Common asset classes securitised in the UK include:
Other less common asset classes that have been securitised in the UK include:
The transactional structures used in securitisations are designed to isolate financial assets, transfer risk and create securities that can be sold to investors.
Securitisation structures are typically constructed to be bankruptcy-remote, meaning the SPE’s assets remain beyond the reach of the originator’s creditors in the event of bankruptcy. In addition, credit enhancement techniques (such as tranching of the securities into different levels of seniority, maintaining cash reserves or procuring third-party credit support such as guarantees) are used to achieve desired credit ratings and to attract investors.
In a standard securitisation, it is common for the originator to continue to administer the receivables on the SPE’s behalf under a servicing agreement in return for a servicing fee. The originator will typically maintain the original contract with the underlying debtors. To mitigate the risk of non-performance by the originator of the servicing and collection role, back-up servicers may also be appointed, such that an alternative and suitably experienced and creditworthy entity is in a position to take over the servicing of the receivables in the event of a default by the originator/servicer.
Payments are made periodically (typically monthly or quarterly) by the SPE according to a priority specified in the transaction documents (often referred to as the cash flow waterfall or priority of payments). The priority will typically change on the occurrence of certain triggers (such as a deterioration in one or more financial performance metrics or an event of default).
Any money left over after all such payments have been made is extracted from the SPE and either retained by the holders of the most subordinated tranche of securities or passed back to the originator using various profit extraction techniques. These profit extraction techniques may include:
Synthetic securitisations, where the assets are retained by the originator, are also common in the UK. These are structured in various ways, and can involve credit-linked notes (CLNs), credit default swaps (CDSs) and/or financial guarantees. They are often used by banks and other financial institutions to transfer credit risk and improve the regulatory capital treatment of assets they have originated. See 5. Synthetic Securitisation.
Securitisation transactions are governed by a complex framework of laws and regulations that encompass corporate law, contract law, insolvency law, regulatory requirements and specific securitisation regulations. Historically, an important piece of legislation was the Securitisation Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 (the “EU Securitisation Regulation”), which was onshored into UK domestic law (in slightly modified form) post-Brexit (the “UK Securitisation Regulation”). However, on 1 November 2024, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) each released new rules that, together with the Securitisation Regulations 2024 (as amended by the Securitisation (Amendment) Regulations 2024 and the Securitisation (Amendment) (No 2) Regulations 2024) (the “Securitisation Regulations 2024” and, together with the FCA and PRA rules, the “UK Securitisation Framework”), replaced the UK Securitisation Regulation. These rules regulate not only authorised firms that are involved in securitisation, but also entities that are not authorised but that act as the original lender, originator or securitisation special purpose entity (SSPE) of a securitisation.
Between the end of the Brexit transition period and 1 November 2024, the UK Securitisation Regulation applied in Britain. The UK Securitisation Regulation set out the following:
Since 1 November 2024, the new UK Securitisation Framework has largely replicated the requirements of the UK Securitisation Regulation (and, therefore, the EU Securitisation), albeit with some technical improvements with respect to (in particular) due diligence, risk retention and transparency requirements. It is likely, however, that further changes will be made over time (and, indeed, the new UK rules have been constructed in a manner that facilitates future changes). In addition, even if the UK rules themselves do not change, there remains the possibility that those rules and the EU Securitisation Regulation – currently subject to the new European Commission proposals of 17 June 2025 (the “EC Proposals”) – will diverge over time, resulting in a dual compliance burden for UK issuers marketing into both the UK and the EU (as is almost always the case with public securitisations).
There are also other relevant areas of the FCA and PRA rules that include regulations on the capital treatment for banks and investment firms, and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA 2000”), which provides the overarching framework for financial regulation.
For securitisations relating to certain asset classes, other rules will also be relevant. For example, in the case of those involving residential mortgages, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 and the FCA’s mortgage rules requires specific authorisations, and adherence to certain rules, for mortgage lending and administration.
Consumer credit laws (including the Consumer Credit Act 1974) will be relevant to securitisations involving consumer loans (including auto loans and credit cards), and impose detailed requirements on the origination of those loans and the conduct of the servicer. In particular, a wide-ranging consumer duty applies in the UK, which includes a requirement for consumer lenders to provide good customer outcomes.
Investor due diligence will typically involve assessing the extent to which the originator and servicer have complied with applicable legislation when originating and servicing loans, the risk being that non-compliance could reduce the amounts recoverable and ultimately the amounts available to pay and repay investors.
Lastly, international standards like Basel III (partially implemented in the UK with outstanding reforms effective on 1 January 2027 and full phase-in completion by 1 January 2030) impact the securitisation market by setting out risk-based capital requirements for banking institutions that may hold securitised assets.
SPEs in UK securitisations can be incorporated in a variety of jurisdictions, depending on the goals of the securitisation, the originator’s location, tax considerations, regulatory concerns and investor preferences.
Kingdom (England and Wales)
SPEs incorporated in the UK are frequently seen. The UK has a clear legal framework, including for corporate establishment, and a specific tax regime for securitisation companies. Using an SPE established in the UK is often the simplest choice where a securitisation relates to UK assets.
European Union
Where a transaction involves assets relating to a jurisdiction in the EU, or where the securitisation transaction is intended to constitute an STS securitisation for the purposes of the EU Securitisation Regulation, an SPE is typically established in the EU, with Luxembourg and Ireland (both of which have favourable tax regimes and a wide network of taxation treaties and benefit from investor familiarity) being the most popular.
Other Jurisdictions
SPEs are occasionally established in Jersey, Guernsey or the Cayman Islands, although this is happening less frequently (although Jersey remains popular as a listing venue).
Four primary forms of credit enhancement are commonly used to improve the creditworthiness of the debt issued.
