Key Developments

The market in Belgium has been affected by EU sanctions developments in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine. At the time of writing, the EU has adopted four additional sanctions packages targeting Russia alone since June 2025. The 20th sanctions package targeting Russia was published in April 2026, and more recently the EU adopted the 21st package of sanctions against Russia in July 2026.

There are also EU sanctions developments in relation to the conflict in the Middle East. Among others, the EU has extended the scope of measures targeting individuals and entities involved in Iran’s actions threatening freedom of navigation in the Middle East.

The EU’s 20th package of sanctions against Russia includes further asset-freeze listings of individuals and entities linked to Russia’s military-industrial complex, the shadow-fleet ecosystem and sanctions circumvention. The new listings also target third-country entities, including in China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, that have supported Russia’s war effort or supplied restricted goods.

The package further strengthens energy-related measures. It establishes the legal basis for a future ban on maritime services connected with Russian crude oil and petroleum products, expands shadow-fleet restrictions, prohibits maintenance and related services for Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers and ice-breakers, and provides that LNG-terminal services to Russian entities will be prohibited from January 2027.

The 20th package also includes increased restrictions on technology and dual-use goods exports to hinder military and technological advancements, including the first activation of the Anti-Circumvention Tool targeting re-export risks via third countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic. The package further introduces expanded financial restrictions, including a sectoral ban on Russian crypto-asset platforms and a new transaction ban on 20 additional Russian financial institutions.

The EU’s 21st package of sanctions against Russia, adopted on 23 July 2026, focuses largely on financial services, crypto-assets and the oil sector. On the financial side, transaction bans were extended to cover 33 further Russian credit and financial institutions, four non-Russian banks and 14 crypto-related service platforms. Over 90 additional banks were subjected to asset freezes, forming part of a broader set of 218 new individual designations.

The package also adds 41 vessels to the list of ships associated with Russia’s shadow fleet, tightens measures targeting the oil sector, and widens existing trade restrictions on goods and technologies feeding Russia’s military-industrial complex.

Impact on European Companies

European companies are facing higher compliance costs, operational challenges, disrupted supply chains, and significant financial losses from operations in Russia and Belarus.

Sanctions Sector Compared to 12 Months Ago

Over the past year, the volume of compliance queries related to Russia has remained steady, but enforcement activity has notably increased as the Russian sanctions regime matures and crosses the four-year mark. Enforcement remains uneven across member states, but there is a clear uptick in investigations, seizures and asset-freezing measures, particularly in jurisdictions with stronger enforcement capacity.

At the same time, the focus of EU sanctions policy continues to diversify. Iran remains a priority target, with the EU having extended and expanded its sanctions regime – now covering not only Iran’s military support for Russia but also threats to freedom of navigation in the Middle East.

Enforcement attention is now firmly focused on entities engaged in sanctions circumvention. The 20th package lists 60 entities subject to enhanced export restrictions, of which 28 are located in third countries such as China (including Hong Kong), Türkiye, Thailand and the UAE. Transaction bans have also been extended to financial institutions in the Kyrgyz Republic, Laos and Azerbaijan involved in activities that significantly frustrate sanctions or connect Russia to the Russian System for Transfer of Financial Messages.

For the first time, the EU has deployed its Anti-Circumvention Tool to block supplies of sanctioned goods to a third country. The Kyrgyz Republic has been formally designated as a jurisdiction that systematically and persistently fails to prevent the re-exportation of restricted goods from the EU to Russia.

For EU-based companies, novel business models and cross-border structures carry increased circumvention risks, which the European Commission (the “Commission”) and national regulators continue to highlight through guidance and outreach. Businesses operating through third-country channels face sharply increased scrutiny.

Co-Ordination With International Partners

The EU continues to align its sanctions efforts with international partners, particularly the USA, the UK and other G7 nations. This enhanced co-ordination is designed to boost the effectiveness of sanctions and limit the scope for sanctions evasion. This includes, for instance, joint action on the G7 Oil Price Cap Coalition and the multilaterally co-ordinated prohibition on imports of Russian diamonds.

