France is involved in multilateral discussions concerning the space sector. In compliance with its international obligations, France has adopted national legal instruments that include measures relating to launching and operating space objects. Moreover, France participates in discussions at the multilateral level, including the United Nations, at the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Conference on Disarmament. France also has a varied industry that provides services to both its national and its international partners. It includes civil, scientific, military and governmental activities.

The French space legal framework is broadly stable (see below) but is refined/updated from time to time and may again be updated to comply with new space activities and applications and to include technical regulations fit to the industry’s needs. As an EU member state, France will be impacted by legislative changes brought about at EU level by the announced EU Space Law if and when passed.

France demonstrates a strong commitment to the space sector through targeted funding at both the national and European levels. In particular, it actively contributes to the budgets of the European Union and the European Space Agency, enabling it to participate in major collaborative space projects while supporting technological innovation within its territory.

Furthermore, France supports initiatives to understand the space sector, particularly in connection with the insurance industry. Indeed, the complexity of space operations, the risks associated with launches and satellites, and the challenges related to orbital debris management require insurers and economic operators to possess sound technical and regulatory knowledge.

Today, France is questioning its ability to participate in the new global space race fully. Industrially, it has a solid space industry capable of producing high-performance satellites and launchers. However, what it lacks is a technological and digital ecosystem adapted to its needs. This absence of major digital players limits the economic development of its space sector. Another essential pillar is political support, which should play a driving role by being a client of these infrastructures while also guiding and massively financing the space effort.

In Europe, political fragmentation complicates the implementation of a coherent strategy, as 27 countries must be aligned, each with its distinct national interests. This requires a common political project capable of implementing a clear strategic ambition. From a legal perspective, this implies not only a regulatory framework adopted at the national level but also the involvement of European institutions, including the European Union with the draft EU Space Act and the adaptation of future calls for tenders for institutional programmes, as well as the European Space Agency and its related contractual processes.

The French space industry is closely linked to the nation’s aviation industry, and generates substantial revenue across civil, military and export markets. Major manufacturers such as Dassault Aviation and the Airbus, Thales and Safran groups are the main systems integrators in the defence aerospace industry, shaping the ecosystem directly or through joint ventures. France also has an integrated launch services provider, ArianeGroup, which faces challenges due to the decreasing launch costs driven by NewSpace entrants leveraging institutional contracts on a scale dwarfing those of European manufacturers.

France remains committed to the Ariane sector, a symbol of strategic autonomy in space based on heavy-duty, multipurpose launchers. Even if the launch rate remains limited to ten to eleven launches per year, it will enable the launch of strategic satellites, such as Galileo or CSO, without relying on foreign launchers.

The French Eutelsat Group is one of the world’s leading satellite telecommunications operators and has been a European pioneer in space-based infrastructure for the transmission of television and radio content for more than 40 years. It works in concert with other national operators to deploy satellites across the country and offers a number of services. Moreover, it recently merged with OneWeb to expand its satellite offering.

Large groups such as Airbus also provide remote detection and satellite imagery services.

The market is supported by the France 2030 investment plan, which aims to modernise the French economy by supporting strategic sectors, including space. This plan specifically aims to enhance the competitiveness of French companies in key areas, including satellite constellations, and in-orbit services and mobility in outer space. France also fosters national space situational awareness capabilities and recently, Aldoria and Look Up Space became key actors in this industry.

France is also much involved in European space research and development through the French Space Agency – ie, the National Centre for Space Studies (Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, CNES) – and strong partnership links with the European Space Agency (ESA) – eg, the ESA’s Business in Space Growth Network accelerator of innovative projects being run by the Institute for Space Medicine and Physiology (MEDES), which for nearly 35 years has sought to maintain and develop French know-how in space medicine and physiology and to promote the applications of space research for healthcare.

The French legal system is based on civil law. France has a legal framework applicable to space activities in the form of the Space Operations Act, which dates from 2008. There are also texts relating to the Guiana Space Centre and the conduct of the CNES’s activities. Some guidelines govern certain satellite services, in particular the use of space data. French space law is essentially based on rules and the codification of measures dedicated to the space sector, notably including the French Research Code, the Post and Communications Code, the Intellectual Property Code, and the Defence Code. The following texts are among those that structure French space law:

• Law No 2008-518 of 3 June 2008, relating to space operations (LOS);
• Decree No 2024-625 of 28 June 2024, relating to space operations authorisation;
• Order of 28 June 2024, relating to the composition of the three parts of the authorisation file;
• Order of 28 June 2024, relating to technical regulations;
• Decrees No 2022-233 and No 2022-234 of 24 February 2022, relating to space data, defence considerations and the authorisation and management of space operations;
• Decree No 2017-1619 of 27 November 2017, publishing the agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the European Space Agency on the Guiana Space Centre and associated services;
• Decree No 2009-643 of 9 June 2009, relating to authorisations issued;
• Article L. 611-1 and L. 613-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which acknowledge the patentability of inventions achieved in space; and
• L. 613-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which states that patent exclusive rights do not apply to objects intended to be launched into outer space introduced into French territory.