The issuer typically takes the form of a bankruptcy-remote SPE, which is a legally distinct entity created solely to carry out the securitisation transaction. The role of the issuer is typically to acquire or hold an economic interest in the pool of assets to be securitised and issue the securitised debt to investors. The issuer’s key obligations are to make payments of principal and interest as required by the transaction documents, to the extent that cash – derived from collections on the receivables – is available for it to do so.
Securitisation transactions sometimes, but not always, have a “sponsor”. This is a financial institution that establishes the transaction and plays a role in its ongoing operation. The sponsor is often involved in structuring the transaction and selecting the portfolio of assets, and may handle or oversee the servicing of the assets post-securitisation. Sponsors can also provide credit enhancement or liquidity facilities to the transaction, or retain risk in the transaction.
An entity that acts as sponsor is subject to regulatory requirements under the UK Securitisation Framework (or the EU Securitisation Regulation, as applicable).
An originator is the entity that originally creates or originates the assets being securitised, or that purchases such assets before they are securitised. In a typical securitisation transaction, the originator sells or transfers a portfolio of financial assets to an SPE, such as loans, credit card receivables or mortgages. The originator is sometimes a financial institution such as a bank, but non-bank originators are a growing feature of the securitisation market. An originator will typically have an ongoing interest in the securitisation. Often, this is by way of an entitlement to the cash generated by the sold receivables to the extent it is not needed to pay third-party investors.
An entity that acts as originator is subject to regulatory requirements under the UK Securitisation Framework (or the EU Securitisation Regulation, as applicable).
Underwriters/arrangers – often investment banks – serve to facilitate the issuing and distribution of the securitised instruments to investors. Their role encompasses structuring the transaction, pricing the securities, ensuring compliance with relevant legal and regulatory frameworks relating to the marketing of securities and often providing a commitment to purchase any unsold securities. Public securitisations, where the securities are to be widely distributed, will typically have multiple banks that act as underwriters/arrangers.
In private placements or direct issuances where the securities are sold to a smaller number of sophisticated investors, underwriters are less frequently seen. In such cases, a bank may be appointed to market the deal but not provide an underwriting commitment. A bank fulfilling this function could be described as a placement agent (although that description/title is not frequently used in a securitisation context).
The servicer is responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the securitised assets, such as collecting payments from borrowers, handling customer enquiries, managing delinquencies and undertaking enforcement and repossession procedures, if necessary.
Servicers thus play a critical role in maintaining the performance and cash flow stability of the securitised asset pool and will generally receive a fee for their role that is sufficient to attract a replacement servicer if the original servicer ceases to be able to perform its role.
The entity that acts as servicer is often the same entity, or part of the same group, as the originator, but transaction documents typically contemplate that the servicer may be replaced in the future (for example, if the original servicer ceases to be able to perform its role). Specialist servicers are frequently appointed at the outset of transactions to act as back-up servicers, with the intention being that such an entity would be able to quickly assume the role of servicer, if necessary.
Investors provide the capital necessary for funding the purchase of assets by buying the securities issued by the SPE. They are typically institutions such as banks, pension funds, insurance companies and asset managers, seeking to deploy capital and earn a yield. Investors will perform due diligence to assess the risk profile, credit quality and potential returns of the securitisation. Their investment decisions are guided by their own analysis of the underlying assets, the structure of the deal, the protections afforded by credit enhancements and, on rated deals, the ratings provided by credit rating agencies (CRAs).
A note trustee is typically appointed on behalf of the investors in the securitisation. The note trustee will typically be party to the key transaction documents and give the investors, indirectly, the benefit of the representations, warranties and undertakings of the other parties to such documentation.
In practice, the note trustee will typically play an active role in two circumstances:
In UK and European transactions, note trustees will typically otherwise play a passive role and not seek, for example, to monitor compliance.
Note trustees are usually trust corporations (and may be owned by specialist service providers or financial institutions with dedicated trustee departments). While note trustees are common in securitisation structures, some transactions (especially those with non-UK aspects) might utilise alternative mechanisms like an owner trust or a fiscal agent arrangement, which provides a different level of oversight and control over the adherence to the structure's terms but may offer less comprehensive protection for noteholders than a traditional note trustee.
A security trustee (or, less frequently, a security agent) is appointed to hold and manage the security interests on behalf of the secured parties (most notably, the investors). The security trustee, which is typically the same firm as the note trustee, takes, directly, the benefit of the security and holds it on behalf of the secured parties. Its responsibilities include managing the security according to the terms of the security documentation, handling enforcement proceedings in the event of default (as directed by noteholders) and distributing proceeds from any enforcement in accordance with the post-enforcement priority of payments. Although focused on security, the role of the security trustee overlaps with that of a note trustee, and both the note trustee and security trustee will have a role to play where consents are required (for example, in relation to amendments or in the case of a default).
Customary documentation effecting bankruptcy-remote transfers to an SPE typically comprises a receivables purchase agreement and a declaration of trust over amounts standing to the credit of collection accounts. Key terms include:
The declaration of trust over the collection accounts is intended to avoid collections forming part of the originator’s (or servicer’s) insolvent estate, and is typically formally notified to and acknowledged by the collection account bank, so as to reduce the risk that such bank may set off amounts standing to the credit of such accounts against other liabilities of the originator or servicer.
The originator, servicer, SSPE and, to a more limited extent, other transaction parties will give warranties relating to certain fundamental matters, such as their capacity, power, authority and solvency.
In addition, the originator will give asset warranties. Most fundamentally, the originator will confirm that the assets are free from encumbrances and that it has the right and ability to sell them. In addition, the originator will represent that the sold assets comply with a set of carefully drafted eligibility criteria. If the asset warranties are breached, the originator will typically be required to repurchase the affected assets or make a compensatory payment equal to the face value of the relevant assets.
In a securitisation where there is a transfer by assignment, the transfer documentation will normally provide for this to take effect in equity only and for perfection of that assignment to occur on (and only on) specified perfection events. Perfection turns the equitable assignment of receivables into a legal assignment, and is important in ensuring the priority of claims and the ability of the SPE to enforce rights under the receivables in circumstances in which the servicer/originator is not able to do so.
