International arbitration in Zambia is still at a relatively early stage of development, with institutional infrastructure only recently being put in place to support cross-border arbitration. A 2025 International Arbitration Survey by the School of International Arbitration, Queen Mary University of London, indicated that African parties continue to prefer established arbitral seats such as London, Paris, Singapore, Geneva and Dubai, largely due to institutional limitations within Africa and the perceived reliability of those centres. Cost is also a significant factor, with international arbitration often viewed as expensive and less accessible.
However, the commissioning of the Lusaka International Arbitration Centre (LIAC) on 5 April 2024 is expected to improve Zambia’s attractiveness as a regional seat of arbitration and to increase the use of international arbitration in practice.
Among domestic parties, arbitration is becoming more widely accepted, particularly in cross-border commercial transactions, although litigation remains the predominant dispute resolution mechanism, with negotiation often used informally as a first step due to its cost-effectiveness.
Where arbitration is chosen, it is most commonly incorporated at the contract drafting stage as the agreed dispute resolution mechanism. However, there is also a growing trend of statutory arbitration in Zambia, where legislation prescribes that certain disputes must be determined by arbitration, for example, disputes arising from a decision taken under the Public Procurement Act.
Zambia also serves as a seat of arbitration in some cases, and with LIAC’s establishment, its role as a regional arbitral hub is anticipated to grow. By contrast, the use of international arbitration in Zambia for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards remains relatively infrequent.
The industries that have experienced the most significant international arbitration activity in recent years are energy, mining and construction.
In the energy sector, Zambia has faced persistent power shortages linked to droughts, most recently associated with El Niño and climate change. One notable arbitration arose in December 2022 between Maamba Collieries Limited (a subsidiary of NAVA Limited, formerly NAVA Bharat Ventures Limited) and Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation Limited (ZESCO). The arbitral tribunal issued a consent award requiring ZESCO to settle an outstanding sum of approximately USD518 million.
The mining sector remains Zambia’s largest industry and a key recipient of foreign investment. With government plans to increase copper production to 3 million tonnes by 2031, there has been significant expansion of large-scale projects involving copper, cobalt and manganese, with major international companies engaged. Given the scale of investment, the complexity of concession and joint venture agreements, and the involvement of foreign investors, arbitration has become the preferred method of dispute resolution in the sector. Recent disputes have involved parties such as Konkola Copper Mines and Kansanshi Mining Limited.
The construction sector has arguably been the pioneer and leading driver of international arbitration in Zambia, particularly in disputes arising under FIDIC contracts (standard form contracts developed by the International Federation of Consulting Engineers and widely used in large-scale infrastructure projects). FIDIC contracts encourage the use of alternative dispute resolution and have been instrumental in embedding arbitration within the construction industry in Zambia. Their adoption has largely propelled the growth of arbitration in this sector. Furthermore, because most heavy construction contracts in Zambia are procured by the state, the Public Procurement Act mandates that disputes under such contracts be resolved by arbitration. This statutory framework, coupled with the international character of many contractors and financiers, has reinforced arbitration as the default mechanism for resolving high-value construction disputes in Zambia.
These sectors are more prone to international arbitration due to their cross-border investment structures, the high value of contracts, frequent state involvement, and investor preference for neutral dispute resolution outside the Zambian courts.
Until recently, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb) has been the primary arbitration institution in Zambia. CIArb has served as the default forum owing to its established rules and procedures, as well as the availability of accredited practitioners within Zambia, which gave parties confidence in the neutrality and enforceability of awards.
In April 2024, LIAC was established in Lusaka to provide a dedicated forum for the administration of both international commercial and domestic arbitrations, as well as other alternative dispute resolution processes. Its establishment reflects the growing demand from the business community for a reputable local institution capable of ensuring efficient and speedy resolution of commercial disputes. Although still new, LIAC is expected to play an increasingly significant role as Zambia positions itself as a regional hub for arbitration.
Importantly, Zambian law imposes no restrictions on parties choosing international arbitration institutions. As such, parties to an international arbitration remain free to designate leading global arbitral bodies – such as the ICC International Court of Arbitration, the London Court of International Arbitration or others – as their administering institution.
In practice, this often occurs where one or more parties to the agreement is a large foreign entity. In such cases, it is also common for the parties to select a neutral foreign seat of arbitration to ensure neutrality and enforceability. At such a hearing, the parties will ordinarily adopt a foreign administering institution. A notable example of such an arrangement is the high-profile shareholders’ dispute between ZCCM-IH and Vedanta Resources concerning the Konkola Copper Mines, in which arbitration was seated outside Zambia.
In Zambia, there is currently no specialist court designated for arbitration-related disputes. Jurisdiction in such matters is vested in the High Court of Zambia as the court of first instance, with appeals lying to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the Supreme Court. On rare occasions where a dispute raises constitutional issues, it may be determined before the Constitutional Court.
Section 10 of Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000 (the “Arbitration Act”) provides that where legal proceedings are brought before a court in a matter that is the subject of an arbitration agreement, the court shall stay the proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration – except where the agreement is found to be null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.
For purposes of the Act, Section 2 defines “court” as the High Court or any other court that may be designated by statutory instrument by the Chief Justice of Zambia. While no such designation has been made to date, this provision creates statutory authority for the Chief Justice to establish a specialist court or division of the High Court to hear arbitration matters in the future.
International arbitration in Zambia is governed by the Arbitration Act, which applies to both domestic and international arbitration. The preamble to the Act makes clear that it repeals and replaces the former Arbitration Act to provide for arbitration through the adoption, with modifications, of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985).
Section 8 of the Act regulates the application of the Model Law. Under Section 8(1), where the seat of arbitration is in Zambia, the Model Law applies in full, subject to the modifications contained in the Act. Section 8(2) provides that where the seat is outside Zambia, only Articles 8, 9, 35 and 36 apply, dealing principally with court assistance and the recognition and enforcement of awards.
Zambian courts have affirmed that the Act is, in substance, the Model Law with modifications tailored to the local legal system. In China Henan International Cooperation Group Company Limited v G & G Nationwide (Z) Limited (Supreme Court Appeal No. 199 of 2016) and Moba Hotel & Convention Centre Ltd v Lyco Business Solutions Ltd (Court of Appeal Appeal No. 66 of 2022), the courts emphasised that certain Articles of the Model Law are expressly replaced by provisions of the Act to ensure consistency with Zambia’s legal framework while maintaining international alignment.
It should be noted, however, that the Act has not been amended to incorporate the 2006 revisions to the Model Law. Zambia’s arbitration regime therefore continues to reflect the 1985 version, subject to domestic modification.
In addition, Zambia enacted the International Investment Disputes Act, which domestically incorporates the provisions of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”). This provides the framework for recognition and enforcement of awards rendered under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Beyond these instruments, certain sector-specific statutes provide for “statutory arbitration” in particular types of disputes. Notably, the Public Procurement Act mandates arbitration for disputes arising from a public procurement decision, while the more recent Minerals Regulation Commission Act of 2025 also includes arbitration as an option for resolution of disputes relating to mining and surface rights. These statutory frameworks reflect an emerging attitude in Zambia to have arbitration as a central mechanism for dispute resolution in Zambia’s key economic industries.
