The Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018 (FCCPA), enacted in 2019, governs merger review and approval in Nigeria.

The Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020 (BOFIA) was enacted in 2020. Section 65 (1) stripped the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC or the Commission) of its competition powers with regard to the financial services sector, which is under the regulatory supervision of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), the financial services regulator. Section 65(3) further assigned the competition regulation powers of the FCCPC to the CBN, thereby subjecting mergers in the financial services sector to the CBN’s regulatory scrutiny.

In the communications sector, Section 90 of the Nigerian Communications Act 2003 confers broad competition oversight powers on the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC, the sector-specific regulator for the Nigerian communications sector), authorising it to determine, administer, monitor, and enforce compliance with both general and sector-specific competition laws as they apply to the Nigerian communications market. Pursuant to this mandate, the NCC enacted the Competition Practices Regulations 2007 (the CPR) through administrative rule-making.

Regulation 26 of the CPR expressly empowers NCC to review all mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers within the communications sector. This sector-specific merger review jurisdiction is exercised concurrently with the FCCPC, reflecting a dual regulatory framework for merger control in Nigeria’s communications industry.

In exercising its rule-making power under the FCCPA, the FCCPC issued the Guidelines on Simplified Process for Foreign-to-Foreign Mergers with Nigerian Component (the “Foreign-to-Foreign Merger Guidelines”). These guidelines outline, among other things, the procedure for notifying a foreign-to-foreign merger with a Nigerian component to the FCCPC and the calculation of applicable notification fees.

In terms of foreign investment, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act provides that a foreign national can own up to 100% of a business or invest in any business except those on the negative list. Prohibited activities include:

• the production of arms, ammunition, etc;
• the production of and dealing in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;
• the production of military and paramilitary wear and accoutrements, including those of the police and the customs, immigration and prison services; and
• other similar activities, determined by the Federal Executive Council.

The FCCPC is Nigeria’s lead competition authority responsible for enforcing the FCCPA. In its review of mergers involving parties that are also subject to regulatory oversight of other sector-specific regulators, the FCCPC typically requires a letter of no objection from the relevant regulator before granting unconditional approval for the transaction.

An exception applies to the financial services sector. Pursuant to the provisions of BOFIA, CBN has been vested with primary regulatory authority over competition and consumer protection matters within the financial services sector, including the review and approval of mergers involving financial institutions and other regulated financial service providers. Notwithstanding this statutory framework, the scope and exclusivity of the CBN’s mandate continue to generate regulatory and judicial debate, particularly following the decision of the Federal High Court in United Bank of Africa Plc v FCCPC (Unreported - FHC/ABJ/CS/1972/2025), where the court affirmed the powers of the FCCPC to investigate and enforce consumer protection matters within the financial services sector.

However, the precise implications of the decision remain unsettled, particularly as regards whether the court’s reasoning extends beyond consumer protection to encompass competition law enforcement and, by extension, merger control and review within the financial services industry. Given that the jurisprudence in this area is still developing and may ultimately be clarified through appellate adjudication or legislative refinement, the extent of the FCCPC’s continuing jurisdiction in competition and consumer protection matters within the financial services sector has yet to be conclusively determined.

Notification to the FCCPC is only required if the merger meets the jurisdictional threshold for notification. Under the FCCPA, a merger becomes notifiable to the FCCPC if it meets the criteria specified as constituting a relevant merger situation. According to paragraph 2.3 of the Merger Review Guidelines (MRG) issued by the FCCPC, a relevant merger situation is created where the following cumulative criteria are met:

• two or more undertakings must come under common control, or there must be arrangements in progress or in contemplation which, if carried into effect, will lead to the undertakings coming under a common control to be distinct; and
• either the Nigerian turnover in the preceding year of the undertaking that is being acquired exceeds the prescribed threshold or the combined value of the Nigerian element of the merging undertakings in the preceding year exceeds the prescribed threshold (known as the “turnover test”), as stipulated in the Notice of Threshold for Merger Notification 2019 (Threshold Regulations) issued by the FCCPC.

If the FCCPC believes that the first criterion has not been met, it will not consider the second criterion, as a relevant merger situation is not created. In addition, where a Nigerian undertaking comes under the control of a foreign undertaking, the merger may be subject to notification if the turnover test under the Threshold Regulations is met or if the acquisition of the Nigerian undertaking affects the market structure by preventing or lessening competition in Nigeria.

The standard used by the FCCPC to assess the jurisdictional threshold for mergers in the financial services sector is likely to be the same as the standard applied by the CBN when determining whether a relevant merger situation exists. In the communications sector, the following types of qualifying merger transactions are notifiable to NCC:

• the acquisition of more than 10% of the shares of a communications licensee;
• a transaction that results in a change of control of a communications licensee; and
• a direct or indirect transfer or acquisition of an individual communications licence.

