In France, the procurement of government contracts is primarily governed by the Public Procurement Code (Code de la commande publique or CCP). The CCP brings together the rules governing the awarding and performance of public contracts and concessions in a single text. They were previously issued in different texts until 1 April 2019. In particular, the CCP incorporates the provisions of Ordinance No 2015-899 on public contracts and Ordinance No 2016-65 on concessions, both of which transposed European Directives (Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU, and Directive 2014/25/EU) into French law.
Litigation rules vary depending on whether a public contract or a concession is governed by public or private law.
Public procurement law applies to contracting authorities and contracting entities.
Contracting Authorities (Article L. 1211-1 of the CCP)
The CCP sets out three categories of contracting authorities as follows.
Contracting Entities (Article L. 1212-1 et seq of the CCP)
The CCP also applies to contracting entities, namely:
French public procurement law applies to public contracts and concessions.
Article L. 1111-1 of the CCP defines public contracts as contracts for pecuniary interest concluded between one or more contracting authorities or entities and one or more economic operators and having the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services as their objective.
Article L. 1121-1 of the CCP defines concessions as contracts for pecuniary interest by which one or more contracting authorities or entities entrust the execution of works or the provision and the management of services to one or more economic operators to whom a risk associated with the operation of the works or services is transferred. The reward consists either solely in the right to exploit the works or the services or in that right together with payment.
All contracts that meet the definition of a public contract or a concession fall within the scope of the CCP, regardless of their value.
However, contracting authorities or entities may award contracts without specific prior publication or competitive tendering or may apply a more or less flexible procedure depending on the value of the contract.
A distinction must be made depending on whether the contract is a public contract or a concession.
Thresholds for Public Contracts
A contracting authority or entity may award a contract without specific prior publication and competitive tendering if the value of the contract is below EUR60,000 for supplies and services and EUR100,000 for works. The same applies if the contract concerns innovative works, supplies or services and is worth less than EUR100,000 (see 2.5 Direct Contracts). For contracts with a value below the aforementioned thresholds, the contracting authority or entity remains subject to the general principles of public procurement (see 1.5 Key Obligations of Awarding Authorities).
The terms and conditions of the awarding procedure are freely determined by the contracting authority or entity (procédure adaptée) when the value of the contract is between EUR60,000 (supplies and services) or EUR100,000 (works) and the thresholds set by the European Directives on public procurement, which the CCP refers to. The latest thresholds, in force since 1 January 2026, are:
When the value of the contract exceeds the European thresholds, the contracting authority or entity must choose between an open or restricted procedure, a negotiated procedure or a competitive dialogue (procédure formalisée) (see 2.4 Choice/Conditions of a Tender Procedure).
Threshold for Concessions
Irrespective of the value of the concession, the contracting authority or entity is free to determine the conditions of the awarding procedure (Article L. 3121-1 of the CCP). However, minimum requirements must be met, though the importance of this varies according to whether the value of the concession is below or above the European threshold of EUR5,404,000 (Article R. 3126-1 of the CCP).
In principle, any economic operator from any jurisdiction may participate in French public procurement procedures.
The principle supporting the rule that all economic operators are free to bid for public contracts or concessions has constitutional value, as do the principles of equal treatment and transparency (Conseil constitutionnel, 26 June 2023, Loi habilitant le Gouvernement à simplifier le droit, No 2003-473 DC).
However, there are limits to this principle, as Article L. 2153-1 of the CCP allows contracting authorities or entities to reject tenders from economic operators who are not nationals of a member state of the EU or of a state which is a party to the Government Procurement Agreement of the World Trade Organisation or to any other similar international agreement which the EU is a party to.
In addition, according to Articles L. 2353-1 and L. 3124-6 of the CCP, defence and security contracts are awarded to economic operators based in the EU or the European Economic Area. On a case-by-case basis, the contracting authority or entity may authorise economic operators from a third country to participate in the awarding procedure.
Regulation (EU) 2022/576 prohibits the awarding of a contract or the performance of a contract with economic persons of Russian nationality or owned by a Russian person.
Under Article L. 3 of the CCP, contracting authorities and entities must comply with the following principles:
Awarding procedures are generally published in advance. Publication methods vary according to the type of contracting authority or entity, the type of contract and its value.
For public contracts awarded by the French State, national public bodies of a non-industrial and non-commercial nature, local authorities and local public bodies, publication is carried out in line with the procedures set out in Articles R. 2131-12 and R. 2131-16 of the CCP.
For public contracts awarded by other contracting authorities and entities, publication is carried out in line with the procedures set out in Articles R. 2131-13 and R. 2131-16 of the CCP.
For concessions below the European threshold, the contracting authority or entity must publish a concession notice in the BOAMP or in a newspaper authorised to publish legal announcements (Article R. 3126-4 of the CCP).
For concessions above the European threshold, the contracting authority must publish the concession notice in the OJEU, in the BOAMP or in a newspaper authorised to publish legal announcements, and in a periodical corresponding to the economic sector of the concession (Article R. 3122-2 of the CCP).
The contract or concession notice includes a description of the main terms of the contract or concession and the conditions for participation in the awarding procedure.
Before starting a procedure for the awarding of a public contract, the contracting authority or entity may carry out consultations or market studies and seek advice or inform economic operators of its project and requirements (Article R. 2111-1 of the CCP).
The results of these studies or exchanges with economic operators may be used by the contracting authority or entity, provided that their use does not have the effect of distorting competition or infringing the general principles of public procurement mentioned in Article L. 3 of the CCP.
The CCP specifies four main types of procedure for awarding a public contract whose value is above the European thresholds (procédure formalisée). They are as follows.
