appointment has been made.
Any person appointed to serve as an arbitrator must be of legal age, in full enjoyment of their civil rights and able to read and write. If the following circumstances are present, a person cannot be appointed as arbitrator:
Arbitrators must disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence. From the time of their appointment and throughout the arbitration proceedings, an arbitrator must disclose any such circumstances to the parties without delay unless they have already been informed of these circumstances by the arbitrator.
An arbitral tribunal has the first opportunity or competence to rule on whether it has jurisdiction to decide a dispute submitted to it, including any objections that a party may have concerning:
Philippine courts must enforce the policy on judicial restraint and give the arbitral tribunal the first opportunity to rule upon issues of jurisdiction and competence.
Unless the court concludes (on no more than a prima facie basis) that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, the court must suspend the action before it and refer the parties to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.
The courts may address the issue of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction:
Before the commencement of arbitration, the court action is limited to a prima facie determination of the existence, validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Under the Special ADR Rules, when a court is asked to rule upon issues affecting an arbitral tribunal’s competence or jurisdiction, the court is mandated to exercise judicial restraint and defer to the competence or jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal by allowing the arbitral tribunal the first opportunity to rule upon the issue of its competence or jurisdiction.
As Philippine courts must follow the principle of judicial restraint, parties have the right to challenge the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal only after the arbitral tribunal makes such a determination.
The challenge may be filed:
Philippine courts must follow a deferential standard of judicial review for questions of admissibility and jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has ruled that courts must uphold factual findings of arbitral tribunals and should not permit the parties to relitigate issues of facts that have been previously presented and argued before the arbitral tribunal.
As an exception, Philippine courts may allow the litgation of factual issues on a de novo basis in domestic arbitration when:
A challenge to the integrity of the arbitral tribunal includes allegations that:
When a party to an arbitration agreement commences court proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement, Philippine courts must refuse to exercise jurisdiction and instead refer the matter to arbitration, provided that at least one party so requests no later than the pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the request for referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the case.
Philippine laws generally do not allow an arbitral tribunal to assume jurisdiction over individuals or entities that are neither party to an arbitration agreement nor signatories to the contract containing the arbitration agreement, for as long as such individuals or entities refuse to submit their dispute to arbitration.
If a request for interim relief was made after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal then the tribunal may award preliminary or interim relief, which it may consider necessary to the subject matter of the dispute, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties to an arbitration agreement. Such relief is binding in nature and may be granted to:
Such interim relief and interim measures of protection include:
To the extent that the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or is unable to act effectively on the request for interim relief, the request may be made with the Philippine courts even after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. The party seeking such interim relief may also apply to the Philippine courts for assistance with implementing or enforcing an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal.
Philippine courts can either be the grantor or facilitator of interim relief.
Grantor of Relief
Philippine courts may grant an application for interim relief before the constitution of an arbitral tribunal, whether before or after the commencement of arbitration proceedings.
After constitution of an arbitral tribunal and during arbitration proceedings, courts may grant a request for interim relief only if the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or is unable to act effectively. The arbitral tribunal is deemed constituted when the sole arbitrator or the chair of the tribunal has accepted the nomination, and the parties are notified.
As with an arbitral tribunal, courts may grant interim relief to:
Facilitator in the Implementation or Enforcement of Relief
Philippine laws allow a party seeking interim relief to apply to the courts for assistance with implementing or enforcing an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal.
Although Philippine laws do not specifically allow Philippine courts to grant interim relief in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations, neither do they specifically prohibit such a grant. Thus, Philippine courts may arguably grant interim relief in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations in the same way Philippine courts grant interim relief for Philippine-seated arbitrations, provided that other requirements for jurisdiction and venue are complied with.
Under the Special ADR Rules, the venue for a petition for an interim measure of protection is the regional trial court that has jurisdiction over:
Philippine laws do not provide for the appointment of emergency arbitrators. The ADR Act was enacted by the Philippine legislature in 2004, and the Special ADR Rules were issued by the Supreme Court in 2009 – both before the appointment of emergency arbitrators was practised. Nevertheless, the rules of Philippine arbitration institutions such as the PDRCI and the PICCR now provide for the appointment of such institutions as emergency arbitrators.
It is therefore not clear whether Philippine courts may still entertain applications for interim measures of protection when an emergency arbitrator has been appointed, considering that the arbitral tribunal, strictly speaking, has not been constituted at that point in time. It is also not clear whether Philippine courts can assist in implementing or enforcing an interim measure that has been ordered by an emergency arbitrator, given that the latter is separate and distinct from the arbitral tribunal. Having said that, Philippine courts may consider the issuance of an interim measure of protection by an emergency arbitrator at their discretion if this supports their own case for issuing interim relief.
