Arbitration is becoming increasingly popular in both cross-border disputes and among domestic parties in high-value, complex commercial disputes.
Several factors are involved in this trend. The significant caseload of the Turkish courts affects both the duration of proceedings and the level of attention that can be devoted to technically complex disputes. In addition, parties to commercial contracts are increasingly choosing foreign substantive laws to govern their contractual relationships. In such cases, arbitration is often preferred over litigation before the national courts, as it enables the parties to appoint arbitrators with expertise in the applicable law and the relevant sector.
The increase in the selection of the Istanbul Arbitration Centre (ISTAC) as the arbitration centre has also contributed to the selection of Türkiye as the seat of arbitration. With the steady increase in ISTAC’s caseload in recent years, an increasing number of international arbitrations are being conducted with their seat in Türkiye.
In addition, international arbitration is prevalent in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Turkish parties frequently engage in cross-border commercial transactions and often agree on a neutral seat of arbitration, such as Switzerland, England or other established arbitration jurisdictions. As a result, Turkish courts regularly hear applications for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
While the major international arbitral institutions do not publish sector-specific statistics limited to arbitrations seated in Türkiye or including Turkish parties, our experience suggests that construction, energy and manufacturing are among the sectors most frequently referred to international arbitration. These industries are characterised by high-value, technically complex and cross-border projects, making arbitration a preferred dispute resolution mechanism. In particular, Turkish contractors have a significant international presence and consistently rank among the world’s leading international contractors. As a result, they are highly familiar with international arbitration and routinely include arbitration clauses in their cross-border contracts. Parties in these sectors commonly opt for established international arbitral institutions for the resolution of disputes.
On the other hand, according to ISTAC’s 2025 statistics, domain name disputes account for the largest share of cases (17%), followed by vehicle leasing disputes (14%), manufacturing and services disputes (12%), and construction disputes (9%). The relatively high proportion of domain name disputes in ISTAC’s caseload is presumably attributable to ISTAC’s role as an authorised dispute resolution service provider for “.tr” domain name disputes.
Based on 2025 statistics, and in light of our experience in the field, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the ISTAC are the most frequently chosen arbitral institutions for international arbitration in Türkiye, followed by certain other international institutions such as the London Court of International Arbitration, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Institute and Singapore International Arbitration Centre.
The popularity of the ICC as a foreign arbitration institution among Turkish parties may be explained by the extensive use of FIDIC standard forms in international construction projects. Given the prominent role of Turkish contractors in cross-border construction and infrastructure projects, many disputes are referred to ICC arbitration pursuant to the dispute resolution clauses contained in the FIDIC standard forms.
There are no specialised arbitration courts in Türkiye. Arbitration-related matters are dealt with by the competent ordinary courts designated under the applicable legislation.
Court Assistance
For court assistance (such as applying for interim measures before courts, or appointment of an arbitrator where provided by law), for both international and domestic arbitrations, the competent court is either the civil court of first instance or the commercial court of first instance based on the subject matter of the dispute pursuant to Article 3 and Additional Article 1 of the International Arbitration Law No. 4686 (IAL) and Article 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure No. 1600 (CCP) (see 2.1 Governing Law for the scope of the IAL and CCP).
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards are heard by either the civil or commercial court of first instance pursuant to Article 60(2) of the International Private and Procedural Law No. 5718 (IPPL).
Setting-Aside Proceedings
Actions for the setting aside of arbitral awards fall directly within the jurisdiction of the regional court of appeal in both domestic and international arbitrations, as per Article 439 of the CCP and Article 15 of the IAL.
International arbitration in Türkiye is governed by the IAL, which applies to arbitrations:
Domestic arbitration is governed by the arbitration provisions of the CCP (Articles 407 to 444), which apply where the seat of arbitration is in Türkiye and the dispute does not involve a foreign element within the meaning of the IAL.
Under Article 2 of the IAL, a dispute may qualify to have a foreign element:
The IAL is based on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and adopts its fundamental principles and structure.
There is no significant difference between the IAL and the UNCITRAL Model Law. The IAL contains certain minor differences, which mostly stem from adapting the Model Law to the Turkish legal system, rather than introducing substantive departures.
The IAL has remained largely unchanged since its enactment on 21 June 2001. The only significant amendment was introduced by Law No. 7101, dated 28 February 2018, which added Additional Article 2. Prior to this amendment, there was uncertainty in both the case law and legal doctrine as to whether references in the IAL to the “civil court of first instance” should be interpreted literally or instead should be interpreted as also referring to the commercial court of first instance, where appropriate.
Additional Article 2 resolved this issue by providing that the powers and duties conferred on the civil court of first instance under the IAL shall be exercised by either the civil court of first instance or the commercial court of first instance, depending on the subject matter of the dispute.
Since then, no further amendments have been made to the IAL.
Pursuant to Article 4 of the IAL, an arbitration agreement must be in writing to be valid. However, as per the same article, this requirement is deemed to be satisfied if the agreement is:
An arbitration agreement may also be incorporated by reference, provided that the reference clearly makes the arbitration clause part of the contract.
Furthermore, the written form requirement is deemed to be satisfied where the existence of the arbitration agreement is alleged by one party in its statement of claim and not denied by the other party in its statement of defence.
Another consideration is Law No. 805 on the Mandatory Use of the Turkish Language in Commercial Enterprises, which requires Turkish companies to execute contracts relating to transactions within Türkiye, in Turkish. Albeit not entirely settled, the current position is that Law No. 805 does not invalidate a foreign-language arbitration agreement where it involves a foreign party or otherwise contains a foreign element. In addition, some courts have relied on the principle of good faith to prevent a party that has signed and performed a foreign-language arbitration agreement from invoking Law No. 805 to subsequently challenge the validity of that arbitration agreement.
