In general terms, Peru maintains a constitutional policy aimed at attracting foreign investment and supports the resolution of disputes through investment arbitration, in accordance with Articles 62 (freedom of contract and stabilisation agreements/contratos-ley) and 63 (equal treatment of national and foreign investment) of the 1993 Political Constitution. Furthermore, Peru has an extensive network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral commercial agreements in force that incorporate investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms, allowing investors access to investment arbitration.

Unlike other countries in the region (such as Venezuela or Ecuador), Peru has not denounced any investment treaties or similar agreements, nor has it expressed any intention to do so, thereby sending a clear signal of legal stability and predictability to international investors.

In addition, Peru has consolidated an articulated institutional framework for the technical management of investment disputes. In 2006, Law No 28933 was enacted, creating the System for the Coordination and Response of the State in International Investment Disputes (Sistema Coordinado de Respuesta del Estado en Controversias Internacionales de Inversión – SICRECI). Pursuant to Article 3 of said law, SICRECI’s fundamental objectives are:

• to optimise timely inter-institutional response and co-ordination;
• to centralise the public registry of investment treaties and contracts;
• to establish an early warning mechanism for emerging conflicts;
• to define clear legal representation procedures for the State; and
• to internalise arbitration costs within the public entity whose measure gave rise to the dispute.

SICRECI therefore serves as the State’s specialised and centralised institutional counterpart in international investment disputes.

Finally, Peru’s active participation in the discussions of Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) on the reform of the Investor–State Dispute Settlement system is worth highlighting. This reflects Peru’s continued engagement with the evolving international investment dispute settlement framework.

Since 1993, Peru has been a state party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the “ICSID Convention”) and, over the last decade, has been one of the most active states within the ICSID system. Furthermore, since 1988, Peru has been a party to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; and, since 1989, to the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”).

At the domestic level, this international framework is complemented by Legislative Decree No 1071 (the “Peruvian Arbitration Act”), which adopts a monist approach substantially based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, expeditiously regulating the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards before domestic courts.

This integrated network of multilateral legal instruments and domestic legislation guarantees a pro-arbitration legal framework for the enforceability of arbitral awards rendered both in favour of and against the Peruvian State.

Investment arbitration is the predominant mechanism for resolving international investment disputes involving Peru. Unlike many other Latin American States, the prevalence of investment arbitration in Peru stems not only from its network of investment treaties, but also from a well-established state contractual practice of including arbitration agreements in investment-related contracts, including public-private partnership (PPP) agreements, infrastructure concession contracts, and hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licences.

Although domestic administrative and contentious-administrative proceedings may be available in connection with certain investment-related disputes, publicly reported international investment disputes involving Peru have generally been pursued through arbitration rather than domestic proceedings as the principal mechanism for resolving investors’ claims. Depending on the circumstances, such disputes may give rise to treaty-based or contract-based investment arbitration. Relevant considerations include:

• the existence and scope of the applicable arbitration agreement;
• the relevant investment treaty;
• the investor’s nationality and investment structure;
• jurisdictional requirements;
• fork-in-the-road provisions;
• waiver or “no-U-turn” clauses; and
• cooling-off periods.

Domestic court litigation has therefore played a comparatively limited role in publicly reported international investment disputes involving Peru. This can be explained, among other factors, by two features of the Peruvian legal framework.

• The constitutional framework expressly permits the State and public-law entities to submit contractual disputes to national or international arbitration, as applicable (Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution).
• Peru’s extensive network of investment treaties provides qualifying investors with access to investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms, generally following compliance with the applicable consultation or cooling-off period, and without requiring the prior exhaustion of local administrative or judicial remedies, subject to the requirements of the relevant treaty.

Peruvian experience shows a significant concentration of disputes in economic sectors characterised by substantial capital investments, long-term contracts, and high levels of interaction between investors and various state entities, among other factors.

Over the last 15 years, the industries in which the Peruvian state has registered the highest arbitral activity are focused on the following.

• Transport sector (highways, airports, ports and railways) – DP World (ICSID Case No ARB/11/21), APMT (ICSID Case No ARB/16/33 and ICSID Case No ARB/21/28), Metro de Lima Línea 2 (ICSID Case No ARB/17/3, ICSID Case No ARB/21/41 and ICSID Case No ARB/21/57), Autopista del Norte (ICSID Case No ARB/18/17), Kuntur Wasi (ICSID Case No ARB/18/27), Deviandes (ICSID Case No ARB/20/18), Covinca (ICSID Case No ARB/21/45), Vinci (ICSID Case No ARB/21/60) and Brookfield (ICSID Case No ARB/25/14).
• Hydrocarbons sector – Pluspetrol (ICSID Case No ARB/12/28), Enagás I (ICSID Case No ARB/18/26), Odebrecht (ICSID Case No ARB/20/4), Amorrortu (PCA Case No 2020-11 and PCA Case No 2023-22), Worth Capital (ICSID Case No ARB/20/51), Upland (ICSID Case No ARB/22/19 and ICSID Case No ARB/26/5), Gas Natural (ICSID Case No ARB/24/9), Gasoducto Sur Peruano (ICSID Case No ARB/24/29) and Promigas (ICSID Case No ARB/26/32).
• Energy sector – Caraveli (ICSID Case No ARB/11/9), Isolux (ICSID Case No ARB/12/5), Hydrikas (ICSID Case No ARB/18/48), IC Power (ICSID Case No ARB/19/19) and Latam Hydro (ICSID Case No ARB/19/28).
• Mining sector – Renco (ICSID Case No UNCT/13/1 and PCA Case Nos 2019-46 and 2019-47), Bear Creek (ICSID Case No ARB/14/21), Freeport (ICSID Case No ARB/20/8), SMM Cerro Verde (ICSID Case No ARB/20/14) and Lupaka (ICSID Case No ARB/20/46).

