In terms of the sanctions sector, the Austrian sanctions market is largely determined by the EU sanctions legislation. The introduction of certain anti-circumvention tools, like the “best-efforts obligation” or the “No-Russia Clause” certainly increased the demand for sanctions work for multinational corporations who deal with international supply chains. The demand for tailored compliance programs is rising as enforcement actions for sanctions violations will increase in the future.
Austrian corporations dedicate more resources to compliance efforts and extend these efforts to subsidiaries as well. This is because subsidiaries of EU companies in third countries must essentially comply with EU sanctions. Moreover, the divergence between US, UK and EU sanctions requires increased attention especially in light of a potential secondary sanctions listing in the US.
Austria is an export-heavy country with a certain dependence on the import of many raw materials. Thus, sanctions affect all kinds of industries, from food and retail throughout heavy machinery. Austria’s oil & gas industry is affected as well as the banking and financial services industry.
As an EU member state, Austria is automatically bound by the EU sanctions regulations. This involves, among others, the sanctions against Russia, Belarus, Iran, Syria and Venezuela but also sanctions against individuals who are allegedly connected to supporting sanctioned regimes. These sanctions include financial sanctions in the form of asset freezing measures and travel restrictions on the one hand, and economic sanctions aimed at specific industrial sectors of a country/sanctioned nation on the other hand.
Austrian nationals must comply with EU sanctions worldwide. Anyone on Austrian territory must adhere to EU sanctions as well. Companies from third countries must comply with EU sanctions in Austria only to the extent it concerns a business in the EU.
Strictly speaking, EU sanctions do not apply extraterritorially unless there is a nexus to the EU, for example, the person concerned being an EU national or a company incorporated in the EU. Non-EU persons, acting outside of EU territory generally do not need to comply with EU sanctions, unless there is a direct or indirect nexus to a business in the EU. Note, however, that aiding and abetting sanctions circumvention outside the EU may be a cause for a sanctions designation under an EU sanctions regime, eg, sanctions against Russia and Belarus (similar to US-secondary sanctions).
Generally, Austria is directly bound by EU sanctions. Furthermore, Austria follows UN sanctions, as UN sanctions are mainly adopted by the EU, and, thus, are directly applicable in Austria.
The Austrian Sanctions Act 2024 does on one hand allow the adoption of unilateral national sanctions. In practice, however, Austria does not impose domestic national sanctions as the legality of such unilateral measures is questionable in light of the EU treaties and case-law, and it could be argued that some national sanctions imposed by member states are inconsistent with EU law. However, Austria may, as any other EU member state, regulate the penalties for EU sanctions violations. In this regard, Austria must still harmonise it’s penal code with the EU Directive of 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of European Union restrictive measures.
The Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) is competent for the making available and unfreezing of frozen funds in case a financial market participant is involved. If no financial market participant is involved, the Austrian Ministry of Finance is competent for the making available and unfreezing of frozen funds. Other authorities may be competent depending on the specific matter. For matters involving economic (sectoral) sanctions, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism is the national competent authority. It decides, among others, derogation requests for the provision of certain services to Russian subsidiaries or the export of sanctioned products to sanctioned nations.
Regarding financial restrictive measures (ie, asset freeze), the operators themselves must apply and essentially enforce the sanctions. For example, a bank must block accounts if the funds are owned or controlled by a sanctioned person. This is because sanctions must be applied swiftly and any delay could lead to asset flight which would jeopardise the object of the sanctions.
In case of the freezing of companies or real estate, the Ministry of Interior notifies the respective court, which is in charge of maintaining the register, and requests the inclusion of a note in the respective register stating that either the assets of the company are, or the concerned real estate is, frozen. The inclusion of such note in the register is, however, not constitutive for the freezing but merely declaratory to inform the public about the status of a company or real estate.
The concerned company or the owner of the real estate may challenge the court’s decision and request the deletion of such note, if it disagrees with the conclusion that the owner or the asset should be considered as (indirectly) sanctioned.
In relation to criminal enforcement, the prosecution is primary responsible for sanctions breaches that amount to a criminal violation.
The breach of sanctions can amount to a criminal offence, if the value of the assets or services in question exceeds EUR100,000, or if sanctioned goods are exported to a sanctioned nation in violation of an export prohibition. The penalty for this criminal offence is imprisonment of six months to five years. The criminal law provisions and penalties will likely change in the near future with further implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/1226.
To the extent a statutory penalty for a sanction violation is more than one year of imprisonment, such violation could count as a predicate crime for money laundering under Austrian criminal law. If proceeds that derive out of such a sanction violation are concealed, the perpetrator could be also prosecuted for money laundering. The matter of money laundering and sanction violation became more relevant with the adoption of the Austrian Sanctions Act 2024, which entered into force in February 2025 and introduced statutory penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment for certain sanctions violations, instead of a maximum sentence of one year’s imprisonment for a sanctions breach as was provided under the former Austrian Sanctions Act 2010.
Notably, according to Austrian Sanctions Act some breaches, ie violation of the reporting obligations, can constitute an administrative offence, with significant financial penalties of up to EUR150,000. For serious, repeated or systematic violations, the fine may rise to up to EUR5 million or twice the economic value (gained benefit) stemming from the violation.