The commercial space industry is also particularly exposed to export control regulations, most space technologies being listed as either military or dual-use items under applicable laws (for EU-origin items, respectively under the national munition list and Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up an EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items). The complexity and extraterritorial effect of some national export control laws (in the case of the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Export Administration Regulations, for example) may create a substantial regulatory burden and trigger important compliance risks with consecutive penalties for companies and their managers. Among other things, releasing technical data and staff training, tests and maintenance and repair operations can all be deemed as export or re-export. It is thus crucial that export control is taken care of in the commercial decision-making process in the initial stages of project design.

To guide this policy, the government provides companies with specific conditions. These include strict requirements in public tenders, constraints stemming from the Military Planning Act, and specific contractual obligations that guarantee compliance with sovereignty, cybersecurity, and performance standards. This regulation ensures both the security of French space infrastructure and the development of a solid industrial base.

Finally, to support the entry into force of new decrees and orders in 2024, the CNES has published a series of best practice guides. These documents govern space operations and launches in accordance with the Space Operations Act and provide recommendations on cybersecurity, technical hygiene, and system security. The CNES also provides compliance matrices, enabling operators to obtain the necessary authorisations, particularly with regard to the technical requirements that must be met to ensure the safety and reliability of space missions.

The French state is an operator, a facilitator and regulator of space activities. It participates in the work of the CNES and also has dedicated government military capabilities. It supports companies in the early stages of their activities, to ensure that their operations comply with the national legal framework. Additionally, the French state carries out scientific activities, notably in co-operation with other states or international organisations, as is the case with the European Space Agency, for example. While the French Ministry of Economy bears primary responsibility for space activities (including by authorising launches in outer space), the Ministry of Higher Education and Research oversees certain aspects, and the Ministry of the Armed Forces retains prerogatives concerning strategic and military operations in relation to outer space.

The authorisation and ongoing supervision of space activities are carried out under the Law on Space Operations, which dates back to 2008. Operators are subject to an authorisation from the French Ministry of the Economy on the basis of a number of factors, including criteria relating to internal organisation, technical capabilities and financial resources, in order to ensure the reliability of their project. CNES supervises the review of launch authorisation applications and the work of the operators. With regard to their space objects, dedicated technical regulations exist to ensure their reliability and meeting technical criteria.

The administrative part of the authorisation is where the applicant is to be identified. They also need to provide moral, financial and professional guarantees, which themselves need to be assessed. The technical part includes a description of the space operation, systems and procedures envisaged. The third part is where the mission of the payload and its characteristics are described, while checking that the operation is not likely to compromise national defence interests.

France’s activities with regard to the distribution of radio frequencies fall within the framework of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The National Frequency Agency (Agence Nationale des Fréquences, ANF) provides stakeholders in space activities with a number of models to be completed in order to meet the requirements for the distribution of radio frequencies in orbit. This enables France to co-ordinate its national activities and reduce the risk of interference between space activities. The ANFR manages requests for frequency assignments relating to satellite systems. More specifically, it receives French requests, checks that they are compatible with the Radio Regulations and the National Table of Frequency Band Allocations, and then sends them to the ITU. ARCEP, the French regulatory authority for electronic communications, post and telecommunications, manages the market for satellite communications services.

Dispute resolution mechanisms are regularly based on diplomatic procedures within the ITU.

In France, ArianeGroup provides launch services for governmental and non-governmental entities. Regardless of whether the activity is public or private, France offers its nationals – as well as its international partners – a dedicated launch platform in French Guiana. This facility is subject to specific regulations and oversight by the CNES, with launch authorisations granted by the French state.

France has signed and ratified the main international legal instruments relating to outer space, including the Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1976), and the Convention on Registration (1977). France has also signed – but not ratified – the Moon Agreement. Furthermore, France has implemented the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines adopted by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), which include measures to minimise the creation of debris (ie, passivation and de-orbiting of satellites at the end of their lives). Moreover, France is also a party to the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, also adopted by the UN COPUOS, which aim to promote responsible practices when conducting space activities to ensure their sustainability and safety. France complies with several of the recommendations of these guidelines. It also works with other countries and entities to enhance the safety of space activities and share critical data on space conditions and orbital events.

Space operators must obtain authorisation from the French government before carrying out space activities. This authorisation is granted after a rigorous assessment of the activities’ compliance with international and national obligations. The CNES is responsible for monitoring space activities to ensure that they comply with safety standards and international obligations.

The French state is responsible for space activities carried out by its entities, whether public or private. This means that, in the event of damage caused by a French space activity, the state can be held liable at the international level. The 2008 LOS provides a mechanism for transferring liability from the state to private operators. This enables the state to protect itself financially by transferring part of the liability to the companies carrying out space operations. However, this transfer is limited and subject to strict conditions. Companies must demonstrate their financial capacity to cover potential liabilities. The law also allows operators to include liability clauses in their contracts with partners and subcontractors. This includes indemnification and limitation of liability clauses aimed at clarifying respective responsibilities in the event of damage. The CNES plays a crucial role in the implementation of this law. It is responsible for preparing the issuance of authorisations for space operations and checking that operators comply with financial and insurance requirements.

