Pensions 2026

Last Updated August 25, 2026

Germany

Law and Practice

Authors



Freshfields is a global law firm with over 280 years of experience in anticipating change, setting new standards, and shaping the future of law. With offices across the EU, US and Asia, it provides unparalleled practice and sector expertise in core market areas. It helps businesses manage risk and capitalise on opportunities with confidence. More than legal experts, the lawyers are strategic partners, problem-solvers, and trusted advisers, bringing fresh thinking to today’s challenges and empowering businesses to shape tomorrow.

Germany has a three-pillar system:

  • the pay-as-you-go statutory pension insurance governed by Book VI of the German Social Code (“SGB VI”) which is compulsory for employees;
  • occupational pensions, which are employer-financed or employer-organised; and
  • privately funded pensions (eg, Riester pension, Basis-/Rürup pension).

Occupational pensions are in principle voluntary (save for a statutory right to salary conversion) but structurally supplement the state pension, since the first-pillar benefit level is generally not regarded as sufficient on its own.

The core statute for all occupational pension schemes is the Company Pensions Act (Gesetz zur Verbesserung der betrieblichen Altersversorgung, “BetrAVG”). It deals with scheme types, vesting, indexation, insolvency protection, portability and settlement, etc.

Supplementary sources are:

  • the Income Tax Act (Einkommensteuergesetz, “EStG”);
  • the Social Security Act IV (“SGB IV”);
  • the Insurance Supervision Act (“VAG”) for the supervision of pension funds (Pensionskassen or Pensionsfonds) and life insurers;
  • the Insurance Contract Act (“VVG”);
  • the Works Constitution Act (“BetrVG”) which deals with the co-determination of works councils in scheme design; and
  • the Collective Agreements Act (“TVG”) which comes into play for schemes established by unions in tariff agreements, eg, the new social partner model.

Secondary law includes Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, “BaFin”) circulars (eg, on risk assessment); Investment and VAG Regulation; and Pension Guarantee Fund (Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein aG, “PSVaG”) circulars dealing with insolvency issues. 

The interplay between the regulations is multi-layered: the pension promise is rooted in employment law, its implementation may however be structured as an insurance contract, and taxation depends on the type of scheme.

At EU level, the Portability Directive 2014/50/EU; the IORP II Directive 2016/2341 (implemented in the VAG); the equal-treatment directives 2000/78/EC and 2006/54/EC (implemented in the General Equal Treatment Act, “AGG”); and the DSGVO 2016/679 are the most relevant frameworks.

Participation in the Pillar 1 pay-as-you-go statutory pension insurance (SGB VI) is in principle compulsory for employees. Self-employed persons are generally not subject to any occupational pension obligation. Certain professions are compulsorily covered by specific pension schemes for these professions (see 2.4 Professional and Self-Employed Pension Arrangements). These replace the statutory pension.

There is no statutory obligation on employers to establish a Pillar 2 occupational pension scheme, with the exception of employees having an individual statutory right to salary/deferred compensation (Entgeltumwandlung, Section 1a BetrAVG) of up to 4% of the contribution ceiling for the social security system.

Sector-wide obligations can arise from collective bargaining (tariff) agreements. These can be declared generally binding (eg, the construction industry’s supplementary pension fund, public sector schemes, etc).

There is no nationwide statutory auto-enrolment/opt-out model as yet. Section 20 BetrAVG, however, allows for the establishment of an automatic deferred-compensation system with an opt-out right, provided there is an underlying tariff agreement.

Pillar 3 private pensions are completely voluntary.

The German Federal Pension Insurance (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund) administers the state pension.

The BaFin supervises Pensionskassen, Pensionsfonds and life insurers (as direct insurers) under the VAG (authorisation, solvency and governance). In contrast, direct pension commitments (Direktzusagen) and support funds (Unterstützungskassen), including their funding, are not subject to supervision. This is also true for contractual trust agreements (CTAs) which are frequently used as funding vehicles for direct commitments.

The Pension Guarantee Fund (PSVaG) administers the statutory insolvency protection system.

A pension promise or scheme can be established in its most basic form by way of a contractual agreement between an employer and an individual or a larger number of employees. This approach is often adopted for board members or senior employees.

Collective schemes covering the workforce of an entire or designated part of an operation or company can be established by way of works agreements concluded between an employer and a works council. This is the most common approach for larger schemes.

Industry-wide schemes can be established between an employers’ association and a union. Such schemes will be directly applicable only to unionised employees and employers which are members of the association, unless they are declared universally applicable throughout the sector. Their applicability can also be – and commonly is – contractually agreed with non-unionised employees.

Regardless of the nature of the scheme, the employer bears a statutory guarantee obligation, Section 1 (1) sentence 3 BetrAVG, even where the pension is externally funded.

Works councils have a statutory co-determination right (Section 87 Nos 8 and 10 BetrAVG) as to the distribution principles if a collective scheme is being established or changed.

Detrimental changes to a collective pension scheme can be challenged by individual employees before the labour courts, claiming that the change is unfair and disproportionate.