Austrian banks have blocked significant amounts of sanctioned individuals or companies allegedly associated with such sanctioned individuals. Furthermore, courts have declared assets of companies allegedly controlled by sanctioned persons as “frozen”. However, in one prominent case, the company concerned challenged the court’s decision and ultimately prevailed in the court of appeals; see the decision of the Higher Regional Court of Vienna of 19 September 2024, in case OLG 6R235/24h (Sibur). The court of appeals found that the evidentiary basis for the “freezing” of the assets was thin and unsubstantial.
A few criminal investigations have been launched in connection with suspected sanctions violations, mainly for the violation of the prohibition to export certain luxury goods or technology to Russia. Such cases are often settled with the court, whereby the perpetrator concedes to the violation in exchange for a small penalty, eg, monetary fine or probation. However, there have been no publicly known criminal convictions yet.
If an operator can demonstrate that he either applied sanctions measures in “good faith” or if he failed to apply sanctions measures because he did not know and had no reason to believe that sanctions applied, the operator shall not be liable for his actions. To avail himself of these defences, the operator must have carried out reasonable compliance measures. For instance, if a bank decided not to block an account allegedly associated with a sanctioned person, the bank must demonstrate that it investigated the ownership structure and other relevant factors before it decided to release the funds. The extent of the compliance measures depends on the individual case. Hence, reasonable compliance measures may be a mitigating factor in order to lessen or even avoid penalties.
The exact measures to be taken depend on the specific case. For example, an in-depth analysis of the transaction at issue, a due-diligence review of the contractual partners involved, and receiving advice from a specialised law firm could support the argument. Importantly, some of the above actions can demonstrate that a violation has not occurred intentionally but rather negligently.
In principle, under Austrian criminal procedure, certain sanctions-related offences may be resolved through Diversion, a special form of settlement under Austrian criminal procedure. This is an alternative mechanism allowing criminal proceedings to be concluded without a formal criminal conviction. As a general rule, this option is available only for offences punishable by a maximum statutory term of imprisonment not exceeding five years. Whether Diversion is available depends on the circumstances of the individual case and the fulfilment of the statutory requirements. A key prerequisite is that the consequences of the offence, including any damage caused, have been fully remedied.
A criminal sanctions offence may be committed wilfully or negligently. Violations of financial sanctions (eg, asset freeze measures) must be committed wilfully, whereas violations against economic sanctions (eg, export prohibitions) may be committed negligently as well.
EU sanctions regulations provide for certain derogations under which frozen funds may be released. These derogations apply directly in Austria as well. Depending on the subject matter of the derogation, the Financial Market Authority or the Federal Ministry of Economy, Energy and Tourism are generally the competent national authorities. They decide whether the legal prerequisites for the respective derogations are fulfilled. However, the authority has discretion and may impose conditions on the release of frozen funds as it deems appropriate. Key grounds include:
Basic Needs
Frozen funds may be released to satisfy the basic needs of a sanctioned person (eg, daily basic needs, taxes, rent and insurance) or to pay for regular maintenance works in relation to frozen assets. Moreover, frozen funds may be released to pay for reasonable professional fees or for the expenses incurred with the provision of legal services.
Prior Contract
Funds owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a sanctioned person may be released if the payment obligation stems from a contract concluded prior to the sanctioning of the concerned person.
Divestments
Frozen funds may also be released if they are necessary for a sanctioned person to sell his stake in an Austrian-legal entity. In such case the shares can be transferred, and the purchase price can be paid directly or indirectly to the sanctioned person. Moreover, should an Austrian entity wish to sell its business in Russia or Belarus, the EU entity requires a derogation from its competent authority if the Russian or Belarusian subsidiary owns products subject to an EU (export) sanctions. This is because the sale of the shares is viewed as a “deemed export” of the products concerned. Note that these derogations in connection with a divestment are timely limited.
Firewall
Funds may be released to set up or certify a firewall. Such firewall can be adopted by an Austrian company which is associated with a sanctioned person and whose funds are, therefore, frozen. The firewall aims at severing the control by the sanctioned person over the Austrian company. If successfully implemented, the assets of the Austrian entity ought not be frozen and funds or economic resources can be made available to such company.
Under the applicable law, a national competent authority is not obliged to recognise a firewall by way of an order or resolution, but it is for the operators to recognise firewall measures and to decide whether to “unfreeze” frozen assets. However, Austria, unlike other member states, is generally amenable to review firewall measures and to conclude whether these measures are appropriate. Austria even considers similar firewall decisions issued by other members states regarding the company concerned, thus, de facto recognising decisions of other member states and, consequently, safeguarding the uniform application of sanctions in the EU. This approach by the Austrian authority is somewhat unique in the EU. Our team has contributed to the development of the firewall practice in Austria and Austria’s approach ought to serve as an example for other member states.
Export/Import of Sanctioned Products
Under currently applicable EU sanctions, a plethora of products are subject to export or import restrictions. Under certain circumstances, however, the export or import may be approved by the competent authority. A derogation may be granted, for example, if the products at issue are for medical, pharmaceutical or for humanitarian purposes or if the import of certain products falls under a certain annual quota.