The concentration of disputes in these industries responds, among other issues, to their strategic nature and execution through long-term concession contracts, where investments remain exposed to government changes, public policy revisions, and constant supervision by regulatory and oversight bodies whose acts can impact project economics. Likewise, in the mining, energy and infrastructure sectors, investments routinely face delays in obtaining environmental permits, tariff modifications and social conflict scenarios.

Throughout the history of investment arbitration in Peru, several landmark cases can be highlighted for establishing relevant criteria regarding the scope of the international obligations of the Peruvian State.

Legal Stability Agreements

The earliest contract-based ICSID arbitrations in Peru were Duke Energy (ICSID Case No ARB/03/28) and Aguaytía (ICSID Case No ARB/06/13). Both proceedings were initiated under legal stability agreements (convenios de estabilidad jurídica), with the dispute focusing on whether the Peruvian State had respected the stabilisation guarantees granted. The outcomes were a victory for Peru in Aguaytía and a favourable decision for the investor in Duke Energy, where the tribunals delimited the scope of such agreements and the standard of state compliance.

Unilateral Termination in Concession Contracts

Subsequently, disputes arose regarding concession contracts where the exercise of the State’s power of unilateral termination on public interest grounds was debated. In Convial (ICSID Case No ARB/10/2), the tribunal concluded that the State acted lawfully and did not breach the Peru–Argentina BIT. In contrast, in Kuntur Wasi (ICSID Case No ARB/18/27), the outcome was adverse to Peru, establishing that the termination of the Chinchero Airport concession contract constituted a breach of contract and a violation of treaty protections.

Transport Infrastructure Megaprojects

In the infrastructure sector, Metro de Lima Línea 2 (ICSID Case No ARB/17/3) stands out. The tribunal determined shared responsibilities: on one hand, it concluded that the Peruvian State incurred delays attributable to the grantor by failing to timely hand over the concession areas and approve the final engineering studies (EDI); on the other hand, it declared that the concessionaire also breached contractual obligations by unjustifiably refusing to take possession of certain land parcels.

Mining Sector and International Standards

Key decisions in the mining sector include the following.

• Bear Creek (ICSID Case No ARB/14/21) – The dispute centred on the expropriatory nature of a supreme decree that revoked the mining company’s authorisation over the Santa Ana project following social protests. The tribunal found the State liable for an unlawful indirect expropriation, it although awarded the investor compensation substantially lower than the amount claimed.
• Lupaka Gold (ICSID Case No ARB/20/46) – The obligation to grant full protection and security and whether the actions of a rural community blocking a mine could be attributed to the State were discussed. The tribunal determined that the community’s conduct was attributable to Peru under the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts of the UN International Law Commission, concluding that authorities failed to exercise due diligence to safeguard the physical integrity of the investment.
• Freeport (ICSID Case No ARB/20/8) and SMM Cerro Verde (ICSID Case No ARB/20/14) – Freeport and SMM Cerro Verde (identical facts, different outcomes) constitute the most illustrative example in recent years of how identical factual circumstances can result in divergent decisions. Although both disputes arose from the same tax-regulatory conflict concerning mining royalties, the application of different treaties (Peru–US TPA and Peru–Netherlands BIT, respectively) and differences in the tribunals’ reasoning reinforce discussions on the challenges of predictability and jurisprudential consistency within the investor–state dispute settlement system.

Agrarian Reform Bonds and the Definition of Protected Investment

Finally, one of the most notable cases for Peru is Gramercy (ICSID Case No UNCT/18/2), centred on disputes regarding the payment methodology for agrarian reform bonds, which was established by the Ministry of Economy and Finance through supreme decrees. Although the outcome was adverse to Peru by majority, a dissenting opinion was issued maintaining that the purchase of such bonds should not be considered an investment and, therefore, the tribunal should have declined jurisdiction.

The Peruvian State has maintained a practice of complying with arbitral awards rendered in investment arbitration and, in specific cases, has initiated annulment proceedings in the exercise of remedies provided under the applicable legal framework.

Based on publicly available information as of October 2026, out of 51 ICSID-administered cases to which the Peruvian State has been a party, at least 12 have resulted in a partially or fully adverse outcome for the State. These cases comprise: Duke (ICSID Case No ARB/03/28),Tza Yap Shum (ICSID Case No ARB/07/6), Metro de Lima Línea 2 (ICSID Case No ARB/17/3), Gramercy (ICSID Case No UNCT/18/2), Autopista del Norte (ICSID Case No ARB/18/17), Enagás (ICSID Case No ARB/18/26), Kuntur Wasi (ICSID Case No ARB/18/27), IC Power (ICSID Case No ARB/19/19), SMM Cerro Verde (ICSID Case No ARB/20/14), Deviandes (ICSID Case No ARB/20/18), Lupaka (ICSID Case No ARB/20/46) and APMT (ICSID Case No ARB/21/28).