There have been no recent changes to the Arbitration Act, and no pending legislation is expected to alter the arbitration landscape.
Under Zambian law, an arbitration agreement is enforceable if it is in writing and clearly demonstrates the parties’ intention to submit disputes to arbitration. Section 9 of the Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration agreement may appear as a clause in a contract or as a separate agreement.
An agreement is deemed “in writing” if it is contained in a signed document or established through an exchange of correspondence, such as letters, telexes, telegrams or other means of communication, that provide a record of the agreement. The Act further recognises an arbitration agreement where its existence is alleged in pleadings (such as a statement of claim or defence) and not traversed by the opposing party.
Additionally, where a contract refers to another document containing an arbitration clause, that reference suffices to constitute a valid arbitration agreement, provided the main contract itself is in writing. Similarly, an agreement that incorporates written terms by reference is also treated as being in writing.
Once these formal requirements are satisfied, Zambian courts will generally uphold and enforce arbitration agreements, staying court proceedings and compelling parties to arbitrate their disputes.
Section 6(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly excludes certain subject matters from arbitration in Zambia. These include:
The general approach of taken in Zambia is twofold. First, the courts assess whether the dispute falls within the categories expressly excluded under the Arbitration Act. Second, where no statutory exclusion applies, the courts examine the wording of the arbitration clause to determine whether the dispute is within its scope.
The Supreme Court has affirmed this approach in African Alliance Pioneer Master Fund v Vehicle Finance Limited (Appeal No. 21 of 2011), emphasising that arbitrability is governed by the law of the seat regardless of what the parties’ choice of procedure is. Similarly, in Audrey Nyambe v Total Zambia Limited (SCZ Appeal No. 29 of 2011), the Court underscored the importance of closely studying the wording of the arbitration clause when determining whether a dispute is amenable to arbitration.
More recently, the Court of Appeal in Cobham Capital Limited v African Inland Container Depot Zambia Limited (Appeal No. 270 of 2024) provided important guidance on the scope of the public policy exception. Recognising that the Arbitration Act does not define “public policy”, the Court adopted a narrow and deferential approach, holding that the public policy ground is confined to exceptional cases where an arbitral award is incompatible with the fundamental values and foundational legal principles of the Zambian legal system. The Court cautioned that setting-aside proceedings should not become disguised appeals on the merits and that mere errors of law or fact, or isolated breaches of legal rules, will not ordinarily amount to a violation of public policy. Rather, the award must, viewed as a whole, offend essential and widely recognised principles underpinning the legal order before judicial intervention is warranted.
The arbitrability of employment discrimination claims has recently been the subject of significant judicial consideration. In Hambani Ngwenya & Another v Lubambe Copper Mine Limited (2025 ZMSC 31), the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether claims for unfair discrimination under Section 5 of the Employment Code Act are capable of settlement by arbitration and whether such claims are excluded on public policy grounds notwithstanding Section 6 of the Arbitration Act. Earlier, the Court of Appeal in the said matter of Hambani Ngwenya & Another v Lubambe Copper Mine Limited (Application No. SP 49 of 2024) (2025 ZMCA 72) held that discrimination claims under the Employment Code Act are matters of public law and are therefore not amenable to arbitration. The Supreme Court’s decision, which is still pending, is expected to provide authoritative guidance on the arbitrability of statutory employment rights in Zambia.
Accordingly, arbitrability in Zambia is determined by reference to the statutory exclusions in the Arbitration Act, the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement, the law of the seat of arbitration and, where public policy is invoked, a narrowly construed incompatibility test that limits court intervention to exceptional circumstances.
Determination of Governing Law
The Zambian courts’ approach to determining the law governing an arbitration agreement is to give effect to what the parties expressly agreed.
In Sigma Financial Solutions and 3 Others v Chongo Kalela Sinyangwe (Appeal No. 4/2023), the Court of Appeal enforced a clause providing for UAE law and the exclusive jurisdiction of Dubai courts, holding that parties who have expressly chosen a foreign law and forum are bound by that choice unless another forum is clearly more appropriate under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Similarly, in Chansa Chipili, Powerflex (Z) Limited v Wellingtone Kanshimike and Wilson Kalumba (2012) Vol. 3 ZR 483, the Supreme Court emphasised that in cross-border commercial transactions with foreign jurisdiction clauses, the parties’ choice of law and forum is paramount, although Zambian courts may still examine whether local jurisdiction is justified by the circumstances.
The overall approach is therefore pro-enforcement: courts will usually uphold arbitration agreements and the governing law chosen by the parties, unless strong reasons exist to depart.
Enforcement
With respect to enforcement, Zambian courts are firmly aligned with Section 10 of the Arbitration Act, which obliges a court to stay proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement unless the agreement is null, void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. In Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited v ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc (CAZ/08/249/2019), the Court of Appeal affirmed that as a general rule, courts must refer a matter to arbitration where an arbitration clause exists, provided a party to the agreement requests such referral. Likewise, in Beza Consulting Inc. Limited v Bari Zambia Limited and Gidey Genremariam Egziabher (CAZ Appeal No. 171/2018), the Court clarified that Section 10 requires the ouster of the Court’s jurisdiction to be triggered by a request by a party to the arbitration agreement who is also a party to the proceedings.
The principle was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Konkola Copper Mines v NFC Africa Mining (SCZ Appeal No. 118 of 2006), where it was held that once an arbitration clause exists and a party applies for a stay under Section 10, the Court has no discretion but to refer the matter to arbitration.
Recent jurisprudence has reinforced the procedural requirements for enforcing arbitration agreements. In Cosmas Mulenga v Bright Jangazya (Appeal No. 262 of 2024) (2026 ZMCA), the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause does not automatically oust the Court’s jurisdiction. Rather, under Section 10 of the Arbitration Act, proceedings may only be stayed and referred to arbitration upon the application of a party. Similarly, in Roland Imperial Tobacco Company Limited v Bpifrance Assurance Export (2026 ZMCA 74), the Court reaffirmed that arbitration is consensual and that a court cannot, of its own motion, refer parties to arbitration or compel a non-party to an arbitration agreement to arbitrate. These decisions reinforce the procedural framework governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements in Zambia.
In practice, arbitration agreements are therefore readily enforced by Zambian courts, reflecting alignment with international arbitration standards and recognition of arbitration as an effective alternative method of dispute resolution.
Under Zambian law, an arbitration clause may still be valid even if the rest of the contract is found invalid. Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, as adopted into Zambian law through the Arbitration Act, provides for the doctrine of separability, stating that an arbitration clause forming part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by a court or tribunal that the contract is null and void does not automatically invalidate the arbitration clause. This means that Zambian courts apply the rule of separability, thereby upholding the arbitration clause and allowing arbitral proceedings to continue, even where the underlying agreement is challenged.