Perfection will typically entail the notification of underlying borrowers/obligors and, in certain cases, registration of the SPE’s interest in related assets (for example, at the Land Registry).
Key covenants typically include:
Covenants are enforceable by the trustee on behalf of noteholders. Of the foregoing, failure by the issuer to pay amounts owed by it or otherwise comply with its obligations will be an event of default under the notes. Breach of fundamental covenants by the originator may result in a perfection event. Breach by a servicer or cash manager of its duties is likely to entitle the trustee to terminate the appointment of the servicer or cash manager and appoint a replacement.
Key obligations of the servicer typically include:
Breaches of servicing obligations can trigger the replacement of the servicer.
Key events of default typically include, subject in some cases to grace periods:
The occurrence of an event of default would typically entitle noteholders to direct the trustee to accelerate payment obligations under the notes and to direct the security trustee to enforce security.
Indemnities are carefully negotiated and vary from deal to deal. In some deals, indemnities are given by the originator in respect of losses caused by the sale of ineligible assets. In public deals, the originator and/or issuer will usually indemnify the financial institutions placing the notes with investors against losses caused by inadequate disclosure or other risks arising from that role.
The notes are typically constituted by a trust deed or a deed of covenant, with terms and conditions set out in a trust deed.
The terms and conditions set out the issuer’s payment obligations, interest provisions, maturity dates and redemption rights, and can sometimes also set out other provisions, such as covenants, representations and warranties, events of default, cash flow waterfalls and provisions regarding ranking and security (although these provisions can equally be found in other related documentation). Either the conditions or the trust deed will set out provisions governing voting and decision-making by noteholders. In the case of a public securitisation, the terms and conditions are typically set out in full in the prospectus.
Derivatives are often, but not always, used in order to hedge interest rate basis risk and (where relevant) currency risk; where present, they are usually entered into by the SPE.
Commonly encountered derivatives include rate swaps, caps or floors. These derivatives are employed to hedge various risks, as follows:
Aside from the hedging of risk, currency swaps enable the issuance of notes in a currency other than that of the underlying assets, thereby allowing securitisations to issue notes targeted at investors in different jurisdictions.
A prospectus is typically required when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market. A prospectus will set out detailed information on the notes and the issuer, as well as on the seller and the underlying securitised assets, in a manner that is consistent with the applicable legal requirements (if the notes are issued to the public or listed on a regulated market in the UK, until 1 January 2026, the Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as retained and amended by UK law post-Brexit and, post 1 January 2026, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Public Offers and Admissions to Trading) Regulations 2023 and FCA rules; if the notes are issued to the public or listed on a regulated market in the EU, the EU Prospectus Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 ). For private placements or other transactions not involving public offerings or regulated markets, the issuer will instead be required to publish a transaction summary, with less extensive/detailed content.
In addition to the disclosure requirements relating to the offer of securities to the public or listing on a regulated market (see 3.10 Offering Memoranda), there are also specific disclosure regulations applicable to investors in the UK under the UK Securitisation Framework rules (ie, the FCA and PRA rules) and applicable to EU investors under the EU Securitisation Regulation. The originator, SPE and any sponsor are, if based in the UK, jointly responsible for providing the required information under the UK Securitisation Framework as a matter of UK law and, if based in the EU, or if based in the UK and the terms of the securitisation so specify (which is commonly the case, in order to facilitate marketing of UK deals to EU investors), jointly responsible for providing the required information under the EU Securitisation Regulation as a matter of law (in the case of EU-based entities) or contract (in the case of UK-based entities), although one of them must be designated as the entity that fulfils the requirements in practice. Information required to be made available is similar under both UK and EU regimes and includes loan level performance data (on the basis of prescribed templates), as well as the transaction documents and investor reports. In the case of a public securitisation (determined by reference to whether or not there is a prospectus), information must be made available by way of an authorised securitisation repository.
See 4.1 Specific Disclosure Laws or Regulations.
Both the EU Securitisation Regulation and the UK Securitisation Framework mandate credit risk retention to ensure that originators or sponsors have “skin in the game”. The FCA and PRA rules and the EU Securitisation Regulation risk retention regimes are very similar and require a minimum retention of 5% of the credit risk of the securitised exposures. This can be done by way of (one of) a number of permitted methods, including by retention of a vertical slice of securitised notes, a first loss tranche of securitised notes or the maintaining of exposure to a random selection of assets that would otherwise be securitised.
The FCA and PRA rules are overseen by the FCA and the PRA, respectively, which enforce compliance through supervision, auditing and sanctions. Penalties for non-compliance may include fines and other regulatory penalties.
It is essential that the risk is retained for the life of the transaction. Hedging or transferring of the retained exposure is permitted under the FCA and PRA rules only where the hedge is:
The UK Securitisation Framework (in the case of UK investors) and the EU Securitisation Regulation (in the case of EU investors) set out periodic reporting requirements for transactions, as described in 4.1 Specific Disclosure Laws or Regulations. Originators, sponsors and issuers are required to provide regular reports on the performance and underlying exposures of the securitised assets. These reports include data on the credit quality and cash flows of the assets, which must be made available to investors, potential investors and the relevant authorities. The reports are typically required on a quarterly basis, but are sometimes provided monthly, depending on the asset type and the transaction’s structure. Non-compliance with these reporting obligations may lead to enforcement action by regulatory authorities, including fines or other penalties.
The reports described in the foregoing must be made available on standardised, prescribed templates in accordance with the FCA and PRA rules and/or the relevant technical standards under the EU Securitisation Regulation (depending on which regime(s) apply). Under the UK Securitisation Framework, UK institutional investors in non-UK securitisations need not be concerned with the format of reporting provided they receive information sufficient to assess the risks of holding the securitisation position (and so can generally invest in securitisations that report under the EU Securitisation Regulation regime).