Annulment Proceedings Initiated by the State and Grounds Invoked

Of the aforementioned cases, it is publicly known that Peru has initiated annulment proceedings in six (Duke, Tza Yap Shum, Enagás, Metro de Lima Línea 2, APMT and IC Power). Three of these proceedings are currently pending (Enagás, Metro Línea 2 and APMT), while in the remaining three, the applications were rejected.

According to publicly available information, under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, the grounds for annulment invoked by Peru have included, among others:

• manifest excess of powers by the tribunal (Article 52(1)(b));
• serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure (Article 52(1)(d)); and
• failure to state the reasons on which the award is based (Article 52(1)(e)).

Annulments Initiated by Investors and Outside the ICSID System

Annulment proceedings have not been initiated exclusively by Peru. Investors have likewise sought annulment of awards favourable to the State (eg, in Freeport, ICSID Case No ARB/20/8). Similarly, despite a ruling unfavourable to the State, the investor initiated annulment proceedings in Autopista del Norte (ICSID Case No ARB/18/17).

Finally, outside the autonomous ICSID regime, publicly available information does not indicate that Peru has sought the setting aside of investment awards before national courts. Conversely, it is verified that two investors have initiated set-aside proceedings against awards rendered under UNCITRAL Rules before state courts in Paris (Amorrortu, PCA Case No 2020-11) and The Hague (Pantel, PCA Case No 2019-26).

Peru possesses an extensive network of international investment agreements signed with countries across various regions of the world (North America, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, Asia, and Oceania). For this report, the analysis is limited to instruments that include investor–state dispute settlement mechanisms. In this context, 40 international agreements are in force (as of October 2026), as detailed below.

• Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) – 25 BITs are in force with countries such as Germany, Argentina, Belgium–Luxembourg, China, Colombia, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, among others.
• Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with an Investment Chapter – 15 FTAs incorporating specific investment protection chapters are maintained in force. Notable examples include those signed with the United States (Peru–US TPA), Canada, Singapore, South Korea, China, Australia, Mexico, as well as multilateral regional treaties such as the Pacific Alliance and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

Based on publicly available information regarding future agreements, FTAs with Brazil and Indonesia are expected to enter into force. However, it should be clarified that the FTAs with said countries do not contain investor–state dispute settlement provisions (Peru–Brazil FTA) or an investment chapter (Peru–Indonesia FTA).

Peru does not have an official Model BIT published as a single standardised text. However, Peruvian practice regarding investment treaty negotiations has evolved from traditional first- and second-generation treaties (1990s and 2000s) towards the systematic adoption of third-generation or latest-generation clauses in its most recent investment agreements.

These provisions are characterised by narrowing protection standards and preserving the State’s regulatory space by circumscribing Fair and Equitable Treatment to the Minimum Standard of Treatment under customary international law, clarifying that non-discriminatory regulatory measures adopted for public interest purposes do not constitute indirect expropriation, conditioning access to investor–state arbitration upon strict requirements (prior notice, cooling-off period, limitations periods, and waivers), and incorporating rules on procedural transparency and non-disputing party participation.

Peru is a party to a broad network of free trade agreements with investment chapters. Among the most relevant, FTAs concluded with the United States, Canada and China stand out. Likewise, the Peruvian State is part of major multilateral agreements with investment chapters in force, such as:

• the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement of the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia and Mexico);
• the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and Vietnam); and
• the Free Trade Agreement between the member states of the Pacific Alliance and the Republic of Singapore.

It should be noted that, within the framework of the CPTPP, Peru and New Zealand agreed that the investment chapter shall not apply between their nationals. Consequently, there is no reciprocal protection of investments nor access to investment arbitration under said treaty with New Zealand, unlike with the remaining states parties.

Legal and Operational Implications

The following arise in relation to FTAs.

• Treaty overlap – The coexistence of bilateral and multilateral agreements with the same state party generates an overlap of legal frameworks. Although potential dual coverage may benefit investors, the legal feasibility of invoking a specific treaty or both simultaneously in an eventual investment arbitration must be formally evaluated in each case.
• Efficiency in international negotiations – Participation in multilateral frameworks optimises state resources, avoiding the need to negotiate additional bilateral investment treaties with countries already integrated into these structures (eg, Brunei), as their nationals are adequately protected by the pre-existing multilateral regime.

There is no applicable information in this jurisdiction.

Peru has a domestic legal framework for investments, with constitutional and statutory rank, structured through various legal instruments aimed at promoting and protecting foreign investment.

Substantive Provisions

Key provisions include the following.

• 1993 Political Constitution – Serves as the cornerstone of the economic and investment regime. Article 63 establishes equal conditions between national and foreign investment (principle of national treatment and inalterability of guarantees). Article 62 grants constitutional status to freedom of contract and guarantees the intangibility of contractual terms.
• Framework Investment Laws (Legislative Decree No 662 and Legislative Decree No 757) – Develop constitutional guarantees at the statutory level, ensuring guarantees for foreign investment such as non-discrimination vis-à-vis nationals, freedom of contract, and the ability to execute Legal Stability Agreements (CEJs).
• Sectoral Laws – For example, the Consolidated Text (TUO) of the Organic Hydrocarbons Law contains certain guarantees for contractors, such as the stability of exchange and tax regimes (Article 63) and guarantees regarding the free handling and availability of foreign currency (Article 66).

Dispute Settlement Provisions

The following provisions apply.