In the context of the growing development of space activities, insurers are increasingly confronted with complex and sector-specific technical challenges. To properly assess the risks associated with launches, satellite operations, constellations, and space debris, these players need to understand the specific characteristics of the space environment. Therefore, insurers may have explicit or implicit obligations to rely on specialised services or technical expertise to ensure the reliability of their risk analyses and insurance offerings. These obligations may be incorporated into contracts with space operators, particularly when these require the insurer to understand the technical aspects of the insured space missions. Thus, questions arise as to whether insurers should include the requirement to utilise space situational awareness capabilities to track and monitor the situation in orbit and mitigate orbital risks.

Insurance Requirements

France imposes strict insurance and liability regulations for space activities aimed at providing a framework and security for this constantly evolving sector. French nationals and companies carrying out space activities under French sovereignty must be covered by insurance or have other financial guarantees approved by the competent authority. The 2008 LOS establishes a liability ceiling for space operators. Above this ceiling, the state guarantees cover for damage depending on the phase of occurrence (either during launch or after launch, including return to Earth). In fact, when the state compensates damage under the 1967 and 1972 Outer Space Treaties, it can take action against the operator responsible, provided that it has not already benefited from the operator’s financial or insurance guarantees to the extent of the compensation. In the case of intentional fault, the ceilings do not apply. No recourse is available for damage resulting from acts against state interests. This authorisation and control system helps to reduce the risk of failure and to control other risks to people, property, the environment and public health, even in the event of failure. Reducing risks also improves the reliability of launch and orbital systems, which in turn optimises their technical and economic performance.

French space law defines damage as “any harm to persons, property, and in particular public health or the environment directly caused by a space object in the context of a space operation, excluding the consequences for users of the signal emitted by this object”. For example, cover for Ariane launchers is a minimum of EUR60 million, including no-fault liability for terrestrial damage and fault liability for outer space damage.

The LOS provides for a clear division of liability between the participants in a space operation. There is no possibility of recourse between participants in the event of damage caused to each other or third parties in order to avoid a snowball effect. Contracts must, therefore, include clauses waiving recourse and warranty agreements. In the event of damage caused by a space operation or the production of a space object, the participants bound by a contract cannot be held liable unless otherwise stipulated for damage occurring during production or in the event of an intentional fault. This practice of waiving recourse clauses is common in the space industry.

In addition to the technical aspects, space insurance includes specific clauses on the performance of space equipment. The notion of “intended commercial purpose” requires the insured to prove that the satellite can no longer fulfil its commercial mission in order to receive compensation. Deviations in performance from a standard are covered, with compensation adjusted according to the percentage of failure. French law does not cover damage caused by pollution unless it results in damage to the ground, an explosion or a fire. However, environmental damage is included in the cover – up to EUR 750 million. The insurance cover must be linked to the insured event. The loss must occur during the period of cover specified in the insurance contract. According to the French Insurance Code, insurance on assets must comply with the principle of indemnity, according to which the insured can only be compensated up to the amount of the loss. The compensation paid by the insurer is intended to restore the policyholder to the situation he or she was in before the loss occurred. The fundamental principle is that a person or company cannot enrich itself as a result of damage to the property it owns or operates. Consequently, the insurer’s maximum liability is determined by the value of the insured property. However, where the law applicable to the contract permits, it is possible to choose between cover based on the principle of indemnity or cover based on the “agreed value”. The agreed value, which is often used for high-value items, is the value of the insured property as agreed between the insured and the insurer at the time the policy is taken out or during the term of the policy. Goods are generally valued by an expert, particularly in the space industry, due to the complex technologies involved.

At the European level, Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 harmonises the laws of the member states concerning product liability. Transposed into French law by Law No 98-389 of 19 May 1998, this directive establishes the producer’s no-fault liability for safety defects in the products it puts into circulation. This means that the producer is liable as soon as a defect in its product causes damage without the victim having to prove fault on its part. However, the victim must prove the causal link between the product defect and the damage. A product is considered defective when it does not offer the safety that can legitimately be expected and not because it is unsuitable for use. With regard to the space sector. Manufacturers and operators of space equipment must guarantee that their products comply with safety standards. In the event of the failure of a satellite or other space object, which results in damage, the principles of strict liability apply. This strengthens the obligations of space operators in terms of product safety and quality.

Very high altitude (VHA) refers to a zone ranging from 20 to 100 km above sea level, corresponding to a nebulous transition layer between the lower boundary of extra-atmospheric space and the upper boundary of atmospheric space.

Historically, the VHA zone has remained largely unexploited, since conventional aircraft, whether civilian or military, are not designed to fly at such altitudes, and gravity is still too significant to accommodate satellites.

Thanks to technological advances, the use of VHA is increasing considerably, particularly with military drones, but also with stratospheric balloons. For instance, stratospheric balloons have been considered arranged in series to provide Internet access to rural and remote areas by Alphabet company (formerly Google X), the signal travelling from balloon to balloon to reach a ground-based station connected to an internet service provider.

International law provides legal standards for aviation and space law, but it is difficult to say whether VHA falls within the scope of either of these legal regimes. Indeed, aviation law is governed by the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, which recognises in Article 1 that “The Contracting States recognize that each State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.” However, the Convention does not provide for any limit to a country’s sovereign airspace. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether VHA are part of sovereign airspace.

