International arbitration is rapidly gaining ground in Uzbekistan as a means of resolving cross-border commercial disputes – though arbitration itself is far from new. Its recent rise reflects the wide-ranging economic and legal reforms launched from 2017, which produced a dedicated international arbitration law in 2021 and a modern arbitral institution. For purely domestic matters, businesses still tend to turn to the state economic courts, but where a contract has a foreign element, arbitration is increasingly the preferred route.

Arbitration is governed by two separate laws: international arbitration by the Law “On International Commercial Arbitration” (ZRU-674, 16 February 2021) (the “ICA Law”), and domestic arbitration by the Law “On Arbitration Courts” (ZRU-64, 16 October 2006) (the “Law on Domestic Arbitration”). The ICA Law gives effect to the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) and operates alongside institutional rules such as those of the Tashkent International Arbitration Centre (TIAC).

The most active sectors are construction and infrastructure, energy (including oil and gas), mining and metallurgy, the trade and supply of goods, and agriculture. Locally, disputes have centred on construction, the trade in goods, agriculture, and oil and gas.

These sectors share features that favour arbitration: they attract the most foreign capital, so their contracts most often contain arbitration clauses; they involve high-value, long-term obligations where technical and industry expertise is valued in arbitrators; and they frequently involve state or quasi-state participation, where investors prefer a neutral forum and New York Convention enforceability.

The leading institution is the Tashkent International Arbitration Centre (TIAC), established in 2018 under the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and operating since 2019. Parties are drawn to it for its zero administrative fees, predominantly virtual processes, and modern rules addressing technology, data and cybersecurity disputes. TIAC also has a co-operation agreement with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), enabling joint administration under the TIAC-HKIAC Cross-Institutional Rules.

For contracts of higher value or with more complex party structures, well-established foreign institutions and headquarters, including the ICC, the LCIA, SIAC, HKIAC and the SCC, are still frequently chosen, with London often becoming the seat of choice for serious disputes given its depth of expertise and predictability.

At the same time, as the Chinese commercial presence in Uzbekistan continues to grow, arbitration clauses increasingly reference Chinese institutions such as CIETAC, the BAC, SHIAC and SCIA, reflecting the shifting composition of counterparties in cross-border contracts. Overall, recent institutional activity has centred on consolidating and growing TIAC, expanding its caseload and deepening co-operation with HKIAC, rather than establishing additional domestic arbitral bodies.

Uzbekistan has not, to date, established a court dedicated exclusively to arbitration-related matters. Jurisdiction over such matters is instead divided between the economic (commercial) courts and the courts of civil jurisdiction, according to the identity of the parties and the nature of the dispute. The economic courts, acting under the Economic Procedure Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan (the “EP Code”), determine the great majority of arbitration-related matters as commercial disputes, whereas the courts of general jurisdiction, acting under the Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, hear matters involving individuals acting otherwise than in the course of business or entrepreneurial activity. The 2022 reforms to the EP Code introduced a dedicated chapter governing judicial assistance to arbitration and applications for the setting aside of arbitral awards.

The national courts exercise supervisory and assistive functions at defined stages of the process. Where the seat of the arbitration is in Uzbekistan, the competent economic court exercises supervisory jurisdiction over applications to set aside awards, applications for interim measures, the taking of evidence, and rules on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, subject to an ultimate right of appeal to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Uniformity of judicial practice in this field – in particular as regards the application of the New York Convention – has been reinforced by Resolution of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 27 of 20 November 2023 “On Certain Issues of the Application of Legislative Acts by the Economic Courts in Cases Involving Foreign Persons” (the “Supreme Court Guidance”).

A degree of specialisation exists at the apex of the system: under Presidential Decree No. UP-6034 of 24 July 2020 and the Law “On Courts”, a specialised panel of the Supreme Court hears, at first instance and at the investor’s election, investment disputes involving major investors (investments of not less than USD20 million) and state bodies, together with competition cases; other investment disputes may, at the investor’s election, be heard at first instance by the courts of Karakalpakstan, the regions and the city of Tashkent.

Finally, a specialised forum has recently been added to this architecture, though it is not yet operational. The Tashkent International Commercial Court (TICC), established by the Constitutional Law “On the Tashkent International Financial Centre” (ZRU-1158, 13 July 2026) (the “Сonstitutional Law”) considered in 2.2 Changes to National Law, is to be activated in stages. Once operational, it will exercise the supervisory and assistive functions described above on an exclusive basis, but only in respect of arbitrations connected with the Tashkent International Financial Centre (TIFC), principally those seated within it; arbitrations seated elsewhere in Uzbekistan will remain under the supervision of the state courts. Its recognition and enforcement jurisdiction is, by contrast, framed more broadly: the TICC may recognise and enforce awards made in any international arbitration, irrespective of the seat and in conformity with Uzbekistan’s treaty obligations, and its decisions are enforceable throughout Uzbekistan rather than only within the TIFC.

International arbitration in the Republic of Uzbekistan is governed by the ICA Law, adopted on 16 February 2021 and brought into force on 18 August 2021. It is the country’s first dedicated statute on international arbitration and stands alongside the Law on Domestic Arbitration, which continues to govern domestic arbitration.

The ICA Law is closely modelled on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, as amended in 2006 (the “Model Law”), making Uzbekistan the 85th Model Law jurisdiction – a correspondence acknowledged by the UNCITRAL Secretariat. Its core architecture tracks the Model Law: party autonomy, separability of the arbitration agreement, minimal curial intervention, a modern interim-measures regime and the written-form requirements for the arbitration agreement.