Services
Austrian operators are prohibited from providing several services to Russia or to Belarus (see 5.1 Services). Under certain circumstances, the provision of these services may be granted by the competent authority. Most relevant is the “intra-group” derogation, allowing an Austrian parent or group company to provide services to its Russian or Belarusian subsidiary, provided the services are for the exclusive use of such subsidiary, and provided the concerned group is owned or controlled by an entity incorporated in the EU or in certain “partner states” (UK, USA, Canada, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Iceland, Australia and New Zealand).
Generally, sanctions restrictions are rarely absolute and almost every restriction allows for a form of derogation under certain circumstances. As opposed to derogations, legal exceptions to sanctions restrictions allow the operator to carry out an action without first obtaining a derogation. When relying on a legal exception, the operator must usually notify the competent authority about the action (eg, an export of products to Russia).
In general, EU law does not prohibit the provision of legal services to sanctioned persons. The right to be advised and defended by a lawyer is a fundamental right of each individual and an important guarantee of access to justice.
However, the payment of the legal fees by the designated person to the legal advisor requires in most cases a derogation because the funds that are used to pay the fees are frozen. Even if the designated person transfers the funds from an account outside of the European Union, the funds are deemed frozen once they enter the EU banking system. The concerned legal advisor may apply for a derogation according to Article 4 part 1 lit b of Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and to obtain the permit to receive reasonable legal fees and expenses.
However, one should distinguish between the possibility of being paid by a person who is subject to individual sanctions set forth in Regulation (EU) 269/2014 and the prohibition of providing legal services according to the sectoral sanctions set forth in Article 5n of Regulation (EU) 833/2014, which applies at the same time to legal advisors who wish to provide legal advisory services to legal entities established in Russia (or persons owned or controlled or action on behalf or at the instruction of such Russian entities). This general prohibition covers mainly services regarding commercial transactions. Intra-group legal services are generally permitted after having obtained derogation. Importantly, legal advisory services for the purposes of defence and access to justice is permitted without the need to obtain a derogation.
In Austria, reporting obligations arise primarily under directly applicable EU sanctions regulations and are addressed to the competent national authorities, in particular the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA).
Reporting Obligations Under Regulation (EU) 269/2014
Newly designated persons under the Russian and Belarusian sanctions regime must report to the Austrian financial market authority within six weeks from their designation funds located within Austria that are owned or controlled by them. Failure to comply with this reporting obligation is deemed as a sanctions circumvention.
Credit and financial institutions are required to immediately freeze funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by designated persons and to notify the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA). Under Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the relevant information must be provided within two weeks of becoming available to the reporting entity. In addition, Austrian financial institutions are subject to periodic reporting obligations in relation to frozen assets and blocked transactions.
Reporting Obligations Under Regulation (EU) 833/2014
Legal entities established in Austria that are more than 40% owned by a Russian legal entity, a Russian national or a person residing in Russia must report to the competent authority in Austria, within two weeks after the end of each quarter, any transfer of funds exceeding EUR100,000 out of the European Union made during that quarter, directly or indirectly, in one or several operations.
Credit and financial institutions must also report, in relation to such legal entities, all transfers of funds out of the European Union that they initiated, directly or indirectly, for such legal entities during that semester, where the cumulative amount exceeded EUR 100,000.
Austrian Sanctions Act 2024 (SanktG 2024)
A significant development is the adoption of the Austrian Sanctions Act 2024 (SanktG 2024), which entered into force in February 2025 and fundamentally modernised Austria's sanctions enforcement framework. While conduct predating the adoption of the Austrian Sanctions Act 2024 continues to be assessed under the previous legal regime (Austrian Sanctions Act 2010), the new legislation strengthens the national implementation of EU and UN sanctions and clarifies the interaction between criminal and administrative enforcement. In practice, sanctions violations may trigger liability under both the Austrian Sanctions Act and the Foreign Trade Act, particularly where export restrictions on dual-use or military goods are involved. Depending on the applicable legal basis, limitation periods and available penalties differ considerably, highlighting the importance of correctly classifying the alleged infringement at an early stage of any investigation.
Change of the Competent Sanctions Authority (NCA)
From 2026, the competence for the release of frozen funds and for other related matters (eg, reporting obligations reg frozen assets) shifted from the Austrian National Bank to the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA). Applicants who wish to release frozen funds held with the Austrian financial institutions must address their request online through the “incoming platform” of the FMA.
Preliminary Ruling of CJEU on the Limits of Freeze of Shareholder Rights of a Sanctioned Person
In terms of court decisions, a ruling issued by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in relation to the shareholder rights of sanctioned persons concerned also an Austrian case. Though the CJEU ruling concerned questions submitted for a preliminary ruling by a Dutch court (C-465/24, SBK Art), an Austrian court referred essentially the same questions to the CJEU, namely, to what extent shareholder rights of a sanctioned person must be frozen. After the CJEU decided in the Dutch case that essentially all shareholder rights must be fully and unconditionally frozen, including the right to attend a shareholder meeting and cast a vote, the Austrian case became obsolete and was withdrawn because the ruling in the Dutch case applied to the Austrian cases accordingly.
In general, rulings of the CJEU impact Austria directly, especially when the CJEU interprets EU sanctions law. A noteworthy decision by the CJEU concerned “ownership” and “control” (C-84/24, EM Systems). The CJEU confirmed that assets owned by a non-listed legal entity which is in turn owned for 50 percent or more by a sanctioned person may be presumed “controlled” by the sanctioned person, and, thus, be frozen. The concerned non-listed entity may rebut the presumption by demonstrating that all or part of the assets are not in fact controlled by the sanctioned person.
