Power Generation, Transmission & Distribution 2026

Last Updated July 21, 2026

Brazil

Law and Practice

Authors



Tauil & Chequer Advogados in association with Mayer Brown is a full-service law firm, offering clients in-depth local knowledge combined with global reach. Founded in 2000, Tauil & Chequer grew rapidly, forming an association with Mayer Brown in December 2009. Today, the firm has approximately 180 lawyers, including 49 partners, in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Vitória and Brasilia, with a team of specialists in several areas of business law in Brazil, who advise in operations ranging from the routine to the highly complex and sophisticated. The firm offers clients the full range of legal services and has a particularly strong and long-standing presence in the energy, oil and gas, and infrastructure industries. It offers a full-service alternative energy and power practice, providing legal advice to domestic and international clients, financial institutions and government agencies.

Early Years

The power industry in Brazil started at the turn of the 20th century with small, local private investments serving specific companies or municipal lighting. Canadian Light and the American & Foreign Power Company (Amforp) later entered the market by acquiring these assets and developing new ones. The industry was therefore originally developed and owned by private companies. 

A major change occurred around 1930, during President Getúlio Vargas’s government. The Great Depression reduced international investment and rising nationalism led the federal government to pass new laws increasing oversight and tariff regulation, which reduced returns. Public companies such as Chesf, Cemig, CEEE and Eletrobras were created to compensate for the lack of private investment, marking a new phase of direct government intervention.

This phase of public investment began to reverse with the transition from military dictatorship to a liberal democracy. The 1988 Federal Constitution allowed power services to be performed directly by the federal government or indirectly through concessions, permissions or authorisations.

The Development of a Market-Driven Industry in the 1990s

In the 1990s, as part of a broader privatisation programme, the government took steps to increase private investment in the power sector and privatise three federal and 20 state-owned power generation and distribution companies.

In 1995, Law No 8,987 (the “Concessions Law”) set general rules for concessions and permissions for public services, and Law No 9,074 introduced independent power producers and free customers with open access to all distribution and transmission facilities.

In 1996, Law No 9,427 created the National Electricity Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica or ANEEL), an independent federal agency regulating and supervising the power industry in accordance with the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Ministério de Minas e Energia or MME) policies. 

In 1998, Law No 9,648 completed the legal framework for a market-driven industry, establishing free power contracting between concessions, permissions and authorisation holders, and initial rules for unbundling power companies into generation, transmission, distribution and trading entities. This law also created the Power Wholesale Market (Mercado Atacadista de Energia Elétrica or MAE), later replaced by the CCEE, as defined below, and the National Electric System Operator (Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico or ONS), a non-profit private entity that co-ordinates and regulates power generation and transmission in the National Interconnected System (Sistema Interligado Nacional or SIN) under ANEEL’s supervision.

Power Shortage and Reforms After 2001

After a serious power shortage in 2001, the federal government reformed the power industry to attract more private investment in power generation, transmission and distribution, aiming to provide a stable power supply at reasonable prices. Law No 10,848/2004 created: 

  • the free and regulated power contracting markets and the Electricity Trading Chamber (Câmara de Comercialização de Energia Elétrica or CCEE), a non-profit private entity responsible for registering, accounting for and clearing all energy transactions in both markets; 
  • the Energy Research Company (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética or EPE), a federal public company conducting strategic studies and research in the energy sector; and 
  • the Power Sector Monitoring Committee (Comitê de Monitoramento do Setor Elétrico or CMSE), an executive branch committee monitoring power service conditions and recommending measures to ensure power supply safety. 

The law also expanded the National Energy Policy Council (Conselho Nacional de Política Energética or CNPE) role in advising the president on national energy policy. 

Law No 10,848/2004 further unbundled the industry by prohibiting power distribution concessionaires from engaging in generation and transmission, selling to free-market customers, holding equity in other companies, or performing activities unrelated to distribution.

In 2012, the government enacted: 

  • Provisional Measure No 577, later converted into Law No 12,767/2012; and 
  • Provisional Measure No 579, later converted into Law No 12,783/2013 (the “Concession Renewal Law”). 

Law No 12,767/2012 required the granting authority to provide power services if a concession ended and to set new rules for intervention to ensure adequate utility service.

The Concession Renewal Law changed the rules for renewing concession agreements. Generation and distribution concessionaires could renew agreements that had been effective since 1995, and transmission concessionaires could renew agreements effective from before and after 1995 for another 30 years, provided they accepted a new tariff regime set by ANEEL.

Re-Allocation of Hydrological Risks

In 2015, Provisional Measure No 688/2015, later converted into Law No 13,203/2015, revised how hydrological risks are allocated among hydroelectric power plants under the Energy Reallocation Mechanism (Mecanismo de Realocação de Energia or MRE). In 2014 and 2015, poor hydrological conditions caused MRE participants to generate less power than their assured energy (garantia física), decreasing their Generating Scaling Factor (GSF), a measurement of the proportion of power generated by MRE participants against their respective assured energy. These generation deficits resulted in losses for MRE participants, given their exposure to hydrological risks.

Law No 13,203/2015 introduced an optional mechanism allowing each plant to transfer these risks to final customers by paying a risk premium to the government, along with temporary extensions of generation concessions and authorisations to offset losses. However, this option mainly benefited generators in the regulated market, leaving those selling in the free market largely unassisted.

New Re-Allocation of Hydrological Risks

The Brazilian government launched a new framework with Law No 14,052/2020, and ANEEL Normative Resolution No 895/2020, to address additional structural issues in the MRE, this time specific to the free market. In exchange for withdrawing certain lawsuits regarding the GSF, the hydropower generators who chose to adhere to this new framework received an extension of their generation concessions and authorisations.

Impact of COVID-19

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic utilities’ finances decreased due to reduced energy consumption and increased payment defaults. As a result, Decree No 10,350/2020, regulated by ANEEL Normative Resolution No 885/2020, created the “COVID Account”, a centralised credit line to support the liquidity of power distribution concessionaires, with costs passed on through tariffs.

At the turn of 2021, Provisional Measure No 998, converted into Law No 14,120/2021, implemented measures to reduce tariff impacts from the pandemic and the privatisation of power utilities in the north and north-east regions. It also ended discounts on power transmission and distribution tariffs for renewable energy projects for which authorisation was requested after March 2022.

Privatisation of Eletrobras (now Axia Energia)

Provisional Measure No 1,031/2021, converted into Law 14,182/2021, determined the privatisation of Eletrobras (now Axia Energia), Latin America’s largest power company, created in 1954 in the phase of strong public investment. The transaction was structured and implemented by the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social or BNDES) and concluded in June 2022, with a market capitalisation of BRL29.3 billion to BRL33.7 billion. This was the first privatisation in Brazil implemented through a public offering, and the largest by value. 

The developments from the enactment of the 1988 Constitution to the privatisation of Eletrobras (now Axia Energia) have enabled the relevant increase in private investment in the electricity sector in Brazil, which represents the vast majority of the power generation, distribution and transmission assets, and few companies involved in power production remain state-owned today.

Inclusion of Battery Energy Storage Systems in the Regulatory Framework

Law No 15,269/2025 (detailed below) established the legal framework for electricity storage, granting ANEEL the authority to regulate and supervise storage systems, including rules regarding revenues and access of storage systems to the SIN and isolated systems.

Law No 15,269/2025 stipulates that electricity storage may be contracted through reserve capacity auctions and transmission auctions. It also provides that the cost of contracting reserve capacity from battery storage systems will be borne solely by generators, in accordance with ANEEL regulations. The law also includes energy storage system projects (including battery energy storage systems or BESS) in the Special Incentives Regime for Infrastructure Development (Regime Especial de Incentivos para o Desenvolvimento da Infraestrutura or REIDI) tax incentive regime, with benefits limited to BRL1 billion per fiscal year between 2026 and 2030, and determined so that the executive branch may also reduce the import tax rate applicable to BESS and other components to zero.

Even before this statutory mandate, ANEEL had been advancing the regulatory agenda on electricity storage through Subsidy Request No 011/2020 and later Public Consultation No 039/2023. The consolidated technical note resulting from Public Consultation No 039/2023, issued in August 2025, addressed the proposed regulatory treatment for energy storage systems, covering authorisation procedures for standalone storage, including closed-cycle pumped-storage hydroelectric power plants, grid access and use, tariff treatment, ancillary services, curtailment mitigation and revenue stacking. ANEEL’s board of directors voted on the draft regulation, but proceedings were suspended following a request for additional review (pedido de vista) by one of the directors. The board voted again on 7 April 2026 to approve the regulation, but a second request for additional review was raised, and the matter remains pending as of the date of publication of this guide. The regulation of energy storage has gained additional relevance in the context of reserve capacity auctions, demand response mechanisms and isolated systems auctions, as well as the need to address renewables curtailment in the SIN.

It is expected that the first BESS Reserve Capacity Auction, carried out in the second semester of 2026, will award a ten-year reserve capacity contract with fixed revenues to winning BESS standalone projects, as well as BESS associated with generation projects.

Despite the positive outlook, significant regulatory challenges remain in the current framework. These include regulating the tax incentive regimes, ancillary services, open cycle and semi-open cycle pumped-storage hydroelectric power plants, storage systems associated with transmission and distribution facilities, as well as impacts on energy pricing.

New Reform of Brazil’s Power Sector – Focus on Market Opening

On 21 May 2025, Provisional Measure No 1,300/2025 (the “Provisional Measure” or “MP”), also known as the Power Sector Reform MP, was published in the Federal Official Gazette. This initiative of the MME was structured around three pillars, as designated by the government:

  • tariff justice;
  • freedom for the consumer; and
  • balance for the sector.

In summary, the first pillar refers to the expansion of certain electricity tariff exemptions for low-income customers (the so-called “Social Tariff”).

The second pillar introduced a gradual expansion of the free market. The third pillar addressed several measures to rebalance the burden of the sectoral charges between the free and captive markets, relocating certain charges to the free customers.