• Article 63 of the Political Constitution – Expressly empowers the Peruvian State and public law entities to submit disputes arising from contracts with nationals or foreign entities to domestic or international arbitration.
• Legal Stability Agreements (CEJs) and Stabilisation Contracts (Contratos-Ley) – Unlike international treaties, domestic investment laws do not contain direct investor–state arbitration clauses. However, dispute settlement mechanisms are funnelled through arbitration clauses agreed upon in CEJs or investment contracts. Historically, early CEJs referred disputes to ICSID (such as in Duke Energy and Aguaytía Energy), whereas currently arbitration in local seats or forums is agreed upon.
• Law No 28933 (SICRECI Law) – Procedural statute establishing the System for the Coordination and Response of the State in International Investment Disputes and the Special Commission responsible for the representation and technical defence of the Peruvian State in international arbitrations arising from contracts, CEJs or international treaties.

Interaction Between the Domestic Framework and Investment Treaties

The domestic legal framework operates complementarily with Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs); however, BITs offer broader international coverage for claiming violations of international investment protection standards.

In Peru, it is standard and mandatory for investment contracts – such as Legal Stability Agreements (CEJs), public-private partnership (PPP) concessions or hydrocarbon licence contracts – to include direct arbitration clauses for resolving disputes between investors (or their Peruvian-incorporated vehicles) and state entities. Under the SICRECI Law, contract-based international investment disputes are strictly limited to those whose arbitration clauses refer to international mechanisms that engage the responsibility of the Peruvian State under public international law, with reference to ICSID being the primary example. Therefore, only disputes arising from contracts incorporating ICSID arbitration are managed within SICRECI’s scope.

In concession and PPP contracts, the typical dispute resolution structure provides for a multi-tiered procedure that begins with a mandatory preliminary Direct Negotiations phase (typically three to six months). If no agreement is reached, parties may resort to domestic arbitration for minor monetary claims or technical matters, or to international arbitration (ICSID) for major disputes exceeding contractually specified thresholds (eg, amounts exceeding USD30 million).

Comparing these protections, a contract-based claim (contract-based arbitration) is strictly limited to alleging breaches of specific contractual obligations, whereas a treaty-based claim (treaty-based arbitration) allows investors to challenge general state conduct violating international protection standards – such as fair and equitable treatment, indirect expropriation, or full protection and security – even if they do not constitute direct contractual breaches. In Peruvian practice, both avenues frequently coexist when a single set of facts generates a contractual breach and simultaneously violates a treaty (as occurred in Azteca, Kuntur Wasi, Latam Hydro and DP World), or parallel proceedings arise in different forums when the contract does not provide for ICSID arbitration but the investor accesses ICSID relying on an FTA or BIT (such as in Brookfield under the Peru-Canada FTA, while commercial claims arising from the Rutas de Lima concession contract were pursued in a non-ICSID forum).

In investment arbitrations brought against the Peruvian State, investors have most frequently invoked claims based on obligations contained in investment treaties as well as contractual breaches under investment contracts.

Claims Concerning Breach of Contract

In cases dealing exclusively with alleged contractual breaches by the Peruvian State, publicly available information indicates over 15 arbitrations involving claims linked to breaches of:

• concession contracts (Metro de Lima Línea 2 cases, APMT cases, Autopista del Norte, Deviandes, Hydrikas, Covinca, Gas Natural, Operadora Ecológica del Titicaca, Gasoducto Sur Peruano and Concesionaria Majes Siguas);
• legal stability agreements (Duke and Aguaytía); and
• hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licence contracts (Pluspetrol and Upland cases).

Claims Concerning Fair and Equitable Treatment, Expropriation and Other Treaty Standards

In cases brought under investment treaties, publicly available information reveals that investors’ claims focus primarily on:

• breach of fair and equitable treatment (De Levi, Lucchetti, Convial, Renco I, Gremcitel, Bear Creek, Gramercy, Lidercón, Renco II, Enagás I, IC Power, Worth Capital, Lupaka, Freeport, Amorrortu I, Kaloti, Scotiabank, Amorrortu II);
• guarantee against expropriation (direct or indirect) (Lucchetti, Tza Yap Shum, De Levi, Convial, Renco I, Bear Creek, Gramercy, Renco II, Enagás I, Pantel, Worth Capital, Lupaka, Kaloti, Scotiabank);
• national treatment (Lucchetti, De Levi, Renco I, Gramercy, Kaloti, Scotiabank);
• most-favoured-nation treatment (Lucchetti, Convial, Gramercy, Lupaka);
• full protection and security (De Levi, Lucchetti, Convial, Bear Creek, IC Power, Lupaka, Kaloti); and
• umbrella clauses (Renco I, Lidercón).

Mixed Claims (Contract and Treaty)

Finally, another group of cases exists where investors initiated disputes under both investment contracts and investment treaties. These cases are Kuntur Wasi, Latam Hydro, DP World and Azteca. Alongside contractual breach claims, claimants submitted claims regarding treaty breaches, focusing on fair and equitable treatment (Kuntur Wasi and Latam Hydro), protection against expropriation (Kuntur Wasi and Latam Hydro), umbrella clauses (Kuntur Wasi and Latam Hydro) and most-favoured-nation treatment (DP World and Latam Hydro).

In investment arbitration involving the Peruvian State, party autonomy to select and appoint arbitrators is the general rule, governed by the specific provisions of the applicable instrument or arbitration rules.

