The main types of companies that can be formed in Zimbabwe are:
Foreign investors generally prefer to incorporate private limited companies (PLCs) for the following reasons:
The main types or classes of shares issued by companies formed in Zimbabwe are:
The rights and preferences attached to each class of shares are generally set out in the company’s memorandum of association.
The rights of shareholders include but are not limited to the following:
Shareholders’ rights may be varied in one or more of the following ways:
There are generally no statutory minimum share capital requirements for the incorporation of companies in Zimbabwe.
However, the share capital requirements that apply to companies seeking a listing, including compliance with shareholder spread obligations, are regulated by securities exchanges, such as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange or the Victoria Falls Stock Exchange. Further, financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies are required to comply with minimum capital requirements as may be prescribed from time to time.
The minimum number of shareholders for the companies listed in 1.1 Types of Company is generally one. However, the requirements may vary in some regulated sectors, for example banking and insurance sectors. In addition, listed entities have more than one shareholder as they are required to comply with shareholder spread requirements.
Apart from the reserved sectors under indigenisation laws, there is no requirement for any shareholder to be resident in Zimbabwe.
Shareholders’ agreements and joint venture agreements are commonly used in private limited companies. Both are used to ensure sound and effective business management, regulate the rights and duties of shareholders and manage conflicts.
The typical provisions included in shareholders’ agreements and joint venture agreements are as follows:
Shareholders’ agreements:
Joint venture agreements:
Shareholders’ agreements and joint venture agreements are generally legally enforceable contracts in Zimbabwe provided that the provisions thereof do not contravene any statute or applicable law. In most instances, these agreements contain a severability clause which specifies that an illegal or unenforceable provision shall be severed from the rest of the agreement and the validity, legality and enforceability of the remaining provisions of the agreement shall not be impaired or affected in any way by such illegality or unenforceability.
Shareholders’ agreements and joint venture agreements are typically private and confidential documents. They are not required to be filed with or made public in any registry. The contents of these agreements are not publicly accessible unless the parties choose to disclose the information or a dispute arises that leads to court proceedings.
All companies are required to hold an annual general meeting (AGM) at least once every 12 months.
The notice period for an AGM is a period of at least 21 days of written notice to shareholders. The notice period can be shortened if all the members entitled to attend and vote thereat agree.
The following issues are normally discussed and approved at an AGM:
Apart from AGMs, companies can hold other general meetings as and when necessary. Such meetings are called extraordinary general meetings (EGMs).
The notice period for an EGM is typically 14 days written notice (for public companies) or seven days (for private companies), unless a special resolution is required to be passed in which case the notice period is generally 21 days. An EGM may be called by shorter notice if the majority in number of the members holding not less than 95% in nominal value of the company’s shares agrees to do so.
Generally, general meetings are called by the board of directors through the board chairperson.
However, members with 5% or more of the voting rights of paid-up capital of the company are entitled to request the company to hold an EGM. Members can exercise this power by submitting a requisition to the directors which is signed by one or more of the requisitionists. The requisition must specify the objects of the meeting. On receipt of the requisition, the directors must issue a notice of an EGM within 21 days from the date of the requisition, failing which the requisitionists themselves will be entitled to convene the EGM.
All shareholders of the company are entitled to receive notice of a general meeting in the manner prescribed by the company’s constitutive documents. Notices may be served physically, electronically or through publication in a newspaper.
A notice of a meeting must generally specify the date, time, place and agenda of the meeting, as well as the resolutions proposed to be adopted at the said meeting. Directors are also required to disclose the following to the shareholders:
Shareholders can request the following information from the company:
Shareholders have the legal right to inspect and obtain copies of the company’s statutory registers, such as, register of members (shareholders), register of directors and secretaries, subject to payment of fees as may be prescribed by the company.
A private company may hold a virtual as opposed to a physical meeting through electronic means if so authorised by a company’s articles of association or by a shareholders’ resolution. However, a public company may permit the participation of members who are not physically present at the meeting, but can be heard and seen by the other members by electronic means if so authorised by a company’s articles of association or by a shareholders’ resolution.
A majority of the total number of votes entitled to vote on a matter shall constitute a quorum for decision of a general meeting unless the company’s memorandum and articles of association provide for a greater or lesser quorum but not less than one-third of the votes of the shares entitled to so vote.
There are three types of resolutions which can be passed by shareholders, namely, ordinary resolutions, special resolutions and written resolutions.
Ordinary resolutions are those which are passed by a simple majority (more than 50%) of the votes cast by the shareholders present and voting, either in person or by proxy.
