As an EU member state, France implements the sanctions imposed by the Council of the EU into its legal system. The sanctions have continued to expand over the last 12 months due to the numerous new sanctions packages (the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th sanctions packages) imposed by the EU in the context of the war in Ukraine. Energy-related sanctions have been expanded, particularly targeting liquefied natural gas (LNG) along with a prohibition on recognising or enforcing judgments issued by Russian courts based on Article 248 of Russia’s Arbitration Procedure Code, the suspension of certain media outlets’ broadcasting activities within or directed at the EU and the listing of hundreds of new Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities under amended or newly introduced criteria.
In particular, recent listing criteria introduced under the Russian sanctions regime now allow for restrictive measures against:
Regarding ancillary proceedings to sanctions, reporting obligations have become stricter, as detailed in the following. In addition, challenges to listings have started to reach the stage of examination of appeals by the European Court of Justice (CJEU), which will likely produce important case law more precisely defining the framework of sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
The top trends in France concerning sanctions in the last 12 months were all due to the expansion and development of tools regarding EU sanctions, including:
In addition, on 8 October 2024, the EU adopted a new sanctions regime targeting Russian actors involved in destabilisation, with the first package of sanctions being approved on 16 December 2024. The aim of these sanctions is to counter Russia’s hybrid actions, which threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability and security in the EU, and the interests of its member states or third countries.
Sectors in France particularly affectedby EU sanctions pursuant to Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 include finance, banking, dual-use goods and diamond mining.
Sectors in which natural persons who are under sanctions are involved, or used to be involved, are also affected, as third-party actors refuse to work with all natural and legal persons even remotely linked to them, even if these links are only historic. In particular, this concerns sectors such as fertilisers, oil, coal and IT.
France implements both individual sanctions, targeting natural and legal persons, and sectoral sanctions, decided at the UN, EU and national levels.
Individual sanctions include travel bans and the freezing of assets, and sectoral sanctions include embargoes and other restrictions on the export and import of certain goods.
The scope of the sanctions applied by France as an EU member state can be considered quite broad (although less broad than the scope of US sanctions, for example, because the EU does not apply secondary sanctions), as EU sanctions must be complied with by:
First, autonomous sanctions imposed by the French authorities (which are not a mere application of EU or UN restrictive measures) do not have extraterritorial effects.
Second, regarding the scope of application of EU sanctions, they must be complied with by:
In addition, although in theory the EU has always stated its sanctions would not have any extraterritorial effects, this has been called into question since the 11th package of sanctions against Russia was issued in June 2023. This created the possibility of taking exceptional, last-resort measures restricting the sale, supply, transfer or export of certain goods, such as sensitive dual-use goods and technology or goods and technology that might contribute to the enhancement of Russia’s military, technological and industrial capacities, and whose export is already restricted to third countries whose jurisdiction is at a particularly high and continuing risk of being used for circumvention.
Furthermore, starting in June 2024, Regulation 833/2014 sets out a “best efforts” obligation under Article 8a providing that: “Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation”.
In France, sanctions are imposed at three different levels.
The primary regulators for sanctions activity in France are:
Within both ministries, sub-entities handle the different aspects of sanctions:
As such, they are the competent authorities for enforcing sanctions or granting derogations, and are the primary interlocutors for all sanctions-related issues in France.
In the EU, member states are responsible for enforcing the sanctions created by the Council of the EU.
In France, restrictive measures are enforced by the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise and French Customs.
Regarding criminal enforcement of sanctions, pursuant to Articles 453 and 454 of the Customs Code, the following authorities are empowered to document violations of sanctions law, as well as to conduct searches and seizures:
Reports by these authorities are then submitted to the Minister of the Economy and Finance, who may in turn refer the matter to the public prosecutor if deemed appropriate.
In France, criminal prosecutions are initiated by the public prosecutor. However, proceedings for breaches of sanctions under Article 459 of the Customs Code may only be initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint by the Minister of the Economy and Finance or an authorised representative, pursuant to Article 458 of the Customs Code.