• In arbitrations under the ICSID Convention, nationality requirements under Article 39 apply, establishing that the majority of arbitrators may not be nationals of the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, unless agreed otherwise by the parties. Furthermore, criteria of competence, high moral character and independence required by Article 14(1) apply.
• In arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules, parties enjoy broad freedom to agree on arbitrator profiles, qualifications and appointment procedures.

By way of illustration, the arbitrator selection method in the Peru–US TPA can be cited. Article 10.19 of said treaty outlines specific selection rules, while permitting the disputing parties to agree otherwise, confirming the primacy of party autonomy. Additionally, Article 826 of the Peru–Canada FTA specifies required characteristics for tribunal members, such as extensive expertise or experience in public international law, international trade, international investment rules or dispute resolution under international trade or investment agreements.

Finally, within the domestic legal framework, there are no limits on party autonomy regarding the selection of arbitrators.

When the parties fail to constitute the tribunal under the agreed procedure, the applicable arbitral instrument establishes a default mechanism. In arbitrations under the ICSID Convention, if the tribunal has not been constituted within 90 days following the notice of registration of the request (or such other period as agreed by the parties), either party may request the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council to appoint the missing arbitrator or arbitrators (Article 38).

If a dispute involves multiple claimants or respondents and disagreements arise over tribunal constitution, the applicable rules (or the default appointing authority) will appoint all tribunal members to ensure equal treatment in the tribunal’s composition.

It is important to clarify that the default procedure under Article 38 of the ICSID Convention does not operate automatically or ex officio by ICSID, but solely upon express party request. As tribunal constitution rules are default rules, practice demonstrates that parties prioritise exercising direct autonomy to select arbitrators, agreeing (explicitly or by granting extensions) to extend the appointment period beyond the 90-day threshold.

Publicly available information provides examples illustrating the flexibility of the ICSID system regarding tribunal constitution without mandatory activation of the appointing authority, for example:

• Gas Natural – registered on 1 April 2024 (default deadline expiring 1 July 2024), tribunal constituted after more than 210 days;
• Upland– registered on 13 July 2022, tribunal not constituted within the standard 90-day period (13 October 2022); and
• Telefónica – registered on 12 March 2021, tribunal constitution finalised on 1 August 2022, over a year post-request.

In investment arbitration, the Judiciary of Peru lacks jurisdiction to intervene in the selection, appointment or challenge of arbitrators, as the method chosen by the parties remains the sole mechanism to constitute the tribunal. In arbitrations conducted under the ICSID Convention, Article 26 strictly precludes any interference by domestic courts in tribunal constitution.

The Peruvian Arbitration Act (Legislative Decree No 1071), modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law, formally enshrines the principle of minimal judicial intervention under Article 3(1), limiting court involvement strictly to cases expressly provided by statute.

The regime governing arbitrator challenges or disqualification in investment arbitrations involving Peru strictly adheres to the institutional framework and rules applicable to the dispute.

• In ICSID arbitrations (Articles 57 and 58), a party may propose the disqualification of an arbitrator based on a manifest lack of the qualities required by Article 14(1) (manifest lack of independence or impartiality). Under the ICSID Arbitration Rules, a proposal for disqualification must be filed promptly and is decided by the unchallenged tribunal members, or by the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council if those members are equally divided or if a majority of the tribunal is challenged.
• In UNCITRAL arbitrations, challenges are processed on the basis of justifiable doubts regarding an arbitrator’s impartiality or independence (Articles 11 to 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules).
• In Peruvian investment arbitration practice, in Kuntur Wasi, Peru filed a proposal for disqualification against the co-arbitrator appointed by claimants; although the proposal was not formally resolved, the arbitrator resigned, prompting tribunal reconstitution.

Complementary Interpretative Instruments and Standards

Although soft law, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration are consistently referenced by tribunals as guidance when assessing challenge grounds, applying their colour-coded lists (Green, Orange and Red Lists).

Additionally, the UNCITRAL Code of Conduct for Arbitrators in International Investment Dispute Resolution establishes rigorous standards of independence and impartiality that serve as interpretative guidelines, without prejudice to noting that any disqualification proposal is formally governed by the applicable consent instrument or arbitration rules.

Arbitrators must be strictly independent and impartial, and are required to disclose all circumstances that could give rise to justifiable doubts regarding their independence or impartiality. No specific requirements exist as such regarding independence, impartiality and/or disclosure duties. The ICSID Convention or UNCITRAL Rules do not explicitly establish exhaustive catalogues of disclosure requirements. However, certain aspects included in soft law instruments must be considered, such as the UNCITRAL Code of Conduct for Arbitrators in International Investment Dispute Resolution, whose Article 3 specifies certain obligations deriving from independence and impartiality, and Article 11 identifies specific circumstances that must be disclosed under a continuing duty to disclose information.

Similarly, within soft law, the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration serve as an interpretative baseline for situations that could generate doubts regarding lack of independence or impartiality.

Regarding domestic regulation, for arbitrations seated in Peru, Article 28 of Legislative Decree No 1071 requires arbitrator independence and impartiality relative to the parties and establishes a non-waivable written obligation to disclose any potential conflict of interest from appointment and throughout the proceedings that could generate justifiable doubts. In Peru, disclosure obligations are interpreted broadly; in case of doubt, arbitrators must opt to disclose any circumstance that, in the eyes of the parties, could give rise to justifiable doubts regarding their independence or impartiality.