Notifying a qualifying merger transaction is a legal requirement under Section 96(7) of the FCCPA. Failing to do so is considered an offence and may result in a fine of up to 10% of the parties’ turnover from the business year prior to the offence. The court may also determine a different percentage based on the case’s specific circumstances.

In the communications sector, a failure to obtain the written consent of the NCC when transferring or assigning a communications licence is an offence under the Nigerian Communications (Enforcement Processes, etc) Regulations 2019. Convicted offenders are liable to a fine of NGN10 million and a further NGN500,000 per day, calculated from the effective date of the transfer or assignment as determined by the NCC and payable for as long as the contravention persists.

The NCC may impose a maximum lump sum fee of NGN2 million on licensees with a turnover of less than NGN1 billion. Where a joint venture or change in shareholding structure in a communications licensee is implemented without first obtaining the consent of the NCC, the offending licensees are liable to a fine of NGN5 million and a further NGN500,000 per day, calculated from the effective date of the joint venture arrangement or change in shareholding structure, as determined by the NCC, and payable for as long as the contravention persists.

However, the NCC normally publishes details of its enforcement activities regarding a failure to notify a qualifying merger in the communications sector. As far as is known, the FCCPC has not applied such a penalty in practice or made it public in any case.

Paragraph 2.6 of the MRG states that the following transactions are subject to a merger review.

• Acquisitions of property within Nigeria are covered by virtue of Section 92 (1) of the FCCPA, including (but not limited to):
1. shares in Nigerian companies, wherever the transaction is entered into, as the shares are domestically situated;
2. domestic businesses;
3. local intellectual property such as trade marks, patents and copyright; and
4. local plant and equipment.
• Acquisitions of property, wherever situated, are covered by virtue of Sections 92(1) and 2 (1)-(3) of the FCCPA if the acquirer:
1. is incorporated in Nigeria;
2. carries on business in Nigeria;
3. is a Nigerian citizen; or
4. is ordinarily resident in Nigeria.

If the above points do not apply, acquisitions of a controlling interest (presumably shares in almost all cases) in a corporate body where that body has a controlling interest in a corporation are covered by Section 92 (1) of the FCCPA.

According to the FCCPC, an internal restructuring within a group of companies does not constitute a relevant merger situation and is thus exempt from notification because it does not lead to control by an external party.

In the communications sector, the following transactions are caught:

• the acquisition of more than 10% of the shares of a communications licensee;
• a transaction that results in a change of control of a communications licensee; and
• a direct or indirect transfer or acquisition of an individual communications licence.

Neither the FCCPA nor the FCCPC defines what constitutes control for merger notification purposes. However, Section 92 (2) of the FCCPA provides a list of situations where an undertaking may be determined to exercise control over the business of another undertaking. These situations are where an undertaking:

• beneficially owns more than one-half of the issued share capital or assets of another undertaking;
• is entitled to cast the majority of votes that may be cast at a general meeting of the company or can control the voting of the majority of those votes;
• is able to appoint or veto the appointment of a majority of the directors of the undertaking;
• is a holding company, and the company is a subsidiary of that company as contemplated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act;
• in the case of an undertaking that is a trust, has the ability to control the majority of votes of the trustees, to appoint the majority of the trustees or can
• materially influence the policy of the company in a manner comparable to a person who, in ordinary commercial practice, can exercise the element of control referred to in the above points.

According to Section 92 (3) of the FCCPA, control does not exist in either of the following circumstances:

• credit institutions or other financial institutions or insurance companies acquiring securities of an undertaking in the ordinary course of business on a transitory basis or where the company is raising capital, provided they do not exercise voting rights to determine the competitive behaviour of the undertaking and they dispose of the securities within one year of acquisition; and
• control acquired under the law relating to liquidation, winding up, insolvency, cessation of payments, compositions or analogous proceedings.

In addition, as explained in 2.1 Notification, control is only one of the criteria used to assess whether a merger is notifiable to the FCCPC; the other is the turnover threshold. If these two criteria are met, then a merger is caught and must be notified to the FCCPC.

See 2.1 Notification.

The jurisdictional threshold necessary to trigger a merger review involves two cumulative criteria that must be met in every case: the control element and the turnover test. Only the turnover test involves calculations which must be done in accordance with the Threshold Regulations. Pursuant to paragraph 1.1 of the Threshold Regulations, the turnover test is met if, in the financial year preceding the merger:

• the combined annual turnover of the acquiring undertaking and the target undertaking in, into or from Nigeria equals or exceeds NGN1 billion; or
• the annual turnover of the target undertaking in, into or from Nigeria equals or exceeds NGN500 million.