The First Company Pensions Strengthening Act (BetriebsrentenstärkungsG, “BRSG I” (2018)) introduced, most notably, the social-partner model (a genuine defined contribution (DC) system which previously did not exist in Germany, even though some schemes are traditionally treated as DC schemes from an accounting perspective) and the mandatory employer top-up for salary conversion. The BRSG II (December 2025) opened the social-partner model to non-collectively-bound employers, facilitated opt-out systems from 1 July 2026, and raised the thresholds for the unilateral settlement of very small entitlements. In parallel, the Rentenpaket 2025 reformed the state pension (floor on the pension level of 48% until 2031, extended maternal pension credits, and an “active pension” tax allowance). There is an ongoing political debate about further reforms to (i) stabilise the state pension; and (ii) correct deficiencies of occupational pension schemes.

Insurance companies can provide occupational pension schemes as a direct insurance (Direktversicherung), Section 1b(2) BetrAVG. The contract is concluded between the employer and the insurance company and the employee is granted a direct claim against the insurance company as beneficiary. The employer retains residual liability under Section 1(1) sentence 3 BetrAVG.

Insurance companies are also used to funding direct commitments and support funds by way of reinsurance policies. In such cases, the employer/support fund has the claim to the benefits.

Life insurers are subject to supervision by the BaFin. Products offered include classic guaranteed-rate plus variable surplus policies, as well as unit-linked and hybrid annuity products.

Occupational pensions can also be provided by Pensionskassen (mostly mutuals, some stock corporations) and Pensionsfonds (introduced in 2002, with greater investment flexibility and lower guarantee requirements). Pensionskassen can be either regulated or deregulated resulting, among other things, in differences regarding their insolvency protection, their rights to reduce benefits, and the degree of supervision by the BaFin.

All these providers require BaFin authorisation and are, in principle, subject to insurance laws and BaFin supervision. The rules relate to management/supervisory board governance, fit-and-proper requirements, a mandatory responsible actuary, technical provisions, prudent-person investment principles (an adapted Investment Regulation), minimum surplus-allocation rules, and ongoing BaFin reporting, including an own risk assessment (ORA).

Support funds (Unterstützungskasse) are legally independent pension providers with no statutory capital requirements. They are not BaFin-supervised and are typically funded via reinsurance policies (kongruent rückgedeckt) or funding assets (pauschaldotiert). Funding is subject to tax-law funding caps (Section 4d EStG). Support funds do not formally grant a claim to the beneficiaries.

An employer may also provide a pension by way of a direct commitment (Direktzusage). In such a case there is no external provider, just an unfunded balance-sheet obligation on the part of the employer. Funding assets which qualify as plan assets can, however, be created by way of CTAs or pledged re-insurance contracts allowing for a balance sheet netting. Direct commitments are the predominant form of occupational pension schemes by volume.

Genuine occupational pension access in the strict sense (employer-linked) is generally unavailable for the self-employed in the absence of an employee status.

Members of so-called “free” professions (doctors, lawyers, tax advisers, architects, etc) are compulsorily members of pension schemes set up for the sector of their profession (Versorgungswerke), which functionally replace the Pillar 1 statutory pension.

Otherwise, self-employed persons have access to the tax-favourable Pillar 3 Basis-/Rürup pension.

The pension promise/scheme itself is an employment-law construct (either an individual commitment, a general commitment, a collective works agreement or collective tariff agreement). The mandatory minimum content is regulated in the BetrAVG (type of promise, vesting, adjustment review, insolvency protection, etc).

Where the pension is externally funded, an additional administrative contract exists between employer and provider (eg, group insurance contract, participation agreement), governed by general civil law. If the third party provider is a Pensionskasse, life insurer or Pensionsfonds, the relevant statutory insurance laws apply and the employee is granted their own direct claim against the provider.

Otherwise, there is substantial freedom of contract, although this is limited by the mandatory provisions for the protection of employees under the BetrAVG.

An individual pension agreement is subject to general civil and employment law principles (party intent, good faith, customary practice) under Sections 133, 157 and 242 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB).

Pre-formulated individual commitments are additionally subject to standard-terms control (Sections 305 et seq BGB), with ambiguities construed against the drafter. The federal labour court has developed extensive case law on this.

Collective pension arrangements (works agreements, tariff agreements) are interpreted objectively/normatively, as would be the case for statutory norms (wording, systematic context, purpose).

Individual commitments can generally only be amended by individual agreement or (rather theoretically) via a notice of termination combined with a modified offer. There are no further conditions or restrictions other than the mandatory regulations under the BetrAVG (which, for example, restrict the ability to settle or waive a pension entitlement in certain situations). Under recent case law, there may be circumstances where individual agreements may also be amended through collective agreements.

Collective arrangements may be amended through a new works agreement under the principle of supersession, but subject to the federal labour court’s three-tier proportionality test:

  • tier 1 – interference with already accrued entitlements is only lawful for compelling reasons;
  • tier 2 – interference with the accrued dynamic of variable factors is only lawful for cogent reasons; and
  • tier 3 – interference with future, not-yet-accrued increments is only permissible for proportionate objective reasons.