The divergences are limited and mostly additive, supplementing rather than departing from the Model Law. Four are of particular note:

• Immunity (Article 6): The Model Law is silent on the civil liability of those who conduct or administer the arbitration. Article 6 confers immunity on arbitrators, tribunal-appointed experts and arbitral institutions for acts and omissions in the discharge of their functions, save in cases of intentional misconduct.
• Confidentiality (Article 53): The Model Law imposes no general duty of confidentiality. Article 53 makes confidentiality of the arbitration, the proceedings and the award a statutory default, without the need for express stipulation.
• Representation (Article 38): The Model Law does not regulate who may appear. Article 38 guarantees the right to be represented by counsel of choice, including foreign-qualified lawyers, so that admission to the Uzbek Bar is not a precondition to representation in an international arbitration seated in Uzbekistan.
• Enforcement formalities (Article 51): By contrast, this is a more restrictive divergence: whereas the 2006 Model Law amendments dispensed with production of the arbitration agreement, Article 51 retains the stricter pre-2006 approach of Article IV of the New York Convention, requiring the original award and arbitration agreement, or duly certified copies of each.

Uzbekistan’s approach has been targeted refinement rather than wholesale revision. The most significant recent measure was the 2022 package of amendments to the EP Code, introducing provisions on judicial assistance to arbitration, the taking of evidence, interim measures and the recognition of foreign awards. In November 2023, the Plenum of the Supreme Court issued the Supreme Court Guidance clarifying enforcement practice and confirming the courts’ application of the New York Convention.

This incremental trajectory continues at the domestic level. The Law “On Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Connection with the Further Improvement of the Activities of Arbitration Courts and the Strengthening of Budgetary Discipline” (No. ZRU-1141, 21 April 2026) (the “Law on Amendments on Domestic Arbitration”), which has just entered into force on 24 July 2026, amends the Law on Domestic Arbitration to professionalise domestic arbitrators (through a mandatory training programme approved by the Ministry of Justice and a continuing duty to maintain qualifications), to require that a permanent arbitration court be established only by a non-state, non-commercial organisation, and – to reinforce budgetary discipline – to exclude the state and enterprises with state participation from domestic arbitration and to place disputes over land, the ownership of buildings and structures, and the recovery of budget funds beyond arbitration, with breaches carrying administrative liability.

The most consequential development is the Constitutional Law, which entered into force on 25 July 2026; the TIFC and its institutions are not yet operational and are to be activated in stages. Rather than alter the substantive law of arbitration, it adds an institutional layer – a distinct jurisdiction with its own legal regime and a dedicated court, the TICC. Taken together, these initiatives point to consolidation and refinement of Uzbekistan’s arbitration architecture rather than its replacement.

The essential conditions for a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement are broadly common to both regimes – international arbitration as regulated by the ICA Law, and domestic arbitration as regulated by Law on Domestic Arbitration – with the validity of the agreement addressed in Article 12 of each of the ICA Law and the Law on Domestic Arbitration.

The threshold requirement is that the agreement is in writing, which may be satisfied by an arbitration clause or a separate agreement whose content is recorded in any form, including electronic communications. Under the ICA Law, the requirement is construed broadly – met also by an exchange of claim and defence in which one party asserts the agreement and the other does not deny it, and by incorporation of an arbitration clause by reference; the Law on Domestic Arbitration lacks these extensions and is somewhat stricter.

The agreement must also be made by parties with capacity, acting through duly authorised representatives and with genuine consent. Consistent with the principle of separability (Article 24 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration and its ICA Law counterpart), the arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract, so the latter’s invalidity does not of itself defeat it.

At the enforcement stage, the party relying on the agreement must produce the original or a duly certified copy. Recognition and enforcement of a foreign award is governed by Article 256 of the EP Code, whose refusal grounds mirror Article V of the New York Convention (including invalidity of the agreement and a party’s incapacity); domestic awards are enforced under the Law on Domestic Arbitration together with the EP Code.

Both regimes proceed from a broad notion of arbitrability, subject to defined exclusions. The test turns on the nature of the underlying relationship: a dispute is arbitrable where it arises from a civil-law or commercial relationship the parties are free to dispose of, whereas disputes rooted in public-law relations or reserved to the state courts are not.

For international arbitration, Article 4 of the ICA Law frames this by reference to a broad concept of “commercial”; for domestic arbitration, Article 9 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration allows disputes arising from civil legal relations, including economic disputes between business entities.

Non-arbitrable matters are those outside the civil and commercial sphere: administrative and other public-law disputes, and criminal, family and labour matters. Insolvency and bankruptcy are likewise non-arbitrable, as are certain intellectual property disputes (in particular, the grant or registration of rights subject to state registration) and any matter reserved by statute to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts or whose resolution would offend public policy. These boundaries are, moreover, set to narrow for domestic arbitration. The Law on Amendments On Domestic Arbitration, which entered into force on 24 July 2026, amends the Law on Domestic Arbitration to exclude from arbitration disputes over land, disputes over the establishment of ownership of buildings and structures, and the recovery of money from the state budget, and to bar state bodies, state institutions, enterprises with state participation and bodies of citizens’ self-government from being parties to a domestic arbitration agreement – a material contraction of arbitrability under the domestic regime.

Neither statute lays down a choice-of-law rule for the arbitration agreement itself, and no separate line of authority has developed; the issue arises only at the set-aside and enforcement stages. Both Article 50 (setting aside) and Article 52 (refusing recognition and enforcement) of the ICA Law require the court to test the agreement’s validity under the law chosen by the parties and, failing a choice, under the law of the seat – Uzbek law where the seat is in Uzbekistan. The courts thus honour an express choice and resort to seat law only in its absence; because that fallback is narrow and untested, parties are well advised to designate the governing law expressly.

On enforcement of arbitration agreements, Article 13 of the ICA Law obliges a court seised of a matter within a valid arbitration agreement to refer the parties to arbitration, on a party’s application made no later than its first statement on the substance of the dispute, unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; the EP Code achieves the same before the domestic courts.