Where the applicable turnover is in a foreign currency, the FCCPC uses the prevailing exchange rate determined by the CBN at the end of the financial year preceding the notification or the date on which the contract creating the merger came into force, whichever is later.

The businesses or corporate entities that have generated turnover attributable to a business or derived from Nigeria are relevant for calculating the turnover. In addition, as explained in 2.6 Calculations of Jurisdictional Thresholds, turnover may be calculated on the basis of the combined annual turnover of the acquiring undertaking and the target undertaking or based on the annual turnover of only the target undertaking.

Turnover may also be calculated group-wide, provided it is attributable to and/or derived from Nigeria. According to the FCCPC’s practice, “group-wide” refers to an undertaking in which any of the merger parties has a controlling interest. Lastly, the FCCPC does not prescribe a particular procedure for changes in the business during the reference period; however, it is conceivable that discussions in this regard may be had with the FCCPC as part of the pre-notification consultation.

Foreign-to-foreign transactions that have a local component are subject to merger control. According to the FCCPC, a local component exists if a foreign entity has a local nexus, such as having subsidiaries in Nigeria, or if it satisfies the turnover test provided in the Threshold Regulations. When the target undertaking has no subsidiaries, sales, or assets in Nigeria, no turnover has been generated, and therefore, notification to the FCCPC is not required.

No market share jurisdictional threshold applies in Nigeria at the time of writing.

As a general rule, any joint venture must meet the following basic criteria to qualify for a merger review:

• economic integration of the parties’ business activities (for example, through a contribution of productive assets to a new business undertaking);
• elimination of competition between the parties in the joint venture’s field of activity through this contribution; and
• the relative permanence of the joint business activity.

Where these basic criteria are met, the joint venture will be brought within the general scope of merger review if its creation typically involves the transfer of voting equity or assets and by reference to the underlying combination of previously independent businesses.

In addition, a full-function joint venture must be notified to the FCCPC if the value of its assets or turnover exceeds the turnover threshold. A full-function joint venture operates on a lasting basis with all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, competes with other undertakings in a relevant market, and has sufficient resources and staff to operate independently in the relevant market.

Section 95 (3) of the FCCPA authorises the FCCPC to require the parties to a merger that falls below the applicable jurisdictional thresholds to notify the Commission of the merger transaction in the prescribed manner and form. This power may be exercised where the FCCPC is of the opinion that the merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition. The FCCPC must exercise this power within six months from the date the merger is implemented.

According to Section 93 (1) of the FCCPA, a proposed merger shall not be implemented unless it is first notified to and approved by the FCCPC. Specifically, Regulation 13 (2) of the Merger Review Regulations 2020 (MRR) requires the merging parties to ensure that they take no steps and undertake no activities before and during the notification period that may be deemed co-ordination or integration of their businesses or their competitive conduct in any of the following respects:

• the exchange of commercially sensitive information;
• the nature of contractual clauses governing the relationship; and
• the activities of the parties before and during the notification of the merger.

To do otherwise would increase their risk of engaging in gun-jumping conduct, which could expose them to fines from the FCCPC. Paragraph 3.61 of the MRG cites the following examples of gun-jumping:

• co-ordination between merging parties on prices or terms to be offered to customers for sales prior to closing the merger;
• allocating customers for sales to be made prior to closing; and
• if, prior to closing, merging firms co-ordinate their negotiations with customers for sales to be made after the merger closes (eg, negotiations of long-term contracts).

For mergers that do not meet the jurisdictional threshold for notification, which are notified to the FCCPC post-transaction, the merger parties are not required to take further steps to integrate the respective businesses.

Under the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (Administrative Penalties) Regulations 2020, the base penalty for gun jumping, ie, implementing a notifiable merger without the FCCPC’s approval, is set at 2% of the turnover of the merger parties in the preceding year.

However, the final administrative penalty is determined through a structured methodology that begins with the calculation of a base penalty, which is set at 2% of the annual turnover of the merger parties. This base amount constitutes the starting point for the overall computation and reflects the initial assessment of the infringement. The second step adjusts the base penalty to account for the duration of the violation. This is done by applying a time-related factor, calculated as the proportion of the number of months of non-compliance over a 12-month period, multiplied by the base penalty. The resulting amount, which reflects the additional penalty for the length of the violation, is added to the base penalty to reflect the continuing nature of the infringement.