Philippine laws do not expressly permit the grant of security for costs, which would serve as an interim measure of protection to secure a future award for the legal or other costs of any party (usually the respondent) by way of a deposit or bank guarantee.
However, there are grounds to argue that Philippine law may allow security for costs to be granted on the basis that such relief:
Parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal. In the absence of an agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate subject to Chapter 4, Rule 5 of the ADR Act’s IRR, which provides that, unless considered inappropriate by the arbitral tribunal, the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules will apply.
Under the ADR Act, international commercial arbitration seated in the Philippines would be primarily governed by the UNCITRAL Model Law.
There are no mandatory procedural steps required by law. As mentioned in 7.1 Governing Rules, parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal during its conduct of the arbitration proceeding and, in the absence of an agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct arbitration proceedings in a manner it considers appropriate.
Philippine law mandates that the parties must be treated equally, and each party must be given full opportunity to present its case. The law imposes the following duties on arbitrators.
Philippine law recognises the power of an arbitral tribunal, inter alia, to do the following.
Furthermore, in the absence of an agreement by the parties concerning the following circumstances, Philippine law recognises the power of the arbitral tribunal to do the following.
A party may be represented by any person of their choice. Other than an authorisation in writing, Philippine laws do not further specify any particular qualification or requirement necessary for representing a party or appearing before an arbitral tribunal. This is true both for domestic and international commercial arbitration.
A representative who is not authorised to practise law, however, is not authorised to appear as counsel in any Philippine court or any other quasi-judicial body – even if such appearance may be in relation to the arbitration in which they appear.
There are no specific rules that apply to the collection and submission of evidence, including discovery, disclosure, privilege, use of witness statements and cross-examination. As mentioned in 7.1 Governing Rules, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal during its conduct of the proceedings and, in the absence of such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.
However, any party to the arbitration, whether domestic or foreign, may request Philippine courts to provide assistance in taking evidence at any time during the course of the arbitration proceedings, when the need arises. The party requiring assistance in the taking of evidence may petition the Philippine courts to direct any person for any of the following reasons:
There are no specific rules of evidence applicable to arbitration proceedings seated in the Philippines. It is generally accepted that the technical rules of evidence that apply in Philippine court proceedings are not applicable to arbitration. As mentioned in 7.3 Powers and Duties of Arbitrators, the arbitrators have the power and discretion to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence submitted by the parties.
However, at any time before arbitration is commenced, or before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, any person who desires to perpetuate their testimony or that of another person may do so in accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines.
Arbitrators have the power to issue subpoenas to compel:
However, Philippine law neither expressly grants arbitrators contempt powers nor recognises that they have inherent contempt powers. Arbitrators (or a party, with the arbitrators’ approval) may therefore apply to the proper court for a subpoena to assist in the evidence-taking process, as discussed in 8.1 Collection and Submission of Evidence.
The ADR Act provides that arbitration proceedings (including the records, evidence and arbitral award) will be considered confidential and should not generally be published, except:
However, these exceptions do not include information containing secret processes, developments, research and other sensitive matters (eg, business or trade secrets) if there is evidence that the applicant will be materially prejudiced by authorising the disclosure of such information.
Under the Special ADR Rules, any person, counsel or witness who disclosed or who was compelled to disclose information related to the subject of the arbitration in circumstances where one might reasonably expect the information to be kept confidential may file a petition with the regional trial court for a protective order to:
Philippine law requires the arbitral award to be in writing and signed by either the sole arbitrator or the majority of arbitrators in the arbitral tribunal, with a statement outlining the reason for any omitted signature.
The arbitral award must state the reasons upon which it is based, unless the parties have agreed otherwise or the award is based on agreed terms. The arbitral award must also state the date of the award and the place of arbitration. Copies of the signed award must be delivered to each party.
Philippine laws do not specify time limits for issuing an award. However, the arbitral tribunal is expected to render a decision within a reasonable timeframe once the hearings have closed and, if an institutional arbitration is involved, within the period provided in the institution’s rules.
There are no limits on the types of remedies that an arbitral tribunal may award, as long as they may be granted:
However, the arbitral tribunal cannot exceed its authority. Thus, it may not grant any remedy for a dispute that is not contemplated by – or does not fall within – the terms of its submission to arbitration.
Philippine laws allow parties to recover their legal costs and interests.
The ADR Act’s IRR provide that the arbitral tribunal must fix the costs of arbitration in its award, which include:
Under the ADR Act’s IRR, the costs of arbitration will, in principle, be borne by the unsuccessful party. However, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the arbitral tribunal may apportion these costs between the parties if it deems this reasonable.