There is substantial case law to be found on this subject matter which is not always fully consistent, especially for tier 3 changes. Great caution and diligence must thus be exercised when implementing scheme changes. It is also important to note that employees may bring individual claims challenging the effectiveness of a change even decades after it was made, which may present substantial long-term risk for the employer. This has led to significant discussions among legal scholars and the problem has been addressed in recent political reform discussions, although with uncertain outcome.

There is no need to seek consent or approval from any other third parties such as the PSVaG in order to implement a change to the pension scheme as such, and there is no “pension regulator” or “scheme trustee” who needs to be involved.

Where the scheme is run by a Pensionskasse, a life insurer or Pensionsfonds, the beneficiary has a direct claim against the provider. The same is factually true for a support fund, even though it does not formally grant such a claim.

In all of the above cases, the employer always bears subsidiary liability for the promised benefit, irrespective of the funding vehicle chosen (statutory guarantee obligation, Section 1(1) sentence 3 BetrAVG).

Disputes between an employee/pensioner and the employer fall to the labour courts; disputes arising from the insurance relationship with the provider fall to the civil courts.

The standard three-year limitation period applies (Section 195 BGB) to payment claims. This limitation does not, however, apply to the basic right to the pension (Rentenstammrecht), which is subject to a 30-year limitation period.

There are five funding methods by which occupational pension schemes can be set up (direct commitment, support fund, direct insurance, Pensionskasse or Pensionsfonds).

These can be combined with four promise types:

  • defined benefit;
  • contribution-oriented defined benefit (contribution defined but converted into a guaranteed benefit);
  • defined contribution with a minimum-capital guarantee; and
  • pure defined contribution (true DC without guarantees, only available under the collectively bargained social-partner model).

Direct commitments are in principle balance-sheet financed (book reserves). Funding assets which can be recognised as plan assets can be created by way of a CTA or pledged reinsurance contracts.

The other vehicles are externally funded. Due to tax restrictions on funding, support funds are usually substantially underfunded unless they are backed by reinsurance, or cover only pensions in payment. The employer has a right to choose whether or not to reflect underfunding in a support fund in its commercial balance sheet. Funding deficits may occur with other external providers due to insufficient investment return.

The statutory retirement age is being raised in stages from 65 to 67 (to reach 67 for those born in 1964 or later; for those born before that, the retirement age depends on birth cohort). Early drawing is currently still possible from the age of 63 with reductions (0.3% per month), or unreduced for particularly long-insured individuals (45 contribution years). These rules may change due to political debate about the sustainability of the state pension system.

Occupational schemes may set their own retirement age; the earliest tax-neutral drawdown age is 60 for contracts concluded up to 31 December 2011 and 62 for contracts concluded thereafter.

Deferral of the pension is also possible.

An entitlement to an old-age pension requires reaching the plan’s retirement event while holding a vested or active entitlement. 

The calculation of the benefit depends on the promise type (benefit formula, account balance, or a conversion factor for DC-oriented schemes).

The default form of benefit is a lifelong annuity but one-off capital payments are permissible, as well as instalments-based drawdown plans.

Lump-sum settlement payments are permitted for de minimis entitlements (commutation thresholds raised by the BRSG II) or where the plan offers a capital option.

Survivors’ and orphans’ benefits are not mandatory for occupational pension schemes but can be included in the scheme. They are often structured as a risk benefit (insured) but can also be capital based. Typical conditions include a subsisting marriage/registered partnership at the time of the insured event,  and sometimes minimum marriage-duration clauses (the validity of which the courts will scrutinise under the equal-treatment law). Orphans’ pensions are restricted by age limits.

Disability pensions are typically linked, as a supplementary benefit, to the statutory concepts of full/partial reduced earning capacity (SGB VI) or to a contractually defined occupational incapacity. The amount is plan-specific (a fraction of the old-age or target pension). Where implemented via insurance, the insurer determines eligibility under the policy conditions, but the employer’s guarantee obligation remains.

Supervision and scrutiny of funding applies mainly to Pensionskassen, Pensionsfonds and life insurance companies. If the technical provisions are insufficient, the BaFin can order remedial measures and, in extreme cases, approve a reduction of non-guaranteed benefits. In such a case, according to the federal labour court, the employer must make up the shortfall against the original promise (guarantee obligation) even if the pension promise dynamically refers to the benefits provided by the external funding vehicle. Surpluses are subject to minimum-allocation rules.

Direct commitments and support fund schemes are not subject to formal solvency oversight. The insolvency risk is mitigated through insolvency protection (PSVaG).

Section 16 BetrAVG requires the employer to review, every three years, whether current pensions need adjusting for purchasing-power loss (based on the CPI) and to decide accordingly, applying equitable discretion. Consumer price indexation can be fully or partly denied if the employer can demonstrate that it is unable to sustain the burden due to insufficient return on capital or capital erosion. Indexation can be capped to the increase in net salaries of active employees but the test is difficult to fulfil in practice. Under certain circumstances, an indexation backlog arising from denied indexation in previous review periods may have to be taken into account in the following review. Detailed regulations apply.

The triannual indexation test may be substituted by a guaranteed 1% per annum minimum adjustment or a surplus-linked adjustment for life insurance-based schemes and Pensionskassen (Section 16 (3) Nos 1 and 2 BetrAVG). The 1% escape option is available only for new promises made after 31 December 1998.