The MP 1,300 was converted into Law No 15,235 published on 9 October 2025, maintaining the provisions regarding the Social Tariff and regulating a discount on the advance payment of the fee for the use of a public good (Uso do Bem Público or UBP) for certain hydropower generators.

In parallel with MP 1,300, Provisional Measure No 1,304 (“MP 1,304”) was published on 11 July 2025, originally intended to establish a cap on the Energy Development Account (Conta de Desenvolvimento Energético or CDE), limiting the growth of certain sectoral charges and creating a supplementary rebalancing mechanism known as the Resource Complement Charge (Encargo de Complemento de Recursos or ECR).

During the legislative process, MP 1,304 was substantially expanded through congressional amendments to incorporate a significant portion of the structural reforms originally proposed under MP 1,300, as well as provisions under Bill No 414/2021 on the modernisation of the power sector. These amendments encompassed measures related to the expansion of the free market, the supplier of last resort, modifications to self-production rules, tariff discounts, sectoral charges, new attributions to ANEEL and the CCEE, electricity storage regulation, treatment for curtailment of wind and solar generation and the cancellation of certain thermal power auctions, among other matters. MP 1,304 was subsequently converted, with 22 presidential vetoes, into Law No 15,269 published on 25 November 2025.

Among the most notable vetoes, the following were removed from the enacted text:

  • compensation for wind and solar generation curtailment resulting from energy surplus;
  • the restriction of new self-production structures to greenfield power-generation projects;
  • P&D and efficiency obligations for traders; and
  • the possibility of reclassifying regulated market/free market (Ambiente de Contratação Regulada/Ambiente de Contratação Livre or ACR/ACL) plants as distributed micro and mini-generation.

The presidential vetoes are still pending voting in Congress.

Provisions of Law No 15,269/2025

Law No 15,269/2025 (“the Law”) modernises the regulatory framework of the Brazilian power sector and constitutes the main reform of the power sector since Law No 10,848/2004. Its main provisions are summarised below.

The Law provides for the complete opening of the free electricity market, impacting 90 million consumer units responsible for approximately 60% of the energy consumed in the country. The opening will occur in two stages: (i) within 24 months from the Law’s effective date, for all industrial and commercial consumers; and (ii) within 36 months from the Law’s effective date, for all remaining consumers. The implementation is subject to prior compliance with regulatory requirements, including the regulation of the supplier of last resort (Supridor de Última Instância or SUI), tariff transparency mechanisms segregating ACR and ACL costs, the definition of standardised products and reference prices, and the regulation of involuntary overcontracting and involuntary exposure by distribution concessionaires.

The Law introduces the SUI or supplier of last resort into the statutory framework. The SUI is a new agent responsible for supplying electricity to customers who lose their contracted supplier, including in cases such as the termination of a consumer’s representation by a retail trading company. The SUI will be authorised and supervised by ANEEL and will be remunerated through specific tariffs to be set by the regulator. The costs and financial effects of any involuntary deficit incurred by the SUI will be allocated among free market consumers through a specific tariff charge, as regulated by ANEEL.

Regarding the discussion about self-production structures, the Law has also revised the corresponding applicable rules. A self-producer is now defined as a consumer holding a generation project authorisation to produce electricity for its own account and risk. Self-production by equivalence is subject to new requirements, including a minimum aggregate contracted demand of 30,000 kW, composed of consuming units with individual demand of at least 3,000 kW, in addition to specific corporate requirements, including direct or indirect participation in the share capital of the entity holding the concession, or common corporate control with the relevant companies.

The Law preserved the previous legal regime for self-producers by equivalence with contracts submitted to the CCEE before the Law’s publication, and established a transition period for new self-producers by equivalence to follow the previous legal regime as long as their self-production share purchase agreements were signed and submitted to the CCEE within three months after the Law’s publication and the relevant transactions are closed within 36 months after signing.

The Law terminated the discounts applied to distribution and transmission tariffs (TUSD/TUST) paid by customers who purchase incentivised renewable energy. In general terms, the Law determined that the discount will not apply to: (i) new customers who migrate to the free market after its publication; and (ii) customers who have already migrated and who increase their use of distribution and transmission systems after publication of the Law, provided that the discount continues to apply to the amount already contracted on that date.

As from 1 January 2027, the Law limits the CDE annual budget to the budget approved in 2025, adjusted by the IPCA (the inflation index observed by the Central Bank of Brazil). The CDE is a sectoral charge that supports several energy policies, including the electricity tariff exemptions for low-income customers. If there is a shortfall in the CDE’s budget due to the cap imposed by the Law, the new Resource Supplement Charge or ECR will be applied and paid by the CDE beneficiaries (except for certain beneficiaries, including low-income customers). Additionally, as from 1 January 2026, the Law revises the allocation of the CDE by voltage level, setting 50% of the low-voltage unit cost for consumers connected at voltage equal to or higher than 69 kV and 80% for consumers connected between 2.3 kV and 69 kV.

The Law authorises ANEEL to regulate and supervise electricity storage as a sectoral activity, which may involve standalone operations, integration with generation, transmission or distribution concessions, or operation by customers.

The Law also changes Law 14,182/2021 (the Eletrobras privatisation law) relating to the compulsory contracting of gas-fired thermal power plants, cancelling the regional power auctions previously mandated for that purpose. The Law also establishes a new framework for the contracting of hydroelectric plants with installed capacity of up to 50 MW, including Small Hydropower Plants (Pequenas Centrais Hidrelétricas or PCHs), in the form of capacity reserve auctions, providing for the contracting of up to 3,000 MW of such plants by the first quarter of 2026, with supply commencement scheduled for 2032, 2033 and 2034. It further provides that the CNPE will be responsible for determining the need to contract new energy arising from hydrogen-from-ethanol in the north-east as well as from wind farms in the south.

The Law also allows the CCEE to participate in other energy markets and provide additional services, including contract guarantee management, registration management and energy certification, subject to administrative, financial and accounting separation. The Law further authorises the CCEE to contract companies and natural persons to monitor market agents and operations, and it provides that such companies and persons, as well as the managers of the market agents, are directly liable, civilly and administratively, for damages resulting from wilful misconduct or gross negligence, as well as violations of laws and regulations.

Finally, the Law also provides for a mechanism for the settlement of the remaining amounts under dispute regarding hydrological risks.

Capacity Reserve Auctions (LRCAP)

The Capacity Reserve Auction (Leilão de Reserva de Capacidade or LRCAP) is a mechanism designed to ensure the operational reliability of the SIN by remunerating the availability of generation capacity, rather than energy effectively generated. Contracted plants must remain available for dispatch by the ONS and must comply with minimum operational flexibility requirements.

In March 2026, the second LRCAP was conducted in two sessions. The first auction (18 March 2026) targeted new and existing natural gas-fired thermal plants, existing coal-fired plants and expansions of existing hydroelectric plants, resulting in the contracting of approximately 18,977 MW from 100 projects, with estimated investments of BRL64 billion and total fixed revenue of BRL39 billion to the winning bidders. The second auction (20 March 2026) targeted existing thermal plants fuelled by fuel oil, diesel and biodiesel, with discounts exceeding 50% relative to the ceiling prices. Winning bidders will execute Capacity Reserve Power Agreements (Contratos de Potência de Reserva de Capacidade or CRCAPs) with the CCEE, with contract terms of ten years for existing plants and 15 years for new projects, a fixed annual revenue adjusted by IPCA, and supply commencement dates ranging from 2026 to 2031.

Under the CRCAPs, dispatch risk is allocated entirely to the generator, which must comply with ONS dispatch instructions and meet the flexibility parameters declared at registration. Contracted thermal plants must be fully flexible (without minimum generation inflexibility) and demonstrate fuel supply availability for seven years plus an additional five years or the remaining CRCAP term. For natural gas-fired plants connected to the Natural Gas Transport System (Sistema de Transporte de Gás Natural or STGN), CRCAP execution is conditional upon evidence of firm gas transport capacity sufficient for at least 70% of maximum continuous operation, as confirmed with the National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis or ANP).

The LRCAP 2026 was preceded by legal uncertainty. The auction was originally planned for 2025 but cancelled by the MME following judicial disputes over the pricing methodology. The MME subsequently reformulated the guidelines through Normative Ordinances No 118 and No 119 dated 23 October 2025 and rescheduled the auctions for March 2026. Following the auctions, the Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da União or TCU) initiated proceedings to examine pricing, competitiveness and tariff impacts, and certain sector associations filed judicial actions challenging the results. On 21 May 2026, ANEEL approved the confirmation of the LRCAP results and the adjudication of the contracted projects, concluding that there was no legal impediment to proceeding with the contracts notwithstanding the ongoing TCU analysis and the non-binding recommendation of the Federal Prosecution Service (Ministério Público Federal or MPF) to suspend the process.

Federal/State-Owned Entities

A few companies are still under the control of federal states, as follows:

  • Companhia Energética de Minas Gerais – CEMIG, controlled by the state of Minas Gerais;
  • Centrais Elétricas de Santa Catarina SA – CELESC, controlled by the state of Santa Catarina;
  • Petróleo Brasileiro SA – Petrobras, the federal state-owned oil and gas company in Brazil, which also owns certain thermal power generation assets; and
  • Empresa Brasileira de Participações em Energia Nuclear e Binacional SA – ENBPar is a federal state-owned company that was incorporated in the context of Eletrobras’s privatisation to ensure that the federal government would maintain its control of Eletronuclear SA (which owns Angra 1, 2 and 3 nuclear power plants) and Itaipu Binacional (which holds a 50% stake in Itaipu hydropower plant).