For the costs of legal representation and assistance, particularly the costs of expert advice and of other assistance required by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal is free to determine which party bears these costs. Alternatively, having taken into account the circumstances of the case, it may deem it reasonable to apportion the costs between the parties. The arbitral tribunal may also refuse to grant such costs of legal representation and assistance if none of the limited grounds for the grant of attorney’s fees under the Civil Code are present.
An arbitral award in an international commercial arbitration cannot be appealed merely on the ground that the arbitral tribunal committed errors of fact or errors of law. Rule 19.7 of the Special ADR Rules provides that an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration means that the arbitral award will be final and binding. The same provision prohibits a party to an arbitration from filing an appeal or petition for certiorari to question the merits of an arbitral award. Specifically, Rule 12.5 of the Special ADR Rules expressly prohibits the filing of an appeal, petition for review or petition for certiorari against an international commercial arbitral award.
Instead, the losing party may file a petition to set aside the arbitral award in an international commercial arbitration no later than three months after receiving the award. This is the exclusive recourse against such an arbitral award.
The courts can vacate or set aside the arbitral award only on the grounds cited under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, to wit:
Philippine courts are mandated to disregard any grounds to set aside or vacate the arbitral award other than those listed.
Procedure for Setting Aside the Arbitral Award
A verified petition must be filed with the proper regional trial court within three months of receiving the arbitral award; it cannot be filed after the three-month period has elapsed. If a petition to recognise and enforce the arbitral award is already pending, the petition to set aside must be filed in opposition to the petition to recognise. Failure to file a petition to set aside will preclude a party from raising grounds to resist enforcement of the award.
If the petition filed is sufficient in both form and substance, the court will issue notice to the other party directing them to file an opposition thereto within 15 days of receiving the petition.
The court will then determine whether the issue is one of law or if there are issues of fact.
If the court finds, on the basis of the pleadings and the affidavits, that there is a need to conduct oral hearings, the court will set the case for the hearing. At such hearing, the witnesses’ affidavits constitute their direct testimonies, and these witnesses will immediately undergo cross-examination. The court will have full control over the proceedings to ensure that the case is heard without delay.
Unless a ground to set aside has been fully established, the court will dismiss the petition to set aside. If, in the same proceedings, a petition to recognise and enforce the arbitral award was filed in opposition to the petition to set aside, the court will recognise and enforce the arbitral award.
The decision of the regional trial court in the petition to set aside can be reviewed by the Court of Appeals via a verified petition for review filed within 15 days from notice of the court’s decision or denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The decision of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court – not as a matter of right, but only of sound judicial discretion – if there are serious and compelling reasons resulting in grave prejudice to the aggrieved party, as per those grounds listed in Rule 19.36 of the Special ADR Rules or those closely analogous thereto. The appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court must be made within 15 days from notice of the court’s decision or denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. For compelling or justifiable reasons, the Supreme Court may grant an extension of 30 days within which to file the petition.
Philippine laws provide that recourse to the court against an international commercial award may only be made by an application to set aside in accordance with the provisions in the UNCITRAL Model Law, which also sets out the specific grounds on which the arbitral award may be set aside.
It is generally accepted that the grounds to set aside/vacate an arbitral award are exclusive. Rule 12.4, in relation to Rule 19.10, of the Special ADR Rules provides that any ground for setting aside an international arbitral award other than those expressly enumerated therein, which reflect the grounds under the UNCITRAL Model Law, will not be considered by the court unless the same amounts to a violation of public policy. Although there has been no Supreme Court decision on this point, it is reasonable to conclude that parties may not exclude or expand the grounds on which an arbitral award may be challenged through a contractual agreement.
In Fruehauf Electronic Philippines Corporation v Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific Corporation (GR No 204197, 23 November 2016), the Supreme Court ruled that courts cannot delve into the merits of an arbitral award and substitute their judgment with regard to the findings of fact and the interpretation and application of laws. The same principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v CJH Development Corporation (GR No 219421, 23 April 2024), where the court emphasised that a contrary rule would render an arbitral award the commencement, rather than the end, of litigation.
In GS Yuasa Corporation (GYC) and GS Yuasa International Ltd v Ramcar, Inc (GR No 252787, 7 May 2025), the Supreme Court held that judicial review of an arbitral award should be confined strictly to the limited exceptions under Rule 12.4 of the Special ADR Rules on Recognition and Enforcement or Setting Aside of an International Arbitration Award, which incorporates Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
As regards construction disputes resolved through CIAC arbitration, as held by the Supreme Court in Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc v Ross Systems International, Inc (GR No 230112, 11 May 2021), such awards rendered may be appealed to:
Courts can set aside or vacate an arbitral award only on the grounds provided under the Special ADR Rules and the ADR Act. Notably, these grounds do not concern the correctness of the arbitral award. Rather, they address the validity of the arbitration agreement and/or the regularity of the arbitration proceedings.