In terms of space law, treaties such as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which provides for the free use and access to space, also fail to clarify the legal regime governing VHA.

Activities taking place between 20 and 100 km therefore appear to fall outside the scope of the international legal regulatory framework. It is therefore difficult to say whether objects operating at this altitude are subject to the unique freedom of outer space, the strict rules governing aviation, or a legal regime specific to VHA.

The legal uncertainty surrounding this zone is creating new tensions between countries when dealing with potentially military surveillance, just like in February 2023 when the United States decided in the name of force majeure to shoot down a Chinese stratospheric balloon flying over North America, on suspicion of gathering intelligence.

Since no international consensus seems to have been reached at this stage, and with the destruction of the Chinese balloon highlighting the importance of regulating VHA, the French Ministry of the Armed Forces is currently leaning toward establishing a military doctrine as reported by General Stéphane Mille : “Until now, very high altitudes have been exploited very little or not at all, but with the proliferation of atmospheric balloon projects, very high-altitude drones, hypersonic gliders, and low-orbit satellites, we need to start thinking about this and avoid a potential capability gap in the future”.       

Under French law, there are no space-specific rules with an economic sector orientation. With NewSpace projects, for instance in the life sciences or agrifood sectors, the legal framework needs to evolve to adapt the existing Earth-orientated rules and guidelines to activities conducted in outer space or to the use of results or data triggered by such activities (for instance, healthcare in or from space). International guidelines (for instance, Good Manufacturing Practices or Good Clinical Practices) or national legislation (for instance, the French Public Health Code) may partially be used but are not substantially adapted. Innovative NewSpace project owners require such adaptations in order for their projects to get legally secured and thus become eligible for private or public financing.

In France, the use of radio frequencies by licence holders is a private occupation of the state’s public domain. These frequencies are subject to specific regulations, which are particularly influenced by international law. The frequency assignments necessary for the operation of satellite systems can only be used once they have been successfully declared to the ITU by a national administration. Title 4 of Law No 2004-575 of 21 June 2004 on confidence in the digital economy introduced a new Title 8 into Book II of the French Post and Electronic Communications Code, entitled “Assignment of frequencies relating to the satellite system”. The Code now includes specific provisions for satellite systems (including space and earth stations). This law fills a gap in communications law by making the occupation of orbit-spectrum pairs subject to an authorisation regime. It transfers the rights to use these resources, which France has been allocated by the ITU, to satellite system operators. It provides companies developing satellite system projects with a clear legal framework, guaranteeing at an early stage the availability of one of the resources essential to their realisation.

Authorisations are subject to proof of the operator’s ability to control the transmission of all the stations using the frequency assignment, and may only be refused in certain cases listed in the French Post and Electronic Communications Code. This is without prejudice to the other authorisation formalities required by applicable laws and regulations, in particular those issued by ARCEP for electronic communications, or by ARCOM for audio-visual communications.

The operator is the person who carries out or undertakes to carry out the activities covered by the law by ensuring, alone or jointly, the effective control of the space object. There is no legal requirement for operators (beyond the space debris management principles and other rules already mentioned in 2.8 Insurance and State Measures on Liability for Damages). However, the documents drawn up by CNES relating to the safeguarding of the Kourou Guiana Space Centre aim to protect the safety of people, property, public health and the environment for launches from the centre and contain prescriptions designed to limit the risks associated with space debris.

Additionally, French law also refers to two other concepts:

• deployers – ie, “devices that carry one or more space objects as part of a multiple launch and inject them into the orbits requested by the customer(s)”; and
• reusable launchers – ie, “self-propelled vehicles designed to place space objects into orbit [...] some or all of whose components undergo a recovery phase on Earth in order to be reused during a subsequent launch operation”.

Moreover, the French intellectual property code states that objects intended to be launched into outer space introduced into French territory are not subject to patent protection (see Article L.613-5), in line with Article 5 ter of the Paris Convention of 1883 and with similar US provisions in order to prevent any risk of IP litigation for foreign satellites launched from French Guiana.

While now enshrining itself in the evolving general EU legal framework on the unique digital and data market and free data circulation in Europe, France has developed a comprehensive legal regime for space data, balancing the promotion of innovation and open access, the protection of privacy and personal data, and national security interests.

This framework is expected to evolve further as new technologies emerge (AI, high-res imaging, signal intelligence, etc) and as space activities become increasingly commercial, strategic and international.

Some space data may have implications for national security, especially in defence or intelligence contexts. Hence, space data that may affect national defence interests is subject to review by the French state while space data with dual-use characteristics (civil/military) may fall under EU Regulation 2021/821 (on dual-use goods), requiring export licences. Operators may need additional approvals to distribute certain space data outside of France or to private entities. At the same time, France promotes public access to non-sensitive public space data, particularly for research, innovation, and environmental monitoring. In this respect, France participates in the EU’s Earth observation programme, which provides satellite data (eg, from Sentinel missions) freely and openly, while under the French Open Data Law (2016) (ie, the Digital Republic Act), public institutions such as the CNES shall make satellite data available for reuse, unless classified or restricted.