Special resolutions are those which are passed by a majority of not less than 75% of such members entitled to vote as are present in person or by proxy at the meeting.
A written resolution is a type of special resolution signed by all the members of a private company entitled to attend and vote on such resolution at a general meeting and such a resolution is valid for all purposes as if same had been passed at a general meeting of the company duly convened and held.
A special resolution is required where the statutes and the company’s constitutive documents specifically state so. In all other circumstances, all other resolutions shall be ordinary resolutions. For instance, under the Companies and Other Business Entities Act [Chapter 24:31] (hereinafter referred to as the “COBE Act”), a special resolution is required in any of the following circumstances:
Generally, matters which are reserved for shareholders in accordance with the constitutive documents and the statutes must be approved accordingly by the shareholders. Such matters include but are not limited to the following:
The following voting requirements apply for passing resolutions:
Generally, every member of a company has one vote in respect of each share. Weighted voting rights (which grant some voters greater rights than others) apply where the articles of association or shareholders’ agreement provide so.
Shareholders can cast their votes electronically subject to the company’s articles of association or by a shareholders’ resolution. See 2.5 Format of Meeting.
Members with 5% or more of the voting rights of paid-up capital of the company are entitled to place issues on the agenda of a general meeting and to propose a resolution for voting. In order to propose matters for a vote, the authorised members specified hereinabove may submit a requisition to the directors requesting for circulation of proposed resolutions to members entitled to receive notice of a general meeting.
A shareholder can challenge a resolution passed at a general meeting if it is null and void. A resolution can be null and void for the following reasons:
A shareholder may challenge a resolution passed at a general meeting in one of the following ways:
Institutional investors and other shareholder groups may influence and monitor a company’s actions through the following means:
The rights of shareholders holding their shares through nominees are the same as those of any other shareholder in respect of matters being voted on and voting rights, provided that the nominee shares have been lawfully allotted, issued or transferred to the nominee. Nominee shares are deemed to have been lawfully allotted, issued or transferred in the following circumstances:
In the event that the nominee shares are not lawfully held:
Shareholders of a private company can pass or adopt a written resolution without holding a meeting. A written resolution must be signed by all the members of the company entitled to attend and vote on such resolution at a general meeting and such a resolution is valid for all purposes as if same had been passed at a general meeting of the company duly convened and held. However, this type of resolution does not apply for the removal of an auditor or a director.
Existing shareholders of a company have pre-emptive rights to acquire newly issued shares pro rata in proportion to the number of shares already held by such existing shareholders, at a price no less favourable than that offered to other persons. The pre-emptive rights do not extend to options to acquire shares or non-share securities convertible into shares. The pre-emptive rights are generally exercised for a period of three months, unless the company’s articles of association provide otherwise.
The following legal or regulatory restrictions apply to the transfer or disposal of shares:
It is important to note that a shareholders’ agreement, company’s articles of association or rules of a securities exchange may contain further restrictions on the transfer or disposal of shares. These could include, but are not limited to, the exercise of pre-emptive rights.
Shareholders are entitled to grant security interests over their shares, for example, through pledges, mortgages, or liens, provided that they follow the necessary legal formalities and any restrictions in the company’s articles of association or applicable laws and regulations, including obtaining approvals from the existing shareholders.
Shareholders are required to disclose their beneficial interests in a company to the directors of the company. There is no prescribed format for disclosing such interests. Apart from this, shareholders of private companies are generally not obliged by any law to disclose their interests to any other person.
All companies are required to regularly file with the Registrar of Companies up-to-date information regarding the ultimate beneficial owners of a company. Thus, companies may require shareholders to disclose their interests. This information, which is kept and maintained by the Companies Registry, shall be made available for inspection by the following:
In addition, publicly listed companies are required to publish the beneficial interests of directors and major shareholders in their annual financial statements as required by Part IX of the ZSE Listing Rules.
Shareholders of publicly traded companies have certain disclosure obligations, which include the following:
Generally, there is no regulatory filing which is made with the Companies Registry following a change of shareholding. That said, in specific industries, such as banking or securities trading, shareholders may be required to notify the regulatory authorities when acquiring or divesting a significant shareholding.
In certain circumstances, shares can be cancelled after issue. The circumstances include but are not limited to the following:
A company can purchase its own shares provided that the purchase was authorised in advance by the company in a general meeting. The authority to buy back the shares:
In the case of a private company or public company, the authority for a buyback is not required when a class of shares are all to be purchased or are to be purchased pro rata from all the shareholders who hold shares of the class concerned.