Under Zambian law, parties enjoy broad autonomy in selecting arbitrators. Section 12(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly allows parties to agree on the procedure for appointing arbitrators. The main limits are that arbitrators must be independent and impartial and must meet any qualifications agreed by the parties. Article 10 of the UNCITRAL Model Law in the First Schedule states that parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators and that failing such determination, the number of arbitrators shall be three. If these requirements are not met, the appointment may be challenged or set aside.
Where the parties’ chosen method of selecting arbitrators fails, the Arbitration Act provides a default framework. Under Section 12(3) of the Act, if the arbitration is with three arbitrators, each party appoints one arbitrator and the two arbitrators then appoint the third. If a party fails, or the two cannot agree, an arbitral institution makes the appointment. For sole arbitrator cases, if the parties cannot agree, the appointment is also made by an arbitral institution. In multiparty arbitrations, the Act does not prescribe a separate rule. In practice, the default provisions under Section 12(3) apply, with institutional or court assistance if the parties cannot agree.
Section 12(4) of the Arbitration Act empowers the court to intervene in the appointment process where a party fails to act, the parties or arbitrators are unable to agree, or a third party/institution fails to perform its role. The court’s decision under Section 12(5) is final and not subject to appeal. However, in exercising this power, the court must respect party autonomy and consider the agreed qualifications and the need for independence, impartiality and, where relevant, diversity of nationality as per Section 12(6).
In Zambia, the grounds and procedure for challenging or removing arbitrators are governed by Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. An arbitrator may be challenged where circumstances give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality, or if they do not possess the qualifications agreed upon by the parties. The procedure for raising a challenge may be agreed upon by the parties. If no procedure is set out, a party may submit a written statement of the grounds for challenge within 15 days of becoming aware of the relevant circumstances or of the arbitrator’s appointment. The mandate of an arbitrator may also be terminated where the arbitrator becomes unable to perform their functions or acts with undue delay. These provisions ensure that, while parties enjoy wide autonomy in the appointment of arbitrators, safeguards exist to maintain the integrity, independence and impartiality of the arbitral tribunal.
Under Zambian law, arbitrators are required to be independent and impartial. Article 12(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, incorporated as the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act, places an ongoing duty on arbitrators to disclose any circumstances that may give rise to justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality. This duty applies from the moment a person is approached for appointment and subsists throughout the arbitral proceedings, and arbitrators must promptly inform the parties of any such circumstances unless the parties have already been made aware. In addition to statutory requirements, the LIAC Rules impose similar obligations. Under Articles 11(4) and (5) of the LIAC Rules, a nominated arbitrator must disclose in writing any facts or circumstances that could raise justifiable doubts as to their independence or impartiality both before appointment and continuously throughout the proceedings. These combined statutory and institutional safeguards ensure transparency, fairness and integrity in Zambian arbitration proceedings, reinforcing the parties’ confidence in the arbitral process.
Zambian law recognises the jurisprudential principle of “kompetenz-kompetenz”, which allows an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections regarding the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. This principle is reflected in Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, incorporated as the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act. In practice, this means that arbitral tribunals in Zambia can determine their competence before any court intervention, although courts retain the power to review such decisions when enforcement or setting aside of awards is sought.
Under Zambian law, courts may intervene on issues of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction primarily when a party challenges a ruling by the tribunal confirming its jurisdiction. Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, as applied in Zambia, provides that such an application must typically be made to the court within 30 days of notice of the tribunal’s ruling. The decision of the court on these matters is final and not subject to appeal. Our courts exercise this power cautiously and generally exhibit reluctance to intervene, respecting the tribunal’s authority while ensuring that statutory and procedural requirements are observed.
Under Zambian law, a party may challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction once the arbitral tribunal has ruled on its competence. Where the tribunal issues a preliminary ruling affirming its jurisdiction, Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, as applied in Zambia, provides that any party may, within 30 days of receiving notice of that ruling, request the court designated under Article 6 to determine the matter. The court’s decision is final and not subject to appeal.
Crucially, while such a request is pending before the court, the arbitral tribunal is not obliged to suspend proceedings; it may continue with the arbitration and even render an award. This framework ensures that jurisdictional objections are dealt with expeditiously, while safeguarding the continuity and efficiency of the arbitral process.
When jurisdictional or admissibility questions are brought before the courts, judicial review is conducted on a fresh assessment (de novo). However, it is important to note that arbitration proceedings themselves do not fall within the scope of judicial review in Zambia.
As earlier discussed, Zambian courts consistently take a pro-arbitration approach when a party commences court proceedings in breach of a valid arbitration agreement. Section 10 of the Arbitration Act, together with the High Court Rules, empowers courts to stay proceedings and refer disputes to arbitration.
The Supreme Court has emphasised that once parties agree to arbitrate, the court’s jurisdiction is ousted unless the arbitration agreement is null, void, or incapable of being performed. Cases such as ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc v Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited and Konkola Copper Mines Plc and Savenda Management Services Limited v Stanbic Bank Zambia Limited reflect this general willingness to uphold arbitration agreements and encourage alternative dispute resolution.
The approach of our courts therefore is heavily pro-referral to arbitration where proceedings in court have been commenced in breach of an arbitration agreement.
Under Zambian law, an arbitral tribunal generally has no authority to assume jurisdiction over parties who are signatories to neither the arbitration agreement nor the underlying contract. The courts have consistently held that non-parties cannot be bound by the terms or outcomes of an arbitration agreement to which they are not privy. For example, in the case of Ody’s Oil Company Limited v The Attorney General and Constantinos James Papoustis, the court held that a third party cannot be compelled to participate in or be bound by arbitration proceedings in the absence of express consent or a legal provision permitting such jurisdiction. Consequently, tribunals’ jurisdiction is confined to the parties who have agreed to arbitrate. The rationale is that arbitration is a voluntary and consensual process.
The principle of privity was recently reaffirmed in Roland Imperial Tobacco Company Limited v Bpifrance Assurance Export (2026 ZMCA 74). The Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause contained in a supply contract between the Appellant and Decoufle Sarl did not bind the Respondent, who, although an assignee of receivables under bills of exchange, was not a party to the supply contract. The Court emphasised that the assignment transferred only the receivables and did not extend to the contractual rights and obligations arising under the supply agreement, including the arbitration clause. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement was enforceable only between the parties to that agreement in the circumstances of the case. The decision reaffirms the principles of privity and consent in arbitration, confirming that a person who is not party to an arbitration agreement cannot ordinarily be compelled to arbitrate.
Under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, arbitral tribunals in Zambia are empowered to grant interim or preliminary relief and such relief is binding on the parties. The term “award” under the Act expressly includes interim and preliminary awards. This position was affirmed in the case of ZCCM v Konkola Copper Mines PLC (in Provisional Liquidation) and Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited (2019/HP/0761), which held that partial awards are generally final and binding. The types of interim relief available to a tribunal include granting interim injunctions, requiring parties to deposit funds to cover arbitration costs, compelling witnesses to attend or produce documents, ordering the discovery of documents, taking evidence out of jurisdiction, and detaining, preserving, inspecting or testing property relevant to the arbitration. These measures are designed to protect the subject matter of the dispute and ensure that the final award can be effectively enforced.