If the notes are listed on a public market, reporting and other obligations under the UK Market Abuse Regulation (which is retained EU law) (UK MAR) or the EU Market Abuse Regulation (EU MAR) can also apply in relation to inside information.
The activities of CRAs in the UK are regulated, with the key regulation being the UK Credit Rating Agencies Regulation (the “UK CRA Regulation”), which is retained EU law, with CRAs being supervised by the FCA. The FCA ensures CRAs adhere to standards of integrity, transparency and analytical rigour by requiring that they are registered, disclose and manage conflicts of interest, and apply appropriate rating methodologies. Enforcement of rules can lead to sanctions, fines or suspension of the CRA’s registration.
In the UK, capital and liquidity rules apply for banks, insurers and certain other regulated financial entities, and are broadly aligned with international standards. For banks, the UK Capital Requirements Regulation (the “UK CRR”), which incorporates the Basel III requirements, dictates the risk weighting applied to securitisation positions to determine regulatory capital requirements. Under UK Solvency II (“UK SII”), insurers (and reinsurers) must also hold capital against securitisation investments on a similar basis. Under HM Treasury’s project to replace assimilated law relating to financial services (such as the UK CRR and UK SII) (referred to as the “Smarter Regulatory Framework”), most firm-facing provisions of the UK CRR and UK SII assimilated law have been extensively amended and supplemented (and in part replaced) by PRA rules. Further revocations, restatements and transitional measures are scheduled in respect of the UK CRR through 2026 and 2027 as part of the UK’s Basel 3.1 implementation and wider prudential reform.
Regulated UK financial institutions must also adhere to liquidity requirements, ensuring they hold sufficient high-quality liquid assets (which may include certain securitisation positions) to cover short-term liabilities. These rules aim to mitigate systemic risk and ensure financial stability. Non-compliance with capital and liquidity requirements can result in penalties, increased capital charges or other regulatory actions.
Derivatives used in securitisations are regulated in the UK under the UK European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which is EU law onshored post-Brexit (the “UK EMIR”). These regulations mandate risk mitigation techniques for non-centrally cleared derivatives and reporting of all derivative contracts to trade repositories. The FCA is the primary enforcer of these rules, with the Bank of England also playing a role. In practice, securitisation SPEs are treated as non-financial counterparties under the UK EMIR; this means that derivatives regulation applicable to securitisations is much lighter than, for example, that applicable in transactions between banks or other financial counterparties.
The UK Securitisation Framework and FSMA 2000 protect investors, along with the UK MAR, the UK CRR and the UK SII. The regulations aim to encourage due diligence and monitoring, whilst also avoiding insider trading, market manipulation and instability. The FCA and PRA enforce these rules, focusing on transparency, risk retention and due diligence. Breaches can result in sanctions, fines and restrictions on the relevant entities.
Please see 4.6 Treatment of Securitisation in Financial Entities.
SPEs established in the UK are registered as companies under the Companies Act 2006, with limited liability. Where it is proposed that securities are issued to the public, the SPE is registered as a public company. Limited liability companies are generally preferred as the form of entity used as SPEs in UK securitisations for several reasons, as follows.
To enhance the foregoing, it is usual for an SPE’s shares to be held on trust by a corporate services provider, with the trust being in favour of a charitable purpose rather than any individual beneficiaries. The lack of any individuals/entities that can be said to beneficially own or control the SPE enhances its bankruptcy remoteness and separation from the originator’s group and the corporate service provider’s group.
It is important that an SPE avoids engaging in activities that would classify it as conducting a “regulated activity” under the FSMA, such as deposit-taking or providing investment advice or insurance business. This is to maintain its status as a bankruptcy-remote entity and to avoid the need for authorisation by the FCA or the PRA. The activities performed by the SPE are determined by its directors, but these are strictly limited in the transaction documents to ensure compliance with regulations and avoid the SPE becoming exposed to extraneous risks.
Where the underlying assets are regulated mortgages or other consumer finance receivables, servicing activities facing customers are typically regulated and require regulatory permission. It is therefore a servicer – with the appropriate permissions – that performs this role, rather than the SPE.
If an SPE performs regulated activities, it could face enforcement actions, including fines or sanctions, and may be required to cease activities or obtain the appropriate authorisations, which could impact the securitisation structure. In practice, this is a fairly minimal risk and is unlikely to arise with proper drafting of the transaction documents and transaction structuring.
The UK government has an established history of participating in the securitisation market, albeit to a much more limited extent than US agencies (for example, there is no UK equivalent of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac). Examples include the securitisation by UK Asset Resolution of receivables acquired from rescued banks in the financial crisis, and the use by the British Business Bank of securitisation funding tools to fund SME lenders via its ENABLE programme.
A wide variety of investors invest in securitisations, including banks, pension funds, asset managers, insurance companies and – primarily in respect of mezzanine tranches – private credit funds.
UK regulated investors are required to conduct due diligence on securitisations before they invest, with prescribed rules for this set out in the FCA and PRA rules. This includes a requirement to ensure that securitisations themselves comply with a number of provisions of the UK Securitisation Framework (to the extent applicable), such as reporting requirements.
However, the due diligence regime under the UK Securitisation Framework is now more flexible than under the EU Securitisation Regulation in that it does not force UK investors to obtain reporting on UK templates, and so facilitates investment by UK investors in EU deals where reporting is only on EU templates. The same flexibility is not included in the EU Securitisation Regulation (nor in the EC Proposals), thus requiring UK issuers to satisfy both UK and EU reporting requirements where there are EU investors who require reporting on EU Securitisation Regulation templates.
The UK GDPR (the onshored version of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation) and the Data Protection Act 2018 govern the handling of personal data, which must be considered carefully in every transaction, especially where the underlying assets are obligations of individuals. It is a fundamental principle of securitisations that the securitisation structure can outlast the business of the servicer, but a large volume of personal data relating to underlying customers must be made available to a replacement servicer in order for this to occur. It is important to ensure that arrangements in this regard are lawful and operate on an appropriate basis. For so long as the original servicer remains responsible for servicing the assets, the transfer, holding and processing of personal data by the SPE and any investors are minimised.