Investor-Owned Entities

Generation

Some of the main investor-owned companies in the generation segment are: 

  • Axia Energia (formerly Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras SA – Eletrobras);
  • Norte Energia SA; 
  • China Three Gorges Brasil Energia Ltda; 
  • Jirau Energia SA;
  • Engie Brasil Energia SA; 
  • Santo Antonio Energia SA; 
  • Energia Sustentável do Brasil SA; 
  • SPIC Brasil; 
  • Companhia Paranaense de Energia – COPEL;
  • Empresa Metropolitana de Águas e Energia SA – EMAE;
  • Energias do Brasil SA – EDP Brasil; 
  • Neoenergia SA; 
  • CPFL Energia SA e CPFL Energias Renováveis SA; 
  • Enel Brasil SA; 
  • Eneva SA; 
  • Companhia Estadual de Geração de Energia Elétrica – CEEE-G;
  • Novta Energia Renovável; 
  • Centrais Elétricas de Sergipe SA – Celse; 
  • Gás Natural Açu – GNA; 
  • New Fortress Energy; 
  • EDF; 
  • Casa dos Ventos Energias Renováveis SA; 
  • PEC Energia;
  • Atlas Renewable Energy; 
  • Auren Energia; 
  • Alupar Investimentos SA; 
  • Companhia Energética de São Paulo – CESP; 
  • Light SA; 
  • Cubico SA; 
  • Trinity Energias Renováveis;
  • CGN Brasil; 
  • Essentia Energia;
  • Arke Energia;
  • Ambar Energia;
  • Karpowership;
  • Comerc Energia;
  • Órigo Energia;
  • Pontal Energy;
  • IVI Energia;
  • GreenYellow;
  • Brennand Energia; 
  • Rio Energy; 
  • Canadian Solar; 
  • Serena Energia SA; 
  • Aliança Energia; 
  • Voltalia SA; 
  • Statkraft Energias Renováveis SA; 
  • CER Energia; 
  • Atlantic Energias Renováveis; 
  • Echoenergia Participações SA; 
  • Acciona Energía;
  • Enerfin do Brasil;
  • Tradener;
  • Total Eren; and
  • Diamante Energia.

Transmission

Some of the principal investor-owned companies in the transmission segment are: 

  • Axia Energia (formerly Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras SA – Eletrobras);
  • Companhia de Transmissão de Energia Elétrica Paulista – Isa CTEEP; 
  • Transmissora Aliança de Energia Elétrica SA – TAESA; 
  • State Grid Brazil Holding SA; 
  • Alupar Investimentos SA; 
  • Engie Brasil Energia SA; 
  • Companhia Paranaense de Energia – COPEL;
  • Equatorial Energia SA; 
  • Energias do Brasil SA – EDP Brasil; 
  • Grupo Energisa SA; 
  • CPFL Energia SA; 
  • Neoenergia SA; 
  • Argo Transmissão de Energia SA; 
  • Celeo Redes;
  • Evoltz;
  • Verene; and
  • Quantum Participações.

Distribution

The principal investor-owned companies in the distribution segment are: 

  • Equatorial Energia SA; 
  • Grupo Energisa SA; 
  • Enel Brasil SA; 
  • CPFL Energia SA; 
  • Companhia Paranaense de Energia – COPEL; 
  • Neoenergia SA; 
  • Energias do Brasil SA – EDP Brasil; and 
  • Light SA.

Federal Control of Nuclear Power

The only restriction to private investment in the power industry – whether foreign or domestic – is in nuclear power generation, as the Brazilian Federal Constitution provides for the federal government’s monopoly over this and does not provide for delegation of such activity through the granting of concessions, permissions or authorisations.

Treatment of Foreign Companies

Basic equality

The Sixth Constitutional Amendment of 1995 revoked Article 171 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution, which provided for preferential treatment for companies controlled by Brazilians over companies directly or indirectly controlled by foreigners. Since then, equal and non-discriminatory treatment of companies, whether controlled by Brazilians or foreigners, has been a constitutional principle. 

Restrictions

There are certain restrictions to the acquisition or lease of rural lands by foreign companies or Brazilian companies directly or indirectly controlled by foreign companies, which commonly impact power generation, transmission and distribution projects, but there are alternative legal structures for foreign investors, which have been accepted by lenders and stakeholders in the development of power projects in Brazil. There are also restrictions on the acquisition of land within the country’s border areas, but this restriction is not usually relevant in the development of power projects in Brazil.

Finally, concessions, permissions and authorisations related to power activities must be granted to companies incorporated pursuant to Brazilian laws. 

The Concessions Law provides that the transfer of the concession or the control of the concessionaire is subject to prior approval of the competent authority, and the interested party must meet the requirements of technical and financial capacity, as well as legal and tax compliance, and must commit to comply with all the terms and conditions of the concession agreement. This provision in the Concessions Law was confirmed after passing judicial scrutiny by the Federal Supreme Court.

ANEEL is the entity in charge of approving the transfer of concessions, permissions or authorisations, or the change of control of companies that hold concessions, permissions or authorisations related to power activities. 

As a general rule, the transfer of concessions, permissions or authorisations (asset deal) is subject to ANEEL’s prior approval, while the change of control of companies (equity deal) in the power industry may or may not be subject to ANEEL’s prior approval. 

ANEEL Normative Resolution No 948/2021 (Module III) provides the rules applicable to change of control of companies in the power industry and, in summary, requires the prior approval of ANEEL for the following companies: 

  • power generation, transmission and distribution companies that hold concessions and permissions; and 
  • hydro and nuclear power generation companies, whether holders of concessions or authorisations. 

In accordance with the guidelines of the Concessions Law, ANEEL Normative Resolution No 948/2021 (Module III) establishes that the potential purchaser must submit evidence to ANEEL with respect to its financial and technical capacity; legal, tax and regulatory compliance; and commitment to comply with the terms and conditions of the concession, permission or authorisation. 

The change of control of oil, coal, gas, biogas, biomass, wind and solar power generation companies is usually not subject to prior approval by ANEEL. Nevertheless, the purchaser has an obligation to inform ANEEL about the change of control within 30 days after implementation of the transaction, upon the competent corporate registration.

The central authority that oversees and administers the technical aspects of the electricity supply and the development of transmission facilities to ensure the reliability of the electricity system and the adequacy of supply to satisfy the demand is the ONS, which is a non-profit private entity comprised of generation, transmission, distribution, importation and exportation companies and free customers. 

The primary role of the ONS is to co-ordinate and regulate the generation and transmission operations in the SIN, subject to ANEEL’s regulation and supervision. 

The main responsibilities of the ONS include, among others: 

  • operational planning for the generation industry; 
  • organising the use of the SIN and international interconnections; 
  • ensuring that industry participants have access to the transmission network in a non-discriminatory manner; 
  • proposing plans to the MME for extensions of the SIN; and 
  • formulating regulations regarding the operation of the transmission system, subject to ANEEL’s approval. 

The MME is responsible for planning the expansion of the electricity system, with the support of the EPE and ONS, and it determines directives by which ANEEL conducts generation and transmission auctions.

The market operator that oversees and manages the electricity trade is the CCEE, which is also a non-profit private organisation comprised of generators, distributors, traders and consumers. 

The CCEE is responsible for comparing the actual measurements of electrical energy consumption and generation with the agent’s respective agreements for the purchase and sale of energy, and for calculating the settlement price difference (Preço de Liquidação de Diferenças or PLD).

Other of the CCEE’s main responsibilities include:

  • collecting measurement data for generation and consumption;
  • registering PPAs;
  • conducting regulated auctions for the supply of power distributors or for back-up reasons; 
  • conducting competitive procedures for the sale of energy surplus by power distributors; and
  • managing sectoral funds.

There have been several material changes in the laws and regulations of the power industry over the past few years.

Foreign Exchange Law

The Foreign Exchange Law (Law No 14,286/2021, which came into effect on 30 December 2022) revoked Decree-Law No 857/1969 and expressly authorised the contractual parties to stipulate the foreign currency indexation in agreements (eg, PPAs) entered into between exporters and holders of concessions, permissions, authorisations or lessees in infrastructure sectors (eg, power companies).

Distributed Generation Law

The Distributed Generation Law (Law No 14,300/2022) established the new distributed generation legal framework and redefined the corresponding net metering rules. It also provided the transition process from the prior distributed generation regime set by ANEEL Normative Resolution No 482/2012 (recently revoked by ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,059/2023).

New Distributed Generation Regulation

The New Distributed Generation Regulation (ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,059/2023) regulates the new rules established by the Distributed Generation Law. It revoked ANEEL Normative Resolution No 482/2012 (prior distributed generation regulation) and amended ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,000/2021 (which establishes general conditions for power supply to consumers by utilities).

Legal Framework for Offshore Power Generation

The Legal Framework for Offshore Power Generation (Decree No 10,946/2022) established the first framework for offshore power generation. In January 2025, Law No 15,097 was published, establishing a legal framework for offshore power generation, providing two regimes through which the areas will be assigned: (i) the permanent offer proceeding, which is initiated upon the request of the interested parties and granted by means of authorisation; and (ii) the planned offer proceeding, in which the federal government assigns offshore areas on which the interested parties can bid, granted by means of concession. In any case, the authorisation or concession for use of the offshore area will be followed by ANEEL’s authorisation to implement the power generation project.

Bidding and Term Extension of Existing Power Transmission Concessions

Bidding and Term Extension of Existing Power Transmission Concessions (Decree No 11,314/2022) establishes a new bidding process as a general rule for expiring transmission concessions agreements. The extension of a transmission concession’s term may occur exceptionally and at the sole discretion of the MME when the bidding process is deemed (i) unfeasible; or (ii) detrimental to the public interest. From 2025 and, more intensely, between 2030 and 2042, 170 transmission concessions will reach their respective contractual terms, according to data made available by the MME.

IPP Authorisation Issuance Procedures for Power Plants

IPP Authorisation Issuance Procedures for Power Plants (ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,071/2023) establishes a different mechanism for obtaining Independent Power Producer (IPP) Authorisation for wind, solar, thermal, hybrid and other alternative source power plants. The main innovations are: (i) that it is no longer necessary to provide a performance bond in order to obtain IPP Authorisation for wind power plants (as required under the previous regulation); and (ii) the execution of grid connection agreements has become a requirement for obtaining IPP Authorisation.

IPP Authorisation Issuance Procedures for Hydropower Plants up to 50 MW

IPP Authorisation Issuance Procedures for Hydropower Plants up to 50 MW (ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,070/2023) modifies ANEEL Normative Resolution No 875/2020 to establish that the criterion for classification as a PCH is exclusively having an installed capacity greater than 5 MW but less than or equal to 30 MW (under the previous regulation, a maximum reservoir area of 13 km² was also required, but this is no longer applicable).