Regarding civil enforcement of restrictive measures, there are no civil penalties or fines for a sanctions violation committed by entities subject only to the rules set out under Article 459 of the Customs Code. However, those under the supervision of the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution, ACPR), as defined in Article L. 612-1 et seq of the Monetary and Financial Code (such as banks, insurance companies, trustees and asset managers), may be subject to specific administrative sanctions or financial penalties. Administrative breaches of financial sanctions are therefore investigated by the ACPR, France’s financial regulatory authority.
At the French Level
At the criminal level, Article 459 of the French Customs Code criminalises having “contravened or attempted to contravene the laws and regulations governing financial relations with foreign countries, either by failing to comply with reporting or repatriation obligations, or by failing to observe prescribed procedures or formalities, or by failing to obtain the required authorisations or to meet the conditions attached to such authorisations”, and “contravening or attempting to contravene measures restricting economic and financial relations provided for by Community regulations adopted pursuant to Article 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or by international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
Under these provisions, the breaching of a sanction is a criminal offence, regardless of whether the sanction originates from the French national sanctions regime or is ratified by France – ie, originates from the EU or UN.
Article 459 also provides for the criminalisation of incitement, by means of writing, propaganda or advertising, to commit one of the offences referred to in the foregoing, whether or not the incited offence is actually carried out.
Potential penalties for breaching sanctions for natural persons include:
Incitement to breach sanctions is punished by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of between EUR450 and EUR225,000.
Legal persons risk:
Article 459 specifies that “where, for any reason whatsoever, the objects liable to confiscation have not been seized or are not represented by the offender, or where the Minister for the Budget or his representative so requests, the Court must, in lieu of confiscation, order payment of a sum equal to the value of these objects”.
At the civil and administrative level, pursuant to Article L. 561-36 et seq of the Monetary and Financial Code, any breach or circumvention by an entity subject to the supervision of the ACPR of financial sanctions set forth in Articles L. 562-1 and L. 562-3 of the same Code – or of any related obligations – may, in addition to applicable criminal penalties, give rise to administrative sanctions under Article L. 612-39 of the Monetary and Financial Code. These sanctions include:
Furthermore, under Article L. 561-36-1 IV of the Monetary and Financial Code, the ACPR may impose civil financial penalties of up to EUR100 million or 10% of the entity’s annual turnover, whichever amount is greater.
At the EU Level
In April 2024, the EU adopted Directive (EU) 2024/1226, which created the European criminal offence of violation of sanctions. In particular, Article 3 of the Directive provides for the following punishable behaviours:
Concerning penalties faced by natural persons, Article 5 of the Directive leaves some leeway to EU member states but provides several indications concerning minimum fines and terms of imprisonment (from one year to five years or a maximum terms of three years, depending on the offence committed).
It also provides for accessory criminal or non-criminal penalties or measures, which may include:
Concerning legal persons, Article 7 of the Directive provides for the following potential penalties:
The Directive provides for minimum fines, varying depending on the offence committed. The Directive was implemented in France through Decree No 2015-470 of 28 May 2025, which gave competence to the Advisory Board on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing to ensure co-ordination and co-operation between law enforcement agencies and the authorities responsible for implementing EU restrictive measures (Article D561-51 of the Monetary and Financial Code). As explained in the foregoing, given that criminal penalties for sanctions violations were already in effect under French law, the transposition of the Directive did not bring any substantial changes.
As explained in the foregoing, the ACPR exercises civil enforcement over entities under its supervision, such as banks, insurers and asset managers, especially regarding asset-freeze obligations under UN and EU restrictive measures.
On 27 June 2024, the ACPR Sanctions Committee fined a major French bank EUR2.5 million for deficiencies in transaction monitoring, insufficient enhanced due diligence and failure to report suspicious transactions, in violation of sanctions law.
Examples of key criminal enforcement actions in respect of sanctions breaches in France in the last few years include:
More generally, since 2022, several criminal investigations have been launched in France against Russian oligarchs for circumventing EU sanctions, primarily involving money laundering, tax fraud and asset concealment. In March 2024, proceedings targeted Ruslan Goryukhin and Mikhail Opengeym, accused of hiding over EUR70 million in real estate through offshore structures. In 2022, Igor Sechin became the subject of an investigation after his yacht was seized in La Ciotat for attempting to evade asset freezing measures. In 2023, Alexey Kuzmichev was indicted in Paris for aggravated tax fraud and sanctions violations. Assets linked to Artur Ocheretny and Iekaterina Solotsinskaya were also seized in the Basque Country and Paris in similar cases. Since 2023, the French National Financial Prosecutor’s Office and the anti-organised crime unit (Junalco) have intensified their investigative activities targeting individuals and entities under EU sanctions.