When the value of the public contract is below the European thresholds, the contracting authority or entity is free to choose the terms and conditions of the awarding procedure (procédure adaptée) (see 2.4 Choice/Conditions of a Tender Procedure).
In cases strictly limited by the CCP, contracting authorities or entities may also award public contracts or concessions directly to an economic operator without prior publication and competitive tendering (marchés et concessions passés sans publicité ni mise en concurrence) (see 2.5 Direct Contract Awards).
Public Contracts Between EUR60,000 (Supplies and Services) or EUR100,000 (Works) and the European Thresholds (Article R. 2123-4 et seq of the CCP)
The contracting authority or entity determines the terms and conditions of the awarding procedure according to the nature and characteristics of the need to be met, the number and location of the economic operators likely to submit a tender, and the circumstances of the procurement. Negotiation is possible. If the contracting authority or entity refers to a specific procedure laid down for public contracts whose value exceeds the European thresholds (procédure formalisée), it must comply fully with the rules of this procedure.
Public Contracts Above the European Thresholds (Article R. 2124-1 et seq of the CCP)
The contracting authority or entity must award the contract by means of an open or restricted procedure, a negotiated procedure or a competitive dialogue.
There are no conditions to be fulfilled in order to opt for an open or restricted procedure. The contracting authority is free to choose either procedure.
While a contracting entity may freely award contracts according to a negotiated procedure or a competitive dialogue, a contracting authority may only use these two procedures if:
Concessions That Cannot Be Awarded Directly to an Economic Operator
The contracting authority or entity is free to determine the terms and conditions of the awarding procedure and may resort to negotiation (Article L. 3121-1 of the CCP).
Direct awards of public contracts and concessions are only permissible under the conditions listed exhaustively in the CCP (Articles R. 2122-1 et seq and R. 3121-6 of the CCP). In particular, a contracting authority or entity may award a contract without prior publication and competitive tendering (marchés et concessions passés sans publicité ni mise en concurrence) in the following cases:
Certain categories of specific contracts may also be concluded without prior publication and competitive tendering. This is notably the case for public contracts and concessions awarded in situations of in-house control (quasi-régie) (Articles L. 2511-1 et seq and Articles L. 3211-1 et seq of the CCP).
An in-house contract refers to a public contract or concession concluded between a contracting authority – including where it acts as a contracting entity – and a legal person which, although having legal personality, constitutes the administrative extension of that authority.
Three cumulative conditions must be met in order to characterise an in-house relationship (Articles L. 2511-1 and L. 3211-1 of the CCP):
Similar conditions apply in the case of groups of entities (Articles L. 2511-3 and L. 3211-3 of the CCP). Thus, where a contracting authority is not individually in an in-house relationship with a legal person, it may nevertheless award a contract to that entity without prior publication and competitive tendering where, in particular, more than 80% of the activities of that entity are carried out in the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the contracting authorities controlling it or by other legal persons controlled by those same authorities. The Court of Justice of the European Union has recently clarified the method for assessing the condition relating to the 80% activity threshold of the controlled legal person in the context of a group of entities (see 5.4 Recent Important Court Decisions).
In all cases, contracts awarded without prior publication and competitive tendering must comply with the general principles of public procurement (see 1.5 Key Obligations of Awarding Authorities).
Public Contracts Above EUR60,000
According to Article R. 2132-2 of the CCP, tender documents must be made available on a dematerialised platform from the date of publication of the contract notice.
Concessions Above the European Threshold
According to Article R. 3122-9 of the CCP, tender documents must be made available on a dematerialised platform from the date of publication of the concession notice or the date of dispatch of an invitation to submit a tender.
As a general rule, the contracting authority or entity must set time limits for the receipt of expressions of interest and tenders, taking into account, in the case of public contracts, the complexity of the contract and the time required by economic operators to prepare their tenders (Article R. 2151-1 of the CCP) and, in the case of concessions, the nature, value and characteristics of the works or services (Articles R. 3123-14, R. 3124-2, R. 3126-8 and R. 3126-9 of the CCP).
Public Contracts Above the European Thresholds
The minimum time limits for receipt of expressions of interest and tenders depends on the procedure chosen by the contracting authority (Article R. 2161-12 et seq of the CCP).
Concessions Above the European Threshold
The minimum time limit for receipt of requests to participate is 30 days from the date of dispatch of the concession notice (25 days if requests to participate can be submitted electronically), and the minimum time limit for receipt of tenders is 22 days from the date of dispatch of the invitation to submit a tender (17 days if tenders can be submitted electronically) (Articles R. 3123-14 and R. 3124-2 of the CCP).
The CCP sets out the eligibility criteria to be met by economic operators to participate in the awarding procedure, as well as the grounds for exclusion from the awarding procedure.
Eligibility Criteria
The contracting authority or entity may not impose any conditions in the awarding procedure other than those designed to ensure that interested economic operators have the professional competence, economic and financial standing or technical and professional ability required to perform the contract (Articles L. 2142-1 and L. 3123-18 of the CCP). These conditions must be related and proportionate to the purpose of the contract or the conditions of its performance.
Grounds for Exclusion
The CCP distinguishes between mandatory grounds for exclusion and grounds for exclusion at the discretion of the contracting authority or entity.
Mandatory grounds for exclusion (Articles L. 2141-1 et seq and L. 3123-1 et seq of the CCP)
Economic operators who have been convicted of a criminal offence, who are in breach of their tax and social security obligations, who are the subject of insolvency proceedings or who have breached the rules on illegal employment must be excluded from the awarding procedure.