Under Peruvian law, Legislative Decree No 1071 (the “Peruvian Arbitration Act”) and the rules of the principal domestic arbitral institutions – including the Lima Chamber of Commerce (CCL) Arbitration Center, the PUCP Dispute Resolution Center, and AmCham Peru – expressly empower arbitral tribunals to grant interim or provisional measures. Once constituted, an arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, order such interim measures as it considers necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the final award or protect the rights in dispute. The tribunal may also modify, replace or set aside interim measures previously granted by a domestic court, in accordance with the Peruvian Arbitration Act.

Interim measures ordered by an arbitral tribunal are binding on the parties upon notification. In the event of non-compliance, the party in whose favour the measure was granted may seek its enforcement through the mechanisms available under the arbitration agreement and applicable rules or request judicial assistance under Article 48 of the Peruvian Arbitration Act. In the latter case, the court’s role is limited to enforcement and does not entail reconsideration of the merits of the tribunal’s decision.

Article 47.2 of the Peruvian Arbitration Act adopts an open-ended approach, broadly reflecting the UNCITRAL Model Law, and contemplates four principal categories of interim relief:

• measures maintaining or restoring the status quo pending determination of the dispute;
• measures aimed at preventing imminent harm or prejudice to the arbitral proceedings, including orders to refrain from particular conduct;
• measures preserving assets from which a subsequent award may be satisfied, including attachments of bank accounts, registrable measures over property and, frequently in Peruvian arbitral practice, stays of calls on performance bonds or bank guarantees; and
• measures aimed at preserving evidence that may be relevant and material to the resolution of the dispute.

In investment arbitration, tribunals may also recommend or order provisional measures aimed at safeguarding the parties’ rights, preserving the status quo, or preventing irreparable harm during the proceedings.

• Under the ICSID Convention (Article 47 and Rule 47 of the 2022 ICSID Arbitration Rules), a tribunal may “recommend” provisional measures for the preservation of a party’s rights. Although Article 47 of the Convention uses the term “recommend”, ICSID case law has consistently treated such measures as binding on the parties. Non-compliance may have procedural consequences and may be taken into account by the tribunal when addressing costs or, where relevant, the merits.
• Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Article 26), a tribunal is expressly empowered to grant interim measures.

In investment arbitrations involving Peru, provisional measures have been requested in cases including Convial (ICSID Case No ARB/10/2), Bear Creek (ICSID Case No ARB/14/21), Lidercón (ICSID Case No ARB/17/9), Telefónica (ICSID Case No ARB/21/10), Metro de Lima Línea 2 (ICSID Case No ARB/21/41), Vinci (ICSID Case No ARB/21/60) and Backus (ICSID Case No ARB/24/53). In Convial, for example, the tribunal rejected the claimants’ request on the basis, among other grounds, that the requested measure was neither urgent nor necessary.

Peruvian domestic courts have played no material role in publicly reported cases concerning provisional measures ordered by investment tribunals. No publicly available Peruvian decisions have been identified in which domestic courts were asked to enforce, modify or interfere with such measures.

In investment arbitrations involving Peru, the availability of security for costs depends on the applicable procedural rules. Under Rule 43 of the 2022 ICSID Arbitration Rules, tribunals may order security for costs after considering the circumstances of the case, including a party’s ability and willingness to comply with an adverse decision on costs, as well as the existence of third-party funding. No publicly available decisions have been identified in which security for costs was ordered in investment arbitrations against Peru.

Third-party funding (TPF) in litigation and arbitration is neither prohibited nor expressly regulated under the Peruvian legal system. In investment arbitrations involving Peru, no publicly available information has been identified regarding the presence of TPF on behalf of claimant investors.

There is no domestic court jurisprudence regarding the validity of TPF agreements. In investment arbitration involving Peru, no cases regarding TPF have been identified.

International practice shows tribunals may require disclosure of TPF existence and, under certain circumstances, funder identity. In investment arbitration, Rule 14 of the 2022 ICSID Arbitration Rules mandates written notice disclosing the name and address of any third-party funder from whom a party received funds directly or indirectly, to prevent conflicts of interest.

In accordance with Rule 43 of the 2022 ICSID Rules, TPF presence is an element the tribunal may consider, but security for costs will only be granted upon proving a real and imminent risk of insolvency or systematic non-compliance with cost orders by claimant, avoiding unjustified barriers to justice.

It is worth noting that, within the framework of the possible reform of the investor–state dispute settlement system by UNCITRAL Working Group III, in which Peru participates, a draft of the provisions on procedural and cross-cutting issues was published in June 2025, and an updated version was published in July 2026. Draft provisions 12 and 12 bis address aspects related to third-party funding.

Based on publicly available information, no security for costs precedents involving Peru have been identified.

Procedural requirements prior to initiating an investment arbitration vary depending on the investment treaty (BIT or FTA) or contract invoked. Key conditions include the following.

Prior Notice and Consultation/Negotiation Period (Cooling-Off Period)

Most instruments require formal notice to the State (via the SICRECI Special Commission) prior to arbitration to initiate mandatory negotiations and consultations (treaty) or direct negotiation (contract), known as a cooling-off period. Typically, these periods range from three to six months from notice receipt.

The legal nature of this period has been debated before tribunals involving Peru. For instance, in Pantel v Peru (PCA Case No 2019-26), under the Peru–Switzerland BIT, the tribunal deemed prior consultations to be a jurisdictional requirement; however, tribunal practice is not uniform on the legal consequences of non-compliance.