The Philippines signed and ratified the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) on 6 July 1967. The Philippines declared that, on the basis of reciprocity, it will apply the New York Convention only to:
International Commercial Arbitral Award
Rule 12 of the Special ADR Rules provides that a verified petition can be filed to recognise and enforce an arbitral award at any time after the award is received, unless a timely petition to set aside an arbitral award is filed, in which case the opposing party must file in the same proceedings, and in opposition thereto, the petition for recognition and enforcement of the same award within the period for filing an opposition.
The verified petition must be filed with the relevant regional trial court based on:
Alternatively, it can be filed in the National Capital Judicial Region.
The verified petition must state the following:
In addition, the following must be attached to the petition for enforcement and recognition:
Upon receiving notice that the petition has been filed, the respondent may file an opposition thereto within 15 days of receiving the petition. Alternatively, the respondent may instead seek to oppose by filing a petition to set aside the award within the same 15-day period. The petitioner may reply within 15 days of receiving the petition to set aside filed in opposition.
The court then has the discretion to either:
Based on the parties’ submissions and/or hearing, the court will thereafter decide.
Foreign Arbitral Award
Rule 13 of the Special ADR Rules sets out the procedure for recognising and enforcing foreign arbitral awards. The procedure outlined in the foregoing is essentially the same for foreign arbitral awards. The court will only recognise and enforce a foreign arbitral award made in a country that is not a signatory to the New York Convention if such country extends comity and reciprocity to awards made in the Philippines.
The contents of the verified petition, however, are not the same as those of a petition to recognise and enforce an international commercial arbitral award. In particular, the verified petition must contain:
The following should also be attached to the verified petition:
Petition to Set Aside in the Foreign Seat
If a foreign arbitral award has been set aside by the courts in the foreign seat of arbitration, Philippine courts may refuse recognition and enforcement of the same.
The recognition of a foreign arbitral award may be refused on exclusive grounds, including where an award has:
If there is an ongoing setting-aside proceedings at the seat, Rule 13.10 of the Special ADR Rules authorises the Philippine courts, before which a petition to recognise and enforce the foreign arbitral award has been filed, to adjourn or defer rendering a decision pending resolution of the proceedings at the seat.
State Immunity
State immunity is not among the grounds to set aside or resist the enforcement of an arbitral award under the Special ADR Rules. The Supreme Court ruled in China National Machinery & Equipment Corp v Santamaria (GR No 185572, 7 February 2012) that:
However, money claims against the government are within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA). The Supreme Court ruled in Department of Environment and Natural Resources v United Planners Consultants, Inc (GR No 212081, 23 February 2015) that the settlement of any money claim against the Philippine government is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA, despite the finality of the confirmed arbitral award by the regional trial court pursuant to the Special ADR Rules.
Thus, money claims must still be approved by the COA through a petition filed before them, unless an appropriation law has already been enacted to cover the prevailing party’s money claim against the government. Significantly, the Supreme Court ruled in a 2022 case that the COA cannot relitigate and re-examine the issues and evidence passed upon in a CIAC arbitral award, or reverse or modify such award. The COA’s jurisdiction is therefore limited only to determining the source of funds for settlement and validating the clerical or mathematical accuracy of the amounts in the award (Sunway Builders v Commission on Audit, GR 252986, 20 September 2022). The COA’s limited jurisdiction was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Bases Conversion and Development Authority v CJH Development Corporation (GR No 219421, 23 April 2024), where it was held that the COA’s dismissal of a money claim was proper in view of the pendency of a case seeking to determine the rights and obligations of the parties under the final arbitral award.
Rule 12.12 of the Special ADR Rules provides for a presumption that an arbitral award was made and released in due course and is subject to enforcement by the court, unless a ground for setting aside the arbitral award was established. Thus, the courts are mandated to apply the grounds for setting aside or refusal of recognition strictly.
Under the New York Convention, a court may refuse to recognise and enforce an international commercial arbitral award if enforcement would contravene the public policy of the state where recognition or enforcement is sought. Philippine Supreme Court jurisprudence provides guidance on the scope and application of this public policy exception.
In Mabuhay Holdings Corp v Sembcorp Logistics Limited, the Supreme Court adopted a narrow and restrictive approach in defining “public policy” pursuant to the pro-arbitration and pro-enforcement policy in Philippine law. The court ruled that that “[m]ere errors in the interpretation of the law or factual findings would not suffice to warrant refusal of enforcement under the public policy ground. The illegality or immorality of the award must reach a certain threshold such that, enforcement of the same would be against [the Philippines’] fundamental tenets of justice and morality, or would blatantly be injurious to the public, or the interests of society” (GR No 212734, 5 December 2018).