Under Article 1(4) of the IAL, disputes concerning rights in rem over immovable property located in Türkiye and disputes that are not subject to the parties’ disposition are not arbitrable. Accordingly, the general test for arbitrability under Turkish law is whether the subject matter is freely disposable by the parties.
Apart from disputes concerning rights in rem over immovable property, Turkish law also treats certain other categories of disputes as non-arbitrable, on the basis that their subject matter is not freely disposable by the parties. For example:
Turkish law contains an express conflict-of-laws rule for determining the law applicable to the arbitration agreement in international arbitration:
If a party commences court proceedings in breach of an arbitration agreement, pursuant to Article 116 of the CCP, Turkish courts must and do take into account arbitration agreements and dismiss cases on procedural grounds where:
One notable aspect of the enforceability of arbitration agreements concerns the validity threshold applied by the Court of Cassation. The Court has consistently held that the parties’ intention to submit their disputes to arbitration must be clear, definite and unequivocal. Accordingly, arbitration clauses that cast doubt on the parties’ commitment to arbitration may be found invalid. For example, clauses that simultaneously provide for arbitration and confer jurisdiction on state courts have repeatedly been held invalid on the ground that no definite intention to arbitrate can be established, as well as clauses containing contradictory arbitration clauses.
Turkish law expressly recognises the rule of separability. Pursuant to Article 7(H) of the IAL, an arbitral tribunal’s decision that the underlying contract is invalid does not, by itself, render the arbitration agreement invalid. Therefore, the validity of the arbitration agreement must be assessed independently from the validity of the main contract, and accordingly, an arbitration agreement may remain valid and enforceable even if the contract in which it is contained is found to be invalid.
Subject to bases on which the arbitrators may be challenged (see 4.4 Challenge and Removal of Arbitrators), the parties are free to determine who to appoint as arbitrators, the number of arbitrators, and the procedure for their appointment. The principal mandatory limitation under the IAL is that the arbitral tribunal must consist of an odd number of arbitrators. Subject to this requirement, the parties enjoy broad autonomy in designing the appointment procedure.
For domestic arbitrations, Article 416(1)(p) of the CCP provides that, where the arbitral tribunal consists of more than one arbitrator, at least one arbitrator must be a lawyer with no less than five years of professional experience. No equivalent qualification or experience requirement exists under the IAL for international arbitrations.
The IAL provides a default appointment mechanism where the agreed procedure fails. Pursuant to Article 7(A) of the IAL, the default mechanism applies:
In such cases, each party may request the court of first instance to appoint the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal.
The IAL does not contain any specific provisions establishing a separate default appointment procedure for multiparty arbitrations.
Court intervention in the appointment of arbitrators is limited to the circumstances prescribed by the IAL, that is, where the agreed procedure fails (see 4.2 Default Procedures). In that case, the court of first instance may appoint the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal, only upon the request of a party.
Pursuant to Article 7(B) of the IAL, when making the appointment, the court must take into account parties’ agreement and the independence and impartiality of the arbitrators. Also, where the parties are of different nationalities, a sole arbitrator must not be of the same nationality of either party and, in a three-member tribunal, two of the arbitrators must not share the nationality of either party.
Beyond these circumstances, Turkish courts do not have authority to intervene in the selection of arbitrators. Issues concerning the independence and impartiality of arbitrators may subsequently arise in setting-aside proceedings (see 11.1 Grounds for Appeal).
As per Article 7(C) and (D) of the IAL, an arbitrator may be challenged where they do not possess the qualifications agreed by the parties, where a ground for challenge exists under the arbitral procedure agreed by the parties, or where circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.
The parties are free to agree on the procedure for challenging an arbitrator. In the absence of such an agreement, the procedure set out in Article 7(D) of the IAL applies:
If a sole arbitrator has been appointed, or if the challenge concerns the entire arbitral tribunal or a sufficient number of arbitrators to prevent the tribunal from reaching a quorum, the challenge must be brought directly before the court of first instance. The court’s decision on the challenge is final. Unless the arbitration agreement designates the arbitrator(s) by name, the arbitration may continue through the appointment of replacement arbitrator(s).
Turkish law does not prescribe a comprehensive set of professional standards for arbitrators. Its principal requirements concern the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and the disclosure of potential conflicts of interest.
Article 7(C) of the IAL mandates an appointed arbitrator to, before accepting the appointment, disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. This duty is ongoing in nature; if such circumstances arise or become known after the appointment, and have not previously been disclosed to the parties, the arbitrator must disclose them to the parties without delay.
The ISTAC Arbitration Rules adopt a similar, but a little more detailed, approach. Under Article 12, an arbitrator must, within seven days of accepting the appointment, sign and submit a declaration of independence and impartiality.
Article 7(H) of the IAL empowers the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. In other words, the IAL expressly recognises the principle of competence-competence.
Parties cannot apply to Turkish courts to determine the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. The tribunal itself is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction in accordance with the principle of competence-competence.
Judicial review of jurisdictional issues arises primarily in setting-aside proceedings, whereby the courts can set aside an arbitral award if “the arbitral tribunal unlawfully ruled that it had, or did not have, jurisdiction” as per Article 15 of the IAL. Accordingly:
Pursuant to Article 7(H) of the IAL, an objection that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction must be raised no later than the submission of the statement of defence.