Other Procedural Conditions and Admissibility/Jurisdictional Requirements

Depending on the treaty or contract, additional pre-conditions or time limitations apply.

• Waiver clauses – require investors to formally waive the right to initiate or continue local administrative or judicial proceedings. The significance of this requirement was highlighted in Renco v Peru (ICSID Case No UNCT/13/1), which was the first case addressing this clause.
• Fork-in-the-road provisions – require investors to make an irrevocable choice between local courts and international arbitration.
• Limitation periods ‒ establish time limits for submitting claims, calculated from the date the investor acquired or should have acquired knowledge of the alleged breach and resulting loss.

The applicable transparency and confidentiality regime in investment arbitration depends principally on the instrument giving rise to consent – whether a treaty or an investment contract – as well as the applicable arbitration rules and any procedural directions issued by the tribunal.

New-generation investment treaties concluded by Peru increasingly contain specific transparency provisions requiring the publication of key procedural documents. For example, Article 10.21 of the Peru–US Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) provides for the public availability of, among other materials:

• notice of intent;
• notice of arbitration;
• pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal;
• transcripts of hearings; and
• the tribunal’s orders, awards and decisions.

Transparency does not, however, eliminate the need to protect confidential or otherwise protected information. Tribunals may adopt procedural arrangements governing the treatment and disclosure of particular categories of information while preserving the transparency requirements established by the applicable treaty. By way of illustration, Procedural Order No 8 in Gramercy (ICSID Case No UNCT/18/2), a case brought under the Peru–US TPA, established a confidentiality regime for certain documents and a procedure governing their disclosure.

Where the instrument giving rise to consent contains no specific transparency provisions, confidentiality and publication may instead be addressed through the applicable arbitration rules or procedural orders. In Kuntur Wasi (ICSID Case No ARB/18/27), for example, the tribunal addressed confidentiality through Procedural Order No 2.

The 2022 ICSID Arbitration Rules also reflect the increasing importance of transparency in investment arbitration. Unlike the 2006 Rules, they contain a dedicated framework addressing publication and access to case materials while providing mechanisms for the protection of confidential or protected information.

Accordingly, the balance between transparency and confidentiality is case-specific. Where the applicable legal framework does not prescribe a comprehensive transparency regime, the parties and the tribunal may establish appropriate arrangements concerning the publication of awards and procedural orders and the protection of confidential information, while also considering whether disclosure could aggravate the dispute or otherwise prejudice the proceedings.

Under Article 34 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, full reparation for injury caused by an internationally wrongful act may take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either separately or in combination. The nature of the relief available in an investment arbitration involving Peru will ultimately depend on the legal basis of the claim and the applicable law.

Reparation and Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are not recognised as a form of reparation under the international law of state responsibility and are likewise not a remedy generally available under Peruvian civil law in contract-based arbitrations.

Although restitution is recognised under international law as a form of reparation, monetary compensation is by far the most common remedy in investment arbitration practice. In publicly available awards finding Peru liable, the relief granted has principally taken the form of monetary compensation. Satisfaction, while recognised under the law of state responsibility, has played a limited role as a remedy in investment arbitration.

Interim Measures and Injunctive Relief

During the proceedings, tribunals may grant provisional or interim measures aimed at preserving the parties’ rights or the integrity of the arbitral process. Such measures are temporary by nature and ordinarily cease to have effect once the final award is rendered or as otherwise determined by the tribunal. In investment arbitrations involving Peru, final relief in cases where liability has been established has predominantly taken the form of monetary compensation and interest.

Contract-Based Investment Arbitrations

In contract-based investment arbitrations arising, for example, from legal stability agreements (convenios de estabilidad jurídica, or CEJs) or concession contracts, Peruvian law will generally govern the merits where so provided by the relevant contract. In such cases, the nature and extent of recoverable damages are determined under the applicable provisions of the Peruvian Civil Code and the relevant contractual framework, including the rules governing actual loss (daño emergente), lost profits (lucro cesante), causation and, where applicable, foreseeability. Punitive damages are not generally recognised under this framework.

In investment arbitrations involving Peru, damages quantification combines international standards with Peruvian civil liability requirements when local contracts apply.

Valuation Methodologies

Method selection depends on project maturity, income certainty and proven historical accounting.

• Discounted cash flow (DCF) – accepted in established projects with predictable income (Tza Yap Shum) but rejected in early-stage projects as speculative (Bear Creek).
• Sunk costs/historical investment – accepted absent proven financial history to project future flows (Gramercy).
• Other methods – fair market value, comparable companies, and net asset valuation.

Peruvian Law Requirements and Equitable Assessment (Civil Code, Article 1332)

Under Peruvian law, prior to assessing quantum (quantum debeatur), the tribunal must strictly verify the concurrent fulfilment of civil liability elements under the Civil Code:

• unlawfulness or non-performance (Articles 1321 and 1969);
• fault/intent attribution factors (contractual) or risky/wilful/negligent conduct (extracontractual);
• actual damage (an debeatur); and
• adequate causation between act and damage (Articles 1321 and 1985).

Equitable assessment authority under Article 1332 of the Civil Code does not remedy a failure of proof nor dispense with solid expert reports, functioning only when exact quantification is technically impossible, subject to burden-of-proof rules (Civil Code, Article 1331).