In the third step, the cumulative amount derived from the base penalty and the duration adjustment is reviewed against the statutory ceiling. The applicable law imposes a cap of 10% of the annual turnover of the merger parties, which serves as the maximum permissible penalty regardless of the outcome of the calculation. The fourth step introduces an assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, which are applied to the calculated amount as a net percentage adjustment. This adjustment may either increase or reduce the penalty, depending on considerations such as the seriousness of the infringement, co-operation with the authority, or remedial conduct by the parties. These factors are aggregated into a single percentage modifier and applied to the amount derived from the earlier steps.

Finally, the resulting figure is again tested against the statutory cap of 10% annual turnover and rounded where necessary to ensure compliance with the legal maximum. The final administrative penalty therefore reflects a composite assessment that integrates the base penalty, the duration of the infringement, and the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors, while remaining subject to the statutory ceiling of 10%.

The FCCPC has consistently reiterated its commitment to sanctioning parties that implement notifiable mergers without obtaining prior regulatory approval. Most recently, in April 2026, the FCCPC issued a public notice warning undertakings against non-compliance with applicable merger control requirements and transaction approval processes. Notwithstanding these regulatory pronouncements, there is, to date, no publicly available record of administrative penalties or enforcement sanctions having been imposed on undertakings domiciled in Nigeria for gun-jumping violations.

Similarly, there have been no publicly disclosed enforcement actions or sanctions in relation to foreign-to-foreign mergers with a Nigerian nexus. While this may suggest a measured or evolving enforcement posture, it should not be interpreted as diminishing the FCCPC’s statutory powers or its stated intention to strengthen merger control compliance and enforcement oversight within the Nigerian competition law framework.

At the time of writing (May 2026), there are no general exceptions to the obligation not to implement a qualifying merger without first seeking and obtaining the approval of the FCCPC and/or the NCC.

Global transactions may be implemented without seeking prior approval from the FCCPC in circumstances where there is no local component, and the jurisdictional threshold is not met.

There is no specific deadline for notification. The FCCPA requires that the FCCPC’s approval be sought and obtained before a qualifying merger is implemented.

As part of the merger review process, the FCCPC requires the submission of all documents that form the basis of the merger transaction. These may include heads of terms, memoranda of understanding, sale and purchase agreements, business transfer agreements, or any similar documents.

Where transaction documents have not been finalised, the most recent draft(s) must be submitted, accompanied by regular updates reflecting any subsequent revisions. It is imperative that the notifying parties keep the FCCPC fully informed of all material changes to the transaction documentation throughout the review process.

Filing fees are payable for merger notifications. The applicable fee is determined by a percentage of either the consideration sum payable for the transaction or the combined turnover of the merging companies in the preceding financial year (whichever is higher).

The applicable percentages are:

• 0.45% of the first NGN500 million;
• 0.45% of the next NGN500 million; and
• 0.35% of any sum thereafter.

The relevant turnover for calculating the applicable fees for mergers involving foreign entities with a local component is the turnover based on or attributable to the business of or in the local component in Nigeria.

There are no deadlines for payments, but a merger notification will not be considered satisfactory if no payments are made.

The primary acquiring undertaking and the primary target undertaking, collectively referred to as the merger parties, are responsible for filing the merger application at the FCCPC, although it is common for such organisations to instruct local counsel to make such filings and notifications on their behalf.

The FCCPC requires the submission of copies of specific internal documents prepared or received by any member(s) of the board of management, board of directors, supervisory board or shareholders’ meeting, or other individuals with similar functions or to whom such functions have been delegated or entrusted. Such documents include minutes of meetings where the transaction was discussed and reports, surveys, studies, presentations and related documents that assess or analyse the merger in terms of its rationale, potential for sales growth, market shares, competitive conditions, competitors (actual and potential), expansion into other markets, and general market conditions.

Analyses, reports, studies, surveys and related documents from the last two years that assess the affected market(s) – including market shares, competitors (actual and potential), competitive conditions and potential for sales growth or expansion into other markets – should also be submitted. In the case of a full merger, the most recent business plan of both merging parties should be included.

Lastly, the FCCPC requires the information provided to be comprehensive, factual, detailed and translated into English (Nigeria’s official language) before submission.

The FCCPA does not impose penalties for submitting an incomplete merger notification; however, the FCCPC will treat such submissions as deficient and decline to treat the filing as complete for the purposes of commencing or continuing its substantive review. In such circumstances, the applicable review timelines may be suspended or remain in abeyance pending the submission of all required information, documents, and supporting materials necessary for the FCCPC’s assessment of the transaction.

The FCCPC can revoke its decision to approve or may conditionally approve a merger where the application was based on incorrect information supplied by the merging parties, subject to the provisions of Section 99 1 (a) of the FCCPA. It can also prohibit the merger in its entirety.