Power of Court to Grant Interim Relief
Under Zambian law, the courts play a limited but supportive role in relation to interim relief in arbitral proceedings. Section 11 of the Arbitration Act empowers a party to request from the court, before or during arbitration, measures for the preservation, custody, sale or inspection of goods in dispute, for securing the amount in dispute or costs, or for interim injunctions, or any other measure necessary to ensure that an arbitral award is not rendered ineffectual. The court may only grant such relief where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been appointed and urgency requires intervention, where the tribunal lacks competence to grant the relief, or where urgency makes it impracticable to seek the relief from the tribunal. Relief will not be granted where the tribunal, being competent, has already determined the application. In Zambia Logistics Limited v ARS Freight Company Limited, the High Court confirmed its powers under Section 11(2) to grant such measures. Furthermore, Section 14(4) allows a tribunal, or a party with the tribunal’s approval, to request executory assistance from the courts in relation to powers conferred on the tribunal, reinforcing the courts’ supportive role.
Zambian courts may, in exceptional circumstances, grant interim relief in aid of foreign-seated arbitrations. In U&M Mining Zambia Limited v Konkola Copper Mines plc [2013] EWHC 260 (Comm), it was recognised that while courts at the seat ordinarily exercise primary supervision, local courts may intervene where urgent measures are necessary for practical reasons and where intervention does not circumvent the arbitration agreement.
Appointment of Emergency Arbitrators
The Arbitration Act does not provide for emergency arbitrators. Urgent relief in Zambia must therefore be sought either from the arbitral tribunal once constituted or, where permitted, directly from the courts in accordance with the statutory framework.
Zambian law allows both courts and arbitral tribunals to order security for costs. Under Section 11(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, the High Court can require a party to provide security for costs, while Section 14(2)(b) empowers the tribunal to do the same. This ensures that the party bringing or defending arbitration has sufficient means to cover the expenses of the proceedings, protecting the financial integrity of the arbitration process.
Arbitral procedure in Zambia is primarily governed by the Arbitration Act. In addition, specific rules provide further guidance, including the Arbitration (Court Proceedings) Rules, Statutory Instrument No. 65 of 2001 and the Arbitration (Code of Conduct and Standards) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 12 of 2007. These rules supplement the Act, particularly in relation to the conduct and standards expected of arbitrators and the procedural interface between arbitration and the courts. Parties may also adopt institutional rules, such as those of LIAC, where agreed.
Zambian law does not prescribe rigid procedural steps for arbitration. In practice, proceedings are generally initiated by the declaration of a dispute and the appointment of arbitrators in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement as read with Section 12 of the Arbitration Act on the appointment of arbitrators.
Beyond this, procedural matters relating to the conduct of the arbitral proceedings such as submission of claims and defences, hearings, document production and the conduct of evidence are largely determined by the parties’ agreement or, in its absence, by the tribunal. This flexible approach allows the tribunal to manage the proceedings efficiently while ensuring fairness. In practice, however, parties to arbitration in Zambia largely adopt the procedure and practice in the High Court.
Powers of Arbitrators
Under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, arbitrators are vested with broad powers. These include the authority to determine their own jurisdiction, issue interim orders (including the power to compel parties to deposit fees and costs), ensure the attendance of witnesses, and detain, preserve or inspect property relevant to the dispute. Arbitrators also have the authority to manage arbitral proceedings by setting timelines and procedural rules where the parties have failed to agree. Additionally, the tribunal may determine the admissibility and weight of evidence, and decide whether to conduct oral hearings or resolve the dispute on written submissions alone.
Duties of Arbitrators
The Arbitration (Code of Conduct and Standards) Regulations impose duties requiring arbitrators to act fairly and impartially, disclose any circumstances affecting their independence or impartiality, avoid conflicts of interest, refrain from accepting gifts or hospitality from parties without consent, and ensure they possess the requisite qualifications and experience to conduct the arbitration. Arbitrators are also encouraged, where appropriate, to advise parties on the possibility of an amicable settlement.
Section 21 of the Arbitration Act provides that, unless the parties agree otherwise, a participant in arbitration may be represented by a legal practitioner or by any other person of their choice. This allows a party to be represented by a qualified legal practitioner, a foreign-trained legal professional, or any other individual the party considers appropriate.
The collection and submission of evidence in arbitration proceedings seated in Zambia is primarily governed by the Arbitration Act, which incorporates the UNCITRAL Model Law and the agreement of the parties to arbitration.
Pleading Stage
Article 23 of the Model Law provides that each party shall set out the facts supporting its claim or defence and may either (i) refer to the documents and other evidence it intends to rely upon or (ii) produce such evidence together with its statement of claim or defence. In practice, parties to arbitration in Zambia often file a bundle of documents and witness statements alongside their pleadings. This reduces the need for extensive discovery procedures, which are commonly used in Zambian litigation proceedings. Arbitration practice in Zambia has a preference for procedural flexibility as opposed to the more rigid discovery rules applied in court proceedings.
Hearing Stage
Article 24 of the Model Law empowers the tribunal to determine whether the proceedings will be conducted on a documents-only basis or by way of oral hearings. Where oral hearings are held (which is the more common method), the practice generally mirrors High Court procedure where witness statements serve as evidence-in-chief, after which the witnesses may be subjected to cross-examination by the opposing party and re-examination by the party calling them. Expert evidence, if relied upon, must also be disclosed and furnished to the other side.
Privileged Evidence
Principles of privilege operate similar to court proceedings, with privileged communications, including attorney–client communications and “without prejudice” correspondence, remaining protected.
Default and Failure to Produce Evidence
Article 25 of the Model Law permits the tribunal to proceed with the arbitration and render an award on the basis of the evidence available if a party fails to appear or to produce documentary evidence.
Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that the parties are free to agree on the rules of procedure, including the rules of evidence. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal has discretion to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
In practice, although parties are not strictly bound by Zambian evidentiary rules, arbitral tribunals seated in Zambia commonly apply the same rules of evidence that govern domestic court proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise. This approach reflects prevailing arbitral practice in Zambia, where domestic evidentiary principles are frequently adopted as the framework for assessing evidence in arbitral proceedings.
The importance of party autonomy in this regard was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in SA Airlink (Pty) Limited v Zambia Skyways Limited and 5 Others (Appeal No. 10/2023). In setting aside the award, the Court held, among other things, that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of the arbitration by determining matters outside the reference, notwithstanding that the parties had agreed at the preliminary conference that the arbitration would proceed under the strict rules of evidence. The decision underscores that while arbitral tribunals enjoy procedural flexibility, they remain bound by the procedural and evidential framework agreed by the parties, and a material departure from that framework may expose an award to judicial intervention.