An objection that the tribunal has exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction must be raised without delay after the relevant issue arises during the proceedings.
In both cases, the tribunal may admit a late objection if it considers that the delay was justified.
The IAL lays down other specific rules governing jurisdictional objections:
Consistent with the principle that Turkish courts may not review the substance of an arbitral award (révision au fond), the courts’ judicial review for questions of admissibility and jurisdiction is limited to the jurisdictional grounds recognised under the IAL.
That said, in order to determine whether the arbitral tribunal correctly accepted or declined jurisdiction, the reviewing court may examine the factual and legal circumstances relevant to the jurisdictional objection to the extent necessary for resolving the jurisdictional issue, including the existence, validity and scope of the arbitration agreement and whether the factual and legal basis of the claims falls within the arbitration agreement. The courts do not, however, review the merits of the underlying dispute beyond what is required for that purpose.
As per Article 116 of the CCP, Turkish courts must and do take into account arbitration agreements and dismiss cases on procedural grounds where there is a valid and binding arbitration agreement governing the same dispute, and a party invokes the arbitration agreement as a preliminary objection in its statement of defence (see 3.3 National Courts’ Approach).
In general, Turkish law adopts a restrictive approach to the extension of arbitration agreements to non-signatories. The principle of privity applies, meaning that an arbitration agreement binds only its parties. In addition, the statutory requirement that an arbitration agreement be concluded in writing as a condition of validity makes the extension of arbitration agreements to third parties more difficult.
Nevertheless, Turkish courts have recognised the extension of arbitration agreements in a limited number of exceptional circumstances. The case law of the Court of Cassation indicates that non-signatories may, in certain situations, be bound by an arbitration agreement, including:
Article 6 of the IAL empowers arbitral tribunals to order binding interim measures, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.
Upon the request of a party, the tribunal may order interim measures or interim attachments and may make such relief conditional upon the provision of appropriate security.
The tribunal’s powers are, however, subject to certain limitations:
For example, the tribunal may preclude a party from presenting a letter of guarantee for encashment. It may not, however, direct the issuing bank (a third party) to withhold payment. Similarly, the tribunal may not direct the Land Registry Office (a public authority) to enter restrictions on powers of disposal in the land register.
Courts’ Role in Interim Measure Decisions
Pursuant to Article 6 of the IAL, a party may apply to the state courts for interim relief both before and during the arbitral proceedings where the statutory conditions are satisfied. Such an application is not regarded as incompatible with, or as a waiver of, the arbitration agreement.
Courts’ Role in Enforcement of Interim Measures
The courts also play a supporting role in the enforcement of interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal. Where a party fails to comply with an interim measure ordered by the arbitral tribunal, the other party may request the assistance of the court of first instance for its implementation.
Status of Emergency Arbitrator
The status of emergency arbitrator decisions and other tribunal-ordered interim measures remains unsettled under Turkish law. The IAL does not provide a clear mechanism for their direct enforcement. Moreover, as explained above, interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunals are not directly enforceable through the execution authorities (see 6.1 Types of Relief) and cannot produce effects vis-à-vis third parties. Consequently, where coercive enforcement is required, the assistance of the competent state court must generally be sought.
The IAL does not expressly regulate security for costs in arbitration, nor does it prohibit arbitral tribunals from ordering such relief. Accordingly, where the parties have agreed to confer such authority on the tribunal, including through the incorporation of institutional arbitration rules providing for security for costs, there is no impediment under Turkish law to the arbitral tribunal ordering such a measure.
This should be distinguished from security required in connection with interim measures. Pursuant to Article 6, an arbitral tribunal may make the grant of an interim measure conditional upon the requesting party providing appropriate security. Where interim relief is sought from the courts (see 6.2 Role of Courts), Article 392 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the applicant to provide security to cover any potential damage that the opposing party or third parties may suffer if the interim measure is subsequently found to have been unjustified. The court may dispense with this requirement where the application is supported by an official document or other conclusive evidence, or where the circumstances otherwise justify such an exception.
The IAL recognises the parties’ procedural autonomy. Pursuant to Article 8, the parties are free, subject to the mandatory provisions of the IAL, to determine the procedural rules applicable to the arbitration or to do so by reference to a national law or to international or institutional arbitration rules. In the absence of such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal conducts the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the IAL.
The principal procedural framework is set out in Articles 8 to 14 of the IAL, which govern matters including the commencement of arbitral proceedings, the time limit for rendering the award, the language of the arbitration, the submission of statements of claim and defence, the evidence collection, the tribunal’s decision-making process, the termination of the proceedings, and the correction, interpretation and completion of awards.
The procedural provisions of the IAL are largely based on the principle of party autonomy. Accordingly, most of the procedural rules set out in Articles 8 to 14 apply only in the absence of a contrary agreement between the parties. Certain provisions, however, regulate fundamental principles of due process and are mandatory. These include the following:
The IAL grants arbitral tribunals broad powers to conduct the arbitration while imposing certain duties to ensure the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.
Subject to the parties’ agreement and the mandatory provisions of the IAL, the tribunal has the authority to determine the procedure applicable to the arbitration, rule on its own jurisdiction, decide on the admissibility and relevance of evidence, appoint experts where appropriate, and order interim measures.
At the same time, arbitrators are under certain statutory duties. They must remain independent and impartial throughout the proceedings. They are also required to treat the parties equally, ensure that each party has a full opportunity to present its case, conduct the proceedings in accordance with the parties’ agreement or, failing such agreement, the IAL, and render the award within the applicable time limit.