Accrued entitlements are forfeited upon leaving employment, unless vested. Vesting occurs after three years of scheme membership and having reached the age of 21 (Section 1b BetrAVG); transitional rules apply for legacy cases.

On leaving employment, a vested entitlement generally remains with the previous provider (as a deferred entitlement) unless it is transferred by mutual tri-party consent to a new employer (Section 4 BetrAVG). The transfer can either relate to the scheme as such, leaving all terms and conditions intact, or relate only to the accrued value, which is then injected into a scheme of the new employer.

A statutory portability right (Section 4 BetrAVG) exists within one year of leaving, for the accrued value under a direct life insurance or Pensionskasse or Pensionsfonds, up to a value cap to be injected into a corresponding scheme of the new employer.

Cash settlement upon leaving employment is generally excluded, except for de minimis entitlements or permanent relocation outside the EU/EEA (Section 3 BetrAVG).

Continued voluntary contributions after leaving are generally not available. Exceptions apply in certain cases to direct insurances and Pensionskassen but these voluntary contributions made by an employee after leaving employment no longer qualify as an occupational pension issued by the employer.

In the event of insolvency, the mandatory insolvency protection by the PSVaG is triggered. The PSVaG insures vested entitlements and current benefits from direct commitments, support funds and, in certain circumstances, Pensionsfonds and at-risk Pensionskasse commitments.

The insurance is capped at three times the monthly reference amount (reference value pursuant to Section 18 SGB IV), which is adjusted annually (2026: EUR11,865 per month).

The insurance is funded through an annual levy on all employers running insured schemes, basically distributing the damage incurred in the previous year in accordance with a mechanism reflecting the size and nature of the scheme run by the employer.

In an asset deal, under Section 613a BGB (the German equivalent of Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) or TUPE regulations), pension obligations, including past and future accrual in relation to the active transferred employees, transfer automatically to the acquirer to which the business transfers. There is no transfer of liabilities with regard to former employees and pensioners under Section 613a BGB. Funding assets do not transfer automatically and compensation thus needs to be negotiated. Relationships to external providers holding funding externally may have to be set up or transferred to the acquirer. Typical due-diligence issues include the size and valuation of pension provisions, the funding status and potential additional capital requirements of external providers, PSV contribution history and exposure, validity of historic scheme changes, harmonisation risks when combining different pension arrangements post merger (again subject to the federal labour court’s three-tier test), and works council co-determination requirements.

In a share deal, the pension schemes are generally unaffected and remain with the sold entity. Where group-linked external scheme providers exist, it may become necessary to negotiate a transfer to another provider for the future. Accrued entitlements can usually be left behind. Due diligence in the case of share deals needs to cover the indexation history for pensions in payment, in addition to the aspects described above.

Where a CTA exists, a transfer of funds to a new CTA may have to be arranged.

For seconded employees, EU Regulation 883/2004 and/or bilateral social security agreements co-ordinate continued social security coverage in the state systems.

For occupational pensions, the VAG enables cross-border activity by Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds as institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) under home/host-state co-ordination.

The Portability Directive secures preservation, not automatic cross-border transfer, of vested rights.

Tax relief under Section 3 No 63 EStG is tied to German unlimited tax liability; payments abroad are subject to double-tax treaties and potentially, German limited tax liability (Section 49 EStG).

For temporary expatriates, it is not uncommon to remain part of a German shadow scheme crediting the years abroad.

The AGG prohibits discrimination based on outlawed criteria. Section 4 of the Part-Time and Fixed-Term Employment Act (Gesetz über Teilzeitarbeit und befristete Arbeitsverträge, “TzBfG”) secures pro-rata equal treatment for part-time/fixed-term employees. Age-graded contribution/benefit scales are permissible under narrow conditions given the special justification for age discrimination (Section 10 AGG), for example, compensating for shorter accrual periods. There is substantial case law on this and breaches may trigger “levelling up” and compensation claims (Section 15 AGG).

Changes to individual pension promises require consent by the employee. Upon an employee leaving the company, settlement of schemes with vested entitlements is restricted by law and usually not possible (Section 3 BetrAVG).

Schemes based on works agreements can be closed to new entrants by way of a works agreement or unilateral notice of termination, without any further test as to legal validity. Freezing or reducing future accrual under such a scheme for employees already enrolled in the scheme is technically achievable via a works agreement, but is subject to the three-tier test by the labour courts as to adequacy and fairness. 

Full wind-up is often not possible due to the vested rights of former employees and pensioners. Such liabilities can, however, be spun off to a pension buyout provider without the need for consent on the part of the employees or works council. This solution has become increasingly common in Germany in recent years and can now be considered a tried-and-tested method. Specific funding requirements apply, as well as statutory regulations on liability.

There is no general statutory obligation on the employer to provide occupational pensions; the only quasi-mandatory element is the right of the employees to demand salary conversion into a deferred-compensation scheme (Section 1a BetrAVG), together with the 15% mandatory employer top-up.

Sector-wide quasi obligations can arise from collective tariff agreements, which can also be declared generally binding for employers and employees who are not members of the associations/unions concluding the tariff agreement (eg, the construction industry’s and public sector’s supplementary pension funds).