In the case of publicly listed companies, a share buyback must be specifically approved by shareholders in a general meeting, and the repurchase by a company of its own securities in any one financial year must not exceed 40% of the company’s issued share capital of the class of shares concerned.
Dividends are paid to shareholders as and when same are declared by the board of directors and approved by shareholders. In accordance with Section 218(2)(e) of the COBE Act, the board of directors is responsible for setting the amounts and the record dates of, and payment dates for, and procedures in connection with, the payment of dividends and other distributions.
Further, in accordance with Section 62(2)(h) of the COBE Act, the court may order payment of a dividend following a legal action by a member.
Dividends are paid out of the profits or reserves of a company. Before declaring a dividend, the company must have sufficient distributable reserves, meaning accumulated profits and reserves available for distribution. The company’s board of directors determines the timing and amount of dividend payments, considering factors like profitability, cash flow, growth prospects, and future capital requirements. Dividend payments must also adhere to legal requirements, such as ensuring the company remains solvent and has positive retained earnings.
A private business corporation is not required directly or indirectly to pay any dividend to any member by reason only of his or her membership unless, immediately after the payment or transfer, the private business corporation’s assets, fairly valued, will exceed its liabilities and it will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of its business.
A dividend may also be paid in any other form other than cash, for example assets or shares (dividend in specie).
Shareholders can appoint and remove directors from the board of the company, subject to the rights and powers specified by the law, the constitutive documents of a company, shareholders’ agreements and applicable securities exchange rules. Appointment of directors can be done as follows:
In the banking and insurance sector, any director appointments by shareholders are subject to fitness and probity tests and approval by the regulators.
Shareholders can challenge a decision that has been taken by the directors or require directors to take any action in favour of the company.
In accordance with Sections 60 and 61 of the COBE Act, members may bring direct or derivative actions against directors for their failure to observe their fiduciary duties, especially where there is fraud or misappropriation. Shareholders may bring an action in court against any manager, officer, or director of the entity in two ways:
In addition to the above, the other ways in which shareholders can challenge or influence directors’ decisions are as follows:
Shareholders have rights or powers to require the appointment/removal of the company’s auditors. According to Section 191(2) of the COBE Act, every company shall, at each annual general meeting, appoint an auditor to hold office from the conclusion of that annual general meeting until the conclusion of the next annual general meeting. The removal of an auditor, prior to expiration of the term, is subject to the provisions of the auditor’s contract.
Directors of public companies have an obligation to report to shareholders on the company’s corporate governance arrangements. According to Section 220(3) as read with Section 167(5)(e) of the COBE Act, at each annual general meeting of a public company, the board of directors shall report to the meeting on the company’s compliance with its corporate governance guidelines and their conformity to the principles set forth in the National Code on Corporate Governance, and explain the extent, if any, to which it has varied them or believes that any non-compliance therewith is justified. This is known as the board’s “comply or explain” report. There is no such positive obligation for other companies unless the company’s constitutive documents provide otherwise.
There are no prescribed duties and liabilities of controlling companies to the shareholders of the company they control. That said, like any other shareholder, a controlling company has a duty to act fairly, lawfully, and in the best interests of the company.
The rights of shareholders if the company is insolvent are specified in the Insolvency Act [Chapter 6:07] (“Insolvency Act”). They are as follows:
Shareholders have legal remedies against the company primarily as follows:
Shareholders have several legal remedies against the company’s directors/officers as established in 6.2 Challenging a Decision Taken by Directors.
Section 61 of the COBE Act permits shareholders to bring a derivative action on behalf of the company. In such case, a member or members (acting in concert) may bring an action in court in their names and on the entity’s behalf against any manager, officer, or director to enforce or recover damages caused to the company by violation of the duties owed by that manager, officer, or director to the company.
The key legal and regulatory provisions that govern/restrict shareholder activism in Zimbabwe include the following:
Considering the above, the legal and regulatory tools available to activist shareholders are judicial remedies, statutory provisions, voting power, and regulatory oversight.
The key aims of the activist shareholders include:
The following strategies are commonly employed by activist shareholders:
The typical agendas of the activist shareholders are outlined in 11.2 Aims of Shareholder Activism.
There are no empirical statistics available regarding particular industries/sectors being targeted by activist behaviour. Activist shareholders are those that respond to specific issues relating to the companies in which they hold shares.
There are no empirical statistics available to support the view that particular groups/types of shareholders are more active than others. Be that as it may, it is normally the minority groups of shareholders which engage in shareholder activism to protect themselves. Major shareholders do not need to engage in activism as they have a plethora of avenues for controlling the affairs of the company.