In the space sector, particularly within the ESA, the ownership, access, use, and disclosure of data – whether pre-existing or generated under ESA contracts – are governed by the Regulation on Information, Data, and Intellectual Property and the General Clauses Applicable to ESA Contracts. These texts stipulate that ownership of information, data, and intellectual property rights remains with the economic operator that developed them.

A space data space would need to be fully GDPR compliant, as it potentially processes personal data, including sensitive data. The use and reuse of this data are based on the legal bases of Articles 6 and 9 of the GDPR. Among other principles of the GDPR, the framework mandates the clear definition of specific, lawful, and legitimate purposes for processing. Furthermore, it places responsibility on the entities, whether they be data controllers or data processors, who are involved in processing the data and liaising with national data protection authorities. The data will preferably be anonymised or pseudonymised and processed in secure environments that guarantee protection and compliance, including when the data is reused.

The EU Space Data Space, currently being built with the support of a working programme financed by the ESA in co-operation with the European Union, needs to comply with the EU data spaces legal framework, including the Data Governance Act (DGA) and the Data Act (DA) with rules tailored to the specificities of the space sector. It aims at introducing technical, operational, legal and governance standards for the security, portability, and interoperability of space data, particularly sensitive data, which the DGA or the DA do not specifically cover. It may also provide for the creation of data access bodies and a secure framework for utilising data from space devices or services and interaction with other data spaces in the EU, feeding users’ needs on earth or in space, including for public purposes.

The Space Data Space is designed to support artificial intelligence (AI) stakeholders in the space sector in meeting their legal obligations under the AI Act. The purpose is to provide high-quality spatial data essential for training, validation, and monitoring AI algorithms while ensuring their ethical and non-discriminatory use. By facilitating access to diverse and transparent data, it intends to accelerate the development of reliable and compliant AI while supporting the authorities responsible for monitoring and regulation in this field.

The NIS2 Directive establishes common European rules for cybersecurity, now including the space sector. The Space Data Space initiative aims to apply and strengthen these measures to ensure the security of space information systems. Furthermore, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) imposes cross-cutting cybersecurity requirements for digital products throughout their life cycle. By aligning with these frameworks, the Space Data Space will hopefully ensure the security, integrity, and resilience of space infrastructures, thus fostering trust and innovation.

The INSPIRE Directive (2007/2/EC) establishes a European infrastructure to facilitate the sharing of environmental spatial data among member states, emphasising interoperability, standardisation, and data access. Based on these principles, the Space Data Space intends to ensure seamless integration and optimal accessibility of spatial data, ensuring compatibility with other datasets. This harmonisation promotes collaboration, innovation, and the development of diverse applications, ranging from environmental monitoring to disaster management. INSPIRE’s legal framework and transparency principles also guide the ethical, secure, and compliant management of spatial data, thus strengthening governance, trust, and engagement among stakeholders in the European space sector.

Among other provisions, the contractual framework of a data space shall define the rights and obligations of participants (data providers, data processors, other services providers, governance authorities, etc), ensuring legal compliance and secure exchanges. It shall specify the conditions of data use (purpose, duration, sharing, and remuneration), responsibilities regarding confidentiality, security, and deletion, and ensure compliance with relevant regulations (the GDPR, intellectual property, and space law).

Based on an effective governance and adapted contractual flow mapping, contract templates and automation tools would facilitate the implementation and deployment of the Space Data Space.

In terms of cybersecurity, the launch operator must implement measures to protect itself against malicious cyber operations that could threaten regulatory compliance. Justifications for this approach and a summary of the security measures must be filed with the CNES. Cybersecurity measures must also be implemented to prevent reception and conduct of unauthorised or unauthenticated remote controls on board. These provisions are supplemented by measures to secure on-board/ground and on-board/on-board in-orbit communication links, and to ensure that they are resilient to any corruption that could jeopardise the safety of operations.

The decree of 28 June 2024, amending the decree of 31 March 2011, relating to the technical regulations for space operations, introduces enhanced cybersecurity requirements, particularly for command, control, and telemetry (TT&C) systems. These systems, essential for satellite management, must now incorporate specific security measures to prevent intrusions and ensure the integrity of communications. Operators are required to implement robust encryption protocols, strengthened authentication mechanisms, and continuous monitoring procedures to detect and respond to security incidents.

In addition, the decree requires the security of ground stations, considered critical access points to space systems. Operators must ensure strict partitioning of TT&C networks, implement regular security audits, and establish detailed incident response plans. These measures aim to protect space infrastructure against cyber threats, in compliance with international standards and future European regulations.

The NIS2 Directive explicitly includes space among the essential sectors, marking a significant advancement compared to the first NIS Directive of 2016. Article 3(1) of the Directive and Annex I (essential sectors) designate space service operators, particularly those related to satellite operations and critical downstream services (navigation, Earth observation, telecommunications, etc), as entities subject to strict cybersecurity obligations. This particularly concerns public or private space service providers whose failure could have a significant impact on public security, defence, the economy, or society. Space ecosystem operators will now be required to implement technical and organisational measures to manage risks to their information systems. In addition, they must notify the competent national authority of any major cybersecurity incident within 24 hours. In all cases, operators are required to ensure that their supply chain (manufacturers, integrators, cybersecurity providers, etc) also complies with adequate security standards.