As a rule, the Uzbek courts uphold and give effect to arbitration agreements, taking a consistently pro-arbitration approach to referral, consistent with their pro-enforcement stance towards awards. A party resisting referral or enforcement must bring its objection within the narrow statutory grounds, which the courts do not interpret expansively.

Uzbek law recognises the principle of separability, codified for international arbitration in Article 21 of the ICA Law and reflected for domestic arbitration in Article 24 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration. An arbitration clause is treated as independent from the rest of the contract, so the invalidity of the main contract does not of itself render the clause invalid: it survives and continues to bind the parties, and a dispute over whether the contract is void remains one for arbitration.

Separability operates hand in hand with the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, likewise embodied in Article 21 of the ICA Law and Article 24 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration, under which the arbitral tribunal is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction, including on any objection to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Read together, the two principles allow the tribunal to determine disputes arising under the main contract without being deprived of jurisdiction by a challenge directed at that contract’s validity; a decision by the tribunal that the contract is null and void does not entail, as a matter of law, the invalidity of the arbitration clause.

The clause fails only where the defect attaches to the arbitration agreement itself – for example, want of capacity or consent to arbitrate, non-compliance with the written form, or non-arbitrability of the subject matter. In the absence of such a ground, the clause remains valid despite the invalidity of the contract containing it.

Under Articles 15 and 16 of the ICA Law, the parties enjoy broad autonomy in constituting the tribunal: they may agree the number of arbitrators (three by default) and the appointment procedure. The ICA Law imposes no nationality or professional-qualification requirement, so foreign nationals may be appointed. Where the parties have agreed particular qualifications, those bind the appointing authority.

This liberal position stands in marked contrast to the domestic regime under the Law on Domestic Arbitration. Article 14 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration confines eligibility to citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan who are at least 25 years of age, capable of ensuring an impartial resolution of the dispute, and free of any direct or indirect interest in its outcome. Foreign nationals may not sit as arbitrators in domestic proceedings. This is one of the principal structural distinctions between the two regimes, and a further reason why the ICA Law, rather than the domestic statute, governs disputes with a genuine cross-border element. These eligibility conditions have been tightened further by the Law on Amendment on Domestic Arbitration, which now additionally requires a domestic arbitrator to complete a training course under a special programme approved by the Ministry of Justice and to maintain their professional qualifications on a continuing basis.

The limits that do apply under the ICA Law are mandatory and cannot be displaced by agreement. Each arbitrator must be and remain independent and impartial and, under Article 17, must disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality, which may ground a challenge under Article 18. Party autonomy is also qualified by the equal-treatment requirement in Article 33, which precludes any appointment mechanism giving one side an unfair advantage – for example, allowing one party alone to nominate a sole arbitrator or a majority of the tribunal.

Where the parties’ chosen mechanism for constituting the tribunal breaks down, the ICA Law supplies a default, with the competent economic court as appointing authority of last resort. Under Article 16, in a three-member tribunal, each party appoints one arbitrator and the two appoint the third (chair); if a party fails to appoint an arbitrator within 30 days of the other’s request, or the two fail to agree on the third within 30 days of their appointment, the court makes the appointment on either party’s application. Where a sole arbitrator is chosen but not agreed, the court likewise makes the appointment. The court’s appointment is final and not subject to appeal.

In exercising this function, the court acts within the supportive role assigned by the ICA Law – the competent court identified by Article 9, and judicial intervention confined by Article 8 to matters for which the ICA Law provides. The procedural mechanics of an appointment application are governed by the EP Code.

The position under the Law on Domestic Arbitration is materially different. It contemplates two forms of domestic arbitration – permanent (institutional) and ad hoc. For a permanent arbitration court, the institution’s rules govern constitution and the fallback appointment. For ad hoc domestic arbitration, there is no equivalent court-appointment backstop: the state courts do not appoint, so a failure to constitute the tribunal means the arbitration cannot proceed and the dispute reverts to the courts. Eligibility is in any event more tightly circumscribed than under the ICA Law.

Neither regime provides a bespoke default for multiparty arbitrations; the gap is filled by any institutional rules the parties have adopted. In the absence of such rules, an international arbitration falls back on the court-appointment power under Article 16 of the ICA Law read with the EP Code, whereas an ad hoc domestic arbitration has no comparable safeguard.

The power of a court to intervene in constituting the tribunal is a feature of the international regime alone: conferred by Article 16 of the ICA Law, it is available only for an international commercial arbitration seated in Uzbekistan and does not extend to domestic arbitration, which has no equivalent court-appointment backstop. The discussion below concerns ICA Law arbitrations.

Within that regime, the court’s involvement is confined to assisting where the agreed appointment mechanism has failed – a party’s default, deadlock between the co-arbitrators or over a sole arbitrator, or a defaulting appointing institution – in which case Article 16 empowers the competent economic court to appoint on a party’s application. The court’s role is facilitative, not supervisory.

That power is subject to real limitations. Consistent with Article 8 of the ICA Law, the court acts only as the ICA Law expressly provides, only where the seat is in Uzbekistan, and only on a party’s application, never on its own motion. In appointing, it must have regard to any qualifications the parties stipulated and to securing an independent and impartial arbitrator, and, for a sole or presiding arbitrator, to the advisability of a nationality. Its decision is final.

This power was recently applied by the Tashkent City Court on 26 December 2025. The claimant sought appointment of a sole arbitrator under Article 232 of the EP Code and Article 16 of the ICA Law after the parties failed to agree and the claimant challenged the composition of the TIAC Court of Arbitration, which had changed three times in a month and then included no local arbitrators, contrary to the institution’s rules. Rejecting the respondent’s argument that appointment should be left to TIAC, the court held that where the parties cannot agree and the institutional mechanism is itself in doubt, the competent court may make the appointment directly, and appointed the claimant’s nominee – an arbitrator of established international standing – applying the statutory standards of independence, impartiality and professional competence.