Synthetic securitisations are common in the UK; whilst this was a relatively quiet market in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, it has grown very significantly in recent years. Synthetic securitisation is a form of structured finance where credit risks are transferred to investors using credit derivatives or guarantees rather than through the transfer of actual assets. The focus is on the transfer of risk rather than the transfer of the underlying assets themselves, as found in traditional securitisations. Synthetic securitisations, like true sale securitisations, operate by virtue of general principles of English contract and property law, although the UK Securitisation Framework does apply.
In terms of structure, a synthetic securitisation typically involves the following elements.
The purpose of a securitisation is to give the investor exposure to the credit risk of underlying obligors, not the originator. Structural protections and contractual provisions are designed not only to insulate the SPE’s assets from creditors of the originator in the event of insolvency, but also to ensure that investors are exposed only to the obligors. In particular, steps are taken to reduce the possibility of an insolvency practitioner successfully unwinding the transfer of assets to the SPE in the insolvency of the originator (for example, by alleging that the sale amounted to a preference or a transaction at an undervalue). This is primarily achieved by ensuring that the transfer of assets is by way of an arm’s length sale (and that it cannot readily be recharacterised as security) that occurs (other than in the case of securitisations of non-performing or other impaired assets) at the face value of the receivables. In addition, confirmations of the solvency of the originator at the time of sale, often backed up by way of directors’ certificates, are almost always sought.
The key consideration for an SPE is to ensure it is bankruptcy-remote and separate from the corporate group of the originator. This is typically ensured by incorporating an SPE that has no prior history and no contractual relationships other than as part of the securitisation, and that is part of an orphan structure (rather than the corporate group of the originator) as described in 4.10 SPEs or Other Entities. The directors of an SPE are typically provided by a corporate services provider that is appointed as part of the securitisation and are not employees of the originator.
English courts do not recognise the doctrine of substantive consolidation.
The transfer of receivables by way of equitable assignment (see 3.3 Principal Perfection Provisions) results in the SPE acquiring an equitable interest in such receivables and a right to the benefit of collections relating to such receivables.
In the ordinary course, the transfer of receivables will not be notified to the underlying customers – instead, the originator will maintain its customer relationships, and the servicer will collect amounts in the name of the originator.
The servicer will typically hold any collections received on trust for the securitisation SPE before paying such amounts to the SPE. Such a trust is intended to put such amounts beyond the reach of the servicer’s or the originator’s other creditors. It is important to ensure that trust funds are not co-mingled with funds not held on trust, and to ensure that any collection account bank is notified that amounts held in the relevant account are held on trust.
Under certain circumstances, such as the insolvency of the originator, it is usual that the equitable assignment of receivables will be perfected into a legal assignment by notifying the underlying obligors of the sale of receivables – see 3.3 Principal Perfection Provisions.
It is common for legal analysis to be undertaken to confirm that the transfer of receivables operates by way of a sale and is not readily recharacterisable as security. It is customary for counsel for the arranger/investors to deliver a formal, reasoned legal opinion to this effect. Counsel will typically look to ensure that:
It is also possible to use a trust instead of a “true sale” of assets. In this less common structure, the originator would declare a trust over its rights under the assets, with the SPE as the beneficiary. Whilst this achieves bankruptcy-remoteness, it is uncommon in practice.
In addition, it is inherent in a synthetic securitisation that investors’ rights are tied to the performance of the portfolio of reference assets, rather than the originator.
Securitisation documents will always include specific provisions to protect the SPE from insolvency. One key measure is the “limited recourse” provision, which ensures that the investors can only claim against the secured assets of the SPE, and not beyond that for any shortfall.
Another safeguard is the “non-petition” clause, where the investors agree not to petition for the insolvency of the SPE. This prevents the investors from forcing the SPE into insolvency proceedings, thereby allowing the securitisation structure to remain intact and cash flows to be distributed by way of the prescribed cash flow waterfalls – even in circumstances in which payments to noteholders are delayed or not made in full due to a shortfall in cash generated by the securitised assets.
In addition, the SPE is typically structured so as not to form part of the corporate group of the originator, and the transfer of assets to the SPE is structured as a sale.
Generally, there are no taxes payable by the SPE on the transfer to it of the financial assets from the originator. There may be potential stamp taxes on the transfer of certain interests in real estate or equity-like securities to the SPE, but this is usually not an issue for securitisations.
Provided that a UK tax resident SPE satisfies the conditions imposed by the Taxation of Securitisation Companies Regulations 2006, the SPE will be chargeable to corporation tax only on the retained profit after it has paid its expenses in accordance with the transaction waterfall. Practitioners will therefore generally structure the SPE so that it benefits from this tax regime by ensuring that:
Withholding Taxes and Cross-Border Payments Received by the SPE
The financial assets securitised in UK SPEs are typically UK financial assets, so UK withholding taxes are not usually an issue. Where cross-border payments are received by a UK resident SPE, withholding taxes may be relevant, depending on the jurisdiction, but treaty or other reliefs may be available to minimise these taxes.
Withholding Taxes and Cross-Border Payments Made by the SPE
The SPE is subject to UK withholding tax at the basic rate of income tax (currently 20%) on interest paid on the securitisation notes it issues, unless an exemption applies. A commonly used exemption is the “quoted Eurobond” exemption, where the notes are listed on a “recognised stock exchange” such as the London Stock Exchange or are admitted to trading on a “multilateral trading facility” operated by a “regulated recognised stock exchange”, being a recognised stock exchange that is regulated in the UK, European Economic Area (EEA) or Gibraltar. The “qualifying private placement” exemption may also be available if the SPE issues notes to investors resident in jurisdictions that are party to a double tax treaty with the UK that includes a “non-discrimination” article. In some securitisations with a more limited number of counterparties, a normal claim for treaty relief may also be possible.