Finally, they must co-operate with national cybersecurity authorities and with the relevant space authorities (such as national space agencies or the ESA, if applicable).

The directive covers space data services, ground infrastructure (stations, command networks), and the satellites themselves. France is currently implementing the directive.

Article 13 of the 2008 Space Operations Act stipulates that the operator is solely liable for damage caused to third parties by space operations. This includes any damage to persons, property, or the environment directly caused by a space object. Article 5 specifies that authorisations and licences issued under this law may be subject to requirements designed to protect public health and the environment, in particular, to limit the risks associated with space debris.

The Order of 31 March 2011 on technical regulations imposes specific measures to limit space debris, in particular during the launch of one or more space objects. The design, production and operation of launch systems must not present excessive risks to the environment, particularly with regard to pollution by hazardous substances. The launcher must be designed and implemented in such a way that, at the end of its service phase, all onboard energy reserves are permanently depleted or placed in a state where such depletion is unavoidable or in a state where they present no risk of generating debris. Moreover, all onboard energy production systems must be permanently deactivated.

After the launch phase, the components of the launcher placed in orbit must be de-orbited in a controlled manner. If this cannot be achieved, the components must leave Protected Region A within twenty-five years of the end of the launch phase, ideally by uncontrolled atmospheric re-entry or, failing that, by remaining in an orbit whose perigee remains above the Protected Region for one hundred years after operation.

The systems must be designed and implemented to limit the risks of accidental collision with human-made objects whose orbital parameters are precisely known and available during the space operation and the three days following the end of the withdrawal from the service phase.

The launch operator must control the re-entry zone for launcher components designed to detach during the launch phase or for the propulsion component placed in orbit as part of a controlled atmospheric re-entry. This zone, associated with a probability of 99.999%, must not interfere with the territory or territorial waters of any state unless agreed by the latter.

Any operator carrying out a launch to another celestial body, whether or not this includes a return of extraterrestrial matter, must comply with the International Standard for Planetary Protection Policy published by the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

With regard to retirement, satellites in the same constellation must incorporate measures to reduce the risk of intra-constellation collisions until their atmospheric re-entry or for 100 years in the approved graveyard zone. For mega-constellations, satellites must have an on-board propulsion system to enable anti-collision manoeuvres to be carried out effectively and in a timely manner until the end of their retirement. The measures also include the objective of limiting optical disturbances for astronomical observations from the ground or space.

For re-entries, the description in the authorisation file must include:

• a re-entry authorisation issued by the authorities responsible for the landing site;
• a description of the critical systems and sub-systems for the rescue mission;
• a description of the landing site and its facilities; and
• re-entry trajectories, flight sequence and triggering events, provisional date and re-entry window.

The CNES works on addressing climate change through space-based technologies. Notably, it spearheads the Space for Climate Observatory (SCO), which unites international partners to develop decision support tools using satellite and ground data to monitor and adapt to local climate impacts. The CNES also co-leads major Earth observation missions such as SWOT (Surface Water and Ocean Topography) to track global water levels and ocean dynamics, and MicroCarb, set to launch in 2025, which will map global CO₂ concentrations to better understand carbon sources and sinks.

France aligns with international recommendations (UN, COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines) regarding the control of space debris. However, national legislation specifies these obligations in domestic law, particularly to ensure the responsibility of operators and the safety of space activities. The law governing space activities in France imposes strict obligations on space operators to manage risks related to space debris, including measures to minimise the production of debris during the design, launch, and operation of satellites. In addition, operators must provide end-of-life procedures for spacecraft (deorbiting, placing in graveyard orbit) to limit orbital pollution. Where applicable, operators must inform the French authorities and obtain prior authorisation before conducting any space operation, including an assessment of the risks related to debris.

The standard French corporate income tax (CIT) is 25%. A 15% reduced CIT rate applies to SMEs on taxable income up to EUR42,500 (subject to various conditions, including EU thresholds and a maximum turnover of EUR10 million).

Under the participation exemption regime on capital gains, 88% of capital gains can be exempt, resulting in an effective CIT rate of up to 4%.

For dividends, the participation exemption regime allows for exemptions of 99% or 95%, making the effective CIT rate between 0.25% and 1.25% for the 2024 fiscal year, provided the company is subject to the 25% CIT rate.

Under the tax consolidation regime, CIT is imposed on aggregate income, including the taxable profits and losses of all French companies within the consolidated group, necessitating a single CIT payment by the parent company.

As space cannot be considered a taxable territory by any country and is not covered by any international tax treaty, the taxation of profits from satellite operations is assessed solely by national tax laws. A French administrative court recently ruled that, in the absence of satellite autonomy from an operational management perspective, profits generated are taxable in France if substantial operations are conducted within French territory. This includes technical human interventions required in France for satellite maintenance, monitoring, operating performance, and commercialisation activities, particularly those involving the negotiation and conclusion of contracts with clients. The courts have deemed the satellite’s value, even if significantly exceeding the cost of the French services rendered, to be irrelevant to the determination of tax liability in France.