The IAL expressly provides that parties may be represented in arbitral proceedings by foreign natural or legal persons. Accordingly, legal representatives appearing in an international arbitration seated in Türkiye are not required to be admitted to the practice of law in Türkiye, and foreign lawyers (or other foreign representatives) may act on behalf of the parties during the arbitral proceedings.
That said, familiarity with Turkish arbitration law and practice is often important. In addition, certain matters connected with the arbitration, such as applications for the appointment or challenge of arbitrators, interim relief or the enforcement of awards, as well as setting-aside procedures, may require recourse to the Turkish courts. Representation before the Turkish courts is subject to Turkish law and requires representation by a lawyer qualified and registered to practise law in Türkiye.
No equivalent provision exists under the CCP. Consequently, domestic arbitrations remain subject to the general rules on legal representation under the Attorneyship Law No. 1136, under which only lawyers admitted and registered to practise law in Türkiye may act as legal representatives.
Under Turkish law, the general approach to the collection and submission of evidence is flexible. The rigid rules of evidence and strict weighing mechanisms applicable in Turkish domestic court litigation do not apply in arbitration.
Pursuant to Article 10(D) of the IAL, parties submit their evidence along with their pleadings. According to Article 12, the arbitral tribunal is authorised to fix time limits for the submission of such evidence.
There is no restrictive statutory framework dictating the types of evidence allowed. Typical forms include documentary evidence, written witness statements, expert reports, and site inspections if necessary.
Broad discovery, as perceived under common-law jurisdictions, is generally not available under Turkish law. In practice, parties usually opt to include a document production phase to receive evidence from the opposing party. In practice, parties frequently agree to adopt the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, or tribunals will proactively use them as guiding principles to manage the evidentiary process.
The arbitral tribunal enjoys full discretion to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of all evidence presented. The tribunal may decide to hold hearings, for example to examine witnesses and experts.
The tribunal has the statutory authority to appoint its own experts and order the preservation of evidence. Furthermore, the IAL allows the tribunal, or the parties with the tribunal’s explicit approval, to seek the assistance of courts for the collection of evidence.
As explained in 8.1 Collection and Submission of Evidence, there are no strict rules regarding the types, admissibility or weighing of evidence submitted during arbitral proceedings. Both the parties and the tribunal enjoy a wide range of flexibility compared to the rigid domestic civil procedure rules provided under the CCP.
However, respecting the principle of party autonomy, parties may still agree to apply the strict Turkish civil procedure evidentiary rules by concluding an evidentiary agreement. Through such an agreement, they can specifically determine what types of evidence will be acceptable or required for their particular dispute.
Under Turkish law, court intervention is in general only possible under limited circumstances as underlined in Article 3 of the IAL. While the tribunal may seek court assistance for evidence collection, applications for other matters, such as interim measures or arbitrator challenges, are exclusively available to the parties.
There are no provisions under the applicable law that grant arbitral tribunals any direct coercive powers to compel the production of documents or force the attendance of witnesses. For production of documents, where a party fails to comply voluntarily with an evidentiary order, the tribunal may draw appropriate adverse inferences, where justified, but it cannot enforce its orders through compulsory measures or seek court assistance. The position is less clear with respect to witness attendance. Neither the IAL nor the CCP expressly regulates whether an arbitral tribunal may seek the assistance of the state courts to compel a witness to appear. There is no publicly available Court of Cassation decision on the issue, and the matter remains debated in Turkish legal doctrine.
Neither the IAL nor the CCP expressly regulates the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. Instead, confidentiality derives primarily from the parties’ agreement and the applicable institutional arbitration rules. Accordingly, arbitral proceedings, including the parties’ submissions, evidence and the award, are generally treated as confidential by the parties and the tribunal.
Disclosure may be made where it is necessary in connection with court proceedings, or recognition or enforcement of the award, or to satisfy mandatory legal or regulatory obligations. For example, Article 61 of the IPPL requires the applicant in exequatur (tenfiz) proceedings to submit the original (or a duly certified copy) of both the arbitration agreement and the arbitral award. Accordingly, disclosure of the award to the competent court is necessary for the purposes of recognition and enforcement. Similarly, although the IAL or the CCP do not expressly regulate the issue, the arbitral award must likewise be submitted to the competent court in setting-aside proceedings, making disclosure necessary for the exercise of judicial review.
The formal requirements of an arbitral award are set out in Article 14(A) of the IAL. An award must state:
As regards the time for rendering the award, Article 10(B) of the IAL provides that the final award must be rendered within one year, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Where the tribunal consists of a sole arbitrator, the period runs from the date of the arbitrator’s appointment; where the tribunal consists of three or more arbitrators, it runs from the date on which the minutes of the tribunal’s first meeting are drawn up. In institutional arbitrations, however, the applicable institutional rules may prescribe a different time limit, in which case that time limit will apply.
The remedies available in international arbitration under the IAL are determined by the substantive law governing the dispute rather than by the relevant Turkish procedural law. Accordingly, an arbitral tribunal seated in Türkiye may grant any remedy that is available under the applicable substantive law and falls within the scope of the parties’ claims and the arbitration agreement.
Certain limitations may nevertheless arise at the setting-aside stage. In particular, an award may be set aside if the remedy granted is considered contrary to Turkish public policy. By way of example, punitive damages are regarded as incompatible with Turkish public policy. In addition, because arbitral awards are binding only upon the parties to the arbitration, remedies intended to create direct legal effects vis-à-vis third parties are subject to this limitation (see 13.5 Binding of Third Parties).