As established in 11.4 Recent Trends and 11.5 Most Active Shareholder Groups, there are no empirical statistics available on the success of activist crusades or campaigns.
A company may adopt the following strategies in responding to an activist shareholder:
A company can take the following practical steps to minimise the risk of shareholder activism:
Number 38 Argyll Drive
Newlands
Harare
Zimbabwe
+263 242 254 531
lawyers@chimukamafunga.com www.chimukamafunga.comThe Rights of Minority Shareholders
The old Companies Act [Chapter 24:03] did not contain adequate provisions protecting the minority shareholders. Instead, such matters were governed by the common law. The recourse for aggrieved minority shareholders was to initiate legal proceedings, either personal or derivative actions, depending on the circumstances. The personal action offered sufficient protection to shareholders who had suffered harm individually due to actions or omissions by the company. The derivative action, on the other hand, permitted shareholders to bring legal proceedings on behalf of the company, but only in specific circumstances and subject to certain limitations.
The Companies and Other Business Entities Act [Chapter 24:31] (“COBE Act”) was enacted in 2019 and it repealed the Companies Act [Chapter 24:03].
The COBE Act codified and broadened the scope of shareholder remedies, which indirectly enhances the protection of minority shareholders. The remedies available to minority shareholders are summarised below:
In addition to the above remedies provided by the COBE Act, shareholders may also utilise the following remedies to voice their concerns and enforce compliance with corporate governance requirements:
Shareholder Apathy
Over the years, shareholder apathy has been a topical issue. It refers to a lack of engagement and interest from shareholders in the affairs of a company, particularly, the management of the company. We highlight below some of the reasons behind shareholder apathy in various corporates.
It is worth noting that traditional company law allocates a relatively minor role to shareholders of a company. The authority of and balance of power between the board and shareholders in general meetings are determined by the COBE Act, the constitutive documents of the company, or in the absence of direction in any of the former, by common law. As a general rule, the authority conferred on either the shareholders or the board in terms of the company’s constitutive documents or the COBE Act is conferred exclusively, and shareholders cannot exercise powers collaterally with the board or vice versa. Shareholders are legally restricted to only act through resolutions passed at a general meeting of shareholders.
Traditionally, companies’ legislation does not provide detailed prescriptions on how meetings of the board of directors are to be convened and how they should conduct their business in those meetings. The COBE Act largely continues with this tradition. However, unlike its predecessor statute, it makes a few basic and default prescriptions concerning quorum and voting at board meetings and the structure and contents of the minutes of board and board committee meetings.
By comparison, the COBE Act provides very detailed prescriptions on how shareholder meetings should be convened and how the proceedings of these meetings are to be conducted. As a result, directors can meet more frequently with minimum legal hurdles and pass resolutions in a manner that they largely see fit. Convening a shareholder meeting is onerous by comparison. This separation carries the potential of a divergence of interests between the shareholders and the managers without an effective check on the powers of the managers. This is amplified by the modern stock markets which result in thousands of people investing in stocks in different companies, thereby creating a situation where the average listed company does not have a single or a group of shareholders capable of exercising any superintendence over the activities of the managers. This, in turn, creates a feeling in most shareholders that their attempts to be more active will not bring about any noticeable change.
In addition, other factors that are contributing to shareholder apathy is that shareholders do not have adequate knowledge about their legal rights and powers. This is mostly the case with the majority of public shareholders. Shareholders would probably be more actively involved in the management and running of the company if they had good knowledge of corporate practices and the rights and responsibilities.
Over and above that, more participation in the governance process comes with costs, and shareholders holding few shares generally have no incentive to absorb those costs, which also contributes to shareholder apathy.
Shareholder Activism
Whether shareholder activism ought to be promoted or restricted has been an issue of concern in the corporate world. Shareholder activism refers to actions taken by shareholders to influence the company’s management and policies. This can involve individual investors raising concerns or organised groups launching campaigns to pressure the board of directors. Put differently, shareholder activism implies taking an active role in a company in which one owns an interest. It can take many forms. It may include attending AGMs and other shareholder meetings to ask directors to account for various issues, engaging management and directors on contentious issues, questioning board composition, and engineering the removal of unsuitable directors. Although shareholders are generally not actively involved in the management of the company, they can influence the direction that the company takes.
Whilst there are no empirical statistics available to support the view that particular groups/types of shareholders are more active than others, it is normally the minority groups of shareholders which engage in shareholder activism to protect themselves. Major shareholders do not need to engage in activism as they have a plethora of avenues for controlling the affairs of the company.