Section 14(3) of the Arbitration Act confers on an arbitral tribunal the power to order the attendance of a witness or production of evidence from both parties and non-parties both within and outside the jurisdiction. However, arbitral tribunals seated in Zambia do not possess direct enforcement powers. Consequently, under Section 14(4), the tribunal may request executory assistance from the courts to enforce these compulsion orders via summons or subpoenas.
In Zambia, arbitration proceedings are treated as confidential, and as such, all the proceedings – including the existence of the arbitration, the documentation and the award – are confidential, unless the parties have consented to the disclosure of arbitration or the disclosure has been ordered by law or court order in the event that the information concerns an actual or potential threat to human life or national security.
It is also the general practice that once parties move the court seeking enforcement of an award, the arbitration award and on some occasions the arbitration proceedings may become part of the court record, thereby placing the arbitration into the public domain and limiting confidentiality to the extent of disclosures made in the enforcement of the award.
The Arbitration Act prescribes the formal requirements for rendering an arbitral award. Section 16(1) of the Act provides that an award must be made in writing and signed by the arbitrator or arbitrators, as the case may be. Where there is a panel of arbitrators, it is sufficient for the majority to sign the award, provided reasons are given for any omitted signature(s).
In addition, the award must state the reasons for the decision, as well as the date and place of arbitration. The Act is silent on any statutory time limit for the delivery of an arbitral award. In practice, however, the tribunal will usually indicate an expected timeframe for delivery, and unless otherwise agreed in the procedural timetable, the date of delivery is not a legal requirement.
Arbitral tribunals in Zambia have wide discretionary powers to grant remedies that fall within the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. These include monetary damages, injunctive relief, specific performance, rescission and rectification. However, there are certain limitations on the types of remedies that may be granted, and this discretion is subject to certain statutory and public policy limitations. In particular, arbitral tribunals may not grant the following remedies:
The Zambian courts have also clarified the limits of arbitral remedies in the context of mortgage enforcement. In Metalco Industries Company Ltd & Others v First National Bank Zambia Ltd & Another (Appeal No. 222 of 2021) (2022 ZMCA 16), the Court of Appeal held that although mortgage disputes are not excluded from arbitration under the Arbitration Act, an arbitration clause contained in a facility agreement does not automatically extend to separate mortgage deeds or guarantees. The Court held that the mortgage enforcement proceedings arose under the security documents, which contained no arbitration agreement, and therefore could not be referred to arbitration.
The same approach was adopted in Nyiombo Investments Limited & Others v Standard Chartered Bank of Zambia Plc (Appeal No. 274 of 2024) (2026 ZMCA). The Court held that an arbitration clause contained in a collateral Field Warehousing and Storage Agreement did not extend to disputes concerning the enforcement of mortgages created under separate banking and security documents. The Court emphasised that the applicability of an arbitration agreement depends on the true nature of the dispute and the agreement from which it arises. These decisions confirm that arbitration is founded on consent and that the availability of arbitral remedies depends upon the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement.
Recovery of Legal Costs
Where there is no agreement between the parties on costs, the general position in Zambian arbitration proceedings is that, unless the award expressly provides otherwise, each party bears its own legal costs. The default position therefore departs from the principle that “costs follow the event”. In practice, however, arbitral tribunals typically exercise their discretion to award costs, and such awards usually follow the “costs follow the event” approach rather than legal costs being shared.
This position does not extend to the fees of the arbitral tribunal, which are subject to a cost-sharing approach. Section 16(5)(b) of the Arbitration Act provides that arbitral tribunal fees are to be shared equally between the parties.
Recovery of Interest
A party to an arbitration seated in Zambia may recover interest on sums awarded. Section 16(6) of the Arbitration Act provides that, in an international arbitration, the tribunal may award simple or compound interest on the whole or part of any sum, for such period (which usually includes the pre-award period and post-award period until settlement) and at such rate as it considers appropriate, subject to party agreement. However, given that Zambian law generally allows compound interest only where the parties expressly agree to it, and arbitration is a consensual process, the prevailing practice is for tribunals to award simple interest at the pleaded rate or such other rate as the tribunal deems appropriate in the circumstances.
Arbitral awards are not subject to appeal in Zambia. Instead, parties may seek recourse by applying to the High Court to set aside an award on prescribed grounds. The grounds for setting aside are set out under Section 17(2) of the Arbitration Act and include:
Procedure for Challenging an Award
An application to set aside an arbitral award must be made within three months from the date on which the award was received. However, Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that an award cannot be set aside where an application for correction or interpretation of the award has been made.
In Zambia, parties cannot agree to exclude any statutory ground for setting aside an arbitral award or to expand those grounds. The Arbitration Act prescribes the method and grounds for challenging an award in mandatory terms. While arbitration is a consensual process, its framework remains subject to public policy considerations. Accordingly, parties cannot contract out of or extend beyond the statutory framework, as doing so would be contrary to public policy.
The standard of judicial review in Zambia is deferential rather than de novo. Although not expressly set out in the Arbitration Act, Zambian case law demonstrates a consistent judicial approach of restraint, with the courts declining to review the merits of an arbitral award or to re-hear the dispute. The courts’ supervisory role is confined to ensuring that the award falls within the statutory framework and to reviewing applications brought on the prescribed grounds for setting aside. The courts have no discretion to re-examine the merits of the arbitration under any circumstances in the Zambian jurisdiction.
Zambia is a ratified signatory to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958). The Convention was domesticated through its incorporation into the Second Schedule of the Arbitration Act pursuant to Part IV of the Act, and this adoption was done without reservation.
Procedure for Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Zambia
In Zambia, the enforcement of an arbitral award begins with registration of the award in the courts. This requires filing an originating summons accompanied by an affidavit exhibiting:
Authentication is generally performed by a notary public at the seat of arbitration. Registration is necessary because arbitral tribunals in Zambia do not have the machinery to enforce or execute awards directly.
For international arbitrations seated in Zambia, the rules for recognition and enforcement under Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law apply, whereas the procedures under the New York Convention typically govern the registration and enforcement of foreign awards.
Where an award or arbitration agreement is in a foreign language, a certified English translation must also be supplied to the court before registration.
Foreign Award Subject of Setting-Aside Proceedings
Zambian courts will not enforce or recognise an award that is not binding in the jurisdiction of the arbitral seat, such as where it has been set aside or its application has been suspended. Where proceedings to set aside a foreign arbitral award are ongoing at the seat of arbitration, Zambian courts may stay enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of those proceedings. This power to stay is discretionary and determined on a case-by-case basis.
Plea of Sovereign Immunity in Enforcement
Zambia does not have legislation directly addressing sovereign immunity in the context of arbitral award enforcement. However, the principle is widely recognised in public international law and may be invoked as a defence. Its presence in Zambian law is indirectly reflected in statutes such as the Diplomatic Immunities Act, which recognises the general concept of sovereign immunity, though not directly applicable to states themselves.