This is largely a non-issue in Germany as there are – with the above-mentioned exceptions – no genuinely mandatory schemes (see 5.1 General Legal Framework).

If an employer refuses to enrol an employee in a mandatory scheme or establish deferred compensation or contribute to top-up, the employee can enforce this before the labour courts (performance/damages). 

Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds are subject to the prudent-person principle (security, quality, liquidity, profitability, diversification) under the VAG/IORP II implementation.

Pensionskassen are additionally subject to quota limits under the Investment Regulation. These regulations are more relaxed for Pensionsfonds.

Direct commitments/support funds are not subject to any investment restrictions. Support funds investments, however, factually consist of re-insurance contracts for tax reasons.

Where a direct commitment scheme is secured via a CTA, general fiduciary duties apply to the trustee but the investment is flexible and not governed by the rules for Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds.

Outsourcing of asset management and administration (record-keeping, member communication, benefit calculation, payment) must be notified to the BaFin before the outsourcing agreement takes effect. Management retains ultimate responsibility, and there are duties of selection, ongoing monitoring and the conclusion of a legally enforceable written agreement, as expressly required by IORP II Article 31. Additional audit/access rights and exit/contingency arrangements are also imposed under the relevant VAG rules.

Occupational pension institutions must disclose how they deal with sustainability risks in their investment policy statement and must factor these into the mandatory own-risk assessment. There is no obligation to invest sustainably, but there is a disclosure obligation. The BaFin has issued a circular on ESG.

The IORP II Directive has been implemented in the VAG and covers Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds as institutions for occupational retirement provision. Direct insurance falls under the Solvency II regime. Cross-border IORP activity and portfolio transfers are separately regulated under the VAG (home/host-state principle, BaFin/European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) co-operation).

When an employee joins a pension scheme, the employer/provider must inform the employee about the type of promise, funding, contribution levels, and vesting and portability rules (insurance law information duties under the VAG Information Regulation apply where the pension is insurance-based).

On leaving, the employee has a right to information on the existence and amount of the vested entitlement, as well as on portability options and the one-year exercise period (Sections 4 and 4a BetrAVG).

Active members regularly (usually annually) receive benefit statements showing accrued entitlement and, where applicable, surplus participation; deferred members and pensioners can request information at any time (Section 4a BetrAVG). The VAG Information Regulation specifies content, clarity and presentation standards.

The 2021 Pension Overview Act created the “Digital Pension Overview” (Digitale Rentenübersicht) – a platform that lets individuals have a consolidated overview of their statutory, occupational and private pension entitlements. Access is via a digital identification procedure, with rights of access to and correction of the underlying data. Exceptions apply for smaller schemes and implementation is still not fully finalised.

Employer contributions to external funding vehicles are deductible business expenses (limits apply in certain cases, such as support funds).

Liabilities arising from direct pension grants are recognised as accruals on the tax balance (Section 6a EStG).

Employee deferred-compensation contributions to Pensionskassen, Pensionsfonds or direct insurance are subject to front-end taxation, but there is a tax-free allowance of up to 8% of the western contribution ceiling (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, BBG) per annum. Contributions are free of social security contributions up to 4% of the BBG per annum. Amounts above these thresholds are taxed and subject to social security charges as ordinary salary.

Returns within the external funding vehicles are not taxed on an ongoing basis for the employee (deferred taxation).

Benefits are taxed in full as employment income (Section 19 EStG) or other income (Section 22 No 5 EStG), depending on the nature of the scheme. Lump sums may qualify for tax-smoothing under the “one-fifth rule” (Section 34 EStG).

Cross-border payments are subject to double-tax treaties and potentially, German limited tax liability (Section 49 EStG).

Disputes over the tax treatment of contributions/benefits follow the standard procedure under the Fiscal Code: tax assessment, objection to the tax office, action before the fiscal court, and appeal to the federal fiscal court. Questions about the deductibility of employer contributions typically arise in the context of tax audits.

Individual disputes between an employee/pensioner and the employer or a works council or union fall within the jurisdiction of the three levels of the labour courts – Arbeitsgericht (ArbG), Landesarbeitsgericht(LAG), Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) – even after termination of employment.

Claims directly against an insurer or Pensionskasse under the insurance relationship go to the civil courts.

Labour court proceedings are comparatively low cost (no cost-shifting in the first instance). Remedies include performance and declaratory actions and damages.

The BaFin supervisory measures against Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds (eg, remediation orders, approval of benefit reductions, licensing decisions) can be challenged before the administrative courts (venue typically Frankfurt am Main), with further appeal to the higher administrative court and revision to the federal administrative court.

Disputes over the scope of PSV protection, by contrast, are heard by the labour courts, since they derive from the underlying employment-based pension relationship.

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Trends and Developments


Authors



Freshfields is a global law firm with over 280 years of experience in anticipating change, setting new standards, and shaping the future of law. With offices across the EU, US and Asia, it provides unparalleled practice and sector expertise in core market areas. It helps businesses manage risk and capitalise on opportunities with confidence. More than legal experts, the lawyers are strategic partners, problem-solvers, and trusted advisers, bringing fresh thinking to today’s challenges and empowering businesses to shape tomorrow.