Lastly, disputes that are not arbitrable under Turkish law cannot be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, an arbitral tribunal cannot render an award in relation to such disputes (see 3.2 Arbitrability).
Both the IAL and the CCP adopt the principle that, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the costs of the arbitration are borne by the unsuccessful party. Accordingly, the default position under Turkish law, for both international and domestic arbitrations, is the “costs follow the event” approach.
Under Article 16(B) of the IAL, recoverable arbitration costs include the legal fees in accordance with the Turkish Minimum Attorney Fee Schedule. However, the Court of Cassation has taken the view that this provision is not mandatory. In a 2024 decision, it held that an arbitral tribunal’s award of legal costs denominated in a foreign currency did not constitute a ground for setting aside, noting that the applicable ICC Rules conferred broad discretion on the tribunal with respect to the allocation and recovery of legal costs, and that the tribunal had acted within that authority.
Also, the “costs follow the event” rule is not mandatory. As is clear from the wording of the relevant provision, the parties remain free to agree on a different allocation of costs, either directly or by adopting institutional arbitration rules containing specific provisions on costs. In such cases, the parties’ agreement or the applicable institutional rules will prevail.
Turkish law also permits arbitral tribunals to award interest where it is claimed and justified under the applicable substantive law.
Arbitral awards rendered under the IAL are not subject to appeal on the merits. The only recourse against an award is an action for setting aside before the competent regional court of appeal. The grounds for setting aside are exhaustively listed in Article 15 of the IAL.
A party may seek to have an award set aside by establishing that:
In addition, the regional court of appeal will examine ex officio whether the dispute is arbitrable under Turkish law and whether the award is contrary to Turkish public policy.
The grounds for setting aside are exhaustive, and the prohibition of review of the merits (révision au fond) bars any reassessment of the tribunal’s findings on the merits.
Turkish law permits parties to waive their right to seek the setting aside of an arbitral award, but only for the parties that are domiciled or habitually resident outside Türkiye. Under Article 15 of the IAL, such parties may waive, in whole or in part, their right to bring a setting-aside action, and such waiver must be made expressly, either in the arbitration agreement or in a subsequent written agreement.
Waiver of right to bring a setting-aside action is, however, subject to important limitations. It does not preclude judicial review of matters that the court examines ex officio, namely whether the dispute is arbitrable under Turkish law and whether the award is contrary to Turkish public policy. Therefore, even where a party has validly waived its right to bring a setting-aside action, it may still initiate setting-aside proceedings, but solely on the grounds of arbitrability and Turkish public policy.
The parties may not expand the scope of judicial review. The grounds for setting aside set out in Article 15 of the IAL are exhaustive, and Turkish law does not permit the parties to agree on additional grounds for challenging an arbitral award.
Judicial review is limited, and prohibition of review of the merits (révision au fond) applies under Turkish law. Turkish courts exercise only supervisory review based on the exhaustive setting-aside grounds in Article 15 of the IAL and do not review the merits of the dispute.
Only in exceptional cases, particularly when assessing public policy, may the court examine aspects of the substance of the award, and only to the extent necessary. In recent years, the Court of Cassation has interpreted the public policy exception narrowly and has generally adopted an arbitration-friendly approach that respects the prohibition on reviewing the merits of the case. For example, in a 2022 decision, the Court of Cassation held that whether a contractual penalty was excessive could not be reviewed under the guise of public policy, as doing so would amount to review of the merits of the arbitral award.
Türkiye is a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”) subject to both the reciprocity and commercial reservations. Accordingly, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Türkiye are primarily governed by the New York Convention, but for only those rendered in the territory of another Contracting State and for disputes that are regarded as commercial under Turkish law.
The IPPL governs the matters that fall outside of the scope of New York Convention.
In General
Arbitral awards rendered under the IAL or CCP do not require recognition or enforcement proceedings in order to be enforced in Türkiye. Once the award has become enforceable under the applicable legislation, it may be enforced directly upon obtaining an enforceability certificate (icra edilebilirlik şerhi) from the court, which is a straightforward procedure.
By contrast, foreign arbitral awards, namely awards rendered in arbitrations not governed procedurally by Turkish laws, must undergo exequatur (tenfiz) proceedings before the Turkish courts. Such proceedings are governed primarily by the New York Convention, where applicable, and if not, by the IPPL.
Effect of Setting-Aside Proceedings Before the Courts in the Seat of Arbitration
Under Article 62(1)(h) of the IPPL, the setting aside of a foreign arbitral award at the seat of arbitration constitutes a ground for refusing recognition and enforcement. Likewise, although Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention confers discretion on the enforcing court, Turkish courts generally refuse to recognise or enforce awards that have been set aside at the seat of arbitration.
With respect to awards governed by the IAL, the commencement of setting-aside proceedings automatically suspends enforcement. By contrast, under the CCP, the filing of a setting-aside action does not automatically stay enforcement, although the court may order a stay upon the provision of security.
Sovereign Immunity
Turkish law adopts the restrictive doctrine of state immunity, since, by virtue of Article 49(1) of the IPPL, a foreign state does not enjoy jurisdictional immunity in disputes arising from private-law relations. Accordingly, a foreign state may not invoke sovereign immunity in recognition or enforcement proceedings arising out of private-law or commercial relationships merely by virtue of its status as a sovereign. This distinction also applies at the recognition stage, so a foreign state cannot defeat recognition merely by invoking jurisdictional immunity.
The recent case law of the Court of Cassation demonstrates a restrained approach to judicial review of foreign arbitral awards.