CCEE Governance Modifications

CCEE Governance Modifications (Decree No 11,835/2023) establishes the new governance structure of the CCEE by modifying the composition of the board of directors and the board of officers. The CCEE board of directors is now composed of eight members, four of whom are appointed by the MME, including the chairman of the board. The other four are appointed by representatives of the production, distribution, commercialisation, and consumption sectors, with one member per sector. Additionally, the administration of the CCEE will now also be carried out by a board of officers composed of up to six officers, with the MME also appointing the chairman of the board. The CCEE Trade Convention was further amended by ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,087/2024 to incorporate the changes made by the decree.

Law No 14,120/2021

Extension of the deadline for the implementation of projects affected by Law No 14,120/2021 (Provisional Measure No 1,212/2024) establishes that certain renewable energy projects that are subject to discounts on connection fees and that were subject to a 48-month deadline for commercial operation may request a 36-month extension (totalling an 84-month deadline), provided that such request complies with the requirements of Provisional Measure No 1,212/2024, including the submission of a performance bond. Provisional Measure No 1,212/2024 also provided for the anticipation of debts from the privatisation of Eletrobras in order to reduce the energy bills of final customers. Although Provisional Measure No 1,212/2024 expired on 7 August 2024, ANEEL still granted a 36-month extension to 601 projects that satisfied the legal requirements in time.

Conditions for the Extension of Certain Power Distribution Concessions

Decree No 12,068/2024 regulated the distribution concession renewal for concessions granted based on Law No 9,074/1995, which were not subject to prior renewal.

Eligible concessions may be renewed once for up to 30 years, subject to the granting authority’s discretion and the concessionaire’s acceptance of revised contractual conditions. Renewal depends on the concessionaire’s performance during the preceding five years – it must have complied with continuity-of-supply standards (measured by the frequency and duration of outages) for at least three consecutive years and must not have breached its economic-financial sustainability obligations for more than two consecutive years (the latter will be assessed only from 2021 onward). If either requirement is not met, the concession may still be renewed provided the concessionaire injects the capital specified in the amendment within 90 days of execution. The amendment will be null in case of default.

The concessionaire must file its renewal request and supporting documentation with ANEEL at least 36 months before the concession expires. ANEEL must forward its recommendation to the MME no later than 21 months before expiration, and the MME must publish its decision at least 18 months before that date. If renewal is approved, the amendment must be signed within 90 days.

The decree also allows a concessionaire to request that renewal effects be anticipated, provided the request was filed within 30 days after ANEEL released the draft amendment in February 2025. Throughout 2025, ANEEL reviewed and recommended the renewal of 17 distribution concessions, having approved all requests submitted for analysis during that period. The first two renewals, EDP Espírito Santo and Neoenergia Pernambuco, were signed in 2025.

On 6 April 2026, the MME published a decision approving the renewal of 14 additional distribution concessions, covering companies from CPFL, Equatorial, Neoenergia, Energisa, EDP and Light Groups, and convened the concessionaires to sign the contractual amendments within 60 days. The renewals were officially signed on 8 May 2026, with the government announcing approximately BRL130 billion in expected investments in the distribution segment through 2030, covering 13 states and approximately 41.8 million consumer units.

The renewed concession agreements introduce stricter requirements compared to the previous contractual framework, including consumer satisfaction indicators, mandatory targets for service restoration following extreme weather events, strengthening of the rural network service, annual investment plans subject to ANEEL oversight, and enhanced criteria for the opening of forfeiture (caducidade) proceedings in cases of persistent non-compliance with continuity-of-supply or economic-financial sustainability indicators.

Three concessions held by the Enel Group (in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Ceará) were not included in the April 2026 renewal package. Although ANEEL recommended the renewal of the Enel Rio and Enel Ceará concessions in August 2025 and March 2026, respectively, the MME has not yet made a final decision on those recommendations. In the case of Enel São Paulo, ANEEL initiated a forfeiture proceeding following repeated service failures and major outages, and has not yet recommended renewal. As of the date of publication of this guide, the Enel São Paulo forfeiture process remains under analysis by ANEEL’s board of directors, and no final decision has been published by the MME on any of the three Enel concessions.

If renewal is denied, the concession will be offered in a new bidding process.

Low-Carbon Hydrogen Legal Framework

The Low-Carbon Hydrogen Legal Framework (Law No 14,948/2024) establishes mechanisms for the insertion of hydrogen into the national energy sector and parameters to encourage its use. It provides the definition of renewable and low-carbon hydrogen. It amends the Petroleum Law (Law No 9,478/1997) to provide that ANP is competent to regulate, authorise and supervise all activities in the hydrogen chain.

The Legal Framework also sets a new Special Regime of Incentives for the Production of Low-Carbon Hydrogen (“Rehidro”) for the low-carbon hydrogen chain and renewable power, biogas and biomethane projects destined to produce low-carbon hydrogen.

Following in the footsteps of Law No 14,948/2024, Law No 14,990/2024 established the Low-Carbon Hydrogen Development Programme (Programa de Desenvolvimento de Hidrogênio de Baixo Carbono Brasil or PHBC), which aims to provide financial subsidies through the concession of tax credits to low-carbon hydrogen projects qualified in the programme.

Energy Sector Reform

As further detailed in 1.1 Law Governing the Structure and Ownership of the Power Industry, Law No 15,269/2025 was published in November 2026, with the aim of reforming the power industry model towards free-market expansion, changes in tariff structures, and rebalance of sectoral charges among customers, among other relevant changes.

Grid Connection Procedures

The Brazilian Federal Government, through Decree No 12,772 of 5 December 2025 established the National Policy for Access to the Transmission System (Política Nacional de Acesso ao Sistema de Transmissão or PNAST), with the aim of modernising the procedures that regulate how generators and customers permanently connect to the SIN. The new policy provides for access through “Access Seasons”, which are periodic seasons during which parties interested in accessing the transmission system can formally register their access requests. These requests will be jointly and concordantly reviewed by the ONS.

The new framework will operate through competitive processes, which will be carried out only when access requests exceed the remaining capacity available at the intended connection point. Under the competitive processes, the connection capacity will be awarded to the bidders with the highest premium offers.  Revenues generated from such competitive processes will be allocated to tariff affordability, in accordance with guidelines issued by the MME and regulations to be established by ANEEL. Competitive processes may also be conducted for the contracting of future capacity, pursuant to MME guidelines.

MME Normative Ordinance No 129, dated 24 April 2026, sets forth the guidelines for the Access Seasons provided for in the decree. The first Access Season is scheduled to occur by 8 October 2026.

Some recent bills of law may materially affect the power industry.

Modernisation of the Power Industry Model

Through Modernisation of the Power Industry Model (Bills of Law No 1,917/2015 and No 414/2021) several improvements have been made to the power industry model as per discussions in MME Public Consultations No 32 and 33/2017. They provide for free market expansion, unbundling of the contracting of capacity and power, and a self-production regime, among other things. As further detailed in 1.1 Law Governing the Structure and Ownership of the Power Industry, Law No 15,269/2025 (resulting from the conversion of Provisional Measure No 1,304/2025) implemented most of the structural changes originally contemplated by those bills of law, including the expansion of the free market to all consumers, the introduction of the supplier of last resort, the revision of self-production rules, the reform of sector charges and the new attributions to the CCEE.

Brazil has one of the cleanest electric matrices in the world, as 84.84% of its power generation capacity comes from renewable sources. This share is led by hydroelectric plants (50.40%), followed by wind (15.91%), biomass (8.19%) and solar photovoltaic power plants (10.34%). Brazilian energy is clean and meets international commitments for the environment, such as those signed by Brazil at COP 21 in Paris (Brazil’s first round of commitments). 

Highlights include wind power, which has grown rapidly (especially in Brazil’s north-east region), sugar cane biomass thermal power generation and, more recently, both centralised and distributed solar power generation. 

Investments in renewable energy will continue to flow in parallel with investments in gas-fuelled thermal power plants, which increase the stability and safety of the power supply. 

Brazil is a continental country that has been making continuous investments in energy transmission and distribution facilities, despite the continuous increase of distributed generation resources. 

With an increasing energy consumption of approximately 65 GW average (reference year: 2025, based on EPE grid consumption data), Brazil is among the top ten countries in the world in terms of electricity demand, and only about 44.8% of such demand is contracted in the free market, with 55% of the demand still supplied by power distribution companies in the regulated market.

The structure of the electricity market in Brazil is divided between the regulated market (ACR) and the free market (ACL).

The Regulated Market

It can be said that the regulated market aims ultimately at serving the retail electricity market, considering that all power distribution utilities mandatorily purchase 100% of the demand of their consumers’ market (“captive customers”) through public auctions defined by the MME and carried out by ANEEL and the CCEE. In these public reverse auctions, power generation companies compete to be awarded long-term power purchase agreements at the lowest electricity prices. This results in regulated prices for consumers. Around 60% of the total energy demand in Brazil is supplied through the regulated market.

The Free Market

On the other hand, the free market covers power sale and purchase transactions freely negotiated among generation companies, trading companies, export and import companies, and free consumers. Due to requirements for entering the free market, it can be said that this currently serves the wholesale electricity market.

Since January 2024, all consumers connected to the grid with a voltage level equal to or higher than 2.3 kV are allowed to freely negotiate in the free market, regardless of their consumption level. Customers with total demand below 500 kW must, however, be represented by a retail trading company (comercializadora varejista) in order to participate in the free market.

High-load consumers – such as industrial facilities and data centres – frequently opt to operate within the free market, given the potential for cost savings, contractual flexibility, and the ability to procure energy exclusively from renewable sources.

As further detailed in 1.1 Law Governing the Structure and Ownership of the Power Industry, Law No 15,269/2025 has introduced a gradual expansion of the free market. Industrial and commercial customers served at low voltage will be able to access the free market within 24 months from the entry into force of the relevant provision (expected by the end of 2027), while the remaining customers, including residential and rural users, may do so within 36 months (expected by mid-2028), subject to the fulfilment of regulatory prerequisites established by the law.