Both the international and domestic arbitration regimes contain express provisions on the challenge and removal of arbitrators, though they differ in their machinery.

Under the ICA Law, the starting point is the duty of disclosure in Article 17: a person approached for appointment must disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality, and the duty continues throughout. An arbitrator may be challenged on that ground, or for lacking a qualification agreed by the parties; a party may challenge an arbitrator it appointed only for reasons arising after the appointment.

Article 18 of the ICA Law governs the procedure. Failing agreement, the challenge must be made in writing to the tribunal within 15 days of learning of the tribunal’s composition or of the relevant circumstances; unless the arbitrator withdraws or the other party agrees, the tribunal decides it. If unsuccessful, the challenging party may apply to the competent court within 30 days; the court’s decision is final and, pending that decision, the tribunal may continue and make an award. Article 19 adds that a mandate terminates where the arbitrator becomes unable in law or fact to act or fails to act without undue delay, with recourse to the court on the same final basis.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration keeps the matter, as a rule, within the arbitration rather than the courts. It imposes a comparable disclosure and self-recusal obligation, and the grounds of challenge are in substance the same – justifiable doubts as to impartiality or independence, or failure to meet agreed qualifications – reinforced by the eligibility conditions in Article 14. Where the dispute is before a permanent arbitration court, that institution’s rules govern the challenge; the domestic regime does not give the state courts the supervisory role that Articles 18 and 19 of the ICA Law confer, so a challenge is resolved by self-recusal, party agreement or institutional rules.

The independence and impartiality of arbitrators is the governing standard under both regimes, and it operates as a continuing requirement rather than a one-off qualification at the point of appointment.

Under the ICA Law, the standard is anchored in the disclosure duty in Article 17. The substantive test is one of justifiable doubts as to independence or impartiality, and a failure to meet this test is a ground of challenge under Article 18. The ICA Law does not itself prescribe a detailed conflict-of-interest taxonomy or a schedule of disqualifying relationships; it states the standard and leaves its application to the tribunal and, on challenge, to the competent court. In practice, the content of that standard is informed by the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which counsel, tribunals and reviewing courts routinely rely upon as persuasive guidance, notwithstanding that they are non-binding soft law and have no formal status under Uzbek law. At the institutional level, the TIAC Rules give the standard practical effect: before appointment, a prospective arbitrator must sign a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality and independence, and is under a continuing duty to disclose to the parties, the institution and the co-arbitrators any circumstances liable to give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration adopts the same underlying standard but expresses it in more categorical terms and enforces it primarily through self-recusal rather than curial review. Article 14 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration makes impartiality and the absence of interest conditions of eligibility to sit at all. That eligibility requirement is supported by a disclosure and withdrawal obligation of the same character as under the ICA Law – the arbitrator must disclose to the parties any circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to their impartiality or independence and must withdraw where such circumstances emerge during the proceedings – so that an arbitrator who ceases to satisfy the impartiality and non-interest conditions cannot continue to act.

The principle of kompetenz-kompetenz is expressly recognised under both regimes, operating in each case together with the principle of separability of the arbitration agreement.

Under the ICA Law, Article 21 provides that the tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including on any objection to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and may do so as a preliminary question or in the final award. Curial review is deferred and narrow: where the tribunal upholds jurisdiction as a preliminary question, either party may, within 30 days, apply to the competent court for a determination, the tribunal being free to continue and make an award meanwhile, and the court’s decision being final.

As to the principle itself, the Law on Domestic Arbitration is to the same effect. Article 24 embodies both separability and kompetenz-kompetenz, empowering the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and treating the arbitration agreement as separate from the underlying contract. What differs is the mechanism of review: the domestic regime does not replicate the ICA Law’s interlocutory 30-day route to court, so a jurisdictional objection in a domestic arbitration must be raised when the award is challenged or its enforcement resisted, the absence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement being a ground on which a domestic award may be denied effect. Where the parties have submitted the dispute to a permanent arbitration court, its rules govern how a jurisdictional plea is first raised and decided, but the tribunal’s competence to rule on its own jurisdiction remains the point of departure.

A court may examine the tribunal’s jurisdiction only where the law permits: on an application to refer under Article 13 of the ICA Law; on review of a preliminary ruling upholding jurisdiction (Article 21 of the ICA Law, within 30 days); on setting aside under Article 50 of the ICA Law; and on recognition and enforcement under Article 52 of the ICA Law. Such applications are heard by the competent economic court under the EP Code.

The courts are strictly non-interventionist. The economic courts increasingly defer to the tribunal’s own competence over jurisdiction, and while the practice is not yet wholly uniform, the trend is towards respect for the arbitral process rather than interference. Court review is available only where the tribunal has affirmed its jurisdiction; a negative ruling, by which the tribunal finds that it lacks jurisdiction, terminates the proceedings and is not subject to the same interlocutory review.

In a domestic arbitration, the tribunal has the same competence under Article 24 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration, but without the interlocutory 30-day route to court; a jurisdictional objection is therefore addressed by the courts only on challenge to, or enforcement of, the award.