Discretionary grounds for exclusion (Articles L. 2141-7 et seq and L. 3123-7 et seq of the CCP)
The contracting authority or entity may, at its discretion, exclude economic operators from the awarding procedure, in particular where:
Right to “self-clean”
Where a mandatory or a discretionary ground for exclusion applies, an economic operator has the right to “self-clean” by providing the contracting authority or entity with evidence that it has taken measures to demonstrate its reliability. If the contracting authority or entity considers this evidence to be sufficient, the economic operator may not be excluded from the awarding procedure (Articles L. 2141-6-1, L. 2141-11, L. 3123-6-1 and L. 3123-11 of the CCP).
Public Contracts Awarding Procedures (Article R. 2142-15 et seq of the CCP)
In all procedures other than the open procedure, the contracting authority or entity may limit the number of candidates admitted to submit a tender or to participate in the competitive dialogue, provided that this number is sufficient to ensure effective competition. If the contracting authority intends to limit the number of candidates, it must indicate in the tender documents the objective and non-discriminatory criteria it intends to apply to this effect.
In awarding procedures conducted by contracting authorities, the minimum number of candidates may not be less than five in the case of a restricted procedure and three in the case of a negotiated procedure or competitive dialogue.
Concessions Awarding Procedures (Article R. 3123-11 et seq of the CCP)
The contracting authority or entity may limit the number of candidates admitted to submit a tender. In this case, it must specify a minimum number and, where appropriate, a maximum number of candidates in the tender documents. The number of candidates admitted to submit a tender must guarantee effective competition.
The contracting authority or entity must select economic operators by applying non-discriminatory criteria linked to the purpose of the contract and relating to their abilities.
Public Contracts Awarding Procedures
According to Article L. 2152-7 of the CCP, a public contract is awarded to the economic operator whose tender is the most economically advantageous on the basis of price or cost. The most economically advantageous tender may also be determined on the basis of a number of non-discriminatory criteria linked to the subject of the contract or its performance conditions. These may include environmental or social criteria.
For contracts above the European thresholds, the awarding criteria are weighted or, where weighting is not possible, are listed in descending order of importance (Article R. 2152-12 of the CCP).
Concessions Awarding Procedures
According to Article L. 3124-5 of the CCP, a concession contract is awarded to the economic operator whose tender represents the best overall economic advantage for the contracting authority or entity. The choice must be made on the basis of objective and precise criteria linked to the purpose of the contract or its performance conditions. These criteria may include environmental, social or innovation criteria.
The contracting authority or entity sets the awarding criteria in descending order of importance. The order of importance is indicated in the concession notice, in the invitation to submit a tender or in any other tender document (Article R. 3124-5 of the CCP).
When awarding public contracts and concessions, the contracting authority or entity must reject irregular or unsuitable tenders.
An irregular tender is one that does not meet the requirements set out in the tender documents, in particular because it is incomplete or does not comply with the applicable legislation (Articles L. 2152-2 and L. 3124-3 of the CCP).
An unsuitable tender is one that is clearly unable, without substantial modifications, to meet the needs and requirements of the contracting authority or entity (Articles L. 2152-4 and L. 3124-4 of the CCP).
In addition, for the awarding of public contracts only, the contracting authority or entity must reject unacceptable tenders, ie, tenders whose price exceeds the budget of the contracting authority or entity allocated to the contract (Article L. 2152-3 of the CCP), as well as abnormally low tenders (Article L. 2152-5 of the CCP).
An abnormally low tender is a tender whose price or cost is clearly underestimated and is likely to jeopardise the proper performance of the contract. When a tender appears to be abnormally low, the contracting authority or entity must require the economic operator to provide details and justification of the price or cost of its tender. If, after examining the justifications provided by the economic operator, the contracting authority or entity establishes that the tender is abnormally low, it must reject it.
The criteria for the selection of bidders and the evaluation of tenders must be communicated in advance, in line with the principles of transparency and equal treatment (Article L. 3 of the CCP).
Criteria for the Selection of Bidders
In the case of public contracts, the criteria for the selection of bidders are indicated in the contract notice or in the invitation to confirm interest or, in the absence of such a notice or invitation, in the consultation documents (Article R. 2142-1 of the CCP).
In the case of concessions, the criteria for the selection of bidders are specified in the concession notice or, in the absence of such a notice, in another tender document (Article R. 3123-5 of the CCP).
Criteria for the Evaluation of Tenders
In the case of public contracts, the criteria for the evaluation of tenders are specified in the tender documents (Article R. 2152-11 of the CCP).
In the case of concessions, the criteria for the evaluation of tenders and their description are indicated in the concession notice, in the invitation to tender or in any other tender document (Article R. 3124-4 of the CCP).
The contracting authority or entity must immediately inform unsuccessful candidates of its decision to reject their request to participate (Articles R. 2181-1 and R. 3125-1 of the CCP).
For public contracts whose value is between EUR60,000 (supplies and services) or EUR100,000 (works) and the European thresholds, and for concessions below the European threshold, unsuccessful candidates must submit a request to the contracting authority or entity to obtain the reasons for their rejection. The contracting authority or entity must respond within 15 days of receiving their request (Articles R. 2181-2 and R. 3126-12 of the CCP).
For public contracts and concessions above the European thresholds, the notification of rejection of the request to participate must include the reasons for the rejection (Articles R. 2181-3 and R. 3125-1 of the CCP).
Notifications are made according to the transmission methods specific to the awarding procedure. They are generally sent electronically.
For public contracts whose value is between EUR60,000 (supplies and services) or EUR100,000 (works) and the European thresholds, unsuccessful bidders must submit a request to the contracting authority or entity to obtain the reasons for their tender not being selected. The contracting authority or entity must respond within 15 days of receiving their request. If their tender was not rejected for being irregular, unsuitable or unacceptable, the contracting authority or entity must also inform them of the characteristics and advantages of the successful tender and the name of the successful bidder (Article R. 2181-2 of the CCP).