Article 132-78 of the French Criminal Code provides for two mitigating circumstances that are applicable only to certain offences, when provided by law, namely:
At the EU level, Article 9 of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 provides for two different mitigating circumstances, and requires that member states implement at least one in their legal system:
French law is reluctant to take mitigating circumstances into account in general, and already provides for the first mitigating circumstance required by the Directive. The second one, which is a lot broader, was not integrated into French law when the Directive was implemented.
Violations of sanctions, as provided by Article 459 of the French Customs Code cited in the foregoing, are referred to in French law as formal offences, which, as opposed to material offences, are constituted by the mere characterisation of the behaviour, without the prosecution having to prove the underlying intent to actually violate sanctions. The French sanctions regimes therefore operate on the basis of strict liability.
Strict liability does not apply to all offences under French law, but it does apply to sanctions-related offences, which are treated as formal offences. In other areas of law, criminal liability generally requires mens rea (intent or negligence), unless otherwise specified.
France applies the derogations provided by the Council of the EU’s Decisions and Regulations in its different sanctions regimes.
Currently, most of the sanctions-related matters concern Russia. In this regard, Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine provide for several derogations to its sanctions, including:
Such derogations must be requested by the persons seeking them from the national competent authorities – ie, the French Treasury, the Directorate General for Enterprise or the French Customs, depending on the derogation sought.
By adopting Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2474 of 16 December 2022, amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine, the Council of the EU adopted a general prohibition of the provision of legal services to the government of Russia or legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia, as enshrined in Article 5(n)(2) of Regulation 833/2014.
However, at the time, it already provided for some derogations, and others were added by Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine. The most common ones can be found in paragraphs 5, 6, 9(a) and 9(b) of Regulation 833/2014, as follows:
In December 2022, the Paris Bar (Ordre des avocats à la Cour de Paris), supported by the Geneva Bar, filed an action for annulment contesting the ban on providing non‑litigious legal advice to the Russian state and entities in Russia (case T-798/22). By a judgment dated 2 October 2024, the court ruled the challenges were unfounded and dismissed the annulment request. Notably, it held that (i) Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU protect access to legal advice only in the context of judicial administrative or arbitral proceedings; (ii) non-litigation is outside this scope; and (iii) the ban includes sufficiently broad exceptions. The applicants appealed this decision before the CJEU (case C-866/24).
The Council of the EU imposes reporting obligations in its sanctions regimes, whereby such reports are to be made to the national competent authorities. The Council also provides the possibility to address such information directly to the Commission of the EU. In the context of Russia, it has created reporting obligations in both its individual and sectoral sanctions regimes.
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014, concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, provides for reporting obligations in its Articles 8 and 9 that weigh on both persons sanctioned and central securities depositories (CSDs).
As such, natural and legal persons, entities and bodies sanctioned, and CSDs must:
Such information must at least identify:
In its frequently asked questions (FAQs), the Commission explicitly states the objective of such reporting obligations, which is to help ensure that those assets are traced effectively in order to avoid circumvention of sanctions via evasion schemes. The Commission also recalls that non-compliance with such obligations would be treated as a breach of EU sanctions law, with criminal penalties provided by EU member states being applicable.
Regarding sectoral sanctions, Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine also provides for some reporting obligations, as follows.
In the past three years, the most significant legal and judicial developments in France arose from the EU restrictive measures imposed on Russia since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
In a decision dated 23 May 2025, the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal rejected an appeal challenging a judgment of the Paris Administrative Court, which had upheld a decision by the French Treasury denying a request to unfreeze assets.
The 17th package of sanctions was adopted on 20 May 2025, strengthening enforcement and anti-circumvention measures, and additional sanctions packages are expected to be released in the upcoming months – as they have been regularly for the past three years.