A party cannot go straight to court merely because a case has been filed or the tribunal constituted. Under the Article 21 of the ICA Law, a jurisdictional objection must first be raised before the tribunal itself, and no later than the statement of defence. When, and whether, the question may then reach a court depends on how the tribunal disposes of it. If the tribunal rules on jurisdiction as a preliminary question and upholds it, either party may apply to the competent court, within 30 days of notice of that ruling, for the court to determine the matter – the earliest point at which jurisdiction can reach the court; the tribunal is not stayed and may continue, including to an award, while the application is pending, and the court’s decision is final. If the tribunal instead joins the objection to the merits and decides it in the final award, there is no earlier route: the objection can be pursued only after the award, by an application to set it aside under Article 50 of the ICA Law or defensively in resisting recognition and enforcement under Articles 51–52 of the ICA Law.

Under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, the objection must likewise be raised before the tribunal first (Article 24), but with no interlocutory route to court: it can reach the courts only after the award.

Uzbek law draws a sharp line between jurisdiction, which the courts review afresh, and questions of admissibility and the merits, which they do not.

Jurisdiction is subject to de novo review: on an application under Article 21 of the ICA Law, or at the set-aside (Article 50 of the ICA Law) or enforcement (Articles 51–52 of the ICA Law) stage, the court itself determines the validity of the agreement and the scope of the tribunal’s mandate, rather than checking the tribunal’s ruling for reasonableness. Its role stops there – it does not reopen the tribunal’s findings of fact or law, there being no révision au fond.

Questions of admissibility are treated as going to the merits, reserved to the tribunal and reviewed deferentially, if at all; they do not give rise to an independent jurisdictional application and are revisited only to the extent that they fall within a recognised set-aside or refusal ground.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration proceeds on the same basis under Article 24, save that it offers no interlocutory route.

Where a party sues in breach of an arbitration agreement, the court will not hear the merits provided the other party objects in time: under Article 13 of the ICA Law, the court must, on application made no later than the first statement on the substance of the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The EP Code produces the same result before the domestic courts, as does the Law on Domestic Arbitration.

Two points qualify this. The court will not act on its own motion: in the absence of a timely objection, a party that litigates without invoking the arbitration agreement is taken to have waived it. And referral is refused only where one of the narrow exceptions in Article 13 of the ICA Law is made out.

The general posture of the courts is one of willingness to hold parties to their bargain and reluctance to entertain proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement, consistent with the broadly pro-arbitration stance of the Uzbek economic courts. A claimant cannot, as a rule, use the courts to circumvent a valid agreement to arbitrate.

Uzbek law provides no basis for a tribunal to assume jurisdiction over a person who is neither party to the arbitration agreement nor a signatory to the contract containing it. Neither the ICA Law, the Law on Domestic Arbitration nor the procedural codes address the extension of an arbitration agreement to non-signatories, and the Uzbek courts have not yet ruled on the question. The governing premise is consent: Article 12 of the ICA Law defines an arbitration agreement as one “between the parties”, so that it is agreement to arbitrate, and not mere connection with the underlying contract, that founds jurisdiction. In the absence of any statutory or judicial doctrine, there is no room for arbitration-specific theories such as the “group of companies” doctrine.

A non-signatory may therefore become bound only through the general mechanisms of the applicable substantive law – assignment of contractual rights and obligations, universal or singular succession, or agency – under which the arbitration agreement passes with the rights and obligations to which it attaches, rather than through any arbitration-specific extension. The Law on Domestic Arbitration rests on the same consensual foundation and is likewise silent on non-signatories, so the position under the domestic regime is no different.

The law draws no distinction between foreign and domestic third parties, precisely because it does not regulate the subject: whether a third party is bound turns entirely on the applicable law and the facts, irrespective of nationality.

An arbitral tribunal seated in Uzbekistan may grant interim relief. Under Article 22 of the ICA Law, it may, unless the parties agree otherwise, order interim measures at a party’s request, subject to Article 23 of the ICA Law (broadly, a reasonable prospect of success and a risk of harm not adequately reparable in damages). Such measures are binding, not merely recommendatory, and are enforceable through the competent economic court. Articles 24–25 of the ICA Law also allow preliminary (ex parte) orders to preserve the position pending determination; these bind the parties but are not court-enforceable. Under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, a tribunal may likewise order interim measures, which take effect between the parties and are enforced through the state courts, a party also being free to seek interim relief directly from the court without waiving the arbitration agreement.

The courts have a defined, concurrent supporting role. Under Article 14 of the ICA Law, a party may apply to the court for interim measures before or during the arbitration without breaching the arbitration agreement; this is available whether or not the tribunal is constituted and is used where urgency, the need to bind third parties or coercive enforcement makes court relief more effective.

That power extends to foreign-seated arbitrations: by Article 4 of the ICA Law, Article 14 and Articles 30–32 (recognition and enforcement of interim measures) apply irrespective of the seat, so the Uzbek courts may grant interim relief in aid of a foreign-seated arbitration and enforce interim measures ordered by a foreign-seated tribunal.

The relief available is that under the EP Code – principally attachment or freezing of assets, prohibitory measures, preservation of the status quo, and measures to secure evidence or property.

The ICA Law does not regulate emergency arbitrators; their availability depends on the parties’ chosen rules. Where those apply, an emergency arbitrator’s decision binds the parties contractually and the relief mirrors Article 22 of the ICA Law, but its status as a court-enforceable interim measure under Articles 30–32 is untested.

Finally, the appointment of an emergency arbitrator does not oust the courts. The court’s power under Article 14 of the ICA Law is concurrent and survives that appointment, so a party may still seek interim relief from the court – a course particularly relevant where coercive enforcement or measures against third parties are required.

Under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, the courts likewise assist with interim measures and their enforcement, but the regime has no framework for foreign-seated proceedings or emergency arbitrators.

Neither regime addresses security for costs by name, so it depends on the general interim-measures powers.