Austria was admonished by the EU Commission for not having timely implemented the Directive (EU) 2024/1226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures. It can be expected that Austria will fully implement the Directive (EU) 2024/1226 into national law sooner to avoid the European Commission initiating infringement procedures and referring the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union with a request for financial sanctions.
Austria does not have a unilateral national list of designated persons because Austria does not impose unilateral sanctions. Persons designated by the European Union under the applicable EU sanctions regimes are deemed as “sanctioned” in Austria as a consequence of direct implementation of EU-Regulations. The delisting procedure takes place at the level of the court of the European Union, namely, the General Court and the Court of the European Union. Whereas, the General Court hears delisting cases in the first instance, the Court of the European Union is the appeals court for such cases. To launch a case, the designated person lodges an action for annulment of the listing acts (ie, the legal act by which the designated person was included in the annex to the applicable sanctions regulation). In addition to the court proceeding, a designated person may address the Council of the European Union in a request for reconsideration. In such request, the Council of the European Union may review the listing grounds and reconsider the designation.
A successful delisting challenge in the Union Courts can lead to the removal of the designated person from the respective sanctions list. However, if the designated person prevails in court, the respective person will not be automatically delisted by the Council of the European Union. In practice, a situation may occur where the Council of the European Union maintains the designation of the concerned person by slightly amending the reasons for the designation upon the extension of sanctions (which occurs every six months in case of individual sanctions against Russia and Belarus [on 18 June 2026 the sectoral sanctions on Russia were for the first time extended for a full 12 months]).
However, in a recent judgement the General Court of the European Union ruled in a 're-listing' case that the Council of the European Union failed to fulfil its duty and to comply with the delisting decision (see T 693/25, Maya Tokareva v Council).
It remains to be seen if the Council of the European Union will in future be more amenable to follow delisting decisions of the General Court of the European Union. Therefore, it is recommended for designated persons to request from the Council of the European Union a reconsideration of the designation. The action for annulment to the General Court and the request for reconsideration to the Council are two separate procedures and can run simultaneously. Unlike in other jurisdictions (such as the UK or the US), it is not required to complete the request for reconsideration before addressing the General Court with an action for annulment of the designation.
The duration of the delisting process depends on which route one has taken to obtain a delisting. The fastest is through the Council of the European Union by way of a request for reconsideration. If one can convince the Council of the European Union that a designation occurred without sufficient grounds, the Council of the European Union will not extend the sanctions upon its re-evaluation of the sanctions. However, such cases are rather rare, and a delisting usually requires a successful challenge of the listing in court. From the date of listing until the judgement, one should expect an average of one and a half years if only one relisting is challenged. An appeal will last at least another year.
Note in this context, that if a designated person has successfully challenged a delisting act, the Council of the European Union may still re-list the designated person under the same or slightly amended listing grounds.
Finally, some member states (ie, Poland, the Czech Republic, Croatia and, to a certain extent, Lithuania) adopt unilateral national sanctions lists and impose sanctions against the persons, who are not sanctioned by the European Union. In practice, such national listing has often the same effects as an EU listing within the territory of the respective member state, especially when dealing with banks. The legality of such national measures is questionable in light of the EU treaties and case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and is disputed in many cases. The judicial challenge and the administrative review in such cases should be made to the national competent courts and sanctions authorities in the member state.
EU sanctions apply directly in Austria and, therefore, the EU service restrictions apply in Austria. The prohibitions depend on the exact sanctions regime. For example, under the Russian and Belarusian sanctions regime, Austrian service providers are prohibited from providing several services to Russian/Belarusian legal entities or to the Russian/Belarusian government.
Scope of the Service Restrictions
The prohibition covers services regarding accounting, business consultancy, tax, public relations, architecture and engineering, legal advisory, cyber security, marketing and sales, artificial intelligence and IT consultancy services. In relation to the Iranian sanctions regime, the provision of services that contribute to Iran's nuclear capabilities are prohibited.
Derogations and Exceptions
Derogations and legal exceptions exist. The right to a lawyer especially cannot be infringed and, therefore, the prohibition to provide legal advisory services essentially does not apply to legal advisory services that are strictly necessary for the exercise of the right of legal defence in judicial proceedings and the right to legal remedies.
Intra-Group services
Moreover, intra-group services may be continued if the service provider obtains a derogation. Such derogation may be obtained if the service provider and the recipient are owned or controlled by a legal entity incorporated in the European Union or in a “partner country” (ie, US, Japan, UK, South Korea, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland Liechtenstein and Iceland) and if the services are for the exclusive use of such subsidiaries.
The Austrian authority issues the derogation usually for two years. The applicant may apply for several services in one application. Upon the expiry of a derogation, the applicant can apply for an extension of the derogation and – to the extent necessary – add new services to be covered by the derogation.
EU sanctions apply in Austria and, therefore, the respective EU prohibitions apply directly as well. Under the Russia and Belarus sanctions regime, a plethora of restrictions apply regarding the export and import of goods.