Companies that are involved in research or innovation development activities may benefit from various CIT credit. Research activities include mainly fundamental research, applied research and experimental development. The tax credit is calculated based on the research expenses (eg, staff expenses, depreciation of fixed assets used in research), with specific adjustments. The research tax credit rate is 30% for expenses up to EUR100 million, and 5% for expenses exceeding this threshold.  In cases of collaborative research involving subcontracting with special public research entities, the tax credit can reach 40% to 50% (for small companies) under certain conditions, calculated on a maximum of EUR6 million in expenses.

The innovation tax credit, available exclusively to small companies, primarily covers the design of prototypes and pilot plants for new products and is calculated at a rate of 30% on a maximum of EUR400,000 in expenses.

Finally, a reduced CIT rate of 10% may be optionally applied, subject to specific conditions, to the net income (royalties and capital gains) derived from patents and industrial property rights, including IT developments.

There is no specific tax regime that applies to space assets.

France’s NewSpace is dynamic and expanding, albeit at a more modest pace compared to the United States. The volume of NewSpace companies has much increased over the years, encouraged in particular by the CNES project “Connect by CNES” (which plays a central role in early-stage support) and the French government’s France 2030 Plan, which allocates EUR930 million as of 2024 to support NewSpace start-ups and foster a competitive ecosystem. The funding ecosystem has also gained depth, with specialised funds investing in early-stage funding as well as recently in later funding rounds (Series B, C and D). In less than a year, four start-ups have completed major funding rounds. Latitude, a developer of small launch vehicles, led the way with a EUR27 million raise in January 2024. Unseenlabs, specialising in radio-frequency geolocation, followed in February with an EUR85 million round. The Exploration Company, which is developing a reusable space capsule, closed the largest Series B round in Europe in November 2024, raising EUR150 million. As for Loft Orbital, it has just secured a EUR170 million round.

At the time of writing, French President Emmanuel Macron is set to unveil the new national New Space strategy during the Paris Air and Space Show at Le Bourget. This strategy is expected to further strengthen an already favourable framework, potentially unlocking additional investment as well as the proliferation of NewSpace players, with traditional aerospace giants and emerging start-ups increasingly collaborating.

Overall, investment in the sector remains predominantly public, with the French government playing a key role. This support is channelled notably through Bpifrance, the French sovereign investment bank, which contributes via direct investments, fund-of-funds operations, and dedicated allocations to New Space initiatives under the France 2030 Plan. Nonetheless, opportunities to attract major private equity funds into space activities are growing. Specialised funds like Expansion and Cosmocapital are supporting early-stage financing, while larger players such as Tikehau Capital, Supernova, Balderton Capital, and Plural are increasingly participating in later-stage funding rounds.

The EU also acts as a lever for intra-European private investment, although public-private partnerships are not always effective, as shown by the failure of the partnership envisaged for the Galileo programme. At present, the EU gives priority to funding programmes. In the current multiannual financial framework, several funds have been created, such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Regional Development Fund and the COSME programme for the competitiveness of businesses and SMEs. However, the diversity of funds available for private investment in the space sector lacks clarity, with no single fund clearly dedicated to this sector. To remedy this, in January 2020, the European Commission and the European Investment Bank Group launched the “Innovation Space Equity” pilot scheme to support the innovation and growth of European SMEs in space technologies. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has actively sought to assert its ambitions in the space sector. However, there remains room for improvement compared to the European Space Agency, which demonstrates a clearer and more coherent approach.

States may adopt restrictive measures on foreign investments if they are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. In this context, for security and public order, the Union indirectly protects intra-European private investments with a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments. Although inspired by the legislation and practices of member states, this regulation provides a list of sectors potentially concerned, including the space sector. Member states and the Commission can determine the scope of filtering, taking into account the potential effects of these investments on critical infrastructures, such as transport, communications and aerospace, as well as on critical technologies and dual-use goods, including cybersecurity and aerospace. In France, the decree of 31 December 2019 on foreign investment sets out the procedure for controlling such investment, requiring authorisation from the Minister for the Economy. Thus, the technique of filtering through control of the potential effects of foreign investments on critical infrastructure and the authorisation requirement may indirectly protect intra-European investments and deter foreign investors.

Given that fundraising is a pivotal phase in the life of a start-up, with each stage presenting distinct legal complexities, it demands thorough attention to legal considerations and precise documentation. The negotiation of the term sheet marks the initial phase of the fundraising process. The term sheet serves as a usual non-binding document that summarises the key commercial and legal terms of the contemplated fundraising transaction. Following agreement on the term sheet, the parties will proceed to the negotiation of the definitive binding legal documentation for the fundraising transaction. The shareholders’ agreement, as the cornerstone agreement governing the relationship between investors and founders, deserves careful scrutiny to ensure a successful fundraising. Investors and founders should pay close attention to the provisions of the shareholders’ agreement that will shape their future relationship, including governance (board structure and control), ownership (particularly the investors’ controlling stake in the start-up post-closing) and share transfer (in particular lock-up, right of first offer and right of first refusal, tag and drag along), dividend policy, decision-making processes, IP/IT, non-compete/exclusivity, dispute resolution mechanisms, and exit strategy (liquidity events).