For concessions below the European threshold, unsuccessful bidders must submit a request to the contracting authority or entity to find out why their tender was not selected and the name of the successful bidder. The contracting authority must provide this information within 15 days of receiving their request (Article R. 3126-12 of the CCP).
For public contracts and concessions above the European thresholds, the contracting authority must inform the unsuccessful bidders, in addition to the reasons for the rejection of their tenders, of the name of the successful bidder and the reasons why their tender was selected, as well as the date on which the contract is expected to be concluded (Articles R. 2181-3 and R. 3125-1 of the CCP). Unsuccessful bidders whose tenders were not rejected because they were irregular, unacceptable (only in the case of public contracts) or unsuitable may also request the contracting authority send them the characteristics and advantages of the successful tender. The contracting authority must provide this information as soon as possible, and no later than 15 days after receiving their request (Articles R. 2181-4 and R. 3125-3 of the CCP).
Notifications are made according to the transmission methods specific to the awarding procedure. They are generally sent electronically.
There is no obligation to grant bidders a prior hearing before a decision is taken in an awarding procedure per se.
However, economic operators have the right to “self-clean” if they fall under one of the mandatory or discretionary grounds for exclusion (Articles L. 2141-6-1, L. 2141-11, L. 3123-6-1 and L. 3123-11 of the CCP) (see 2.8 Eligibility for Participation in a Procurement Process).
In the context of a restricted or open procedure, the contracting authority or entity may request bidders to clarify the content of their tender (Articles R. 2161-5 and R. 2161-11 of the CCP), provided that the contracting authority or entity and the bidder do not negotiate the tender. In the context of a competitive dialogue, the contracting authority or entity may request details, clarifications, improvements or additions to their final tender from bidders. These requests may not have the effect of modifying the essential aspects of the tender (Article R. 2161-29 of the CCP).
For public contracts and concessions above the European threshold, a minimum period of 11 days must elapse between the date of the notification described in 3.3 Obligation to Notify Bidders of a Contract Award Decision and the date on which the contract is concluded. The “standstill period” is extended to 16 days if the notification is not sent electronically.
Compliance with the “standstill period” is not required when the contract is awarded to the sole economic operator who took part in the awarding procedure (Articles R. 2182-1, R. 2182-2 and R. 3125-2 of the CCP).
There is no “standstill period” for public contracts and concessions below the European threshold.
A distinction must be made depending on whether the contract governed by the CCP is an administrative or a private law contract.
Administrative Contracts
Administrative courts have jurisdiction in disputes relating to administrative contracts.
In the case of summary proceedings (référé précontractuel, référé contractuel), the review body is the president (or a judge appointed within the court) of the locally competent administrative court of first instance (Articles L. 551-1 et seq and L. 551-13 et seq of the CJA). An appeal may then be filed with the highest French administrative court (Conseil d’Etat).
An action challenging the validity of an administrative contract or a claim for compensation for damage suffered as a result of a breach by the contracting authority or entity during the awarding procedure may be brought before the locally competent administrative court of first instance. A review may be filed with the locally competent administrative court of appeal. Ultimately, the Conseil d’Etat has jurisdiction to rule on the decisions of the administrative courts of appeal.
Private Law Contracts
Judicial courts have jurisdiction in disputes relating to private law contracts.
In the case of summary proceedings (référé précontractuel, référé contractuel), the review body is the president (or a judge appointed within the court) of the competent judicial court (Article R. 213-5-1 of the COJ). Thereafter, an appeal may be filed with the highest French judicial court (Cour de cassation).
A third party cannot challenge the validity of a public contract or a concession governed by private law before a judicial court.
However, a claim for compensation for damage suffered as a result of a breach by the contracting authority or entity during the awarding procedure may be brought before the competent judicial court of first instance. A review may be filed with the competent court of appeal. Ultimately, the Cour de cassation has jurisdiction to rule on the decisions of the courts of appeal.
Summary Proceedings
There are two types of summary proceedings. The proceedings that will be used depend on whether or not the contract has been concluded.
Summary appeals may be filed with the administrative courts, if the contract is an administrative contract, or with the judicial courts, if the contract is governed by private law.
Challenging the Validity of a Contract
If a public contract or a concession is an administrative contract, third parties to the contract may file an appeal challenging its validity (review procedure opened by French administrative case law concerning administrative contracts only: CE, Ass., 4 April 2014, Département de Tarn-et-Garonne, No 358994). The claimant may only rely on breaches which are directly related to the interest they claim has been harmed, or those of a certain seriousness.
They may, for example, invoke breaches committed by the contracting authority or entity during the awarding procedure. The judge has wide powers. They may order the parties to regularise the contract or, if regularisation is not possible, order its termination or annulment. In practice, termination or annulment of the contract is rare.
Claim for Compensation
A claim for compensation for damage suffered as a result of a breach by the contracting authority or entity during the awarding procedure may be brought before administrative courts if the contract is an administrative contract or before judicial courts if the contract is governed by private law. The claimant must demonstrate a fault committed by the contracting authority or entity, the damage suffered and a causal link between the fault and the damage. The amount of compensation depends on whether the claimant had a serious chance of being awarded the contract.
The following considerations apply to both administrative and private law contracts.
In the case of a summary appeal filed before the conclusion of a contract (référé précontractuel), an appeal to the court automatically suspends the awarding procedure. The contract may not be concluded from the time the appeal is filed until the judge has made their decision (Article L. 551-4 of the CJA; Article 4 of Ordinance No 2009-515).