Notably, on 12 June 2025, the European Commission proposed its 18th package of “hard-biting sanctions”, according to Commission President von der Leyen, targeting Moscow’s energy and banking sectors as well as its military industry.
In addition to new listings, this sanctions package includes banning transactions with Russia's Nord Stream gas pipelines, as well as banks that engage in sanctions circumvention. It also restricts the export of dual-use goods and technologies that are used for producing drones, missiles, and other weapon systems.
On the judicial side, challenges of listings have started to reach the stage of examination of appeals by the CJEU, which will likely produce important case law more precisely defining the framework of sanctions against Russia and Belarus.
The delisting process varies depending on the source of the sanction:
Concerning French sanctions, the procedures of recours gracieux and recours pour excès de pouvoir aim solely at removal from the list and do not authorise the judge to grant damages to the applicant. However, pursuant to Article L761-1 of the French Administrative Justice Code, the person concerned can ask the court to condemn the administration to pay them sums in addition to the costs of the proceedings, which resembles damages.
At the EU level, if the delisting is obtained before the Council of the EU, the name of the person is taken off the list. Even if the court annuls an individual’s listing, it will remain in place until the Council takes it off.
Once taken off the sanctions list, the person can ask the court for damages under Article 340(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides for the right of individuals or legal persons to obtain compensation for damages occurring by the non-contractual liability of EU institutions.
At the time of writing, only one entity has obtained damages in the context of sanctions before the CJEU: in 2014, the Iranian company Safa Nicu Sepahan obtained EUR50,000 for non-material damage to its reputation (judgment of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan Co. v Council, T-384/11, EU:T:2014:986).
At the French level, a person wishing to obtain their delisting must first request the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs to reconsider its decision to sanction them (recours gracieux). The person concerned has two months after having been notified of the sanction to exercise their right. The administration then has two months to reply.
If the request is not granted, the person can make a recours pour excès de pouvoir against the administration’s refusal or silence. They then have two months (if they are located in France), three months (if they are in one of the French territories overseas) or four months (if they are abroad, after the refusal of the administration to satisfy their request) to challenge such refusal.
At the EU level, to oppose their listing before the court, a sanctioned person has two months from the publication or personal notification of the decision to include their name on the lists. Concerning the administrative procedure before the Council, there is no time limit to request reconsideration of its decision to target the person with restrictive measures.
Regarding time limits, there are none under the administrative procedure of the Council, which relists individuals periodically – every six months under its Russian sanctions regime and every year under the one for Belarus. In proceedings before the court, there is no time limit for a ruling to be issued on the action for annulment, and as of the time of writing, delistings before both the court and the Council have taken around two years.
Economic sanctions against Russia include a ban on providing to – and buying from – Russia or Russian persons several services, including crypto-asset wallets, engineering, IT consultancy and legal advisory, brokering and trade secrets, as provided by Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures, in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine.
Under Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising the situation in Ukraine, several goods are prohibited from being imported from or exported to Russia, such as oil and coal, liquefied propane, dual-use goods and technology for military use, navigational instruments, drone engines, chemicals, cement and asphalt, helium, diamonds and gold.
Under French law, pursuant to Article 1218 of the French Civil Code, three conditions have to be met for force majeure to be characterised as such and justify the suspension of execution of someone’s contractual obligation:
In 2020, the French Supreme Court, the Cour de cassation, ruled that the freezing of a person’s assets under sanctions did not constitute a case of force majeure, as it did not meet the second condition (Cass., ass. plén., 10 juill. 2020, P+B+R+I, No 18-18.542 et 18-21.814).
The opposite approach would have offered sanctioned persons the possibility of relying on the restrictive measures to justify non-compliance with their obligations as debtors, which would have undermined the sanctions’ legitimacy.
For French economic actors to avoid all detrimental effects of sanctions decided by France, the EU, the UN or even other countries (such as the USA, whose sanctions are not supposed to bind French persons but tend to be complied with in practice), it is recommended that a clause foreseeing the imposition of a sanction on them or their co-contractor – and providing for a solution should such a scenario occur – be included
When sanctions issues arise in cases of enforcement of French or foreign judgments in France, the French courts have adopted a classical approach – ie, examining whether the judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision concerned, whether the decision complies with French public order and whether the decision contravenes French law. If any of these conditions are not met, exequatur of the decision will not be given.