This approach was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v TIG Insurance Company (GR No 256177, 26 June 2022), where the court held that, to successfully invoke a violation of public policy as a ground to refuse enforcement of an arbitral award, the party asserting such ground must:
The ADR Act and the Special ADR Rules do not have provisions for class action or group arbitration. There were also no judicial precedents on this matter at the time of publication.
Various Philippine arbitration organisations and institutions have adopted ethical codes and professional standards for arbitrators and arbitration counsel. To the extent that they do not conflict with any provisions in Philippine law, the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in the PDRCI’s administrative guidelines expressly incorporates:
Similarly, the PICCR has expressly adopted the original IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1987) and the 2014 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration as a Code of Ethics in its guidelines for complaints against arbitrators.
On the other hand, the Philippine Institute of Arbitrators issued its own Code of Professional Responsibility for Members, which provides a uniform benchmark for the application of professional and ethical standards that should govern its members’ conduct at all times.
Further, if the counsel or arbitrator is a Philippine lawyer, they are also bound to observe and comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability promulgated by the Supreme Court in April 2023. Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate these rules, with the most severe penalty being disbarment.
Lastly, the ADR Act expressly provides that ADR providers (which include arbitrators) and practitioners (which include arbitration counsels) are deemed public officers. Thus, they can also be held civilly liable for acts performed during their official duties that clearly show bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
There are no Philippine laws expressly providing for rules or restrictions on third-party funders. However, the use of third-party funders may arguably be objectionable in that contracts with third-party funders which are grossly disadvantageous to the litigant-fundee may be deemed champertous, which is a kind of contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit in which the stranger pursues the party’s claim with the aim of receiving part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment. The Supreme Court ruled in RODCO Consultancy and Maritime Services Corp v Ross (GR No 259832, 6 November 2023) that champertous contracts are void for being against public policy – because they are grossly disadvantageous to the party involved, and there is financial overreach by a third party with a superior bargaining position vis-a-vis a financially pressed litigant. In the same case, the Supreme Court also stated that prohibited champertous contracts do not only contemplate lawyers, but also third persons who fund the commencement of a suit or a dispute in exchange for a portion of the award that may later on be granted to the party. The Supreme Court emphasised that third-party funders have no legitimate interest in the monetary claims of claimants, and that such arrangements are primarily motivated by profit from the litigation outcome, thereby making these champertous arrangements that are contrary to public policy.
Article 4.45 of the ADR Act’s IRR expressly provides that there can be consolidation of arbitration proceedings only if the parties agree to the consolidation. The parties’ agreement is the operative fact that forms the basis for consolidation.
Philippine arbitration institutions provide the procedures for consolidation. For instance, at the request of a party, and after consulting with the parties and any confirmed arbitrators, the PDRCI has the power to consolidate two or more arbitration proceedings provided that:
An arbitration agreement generally can only bind and be invoked by those who are parties to the agreement. However, there are certain circumstances in which third parties, who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, may be bound by it. Similarly, only parties are generally bound by an arbitral award, yet there are certain exceptional instances where the arbitral award may be enforced against third parties.
In this regard, Rule A.6 of the Special ADR Rules provides that third-party security providers will be bound by the arbitration agreement only if the third party that secures the loan has agreed in the accessory contract (either directly or by reference) to be bound by such arbitration agreement.
Furthermore, heirs and assigns are generally bound by contracts (including arbitration agreements) entered into by their predecessors-in-interest, except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by their nature, the parties’ stipulation or the provision of law.
Another possible exception occurs if a representative of a corporation that is party to an arbitration agreement, and who signs the arbitration agreement or a contract in which an arbitration clause is contained, is then deemed to have agreed to such arbitration agreement or clause (see 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties).
On the other hand, an arbitral award may possibly be enforced on such third parties when the separate juridical personality of the corporation that is a party to the arbitration is disregarded – and the corporate veil pierced – on grounds recognised by Philippine law and jurisprudence.
In Playinn, Inc v Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc (GR No 254764, 29 November 2023), the Supreme Court held that a third-party beneficiary of a contract may invoke the arbitration clause contained therein (citing Coquia v Fieldmen’s Insurance Company, Inc, GR No L-23276, 29 November 1968, and Bases Conversion Development Authority v DMCI Project Developers, Inc, GR No 173137, 11 January 2016).