Introduction

Occupational pensions (betriebliche Altersversorgung, “bAV”) are one of the most legally complex and challenging areas of German employment and benefits law.

For decades the system has been built around long-term promises made by employers to their workforce, ranging from traditional final-salary defined benefit plans to more modern contribution-based arrangements. These promises are primarily based on a collective agreement with the relevant works council. As a peculiarity of the German pension landscape, all of these traditional schemes are ultimately guaranteed by the employer and, until very recently, there was no such thing as a genuine defined contribution (DC) scheme. This has led to a significant build-up of liabilities and associated risk.

Occupational pension schemes now sit at the intersection of powerful forces and trends: a changing and in parts struggling economy, pressure on the sustainability of the classic state pension system, uncertainties of the capital markets, and a legislature under pressure to make pension schemes more attractive and less burdensome for employers.

This article focuses on some of the core topics and tries to identify the trends likely to dominate the agenda for the coming years. If there is one common denominator to these trends from an employer’s perspective, it is risk reduction.

This article looks at where these risks come from; why they are so difficult to control; what the employer can do to mitigate them; and what the legislator is offering on the reform agenda.

The German Occupational Pensions Landscape in Brief

Germany’s old-age provision system rests on three pillars: the statutory pension insurance scheme, occupational pensions, and private pension products.

Occupational pensions have traditionally played a supporting but significant role, delivered through five recognised implementation vehicles – direct pension commitments (Direktzusage), support funds (Unterstützungskasse), pension insurance funds (Pensionskasse), pension schemes with insurance-based funding (Direktversicherung) and pension funds (Pensionsfonds). Each pension funding vehicle carries its own specific funding, insolvency-protection and tax profile.

These schemes were traditionally structured as defined benefit or at least benefit-oriented commitments, ultimately underwritten by the employer (employer guarantee) under the Company Pensions Act (Betriebsrentengesetz, “BetrAVG”).

That employer guarantee is a defining and, for many multinational groups, an increasingly uncomfortable feature of the German system. Unlike in some other jurisdictions, an employer cannot simply hand a defined contribution promise to an insurer and walk away from the risk. The benefit is legally guaranteed by the employer regardless of how the underlying assets perform.

Amending Existing Pension Commitments

Many large employers operate several or even a multitude of pension schemes side by side as a result of decades of corporate history, mergers and acquisitions, and successive waves of legislative reform, thereby creating what some legal scholars have nicknamed a “zoo of pension schemes”. This results in a considerable administrative burden and wildly inconsistent and diverse benefit and risk levels throughout the workforce; hence the desire to harmonise and de-risk these schemes.

Given the collective nature of most schemes and the established rule of law that a works agreement may at any time be superseded by a follow-up agreement with the works council, one might be forgiven for thinking that all it would take to implement a change is to agree on the changes with the works council. German labour courts, however, do not allow employers to implement changes that freely and easily, because a pension commitment is regarded as remuneration for service. Changes to a collective scheme to the disadvantage of the beneficiaries must therefore pass a test of adequacy and fairness developed by the labour courts, which substantially restricts employers’ ability to apply changes.

The legal framework: the three-tier test

The test distinguishes three categories of accrued entitlement, each attracting a different, progressively lower level of protection:

1. Vested entitlements (the amount the employee has fully earned by past service) enjoy the highest level of protection and can only be reduced for compelling reasons (zwingende Gründe) in the most exceptional cases.

2. The earned portion relating to a dynamic element (ie, the reference of an earned pension point or percentage to the final salary) can only be curtailed for cogent reasons (triftige Gründe), typically a demonstrable and serious economic crisis at the employer.

3. Future increases that the employee could still accrue through continued service after the amendment date can only be changed for legitimate and  proportionate reasons (sachlich-proportionale Gründe). 

What seems at first glance as a reasonable categorisation often becomes in practice, however, an impenetrable fortress due to the case law established by the federal labour court. This is especially true for changes to the future accrual of benefits (level 3), with the federal labour court ruling that the wish to harmonise terms and conditions is, in itself, not a sufficient reason to justify the change. The mere desire to save costs and reduce risk is also not always sufficient to justify a change affecting future service.

Except for cases of severe economic distress, it has thus become increasingly difficult to predict what the courts will ultimately accept as a justifying reason. The situation is worsened by the fact that the burden of proof of the existence and weight of the relevant justification lies with the employer. Crucially, the courts can review whether adequate grounds existed years and decades after an amendment has been implemented, leaving the employer at considerable uncertainty and risk.

Changing existing schemes with an aim to harmonise, de-risk and save costs is thus a risky game in itself, often with an uncertain outcome.

Pensions in Transaction

It should come as no surprise that pension liabilities are a hugely influential, not to say unpopular, factor in corporate transactions, usually representing the single largest item on the passive side of the balance sheet of the target.

In particular, in situations where there is substantial historical baggage sitting on the back of a relatively small operating business, the heritage pension liabilities vis-à-vis pensioners and deferred pensioners, and the risks arising therefrom, can make a target unattractive for a buyer.