As UN, EU and national sanctions prohibit certain behaviours in France, such as the use of frozen assets, a judicial decision that would provide for the transfer of money from a frozen bank account would not be recognised and executed.
A person who wishes to have a decision enforced in France could appeal the initial refusal – albeit with a low chance of success, as the same law would remain applicable. The only recourse would be to ask the Treasury for a derogation or wait for the sanctions to be lifted.
At the French level, the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs decides the names to include on France’s sanctions lists. At the EU level, the Council of the EU, on the basis of proposals that arise from and go through three working committees – the Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST), the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX) and the Committee of Permanent Representatives – Part II (COREPER II) – decides which natural and legal persons to sanction. In both regimes, therefore, the process is entirely political.
Under Article 2(1) of Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, “all funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by” sanctioned natural and legal persons shall be frozen.
In its FAQs, the Commission of the EU explicitly states that for companies owned or controlled by listed persons, “it can be presumed that the control also extends to the assets of that entity, and that any funds or economic resources made available to that entity would reach or benefit the listed person”, and that, therefore, Article 2 would apply to them, which clearly amounts to an indirect designation of persons as a result of them being owned or controlled by another directly designated person – as although the Commission’s FAQs are not binding, they are strictly applied by all EU actors.
At the same time, the Commission recalls that this presumption can be rebutted, “if it can be demonstrated that some or all of its assets are outside the control of the listed person, and/or that funds or economic resources made available to it would in fact not reach or benefit the listed person”.
Concepts of ownership and control have created many disputes before the court since their creation. To guide legal practitioners, the Commission has published two opinions on Article 2, on 19 June 2020 and 8 June 2021. Some guidance can also be found in the EU best practices, where ownership is defined as “the possession of 50% or more of the proprietary rights of an entity or having majority interest in it”. Where there is no ownership, control is determined based on a non-exhaustive set of criteria.
The French Treasury Department (Direction Générale du Trésor, or DGT) has published a compliance guide in which it defines the notion of ownership as follows:
“Ownership is established by a title of ownership or a debt instrument; in the absence of such a title and in the case of movable property, ownership is presumed if the asset is in the possession of the person subject to a freezing measure”. From this definition, the following can be inferred:
Regarding the notion of control, the guide reads as follows:
“Control is a legal concept or one that can be inferred from the facts:
Further clarification is provided based on the French Commercial Code, offering guidance on the notions of control and ownership.
Another guiding instrument is the Joint Guidelines of the Directorate General of the Treasury and the ACPR on the Implementation of Asset Freezing Measures. In addition, French authorities refer to the EU best practices.
Article 459 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of having “contravened or attempted to contravene the laws and regulations governing financial relations with foreign countries, either by failing to comply with reporting or repatriation obligations, or by failing to observe prescribed procedures or formalities, or by failing to obtain the required authorisations or to meet the conditions attached to such authorisations”, and “contravening or attempting to contravene measures restricting economic and financial relations provided for by Community regulations adopted pursuant to Article 75 or 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or by international treaties and agreements duly approved and ratified by France”.
The Code therefore encompasses circumvention of French, EU and UN sanctions, which are the only sanctions implemented in France.
At the EU level, and since April 2024, the circumvention of EU sanctions is also a criminal offence pursuant to Article 3(h) of Directive 2024/1226, which details the behaviours targeted:
“(i) using, transferring to a third party, or otherwise disposing of, funds or economic resources directly or indirectly owned, held or controlled by a designated person, entity or body, which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure, in order to conceal those funds or economic resources;
(ii) providing false or misleading information to conceal the fact that a designated person, entity or body is the ultimate owner or beneficiary of funds or economic resources which are to be frozen pursuant to a Union restrictive measure;
(iii) failure by a designated natural person, or by a representative of a designated entity or body, to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to report to the competent administrative authorities funds or economic resources within the jurisdiction of a Member State, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by them;
(iv) failing to comply with an obligation that constitutes a Union restrictive measure to provide the competent administrative authorities with information on frozen funds or economic resources or information held about funds or economic resources within the territory of the Member States, belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons, entities or bodies and which have not been frozen, where such information was obtained in the performance of a professional duty”.