However, alignment has become more complex. The US sanctions regime against Russia remained largely intact under the Trump administration, and the USA imposed new sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil in October 2025. At the same time, the USA did not always move in parallel with the EU, UK and other partners, including on the July 2025 lowering of the oil price cap. The position is therefore better described as continued co-ordination among international partners, but with less automatic transatlantic alignment than in the earlier phase of the sanctions regime.

Beyond G7 partners, the EU actively pursues sanctions alignment with EU candidate countries and with countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA).

Systemic Targeting of Circumvention

The first activation of the so-called Anti-Circumvention Tool, the wave of third-country entity designations (China, UAE, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye) and the extension of transaction bans to third-country financial institutions all point to a distinct enforcement phase. Combating circumvention has therefore reached a new level and has become a primary issue addressed in the new measures.

Technological, Cyber and Hybrid Sanctions

In response to the growing cyber and hybrid threat landscape, the EU has expanded its sanctions targeting cyber-attacks, disinformation and destabilising activities. In December 2025, January and April 2026, the Council of the European Union (the “Council”) adopted sanctions against individuals and entities for their involvement in Russia’s continued hybrid activities, foreign information manipulation and malicious cyber-activities against the EU and its member states. 

Belgium at the Centre: Euroclear and Immobilised Russian Assets

Euroclear, the Brussels-based central securities depository, holds approximately EUR200 billion of Russian central bank assets immobilised in the EU. That concentration placed Belgium at the heart of a heated debate in late 2025 over the Commission’s proposal to use those assets to finance Ukraine. The Belgian government held firm, demanding full mutualisation of the legal and financial risks and legally binding guarantees from all member states before agreeing.

The reparations loan ultimately collapsed. EU leaders agreed at the December 2025 summit to raise EUR90 billion on capital markets to support Ukraine in 2026–2027, stepping back from direct use of the immobilised assets.

With Belgium being the institutional centre of the EU, its jurisdiction has numerous sectors that are strongly affected by sanctions regulations. These include:

• financial services;
• the energy sector;
• defence and dual-use goods;
• technology and telecommunications;
• international trade;
• maritime and shipping;
• luxury goods and diamonds; and
• healthcare and pharmaceuticals.

Belgium was particularly affected by the financial sanctions, owing to the presence of world-leading securities depository Euroclear. The EU’s maximum oil price and ports ban affected the North Sea ports. The EU diamond ban affected the Antwerp diamond industry hub.

Belgium distributes sanctions implementation responsibilities across multiple federal and, in certain areas, regional authorities. The primary federal authorities are FPS Finance and FPS Economy.

Within FPS Finance, the Treasury deals mainly with financial sanctions, including asset-freeze derogations, handling notifications and issuing payment authorisations. Customs and Excise, also within FPS Finance, carries out border controls and checks compliance with applicable import, export and transit restrictions.

For trade-related restrictions, FPS Economy acts as the licensing authority for the importation, exportation and transit of goods and services, financial assistance and brokerage services, except where such competences have been transferred to the Regions.

In Belgium, financial institutions must report immediately to the Treasury within FPS Finance the persons or entities detected that are subject to asset freeze measures. The National Bank of Belgium recommends that this reporting be made by the AML Compliance Officer (AMLCO). In such case, the AMLCO provides the Treasury with all the information at its disposal in order to enable the Treasury to carry out the necessary verifications ‒ for example, a copy of the identity card or passport of the person concerned, as well as a reference to the regulation or decision that imposes the sanction and which includes the name of the person or entity that is subject to the sanction.

Besides the asset-freezing measure and its notification to FPS Finance’s Treasury, it may also be necessary to make a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) to the authority in charge of AML ‒ namely, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financières/Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking, or CTIF-CFI).

Court Decisions

The Belgian courts generally adhere to the provisions of EU law and EU guidelines issued by the Commission regarding the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions and may refer preliminary references to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) when in doubt on the proper interpretation of the provisions of EU sanctions.

Despite several projects to increase the publication and dissemination of Belgian courts’ case law, there is generally little publicly accessible case law on EU restrictive measures and export controls by the civil and administrative courts. 