For instance, it is prohibited to export goods to Russia or Belarus which (inter alia):
Under the EU's Iran sanctions regime, the export of certain goods is restricted as well. Goods covered by prohibitions are (inter alia) dual-use goods and goods that could be used in nuclear enrichment-related activities, certain naval equipment, certain software, equipment used in the energy sector or gold, precious metals and diamonds.
Most EU sanctions regulations include a so-called “no-claims” clause. Austrian courts must directly apply such clauses when dealing with litigation that involves a sanction issue.
The no-claims clause essentially states that an EU person cannot satisfy a claim under a contract, the performance of which has been affected in whole or in part by prohibitions set forth in the EU sanctions regulation at issue.
Though, the standard language of a no-claims clause especially (but not exclusively) mentions the claims for indemnity or any other claim of this type, such as a claim for compensation or a claim under a guarantee, notably a claim for extension or payment of a bond, guarantee or indemnity, particularly a financial guarantee or financial indemnity, it has been clarified in a recent request for a preliminary ruling by an Advocate General of the European Court of Justice (C-802/24 Reibel) that the term “claim” ought to be interpreted broadly. This is because the no claims clause expressly refers to “any contract” or “any transaction affected directly or indirectly, in whole or in part” by the applicable sanctions regulation. Though, the European Court of Justice has on the date of writing (August 2026) not issued a ruling, opinions of the Advocates General are followed in the majority of cases.
It can be argued therefore, that an EU operator cannot perform any claims under a contract if the performance of such claim is affected directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the applicable EU sanctions and if the performance of such claim is essentially made by a person from a sanctioned state or a designated person.
The no-claims clause, however, does not preclude the parties to the contract to seek judicial review and to ask a court whether the no-claims clause applies to the claim at issue. The court must consider directly applicable EU law ex officio and rule in favour of the EU operator if the no-claims clause applies.
Following the successive amendments to the EU sanctions framework, culminating in the 18th EU sanctions package, Austrian courts are expected to refuse the recognition or enforcement of judgments and arbitral awards that would require an EU operator to act in breach of EU sanctions. Likewise, where the seat of arbitration is in Austria, arbitral awards may be set aside or refused enforcement if they are incompatible with EU public policy as reflected in the EU sanctions regime.
The 18th EU sanctions package, adopted on 18 July 2025, significantly reinforced the interaction between sanctions law and dispute resolution by elevating the “no-claims clause” under Regulation 833/2014 to a matter of EU public policy. As a result, member states may refuse to recognise or enforce foreign judgments or arbitral awards where doing so would effectively compensate a party for losses arising from another party's compliance with EU sanctions. The package also introduces specific measures in the field of investor-state arbitration, requiring member states to oppose the recognition and enforcement of awards that conflict with EU sanctions. In addition, designated claimants and, in certain circumstances, entities within their corporate group may become liable for damages suffered by EU parties as a result of sanctions-related proceedings.
Recent case law from neighbouring jurisdictions illustrates a broader European trend. On 13 May 2025, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart held that the enforcement of an arbitral award that would result in a breach of EU sanctions must be suspended. On 13 March 2026 the Swiss Federal Supreme Court ruled that, in debt enforcement proceedings initiated by a company controlled by a sanctioned person, sanctions create a statutory deferral that prevents enforcement for as long as the relevant sanctions remain in force, while the claim itself continues to exist. The practical application of these principles in Austria remains to be seen.
Austria has not yet imposed its own economic sanctions. Thus, persons designated by the EU are deemed as 'sanctioned' in Austria; EU sanctions regulations apply directly in Austria. However, the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Interior, after consultation with the Ministry of European and International Affairs, may propose to the United Nations or the European Union the designation of a person, provided that such person fulfils a listing ground as set forth by the UN or the EU under a specific sanctions regime, a direct territorial or personal nexus to Austria exists and the designation promotes Austrian security interests and does not contradict Austria's obligations under EU and international law.
Entities that are owned or controlled by a designated person are strictly speaking not deemed “sanctioned” or “designated” under a sanctions regime for these entities do not fall under any of the applicable listing grounds. However, their assets may be subject to financial restrictive measures if a designated person owns or controls such non-listed legal entity (knock on effect of sanctions). In practical terms, such entity is indirectly sanctioned.
Guidance on Ownership and Control
To determine whether or not a non-listed entity is owned or controlled, Austrian operators, courts and authorities follow the Frequently Asked Questions of the EU Commission on the implementation of Regulation 833/2014 and Regulation 269/2014 and the Best Practices of the Council of the European Union for the effective implementation of financial restrictive measures. Though, these guidance documents are not binding, the factors to determine ownership or control are accepted throughout the European Union. Recently, in relation to the sanctions against Russia, the European Union has introduced into Regulation 269/2014 the definition of the terms “ownership” and “control” (these definitions were originally introduced in 2001, in a sanctions regulation on combating terrorism).
A designated person “owns” a legal entity if the person holds 50 or percent of the proprietary rights of the legal entity (eg, shares). A designated person may exert “control” if such person essentially can control the management or strategy of the concerned legal entity. This covers the right to appoint or remove the majority of the management board of the legal entity or the holding of the majority of the voting rights in the legal entity. Another factor for control is the right of the designated person to use the assets of the legal entity (often decisive when assessing property companies that own high-end luxury goods, such as vessels or real estate).