UK VAT on servicing fees incurred by the SPE may be relevant, depending on the nature of the services. Where possible, the servicer will usually look to provide the services in a way that falls within a VAT exemption (such as the exemptions for financing transactions). Where this is not possible, the VAT incurred is likely to be an additional cost of the securitisation.
The tax lawyers acting for the SPE/arrangers/investors are commonly required to give a tax opinion addressed to the SPE, the trustee acting for the noteholders and the arrangers. The material conclusions will generally be that:
The tax opinion(s) will make a number of factual assumptions based on the transaction documentation. Following the introduction of the Pillar 2 tax regime, it has become increasingly common for such opinions to also conclude that the SPE should not be subject to any Pillar 2 taxes.
Originators will typically obtain accounting advice to ensure the desired accounting treatment of the securitisation is achieved. The accounting treatment that is desired and is achievable varies from transaction to transaction, but key considerations include:
As for derecognition, a key consideration is typically whether the originator has sufficiently relinquished control over the sold assets. This requires particular care in the case of whole-loan/forward-flow funding transactions (which, although not strictly securitisations, provide analogous asset-backed funding), where accountants will often require that the purchaser is able to trigger perfection of legal title to the receivables, sell the receivables on and appoint an alternative servicer. Care is required to assess the impact of the exercise of any such rights on, for example, any originator’s entitlement to deferred consideration.
Legal opinions as to “true sale”, the SPE’s independence and bankruptcy-remote status and the legal enforceability of transaction documents are the principal interaction between lawyers and these accounting issues. Accountants are likely to use such opinions when drawing conclusions and advising the originator, but it is uncommon for lawyers to directly opine on the accounting treatment of a given transaction.
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The story of the UK securitisation market in 2025 has generally been one of continued investor confidence and gradual regulatory evolution. The market has benefited from the opportunities presented by private credit investors, increased interest in non-bank lenders, and the continued development of forward flow and platform lending structures providing a pipeline for public and private securitisations. New transaction structures and emerging/growing asset classes – electric vehicles, data centres and equity release mortgages – keep the UK at the forefront of the European securitisation market.
Issuance volumes of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) in the UK declined in 2025 but the market was supported by steadily increasing lending activity in 2025 (2.9% higher than the same time in 2024; Bank of England – Mortgage Lenders and Administrators Statistics – 2025 Q3). The commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market has seen strong issuance volumes and large transactions, especially in the logistics and industrial sectors – though there remain challenges in the retail sector. There was a spotlight on the motor finance sector in 2025, which has been particularly affected by the Hopcraft litigation and the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) proposed redress scheme. Finalisation and implementation of that scheme in 2026 is hoped to provide the certainty required to support more securitisation activity in that sector – in particular, for specialist and non-bank lenders.
UK/EU Divergence
On 1 November 2024, the UK introduced a new securitisation framework to replace the version of the EU Securitisation Regulation (2017/2402) which was (with some limited amendments) incorporated into UK domestic law in the wake of Brexit (the “UK Securitisation Framework”). The UK Securitisation Framework is set out in the Securitisation Regulations 2024 (SI 2024/102) (as amended), the Securitisation Part of the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) Rulebook (the “PRA Securitisation Rules”) and the Securitisation Sourcebook (SECN) of the FCA Handbook (the “FCA Securitisation Rules”), together with the relevant provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) (as amended).
On the whole, the UK Securitisation Framework retains much of the language and substance of the EU Securitisation Regulation, but includes a number of useful clarifications and small yet important improvements (for example, by allowing UK regulated investors greater flexibility in the manner of reporting required to be provided by securitisations in which they invest). Nevertheless, despite the introduction of the UK Securitisation Framework, the regulatory regimes applicable to securitisations in the UK and the EU remain largely aligned, and the UK Securitisation Framework has not undergone any significant reforms since it was introduced.
On 17 June 2025, the European Commission released its proposals for amendments to the EU Securitisation Regulation and the EU Capital Requirements Regulation (the “EU Proposals”). Industry bodies have thus focused their attention this year on digesting and responding to these EU Proposals and the subsequent consultations in respect of the EU Liquidity Coverage Ratio Delegated Regulation and the EU Solvency II Delegated Regulation. These proposals aim to reinvigorate the EU securitisation market by reducing operational complexity and recalibrating prudential requirements to achieve greater proportionality. Key elements include streamlined reporting for private securitisations and adjustments to capital treatment for banks and insurers, mitigating some of the punitive aspects that have historically constrained investor participation.
In the UK, no new consultations have been released during 2025 by the FCA or the PRA in respect of the UK Securitisation Framework, though market participants expect that the UK regulators will focus on improving the reporting and disclosure regimes in 2026. In particular, echoing a theme of the EU Proposals, it is hoped that a more proportionate reporting regime for private transactions may be introduced.
Given the desire of UK and EU issuers to maximise their access to UK and EU investors, divergence of the UK and EU securitisation regimes remains a key focus for market participants. Any divergence between those regimes risks introducing additional complexity, enhanced reporting obligations and duplication of processes for those transactions looking to achieve dual compliance, which can increase cost and adversely affect the functionality of the UK and EU securitisation markets. Areas of divergence arising from the EU Proposals and causing particular concern include:
Each of these topics has been the subject of significant discussion and debate across a broad range of participants in the securitisation market, and the final outcome of the consultation process for the EU Proposals is keenly awaited.
Regulatory Evolution
In addition to the securitisation regulatory developments, 2025 has seen the continued implementation of Basel 3.1 reforms in the UK, certain of which will impact the capital treatment for securitisation exposures. The PRA published PS 12/25: Restatement of CRR and Solvency II Requirements in the PRA Rulebook – 2026 implementation (effective from 1 January 2026) and the PS19/25: Restatement of CRR Requirements – 2027 implementation – near final, which largely preserve current requirements and supervisory expectations relating to the securitisation requirements, but propose some targeted policy changes, including changes to p-factor calculations for the standardised securitisation approach and clarifications relating to the use of unfunded credit protection in synthetic significant risk transfer (SRT) securitisations. Full Basel 3.1 implementation is scheduled for 1 January 2027, with transitional arrangements running until 2030.