A tribunal seated in Uzbekistan may order security for costs under its power to grant interim measures (Article 22 of the ICA Law, subject to the conditions in Article 23, which also lets the tribunal require a party to provide appropriate security). As the power is not express, parties wanting it clearly available should rely on institutional rules or provide for it in the arbitration agreement. The Law on Domestic Arbitration is to the same effect through the tribunal’s interim-measures power.

The courts are an unlikely source: security for costs is not among the measures contemplated by the EP Code, and the court’s role under Article 14 of the ICA Law is limited to the protective measures that its own procedural law recognises.

Arbitral procedure in Uzbekistan is governed by two principal statutes according to the character of the arbitration: the ICA Law, which is modelled on the Model Law and applies to international commercial arbitration seated in Uzbekistan, and the Law on Domestic Arbitration, which governs domestic arbitration.

Both laws rest on party autonomy: the parties may agree the procedure, and only failing agreement does the tribunal conduct the arbitration as it sees fit. Court-support and supervisory functions – appointment, interim measures, setting aside, enforcement – run through the EP Code.

Uzbek law prescribes few mandatory procedural steps, leaving the detailed conduct of the arbitration to party agreement and, failing that, to the tribunal. The overriding requirements under the ICA Law are the mandatory guarantees of Article 33: the parties must be treated equally and each given a reasonable opportunity to present its case.

Within that framework, the ICA Law sets out a recognisable sequence. Unless otherwise agreed, proceedings commence when the respondent receives the request to arbitrate (Article 37); the tribunal is then constituted (Articles 15–20). The claimant files a statement of claim and the respondent a defence within the agreed or tribunal-fixed period, each amendable unless the tribunal thinks it inappropriate given the delay (Article 39). Subject to party agreement, the tribunal decides whether to hold hearings or proceed on documents, but must hold a hearing if a party requests one (Article 40). Default does not halt matters: under Article 41, the tribunal terminates if the claimant fails without cause to submit its claim, continues (without treating silence as admission) if the respondent fails to defend, and may award on the available evidence if a party fails to appear or produce documents. It may appoint an expert (Article 42) and seek the court’s assistance in taking evidence (Article 43).

The Law on Domestic Arbitration rests on the same premise – party autonomy subject to equal treatment and a fair opportunity to be heard, with statements of claim and defence, hearings or documents-only determination and default consequences – and imposes no materially different compulsory steps.

The ICA Law confers on the tribunal the powers needed to conduct the arbitration effectively and imposes on it a small core of mandatory duties.

As to powers, the tribunal may determine procedure and rule on the admissibility, relevance and weight of evidence (Article 34), rule on its own jurisdiction (Article 21), order interim measures (Article 22) and continue to an award despite a party’s default (Article 41). As to duties, it must treat the parties equally and give each a reasonable opportunity to present its case (Article 33), and each arbitrator must disclose circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality (Article 17). Arbitrators enjoy immunity for acts and omissions in the proceedings, save intentional misconduct (Article 6). Further duties – availability, confidentiality, timely conduct – derive from the chosen institutional rules.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration imposes an equivalent framework – powers to govern procedure, to rule on evidence and on its own jurisdiction (Article 24) and to address default, with duties centred on equal treatment, a fair hearing and the disclosure and impartiality obligations tied to Article 14; the remaining duties come from the chosen permanent arbitration court’s rules.

Arbitration imposes no special qualification requirement on a party’s representatives. Under Article 38 of the ICA Law the parties may be represented by persons of their choice; there is no requirement to be an Uzbek-qualified advocate, and foreign lawyers may appear in an international arbitration seated in Uzbekistan.

The position is the same in substance for domestic arbitration under the Law on Domestic Arbitration: representation before the arbitral tribunal is not confined to licensed advocates, and the parties may appoint representatives of their choosing, subject to a narrow statutory bar (introduced in 2026) preventing a person who sat as arbitrator in the case from then acting as a party’s representative in it, with any further requirements coming from the rules of the chosen permanent arbitration court.

This differs from representation before the state courts – including in ancillary set-aside or enforcement proceedings – where the ordinary rules on court representation and advocate licensing apply and a locally qualified advocate is generally required.

The approach is one of tribunal control and party autonomy, not court-style discovery. Under Article 34 of the ICA Law, the tribunal determines the admissibility, relevance and weight of evidence, subject to party agreement and equal treatment; there is no discovery or compulsory disclosure, and matters such as privilege are left to the tribunal and any rules the parties adopt. The tribunal may appoint an expert (Article 42) and seek the court’s assistance in taking evidence (Article 43), given effect through the EP Code.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration treats evidence more prescriptively: it requires the parties to prove the circumstances on which they rely and regulates the exchange of documents and materials between them, and a domestic tribunal remains anchored to Uzbek rules of evidence rather than enjoying the broader procedural latitude of the ICA Law regime.

Arbitral proceedings seated in Uzbekistan are not governed by any mandatory code of evidence. Under Article 34 of the ICA Law, the tribunal determines admissibility, relevance and weight, subject to party agreement and equal treatment; an international tribunal is therefore not bound by the rules of evidence applied in the state courts and may, where the parties agree or it thinks fit, be guided by soft-law instruments such as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence.

Domestic arbitration is closer to the court model: under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, the parties bear the burden of proving the circumstances they rely on, and the tribunal remains more tightly anchored to Uzbek evidentiary rules, though still short of a full court process.

An arbitral tribunal in Uzbekistan has no coercive power of its own. It may direct the parties to produce documents or to procure the attendance of witnesses, but it cannot compel compliance; its sanction against a defaulting party is procedural – under Article 41 of the ICA Law, it may continue the proceedings and draw appropriate conclusions from the evidence before it, including adverse inferences.

Where compulsion is needed, the route is court assistance: under Article 43 of the ICA Law, the tribunal, or a party with its approval, may request the competent court to take evidence, and the court applies its own coercive powers under the EP Code.