The modern approach to sovereign immunity is that it is not absolute: where the dispute arises from commercial activities rather than sovereign acts, a state cannot claim immunity. In Zambia, the Zambian state enjoys specific protection from enforcement actions under the State Proceedings Act, which excludes enforcement of awards against it.
The courts in Zambia have adopted a co-operative approach towards the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, subject to public policy considerations. Enforcement will be refused on public policy grounds where an award is found to be intolerable to Zambia’s public policy or contrary to fundamental notions of justice. This was the approach emphasised in the case of Tiger Limited v Engen Petroleum (Z) Limited. It is uncommon for Zambian courts to consider foreign public policy in determining the enforceability of an award where the arbitration was seated domestically.
The law in Zambia is silent on the arbitrability of class actions. In the absence of an express prohibition or group arbitration framework, it could be argued that class actions are arbitrable. However, the arbitration framework in Zambia – and international practice – rests on party consent as the foundation of the process. Class or group arbitrations do not ordinarily anticipate prior consensus of all affected parties before proceedings are commenced. For this reason, it is unlikely that a class arbitration could proceed in Zambia without facing significant hurdles in satisfying the requirement of party consent.
The professional and ethical standards applicable to arbitrators in Zambia are set out in the Arbitration (Code of Conduct and Standards) Regulations 2000. These require arbitrators to observe the principles of fairness, impartiality, disclosure of potential conflicts of interest, and confidentiality.
In arbitrations seated in Zambia, legal practitioners admitted to the Zambian Bar must comply with the standards of professional conduct prescribed under the Legal Practitioners Act. Where foreign counsel appear in international arbitrations seated in Zambia, they are not subject to Zambian ethical and professional standards of conduct, but are ordinarily regulated by the professional rules of their home jurisdiction.
In Zambia, there are currently no restrictions or regulations governing third-party funding. In practice, the use of third-party funding in arbitration remains rare, similar to use of litigation funding in this jurisdiction. The research conducted in preparation of this Guide reveals that third-party funding is yet to be tested before the courts, but in the absence of an express prohibition, there is essentially no legal barrier to its development in the market.
The current rules of practice in arbitral proceedings, as well as the rules of court in Zambia, do not expressly provide for the consolidation of separate arbitral proceedings. As the legal framework is currently silent on this matter, it is unclear under what circumstances, if any, separate arbitrations could be consolidated.
In Zambia, the principle of consent underpins arbitration, and accordingly, third parties generally cannot be bound by an arbitration agreement or arbitral award. This reflects the doctrine of privity, under which only parties to an agreement are legally obligated by its terms. The Supreme Court confirmed this position in Vedanta Resources Holding Ltd v ZCCM Investments Plc and Konkola Copper Mines Plc. This rule applies equally to foreign third parties, and Zambian courts do not have the power to compel a third party to arbitrate or to be bound by an arbitration agreement to which they are not a party. While exceptions to the doctrine of privity could in theory apply to bind third parties, such scenarios have not yet been tested in Zambia.
The Supreme Court of Zambia reinforced this principle in SA Airlink (Pty) Limited v Zambia Skyways Limited and 5 Others, where it held that only parties to an arbitration agreement may claim the benefits arising from arbitral proceedings. The Court set aside the award, in part, because the arbitrator had made an award in favour of a non-party to the arbitration agreement. The Court held that, to the extent the award purported to confer rights on non-parties, it offended the principle of party consent, exceeded the scope of the arbitral reference and was contrary to public policy, rendering it liable to be set aside.
The same principle was recently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Roland Imperial Tobacco Company Limited v Bpifrance Assurance Export (2026 ZMCA 74). The Court held that an assignee of receivables under bills of exchange was not bound by the arbitration clause contained in the underlying supply contract because the assignment transferred only the receivables and not the contractual rights and obligations under that agreement, including the arbitration clause. The decision confirms that a person who is not party to an arbitration agreement cannot ordinarily be compelled to arbitrate, irrespective of whether that person is a domestic or foreign third party.
While recognised exceptions to the doctrine of privity may, in principle, arise in appropriate circumstances, such as through assignment, agency or succession, these issues have not yet been fully developed in Zambian arbitration jurisprudence.
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Arbitration as Economic Infrastructure: Zambia’s Mining Ambition and the Road to 2031
Zambia has set itself ambitious development targets. Under Vision 2030, the country aims to become a prosperous middle-income nation, while its mining policy seeks to increase annual copper production to three million tonnes by 2031. Achieving these objectives will require substantial expansion in productive and institutional capacity.
Every tonne of additional copper and every megawatt needed to process it arrives through:
Each says what happens when parties disagree. The quality of those clauses will determine how much of the investment programme survives its first serious dispute.
Mining sits at the centre of this network. Expanding copper production depends on agreements governing exploration, joint ventures, finance, offtake, construction, electricity, transport, water, land compensation and community obligations. A dispute under one may interrupt the wider project. Zambia’s mining ambition therefore tests whether its arbitration framework can resolve complex disputes without delaying investment, infrastructure and production.
That is worth taking literally. Dispute-resolution capacity is priced into borrowing much as transmission capacity is priced into power. Slow, unenforceable or unpredictable awards add a premium to every project. At the scale required for 2031, that premium is a national expense.
The shift to sectoral use changes the practical test. The question is no longer whether Zambia has arbitral institutions and supportive courts, but whether they can handle the disputes generated by mining, energy, construction, public procurement and infrastructure finance.
Mining and the growth of sector-specific arbitration
Zambian arbitration remains anchored in the Arbitration Act No 19 of 2000, which adopts the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and gives domestic effect to the New York Convention. Reform should incorporate the 2006 revisions, including recognition and enforcement of tribunal-ordered interim measures and provide machinery for emergency relief, consolidation and joinder.
Recent development has occurred chiefly through the following sector legislation:
These developments operate alongside LIAC, which completed its first full operational year in 2025. The question is whether its urgent relief, expedited proceedings, joinder, consolidation and award scrutiny can address multi-party, multi-contract disputes arising from mining and infrastructure expansion. Its Jus Mundi partnership can also make non-confidential awards internationally accessible.
This represents substantial development within a relatively short period. As it has occurred sector by sector, through different statutes, ministries and regulatory institutions, the next opportunity is to coordinate these developments within a more unified national dispute-resolution framework.
Arbitration is no longer always a choice
Mining illustrates arbitration’s changing character in Zambia. Disputes extend beyond licences and extraction rights to land access, compensation, environmental obligations, joint ventures, taxation, finance, offtake, guarantees, power and changes in law. Often involving several contracts, parties and jurisdictions, they must be assessed across the investment structure rather than only the mining legislation.
Public procurement is the compulsory case. Section 101 of the Public Procurement Act provides that any dispute over a decision made under that Act shall be determined by arbitration. An aggrieved bidder has ten working days from the Authority’s decision in which to refer the matter.
The courts have confirmed the mandate is real. In Wongani Investments Limited v ZPPA, the High Court held that judicial review cannot be used where the statute expressly provides for arbitration as the route. The court treated a statutory requirement with the same force as a clause the parties had negotiated, extending the logic of earlier authorities such as Leonard Ridge Safaris Limited v Zambia Wildlife Authority and Audrey Nyambe v Total Zambia Limited.