As cited in 7.3.1 Prohibiting Provisions, Article 459 of the French Customs Code provides for the criminalisation of circumvention of sanctions. This offence is punishable by five years’ imprisonment, confiscations and a fine. Until 12 June 2024, there was an additional penalty prohibiting those convicted for this offence to act as stockbrokers, or to be voters or elected members of chambers of commerce, commercial courts or industrial tribunals. However, this provision was declared unconstitutional and effectively taken out of Article 459 of the Customs Code by Constitutional Council decision No 2024-1096 QPC of 12 June 2024. The judge ruled that this provision established an additional penalty of disqualification that would apply automatically and without the criminal court being able to adjust its duration, in violation of the principle of individualisation of penalties. It was effectively taken out of Article 459.
On 24 April 2024, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU adopted Directive 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions for violations of EU restrictive measures, amending Directive (EU) 2018/1673. Article 3 of this text establishes minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions for violations of EU restrictive measures. This includes measures concerning the freezing of funds and economic resources, prohibitions on making funds and economic resources available, and prohibitions on entry into or transit through the territory of a member state, as well as sectoral economic and financial measures and arms embargoes.
As explained in the foregoing, the Directive was implemented in France through Decree No 2015-470 of 28 May 2025.
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info@wjavocats.com www.wjavocats.com/en/As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the EU has continued to expand its sanctions policy, which has increased in complexity and scope. What began as a relatively narrowly focused legal tool has transformed into a broad, strategic instrument designed to influence global behaviour. This transformation raises critical questions about the effectiveness, proportionality and long-term implications of EU sanctions, particularly in light of their increasingly extraterritorial application and the controversial inclusion of third-country actors and family members of sanctioned individuals.
Sanctions have long served as a core component of the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Yet, recent developments reveal a significant doctrinal shift – one that moves beyond traditional state-to-state measures and ventures into the realms of family relations and international trade. This article explores two notable trends in the EU’s recent sanctions practice:
Expanding the Scope: An Increase in the Listing of Non-Russian Individuals and Entities
The shift towards extraterritoriality: Regulation 269/2014
Traditionally, the EU has maintained a cautious stance on the concept of secondary sanctions, often criticising the USA for imposing measures on third-country entities engaged in lawful business. However, recent sanctions packages adopted under Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 suggest a departure from this posture. Between the 10th and 17th sanctions rounds (2023–2025), the EU systematically broadened its reach to target individuals and companies based in jurisdictions such as China, North Korea, Iran, Turkey, the UAE and Central Asia.
The rationale underlying these listings is the alleged provision of goods or services that “materially support” the Russian war effort or undermine the effectiveness of existing EU sanctions. For instance, through Regulation 2024/753 of the 13th package, the Council of the EU included Chinese technology firms and logistics operators deemed to have supplied Russia with dual-use goods. Similarly, with its 15th package in December 2024, the EU invoked Article 3(1)(h) of Regulation 269/2014 to list non-Russian nationals and companies because of their role in facilitating sanctions evasion or materially supporting destabilising activities in Ukraine.
This trajectory persisted with the adoption of the 16th sanctions package on 24 February 2025, which expanded the EU’s sanctions list to include additional non-Russian individuals and entities. Through these designations, the EU targets not the primary subjects of its restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, but rather those who are alleged to materially support the direct targets and thereby undermine the overarching objectives of the EU’s sanctions policy against Russia.
Thus, a clear doctrinal evolution is emerging: in contrast to its prior focus on essentially directly involved Russian targets, the EU is now actively sanctioning foreign actors whose conduct, although external to the initial scope of the sanctions regime, is considered instrumental in undermining it. While the EU has not explicitly adopted a framework of secondary sanctions, its actions increasingly resemble such a model. Entities located far outside EU jurisdiction are now sanctioned based on their alleged interactions with sanctioned Russian actors, even absent a direct EU nexus. This evolution challenges foundational principles of sovereignty, legal predictability and proportionality.