Highly discussed in the UK RMBS arena was the 2025 Renter’s Rights Act, which applies to residential “assured” tenancies to individuals only (eg. buy-to-let (BTL) properties and not commercial/business leases). With fixed-term assured shorthold tenancies and Section 21 “no-fault” two-month notices to regain possession being abolished, and new rent increase controls, the slower landlord remedies and reduced income flexibility or potential income voids have reallocated risk towards lenders and landlords, resulting in BTL lenders tightening their underwriting standards. Stricter affordability testing, lower loan-to-value ratios and tighter portfolio and income scrutiny have been a focus for lenders in 2025, as well as the potential impact they may have on the pipeline for UK RMBS transactions.
Environmental, social and governance considerations continue to play an influential role in the UK securitisation market, impacting investor demand, transaction structures and asset eligibility. Regulatory initiatives, including the sustainability and disclosure regime in the UK, have sought to encourage issuers to improve disclosures and transparency regarding the environmental performance of underling assets and thereby inform investors’ investment decisions. This is expected to remain an evolving area in 2026 and beyond, reflecting the changing governmental and regulatory priorities and developments in the macro-economic and political environment.
Motor Finance – Moving on From Hopcraft
During 2025, the UK motor finance industry was beset by uncertainty arising from the Hopcraft case decisions in the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, and the subsequent FCA proposed redress scheme. These have had a material impact on the UK motor finance industry and may have broader consequences for consumer financing and any other financial products originated through brokers.
The case involved three linked appeals that raised common issues about the lawfulness of the payment of commission by auto finance lenders (the “Finance Companies”) to motor dealers (the “Dealers”) in connection with the provision of finance for the hire purchase of cars, where that commission was either not disclosed (as alleged in the case of Hopcraft and another v Close Brothers Limited), or only partly disclosed (as alleged in the case of Johnson v FirstRand Bank Limited (London Branch) t/a MotoNovo Finance (FirstRand) and Wrench v FirstRand Bank Limited (London Branch) t/a MotoNovo Finance), to the hirers of the cars (the “Customers”).
Before the Court of Appeal, the claimants claimed that the commissions paid to the Dealers by the Finance Companies amounted to bribes, or to secret profits received by the Dealers in breach of the fiduciary duties that they owed to the Customers. Two claimants claimed payment of an amount equivalent to the commissions from the Finance Companies under the tort of bribery. Two claimed, in the alternative, compensation from the Finance Companies for dishonest assistance in the Dealers’ receipt of secret profits. In Johnson, it was further claimed that the hire purchase agreement gave rise to an unfair relationship under Section 140A of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA). The Court of Appeal upheld these claims, and the Finance Companies appealed to the Supreme Court.
On 1 August 2025, the Supreme Court handed down its judgment, in which it determined that the Dealers did not owe fiduciary duties to their Customer. The Dealers were acting in their own commercial interests and not pursuant to a duty of single-minded loyalty to the Customers, and the parties to the three-cornered commercial transaction would have expected that to be the case. As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the claimants’ claims in tort and equity against Close Brothers Limited and FirstRand in their entirety, as such claims depended on the Dealers owing a fiduciary duty to the Customer. However, the Supreme Court found that, in Johnson, the claimant’s claim of unfairness under the CCA succeeded on the facts – ie, the size of the commission was very high (55% of the interest charge and 25% of the total sum advanced), the commission was not prominently disclosed, and there was an undisclosed commercial right of first refusal between the Dealer and the Finance Company.
Following the Supreme Court judgment, the FCA announced its decision to introduce an industry-wide redress scheme to compensate motor finance customers who had been (in the FCA’s view) treated unfairly. The FCA subsequently published a consultation on the proposed redress scheme on 7 October 2025, and the deadline for consultation responses was 12 December 2025. The FCA is aiming to publish its final rules in February or March 2026.
In order for the consumer to be owed redress under the proposed scheme, at least one of the following “relevant arrangements” must have been present and must not have been adequately disclosed to the consumer:
If any relevant arrangement was not adequately disclosed, the relationship is presumed to be unfair under the proposed scheme (this presumption may be rebutted in certain circumstances). The FCA noted that the redress scheme is designed to be easy for consumers to participate in and does not require a claims management company or law firm to be involved.
The Supreme Court judgment was largely welcomed by the UK’s auto finance industry, though many auto lenders and industry bodies have expressed concerns with the scope of the FCA scheme. Nevertheless, after a period of limited UK auto asset-backed securities (ABS) securitisations in the wake of the Court of Appeal judgment, public motor finance securitisations (such as Oodle Finance’s Dowson 2025-1) began re-emerging in 2025. 2026 will hopefully see the transition to more sustained growth in motor finance securitisations, particularly if the FCA consultation process results in a UK redress scheme that can be implemented in an efficient and proportionate manner from the perspective of both lenders and consumers.
Forward Flow
Forward flow has moved from a relatively niche structure to a mainstream funding solution for originators over the last few years. It covers a broad range of asset classes, including mortgages, auto loans, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) lending and fintech originated receivables. Its (relative) simplicity, efficiency and flexibility have added to its attractiveness for lenders and investors alike.
In particular, for non-bank lenders, forward flow provides a useful combination of the opportunity to build long-term partnerships with funders with a deep understanding of their business, funding certainty to support investment in growing originations, reduced refinancing risk, and the possibility of operating an asset-light balance sheet where accounting derecognition of assets is achieved. Forward flow has increasingly become a viable alternative to warehouse securitisation facilities for start-ups and non-bank lenders seeking to scale without raising significant equity or debt.