As a general rule, disputes involving the impact of sanctions on a business transaction may be litigated before competent civil courts. Infringements are prosecuted before criminal courts, and decisions on licences issued by the national competent authorities – often either FPS Economy or FPS Finance – may be challenged at the highest administrative court, the Council of State.

Reuters reported that, in June 2026, the Brussels Criminal Court issued a judgment concerning a Russia sanctions-evasion scheme. Three individuals were convicted in connection with the exportation of restricted goods to Russia through intermediary jurisdictions, including Hong Kong and Kazakhstan, using front companies. The convictions reportedly included criminal organisation, illegal exports, forgery and customs fraud. This appears to be one of the few publicly reported Belgian convictions concerning Russia-related sanctions circumvention.

Similarly, there is only limited case law publicly available from the Council of State on appeals against negative licence decisions to release frozen assets.

Legal Developments

EU measures concerning immobilised Russian sovereign assets remain particularly important for Belgian practice because Euroclear – one of the world’s leading international central securities depositories – is based in Belgium. The 2024 EU framework allowing net profits generated by immobilised Russian central bank assets held in EU central securities depositories to be used in support of Ukraine continues to apply. However, the more significant recent development was the debate in late 2025 over a possible reparations loan linked to cash balances associated with those immobilised assets.

Belgium played a central role in that debate because of Euroclear’s exposure, with the Belgian Prime Minister, Bart De Wever, seeking EU-wide guarantees and risk-sharing before supporting any mechanism that could expose Belgium or Euroclear to disproportionate legal or financial risk. In December 2025, EU leaders did not proceed with the reparations loan at that stage and instead agreed to provide Ukraine with a EUR90 billion loan for 2026–2027 based on EU borrowing, while calling for further technical and legal work on a possible mechanism linked to Russia’s immobilised assets.

A second important development concerns the transposition of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for violations of Union restrictive measures. In March 2026, the Commission sent Belgium a reasoned opinion for failure to notify full transposition measures. In July 2026 Belgium adopted the draft law transposing the Directive, which is planned to enter into force on 1 September 2026. Once in force, the transposing law will alter the Belgian penalties framework as discussed in 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions.

Legal Developments

A recent development concerns the EU’s increasing use of more targeted sanctions measures “on a rolling basis” – the so-called “mini-packages”, alongside the adoption of the large numbered sanctions packages. The EU has indicated that it intends to adopt certain measures, in particular listings of vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet, more frequently rather than waiting for the next comprehensive package of sanctions against Russia. This approach is intended to allow the EU to react more quickly to newly identified vessels, entities and circumvention networks.

This shift is already visible in practice. In June 2026, while negotiations on the 21st package of sanctions were ongoing, the Council adopted a separate set of sanctions targeting, among others, Russia’s military-industrial complex and shadow fleet ecosystem. The future EU sanctions landscape may therefore increasingly combine comprehensive sanctions packages with smaller and more frequent targeted measures.

Administrative Review by the Council of the European Union

The individual or entity designated under EU sanctions may ‒ within a time limit determined by the Council – submit observations to the Council, asking for a review or removal of their listing. Those observations are submitted only once, and could include detailed reasons and supporting evidence explaining why the listing is not or no longer justified or why the circumstances have changed.

The Council reviews the observations and considers the evidence provided as part of a general review for all listed persons from the same third country. If the Council finds the arguments justified, it may decide to remove the individual or entity from the sanctions list. If the Council rejects the request, the individual or entity remains on the sanctions list.

The Council must provide sufficient and concrete reasons for each (re-)listing decision.

Judicial Review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

The individual or entity can bring an action for annulment before the EU’s General Court in accordance with Articles 263, paragraph 4 and Article 275, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The applicant must argue that the listing is unlawful, presenting grounds such as violations of fundamental rights, lack of sufficient Council evidence, procedural errors or errors of assessment.

If the General Court finds the listing unlawful, it annuls the individual listing, which – in principle – should result in the individual’s or entity’s removal from the sanctions list. However, the Council may find new reasons for maintaining the listing of the successful applicant. If the General Court upholds the listing, the individual or entity remains on the list with the same or updated reasons.