Subject to Section 112 of the FCCPA, an undertaking that gives the FCCPC or an authorised officer of the FCCPC any information that the undertaking knows to be false or misleading commits an offence, leading to the following penalties:

• where the undertaking is a natural person: liability on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding NGN10 million, or both; and
• where the undertaking is a body corporate: liability on conviction to a fine not exceeding 10% of its turnover in the preceding business year, and each director of the entity is liable to be proceeded against and, on conviction, dealt with as a natural person.

In addition, the appointed legal representative of a merger party is required to submit a sworn declaration attesting that the information provided in the notification is true and accurate to the best of their knowledge. Any false or misleading declaration may expose the representative to prosecution for perjury under applicable law.

Subject to the provisions of the MRG and Section 95 of the FCCPA, the merger review consists of two phases. For small mergers, the FCCPA requires the FCCPC’s review to be concluded within 20 business days (extendable by 40 days) of satisfactory merger notification. The period may be extended by up to an additional 15 business days if the merger raises initial competition concerns and the parties propose acceptable remedies, but the need for a Phase Two review is not anticipated.

For large mergers, Section 97 of the FCCPA limits the period of review to 60 business days, which is extendable by an additional 60 business days. This period may be extended by up to a further 30 business days if the merger raises initial competition concerns, but the need for a Phase Two review is not expected. For most cases where no material competition concerns arise, the FCCPC will seek to complete the first detailed review within 45 business days. Generally, a Phase One review will conclude within the statutory timeframes. Under Regulation 19 of the MRR, the FCCPC utilises the statutory extensions in two ways:

• first, to fulfil the proposed remedies’ objective, where they are acceptable; and
• second, to undertake the Phase Two review.

The MRG suggest that the pre-notification phase of a merger review is crucial, and the FCCPC encourages merging parties to discuss a proposed merger informally and confidentially before submitting a notification, typically at least two weeks before the submission of a formal notification is contemplated. This allows both the FCCPC and the merging parties to discuss legal issues, prepare for investigations and identify potential competition concerns early on.

Consultations with the FCCPC may be conducted in person, by telephone, via videoconference, through other digital platforms, or by any other means deemed appropriate by the Commission. These consultations are intended to clarify jurisdictional issues as well as substantive and procedural matters. They may be scheduled through the FCCPC’s merger notification portal and, for confidentiality purposes, can be held on a “no-names” basis. However, consultations are generally more effective and offer clearer guidance to merging parties when the Commission is provided with complete and accurate information.

During the review process or while conducting its investigation, the FCCPC may undertake market testing of the notified transaction and request additional information from the notifying parties to enable it to proceed or conclude with its review.

Such requests effectively suspend the review pending their resolution.

Form 2 (Notice of Merger Simplified Procedure) allows for a simplified procedure if the merger parties assess the proposed merger and believe that the transaction is unlikely to impede market competition.

Paragraph 21(3) of the MRR empowers the FCCPC to approve a fast-track process for merger notifications upon request by the parties. This expedited process reduces the timeline for all relevant steps during the initial review by 40% unless a different timeframe is specified in the applicable notice. It is important to note that this reduction applies only where the FCCPC has not already published a specific review period and is subject to any issues that may arise during the prescribed review period.

For foreign-to-foreign mergers with a Nigerian nexus, the Foreign-to-Foreign Merger Guidelines provide an expedited procedure under which the Commission is required to conclude its review and issue a decision within 15 business days, following the payment of a processing fee of NGN10 million. The FCCPC generally adheres to this 15-day timeline, except where the notification is deficient or other substantive or procedural issues are identified.

Section 94 (1) of the FCCPA requires the FCCPC to undertake two levels of review. At the first level, the FCCPC will determine whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition (SPLC) in a relevant market in Nigeria. Where the outcome of the FCCPC’s review is negative, the merger will be approved. However, where the FCCPC determines that an SPLC situation does exist, it will undertake a second-level review that involves an in-depth substantive assessment of the merger. At this level, the FCCPC will also examine whether factors such as efficiency and public interest considerations can offset or reverse the SPLC situation.

The CBN will assess a merger on whether or not it is likely to lead to an SPLC situation in a relevant financial services sector market. The NCC will assess a merger on whether it is capable of a substantial lessening of competition or would result in a dominant position in a relevant communications market in Nigeria.

As a general principle, the FCCPC would not assume that the merging parties operate in the same relevant market(s), even when there appears to be some overlap between their products and the geographic areas in which they conduct business. In addition, the FCCPC considers that the relevant market(s) being analysed for competitive effects may not necessarily correspond to the product categories or service areas established by the merging firms or their rivals for operational purposes.