The proponents in favour of shareholder activism argue that companies with active and engaged shareholders are more likely to be successful in the long term than those whose boards are left to do as they please. Contrastingly, those opposed to it argue that increased shareholder participation in the governance process creates another set of corporate governance problems, abusive transactions, increased minority shareholder oppression, and aggressive pursuit of the “bottom line” to the exclusion of all other considerations that are detrimental to the interests of other legitimate stakeholders.
In private companies, particularly small ones, the shareholders more often than not exercise substantial influence on the company’s management. There is effectively “owner management”. However, in some public companies, the shareholders can become numerous and dispersed, thus each holding a small number of shares. In such a company, there is a complete disconnect between ownership of shares in the company, and control of the day-to-day affairs of that company. There is a separation between “ownership” and management, with the shareholders “owning” the company shares but management controlling the company.
In companies with dispersed shareholders, boards of directors tend to have significant power. This power is not an inherent corollary of the separation of control from ownership but is also due to legal rules that largely insulate directors from shareholder intervention. Separation of control from ownership results in directors being put in charge of investments made by other people, and hence, the reason why the position of a director is a fiduciary one. Directors can use their control over the corporate resources to further their selfish endeavours, which gives rise to the agency problem. Therefore, the argument for increased shareholder involvement is primarily aimed at mitigating this issue.
On the other hand, the case for greater shareholder activism is premised on the perception that shareholders own the company. Shareholders, primarily of public companies, are unwieldy and cannot easily organise themselves into acting in a concerted manner. The board of directors, in the context of a public company, exists precisely to counter this problem as its centralised structure is more efficient.
However, unlike the directors of a company who stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company and are therefore constrained to act in its best interests, shareholders are not legally bound to exercise their vote in the best interests of the company as a whole, and they are allowed at law to vote in the advancement of their self-interests. The shareholder’s right to vote is a proprietary interest. The right to vote is attached as an incident of property to be enjoyed and exercised for the shareholder’s personal advantage. A hostile takeover is a classic example of a situation where shareholders act in the advancement of their interests, often at the expense of the company and its non-shareholder constituencies.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholders’ Rights
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to a business approach wherein companies, rather than focusing solely on financial gain, include social and environmental issues into their operations and interactions with stakeholders.
It can be difficult to strike a balance between shareholders’ rights and CSR. CSR efforts can improve a business’ standing and long-term profitability, but occasionally they run counter to shareholders’ short-term financial goals. Investing in eco-friendly technologies, for instance, may result in lower short-term profits but higher long-term gains.
The following are scenarios where CSR efforts clash with shareholder interest:
It cannot be said that shareholders’ rights and CSR are mutually exclusive. A balance must be attained by each company as far as is practicable. In terms of Section 195(5) of the Companies and Other Business Entities Act [Chapter 24:31], the directors are obliged to have regard for the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment.
The Role of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in Promoting Foreign Investment
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) plays a key role in the regulation and facilitation of foreign investment in Zimbabwe. It is important for prospective investors to familiarise themselves with the functions and roles of the RBZ. Some of the key functions of the central bank are summarised below.
Regulation and supervision
The RBZ regulates compliance of investors with Zimbabwe’s financial regulations and issues relevant licences to foreign investors. It also oversees exchange control regulations, which serve to manage foreign investments. This includes approving foreign investments, acquisitions, mergers, and the remittance of dividends and proceeds thereof.
Facilitation of foreign investment
The RBZ provides information on investment opportunities and guidance on the legal and regulatory requirements. It does this in conjunction with investment promotion bodies such as the Zimbabwe Investment Development Agency (ZIDA), Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and other regulatory bodies. The RBZ is also responsible for granting approvals to importers and exporters to make foreign payments through authorised dealers (banks).
Monetary policy and economic stability
The RBZ formulates and implements monetary policies in a bid to ensure that the economy and the investment environment remain stable. It also controls inflation, which directly impacts the interests of investors. Further, the RBZ regulates permissible interest rates so as to protect the interests of investors.
Consumer and Investor Protection
The RBZ provides a regulatory framework which protects both consumers and investors, fostering a safe and transparent investment environment.
The following points are of notable interest to prospective investors:
Exchange control approvals
The RBZ considers and grants exchange control approvals for restructurings, takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and rights issues involving foreign investment. The RBZ also regulates the remittance of dividends and disinvestment proceeds to ensure compliance with exchange control regulations.
Number 38 Argyll Drive
Newlands
Harare
Zimbabwe
+263 242 254 531
lawyers@chimukamafunga.com www.chimukamafunga.com