The distinction between parties and non-parties is central: the tribunal’s directions bind the parties (subject to adverse inferences for non-compliance) but not third parties, who can be reached only through the court’s assistance under Article 43. The position under the Law on Domestic Arbitration is the same – the tribunal lacks coercive power over non-parties and depends on the state courts.

Arbitration carries a statutory presumption of confidentiality: under Article 53 of the ICA Law, unless the parties agree otherwise, the proceedings and all documents prepared for or produced in the arbitration – pleadings, evidence and the award – are confidential by default.

The protection is not absolute: Article 53 permits disclosure where it is a party’s statutory duty, where necessary to protect the rights of third parties, or where otherwise necessary, including to a court in proceedings to challenge or enforce the award. Information may thus be used in later proceedings within these gateways; otherwise, the obligation stands.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration is to similar effect for domestic arbitration, treating the proceedings as private with closed hearings, though without the same detailed list of exceptions.

Under Article 47 of the ICA Law, an award must be in writing and signed by the sole arbitrator or, in a plural tribunal, by a majority (any missing signature being explained). Unless the parties agree otherwise, or the award records a settlement on agreed terms (Article 46), the award must state its reasons, its date and the place of arbitration, and a signed copy is delivered to each party.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration imposes a comparable set of mandatory elements for domestic awards – writing, reasons, date, and delivery to the parties – so that the two regimes share the same essential architecture, with any additional formalities supplied by the rules of the chosen permanent arbitration court.

Neither regime fixes a statutory deadline for rendering the award. Any time limit derives instead from the institutional rules the parties have adopted or from their agreement with the tribunal.

Uzbek law does not enumerate or cap the remedies a tribunal may grant. Under Article 44 of the ICA Law, the tribunal decides according to the law chosen by the parties, the contract and trade usages, and may award any remedy available under that law – damages, contractually stipulated sums, declaratory relief, rectification, specific performance or injunctive relief.

The real constraint operates at enforcement: a remedy is not precluded merely because it is unknown to Uzbek law, but recognition and enforcement may be refused under Article 52 of the ICA Law on public-policy grounds, which are narrowly construed. A remedy alien to fundamental principles, such as punitive or exemplary damages, is the likeliest candidate for such an objection.

Under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, the position is tighter, because a domestic tribunal resolves the dispute under Uzbek substantive law: its remedies are in practice confined to those Uzbek law recognises, so remedies such as punitive damages fall away at the merits stage rather than only at enforcement.

Interest is not regulated in detail by either regime, and cost allocation is left to the rules and the tribunal only under the international regime; the domestic regime prescribes it by statute.

On costs, the ICA Law does not lay down a costs regime, so their allocation is governed by the institutional rules the parties have adopted or by their agreement, which typically leave the tribunal a broad discretion to apportion the costs of the arbitration – the arbitrators’ fees, administrative charges and the parties’ legal costs – in light of the outcome and the parties’ conduct. In practice, Uzbekistan follows the “costs follow the event” approach: the tribunal ordinarily awards the successful party its reasonable costs, adjusted for the parties’ conduct, rather than dividing costs equally.

On interest, a party may recover interest where the applicable substantive law and the parties’ agreement so allow; where Uzbek law governs, statutory interest on monetary obligations provides the basis, and the tribunal fixes the rate and period accordingly.

Under the Law on Domestic Arbitration, however, costs allocation is largely prescribed by statute rather than left to the tribunal’s discretion. Article 22 of the Law on Domestic Arbitration directs the arbitration court to allocate the costs of the proceedings first in accordance with the parties’ agreement and, failing such agreement, in proportion to the claims granted and rejected. The successful party’s representative (legal) fees and its other costs of the proceedings may be shifted onto the other party only where reimbursement was requested during the proceedings and granted by the tribunal, with the allocation set out in the award or ruling. Interest, by contrast, is not addressed by the Law on Domestic Arbitration and is recovered under Uzbek substantive law where the applicable law and the parties’ agreement so allow.

An award is not open to appeal on its merits. The only recourse against an award seated in Uzbekistan is an application to set it aside, heard by the economic court, which examines the statutory grounds alone and does not review the substance of the dispute.

Under Article 50 of the ICA Law those grounds are exhaustive and track the international standard: incapacity of a party or invalidity of the agreement; want of proper notice or inability to present one’s case; excess of mandate; improper composition or procedure; non-arbitrability under Uzbek law; and conflict with public policy. The application must be made within three months of receipt of the award and is given effect through the EP Code; the court may suspend proceedings to let the tribunal cure the defect. The same grounds – invalid agreement, excess of mandate, non-arbitrability, public policy – also justify refusing recognition and enforcement under Article 52.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration follows a parallel structure for domestic awards, with a closely comparable and exhaustive list of setting-aside grounds – invalidity of the arbitration agreement, excess of scope, improper composition or procedure, want of proper notice, and non-arbitrability. Unlike the international regime, the Law on Domestic Arbitration contains no separate public-policy ground – neither for setting aside nor for refusing enforcement.

Parties cannot contract out of, or add to, the statutory grounds of challenge. The setting-aside grounds in Article 50 of the ICA Law are mandatory: they protect due process and the public interest and cannot be waived, narrowed or enlarged by agreement, nor can a right to appeal on the merits be created by contract.

The parties may adjust procedural entitlements that do not touch these guarantees – for example, agreeing under Article 47 that the award need not state reasons, or an abbreviated procedure – provided each retains a reasonable opportunity to present its case. Any agreement excluding review on due-process or public-policy grounds is ineffective.

The Law on Domestic Arbitration is to the same effect for domestic awards: its setting-aside grounds are likewise mandatory and exhaustive, cannot be expanded or excluded by agreement, and confer no merits appeal, while the parties retain the same limited freedom to shape procedural details that do not compromise the fundamental guarantees.