A not uncommon solution to avoid this baggage from a buyer’s perspective is an asset deal. An asset deal leaves the pension liabilities vis-à-vis pensioners and deferred pensioners behind and transfers only liabilities towards active staff to the buyer. This, however, leaves the seller, in its most extreme case, with a so-called “pensioner company”, a non-operational shell which only administers pension obligations for the remainder of its lifespan, which may well be 40–50 years or more.

An asset deal is often not possible for tax reasons, or due to the need to seek third-party consents, resulting in a share sale scenario as the only viable option. In a share sale, the buyer acquires the legal entity with its pension liabilities intact and basically unaffected. The buyer thus buys into the entirety of legacy schemes. This is then tied to the issue that the buyer – as a consequence – also faces future indexation risks for the pensions in payment as well as risks resulting from a backlog of unfulfilled indexation claims.

Traditionally, there has been no truly convincing solution to the problem. Balance-sheet-driven approaches such as contractual trust agreements (CTAs) have allowed for a netting of liabilities and plan assets, but fail to remove the liability, the risks and the administration as such. Other solutions, such as the scheme change from direct pension grant to pension funds allow for a dissolution of accruals and establishment of external funding but are also incapable of extinguishing the residual employer guarantee. On top of that, pension fund solutions either come at considerable cost, substantially exceeding the accruals under the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch, “HGB”) or with an almost certain need for further cash injections in the future.

This, combined with the technical difficulties of implementing such a scheme change (eg, it may require consent from employee representatives and/or the beneficiaries), has left the market searching for a real solution to de-risking business.

Pension Buyouts: A Fast-Growing De-Risking Trend

The desire to avoid or discharge the burden arising from pension liabilities, their indexation and their administration, has given birth to the pension buyout market in Germany. Pension buyouts have over the past five years become perhaps the most significant structural trend in the German company pension market. Market commentators expect the German pension buyout market to grow substantially over the coming years – estimates put its potential size at around EUR60 billion over the next five to ten years.

Structures, vehicles and concepts

Buyout and risk-transfer transactions have long been a mainstay of pensions practice in the United Kingdom. The new German concept is, however, different in that it is not insurance-based and is not subject to regulator consent. It can, in fact, be implemented autonomously between the corporate and the buyout provider.

The concept is based on a transfer of legacy pension liabilities towards pensioners and deferred pensioners, together with funding assets from the sponsoring employer to a new corporate entity already owned by, or later sold on to, a buyout provider. This transfer is effected by way of a spin-off or hive-down under the Conversion Act (Umwandlungsgesetz, “UmwG”). There is consensus that such a transaction requires neither the consent of the beneficiaries, nor that of the works councils or the Pension Guarantee Fund (Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein VVaG, “PSVaG”). Most notably, it is also not subject to approval or supervision by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, “BaFin”).

The spin-off as such is a well-established corporate transaction with a 30-year track record. What is new, is the fact that the German market did not previously have any buyers for such pension vehicles willing to take on the business of administering the schemes for the remainder of their lifespan. This has changed, with the rise of the buyout providers offering buyout concepts which are financially viable and interesting. These concepts can usually be implemented at a balance-sheet-neutral cost and – depending on the transaction concept – provide for a settlement under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).

The funding concept is to a large degree flexible and can be tailored to match the corporate’s liquidity demands. It can consist of a one-off payment, an instalment plan, and/or also fully or partly of guarantees (including third-party guarantees) or own contributions by the buyout provider (who then has “skin in the game”). The various buyout providers each offer specific variants and structures for the funding to cater for the needs of the market.

In practice, the total amount and the structure of the funding are largely subject to negotiation, with two caveats. Already in 2008, the federal labour court ruled that a corporate which underfunds the pension liability in the course of a spin-off may be held liable for damages by the beneficiaries if the pension company later fails to provide payments and due indexation. It is widely held that the criteria established by the court back then to determine the amount of funding were largely outdated by the reform of the HGB, which introduced new rules for the accounting of pension liabilities, but the general idea remains intact that the corporate must exercise due and proper care in structuring the funding and its amount.

It must also be noted that the spin-off triggers a ten-year joint and several liability of the corporate and the target pension vehicle for all pension liabilities falling due for payment within this timeframe. This economic risk is, however, being mitigated and factually reduced to zero under the financing concept.

In practice, providers take these risks on board and funding assets are usually separated into trust structures to mitigate and reduce the risk.

In essence, this is a concept well worth investigating.

The Sozialpartnermodell: Towards a Genuine Defined Contribution Model

If buyouts address the legacy stock of defined benefit liability, the Sozialpartnermodell is Germany’s principal legislative attempt to change how new pension promises are designed going forward, by finally permitting a genuine, guarantee-free defined contribution structure.

Background and design

Introduced by the First Company Pensions Strengthening Act (BetriebsrentenstärkungsG, “BRSG I”) with effect from 1 January 2018, the Sozialpartnermodell allows the social partners – employer associations and trade unions – to agree, exclusively by collective bargaining agreement, a pure defined-contribution promise (reine Beitragszusage). Under this model, the employer’s obligation is strictly limited to paying the agreed contribution into an external funding vehicle, typically a pension fund; the employer is not liable for any particular level of benefit and does not stand behind the promise the way it does under a conventional BetrAVG commitment. This is often summarised as a “pay and forget” principle, and it is the first structure under German law to genuinely shift capital market and longevity risk from the employer (and, indirectly, from the PSVaG insolvency insurance system) to the employee. In place of a guaranteed benefit, members are offered a non-guaranteed “target pension” (Zielrente) that reflects the projected performance of the underlying investment portfolio; potentially producing higher expected outcomes over the long term than the guarantee-laden traditional design.