In The Consortium of Hyundai Engineering Co, Ltd v National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (GR 214743 and 248753, 4 December 2023), the Supreme Court ruled that a non-party to a construction contract containing an arbitration clause can be bound by such clause, depending on the non-party’s ties to the subject contract. Thus, where there is a “substantial and significant connection” between the third-party sought to be impleaded and the construction contract subject of the arbitration, the third-party may be bound by the arbitration agreement contained therein.
Jurisdiction of Philippine Courts Over Foreign Third Parties
Philippine courts may bind foreign third parties only if they acquire jurisdiction over such third parties. In ordinary court actions, if the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity doing business in the Philippines, summons may be served on its resident agent. If the defendant has no such resident agent, summons may be served on any of its officers, directors or trustees within the Philippines, or a government official designated by law.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines and does not have a resident agent, but has transacted or is doing business in the Philippines, the Philippine courts may authorise the service of summons outside the Philippines in the following ways:
Significantly, Rule 22.1 of the Special ADR Rules expressly provides that the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court that apply to petitions under the Special ADR Rules have either been included and incorporated in the Special ADR Rules or specifically referred to therein. The above-mentioned rules on methods for the acquisition of jurisdiction by Philippine courts have not been included and incorporated in the Special ADR Rules, nor specifically referred to therein. Indeed, Rule 1.9 even provides that “in cases covered by the Special ADR Rules, a court acquires authority to act on the petition or motion upon proof of jurisdictional facts, ie, that the respondent was furnished a copy of the petition and the notice of hearing”. Consequently, since the technical rules on services of summons do not apply to these proceedings, “the method of service resorted to must be such as to reasonably ensure receipt thereof by the respondent to satisfy the requirement of due process”.
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Judicial Deference to Arbitral Tribunals
Introduction
Philippine jurisprudence on arbitration continues to trend in favour of arbitration, reflecting a judicial policy of deference to arbitration proceedings and their outcomes. This policy is grounded in the Philippine Supreme Court’s recognition of several fundamental principles: first, that arbitration is based on party autonomy; second, that the principal purpose of arbitration is to resolve, rather than to prolong, disputes; and third, that arbitral tribunals – particularly specialised ones – are uniquely equipped to resolve technical and complex issues. At the same time, Philippine jurisprudence has been firm that such deference is not absolute, and that the courts retain the power of judicial review in limited circumstances.
The trajectory of arbitration jurisprudence mirrors the policy embodied in Philippine arbitration laws and regulations to treat arbitral awards as final, unappealable, and binding upon the parties, subject to exceptional circumstances where judicial review is warranted.
Under Rule 19.7 of the Philippine Supreme Court’s Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (the “Special ADR Rules”), an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration binds the parties to the arbitral award and precludes either party from filing an appeal or certiorari petition questioning its merits. However, Rule 19.10 of the Special ADR Rules grants courts the authority to vacate a domestic arbitral award upon a clear showing that:
Further, the Special ADR Rules empower courts, upon proper application of a party, to set aside an international commercial arbitral award for any of the grounds to vacate an award under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Model Law”). The same grounds can be found in Rule 12.4 of the Special ADR Rules, namely that:
The first four require proof by the party making the application, while the last two may be determined by the court on its own, without need of such proof.
Similarly, the Construction Industry Arbitration Law (Executive Order No 1008, 4 February 1985) expressly states that an award by a tribunal of the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) will be binding upon the parties and will be final and unappealable, except on questions of law, which must be brought before the Supreme Court. However, the CIAC Rules of Procedure, up until their recent amendment was clarified in 2023, had provided that CIAC arbitral awards could be appealed to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, and to the Supreme Court on questions of law. The amendment was prompted by the Philippine Supreme Court’s decision in Global Medical Center of Laguna, Inc v Ross Systems International, Inc (GR No 230112, 11 May 2021)(“Global Medical Center”), which clarified that the Philippine Court of Appeals may only conduct a factual review of the arbitral award upon sufficient proof that the tribunal’s integrity had been compromised, or that the tribunal committed unconstitutional or illegal acts in the arbitration process.
The Philippine Supreme Court’s recent decisions collectively demonstrate the judiciary’s continuing policy to accord substantial deference to arbitral awards by refraining from reviewing factual findings or the merits of the dispute, and limiting judicial intervention to narrowly tailored exceptions provided under the relevant laws. In GS Yuasa Corporation and GS Yuasa International Ltd v Ramcar, Inc (GR No 252787, 7 May 2025)(“GS Yuasa”), the Philippine Supreme Court explained that an international arbitral award may not be appealed and subsequently vacated because the tribunal supposedly committed errors of fact, law, or of fact and law, and that a party’s exclusive recourse is an application to set aside the award based on the grounds under the Model Law. In Roxaco-Asia Hospitality Corp v Gulf Canary Construction and Development, Inc (GR Nos 246250–51, 29 September 2025), the Philippine Supreme Court confined its review of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s final award to the lone legal question raised, and refused to rule on the factual matters, because the arbitral tribunal’s partiality was not sufficiently proved. Similarly, in Grand Exploit Builder Development, Inc v Hoegaarden Realty Corporation (GR No 267541, 2 April 2025), the Philippine Supreme Court applied Global Medical Center and found that the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it conducted a factual review of the final award of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal because of its purported evident partiality, which the Supreme Court found to be nonexistent.