A significant turning point was the 2012 Decision of the Court of Cassation’s General Assembly on the Unification of Judgments (Case No. 2012/1, Decision No. 2012/1, dated 10 February 2012), examining how to assess “public policy” as a condition for enforcement of foreign court decisions. However, its reasoning is equally relevant to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, as Turkish law recognises the same public policy ground for refusing enforcement of the latter.
In its Decision, the Court made clear that recognition or enforcement cannot be refused merely because the foreign decision applies a law different from Turkish law or reaches a result inconsistent with mandatory provisions of Turkish law. Rather, refusal is justified only where the legal consequences of enforcing the foreign decision would themselves be contrary to Turkish international public policy.
This approach is reflected in the subsequent case law. For example, in a 2022 decision, the Court of Cassation upheld the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award providing for compound interest, which is generally prohibited under Turkish law, subject to limited exceptions. The Court further held that objections alleging that the tribunal had awarded damages despite the absence of actual loss could not be examined in enforcement proceedings, because such an examination would amount to a review of the merits of the arbitral award under the guise of public policy.
Turkish law does not recognise class action arbitration or group arbitration. A party may pursue only its own claims in arbitration and may not seek relief on behalf of a broader class of persons or other third parties. Likewise, arbitral awards bind only the parties to the arbitration agreement and the arbitral proceedings (see 13.5 Binding of Third Parties).
There is no single ethical code specifically governing counsel or arbitrators in international arbitration under Turkish law. The IAL does not establish a comprehensive set of professional or ethical standards beyond imposing certain duties on arbitrators, namely the obligations of independence, impartiality and disclosure of circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality.
Counsel admitted to the practice of law in Türkiye remain subject to the applicable rules governing the legal profession, including the Attorneyship Law and the professional rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations, when acting before Turkish courts or otherwise practising law in both contentious and non-contentious matters.
Turkish law does not regulate third-party funding in arbitration. Accordingly, such arrangements are generally regarded as permissible under the principle of freedom of contract, subject to the limits imposed by mandatory rules of law. For example, a funding agreement providing for excessive compensation to the funder may be deemed invalid due to its incompatibility with public policy.
Third-party funding remains relatively uncommon in practice, and there is little, if any, judicial authority addressing its use. As a result, issues such as disclosure, conflicts of interest and the role of the funder are primarily governed by general principles of contract law, best practice and, where applicable, the rules of Turkish arbitration institutions.
The IAL does not contain any provisions specifically governing the consolidation of arbitral proceedings. It is nevertheless possible where the parties have agreed to it. In institutional arbitrations, it is usually governed by institutional rules. For example, Article 11 of the ISTAC Arbitration Rules permits consolidation:
As a general rule, arbitral awards bind only the parties to the arbitration and cannot be enforced against third parties. Turkish courts have no power to extend the binding effect of an arbitral award to a person or entity that is not bound by the arbitration agreement.
A non-signatory may nevertheless be bound by an arbitration agreement, and therefore the arbitral award, in the limited exceptional circumstances under Turkish law (see 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties).
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Arbitrating in Türkiye: A Practical Guide to What Has Changed and Why It Matters
Anyone advising on Türkiye-connected disputes over the past year will have seen two developments moving in parallel. On the policy side, the Turkish government has taken a notable institutional step by directing certain public-sector and state-linked contracts towards a Türkiye-based arbitration centre, namely the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Arbitration Centre. On the judicial side, the Court of Cassation and regional appellate courts have continued to narrow the space for tactical objections in enforcement and set-aside proceedings. The result is a body of case law that is more consistent, more restrained in its use of public policy, and more deferential to arbitral finality.
The numbers also suggest a market gaining momentum. According to the 2025 figures from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Türkiye was the ninth most represented nationality among parties worldwide and the most represented within Central and South-East Europe. Turkish law was chosen as the governing law in seven newly registered cases, and Turkish nationals were confirmed or appointed as arbitrators 12 times during the year. The 2025 caseload of the Istanbul Arbitration Centre (ISTAC) points in the same direction at the domestic level: 263 new applications, still predominantly domestic in character, but extending beyond traditional commercial disputes into areas such as energy and construction. Women represented close to half of all appointed arbitrators. Taken together, these point to a jurisdiction whose arbitration practice is both expanding and diversifying.
A new institutional anchor: the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Arbitration Centre circular
One of the most notable arbitration-related developments in Türkiye over the past year came not from the courts but from the executive branch. On 16 April 2026, the Turkish Presidency issued Presidential Circular No. 2026/3 (“Circular”), directing Turkish public institutions, state-owned enterprises and public-private partnership projects to consider the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Arbitration Centre (OIC-AC), based in Istanbul, when drafting dispute resolution clauses.
The OIC-AC itself is not new. It was established pursuant to the Host Country Agreement signed on 27 November 2019 between the Republic of Türkiye and the Islamic Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (now the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Development), an affiliate of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), representing the private sectors of its 57 member states. In recent years, the OIC-AC has developed its institutional framework, including an international panel of arbitrators and, as of January 2026, a new set of Arbitration Rules and Mediation Rules. The Circular is significant as it elevates the OIC-AC from an available institutional option into one actively endorsed by the Turkish state.
In practical terms, the Circular is likely to have several consequences. Turkish ministries, state-owned companies and public-private partnership project companies are now expected to consider OIC-AC arbitration or mediation clauses in contracts involving counterparties from OIC member states. It extends beyond these actors to special-purpose vehicles used for sovereign bond and sukuk issuances, making it relevant not only to disputes practitioners, but also to lawyers involved in international debt and Islamic finance transactions. It also reaches backwards: parties to disputes already underway are invited to opt into OIC-AC jurisdiction mid-stream through a simple submission agreement, and Istanbul becomes the default seat wherever a contract is silent on the point, although nothing forecloses parties from agreeing on a different seat if they actually negotiate one.