There have also been an increasing number of partnerships between banks and private credit funds, which have used forward flow structures to allow funds to benefit from banks’ sophisticated origination platforms and to provide banks with increased balance sheet to fund new originations.
Forward flow structures typically have the advantage of lighter documentation and fewer regulatory obligations compared to other asset-backed funding solutions. However, as there remains no standardised approach for forward flow structures or terms, there is broad scope for negotiation for both originators and funders. Key points for negotiation commonly include the following.
Managing originations
This includes setting allocation targets and minimum allocation requirements with a view to ensuring that the funder achieves expected capital outflows, agreeing eligibility and portfolio criteria designed to meet funding objectives – in particular, when a funder is using back leverage or senior funding that needs to meet simple, transparent and standardised (STS) requirements, designing stop purchase events that are tailored to ensure that funding can be switched off where the originator or the assets no longer meet the funder’s investment assumptions.
Facilitating refinancing
Where the funder’s long-term plans may involve refinancing the purchased assets, in particular by way of a securitisation, they will look to agree upfront on the level of support that the originator and servicer provide for that refinancing, including reporting meeting regulatory requirements, servicing being portable, and warranty and eligibility criteria being suitable for a securitisation (and potentially an STS transaction).
Keeping interests aligned
In its simplest form, a forward flow transfers the entire beneficial interest of originated assets to the funder, with the originator retaining no economic interests in the sold assets – noting that regulatory risk retention requirements do not apply to bilateral forward flow transactions. Funders will often need to carefully consider how their and the originator’s interests are kept aligned. Solutions may include one or a combination of contractual requirements for originators to adhere to such detailed origination and servicing policies, and a general obligation on the originator to comply with reasonable lender and servicer standards or profit-sharing arrangements with respect to excess spread.
The growth in forward flow structures is likely to continue into 2026, with originators seeking to have a broad mix of funding sources that are not all exposed to the potential vagaries of the capital markets, and with funders – in particular private credit funds – being under increasing pressure to find opportunities to allocate capital.
Equity Release Mortgages
The market for UK equity release mortgages (ERM) continued to expand in 2025, with lending volumes increasing 32% year-on-year (Equity Release Counsel, April 2025). ERM allow consumers at or nearing retirement age to borrow funds with their home as security, without them having any repayment obligations during a period when they have no or low employment income. These assets have an unusual repayment profile as they tend to be repaid when the last surviving borrower dies or goes into long-term care (and interest can be paid on a periodic or rolled-up basis). The aging UK population, the cost-of-living crisis, inadequate pension provisions and sustained historic increases in UK property values remain key drivers for consumers looking to equity release as a form of retirement funding. Providers are responding to evolving customer needs with more innovative products – eg, inheritance protection models, mortgage products featuring downsizing protections, and loan portability and loans with optional repayment features and drawdown options.
ERM tend to be offered by life insurers (as a tool to improve liability matching and manage longevity risk, since the repayment profile of a portfolio of ERM can correspond to the liability profile of a portfolio of life insurance policies) or by specialist lenders. Traditionally, ERM have been held on balance sheet or, in the case of life insurers, securitised in internal securitisations (in order to create matching adjustment eligible notes under the relevant solvency capital regime).
The downside of funding ERM portfolios through internal securitisation is that, as well as the senior matching adjustment eligible securities, life insurers are also required to hold the junior variable tranches, which absorb (in addition to the usual risks) the payment volatility associated with this asset class. The benefit of a public ERM securitisation, therefore, is that a life insurer may hold the matching adjustment senior notes, but the mezzanine notes (which can have attractive cash flows), and potentially the junior notes, can be held by third parties.
2024 and 2025 saw a handful of public securitisations of ERMs in the UK and European securitisation markets, with the roughly GBP1 billion Lifetime Mortgage Funding 1 plc securitisation of ERMs originated by Aviva closing in December 2024. These transactions have shown the market that it is possible to achieve a public securitisation of ERMs at scale. In each deal, to make the junior and mezzanine notes attractive to third-party investors, the majority junior noteholders hold a circa three-year refinancing call option in respect of all the mezzanine and junior notes. This means that, while the senior notes are structured to be suitable as long-term buy-to-hold instruments, the mezzanine and junior noteholders are not required to take such a long-term position. The success of these deals may pave the way for further transactions in the UK and EU equity release securitisation markets, which have seen limited activity in recent years, providing liquidity, improved capital efficiency and funding options for equity release product originators and owners.
Significant Risk Transfer (SRT)
The SRT market in the UK continues to grow, covering a wide range of asset classes, including corporate and SME loans, subscription lines, residential mortgages and commercial real estate, consumer credit and auto loans. SRT remains an area of regulator focus with the PRA re-confirming in 2025 its supervisory expectations (which, while not a rule, firms are expected to have regard to) in SS9/13 (Securitisation: Significant Risk Transfer), including proving that capital reflects genuine, ongoing risk transfer, notifying the PRA of SRT deals in a timely manner and obtaining self-assessment SRT approval.
Policy statement 12/25 (Restatement of CRR requirements – 2026 implementation) published in July 2025, with final legally enforceable rulebook changes effective from 1 January 2026, permits unfunded credit protection such as insurer guarantees for synthetic SRT and requires senior management approval for SRT transactions. In addition, in October 2025, the near-final PS19/25 (Restatement of CRR requirements – 2027 implementation) (with no PRA rulebook changes yet) delivered the Basel 3.1 reforms (effective 2027) into the SRT framework, by including, among other things, a risk-sensitive formula-based “p-factor” in capital calculations – however, unlike the similar proposals in the EU, it did not introduce a “fast-track” SRT approval process in the UK.
Slaughter and May
One Bunhill Row
London
EC1Y 8YY
United Kingdom
+44 020 7090 4549
+44 020 7090 5000
kate.patane@slaughterandmay.com www.slaughterandmay.com/