In the case of a summary appeal filed after the conclusion of a contract (référé contractuel), an appeal to the court has no automatic suspensive effect. However, it is possible to apply for interim measures. The judge may even decide spontaneously to suspend the performance of the contract, for the duration of the proceedings, unless they consider, given all the interests likely to be affected and in particular the public interest, that the disadvantages of this measure could prevail over its advantages (Articles L. 551-17 and L. 551-21 of the CJA; Articles 15 and 19 of Ordinance No 2009-515).
Summary Proceedings
Anyone who has an interest in concluding the contract and who is likely to be harmed by a breach of free access to public procurement and equal treatment by the contracting authority or entity may file an appeal. In the case of a contract concluded by a local authority or a local public body, the locally competent prefect may also file appeals.
Challenging the Validity of a Contract
Anyone whose interests are likely to be harmed in a sufficiently direct and certain manner by the contract or its clauses has standing to challenge the validity of an administrative contract. When the contract is concluded by a local authority, the locally competent prefect and the members of the deliberative body of the local authority may also file an appeal.
Claim for Compensation
Unsuccessful candidates or candidates who have been deterred or prevented from submitting a tender as a result of a breach by the contracting authority or entity may claim for compensation.
The applicable time limit depends on the type of appeal filed by the claimant.
In the case of a summary appeal filed with the administrative or judicial courts before the conclusion of a contract (référé précontractuel), the judge of first instance must in principle rule within 20 days (Article R. 551-5 of the CJA; Article 1441-2 of the CCP).
In the case of a summary appeal filed with the administrative or judicial courts after the conclusion of a contract (référé contractuel), the judge of first instance must in principle rule within one month (Article R. 551-9 of the CJA; Article 1441-3 of the CCP).
In the case of an appeal challenging the validity of an administrative contract (Tarn-et-Garonne review) and a claim for compensation brought before the administrative courts, there is no specific time limit for the ruling. The timeframe depends on the usual processing times before the administrative courts, namely ten months before the administrative courts of first instance and the administrative courts of appeal, and six months before the Conseil d’Etat.
The total length of proceedings may therefore theoretically exceed two years. The same applies to claims for compensation brought before the judicial courts.
The most recent statistics available from the administrative courts relate to the year 2022. In that year, 5,342 cases relating to public procurement were brought before the administrative courts of first instance, 698 before the administrative courts of appeal and 228 before the Conseil d’Etat.
No statistics are available on public procurement disputes brought before the judicial courts in relation to private law contracts.
There are no fees for bringing an action before an administrative or judicial court per se.
However, certain fees may be incurred.
As a general rule, fees that are not related to the proceedings are borne by the losing party. However, both administrative and judicial judges may decide to charge them to another party, or to share them between the parties (Article R. 761-1 of the CJA; Article 696 of the CCP).
In addition, the party ordered to pay the fees related to the proceedings, or, failing that, the losing party, may also be ordered to pay the fees incurred by the opposing party which are not related to the proceedings (Article L. 761-1 of the CJA; Article 700 of the CCP).
Articles R. 2194-1 et seq and R. 3135-1 et seq of the CCP specify the cases in which public contracts and concessions may be modified during their term.
In essence, a public contract or a concession may be modified when:
These modifications may not, in any case, change the overall nature of the contract.
The CCP provides specific grounds for termination of the contract by the contracting authority or entity (Articles L. 2195-1 et seq and L. 3136-1 et seq of the CCP).
The contracting authority or entity may terminate the contract:
The contract may also provide for termination at the initiative of either party. In the case of administrative contracts, the contracting authorities or entities may refer to the general conditions of contract (Cahiers des clauses administratives générales), which contain standardised clauses for the termination of the contract at the initiative of the contracting authority, entity or contractor.
For contracts which are administrative contracts, the contracting authority or entity has special prerogatives, listed in Article L. 6 of the CCP.
In addition to these three prerogatives, the contracting authority or entity also has the power to impose penalties on contractors who fail to meet their obligations. These may take the form of financial or coercive penalties, up to and including termination of the contract. Penalties may only be imposed after formal notice has been given and must be proportionate.
In a decision dated 15 January 2026 (No C-692/23), the Court of Justice of the European Union, applying Directive 2014/24/EU, held that, in the context of an in-house relationship within a group of entities, the condition that more than 80% of the activities of the controlled legal person must be carried out in the performance of tasks entrusted to it by the controlling contracting authorities, where that condition is determined by reference to turnover and the controlled legal person is the parent company of a group, requires that the turnover of the other entities belonging to that group must also be taken into account, where appropriate on the basis of the consolidated turnover which that legal person is required to establish.
In a decision dated 9 January 2025 (No C-578/23), the Court of Justice of the European Union, applying Directive 2004/18/CE, ruled that, in order to justify recourse to the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, a contracting authority may not invoke the protection of exclusive rights where the grounds for such protection are attributable to it. The attributing of such reason is to be assessed on the basis not only of the factual and legal circumstances surrounding the conclusion of a contract for an initial service, but also of all those which characterise the period between the date of concluding that contract and the date on which the contracting authority chooses the procedure to be followed for the award of a subsequent public contract.
In a decision dated 23 December 2025 (No 507500), the Conseil d’Etat held that the sub-criterion “Social Measures”, provided for in the tender documents and included under the criterion “Corporate Social Responsibility”, cannot be regarded as being unrelated to the conditions for determining the most economically advantageous tender. That sub-criterion was notably intended to assess the various social initiatives implemented in the performance of the contract, in particular, the number of job seekers who are long-term unemployed or otherwise disadvantaged in the labour market and who are specifically recruited for the performance of the contract.