Distinctions Between the Two

This distinction between the regulated market and the free market was created in 2004 by Law No 10,848/2004. The regulated market has been primarily responsible for the development of greenfield power generation projects, but recently the free market has been gaining relevance, as: 

  • the free market offers lower energy prices;
  • requirements for migrating to the free market are being reduced; and
  • the BNDES and other lenders have been financing projects in the free market.

Power generation companies have been building mixed portfolios of PPAs to develop greenfield power generation projects, both in the regulated and free markets. With the ongoing expansion of the free market in the past years, power generation companies have been increasingly relying on the free market, specifically through self-production structures and corporate PPAs, to develop greenfield projects.

The importation or exportation of electricity is an activity subject to authorisation by the MME pursuant to MME Ordinance No 596/2011. Pursuant to Decree No 5,668/2006 and ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,009/2022, electricity import and export transactions are subject to ANEEL’s approval through an importation licence or the exportation registry with the Foreign Trade Integrated System (Registro de Exportação no Sistema Integrado do Comércio Exterior or “SISCOMEX”). 

MME Normative Ordinance No 60/2022 and MME Ordinance No 418/2019 regulate specific importation and exportation transactions to and from Argentina and Uruguay.

According to information available on ANEEL’s website (reference date: May, 2026), the supply mix of electricity in Brazil comes from the following principal sources, with corresponding rounded percentages based on installed capacity: 

  • hydro – 50.46%; 
  • wind – 15.94%; 
  • biomass – 8.2%; 
  • natural gas – 8.9%; 
  • solar – 10.23%;
  • oil – 3.56%; 
  • coal – 1.8%; and
  • nuclear – 0.91%.

Law No 12,529/2011, also known as the “Competition Law”, provided for an institutional reorganisation of the Brazilian System for the Defence of Competition. Under this law, the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica or CADE), an independent agency reporting to the Ministry of Justice, is the authority with jurisdiction over the national territory responsible for investigating and ultimately deciding on competition issues. 

Pursuant to the Competition Law, concentration acts (amalgamations, mergers, share or asset acquisitions, associations, consortiums, or joint ventures) must be submitted for CADE’s prior approval if one of the groups involved in the transaction has an annual gross revenue equal to or greater than BRL750 million and the other group involved in the transaction has an annual gross revenue equal to or greater than BRL75 million. 

The electricity market is divided, according to the case law of CADE, into four distinct relevant markets: 

  • generation; 
  • transmission; 
  • distribution; and 
  • trading. 

There are no concentration limits regarding percentage of market share in these segments of the power industry. In general terms, CADE understands that there is “competition by the market” in the power transmission and distribution segments, where concessions are granted after a public bidding procedure with the participation of Brazilian and foreign bidders.

As mentioned in 2.4 Market Concentration Limits, CADE is the authority with jurisdiction over national territory responsible for investigating and ultimately deciding on competition issues. ANEEL supports CADE’s activities by analysing concentration acts and behaviours violating competition laws by power companies, pursuant to ANEEL’s Normative Resolution No 948/2021. 

In the event of violation of competition laws, CADE may impose fines for an amount equivalent to 0.1% to 20% of the company’s or group’s gross revenues, as well as other penalties, such as: 

  • prohibition from entering into contracts with official financial institutions and participating in public tenders for a five-year period; 
  • denial of payment by instalment of federal taxes and cancellation of tax incentives or public subsidies; and 
  • the transfer of corporate control, sale of assets or partial suspension of activities. 

Furthermore, companies may be subject to prosecution in the civil sphere and individuals in the criminal sphere.

Pursuant to Law No 9,074/1995 and the Concession Renewal Law, the construction and operation rights of power generation facilities may be granted through concessions or authorisations by the MME or ANEEL, depending on the source and size of the power plant. Both concessions and authorisations grant the concessionaire or authorised agent a 35-year term in which to act as an independent power producer or self-producer. 

The construction and operation of large hydropower plants (equal to or greater than 50 MW of installed capacity) is subject to a concession, which is granted after a public bidding process. The construction and operation of small hydro, wind, solar, biomass and fossil fuel thermal power plants is subject to authorisation by the MME or ANEEL. Power generation projects with installed capacity equal to or lower than 5 MW simply need to register with ANEEL after construction. 

Environmental licences at federal or state level are also required for the construction and operation of power generation facilities, as well as certain construction and operation permits at local level. Depending on the project’s characteristics, other permits may also be required, such as a water-usage permit. 

Access to the electricity grid is also a critical part of the process, and is subject to specific regulations, such as ONS’s Grid Procedures, ANEEL’s Transmission Rules and ANEEL’s Distribution Procedures.

Hydropower generation concessions are usually granted after a public auction, in which the winning bid criterion is the lowest power price, considering the payment of a fee for the use of a public good (Uso do Bem Público or UBP). 

Authorisations for power generation facilities are granted by ANEEL upon fulfilment of certain legal, technical and financial requirements pursuant to ANEEL Normative Resolutions No 875/2020 (small and medium-sized hydropower plants) and No 1,071/2023 (thermal, wind and solar power plants). 

Authorisations are also automatically granted, by the MME or ANEEL, to the winners of the new energy auctions. To participate in these auctions, the projects need to be technically qualified by the EPE upon evidence of certain technical, environmental, real estate, grid connection and fuel supply (if applicable) conditions that confirm the project’s feasibility.

Obligations

Permission to build large hydropower plants may be granted by means of public service concessions or concessions for the use of the public good, since all hydro-resources in Brazil are considered public. Concession agreements for power generation place several obligations on concessionaires regarding the regularity, continuity, safety, efficiency and quality of public services, as well as payment of the UBP, if applicable. 

Authorisation acts make reference to the obligation of authorised agents to comply with ANEEL Normative Resolution No 921/2021, which sets forth the rights and obligations of independent power producers and self-producers under authorisation.

Construction Schedule

Both the concession agreements and authorisation acts of greenfield projects establish a construction schedule with the dates for achieving intermediary milestones and the dates for commencing the commissioning and commercial operation of the power plant; and, specifically for solar, wind and thermal power plants, authorisation acts indicate a 54-month term for commencing their commercial operation. Projects that sell energy in the regulated market, by contrast, usually have the commercial operation date required to meet the supply term for the specific auction in which they negotiated power, unless the entrepreneur requests a shorter term (eg, in order to sell power in the free market by an earlier date).

Performance Bond

In relation to greenfield power generation projects that have sold energy in the regulated market, a performance bond must be submitted by the concessionaire or authorised agent to ANEEL, usually for an amount equivalent to 5% of the project’s capital expenditure (CAPEX) – as indicated by bidders in energy auctions in the regulated market – to guarantee the timely implementation of the project pursuant to its approved construction schedule.

Assured Energy

Concession agreements and authorisation acts may also indicate the officially approved power output of the project, the so-called assured energy (garantia física), which is the maximum amount of power that the concessionaire or authorised agent is entitled to sell to the market. The project’s assured energy can be revised in cases specified in the regulations.

Penalties

Non-compliance with the terms and conditions of concession agreements and authorisation acts is subject to penalties imposed by ANEEL after an administrative proceeding, based on ANEEL Normative Resolution No 846/2019. Depending on the seriousness of the violation, ANEEL may impose penalties of a warning; fine; suspension of works or activities; specific performance; temporary prohibition from participating in public auctions for new concessions, permissions, or authorisations and entering into contracts with ANEEL; revocation of authorisation; intervention and forfeiture of the concession or permission.

If the proponent fails to reach an amicable agreement with landowners over compensation for the construction and operation of power generation facilities on their land, the proponent may request the issuance of a Declaration of Public Utility (Declaração de Utilidade Pública or DUP) by ANEEL, pursuant to ANEEL Normative Resolution No 919/2021, which entitles the proponent to easement or expropriation rights over these lands. Based on the DUP, the proponent may judicially obtain injunctions against landowners to access their land, and the court will define the fair compensation due to landowners, usually based on market value.

However, according to ANEEL’s precedents, the DUP only covers lands required for construction of hydropower plants or high-voltage transmission lines and substations necessary to connect power plants of any source to the electricity grid.

Apart from certain environmental obligations applicable to decommissioning of nuclear power plants, there are no specific requirements for decommissioning of generation facilities in Brazil. 

Power generation facilities under the concession regime will revert to the federal government, upon compensation if the investment by the concessionaire has not been fully amortised. Power generation facilities under the authorisation regime, except hydropower facilities, may be freely disposed of by the authorised agent.

Pursuant to Law No 9,074/1995 and the Concession Renewal Law, the construction and operation rights of power transmission facilities may be granted through concessions following public auctions. The MME defines the transmission facilities to be auctioned, the cap for the annual revenue of each concession (Receita Annual Permitida or RAP) and the deadline for commencement of the commercial operation of such facilities. ANEEL then promotes the reverse auction, where the winning bid criterion is the lowest RAP. The concessions have a 30-year term. 

Environmental licences at federal or state level are also required for the construction and operation of power transmission facilities, as well as certain construction and operation permits at local level. 

Power transmission facilities are composed of transmission lines, substations, and other equipment with voltages equal to or higher than 230 kV. There are over 200 power transmission concessionaires, operating approximately 200,000 km of transmission lines in Brazil, and around 40% of these facilities are operated by Eletrobras.

The winning bidders must submit evidence of their legal, technical, economic-financial and tax qualification after the auction session. The winning bidders are also required to replace their bid bonds with performance bonds, for an amount equivalent to at least 5% of the project’s CAPEX, to guarantee the timely implementation of the project in accordance with the construction schedule set forth in their concession agreements. 

The process from the publication of the auction documents up to the signing of the concession contract usually takes four months.

Concession agreements provide for several obligations on the part of concessionaires regarding the regularity, continuity, safety, efficiency and quality of public services provided, and they establish a construction schedule with dates for achieving intermediary milestones, and dates for commencing the commissioning and commercial operation of power transmission facilities. 