Mining exemplifies a facilitative approach. Sections 35, 39 and 40 of the Minerals Regulation Commission Act establish arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes over mining rights to land. The Commission may:
Compensation disputes with landowners and lawful occupiers disturbed by mining activity may also proceed to arbitration, subject to a three-year limitation period.
This approach is practical: the Mining Appeals Tribunal handles licensing disputes, while arbitration resolves issues of access and compensation. Section 40 serves rural landowners, often unrepresented, whose claims may be worth less than the cost of a tribunal hearing. Success will depend on affordable procedure and arbitrators experienced in land valuation.
The capacity question extends beyond land valuation. Mining, energy, construction and PPP cases need arbitrators able to manage expert-heavy disputes involving finance, engineering, valuation and public law. LIAC and professional bodies should deepen local and regional panels through sector-specific training, mentoring and smaller-case appointments. Credibility depends on both the rules and those applying them.
This cumulative shift requires clear recognition for its significant scope. Across several sectors that will deliver Zambia’s 2031 mining ambition, arbitration is increasingly prescribed, facilitated or adopted as the commercial default through legislation and market practice. That changes where the system’s legitimacy comes from. Where consent no longer explains why a party is in arbitration, the process must justify itself entirely on whether it is fair, affordable and enforceable.
Public-private partnerships: where the trend reverses
PPPs are central to the 2031 programme because Zambia lacks the fiscal room to build all required infrastructure from the national budget. The copper-production target depends on assets beyond the mine gate, such as:
Where such projects use PPP structures, the quality and consistency of their dispute clauses will directly affect investment and production.
The 2023 PPP Act does not itself allocate a dispute forum. That marks a change from section 64 of the repealed 2009 Act, which directed disputes between the contracting authority and concessionaire to the agreed mechanism or, failing agreement, arbitration under the Arbitration Act. Under the current Act, section 55(l) merely requires a PPP agreement to state its governing law and dispute mechanism. Section 90 gives an aggrieved bidder ten working days to appeal to the PPP Council and states that the Council’s decision is final.
Two consequences follow, as outlined below.
The text does not say whether a final Council decision excludes arbitration, judicial review or neither. Given the Council’s governmental composition, an unsuccessful bidder in a major procurement is unlikely to regard the question as settled.
The Act also creates dispute-prone rights without allocating a decision-maker:
Each raises the boundary between legitimate statutory power and interference with the investor’s bargain. Section 71 may become one of Zambia’s most commercially significant infrastructure provisions, yet the Act does not identify who decides how it applies.
The same facts may generate investor-state claims. Contractual arbitration enforces the PPP or mining agreement; treaty arbitration asks whether State conduct breaches applicable investment protections. Zambia is an ICSID Contracting State and qualifying investors may benefit from treaties, depending on nationality, timing and the instrument in force. Drafting should coordinate contract and treaty exposure, including waivers, parallel proceedings and attribution. Treaty protection is a distinct route, not a substitute for a sound contract.
Statutory amendment is not essential to close the gap. Section 51 requires contracting authorities to use standard solicitation documents issued by the PPP Office. Those documents and the standard project agreement can establish negotiation, adjudication or dispute-board determination, then institutional arbitration at an identified seat. They should also address consolidation, joinder, lender participation, interim relief, sovereign immunity, enforcement and award currency.
Adjudication and the construction sector
The construction sector is integral to mining expansion, as new mines, processing plants, transmission lines, roads, railways and water infrastructure will depend on major engineering and construction contracts – many of which will be based on or influenced by the FIDIC standard forms.
In Zambia, construction disputes are governed almost exclusively by contractual terms. When FIDIC standard forms retain the dispute adjudication board clause, they enable interim decisions that allow projects to advance without interruption.
Where the employer’s bargaining strength results in the board clause being deleted, the contractor has no interim remedy short of a full arbitration. Enforcement compounds the problem: a board decision that the losing party ignores must be converted into an arbitral award and the award must then be registered with the High Court. Each stage adds delay and cost to a mechanism meant to avoid both.
The draft ADR Bill proposes statutory adjudication, creating a right that exists by law rather than by contract. That would move Zambia toward the model introduced in the UK by the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and its principle that the paying party pays now and argues later. Enforcement is pivotal: reform will succeed only if adjudication decisions are swiftly enforceable, sparing successful parties from the need to pursue full arbitration before obtaining meaningful relief.
Power and the multiplication of contracts
Progress toward the 2031 target depends on coordinated electricity-market reform and mining sector expansion, together with increased generation and transmission capacity. The Electricity (Open Access) Regulations of 2024 replaced the single-buyer model under which ZESCO alone purchased independent power; producers may now sell directly to consumers through the networks of ZESCO, Copperbelt Energy Corporation and North-Western Energy Corporation.
Open access may place transmission, distribution and supply contracts around one industrial customer; consequently, a single curtailment or metering failure can create related claims across separately documented relationships. The Arbitration Act contains no express consolidation or joinder power. LIAC’s Rules do, but only where every contract consistently selects them. Without aligned clauses, parallel proceedings may arise, as occurred in the ZCCM and First Quantum Minerals disputes.
Zambian power purchase agreements and mining-finance arrangements have used United States dollar obligations. The Bank of Zambia Currency Directives, 2025 require domestic transactions in ZMW, but exempt electricity production, transmission, distribution and trading, together with financial and mining transactions. Those exemptions reduce the conflict but do not eliminate award-currency questions where a contract or claim falls outside or partly within, the Schedule. Parties should state payment and award currencies and address prevailing exchange-control requirements.
What the Trafigura Award tells the market
Enforceability explains why parties contracting with Zambian counterparties arbitrate. A foreign judgment depends on reciprocity under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act; without it, a claimant may need to sue again in Zambia or sue on the judgment. An arbitral award instead benefits from the New York Convention, given effect by the Arbitration Act. That difference makes foreign seats commercially workable and explains the prevalence of arbitration clauses in cross-border finance.
The Trafigura proceedings show the framework in practice. Trafigura commenced LCIA arbitration against ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc in February 2024 under a copper prepayment agreement with Konkola Copper Mines backed by a ZCCM-IH guarantee. A partial award in December 2025 held the guarantee binding. The final award in May 2026 ordered about USD69.3 million in principal and USD19.7 million in interest, plus arbitration costs and Trafigura’s legal fees.
The first lesson from the award concerns guarantees. The tribunal held ZCCM-IH bound by its guarantee regardless of the identity of the ultimate shareholder. For a country seeking to finance its 2031 programme partly through credit support from ZCCM-IH, IDC and ZESCO, the result is on balance constructive: clear and predictable enforcement strengthens counterparty confidence in guarantees issued by state-linked commercial entities, although the effect will always depend on the wording of the instrument and the financial position of the guarantor.