In a decision dated 2 October 2025 (No 501204), the Conseil d’Etat held that the electronic signature of a public contract by the successful bidder does not preclude the contracting authority from signing it by hand, unless otherwise provided in the tender documents.
In a decision dated 15 July 2025 (No 490592), the Conseil d’Etat held, in matters relating to concessions, that a contracting authority may, even in the absence of an express provision to that effect, and subject to judicial review, limit the number of lots for which the same economic operator may submit a tender. Such a limitation, which must be indicated in the tender documents, must be justified by the subject matter of the concession, the specific requirements of the delegated public service, or the procedure for awarding the contract, and must not be disproportionate.
In a decision dated 3 July 2025 (No 501774), the Conseil d’Etat confirmed that a contracting authority may not reject a tender as irregular solely on the ground that it does not contain certain information requested for the purpose of assessing the merits of the tender, where such information is not included in the list of documents and information required for the tender to be considered regular.
The European Union intends to undertake a major revision of its public procurement framework, focusing on the 2014 Directives. A recent evaluation highlighted several shortcomings, including legal complexity, insufficient competition in certain sectors, overreliance on the lowest-price criterion and uneven implementation across member states.
On 3 November 2025, the European Commission launched a 12-week public consultation, open until 26 January 2026, to gather stakeholders’ views and evidence in preparation for a legislative proposal.
The objective is to modernise and simplify the framework so as to better align it with the EU’s strategic priorities – strategic autonomy, sustainability, efficient public investment and support innovation – with a proposal for revised texts expected in the second quarter of 2026.
Moreover, the bill to simplify economic life, which is currently under discussion in the French National Assembly, includes a number of measures relating to public procurement.
With the aim of facilitating access to public contracts for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the bill provides for:
Successive changes of government in France in recent months have delayed the examination of the bill. It should nevertheless be voted on and promulgated before the end of 2026.
Furthermore, a bill aimed at placing public procurement at the service of economic sovereignty was tabled before the French Senate in December 2025. It is currently at an early stage of the parliamentary review process.
It notably provides for defining public procurement as a public policy contributing to economic sovereignty and sustainable development, with the prime minister being responsible for its implementation.
It also proposes the introduction of a “public procurement passport” in order to simplify the verification of documents required from candidates, allowing contracting authorities and entities direct access to their tax and social security information.
It additionally provides for reforming UGAP, the central public purchasing body, so as to turn it into a tool serving economic sovereignty, in particular, by revising its governance.
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While no sweeping reform of French public procurement law is expected in 2026, the topics that shaped the debate in 2025 continue to dominate: simplification, digitalisation, innovation and the growing place of artificial intelligence in procurement strategies. At the same time, sustainability requirements are moving from policy ambition to operational reality, with new obligations set to take effect in 2026.
Beyond these domestic trends, 2026 could be a pivotal year at EU level. With a potential overhaul of the 2014 procurement Directives under preparation and a legislative proposal seeking to introduce a “Made in EU” preference, public procurement is increasingly framed as a strategic lever to support European and French economic sovereignty and industrial resilience.
Public Procurement as a Tool for European and National Sovereignty
Emerging initiatives at the European level
Public procurement – accounting for approximately 14–18% of EU GDP – is increasingly being considered at the European level as an instrument capable of supporting industrial competitiveness and reinforcing the EU’s strategic autonomy.
In March 2026, the European Commission presented a proposal for a regulation aimed at accelerating industrial capacity within the EU, known as the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA). The proposal builds in part on recommendations contained in the report on European competitiveness prepared by Mario Draghi and published in September 2024.
Among its various provisions, the proposed regulation introduces a “Made in EU” preference in public procurement procedures in order to stimulate demand for European industrial products, including materials such as cement and aluminium.
However, the proposal adopts a relatively broad definition of what may be considered “Made in EU”. In particular, products originating from countries that have concluded a free trade agreement or customs union with the EU would also be considered eligible under this definition. The Commission justifies this approach as a means of promoting reciprocity in public procurement markets by granting equal treatment to countries that provide EU companies with access to their own procurement markets.
While the French government has welcomed the introduction of a European preference in public procurement – a policy objective long supported by France – it has indicated that the proposed framework should be strengthened. In particular, the French authorities consider that the current proposal does not sufficiently protect European industrial interests, since it treats products originating from certain third countries as equivalent to those produced within the EU. France has therefore advocated reinforcing the advantages granted to companies that actually manufacture within the EU.
The proposal will now be examined by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament as part of the ordinary legislative procedure.
More broadly, the EU is preparing a major revision of its public procurement framework, focusing on the Directives adopted in 2014. A recent evaluation identified several shortcomings in the current framework, including the legal complexity of the rules, insufficient competition in certain sectors, excessive reliance on the lowest-price criterion and uneven implementation across member states.
In order to prepare the ground for legislative reform, the Commission launched a 12-week public consultation on 3 November 2025, open until 26 January 2026, inviting stakeholders to submit their views and evidence on the functioning of the existing framework. The objective of this consultation was to identify possible avenues for modernising and simplifying public procurement rules so that they better align with the EU’s priorities, including strategic autonomy, sustainability, efficient public investment and support for innovation.
A legislative proposal revising the 2014 Directives is expected to be presented in the second quarter of 2026.
The debate in France
In France, the idea of using public procurement as a tool to strengthen national economic sovereignty has gained increasing prominence in recent policy discussions.
In July 2025, the French Senate published a report on the effectiveness of public procurement, which sets out several recommendations aimed at improving the strategic use of public procurement. Among these recommendations is a proposal to entrust the prime minister with responsibility for steering, co-ordinating and ensuring the effectiveness of the national public procurement policy.