Power transmission concessionaires are subject to regulations established by ANEEL and the ONS’s grid procedures, as well as conditions defined in the concession contract and in the transmission service agreement (Contrato de Prestação de Serviços de Transmissão or CPST), entered into by and between the concessionaire and the ONS, which provides for the payment of the RAP based on the availability of the power transmission facilities.

Similarly, in relation to power generation facilities, if the proponent fails to reach an amicable agreement with landowners over compensation for the construction and operation of power transmission facilities on their land, the proponent may request the issuance of a DUP by ANEEL, in accordance with ANEEL Normative Resolution No 919/2021, which entitles the proponent to easement or expropriation rights over the land. Based on the DUP, the proponent may judicially obtain injunctions against landowners to access the land, and the court will define the fair compensation due to landowners, usually based on market value.

Power transmission concessionaires have an exclusive right to construct and operate the transmission facilities under the scope of their concession agreements. The construction of new facilities or the expansion of the capacity of existing facilities may be required by the ONS and authorised by ANEEL, subject to an additional parcel of the RAP. 

A concessionaire has no exclusive right within a specified geographical territory, but there is no competition among concessionaires, as the RAP is not based on the amount of power transmitted by the concessionaires’ transmission facilities, but on the availability of such facilities.

The principal laws governing the provision of transmission services, as well as transmission charges and terms of service, are:

  • the Concessions Law; 
  • Law No 9,074/1995; 
  • Law No 9,427/1996; 
  • Law No 9,648/1998; 
  • Law No 10,848/2004; 
  • Law No 14,120/2021;
  • Law No 15,269/2025; and 
  • the Concession Renewal Law. 

All of these have been previously discussed throughout this guide.

As mentioned in 5.1 Constructing and Operating Electricity Distribution Facilities, power transmission concessions are under a revenue cap regulation. These concessions may be divided into three categories, as follows:

  • concessions granted prior to 1998 – their RAP is adjusted annually based on the IPCA, they were renewed for an additional 30 years in 2013 and they have a tariff review every five years; 
  • concessions granted from 1999 to November 2006 – their RAP is adjusted annually based on the IPCA index or IGP-M index (the general market price index) and is reduced by 50% in the 16th year of their commercial operation, they have a 30-year term and no tariff review; and 
  • concessions granted after November 2006 – their RAP is adjusted annually based on the IPCA index, they have a 30-year term and three limited tariff reviews within five, ten and 15 years of the granting of the concessions, which only takes into account changes in the cost of capital. 

ANEEL adopts the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) methodology to review the transmission tariffs. In 2026, the WACC of transmission and generation companies is 8% (after taxes, in real terms), as defined by ANEEL. The updated WACC was published on 4 March 2026 and applies to tariff review processes conducted from 1 March 2026 onwards. The 2026 WACC represents an increase of 0.11% relative to the previous cycle.

The RAP is adjusted annually and revised periodically, as applicable, according to the concession agreement.

In general terms, in the periodic tariff review, ANEEL covers the recalculation of the cost of capital, efficiency gains in the operation and maintenance of the facilities, and the partial or total deduction of revenues arising from other activities (so-called “other revenues”). The tariff review process follows a procedure of public hearing, where the company, consumers and any other party may submit contributions to ANEEL prior to definition of the new tariffs. 

For the periodic tariff review cycle of July 2026, ANEEL opened a public consultation process (Tomada de Subsídios No 6/2026) covering 50 transmission contracts, with an average repositioning index of 2.42% for the reviewed concessions.

The RAP is supported by revenues arising from payments of the transmission tariff (TUST) by users of the transmission grid in accordance with Transmission System Use Agreements (Contratos de Uso do Sistema de Transmissão or CUST) entered into by and between the ONS and such users. Concessionaires collect their allowed share of the TUST from each user of the national transmission grid, despite the location of their assets.

The TUST is calculated on a monthly basis by the ONS according to a nodal methodology and applicable regulations that differentiate consumers from generators, and also observing the rights of certain generators that participated in auctions with stabilised TUSTs.

Law No 9,074/1995, Decree No 2,655/1998 and ANEEL Resolution No 281/1999, as amended, provide open-access rights to all power transmission facilities on a non-discriminatory basis for any power generator, distributor, or consumer, subject to payment of the applicable transmission charges. Nonetheless, access can be subject to technical restrictions and to the performance of studies and works by the accessing party, as determined by the ONS in each case.

The transmission charges are divided into: 

  • connection charges that cover the costs incurred by the local transmission concessionaire in the construction and operation of the connection point of the user; and 
  • usage charges to be paid to all transmission concessionaires and the ONS (TUST) according to the capacity contracted by the user. 

The ONS is responsible for the procedure of access to transmission facilities and it issues the access opinion required for the execution of the Transmission Usage and Connection Agreements (CUST and Contrato de Conexão ao Sistema de Transmissão or CCT).

Pursuant to Law No 9,074/1995 and the Concession Renewal Law, the construction and operation rights of power distribution facilities may be granted through concessions or permissions. The concessions and permissions have a 30-year term. 

Environmental licences at state level are also required for the construction and operation of power distribution facilities, as well as certain construction and operation permits at local level. 

Power distribution facilities are composed of distribution lines, substations, and other equipment with voltages lower than 230 kV. Certain equipment over 230 kV is maintained by power distribution companies and called “Other Transmission Facilities” (Demais Instalações de Transmissão or DITs). There are 105 distribution companies in Brazil, composed of 53 concessionaires and 52 permissionaires. 

The permissionaires are mainly power distribution co-operatives in rural areas. Of the concessionaires, 48 out of 53 are controlled by private capital and the remaining five are controlled by states and municipalities. In 2016, CELG D was privatised and sold to Enel, and in 2018, Eletrobras’s six distribution concessionaires in the north and north-east regions were also privatised and sold to Energisa, Equatorial, Oliveira Energia and Atem. In 2020, CEB and CEEE-D were privatised and sold to Neoenergia and Equatorial, respectively. In 2021, CEA and CELG D (currently EDP Goiás) were privatised and sold to Equatorial and EDP, respectively. In 2023, COPEL was privatised by public offer of its shares.

The existing concessionaires and permissionaires have monopoly rights over the totality of the geographical territory of Brazil, and they have the right and the obligation to construct and operate distribution facilities within their concession or permission areas.

Concession and permission agreements provide several obligations for concessionaires and permissionaires regarding the regularity, continuity, safety, efficiency and quality of the public services provided, as well as the universalisation or accessibility rights of consumers, and the affordability of tariffs. 

Power distribution concessionaires and permissionaires are subject to regulations established by ANEEL. The quality and continuity of the services are regulated by the Procedures for Distribution of Electricity in the National Electrical System (Procedimentos de Distribuição de Energia Elétrica no Sistema Elétrico Nacional or “PRODIST”) approved by ANEEL Normative Resolution No 956/2021. Interruptions in the power supply are assessed by two indicators called the “DEC” (Duração Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora) and “FEC” (Frequência Equivalente de Interrupção por Unidade Consumidora), which measure the duration and frequency of the interruptions, respectively.

ANEEL Normative Resolution No 1,000/2021 establishes the directives related to the general conditions of the supply of power to consumers by distribution companies. 

Similarly, in relation to power generation and transmission facilities, if the proponent fails to reach an amicable agreement with landowners over compensation for the construction and operation of power distribution facilities on their land, the proponent may request the issue of a DUP by ANEEL, in accordance with ANEEL Normative Resolution No 919/2021, which entitles the proponent to easement or expropriation rights over the land. Based on the DUP, the proponent may judicially obtain injunctions against landowners to access the land, and the court will define the fair compensation due to landowners, usually based on market value.

The power distribution concessionaires and permissionaires have the exclusive right to construct and operate distribution facilities within a specified geographical territory. The concession or permission agreement indicates the areas subject to the concessionaire’s or permissionaire’s monopoly rights.

The principal laws governing the provision of distribution services, as well as distribution charges and terms of service, are the same as those governing transmission services. See 4.6 Transmission Charges and Terms of Service.

Distribution Tariffs

ANEEL adopts the WACC methodology to review the distribution tariffs. The definition of remuneration base considers only the value of the assets which are effectively rendering services to the customers, compared to the referential models established by ANEEL, specific to each company, which reflect the economic and geographic conditions of their respective concession or permission areas and the efficiency levels in services. In 2026, the WACC of distribution companies is 8.1% (after taxes, in real terms), as defined by ANEEL. The updated WACC was published on 4 March 2026, with an additional adjustment approved on 5 May 2026 following the incorporation of debenture emissions not previously included in the cost of debt database. The new WACC applies to tariff review processes conducted from 1 March 2026 onwards and represents an increase of 0.07% relative to the previous cycle.

Power distribution tariffs are subject to adjustments and reviews as provided in the concession or permission agreements.

Annual adjustment

In the annual tariff adjustments, non-manageable costs are fully passed on to the consumers and manageable costs are adjusted in line with inflation, based on the IGP-M or IPCA index, reduced by a factor – the so-called “X Factor” – determined by ANEEL so that distribution companies can share the gains of productivity with their consumers.

Periodic tariff review

Every four or five years, there is a periodic tariff review to ensure the necessary revenues to cover efficient operational costs and adequate compensation of investment. There is also an extraordinary tariff review, on a case-by-case basis, to compensate for unpredicted costs, including taxes and charges which significantly change the cost structure of the distribution company. 

In the process of review of the tariffs, ANEEL takes into account the costs and the company’s markets, comparing them and other similar companies abroad; the company’s efficiency; and the need for fairer tariffs and appropriate returns to shareholders. The tariff review process follows a procedure of public hearing, where the company, consumers and any other party may submit contributions to ANEEL prior to definition of the new tariffs.

Tauil & Chequer Advogados in association with Mayer Brown

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+55 21 2127 4210

+55 21 2127 4210

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Trends and Developments


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Advocacia Bettiol was founded in 1961 in Brasilia. The firm specialises in litigation and has a strong presence in the Federal Supreme Court, the Superior Court of Justice and Brazil’s other main courts, as well as in national administrative bodies. Its highly qualified professionals in public and private law are recognised for their performance in lawsuits involving administrative, tax and business matters, consensual dispute resolution and arbitration. They also play a prominent role in regulatory law, operating in both administrative and judicial litigation, and providing advisory services in energy, oil and gas, mining and telecoms.