Substance Over Form
Crucially, the principle of “substance over form” applies when determining “control”. It is irrelevant who the legal owner of an asset is; it is also irrelevant if constitutional documents of a legal entity limit or exclude any rights of a designated person vis-à-vis the legal entity and its assets. If the designated person can de facto exert influence that amounts to “control”, the assets of the concerned legal entity are to be frozen.
To better assess such scenarios of de facto control, the Council of the European Union introduced in the Best Practices several indications according to which it is likely that a designated person maintains control over a legal entity or its assets. These indications include, among others, the retention of a buyback option after a designated person sold a business to a third person (often a management buyout), use of strawmen (often close family members or associates), use of needlessly complex corporate structures or trusts. Moreover, a telling indication is the sale of a business by the designated person shortly before the inclusion of said person into the applicable sanctions list.
It is for the operator to assess the structure of a legal entity and decide whether a designated person has ownership or control. Once ownership or control has been established, the operator may presume that the assets of the concerned non-listed legal entity are controlled by the designated person. Consequently, these assets may be frozen. However, the presumption of control is rebuttable, and the concerned legal entity may demonstrate that all or part of its assets are not (anymore) controlled by the designated person. For the operator it is paramount to treat each case individually as excessive application of freezing measures may also lead to damage claims against them, if the asset freeze is imposed excessively and without sufficient basis. Accordingly, blocking all assets and refusing to engage solely for fear of breaching sanctions may not constitute an appropriate defence for an operator.
Firewall
Following the European Commissions “Guidance Note on Implementation of Firewalls in cases of EU entities owned or controlled by a designated person or entity” a so-called “firewall” may be implemented. A firewall is a complex of compliance and ringfencing measures that can be adopted by the legal entity which is associated with a sanctioned person and whose funds are, therefore, frozen. The firewall aims to eliminate control by the sanctioned person over the legal entity and its assets, and to prevent such person from accessing them. If successfully implemented and – to the extent possible – acknowledged by the competent sanctions authority, the assets of such legal entity ought to be released and funds or economic resources ought to be made available again.
Austrian Particularities
In Austria, the fact that assets of a non-listed legal entity are frozen may be displayed by way of an annotation in the commercial register excerpt of the concerned legal entity. The court includes such annotation regarding the asset freeze upon notification by the Ministry of the Interior. The concerned non-listed entity may challenge the inclusion of such annotation in the commercial register. If the legal entity can demonstrate that it is in fact not owned or controlled by a designated person, the court will remove the annotation from the commercial register, and the assets concerned are not deemed frozen. Should an Austrian operator still refuse to “unfreeze” the assets despite the removal of the annotation (eg, a bank refuses to unblock the account), the concerned legal entity could lodge a civil claim and argue that the operator is excessively applying sanctions.
Furthermore, with our team's contribution, Austria has developed a rather unique practice in relation to the recognition and the acknowledgement of a firewall. Unlike other member states, Austria is amenable to review the implemented firewall measures and to approve the firewall. Moreover, Austria even considers firewall-related decisions issued in other member states in relation to the company concerned. This practice safeguards the uniform application of EU sanctions throughout the European Union and should serve as an example to other member states.
The provisions prohibiting the circumvention of sanctions are included in the directly applicable EU sanctions regulations. The Austrian Foreign Trade Act prohibits explicitly the circumvention of an export approval required for the export of dual-use goods or sanctioned products.
The Austrian Sanctions Act treats the violation of the reporting obligations as an administrative offence with a financial penalty of up to EUR150,000. For serious, repeated or systematic violations, the fine may rise to up to EUR5 million or twice of the economic value (gained benefit) stemming from the violation. Moreover, the Austrian Foreign Trade Act stipulates the circumvention of export approvals as criminal offences. Note that a person who circumvented sanctions may be (criminally) prosecuted for the violation of the provision that they circumvented or attempted to circumvent.
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Best-Efforts Obligation – Cryptic Wording with Wide-Reaching Consequences?
The “best-efforts” obligation remains highly relevant in practice, especially for multinational corporations with numerous subsidiaries in non-EU jurisdictions. This fairly new concept in EU sanctions requires EU entities to use their best efforts to ensure that their subsidiaries in third countries essentially comply with EU sanctions. Due to the cryptic wording of the relevant legal provisions and the lack of comprehensive guidance on the subject, the best-efforts obligation still poses plenty of questions for practitioners. This chapter provides an overview of the best-efforts obligation, its practical application and existing uncertainties.
Background
From the outset of sanctions legislation, the combating of sanctions circumvention was a key concern for the EU and its member states. It was evident that sanctions would be rendered obsolete if circumvention could not be effectively curbed.
Instruments against circumvention are (among others) broadly-worded sanctions prohibitions (wording like “directly or indirectly”, “in whole or in part” or “business of any kind”) and a broad interpretation of sanctions regulations in order to achieve the object of a particular sanctions regime and to combat circumvention. Furthermore, in relation to the Russian sanctions regime, the European Union recently “activated” the anti-circumvention tool by adding the Kyrgyz Republic into Annex XXXIII to Regulation 833/2014. As a result, certain products cannot be exported from the European Union to the Kyrgyz Republic in order to halt the re-export of such products to Russia. It can be expected that the anti-circumvention tool will be extended in the future.
By introducing the “best-efforts obligation” the European Union continues its efforts against transactions and structures that frustrate the purpose of sanctions.