Sectoral sanctions and non-EU actors: Regulation 833/2014
Complementing the asset freeze regime under Regulation 269/2014 is Regulation 833/2014, which addresses sectoral measures. Recent amendments – particularly through the 14th and 16th sanctions packages – further reflect the EU’s intent to project its regulatory power beyond its borders.
Article 5a, introduced in the 14th package and amended in the 16th, enables the listing of financial institutions and crypto-asset service providers that support Russia’s defence-industrial complex, participate in circumvention or facilitate prohibited transactions. Notably, the article applies regardless of whether the entity is based in the EU or is even simply connected to it.
Additionally, Article 3s targets vessels flagged by or operated from third countries. These vessels, allegedly involved in transporting military-relevant goods, face service bans including access to EU ports and maritime services. The 15th and 16th sanctions packages designated 52 and 74 vessels, respectively.
The 16th package also introduced Article 3d(1b), prohibiting access to EU airspace and airports for non-Russian airlines providing domestic services within Russia or supplying banned aviation equipment. Alongside these measures, Article 5ac imposed transaction bans on three foreign banks using Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) – a domestic alternative to Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT).
These provisions underscore the EU’s evolving enforcement philosophy, which places increasing weight on the perceived role of third-country actors in enabling circumvention. However, the legal and diplomatic implications of sanctioning entities outside the EU with no direct connection to Russia or the EU remain contentious.
The Expanding Personal Nexus: Targeting Relatives and Associates
The rise of associative listings
In parallel with its geographic expansion, the EU has embraced a more flexible and arguably controversial interpretation of personal connection as a basis for sanctions. Traditionally, sanctions were directed at individuals based on their actions or direct involvement in prohibited activities. Recent EU measures, however, increasingly focus on family members or associates of designated persons, premised on a broad understanding of “benefit”.
On 5 June 2023, through Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 and Regulation (EU) 2023/1089, the Council amended Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 to allow the listing of individuals who are immediate family members of leading Russian business persons and are deemed to benefit from them (hereafter “amended criterion (g)”).
The rationale for the creation of said criterion is clear: “the Council has also assessed that leading Russian businesspersons have engaged in a systematic practice of distributing their funds and assets amongst their immediate family members and other persons, often in order to hide their assets, to circumvent the restrictive measures and to maintain control over the resources available to them. Therefore, the Council considers that immediate family members or other natural persons, who benefit in such a way from leading businesspersons operating in Russia, should also be designated as appropriate, in order to both increase pressure on the Government of the Russian Federation to bring an end to its war of aggression against Ukraine as well as to avoid the risk of circumvention of the restrictive measures” (Recital 5 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1094 of 5 June 2023).
As such, the Council expressed its belief that all leading businesspersons in Russia attempt to circumvent EU sanctions by distributing their assets to their immediate family members. This is problematic on several levels, as the Council keeps, in a highly far-fetched manner, sanctioning individuals for being leading businesspersons in Russia who in reality and objectively do not qualify as such, many of them not even having set a foot in Russia for decades, and now targeting these people’s family members.
Judicial scrutiny and emerging case law
Such a presumption had already been addressed by the Court of Justice in another sanctions regime, created in reaction to the situation in Myanmar. In a judgment of 13 March 2012, Tay Za v Council, the appellate judges expressed their doubt as to the possibility of “establish[ing] a link, even an indirect link, between the absence of progress towards democratisation and the continuing violation of human rights in Myanmar, which, as is apparent from recital 1 in the preamble to the contested regulation, is one of the reasons which led to the adoption of the regulation, and the conduct of the family members of those in charge of businesses, which, in itself, has not been criticised” (paragraph 67).
They recalled that “the application of such measures to natural persons on the sole ground of their family connection with persons associated with the leaders of the third country concerned, irrespective of the personal conduct of such natural persons, is at variance with the Court’s case law on Articles 60 EC and 301 EC” (paragraph 66), and “by finding at paragraph 168 of Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission that the restrictive measures adopted against a third country could not be directed at persons associated with that country ‘in some other way’, the Court intended to restrict the categories of natural persons at whom targeted restrictive measures may be directed to those whose connection with the third country concerned is quite obvious, namely the leaders of third countries and the individuals associated with them” (paragraph 68).