Regulatory Limits and Legitimate Expectations in Electricity Transmission Concessions: Asset Compensation and Investment Protection

The debate surrounding compensation at the end of electricity transmission concessions in Brazil has re-emerged as one of the most sensitive regulatory issues on the sector’s current agenda.

Historically, the Brazilian regulatory model for electricity transmission has been structured around a clear economic and accounting rationale: assets are remunerated and depreciated according to their technical useful life, based on depreciation rates defined and consistently applied by the regulator. This approach has shaped tariff calculations and the regulatory asset base and, above all, has guided the assessment of concessionaires’ financial statements, financing structures, and investment decisions by both domestic and international capital providers.

However, recent interpretative changes that disconnect compensation from the technical useful life of assets – particularly when applied to contracts entered into under different regulatory assumptions – raise structural concerns regarding legal certainty, regulatory stability, and the proper allocation of risks within concession-based infrastructure models. The issue reflects a challenge faced by regulatory systems worldwide: how to reconcile the necessary evolution of regulation with the preservation of legitimately formed expectations in arrangements designed for long-term horizons.

In Brazil, discussions between the National Electricity Regulatory Agency (Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica or ANEEL) and society have been further developed within the framework of Public Consultation No 43/2025, which, among other issues, addresses the criteria for compensating remaining assets.

Historical Foundations of Asset Compensation in Transmission Concessions: Legal and Regulatory Framework

Upon the expiration of the contractual term, the concession is terminated and the assets allocated to the provision of the service revert to the granting authority. This mechanism of reversion, however, has never implied that the mere end of the contractual term would automatically result in the economic exhaustion of the assets used in the provision of the service.

This observation is particularly relevant in the electricity transmission sector, where assets typically have long technically useful lives that, in many cases, exceed the duration of the concession itself.

From a legal perspective, the Brazilian framework applicable to the termination of public service concessions – under which reversible assets that have not been fully depreciated or amortised at the end of the concession must be compensated – has always been grounded in a clear constitutional and statutory structure aimed at protecting property rights and ensuring the continuity of the service.

At the constitutional level, the guarantee of fair compensation derives from the right to private property, granted by the constituent legislator as a fundamental right under Article 5, items XXII and XXIV, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988. This right is further reinforced as a structural principle of the national economic order by Article 170, item II, of the Constitution, which enshrines private property as an essential element of economic activity.

Building upon this constitutional foundation, the statutory framework governing concessions has consistently translated these guarantees into operational rules. Law No 8,987/1995 expressly establishes that, upon the termination of the concession, the reversion of assets associated with the service must be accompanied by compensation for investments that have not yet been amortised or depreciated. Article 36 of that law is unequivocal in linking the reversion of assets to the obligation of compensation whenever residual asset value remains.

In the electricity sector, this logic is reiterated by sector-specific legislation. Article 14 of Law No 9,427/1996, which created ANEEL, incorporates into the economic and financial regime of electricity concessions the responsibility of the concessionaire to carry out investments in works and facilities that will return to the granting authority at the end of the contract, while guaranteeing compensation in the cases and under the conditions provided by law.

It is also important to emphasise that the legal framework has never equated the contractual term of the concession with the complete economic exhaustion of assets. Although Law No 9,074/1995 refers to concession terms associated with the amortisation of investments, this provision has always been interpreted in a systematic and harmonious manner with the broader legal framework, rather than as a limitation on the right to compensation.

This interpretation has also been consolidated in administrative practice. The Federal Attorney’s Office has acknowledged that, although investments are generally expected to be recovered over the course of the concession, in the exceptional event that, at the end of the concession term, the concessionaire’s investments have not been fully amortised, the granting authority has the obligation to pay compensation for the remaining balance. The absence of compensation in such circumstances, as highlighted by the Federal Attorney’s Office, would constitute unjust enrichment of the granting authority and, ultimately, a form of indirect expropriation without compensation (Legal Opinion No 00237/2015/PFANEEL/PGF/AGU and Legal Opinion No 328/2011/PGE/ANEEL).

The former National Department of Water and Electric Energy (Departamento Nacional de Águas e Energia Elétrica or DNAEE) and ANEEL have historically established depreciation rates linked to the technical useful life of assets, as set forth in the Electricity Sector Accounting Manual (Manual de Contabilidade do Setor Elétrico or MCSE) and the Electricity Sector Asset Control Manual (Manual de Controle Patrimonial do Setor Elétrico or MCPSE). These instruments, which are binding on concessionaires, establish that asset accounting must follow the technical useful life of the equipment.

In this context, the treatment of depreciation and compensation in transmission concessions reflects the concrete application of constitutional guarantees, express statutory provisions, and an interpretative consensus consolidated over time, aimed at balancing the continuity and adequacy of public service provision with the protection of invested private capital.

Regulatory Oversight, Asset Control and the Formation of Legitimate Expectations

Beyond the legal framework governing compensation at the end of concessions, the Brazilian electricity transmission model has been shaped by a robust system of regulatory oversight, which plays a decisive role in the formation of legitimate expectations. Among ANEEL’s responsibilities is a continuous duty to supervise, validate and monitor the economic and asset-related dimensions of concessionaires’ activities.

In this context, the Public Administration has consistently required, audited and accepted the Asset Control Reports (Relatórios de Controle Patrimonial or RCP), the Standardized Monthly Trial Balance (Balancete Mensal Padronizado or BMP) and the Annual Accounts Report (Relatório Anual do Novo PAC) submitted by concessionaires, which include balances yet to be amortised and calculated based on depreciation rates defined by ANEEL itself and on the technical useful life of the equipment, in accordance with the MCSE and the MCPSE.

The interaction between regulatory accounting and corporate financial reporting has been further reinforced by institutional co-operation between ANEEL and the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários or CVM). Through a co-operation agreement executed in 2011 and still in force, the CVM oversees the proper incorporation of these criteria into financial statements, issuance prospectuses, periodic reports and other disclosures required in the capital markets. As a result, the sectoral regulation exercised by ANEEL produces effects that are also relevant to the functioning of the securities market.

Through this process, ANEEL has not only supervised compliance with the applicable rules, but has also, in practice, endorsed the economic assumptions underlying the recovery of investments over the life cycle of the concession. This has strengthened the confidence of investors, lenders and market analysts in regulatory data as a legitimate source of information for risk assessment, financing structures and capital pricing, thereby supporting long-term investment decisions.

The Impact of the Regulatory Reinterpretation of Compensation Rules in Transmission Concessions on the Capital Markets

In the Brazilian context, the debate regarding the recoverability of assets that have not been fully depreciated first gained prominence in 2022 in the framework of Public Consultation No 136/2022, conducted by the Ministry of Mines and Energy, which discussed the guidelines for the bidding or extension of electricity transmission public service concessions approaching the end of their term. This process culminated in the issuance of Decree No 11,314/2022, which regulates the bidding and extension of electricity transmission public service concessions nearing expiration.

With the initiation of discussions within ANEEL regarding the regulation of the decree, Public Consultation No 43/2025 was opened with the objective of engaging society – through Regulatory Impact Analysis No 2/2025-STD-SCE-STR-SFF-SFT-SEL/ANEEL – in the discussion of the regulatory framework for Decree No 11,314/2022. Among the topics under discussion are the criteria for compensation of remaining assets.

In the Joint Regulatory Impact Analysis Report No 2/2025-STD/ANEEL, when addressing the debate concerning asset compensation, ANEEL took the view that concessionaires would not be entitled to compensation for assets not fully amortised and/or depreciated, without considering the essential legal and regulatory distinction between concession contracts executed before and after 2019.

The Decree, which addressed only non-amortised assets (without addressing the issue of depreciation), reflects a public policy choice directed at future concessions and contractual extensions by introducing parameters that align asset amortisation with the contractual term of the concession. For concessions granted from 2019 onwards, this logic had already been incorporated into bidding documents and concession agreements, allowing investors to price these assumptions in advance and with transparency.

The sensitive issue arises, however, when this interpretative logic begins to be projected onto earlier concessions executed before 2019 under a substantially different regulatory and contractual environment. For these contracts, the bidding documents and concession instruments did not provide for accelerated amortisation linked to the term of the concession. On the contrary, they were structured based on depreciation methodologies anchored in the technical useful life of the assets, as defined in binding regulatory manuals and repeatedly validated by ANEEL over time.

For illustrative purposes, the contractual instruments executed prior to 2019 themselves expressly and unequivocally provided for the compensation of investments that had not been fully amortised or depreciated. In the case of the Concession Agreement of Auction Notice No 02/2017-ANEEL, for example, it was expressly established that: “Upon termination of the concession, the assets associated with the service shall revert to the GRANTING AUTHORITY, and the necessary surveys and valuations shall be carried out to determine the amount of compensation to be owed to the TRANSMISSION CONCESSIONAIRE, in accordance with Article 36 of Law No. 8,987 of 1995” (clause 12, second subclause).

The application of the logic incorporated by Decree No 11,314/2022 to these earlier concessions would therefore represent more than a prospective regulatory evolution. It would imply a substantial alteration of the economic assumptions that underpinned existing investments, with direct repercussions for financial statements, financing structures and risk allocation. From the perspective of the capital markets, this raises concerns related to legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations – central elements for long-term infrastructure investment decisions.

This understanding has also begun to be reflected in Brazilian case law. In the judgment of REsp No 1.969.446/DF, involving the compensation regime applicable to hydroelectric generation assets, the Superior Court of Justice expressly recognised that the methodology for calculating compensation for reversible assets forms part of the economic and financial framework of the concession agreement itself and therefore cannot be unilaterally altered by subsequent legislation or regulation where the contract expressly provides otherwise. On that occasion, the court emphasised that changing the compensation methodology “also constitutes a violation of the principles of legal certainty and objective good faith”, further recognising that the calculation methodology constitutes an essential, rather than an ancillary, element of the economic equation of the concession.