Take-up so far: a mixed picture

Uptake of the Sozialpartnermodell has been markedly uneven across sectors. The chemical industry has been the clear front-runner and has launched a live “Zielrente Chemie” offering. By contrast, in the metal and electrical industry – Germany’s largest single collectively bargained sector – IG Metall halted development of its own Sozialpartnermodell some years ago, and has instead pressed for statutory pension reform (in particular, stronger voluntary top-ups to the state pension) as its preferred route to improving retirement outcomes for its members. Other sectors have shown only tentative interest, and, more than seven years after the legislation came into force, the number of employees actually covered by a live Sozialpartnermodell remains a small fraction of the German workforce.

Why uptake has been slow

The reasons commonly cited for this slow start are structural rather than incidental. First, and most fundamentally, trade unions and many employees remain wary of a model that transfers capital market risk to the individual with no guaranteed floor – a significant departure from the risk allocation German employees have historically enjoyed, and one that is politically sensitive for union negotiators to sign up to.

Second, the model can only be introduced via a collective bargaining agreement, which means it is simply unavailable to any employer, however keen, that is not tied to a sector-wide agreement providing for it, and negotiating a new sectoral model from scratch is a lengthy and uncertain process.

Third, the regulatory approval process for a new Sozialpartnermodell – including BaFin sign-off of the pension fund vehicle and its security-buffer arrangements – has proved complex and time-consuming.

Opening the model under the current reforms

The current reform round, principally BRSG II, is squarely targeted at this problem. Since 1 July 2026, access to an existing “Sozialpartnermodell” has become easier. Employers that are not themselves bound by the relevant collective bargaining agreement will be able to join an existing Sozialpartnermodell operated in their sector. Subject to the agreement of the relevant social partners, it will even be possible to join a model developed in a different sector.

This is a deliberate attempt to make successful models such as the chemical industry’s available to employers that would otherwise have no realistic route into a pure defined-contribution structure. Whether this approach will be successful remains to be seen given the deeply rooted aversion to the model in some unions. It also cannot be taken for granted that the relevant social partners will be willing to open up an already existing model, given the multitude of political and practical implications.

Current Reform Considerations: BRSG II and the Wider Agenda

Automatic enrolment (opting out)

Another central piece of BRSG II is the extension of automatic enrolment. Opting-out models – under which employees are automatically enrolled into salary-sacrifice pension contributions unless they actively object – already existed on a tariff basis in some sectors, but since 1 July 2026 employers that are not bound by a collective bargaining agreement have also been able to introduce an opt-out model of their own, provided this is done through a works agreement (or, where there is no works council, an equivalent arrangement) and the employer commits to a minimum top-up of at least 20% of the converted salary amount.

Outlook and Practical Takeaways

The themes discussed in this article are best understood as different responses to the same underlying problem:

How to keep occupational pensions attractive and sustainable for employees while making the associated risk and cost more manageable.

Welcome as the latest efforts of the legislator are, further efforts may be needed.

What it might ultimately take to allow the “Sozialpartnermodell” to take off, granting broader access to the model, is to allow the pension and insurance industry to offer models which can be agreed by way of a regular works agreement or individual contract.

In addition, allowing more flexibility on the change of pension schemes (in particular, in relation to future service) should help to expand pension benefits, which would be more flexible for employers to use and to adjust.

For employers and their advisers, the practical agenda for the next 12–24 months is likely to include:

  • reviewing whether existing pension promises, particularly legacy defined-benefit arrangements inherited through M&A, are candidates for harmonisation, closure or an outright buyout, and sequencing those projects together rather than in isolation;
  • assessing whether the widened access rules make joining an existing Sozialpartnermodell a realistic option; and
  • preparing payroll, works council and communication processes for opt-out enrolment, where the employer is not already bound by a collective arrangement covering these points.
Freshfields

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Law and Practice

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Freshfields is a global law firm with over 280 years of experience in anticipating change, setting new standards, and shaping the future of law. With offices across the EU, US and Asia, it provides unparalleled practice and sector expertise in core market areas. It helps businesses manage risk and capitalise on opportunities with confidence. More than legal experts, the lawyers are strategic partners, problem-solvers, and trusted advisers, bringing fresh thinking to today’s challenges and empowering businesses to shape tomorrow.

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Freshfields is a global law firm with over 280 years of experience in anticipating change, setting new standards, and shaping the future of law. With offices across the EU, US and Asia, it provides unparalleled practice and sector expertise in core market areas. It helps businesses manage risk and capitalise on opportunities with confidence. More than legal experts, the lawyers are strategic partners, problem-solvers, and trusted advisers, bringing fresh thinking to today’s challenges and empowering businesses to shape tomorrow.

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