Compensation of Damages

Alongside or following the annulment action, the individual or entity can file a claim for damages before the CJEU. The claim must demonstrate that the wrongful listing caused financial loss or other harm and establish a causal link between the listing and the damages. If the court finds in favour of the applicant, it awards damages to compensate for the financial and non-material harm suffered. If the court rejects the claim, no compensation is awarded.

In the context of EU law, which is relevant for Belgian law, a de-listing challenge can achieve several significant outcomes.

First, an individual or entity may be delisted by the Council. This occurs when the Council reviews evidence and decides to remove the individual or entity from the list, finding that the original reasons for listing are no longer valid or were incorrect.

Second, the EU’s General Court can annul the listing, if an individual or entity brings an action before the General Court, and the latter finds it unlawful. Annulment of a listing decision does not, however, automatically result in delisting. The Council retains the power to relist but may only do so on new grounds or new evidence. This was confirmed in the landmark case, Tokareva v Council (Case T-693/25); the General Court found, for the first time, that the Council had violated Article 266 TFEU – which requires the Council to take necessary measures to comply with the judgment annulling the listing – by relisting Ms Tokareva on the same grounds as the earlier annulled measures and without adducing new evidence capable of supporting the relisting.

Lastly, an individual may file an action for damages to the EU’s General Court. If the General Court determines that the listing was unlawful and caused harm, it can award damages to compensate for the financial loss and other harm suffered due to the wrongful listing. Such damages have rarely been awarded, owing to the difficulty of meeting the legal tests for damages suffered and causality.

In the EU legal system, which is relevant for Belgium, the minimum period in which delisting can occur is six to 12 months from the date of initial listing – something that is relevant for sanctions against Russia and Belarus. This may extend to several years in cases where the individual’s/entity’s listing is renewed at regular reviews and/or is challenged in the EU’s General Court.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes several service-related bans aimed at restricting trade and economic interactions with Russia. These bans, alongside legal and other professional services prohibitions, include the following.

• Technical assistance and brokering services: there is a prohibition on the provision of technical assistance, brokering services, or other services related to goods and technology covered by export bans. This includes, among others, services associated with the use of dual-use goods and technologies that might contribute to Russia’s military or technological enhancement.
• Financial services: there is a ban on providing financial assistance for trade involving prohibited goods and technologies. This extends to credit-rating services and other financial activities that could support Russian sanctioned sectors.
• Professional, business and industrial software services: the provision of a range of professional services to the Russian government and entities established in Russia, including accounting, auditing, tax consulting, legal advisory, architectural, engineering, IT consultancy, advertising and market-research services, is prohibited. Restrictions also apply to enterprise-management software and industrial-design and manufacturing software. The 18th package added software management systems and software for specified banking and financial-sector uses, while the 20th package added a prohibition on the provision of managed security services.
• Transport and logistics services: the regulation bans services related to the transportation of goods covered by the sanctions. This includes restrictions on Russian transport undertakings operating within the EU and the use of EU ports and locks for certain Russian vessels.
• Prohibition on media services: certain Russian media outlets are subject to a broadcasting suspension within the EU. Additionally, advertising on these banned media outlets by any means is prohibited.
• Prohibition to provide services directly related to tourism activities in Russia, including travel agency and tour operator services, tourist guide services and advertising services connected with those activities.
• Cryptocurrency services: the provision of crypto-asset services to Russian nationals, persons residing in Russia, or legal persons and entities established in Russia is prohibited. More recent measures separately introduced a total sectoral ban on crypto-asset service providers and platforms based in Russia that facilitate the transfer or exchange of crypto-assets. The measures reflect the EU’s increasing focus on crypto-assets as a means of sanctions circumvention.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 imposes restrictions on the exportation and importation of several goods to and from Russia. These restrictions include the following.