The report also suggests allowing contracting authorities – in the same way as contracting entities – to reject tenders in supply contracts where a majority of the products originate from non-European countries that have not concluded an agreement with the EU on public procurement.
In addition, the Senate recommends introducing, within the context of the forthcoming revision of the 2014 Directives, a general principle of European preference in public procurement by public authorities.
Another recommendation concerns the reform of UGAP, the main French central purchasing body. According to the Senate report, stronger political oversight of UGAP would enable it to become a strategic instrument supporting industrial and digital sovereignty. The report therefore proposes transferring supervision of UGAP to the ministry responsible for industrial and digital sovereignty and reforming its governance structure.
Some of these proposals were subsequently incorporated into a bill introduced in the Senate in December 2025. It is currently at an early stage of the parliamentary review process. The bill notably proposes defining public procurement as a public policy contributing both to economic sovereignty and sustainable development, with the prime minister being responsible for its implementation. It also includes provisions aimed at reforming UGAP so that it can serve more effectively as a tool supporting economic sovereignty, notably through changes to its governance structure.
Simplification of Public Procurement
Facilitating access to public procurement for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
Efforts to simplify public procurement and facilitate access for SMEs continue to be a major policy objective for the French government.
Several measures adopted in recent years have already sought to address this issue. In particular, Decree No 2024-1251 of 30 December 2024 introduced various provisions designed to simplify access to public procurement procedures. Among these measures, the decree increased the minimum share of contract performance that must be subcontracted to SMEs from 10% to 20% in the context of partnership contracts (marchés de partenariat), global contracts (marchés globaux) and concessions.
The bill aimed at simplifying economic life – currently under examination by the French parliament and expected to be adopted before the end of 2026 – proposes to go further in this direction. It provides for the possibility – for contracts with an estimated value exceeding EUR100,000 (excluding VAT) – of requiring that a minimum share of contract performance, set at 20%, be subcontracted to local SMEs and craft enterprises where the successful bidder is not itself an SME or a craft enterprise.
Building on these initiatives, the Senate’s July 2025 report recommends setting an ambitious target for SME participation in public procurement. Noting that, in France, SMEs accounted for approximately 27.2% of the total value of public contracts awarded in 2023, the report proposes the introduction – in the context of the forthcoming revision of the 2014 Directives – of a European “Small Business Act” reserving at least 30% of the total value of public contracts awarded by contracting authorities for SMEs.
Another important measure concerns the thresholds below which public contracts may be awarded without prior publication or competitive tendering.
Decree No 2024-1217 of 28 December 2024 had already extended until 31 December 2025 the temporary exemption allowing public works contracts with an estimated value below EUR100,000 (excluding VAT) to be awarded directly.
Decree No 2025-1386 of 29 December 2025 further modified these thresholds. It makes the EUR100,000 threshold for public works contracts permanent from 1 January 2026 onwards. In addition, from 1 April 2026, the threshold for supply and service contracts has been increased from EUR40,000 to EUR60,000 (excluding VAT).
This measure had been particularly requested by SMEs as well as small local authorities, which often face significant needs for relatively low-value works but receive few tenders due to the limited capacity of SMEs to respond to formal procurement procedures and the reluctance of large companies to compete for such contracts.
Another decree adopted on the same date – Decree No 2025-1383 – also introduces measures aimed at facilitating access to public procurement for SMEs. In particular, it reduces the maximum financial capacity requirements that contracting authorities may impose when assessing candidates. The minimum turnover that may be required from candidates has been lowered from twice the estimated contract value to one and a half times that amount.
Simplifying procedures for candidates and contracting authorities
Digitalisation continues to play a central role in efforts to simplify public procurement procedures.
Electronic exchanges have progressively become the norm in procurement procedures. They are mandatory for contracts whose value exceeds EUR60,000 (excluding VAT), following the increase in the threshold introduced by Decree No 2025-1386.
The bill aimed at simplifying economic life also contains provisions relating to digital procurement procedures. While the initial version of the bill provided that most public entities – with the notable exception of local authorities and public local bodies – would be required to use the State’s e-procurement platform by 31 December 2028, the current version of the text postpones this obligation until 31 December 2030.
Beyond digitalisation of procedures, policymakers are exploring further ways of simplifying administrative requirements for companies wishing to participate in public procurement procedures.
The Senate’s July 2025 report proposes the creation of a “public procurement passport”, accessible through an online platform, certifying that a bidder complies with its legal and regulatory obligations, particularly in the areas of taxation and social security contributions. This proposal has been incorporated into the Senate bill introduced in December 2025.
In parallel, in 2026 the French government plans to launch an experimental digital system known as “Passe Marché”, designed to simplify application procedures for businesses while reducing the administrative workload for contracting authorities.
The system would allow companies – particularly SMEs – to submit tenders for public contracts using only their SIRET number, the unique identification number assigned to French businesses. Through the platform, companies would be able to automatically generate a complete application file, including identification data, certificates, attestations and information relating to their professional and financial capacities.
For contracting authorities, the system is expected to provide significant simplification gains. They will be able to define their requirements more easily, depending on the nature of the contract, and will benefit from a consolidated overview of each candidate’s data and supporting documents collected through the platform.
Strengthening governance of public procurement
Efforts to improve the governance and strategic steering of public procurement have also intensified.
In February 2026, the French government established the National Council for Public Procurement (Conseil national de la commande publique or CNCP), replacing the former Economic Observatory of Public Procurement (Observatoire économique de la commande publique or OECP).
The CNCP is intended to provide a more representative forum for dialogue between the various stakeholders involved in public procurement, including state and local public authorities, social security organisations, central purchasing bodies and economic operators.