The need to establish clearer substantive limits on regulatory action, or what is sometimes referred to as “regulatory abuse” – today also described as “expropriatory regulation” or indirect expropriation – is a concept that has been developed over decades, primarily through the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Direct Expropriation, Indirect Expropriation and Regulatory Takings: Implications for the Compensation of Transmission Assets

While “direct expropriation” is characterised by the formal transfer of ownership of property to the State, through an express act and usually accompanied by compensation, “indirect expropriation” manifests itself through government measures that, although formally preserving ownership of the property, substantially deplete its economic value, its utility, or its capacity to generate returns for its owner.

Although the termination of the concession implies the formal reversion of the assets to the granting authority, the legal controversy lies in the absorption, without compensation, of their residual economic value. When assets that remain economically useful are transferred to the State without corresponding compensation, the material effect of the measure approaches the classic hypothesis of indirect expropriation.

Because it involves broad economic and social implications, each country has developed its own political and legal approach regarding the limitation of State power in the face of regulatory interference with private property.

In the United States, this debate is centred more specifically on regulatory takings, a doctrine analysed extensively in both legal scholarship and case law, which still does not present a single unified interpretation.

The constitutional foundation for government takings derives from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, which protect private property from being taken by the government without just compensation or due process of law, establishing the so-called “Takings Clause”.

In addition to the physical appropriation of land for government use, the Fifth Amendment also encompasses regulatory takings, leaving it to the Supreme Court to determine what constitutes a regulatory taking and the amount of compensation that may be required.

Since the Supreme Court began recognising the possibility that regulatory activity itself could constitute a form of expropriation, the principal challenge has been identifying when a government measure that affects property owners should be considered legitimate and non-compensable, and when regulation becomes excessive, reducing property values to such an extent that compensation becomes constitutionally required. This distinction is particularly significant because, if the State holds unlimited power to redefine the use and enjoyment of property, one of the central virtues of property rights, its ability to stabilise and protect expectations regarding assets may be undermined.

The recognition by the United States Supreme Court that regulatory activity may constitute a form of expropriation dates to Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon (260 US 393, 1922). In that precedent, while invalidating a Pennsylvania statute that rendered contractually guaranteed mining activities impossible, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr famously stated that “while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”. The court thereby recognised the possibility that regulation may exceed legitimate limits and become expropriatory in nature.

This statement was considered a paradigm shift, as it introduced the idea that a substantial loss of value and the frustration of legitimately formed expectations may transform regulation into expropriation. The case marked the beginning of the doctrinal development of regulatory takings.

The consolidation of this doctrine occurred in Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York (438 US 104, 1978), in which the Supreme Court established a multi-factor test to determine when a regulatory taking occurs. The court stated that regulatory taking cases must be analysed through ad hoc, factual enquiries, considering three principal factors: (i) the economic impact of the regulation; (ii) the degree of interference with investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of government action.

On several subsequent occasions, the court has relied on the concept of reasonable investment-backed expectations. This was first articulated in Penn Central In Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co (467 US 986, 1984) when the court recognised that the disclosure of data protected by statutory confidentiality guarantees could constitute a taking, as it affected the economic value of trade secrets grounded in investment-backed expectations. In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (1994), a property owner purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms intending to build houses. A subsequent state law prohibited permanent construction in the area for environmental protection purposes, substantially eliminating the economic value of the property. The Supreme Court held that a total deprivation of economic value constituted a taking requiring just compensation.

These precedents demonstrate that the central focus of the analysis lies primarily in the owner’s expectations regarding the use of the property, particularly when investments are made in reasonable reliance on a regulatory framework that is subsequently altered in a manner that prevents the intended use of the asset.

Building upon this reasoning, the Supreme Court in Eastern Enterprises v Apfel (524 US 498, 1998) rejected the retroactive imposition of disproportionate financial burdens. In Lingle v Chevron USA Inc (544 US 528, 2005), the court clarified that the focus of the Takings Clause lies on the severity of the burden imposed on property rights, rather than on the effectiveness or reasonableness of the public policy adopted.

In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has continued to reinforce the importance of the Takings Clause as a safeguard of property rights. In Sheetz v County of El Dorado, California (601 US, 2024), a property owner was required to pay an impact fee of USD23,420 as a condition for obtaining a building permit for a residence. After paying under protest, the owner argued that the requirement constituted an unconstitutional taking. State courts rejected the claim on the grounds that the charge had been imposed by statute rather than administrative action. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative acts and demanded the case for further analysis.

Landmark cases such as those described above – addressing regulations that diminish property value or prevent owners from using their property – demonstrate that interference with property rights is not limited to the formal transfer of ownership but may also arise from regulatory measures that restrict the exercise of property rights. Under the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, even when property is taken for public purposes, compensation remains constitutionally required.

In Brazil, both the Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal or STF) and the Superior Court of Justice (Superior Tribunal de Justiça or STJ) have ruled on numerous cases involving regulatory takings through indirect expropriation; however, the two courts have adopted distinct approaches to the matter.

The STJ has consolidated the understanding that indirect expropriation requires an effective dispossession of property rights. According to the Court, indirect expropriation is not characterised merely by the enactment of regulatory or declaratory acts; rather, it requires either a factual encroachment by the State upon the asset or the imposition of restrictions of such magnitude that they irreversibly extinguish the prerogatives inherent to ownership (REsp No 1.524.056/ES, Reporting Justice Og Fernandes, March 13, 2018; and AgRg in REsp No 1.192.971/SP, Reporting Justice Humberto Martins, September 3, 2010).

Conversely, the STF recognises that the duty to compensate arises imperatively whenever an act of State authority results in the total deprivation of property rights. The Court’s settled case law emphasises that the individual dimension of the harm suffered by the owner constitutes the determining criterion for the characterisation of regulatory indirect expropriation. Once regulation ceases to represent a general burden equally shared by society and instead becomes a specific restriction that deprives a particular owner of the economic utility of the asset, the sacrifice imposed must be compensated by the State (RE 361127 AgR, Reporting Justice Joaquim Barbosa, May 15, 2012).

In light of these precedents, both in comparative law and in Brazilian case law, there is a growing consolidation of the understanding that the exercise of regulatory power, although legitimate and inherent to State action, encounters limits when its effects go beyond the mere regulation of property use, and begin to produce the substantial deprivation of its economic value or the frustration of legitimately established expectations.

Thus, the potential suppression of the right to compensation for assets that have not been fully depreciated, when disconnected from the legal framework in force at the time the concession was granted, may be understood not merely as a regulatory change, but as an intervention in property rights producing effects equivalent to indirect expropriation.

In such circumstances, the economic impact falls directly on the core of property rights, affecting not only concessionaires but also creditors, investors and other stakeholders whose decisions were based on consolidated regulatory expectations.

From this perspective, the discussion regarding compensation at the end of concessions cannot be reduced to a technical debate about amortisation criteria or to the mere redefinition of regulatory parameters. Rather, it engages broader legal concepts developed over decades in comparative law, which recognise that the exercise of regulatory power – although legitimate – encounters limits when its effects approach the equivalent of uncompensated appropriation.

International experience demonstrates that the stability of long-term infrastructure arrangements depends on the preservation of legitimate expectations formed through consistent regulatory practices and on maintaining the balance between the public interest and the protection of private investment. Otherwise, the predictability and credibility of the institutional framework that sustains infrastructure investment in Brazil may be compromised.

Conclusion

Considering the constitutional, statutory, contractual and regulatory framework analysed, it becomes clear that the right to compensation for assets not fully amortised or depreciated in concession contracts executed up to 2019 constitutes a structural element of the economic and financial framework governing electricity transmission concessions. This regime was expressly provided for in bidding documents and concession agreements, operationalised through binding accounting manuals (the MCSE and MCPSE), and repeatedly validated through ANEEL’s own supervisory activities, thereby shaping legitimate legal and economic expectations.

The retroactive application of an accelerated amortisation logic – conceived for later contracts and expressly incorporated only from 2019 onwards – would imply a substantial alteration of the original assumptions underlying the bidding processes, with direct repercussions for financial statements, financing structures, leverage levels and the valuation of regulated assets. Such reinterpretation would amount to a genuine modification of the contractually defined allocation of risks, in violation of the principles of vested rights, objective good faith, protection of legitimate expectations and the economic-financial equilibrium of concession contracts.

In this context, the regulatory framework resulting from Public Consultation No 43/2025 must preserve the coherence of the Brazilian regulatory model by properly distinguishing between different contractual regimes and ensuring compensation for non-amortised or non-depreciated balances in earlier concession contracts. The institutional stability of the electricity sector and the credibility of the infrastructure investment environment depend on the strict observance of these principles.

Advocacia Bettiol

SGAN Quadra 601
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Brasília Federal District
CEP 70.830-026
Brazil

+ 55 61 4501-5050

contato@bettiol.com.br www.bettiol.com.br
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Tauil & Chequer Advogados in association with Mayer Brown is a full-service law firm, offering clients in-depth local knowledge combined with global reach. Founded in 2000, Tauil & Chequer grew rapidly, forming an association with Mayer Brown in December 2009. Today, the firm has approximately 180 lawyers, including 49 partners, in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Vitória and Brasilia, with a team of specialists in several areas of business law in Brazil, who advise in operations ranging from the routine to the highly complex and sophisticated. The firm offers clients the full range of legal services and has a particularly strong and long-standing presence in the energy, oil and gas, and infrastructure industries. It offers a full-service alternative energy and power practice, providing legal advice to domestic and international clients, financial institutions and government agencies.

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Advocacia Bettiol was founded in 1961 in Brasilia. The firm specialises in litigation and has a strong presence in the Federal Supreme Court, the Superior Court of Justice and Brazil’s other main courts, as well as in national administrative bodies. Its highly qualified professionals in public and private law are recognised for their performance in lawsuits involving administrative, tax and business matters, consensual dispute resolution and arbitration. They also play a prominent role in regulatory law, operating in both administrative and judicial litigation, and providing advisory services in energy, oil and gas, mining and telecoms.

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