Despite this precedent, the General Court confirmed the legality of the amended criterion (g) in September 2024 in the case of Mordashova v Council (T-497/22, paragraphs 105 to 117). It clarified that the notion of benefit “covers any benefit of any kind whatsoever, which is not necessarily undue, but which must be quantitatively or qualitatively not negligible”, including “a financial or non-financial benefit, such as a gift, a transfer of funds or economic resources, an intervention with a view to facilitating the award of public contracts, an appointment or a promotion.”
The Court clarified that “although a situation likely to lead to circumvention may justify the existence of a benefit”, proof of such a situation does not need to be provided by the Council for the purpose of adding a person’s name to the list under the new criterion (g). It then unconvincingly concluded that the amended criterion (g) does not constitute an irrebuttable presumption as it is not based “solely on family ties between a close family member and an influential businessman or woman, but requires demonstration of the advantage derived, which must be quantitatively or qualitatively significant”.
Similarly, the case of Mrs Elena Timchenko, who was sanctioned in April 2022 by the Council on the criterion of “association” for being the wife of Gennady Timchenko, is worth analysing. By a judgment of 6 September 2023 (T-361/22), the General Court held that the concept of association covers persons who are “linked by common interests, without, however, requiring a connection by means of a common economic activity”. As regards family members, the Court stated that “the link must go beyond the family relationship” and “must be characterized by the objective existence of interrelated common interests”. It essentially held that Mrs Timchenko was associated with her husband because they were both members of the board of directors of the Timchenko Foundation.
In her appeal, Mrs Timchenko contested this was an overly broad interpretation of the concept of association, arguing that it allows the listing of any natural persons solely because of the existence of a family relationship between them, in violation of the case law of the Court of Justice mentioned above.
While the Court of Justice has not yet rendered its judgment in this case, Advocate General Medina delivered an opinion on 10 April 2025, which failed to bring any clarification to the notion of association in the context of family members. As a matter of illustration, she explained that “the words ‘natural persons associated with them’ are not clarified any further, [which in line with the literal interpretation suggests] that those terms should be interpreted in a way that it is not subject to any specific constraints and, in particular, without any need, as the General Court rightly pointed out, for the link between the persons concerned to be construed as being of an economic nature of being part of a specific legal structure” (paragraph 46). This is a clear admission of the Advocate General’s acceptance of the overly broad nature of the concept of association.
In contrast, a few paragraphs later, she states that “the General Court’s interpretation sets out sufficiently specific criteria for recognizing the cases in which the concept of ‘association’ may be applied”, merely repeating once again that “it is necessary for [family members] to share common interests going beyond their mere family relationship and for those interests to be objectively interrelated” (paragraph 55).
Hence, this opinion unfortunately brings no useful clarification of the concept of “association” in the context of family members, nor of the elements constituting a “common interest” or the definition of “objectively interrelated”. Legal practitioners are left to rely on the slim hope that the Court of Justice will fill in the existing gaps and address these unresolved issues.
This evolution raises broader questions about the legitimacy and moral underpinnings of the EU’s sanctions regime. Targeting individuals for their proximity – rather than their conduct – strains the principles of individual responsibility and due process.
As the EU aims to show determination in countering circumvention, it must remain mindful of the broader reputational and legal consequences of overreach. Sanctions regimes that appear to operate on assumptions or generalised suspicion risk undermining both their legitimacy and effectiveness.
Conclusion: Sanctions as Strategy – and as Liability
The EU’s evolving sanctions framework reflects a shift in philosophy: from reactive and contained to preventive, expansive and strategic. The increasing inclusion of third-country actors – many of whom lack a direct link to Russia or the EU – raises important jurisdictional and diplomatic questions. Meanwhile, the expansion of personal nexus criteria, particularly as applied to family members, strains the boundaries of legal proportionality and invites criticism of guilt by association.
As the EU moves forward, it must strike a delicate balance between enforcement and legality, and between pressure and principle. Without such balance, the credibility of the sanctions regime – and the values it purports to defend – may be put at risk.
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