• Dual-use goods and technology, which can be used for both civilian and military purposes, are restricted. Military goods, specifically designed for military applications, are also prohibited. Maritime navigation equipment for maritime use is restricted, as are advanced electronics and components – particularly those intended for military applications. Industrial machinery used in various production processes is also included in the sanctions.
• Sanctions targeting the energy sector include a phased prohibition to import, purchase or transfer of Russian LNG into the EU.
• Aviation and space industry goods, including aircraft and spacecraft, are restricted as well. Certain motor vehicles ‒ including trucks, buses and special vehicles, as well as high-end luxury vehicles – are prohibited.
• High-value luxury goods (eg, luxury cars, jewellery and high-end fashion items) are banned if they exceed certain value thresholds. Precious metals and stones (eg, gold, silver, platinum and diamonds) are banned.
• Iron and steel products and other revenue-generating imports, including raw materials, metals, chemicals and minerals, are sanctioned, alongside coal and other solid fossil fuels.
• Banknotes and securities, which include currency and financial instruments, are restricted under the sanctions.

Belgian courts may consider compliance with sanctions as a case of force majeure. This means that companies may be able to invoke force majeure clauses in their contracts to suspend or terminate performance of obligations as a result of sanctions against Russia. If the performance of a contract becomes illegal owing to the sanctions imposed, Belgian courts may rule that the contract cannot be performed. This can lead to the application of the doctrine of “frustration”, whereby a contract is rescinded because it has become impossible to perform it without breaking the law.

Belgian courts handle the enforcement of judgments involving sanctions by carefully adhering to both domestic law and EU regulations.

Under EU law, judgments rendered by courts in other EU member states generally enjoy automatic recognition and enforcement within all EU member states. It is not required to obtain prior recognition and enforcement by a Belgian court.

However, in practice, EU operators may still refuse enforcement if circumstances that appear to be a violation of EU sanctions become known during enforcement efforts. This is particularly true if they were not addressed by an EU court judgment or if the activity required by the EU operator is subject to licence requirements (such as release of funds by a bank).

In such cases, parties involved may request required domestic licences based on the judgment or address the issue to a specific entity called the Attachment Judge (beslagrechter or juge des saisies), who is competent for disputes arising from conservatory or executionary attachment of assets or the enforcement of judgments on Belgian territory.

Judgments rendered by courts outside the EU can be enforced in Belgium under the rules of the Belgian Code of Private International Law but need to obtain an exequatur. The exequatur is essentially a judgment confirming recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment on Belgian territory. This is an ex parte procedure within which the Belgian court reviews the outcome of a foreign judgment for compliance with, inter alia, EU sanctions.

Compliance with EU sanctions is considered to fall under the public order exceptions that may lead to non-recognition or non-enforcement of foreign judgments.

The Council, which represents the governments of EU member states, adopts legal acts imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) through decisions and regulations. These decisions are typically based on proposals from individual member states, the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS). Such decisions are binding on EU member states, including Belgium.

Belgian law and its courts generally adhere to the “owned or controlled” criteria set out in the guidance issued by the Commission and the best practices issued by the Council.

The concepts of ownership and control were clarified in the Council’s updated Best Practices document of July 2024, which modifies the notion of ownership from “more than 50%” to “50% or more” (therefore including the scenario where a designated person or entity owns exactly 50% of another entity). It also explicitly confirmed that the 50% ownership threshold includes cases where multiple designated persons’ shares are aggregated.

Control may be established on the basis of legal rights or factual indicators such as veto powers, nominee structures or other indirect means of influence.

The Council’s updated Best Practices identify several criteria which should be taken into account when assessing whether a legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity, alone or pursuant to an agreement with another shareholder or other third party. These criteria could include:

• having the right or exercising the power to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of such legal person or entity;
• having appointed ‒ solely as a result of the exercise of one’s voting rights – a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of a legal person or entity who have held office during the present and previous financial year;
• controlling alone ‒ pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or members of a legal person or entity – a majority of shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in that legal person or entity;
• having the right to exercise a dominant influence over a legal person or entity – pursuant to an agreement entered into with that legal person or entity or pursuant to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association – where the law governing that legal person or entity permits its being subject to such agreement or provision;
• having the power to exercise the right to exercise a dominant influence referred to in the preceding point, without being the holder of that right;
• having the right to use all or part of the assets of a legal person or entity;
• managing the business of a legal person or entity on a unified basis, while publishing consolidated accounts; and
• sharing jointly and severally the financial liabilities of a legal person or entity, or guaranteeing them.

If any of these criteria are satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is controlled by a designated person or entity, unless the contrary can be established on a case-by-case basis.