Tribunals’ Rigorous Approach and Quantum Reductions

Public records show tribunals penalise speculative or excessive calculations by applying substantial reductions to the compensation awarded relative to the amounts claimed (awards reduced to roughly half in Duke, to 30% in Tza Yap Shum, to marginal sums in Bear Creek, to barely 5% in Autopista del Norte upon discarding unconsolidated future damages; in Gramercy, compensation was reduced from USD1.8 billion to USD33.2 million). Proving quantum requires high-level economic/financial expert witness reports auditing project accounts capable of withstanding cross-examination or hot tubbing, ensuring compensation reflects actual, direct and proven harm.

Under Peruvian law, the rules on interest are default rules that supplement party autonomy: absent an express agreement on the compensatory or default interest rate, Article 1245 of the Civil Code mandatorily refers to the statutory interest rate, which the Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCRP) sets for both domestic and foreign currency.

In investment arbitrations involving Peru, public records show that when tribunals found state liability, they awarded interest alongside compensation (Duke, Tza Yap Shum, Bear Creek, Gramercy, Kuntur Wasi, IC Power and Lupaka). However, cost allocation differs: in roughly half of adverse cases, tribunals ordered each party to bear its own legal costs (Duke, Tza Yap Shum and Kuntur Wasi).

Where Peru prevailed, claimants were not systematically ordered to pay Peru’s legal costs. In Freeport, each party bore its costs and half of the arbitration costs. Similar outcomes occurred in Lucchetti, De Levi and Renco I. Conversely, in Caraveli, Gremcitel, Pluspetrol, Lidercón, Latam Hydro and Amorrortu I, tribunals ordered claimants to pay Peru’s arbitration costs.

Thus, arbitral practice does not necessarily follow “costs-follow-the-event”; depending on the case, tribunals may apply a cost-apportionment approach under which each party bears its own costs, setting aside the “loser pays” premise.

The duty to mitigate damages has been recognised by various investment tribunals, with some classifying it as a general principle of law (Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co SA v Egypt). Investors must take reasonable steps to minimise losses and prevent escalation.

This duty is recognised across common law and civil law jurisdictions, including Peruvian domestic law (Civil Code, Article 1327). However, in investment arbitrations where tribunals found Peru liable, the issue of mitigation was not addressed, based on publicly available information to date.

The enforcement of arbitral awards in Peru is governed by Article 68 of the Arbitration Act (Legislative Decree No 1071). For foreign commercial or non-ICSID awards, recognition and enforcement are governed by the 1958 New York Convention and domestic arbitration law.

For ICSID investment arbitrations, enforcement against the State is governed by Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, which equates awards to final domestic court judgments.

Annulled Awards or Pending Annulment Proceedings

The following apply in relation to annulments.

• Awards set aside at the seat – Peruvian courts refuse enforcement of foreign commercial awards annulled by a competent court at the seat of arbitration (lex loci arbitri), pursuant to Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention.
• Pending annulment at the seat – If a commercial award is subject to pending set-aside proceedings at the seat, Peruvian judges hold discretion to adjourn recognition proceedings (Article VI of the New York Convention; Articles 75–78 of Legislative Decree No 1071). Under ICSID (Article 52(5)), a party requesting annulment may seek a stay of enforcement, granted provisionally pending ad hoc Committee determination.

International Practice and Enforcement Overseas Against Peru

Public records show investors initiating enforcement proceedings in foreign courts (US, Canada, Luxembourg) in cases such as Lupaka, Kuntur Wasi, IC Power, Metro de Lima Línea 2 and Deviandes. While some actions were dismissed (Lupaka, IC Power), the US court confirmed the award in Kuntur Wasi, declaring Peru in default for failure to appear.

Sovereign Immunity From Execution

Sovereign immunity defences depend on asset nature: public domain or diplomatic assets enjoy robust protection, whereas purely commercial state assets carry diminished immunity protection. No publicly available enforcement proceeding reviewed for purposes of this chapter has been identified in which Peru formally asserted sovereign immunity from execution.

Peruvian courts maintain a pro-arbitration stance regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign awards. Under Article 75 of Legislative Decree No 1071, international public policy violation serves as a statutory ground to refuse recognition. Although local case law has not developed an exhaustive and uniform standard on this matter, the trend of the commercial chambers is a restrictive interpretation in favour of the award.

A notable milestone occurred in late 2025 involving the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima (MML), where the First Civil Chamber (Commercial Sub-Specialty) of the Judiciary rejected MML’s public policy challenge, fully recognising the foreign award.

Regarding sovereign immunity and asset attachment, there are no Peruvian court decisions addressing this matter at the award enforcement stage. However, under Article 73 of the Constitution, public domain property is inalienable and not subject to attachment.

Under Article 73 of the Peruvian Constitution and Constitutional Court precedent (Exp No 006-1997-AI/TC), relative immunity applies to Peruvian State assets: public domain property, Central Reserve Bank (BCRP) reserves and sovereign function assets are immune from execution.

In foreign enforcement litigation against Peru, such as Redes Andinas de Comunicaciones SRL v PRONATEL & MTC before the US District Court for the District of Columbia (2026), the claimant sought discovery under FRCP Rules 69(a)(2) and 37(a) to locate Peruvian State assets. The court granted the motion, ordering a diligent search for the information and its production within 30 days of the order.

Regarding piercing the corporate veil, Peruvian courts and doctrine treat veil-piercing as an exceptional remedy requiring clear proof of fraud, abuse of rights, or sham corporate structuring. Based on publicly available information, no local commercial awards addressing this matter have been accessed.