The black letter law and available guidance
The best-efforts obligation was introduced in relation to the Russia and Belarus sanctions regimes in 2024 (Regulation 833/2014 and 765/2006) and 2025 (Regulation 269/2014).
The provision reads as follows: “Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in this Regulation.”
In November 2024, the Commission of the European Union introduced in its “Frequently Asked Questions” a chapter on the best-efforts obligation. In addition, the EU Sanctions Helpdesk published some guidance on the application of the best-efforts obligation. Though useful for practitioners to a certain extent, the available guidance is rather superficial and leaves plenty of open questions. Moreover, the FAQ chapter on the best-efforts obligation partially arrives at conclusions that have no support in the black-letter law (see below for a more detailed elaboration). Practitioners have criticised the European Commission in this regard for “gold platting”, ie, using the FAQ to achieve more extensive interpretation of the best-efforts obligation than the black-letter law would allow.
Addressee of the obligation is the EU entity
The person obliged to comply with the best-efforts obligation is the EU entity that has subsidiaries in third countries which it owns or controls. EU subsidiaries are not covered because they are anyway obliged to comply with the EU sanctions regulations by themselves.
Though, the best-efforts obligation extends to all subsidiaries in third countries, subsidiaries incorporated in jurisdictions with similar sanctions against Russia or Belarus require less oversight by the EU parent as such subsidiaries are anyway obliged to comply with their own sanctions regimes against Russia or Belarus. Thus, emphasis is placed on subsidiaries in jurisdictions without a sanctions regime against Russia or Belarus in place (eg, Serbia, Turkey, India and China).
“Undermining” instead of “circumventing”
EU sanctions generally do not extend to a legal entity established outside of the European Union. The mere fact that such entity is a subsidiary of an entity incorporated in the European Union, is insufficient to establish a nexus and to trigger the application of EU sanctions regulations. Therefore, a legal entity established outside the EU generally cannot circumvent sanctions for they do not apply to it in the first place.
Thus, through the best-efforts obligation, the European Union aims to curb the “undermining” of sanctions in lieu of the “circumventing” of sanctions. EU sanctions are undermined if one participates in activities that result in an effect that the restrictive measures seek to prevent. For example, goods that cannot be imported to Russia under Regulation 833/2014 are supplied to Russia by the third-country subsidiary of an EU parent company. Moreover, entering into transactions with designated persons is also deemed an “undermining” of sanctions by the third-country subsidiary (eg, maintaining a bank account with a designated bank and paying to such bank account fees).
Actions that would be exempt from an applicable sanctions regulation should not be deemed to “undermine” sanctions. For example, if a Turkish subsidiary exports to Russia products subject to an EU export restriction, the applicable export restriction is not undermined by the Turkish subsidiary if the respective EU restriction sets forth an exception and the export at issue would fall under such exception (eg, products used for medical or pharmaceutical purposes).
If the action concerned could be carried out after having obtained a derogation from the competent authority, the EU parent entity can apply on behalf of its third-country subsidiary for such derogation. For example, if the Indian subsidiary of an EU parent entity provides IT services to the Russian subsidiary of the EU parent entity, the EU parent entity could apply for a derogation which would allow the provision of these services by the Indian subsidiary to the Russian subsidiary. Should the authority in the place of incorporation of the EU parent entity refuse such derogation due to lack of competence, the provision of such services to the Russian group company ought not to be viewed as “undermining” sanctions.
Necessary and suitable measures
The EU entity must use its best efforts to ensure that its third-country subsidiary does not participate in activities that undermine EU sanctions. Pursuant to the recitals of the EU regulation that introduced the best-efforts obligation to the EU sanctions on Russia, best efforts should be understood as comprising all actions that are suitable and necessary to achieve the result of preventing the undermining of the restrictive measures in Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. Those actions can include, for example, the implementation of appropriate policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage risk effectively, considering factors such as the third country of establishment, the business sector and the type of activity of the legal person, entity or body that is owned or controlled by the European Union operator.
The exact actions must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Factors like the nature and size of the business, the extent of control over the subsidiary, the location of the subsidiary and potential repercussions for the subsidiary or its directors must be considered.
Actions to be taken by the EU entity involve the issuance of a shareholder instruction to cease certain actions or to terminate certain contracts, cancelling a licence to re-sell certain products and exchanging the subsidiary’s directors. However, prior to taking any actions, the EU entity must become aware of the subsidiary’s business scope and partners. Hence, “awareness” is key and a first step in complying with the best-efforts obligation. Consequently, the relevant subsidiaries ought to be included in a compliance program and be informed on recent relevant sanctions developments.
Actions must be “feasible”
In addition to actions being necessary and suitable, the actions must also be feasible. The recitals state that actions must be feasible for the European Union operator in view of its nature, its size and the relevant factual circumstances, in particular the degree of effective control over the legal person, entity or body established outside the EU. Moreover, an action may not be feasible if the EU entity has lost control over its subsidiary (see in more detail below).
The feasibility-threshold is critical in the assessment of the actions to be taken by the EU entity vis-à-vis its third-country subsidiary. Suppose the EU entity instructs its subsidiary to cancel three contracts because the performance of such contracts undermines sanctions. The termination of the first contract leads (only) to a loss of revenue for the subsidiary, the second contract leads to damage claims launched by the contractual partner of the subsidiary, and the third contract concerns the subsidiaries bank account with a designated bank, with the consequence that the subsidiary cannot pay its employees and suppliers and that the directors of the subsidiary will be investigated for an alleged breach of local laws.