Uzbek law provides no review of an award on its merits. The court does not revisit the tribunal’s findings of fact or law; it verifies only whether a statutory ground for setting aside or refusing enforcement is made out. The standard as to substance is thus near-total deference, while the enumerated procedural and jurisdictional grounds are examined independently.

Uzbekistan is a party to the New York Convention, having acceded on 7 February 1996 (in force from 7 May 1996) without the reciprocity or “commercial” reservations under Article I(3), so it applies without those limitations.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign award proceeds under the New York Convention and the EP Code, principally Chapter 33 (Articles 248–256). The creditor applies to the competent economic court at the debtor’s residence or registration (Article 249); where the debtor is a natural person acting non-commercially, the Civil Procedure Code applies similarly. The application is determined within six months and, if granted, yields a writ of execution. The applicant must produce the authenticated award and arbitration agreement, or certified copies (Article IV of the New York Convention), with a certified Uzbek translation. There is no review of the merits; enforcement may be refused only on the exhaustive grounds in Article 256 of the EP Code, which reproduce Article V of the Convention.

An award annulled at the seat engages the ground in Article 256 of the EP Code (Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention), and the courts would ordinarily decline to enforce it. Where set-aside proceedings are pending at the seat, the enforcing court may, under Article VI of the New York Convention, adjourn enforcement pending their outcome and order the debtor to provide security; the suspension is discretionary, not automatic.

As to sovereign immunity, Uzbek law lays down no comprehensive statutory regime of immunity from execution. A plea by a state or state entity is assessed along restrictive lines: a state that has agreed to arbitrate a commercial matter is generally taken to have submitted, so immunity from jurisdiction does not bar recognition, though immunity from execution may still be invoked over particular categories of protected state property.

Domestic awards are enforced through the same economic-court machinery under the EP Code, on application for a writ of execution, the Law on Domestic Arbitration prescribing refusal grounds corresponding in substance to those for foreign awards.

The courts’ approach to recognition and enforcement is increasingly favourable, reinforced by the 2023 Supreme Court Guidance and the EP Code procedure; refusal is confined to the exhaustive grounds of the New York Convention and the ICA Law.

The public-policy ground is construed narrowly. It operates as a safeguard against awards that offend the fundamental principles of Uzbek law and justice, not as a means of policing divergence from ordinary domestic substantive rules; in substance, the courts apply the restrictive, international conception of public policy (ordre public international) rather than the whole body of mandatory domestic law. This is illustrated by the ruling of the Supreme Court of 2 March 2023 enforcing an award issued under the rules of the Russian Arbitration Center. The debtor argued that enforcement offended public policy because the creditor had named a bank under US sanctions as its servicing bank; the court held that the existence of such sanctions did not of itself render enforcement contrary to, or a threat to, Uzbek public policy, and upheld the grant of enforcement.

Domestic awards are not a perfect mirror. The Law on Domestic Arbitration enforces through a writ-of-execution procedure, not New York Convention-style recognition, and has no public-policy ground. A court may refuse a writ only on invalidity, excess of scope, want of proper notice, improper composition or procedure and non-arbitrability grounds. These are exhaustive and bar any review of the merits.

Uzbek law makes no provision for class or group arbitration. Neither the ICA Law nor the Law on Domestic Arbitration contemplates collective or representative claims, and no mechanism binds a class of unnamed claimants to a single arbitration.

This follows from the consensual basis of arbitration: jurisdiction rests on agreement, so only those who have consented may be joined. Multiparty proceedings are possible only where all parties are bound by the same agreement, and even then, the tribunal is constituted by the parties’ agreement or the chosen institutional rules, not by any class mechanism.

There is no arbitration-specific statutory code of ethics in Uzbekistan; the applicable standards come from several overlapping sources.

For arbitrators, the governing standards are the statutory duties of independence, impartiality and continuing disclosure under the ICA Law (and the corresponding eligibility and disclosure requirements of the Law on Domestic Arbitration for domestic arbitration), supplemented by the conduct rules and codes of ethics of the chosen arbitral institution.

For counsel, the position depends on their qualification. A locally licensed advocate is bound by the Law “On Advocacy” and the professional code of ethics of the Uzbek advocates’ Bar; foreign lawyers appearing in an arbitration seated in Uzbekistan remain subject to the professional and ethical rules of their home Bar.

Uzbekistan has no specific legislation or rules governing third-party funding of arbitration or litigation. Neither the ICA Law nor the Law on Domestic Arbitration addresses the practice, and there is no statutory regime imposing licensing, capital, disclosure or control requirements on funders, nor any express prohibition of the kind associated with the old doctrines of maintenance and champerty.

Neither the ICA Law nor the Law on Domestic Arbitration confers a power to consolidate separate arbitral proceedings, and the courts have no such power either. Consolidation is therefore not available as a matter of statute, in keeping with the consensual basis of arbitration.

It can be achieved only through the parties' agreement – most practically by their adoption of institutional rules that provide for it.

Under Uzbek law, the question is governed by the consensual basis of arbitration and by the general civil law on the transfer of obligations.

As explained in 5.6 Jurisdiction Over Third Parties, consent governs: under Article 12 of the ICA Law, only the parties to the arbitration agreement are bound, and a third party becomes bound only where, under the general civil law, it steps into the underlying relationship carrying the clause – through assignment, succession or agency – and not through any arbitration-specific doctrine such as “group of companies”. The award binds only the parties and their successors.

As to foreign third parties, the courts cannot draw a non-consenting third party, of any nationality, into an arbitration agreement or make an award binding on it; the question turns solely on the applicable substantive law and the facts, with no distinction between domestic and foreign parties.