The second lesson is the distinction between the State and its commercial vehicles. The State Proceedings Act protects the State itself from execution, which is the most significant limitation on compulsory arbitration in procurement, where the counterparty is ordinarily a government body. A company incorporated under the Companies Act and listed on the Lusaka Securities Exchange does not have that protection.
The third lesson is that an award cannot be used to bypass separate legal personality. Precise identification of the obligor is among the most consequential decisions in Zambian transaction drafting. An award binds only the parties to it. In Star Drilling and Exploration Limited v National Technologies Limited, the Supreme Court confirmed that piercing the corporate veil at the enforcement stage is a separate claim requiring its own proceedings.
Judicial support, enforcement and a bill that remains a bill
Recent cases remain supportive while policing jurisdictional boundaries:
Therefore, support for finality operates within the tribunal’s mandate.
These decisions show the courts’ legal posture, not the time or cost of enforcement. LIAC’s 2025 baseline recorded seven cases involving 15 parties from three jurisdictions, four domestic and three international, valued from about USD10,000 to USD40 million; energy represented 42.9%. Tanzania separately reported 380 arbitration, mediation or adjudication disputes since 2023, with 250 resolved. Though not directly comparable, publication permits scrutiny of speed and cost. Zambia should publish anonymised data on duration, settlement, challenges and enforcement.
The Zambia Law Development Commission handed the draft Alternative Dispute Resolution Bill to Government in February 2026. Public descriptions indicate alignment with the 2006 Model Law revisions, emergency arbitration, statutory mediation and construction adjudication. As at August 2026, however, it has not been tabled or enacted and no definitive text is public; its contents indicate the direction of reform, not settled law.
The proposed mediation framework deserves separate attention. Long-term mining, energy and PPP arrangements often require the parties to continue working together after a dispute. Time-limited mediation within a tiered clause can preserve that relationship and resolve smaller claims before arbitration costs become disproportionate. Standard documents should, however, state whether mediation is mandatory, how it affects limitation periods and urgent interim relief and how any settlement is recorded and enforced; otherwise, a cost-saving step can become a procedural trap.
Long-term contracts being negotiated now may mature into disputes after legal reform. They should therefore:
Funding the dispute: third-party funding and the affordability of arbitration
None of the foregoing matters if the party with the stronger claim cannot afford to pursue it. A contested LCIA arbitration comparable to the proceedings brought by Trafigura against ZCCM-IH may cost each party several million dollars before an award is rendered. That may be a manageable outlay for a listed commodity trader or well-capitalised mining company. It is far less manageable for a landowner seeking compensation under section 40 of the Minerals Regulation Commission Act, a citizen subcontractor pursuing payment under a PPP arrangement or a supplier enforcing rights under section 101 of the Public Procurement Act. Yet these are precisely the counterparties that the sectoral reforms discussed above were intended to bring into the system.
Third-party funding is one response to this asymmetry. A funder with no pre-existing interest in the dispute finances some or all of a party’s legal and arbitration costs on a non-recourse basis, in return for an agreed share of the proceeds if the claim succeeds. Before committing capital, the funder assesses the merits, likely quantum, enforceability and prospects of recovery. In FY2025, 7% of newly registered ICSID cases included third-party funding disclosures, a figure of particular relevance to a mining jurisdiction with its own investment treaty exposure.
Zambia’s legal position remains uncertain, although it is not expressly hostile. Neither the Arbitration Act nor the Legal Practitioners Act addresses third-party funding and no reported Zambian decision has tested the enforceability of such an arrangement. The doctrines of maintenance and champerty entered Zambian law through the English Law (Extent of Application) Act (Chapter 11), which fixes the reception of English common law at 17 August 1911. England abolished both doctrines in 1967, but that reform postdates Zambia’s statutory cut-off and did not automatically extend to Zambia. The doctrines therefore remain at least in principle, despite never having been tested by a Zambian court in the context of modern arbitration funding. At the same time, Statutory Instrument No 50 of 2025, the Legal Practitioners’ Practice (Amendment) Rules, 2025, replaced Rule 8 of the 2002 Rules and permits written contingency-fee arrangements. That points in the opposite regulatory direction by recognising that access to justice may depend on alternative ways of financing legal claims.
Arbitral institutions have already moved ahead of the legislature. The CIArb Zambia Branch Rules require disclosure of any arrangement under which a non-party has an economic interest in the outcome of the proceedings. The LIAC Rules go further by requiring disclosure of the funder’s identity at the outset and directing tribunals to consider the existence of funding when determining applications for security for costs. These provisions do not themselves settle the legality of third-party funding, but they plainly contemplate its use and establish safeguards for addressing conflicts of interest, transparency and costs.
Other jurisdictions competing for the same investment have resolved the issue. Nigeria disapplied maintenance and champerty to arbitration funding by statute in 2023. In South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal held in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc. v National Potato Co-operative Ltd that funding litigation for a share of the proceeds was not, without more, contrary to public policy. Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia have each enacted legislation expressly permitting and regulating third-party funding in arbitration.
The draft ADR Bill provides an obvious opportunity for Zambia to resolve the uncertainty in the same manner as Nigeria: by disapplying maintenance and champerty to third-party funding while imposing clear disclosure requirements and appropriate safeguards. That would be preferable to leaving the issue to be litigated for the first time by a party that can least afford the additional uncertainty. Until legislative reform is enacted, the CIArb and LIAC Rules must carry much of the regulatory burden.
A legal system that increasingly directs parties towards arbitration, particularly parties with limited financial resources, has a direct interest in ensuring that the funding required to pursue those proceedings is not itself placed in legal doubt.
Conclusion
Zambia’s arbitration framework has developed substantially over the past three years. The clearest trend is the movement of arbitration into the sectors central to the country’s economic programme, particularly mining, energy, public procurement, construction and infrastructure. Sector-specific legislation has created new dispute-resolution pathways; the courts have continued to support arbitration while policing jurisdictional limits; LIAC is building domestic institutional capacity; and the proposed ADR Bill indicates a broader programme of modernisation.
Underlying it all is a change in what arbitration is understood to be: no longer a private final hearing, but one part of a system that begins with prevention and reaches binding determination only where earlier stages have failed.
The unfinished work is concentrated in four areas. The Arbitration Act remains a 1985 instrument in a market moving toward multi-party project structures. The PPP Act allocates no forum and leaves a finality provision whose effect is untested. Third-party funding remains legally uncertain even as statutory arbitration reaches parties with limited resources. Zambia also needs a fuller performance record showing time, cost, settlement, challenge and enforcement outcomes. Modern rules without affordable access, specialist decision-makers or measurable results do not yet amount to complete economic infrastructure.
None of these is a defect of foundation. The current reform cycle can address them by moving the ADR Bill through public consultation and enactment; inserting a standard dispute-resolution architecture into PPP documents; deepening the sector-specific arbitrator bench; and building on LIAC’s 2025 summary with regular outcome and enforcement data. For a country whose development plan depends on attracting and retaining long-term private capital, the return on that work is measured not only in disputes resolved, but in the price of the capital itself.
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