Thus, the conceptual framework adopted by the FCCPC within which relevant information can be organised to assess the competitive effect of a merger is, in the first instance, to identify the products or services and geographic area in which competition may be harmed. In this regard, the FCCPC defines the relevant product market in terms of the set of products that customers consider to be close substitutes, while the relevant geographic market is defined in terms of the location of suppliers; this includes those suppliers that customers consider to be feasible substitutes and it may be local, state-wide, regional, national or wider (transcending national boundaries).

Although neither the FCCPA nor the FCCPC explicitly mentions a “de minimis level,” a merger or acquisition involving two or more companies that operate in the same product or geographic market is eligible for notification through the simplified procedure if their combined market share is less than 15%. The FCCPC states that this simplified procedure may be applicable for mergers that do not pose significant concerns regarding competition.

As a matter of practice, the FCCPC allows the merger parties to rely on cases and theories from Nigeria and other jurisdictions as judicial precedents when articulating their views on the overall impact of the merger on market competition.

There is no preference for cases from any particular jurisdiction; what is most relevant is that the cases and theories relied on by the parties are applicable to the views they advance.

In reviewing mergers, the FCCPC is concerned about the following anti-competitive harms that can arise from those mergers:

• unilateral effects in a horizontal merger that involves two competing firms and removes the rivalry between them, allowing the merged firm to raise prices profitably;
• co-ordinated effects in either a horizontal or non-horizontal merger that enables or increases the ability for several firms within the market (including the merged firm) jointly to increase prices because it creates or strengthens the conditions under which they can co-ordinate; and
• vertical or conglomerate effects that may arise principally in a non-horizontal merger that creates or strengthens the ability of the merged firm to use its market power in at least one of the markets, thus reducing competition.

The FCCPC’s approach to the assessment of these harms is set out in the MRG. The CBN and NCC may recognise these same theories of anti-competitive harm.

The FCCPC considers economic efficiencies in circumstances where a merger has been determined to be capable of an SPLC situation. In such cases, economic efficiencies would be considered as a trade-off evaluated against the perceived anti-competitive effects of the merger. Such economic efficiencies must result in the better utilisation of existing assets, enabling the combined firm to achieve lower costs than either firm could have achieved alone.

According to the FCCPC, the party relying on efficiencies must prove that the efficiencies are:

• likely to occur;
• merger-specific; and
• greater than the anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger, which they will offset.

Non-competition issues are taken into account by the FCCPC during the review process. Specifically, the following non-competition issues are considered in applicable circumstances when reviewing a merger.

• Public interest gains, which must be substantial and specific to the merger. In addition, public interest considerations must be assessed under any of the following grounds:
1. gains relating to a particular industrial sector or region – eg, the stable supply of electricity;
2. employment;
3. the ability of national industries to compete in international markets; and
4. the ability of small and medium-sized enterprises to become competitive.
• The firm is failing, which can be used to justify the approval of an otherwise anti-competitive merger where one of the merging firms is in financial difficulties or at risk of bankruptcy.
• According to the FCCPC, the following conditions must be cumulatively met for the defence of a failing firm to be successfully invoked:
1. the firm must be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future;
2. there must be no viable prospect of reorganising the business through the process of receivership or otherwise;
3. the assets of the failing firm would exit the relevant market in the absence of a merger transaction; and
4. there is no credible, less anti-competitive alternative outcome than the merger in question.

The analytical framework adopted by the FCCPC for assessing these defences is set out in the MRG.

There are no specific rules for foreign direct investment in relation to merger control.

The same standard applies to the substantive assessment of mergers and the substantive review of joint ventures. At the time of writing, there is no indication as to whether or not the FCCPC will examine possible co-ordination issues between joint venture parents when reviewing a joint venture.

Section 98 of the FCCPA authorises the FCCPC to direct any of its officers to investigate a merger. In exercising this power, the FCCPC may also require any person or undertaking to provide any information regarding the merger. In addition, Regulation 20 (1) of the MRR authorises the FCCPC to prohibit a merger upon the conclusion of the review process.

However, the FCCPC has indicated that only mergers that lessen competition substantially will be prohibited. In assessing whether a merger is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially, the FCCPC evaluates whether the merger is likely to lead to higher prices, either through the unilateral ability of the merged firm or in co-ordination with other firms. Generally speaking, the prevention or lessening of competition will be considered by the FCCPC to be “substantial” in either of the two following circumstances:

• where the price of the relevant product(s) would likely be higher in the relevant market than it would be in the absence of the merger (“material price increase”); or
• where sufficient new entry would not occur rapidly enough to prevent a material price increase or counteract the effects of such an increase.