A related question is not only how the Circular will be implemented, but also what it may indicate in broader terms. Since August 2024, Türkiye has also been inserting the OIC-AC into the dispute resolution provisions of its newer bilateral investment treaties. This suggests that the Circular should be read not as a standalone administrative measure, but as part of a wider strategy to position Istanbul as the forum of choice for the 57-member OIC bloc, where institutions historically seated in Europe or Asia have tended to dominate.
A further practical implication is that the Circular may matter even where the Turkish public sector is not the named contractual counterparty. Although the Circular is formally addressed to public institutions rather than private parties, many Turkish projects, especially in construction, energy and infrastructure, involve complex ownership, financing or regulatory structures. A counterparty that appears private on paper may have a state-owned shareholder, benefit from a state guarantee, require regulatory approval, or sit within a wider project structure involving a public-sector entity. For that reason, the application of the Circular should not be assessed by looking only at the identity of the contracting party named on the first page of the agreement. In practice, diligence on the counterparty’s ownership, financing and project structure may be necessary to determine whether the OIC-AC preference is likely to become relevant in negotiations.
It is worth being precise about the procedural consequences of bringing a dispute before the OIC-AC. The institution does not operate separate rulebooks for commercial and investment arbitration. The Arbitration Rules 2026, effective from 1 January 2026, provide a single procedural framework for both. Article 2 expressly applies to disputes that are “commercial, investment, or otherwise”, so a private contractual dispute and a treaty-based claim against a host state are both governed, at least initially, by the same core rules on tribunal constitution, evidence and awards. The main distinction is transparency. Annex II, added in the 2026 revision, introduces Rules on Transparency that substantially reflect the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration: certain basic information about the dispute is made public, hearings are public by default, and non-disputing treaty parties or interested third parties may seek permission to make submissions. By contrast, commercial arbitrations remain subject to the default rule of confidentiality under Article 45.2, unless the parties agree in writing to depart from it.
For foreign investors, the key takeaway is not that OIC-AC clauses are unavoidable, but that they are likely to appear more frequently in Türkiye-facing transactions with a state-linked element. The issue is therefore best addressed early, as part of the parties’ broader dispute resolution strategy.
The courts narrowing the public policy shield
Public policy has long been the broadest ground for resisting enforcement in Türkiye. Recent case law points towards Turkish courts becoming more disciplined in its application. Turkish courts are treating public policy as a genuinely exceptional, last-resort safety shield, not a general licence to reopen arbitral findings.
A useful illustration is found in a 2025 decision concerning the enforcement of a Paris-seated ICC award. The respondent sought to resist enforcement by relying on Turkish criminal proceedings involving two individuals connected to the evidence before the tribunal: an expert who had been convicted of forging the report submitted in the arbitration, and a witness who had separately admitted giving false testimony. The Court of Cassation upheld enforcement, affirming the regional appellate court’s decision. Its reasoning is more significant than the outcome itself. The Court noted that the tribunal’s award did not depend solely on the expert report but was also supported by independent technical assessments from two other consultancies. More importantly, it also emphasised that the same forgery and perjury allegations had already been raised, argued and rejected both before the arbitral tribunal and before the Paris Court of Appeal in the annulment proceedings. On that basis, the Court of Cassation held there was no public policy violation within the meaning of the New York Convention or Law No. 5718 on Private International Law and Procedural Law. Allowing a later domestic conviction to reopen an issue that had already been tested twice by both the tribunal and the supervising court would have turned Turkish public policy review into an appellate review. The Court of Cassation therefore confirmed that public policy review cannot be used as a vehicle for a de novo examination of matters already addressed by the arbitral tribunal.
A similar approach can be seen in a shareholders’ dispute involving a port company. The Court held that a criminal acquittal could not be relied on to contradict the tribunal’s contractual findings. Together, the decisions reinforce the distinction between criminal liability and contractual liability. Unless the connection is legally direct and substantively compelling, public policy review will not operate as a bridge between the criminal process and the enforcement of an arbitral award.
This is not a sudden change of direction so much as the development of an existing line of authority. The doctrinal basis was already present in the Court of Cassation’s established case law, which defines public policy by reference to Türkiye’s fundamental constitutional and legal values, rather than by reference to whether the foreign decision is correctly reasoned. What recent decisions add is consistency. They apply that narrower understanding of public policy across different factual contexts, rather than standing as isolated pro-enforcement decisions. That consistency is important for Türkiye’s reputation as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction and a reliable venue for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.
A February 2026 ruling shows the same discipline applied at a different procedural stage: the certification of a Türkiye-seated tribunal’s award as enforceable, rather than the exequatur proceeding for the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. Under Law No. 4686 on International Arbitration, the court’s role in enforceability certificate proceedings depends on the procedural history. If the time limit for bringing an application to set aside the award has expired, or the parties have waived that right, the certifying court must review public policy and arbitrability itself. If, however, set-aside proceedings have been brought and finally rejected, that review has already taken place and need not be repeated. Applying that framework, the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal declined to revisit public policy objections at the certification stage. The respondent relied on a later error admission by the arbitral institution’s secretariat and on a pending retrial application seeking to reopen the set-aside case. The court held that neither was enough. The decision rejecting the set-aside application had become final following review by the Court of Cassation, and the mere pendency of a retrial application did not suspend enforcement. The underlying point is consistent with the broader case law: public policy is reviewed at the stage assigned by law, not revisited at every later procedural step.