In the first example, the mere loss of revenue and the potential decrease in profits will likely not render the shareholder instruction “unfeasible”. As for EU entities, economic losses must be tolerated in order to achieve the objectives of a particular sanctions regime.
The second example includes damage claims against the subsidiary. One could argue that damages are part of an “economic loss” and, thus, must be tolerated by the EU parent. However, it could also be argued that in such cases the third-country subsidiary is worse off compared to an EU subsidiary. This is because an EU subsidiary could protect itself against damage claims by referring to the “no claims clause” which prohibits an EU operator from satisfying any claims where performance is impacted by EU sanctions. This defence would hold up in an EU court and the EU subsidiary would not be required to pay the damages. Since the third-country subsidiary should not be treated worse than the EU subsidiary, one could further argue that instructing the subsidiary to terminate such agreement is “unfeasible” for it exposes the subsidiary to damage claims.
In the third example, terminating the bank account with a designated bank exposes the subsidiary and its directors to significant liabilities. If under local laws directors are exposed to civil or criminal liability for complying with the EU parent’s instruction, one can argue that such instruction is not “feasible”. Consequently, the EU parent would not breach its best-efforts obligation if it refused to issue such instruction to its subsidiary.
The above examples demonstrate the potential difficulties in the practical application of the best-efforts obligation. This is why each measures ought to be assessed individually and regard must be given to the consequences for the concerned subsidiaries and directors.
Loss of control
If an EU entity lost control over its third-country subsidiary and if such loss is not attributable to the EU entity’s conduct, it is generally accepted that in light of the best-efforts obligation, the EU entity cannot take any measures for the lack of actual control – such actions are not feasible and, therefore, the best-efforts obligation is complied with.
However, according to the EU Commission, EU entities that decided to remain in Russia may not argue the loss of control over its Russian subsidiary due to Russian laws in order to justify its inactivity vis-à-vis the Russian subsidiary. The EU Commission argues that such an EU entity must have been aware that Russia is a jurisdiction with serious and well-documented deficiencies in the rule of law. Thus, the loss of control is attributable to the EU entity and the best-efforts obligation continues to apply to it even if it factually lost the ability to exert influence over its Russian subsidiary.
Indeed, Russia has adopted wide-spread countersanctions against companies from “unfriendly states”. A Russian subsidiary of an EU entity cannot refuse performance under a contract because it may undermine EU sanctions. The subsidiary’s directors are obliged to act in the best interest of the company; this extends also to the best economic interest of the company. Failing to do so exposes the directors to severe civil and even criminal liability.
The existence of Russian countersanctions on the one hand and the obligation to (strictly) comply with the best-efforts obligation on the other often results in a dead-lock situation in which the EU entity issues instructions to the Russian subsidiary to cease certain activities, and the Russian subsidiary refuses to follow these instructions to avoid exposure to liability.
Though the EU Commission’s approach towards Russian subsidiaries is not binding, authorities often defer to the views of the EU Commission. Thus, as long as the EU Commission maintains its position on the best-efforts obligation vis-à-vis Russian subsidiaries and as long the Court of the European Union does not provide a different interpretation, EU entities are generally advised to follow the EU Commission’s guidance in this regard. Whether or not this interpretation of the law is excessive in light of the rather cryptic black-letter law is at least debatable.
Extraterritorial application of EU sanctions?
The best-efforts obligation prima facie does not establish extraterritorial application of EU sanctions. This is because the addressees of the obligation are the EU entities and not the third-country subsidiaries. Only an EU entity could be theoretically charged with the violation of the best-efforts obligation.
However, the EU entity is obliged to stop or mitigate actions that are technically not prohibited by EU sanctions for lack of territorial or personal scope of application. The EU Commission has repeatedly stated that subsidiaries are separate legal entities and – for the purposes of sanctions – are not obliged to follow EU sanctions if they are established outside of the European Union.
Through the best-efforts obligations, EU sanctions apply indirectly to these third-country subsidiaries. Even if the subsidiary itself cannot be charged with a violation of a sanctions restriction, its EU parent entity may be charged for failing to stop or mitigate it. Thus, one can argue that through the best-efforts obligation, EU sanctions become indirectly extraterritorially applicable.
Outlook
As long as the EU maintains its sanctions regime against Russia, the best-efforts obligation will remain. Thus, EU entities with third-country subsidiaries must consider this obligation and adjust their compliance programs accordingly.
It is expected that member states will eventually introduce penalties for the non-compliance with the best-efforts obligation (in Austria, the breach of the best-efforts obligation is currently not subject to a penalty). In order to establish a breach of the best-efforts obligation, it is likely that authorities will take the way of least resistance and evaluate the EU entity’s compliance program and its documentation regarding the activities of its third-country subsidiaries (list of contractual partners, products traded by the subsidiary, sanction training and the like).
In terms of guidance, it remains to be seen when the EU Commission will provide more detailed guidance on the application of the best-efforts obligation. For now, no request for a preliminary ruling regarding the interpretation of the best-efforts obligation has been addressed to the Court of Justice of the European Union.
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