Where the merging firms have pre-existing market power, individually or collectively, the FCCPC will consider smaller impacts on competition resulting from the merger to meet the test of being substantial.

The FCCPC may apply remedies, or the merger parties may propose remedies, including:

• structural remedies, which typically involve the disposal of a business or assets from the merger parties to create a new source of competition (if sold to a new entrant) or to strengthen an existing source of competition (if sold to an existing competitor);
• behavioural remedies, non-structural remedies or “conduct” remedies, which are ongoing measures designed to modify, regulate or constrain the future conduct of the post-merger firm; and/or
• hybrid remedies, which are a combination of both structural and behavioural remedies and will be applied by the FCCPC when, for example, a merger involves multiple markets or products and competition is best preserved by structural relief in some relevant markets and by non-structural relief in others.

While remedies are not generally required to meet a specific legal standard to be deemed acceptable, the FCCPC must, as a matter of practice, ensure that any proposed remedy is appropriately tailored to address the identified competition harm(s). The remedy must also effectively mitigate or eliminate such harm(s) to ensure that the merger does not substantially lessen competition.

Merger parties may put forward remedies to the FCCPC at any time during the merger review process, including during pre-notification consultations. Alternatively, the FCCPC may allow the merger parties to propose remedies in any of the following circumstances.

After the initial first-level review of the merger, if the FCCPC determines that the merger is likely to give rise to an SPLC situation, it shall issue an issues paper to the merger parties that, among other things, requires the presentation of a written response addressing the competition concerns raised in the issues paper and proposing remedies as applicable to alleviate them.

After consideration of the merger parties’ response to the issues paper, if the FCCPC still finds that the merger is likely to lead to an SPLC situation and the remedies proposed by the merger parties do not address the competition issues identified, it shall issue a Statement of Objections and commence the second level of the merger review process. At this level, the merger parties may put forward a remedies proposal in their response to the Statement of Objections to address the competition concerns raised by the FCCPC in the issues paper. Where the FCCPC is satisfied with the presentation of the merger parties, it may approve the merger at this stage, subject to requiring the merging parties to:

• take an action to remedy, mitigate or prevent the substantial lessening or prevention of competition; or
• fulfil any other conditions as may be appropriate in the circumstance of the case.

Thereafter, the FCCPC shall publish a non-confidential version of the remedies proposal, giving interested third parties the opportunity to comment on the effectiveness and sufficiency of the proposals. At least ten working days will be allocated for this consultation process, following which the FCCPC will determine whether the remedies proposal will be accepted and finalise the remedies package alongside the final decision on the merger.

The power of the FCCPC to approve a merger subject to conditions also includes the power to impose any remedies, whether or not agreed by the merger parties.

There is no prescribed timeline for the implementation of remedies according to the decisional practice of the Commission. However, when approving a remedies package, the FCCPC may stipulate specific timeframes for implementing the remedies to address identified competition concerns. In certain cases, the merger may be completed prior to the implementation of the remedies, particularly where the remedy is post-approval in nature. In such instances, the FCCPC will, as a matter of practice, require the merging parties or the post-merger entity to provide an undertaking to implement the remedy as a condition for approval.

There is no specific penalty for failing to implement an approved remedy; however, non-compliance with any order or directive of the FCCPC is considered an offence under the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (Administrative Penalties) Regulations 2020. Offenders may face a base penalty of NGN5 million, which can be adjusted based on various factors, such as the duration of the non-compliance and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances present.

Section 97 (1) (b) of the FCCPA requires the FCCPC to issue a decision in the form of a report after considering a merger, stating whether to:

• approve the merger;
• approve the merger subject to condition(s); or
• prohibit the implementation of the merger.

Merger review decisions are not made publicly available.

As far as is publicly known, there have been no recent cases where the FCCPC has required remedies or prohibited a merger transaction. However, on 4 March 2023, the FCCPC published and invited comments with respect to the remedies package proposed by the merger parties in the proposed acquisition of a 21.61% equity stake by FMDQ Holdings PLC in Central Securities Clearing Systems PLC. The remedies proposed by the merger parties in this case are both behavioural and structural; no information is available on the outcome of this case nor any decision of the FCCPC in this regard.