Review of international arbitral awards
GS Yuasa, Ramcar, Inc (“Ramcar”) and Yuasa Battery Co, Ltd (“YBC”) entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) to form Oriental Yuasa Battery Corporation (OYBC), 70% of which will be owned by Ramcar, while the remaining 30% will be owned by YBC. The JVA contained a non-compete clause, which bound the parties’ successors and assigns. YBC thereafter changed its corporate name to Yuasa Corporation (YC) and, along with Ramcar and OYBC, entered into Technical Assistance Agreements (TAAs) whereby Ramcar was granted exclusive rights to manufacture and sell batteries with the trademark “Yuasa” in the Philippines. The controversy arose with the establishment of GS Yuasa Corporation (GYC), a holding company wherein YC held shares of stock. YC spun off the assets, rights, liabilities, and obligations of its international operations, including its 30% share in OYBC to GS Yuasa International Ltd (GYIL), a wholly owned subsidiary of GYC. Accordingly, Ramcar served a demand for arbitration upon GYC and its successors, agents and assigns on the ground that they breached the non-compete clause of the JVA.
The arbitral tribunal ruled that Ramcar was not the real party-in-interest to question the alleged violation of the non-complete clause, as such clause was only for the benefit of OYBC. Moreover, the arbitral tribunal held that GYC and GYIL did not violate the provisions of the JVA and the TAAs because they were able to prove that OYBC had already ceased manufacturing and assembling batteries when they engaged in the same business.
Ramcar thereafter sought to vacate and/or correct the arbitral award by filing an action before the regional trial court (RTC), a first-level court in the Philippines. The RTC vacated the award, finding that Ramcar was a real party-in-interest and that the determination of whether OYBC had ceased its battery manufacturing business was not included in the Amended Terms of Reference (ATOR) that governed the arbitration. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC ruling, prompting GYC and GYIL to elevate the case to the Philippine Supreme Court.
Given the distinct applicable rules governing the review of domestic arbitral awards and international commercial arbitral awards, the Philippine Supreme Court first determined that the case involved an international commercial arbitration because the places of business of the parties were located in different states – the Philippines and Japan. The Supreme Court then explained that the Special ADR Rules explicitly state that an arbitral award shall be final and binding, but also authorise courts to vacate or set aside an arbitral award on limited grounds, which, in the case of international commercial arbitration, are enumerated in Article 34 of the Model Law and reproduced in Rule 12.4 of the Special ADR Rules.
The Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the RTC and the CA correctly set aside the arbitral tribunal’s finding on the alleged cessation of OYBC’s battery manufacturing business, as such matter was not included in the ATOR. The Supreme Court explained that this is a recognised ground for setting aside an international arbitral award under Rule 12.4(a)(iii) of the Special ADR Rules. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC and the CA should not have vacated the arbitral tribunal’s finding on Ramcar’s standing as a real party-in-interest. The Special ADR Rules prohibit a review of an arbitral award merely on the ground that it contains errors of fact, of law, or of fact and law. Ramcar’s standing, being a question of fact, is outside the scope of the court’s power to review an arbitral award.
The Philippine Supreme Court emphasised that courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal, as doing so would weaken alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and allow losing parties to forum-shop for a more favourable ruling from the court, thereby eroding the obligatory force of arbitration agreements (Fruehauf Electronics Philippines Corp v Technology Electronics Assembly and Management Pacific Corp, GR No 204197, 23 November 2016).
Global medical center in practice
Roxaco-Asia
Roxaco-Asia involved construction agreements between Roxaco-Asia Hospitality Corporation (“Roxaco”) and Gulf Canary Construction and Development, Inc (“Gulf Canary”) for the construction of a 12-storey hotel. The agreements required Gulf Canary to complete construction by 31 March 2015, unless an extension was authorised and approved in writing by Roxaco. When the construction was not completed on 31 March 2015, Roxaco and Gulf Canary agreed to engage a subcontractor to share in the works being performed by Gulf Canary in order to expedite the construction. Still, Gulf Canary was not able to complete the construction. As such, Roxaco called on Gulf Canary’s performance bond, terminated the construction agreements, and filed a complaint against Gulf Canary before the CIAC.