None of this means that the public policy exception has lost its force. Turkish courts continue to rely on it where enforcement would genuinely compromise the public order. What is less likely to succeed is a public policy objection that, in substance, amounts to a merits appeal.
The courts are closing the door on reserved objections
A related trend focuses on timing instead of substance. Turkish courts are increasingly treating a party’s failure to raise objections during the arbitration as a waiver, emphasising that such objections should be raised at the appropriate stage of the proceedings rather than being held back as a tactical weapon for use at the set-aside or enforcement stage.
This approach appears in different factual settings, including challenges to arbitrator independence, objections based on lack of authority to sign the arbitration agreement, and attempts to deny arbitration after previously arguing in favour of it before a state court. Across these cases, Turkish courts have looked closely at when the objection was raised. Objections brought only after an unfavourable result are increasingly treated as opportunistic, rather than as safeguards of due process.
The practical point is that objections concerning tribunal composition, authority to conclude the arbitration agreement or jurisdictional scope should be addressed during the arbitration itself. If counsel identifies a real concern and waits, the objection may no longer be available when enforcement or set-aside proceedings begin.
Provisional attachment ahead of enforcement
For a creditor holding a foreign award, enforcement success may come too late if the debtor’s assets are no longer available by the time the process is complete. Recent appellate decisions have made this risk considerably more manageable.
Turkish courts have confirmed that a foreign arbitral award may support a provisional attachment order over assets in Türkiye, rejecting the argument that a debt is not yet due and payable until formal exequatur proceedings conclude. The reasoning rests on the distinction between protective measures and enforcement measures. Provisional attachment is treated as a protective measure and therefore does not require the award to have already acquired the status of a domestic judgment. The corresponding safeguard for respondents is a security requirement, generally fixed at 10–15% of the claim value, intended to protect against the consequences of an ultimately unsuccessful enforcement process.
The strategic implication for creditors is that asset tracing should not be left until after recognition or enforcement is completed. Where assets in Türkiye can be identified, provisional attachment may be available at an earlier stage and can help preserve recovery prospects during what may otherwise be a lengthy enforcement process.
A clearer roadmap for ICSID award enforcement
Another significant recent development concerns the enforcement of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) awards in Türkiye. Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention requires each Contracting State to recognise an award rendered under the Convention as binding and to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award as if it were a final judgment of one of its own courts. This is one of the defining features of the ICSID system and a key advantage of ICSID arbitration over other arbitral regimes that may also be available for investor-state disputes, depending on the applicable bilateral investment treaty and the investor’s choice of forum. Unlike non-ICSID awards, ICSID awards are not subject to exequatur proceedings under domestic law or the New York Convention.
That does not mean, however, that no domestic procedure is required. Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention provides that a party seeking recognition or enforcement must furnish a copy of the award certified by the ICSID Secretary-General to the competent court or other authority designated by the relevant Contracting State. It further requires each Contracting State to notify the Secretary-General of the court or authority designated for that purpose.
Türkiye ratified the ICSID Convention in 1989, but for many years there was uncertainty over the domestic route for enforcing ICSID awards under Article 54(2). The practical difficulty became clear in 2016, when Turkmenistan sought to enforce a costs award directly through Turkish debt-collection offices. At that time, Türkiye had not yet made its Article 54(2) designation. When the matter reached the Court of Cassation in 2021, the court held that no competent authority had been designated at the relevant time and that enforcement could not proceed directly through execution offices without the required domestic procedure.
Türkiye made its Article 54(2) notification in 2017, designating the first-instance commercial court at the place agreed by the parties in writing, or in the absence of such an agreement, at the losing party’s domicile, if not, residence, or in the absence of both, the location of the subject property of the claim, as the competent forum. The first-instance civil court is competent only in places where no commercial court exists. However, Türkiye has not enacted detailed legislation setting out the mechanics of ICSID award enforcement.
A 2025 appellate decision involving Oman is currently the best available guidance on the point, although it remains subject to cassation review. The decision indicates that the competent forum is the commercial court at the place where the losing party is domiciled in light of Türkiye’s Treasury Undersecretariat having advised the ICSID Secretariat in 2017 that commercial courts are the competent forum for such matters generally. The decision refers only to commercial courts, likely because the defendant company’s registered seat, Ankara, has a commercial court. The case therefore did not require the court to address the civil court fallback that applies, per the 2017 notification, only where no commercial court exists at the relevant place. The court’s review is narrow. It does not revisit the merits but only verifies the certified award and checks whether there is a stay or annulment. A stay requires a formal order, not simply a pending annulment application; if the security ordered by an ICSID ad hoc committee is not furnished, any existing stay is lifted.
Pending formal legislation, the 2025 decision is a meaningful step towards clarifying a process that had long been uncertain.
What this means for parties doing business with or within Türkiye
Individually, none of these developments would necessarily alter Türkiye’s standing as a seat or enforcement jurisdiction. Collectively, they tell a more important story: Türkiye is becoming more active, more deliberate and more coherent in its approach to arbitration.
A few practical takeaways follow for parties structuring cross-border transactions touching Türkiye:
Türkiye remains a jurisdiction that requires careful, fact-specific analysis, and none of these developments removes the need for fact-specific local advice. The direction is nevertheless clear: the legal framework governing arbitration in Türkiye is becoming more predictable, from the drafting of arbitration agreements to the recognition, enforcement and judicial supervision of arbitral awards.
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