Both the FCCPA and the decisional practices of the FCCPC are silent on the concept of ancillary restraints. However, according to Regulation 13 (2) (b) of the MRR, certain contractual clauses ancillary to the merger transaction may be deemed a co-ordination or integration of the parties’ businesses or their competitive conduct and thus expose them to liability for gun jumping. According to the FCCPC, these clauses demand greater scrutiny during the merger review process and include the following:

• the lack of a precedence clause delineating the effective date of the contract and the date of its execution in relation to the creation of any integration among parties;
• prior non-compete clauses;
• clauses for full or partial payment of non-reimbursable, earnest money deposit or advance payments, in consideration for the target, except in the case of:
1. customary down payments for business transactions;
2. deposits in escrow accounts; or
3. break-up fees (payable if the transaction is not consummated);
• clauses allowing direct interference by either party in the other party’s business strategies by submitting, for example, decisions over prices, customers, business/sales policy, planning, marketing strategies and other sensitive decisions (that do not constitute a mere protection against deviation from the normal course of business and, consequently, the protection of the value of the business being sold); and
• in general terms, any clause providing for activities that cannot be reversed at a later time or which implies the expenditure of a significant amount of resources by the agents involved or the authority.

Third parties are involved in the merger review process. Regulation 16 (1) of the MRR requires the FCCPC to publish a notice of a proposed merger upon satisfactory notification by the merger parties. Under Regulation 16 (2) of the MRR, the publication of the notice shall include an invitation to any interested third parties to comment on the merger by providing a written submission to the FCCPC within the prescribed timelines.

In addition, Regulation 16 (3) of the MRR requires the merger parties, in notifying the merger to the FCCPC, to provide evidence of service of notice of the proposed merger to any registered trade union that represents the employees in the acquiring and target undertakings respectively, or to the employees or representatives of the employees of the acquiring and target undertakings if there are no such registered trade unions.

In conducting a second-level review of the proposed merger, the FCCPC may hold hearings with third parties and issue detailed questionnaires to market participants, such as key customers or competitors, and industry experts, such as relevant public authorities or regulators.

The FCCPC does not generally market-test the remedies proposed by the merger parties. However, in assessing the effectiveness of a proposed remedy, the FCCPC would consider its competitive impact – ie, whether the remedy is designed to address the identified competition harm that is likely to result from the merger, with due consideration to how the remedy changes the competitive dynamics of the market and the incentives of the post-merger firm post-remedy. In doing this, the FCCPC will set out terms in the Remedy Order that specify and anticipate potential issues that may arise during the implementation phase to help actualise the intended competitive impact (eg, restoring competition) and protect against the merging parties’ ability to thwart the intended competitive impact.

The FCCPC publishes public notice of a proposed merger; however, commercial information is treated with the utmost confidentiality by the FCCPC at the request of the merger parties, including business secrets. If the merger parties believe that their interests would be harmed if any of the information they are required to supply were to be published or otherwise divulged to other parties, they should submit this information separately, with each page clearly marked “Business Secrets” under separate cover. They must also give reasons why this information should not be divulged or published.

In the case of business combinations or in other cases where the notification is completed by more than one of the parties, business secrets may be severally submitted under separate cover and referred to in the notification as an annex. All such annexes must be included in the submission for a notification to be considered complete.

As a matter of policy, the FCCPC encourages the merger parties to facilitate international co-operation between the FCCPC and other competition authorities reviewing the same merger. During the pre-notification consultation and actual notification of the merger, the FCCPC encourages the merger parties to disclose the jurisdictions outside Nigeria where the merger is subject to regulatory clearance under merger review rules.

Furthermore, the FCCPC encourages the undertakings concerned to submit confidentiality waivers that would enable the FCCPC to share information with other competition authorities outside Nigeria reviewing the same merger. Each waiver is intended to facilitate joint discussion and analysis of a merger as it allows the FCCPC to share relevant information with another competition authority reviewing the same merger, including confidential business information obtained from the undertakings concerned.

Merger review decisions are subject to appeal. Where a sector-specific regulator, such as the NCC, has issued a merger decision following a competition assessment, the FCCPC must first review it before it may be appealed to the Competition and Consumer Protection Tribunal (CCPT).

In contrast, decisions issued directly by the FCCPC are, in the first instance, appealable to the CCPT. Further appeals from the CCPT’s decisions lie with the Court of Appeal.

Notice of Appeal against the FCCPC decision (including merger review decisions) must be delivered to the Chief Registrar of the CCPT within 30 days of receiving the disputed decision, except where full reasons for the decision were not initially provided, in which case the 30-day period begins only upon receipt of the full reasons.

However, as far as is known, there have been no reported appeals against a merger review decision at the FCCPC, the CCPT or the Court of Appeal.

Although the FCCPA does not expressly provide for third-party appeals of merger clearance decisions, it is conceivable that parties with a legitimate interest in the merger or those able to establish locus standi may be permitted to appeal such decisions. Notably, there is no precedent for appealing a merger clearance decision issued under the FCCPA in Nigeria, as no such appeal has been lodged to date.

There is no foreign direct investment/subsidies review legislation in Nigeria, nor are there related filing requirements.