The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favour of Roxaco, finding that (i) there was no valid extension of the completion date; (ii) Gulf Canary was liable for liquidated damages for its delay; and (iii) Roxaco validly terminated the construction contracts. Gulf Canary challenged the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling on these three points before the CA.
In its ruling, the CA held that it could review the arbitral award because the issues raised by Gulf Canary involved questions of law. It further reasoned that, even assuming the issues were factual, judicial review was warranted because the arbitral tribunal had exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made. The CA then found that the parties agreed to an extended completion date, citing several documents, including meeting minutes and letters between the parties. Roxaco appealed the CA’s decision before the Philippine Supreme Court.
The Philippine Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and substantially reinstated the CIAC arbitral award. Notably, the Supreme Court limited its ruling to the question of the existence of a valid extension of the completion date and declined to rule on the two other issues previously decided by the CA and the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal. The Supreme Court explained that the existence of a valid extension of the completion date is a question of law, in as much as it necessitates the determination of the legal significance of the evidence presented by the parties, in particular, whether such pieces of evidence indicate that Roxaco waived the requirements for a valid extension in the construction contracts. The Supreme Court held that there was no waiver of such requirements and, consequently, no valid extension of the completion date.
Further, the Supreme Court ruled that Gulf Canary’s liability for delay and the validity of Roxaco’s termination of the construction contracts are questions of fact which are beyond the scope of the court’s power of review. It further clarified that the CA’s justification for conducting a factual review of the arbitral award – that the arbitral tribunal “had exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made” – goes into the arbitral tribunal’s integrity, fairness, and impartiality, and does not merely pertain to the correctness of its ruling. In this case, however, Gulf Canary merely disagreed with the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence and legal conclusions. The Supreme Court emphasised that such disagreement, by itself, does not constitute sufficient proof of partiality.
Grand Exploit
Grand Exploit involved three construction contracts between Grand Exploit Builder Development, Inc (GEBDI) and Hoegaarden Realty Corporation (“Hoegaarden”) for the construction of three warehouse buildings. The dispute arose when GEBDI halted construction, alleging underpayment by Hoegaarden. In response, Hoegaarden filed a complaint before the CIAC, asserting, among other things, that GEBDI had incurred delays and was liable for damages.
The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal ruled in favour of GEBDI. Hoegaarden then filed an action before the CA to vacate the Final Award on the ground that the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal acted with evident partiality. The CA vacated the Final Award, finding, among other things, that the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal prevented Hoegaarden from presenting evidence, showed leniency to GEBDI, and unduly awarded GEBDI for the appropriated tools, machinery, and equipment. GEBDI appealed the CA’s decision to the Philippine Supreme Court.
The Philippine Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and reinstated the CIAC’s Final Award. Applying Global Medical Center, the Supreme Court ruled that the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s integrity was not compromised, contrary to Hoegaarden’s allegations and the CA’s findings. According to the Supreme Court, the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal simply enforced its rules of procedure, and its refusal of Hoegaarden’s additional evidence was justified because the proceedings were past evidence presentation and were already at the formal offer stage. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal was also not unduly lenient towards GEBDI, having similarly stricken GEBDI’s Amended Answer for being filed out of time. Finally, the monetary award in favour of GEBDI was supported by Hoegaarden’s own admission that it had taken GEBDI’s tools, machinery and equipment.
Broader implications
GS Yuasa, Roxaco-Asia, and Grand Exploit not only affirm the legislative and judicial policies favouring limited court intervention and the finality of arbitral awards, but also clarify the parameters of such approach. In particular, GS Yuasa and Roxaco-Asia demonstrate how these standards are applied in practice – in both cases, the Supreme Court identified which among the issues brought before it fell within the permissible scope of judicial review and which lay beyond the courts’ authority, thereby concretely delineating the boundaries of judicial intervention in arbitral awards.
Further, Roxaco-Asia and Grand Exploit exemplify the exacting standard established under the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, and reaffirm the merit of a factual review of arbitral awards as highlighted in Global Medical Center. These cases underscore that judicial review of CIAC arbitral awards on factual matters is permissible only in the most exceptional circumstances, namely, where there is a violation of the Philippine Constitution, denial of due process, or serious questions about the arbitral tribunal’s integrity. These cases also illustrate that a claim of “evident partiality” is a serious allegation, which must be sufficiently and demonstrably shown, and that loosely invoking it will not merit a factual review of arbitral awards.
Overall, these rulings strengthen arbitration in the Philippines. They affirm the authority of arbitral tribunals and uphold the finality of their awards, reinforcing the value of party autonomy, the special character of arbitration, and its purpose to resolve, rather than prolong, disputes.
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