The CNCP is organised into several thematic colleges, including a college dedicated to AI, a college focusing on central purchasing bodies, and a college representing local contracting authorities.
For 2026, the CNCP has identified three main priorities: improving the governance and monitoring of public procurement, simplifying procedures through digital tools, and strengthening the sovereignty of public procurement.
Digital Transformation, Innovation and AI
Innovation in public procurement
Public procurement plays a key role in supporting innovation. Representing approximately 14% of France’s GDP, public procurement can act as a powerful lever for stimulating technological development and enhancing the competitiveness of businesses, particularly SMEs and start-ups.
The French Public Procurement Code (code de la commande publique or CCP) already provides several mechanisms designed to facilitate the procurement of innovative solutions. In particular, contracting authorities may award contracts for innovative solutions without prior publication or competitive tendering when their value does not exceed EUR100,000 (excluding VAT).
Current policy discussions nevertheless suggest that this threshold may be increased in order to further encourage innovative procurement. The bill aimed at simplifying economic life proposes that the threshold should be raised to EUR140,000 (excluding VAT).
The bill also introduces the possibility of reserving up to 15% of the value of an innovative public contract – when the contract value is below EUR140,000 (excluding VAT) – for innovative start-ups.
In parallel, the Senate’s July 2025 report highlights the need to clarify and simplify the legal definition of innovation in public procurement law, particularly in the context of the forthcoming revision of the 2014 Directives. The definition and legal treatment of innovation are therefore likely to be central issues in future debates on the reform of the European public procurement framework.
Digital technologies and AI
Digital technologies are increasingly recognised as a key driver of the transformation of public administration, enabling improvements in the efficiency of public services while supporting innovative companies and contributing to national technological capabilities.
In this context, the prime minister issued a circular on 5 February 2026 setting out the State’s strategic orientations for the procurement of digital solutions. The circular describes several possible approaches for meeting the needs of central government authorities, including the acquisition of existing solutions available on the market, the development of software or services internally within the administration and the development of solutions through private providers or public-private partnerships.
Furthermore, the circular identifies several priority objectives that must be taken into account when purchasing digital solutions, including security, sovereignty considerations, cost control, adaptability, maintainability and interoperability. Through this initiative, the government is signalling its intention to address digital and technological challenges more systematically through public procurement policy.
The digital transformation of public procurement is also supported by the State Procurement Information System (Système d’information des achats de l’Etat or SIA), which aims to improve the performance and efficiency of public procurement processes for both public authorities and businesses.
As part of its roadmap for 2026–2027, the SIA has identified the integration of AI tools as one of its strategic priorities. The roadmap notably provides for the progressive implementation of AI-based tools tested during experiments conducted in 2025, including tools designed to assist contracting authorities in analysing tenders submitted in procurement procedures.
“Greening” of Public Procurement
Environmental considerations continue to gain importance in the legal framework governing public procurement.
A key milestone will occur in 2026 with the entry into force, on 22 August 2026, of the obligation introduced by the Climate and Resilience Law No 2021-1104 of 22 August 2021 and its implementing Decree No 2022-767 of 2 May 2022, requiring contracting authorities to include at least one environmental criterion when awarding public contracts.
This reform effectively puts an end to the possibility of awarding contracts solely on the basis of price. Where contracting authorities choose to rely on a single award criterion, only the criterion of overall cost – which necessarily integrates environmental considerations – may be used.
In addition, the reform strengthens the integration of sustainable development objectives at earlier stages of the procurement process. While the CCP already requires contracting authorities to take sustainable development objectives into account when defining their needs, the Climate and Resilience Law extends this obligation to the drafting of technical specifications. This obligation will also enter into force on 22 August 2026. In practice, contracting authorities will be required to integrate environmental considerations into the definition of their requirements, including through the technical specifications of the contract.
The development of socially and environmentally responsible public procurement promotion schemes (schémas de promotion des achats socialement et écologiquement responsables or Spaser) also continues to play an important role in promoting sustainable procurement policies.
Under Law No 2023-973 of 23 October 2023, contracting authorities whose annual procurement expenditure exceeds EUR50 million must adopt a Spaser setting out their strategic objectives for responsible procurement, supported by measurable indicators.
However, the Senate’s July 2025 report highlights a significant delay on the part of the State in adopting such a scheme, in contrast with local authorities. According to the report, 81 French départements have already adopted a Spaser.
The Senate therefore recommends that the State ensures as soon as possible that it complies with its legal obligations by adopting a Spaser applicable to all of its public operators.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms – particularly conciliation and mediation – continue to be promoted as efficient tools for resolving disputes arising in the context of public procurement contracts.
These mechanisms typically offer contracting authorities and economic operators relatively quick, inexpensive and flexible means of resolving disputes, usually within three months for mediation and six months for conciliation.
Despite these advantages, their use remains relatively limited. Stakeholders involved in public procurement continue to show a degree of reluctance to rely on such mechanisms, often due to unfamiliarity with the procedures or uncertainty regarding their effectiveness.
The government had considered expanding the competence of the consultative committees for amicable settlement of disputes (comités consultatifs de règlement amiable or CCRA) – currently competent in matters relating to public contracts – to cover conciliations concerning the performance of concession contracts as well.
However, this measure was ultimately not included in the simplification decrees adopted in December 2025.
The promotion of alternative dispute resolution therefore remains an ongoing objective for public authorities seeking to reduce litigation and facilitate the efficient performance of public contracts.
40 rue de Courcelles
75008 Paris
France
+33 144 824 300
+33 144 824 343
contact.paris@racine.eu www.racine.eu