Other important fundraising documents may include the investment agreement, which sets out the terms of more complex transactions such as conditions precedent, the subscription price, representations and warranties, and other key provisions, as well as convertible bond agreements and the terms and conditions of preferred shares, when complex legal instruments are used for the fundraising. Finally, a management package is generally negotiated with the founders and involves the drafting of specific, complex agreements, which require dedicated legal and tax expertise.

Due diligence in New Space fundraisings and M&A transactions presents distinct challenges due to the complexity of the global ecosystem and the sector’s highly technical and regulated nature, requiring a deep understanding of its technical, financial, and legal dimensions. Legal due diligence should encompass a thorough analysis of, inter alia:

• regulatory compliance, including adherence to European and French space laws as well as applicable US regulations;
• a review of intellectual property and data rights to ensure key technologies are properly protected through patents or trade secrets and that data ownership complies with relevant legal frameworks; and
• an assessment of environmental impact.

Unlike public companies, where shareholders can generally sell their shares at any time, private companies typically restrict share transfers to specific periods or structured processes. A liquidity event refers to a defined event or period during which shareholders may have the opportunity to sell some or all of their shares. For this reason, it is essential for investors and founders to consider and plan their exit rights at the time of investment, in order to secure a path to liquidity and ultimately realise a return for the investors.

Liquidity mechanisms are generally set out in the shareholders’ agreement and typically fall into two categories: (i) contractual rights, such as drag-along provisions which enable majority shareholders to compel minority shareholders to participate in a change-of-control transaction; and (ii) structured exit processes, including the initial public offering (IPO), allowing shareholders to sell their shares on a public market, or an M&A exit managed by a dedicated financial adviser. It is strongly recommended to appoint a financial adviser with deep expertise in the NewSpace economy to help ensure the success of any IPO or M&A exit. Liquidity mechanisms may include a liquidation preference in favour of investors, providing for a preferential distribution of proceeds in the event of a company’s liquidation or certain deemed liquidation events, such as a merger, a sale of substantially all assets, or change-of-control transactions.

There is no applicable information in this jurisdiction.

A patent provides the patentee with the right to prohibit the exploitation of the concerned invention without his/her consent. This right to prohibit has a territorial dimension: it is limited to acts of manufacture, use, sale or offer for sale, or importation of the invention on the territory of the state for which the patent was granted.

The territorial dimension of patent law comes into direct collision with the fundamental principle of “outer space is not subject to national appropriation”, established in 1967 by the Space Treaty, to guarantee every nation equal access to space resources.

Indeed, it is therefore relevant to ask: is the right to prohibit granted to the patentee rendered inoperable when the invention protected is used in outer space?

With the introduction of the Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space in 1974, Article I of which implements Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty by qualifying areas of jurisdictional control over space objects through the concept of a “launching state”, a state party to the treaty retains jurisdiction over objects launched into space which have been registered in its name.

For example, a satellite launched from the Space Centre in French Guiana is considered, in practice, to have a volume – defined by the satellite’s physical boundaries – that falls under French jurisdiction. Accordingly, patent rights are understood to apply within this volume. In line with this, France has amended its patent law in its capacity as a launching state, extending patent protection to registered objects launched into space, as stipulated under Article L611-1 of the French Intellectual Property Code. These provisions allow a French court to hear an infringement case involving acts committed aboard a French-registered satellite in outer space, and to award compensation for resulting damages.

Article L613-5 of the Code introduces certain exceptions to patent protection. Two of these are particularly pertinent in the context of space activity: clauses (b) and (e).

Clause (b)

Clause (b) is common to the patent laws of most countries.

Under this clause, the use of a patented invention does not constitute infringement if the activity is carried out for experimental purposes. The rationale is that patent rights, which are intended to foster scientific progress, should not hinder innovation.

In practice, this exception is not limited to any particular sector of innovation, but is particularly notable in the space sector, since by its very nature, a significant proportion of missions are experimental in nature.

There is broad international agreement that for this exception to apply, the tests must relate to the invention as described in the patent – the invention must be the subject of the tests, not merely a means of conducting them.

In some cases, it can be difficult to determine whether a patented invention is being used simply to collect spatial data – which would not fall under the experimental use exception – or whether the use is genuinely intended to generate new knowledge about the invention itself, which would be exempt and thus not constitute infringement..

Clause (e)

Clause (e), which may initially seem problematic for space companies, states that patent rights do not apply to objects intended for launch into outer space that are temporarily introduced into French territory.

Introduced for both practical and competitive reasons, this clause should not be interpreted as denying all patent enforcement where inventions have space applications.

According to the 2008 Senate Report, the clause specifically refers to the temporary presence of space-bound objects in France prior to launch. The legislature included it for two main reasons. First, it seeks to avoid a potential legal risk where patentees might bring infringement actions based on the short-term presence of satellites in French territory – particularly in Kourou, French Guiana – before launch. The absence of such a provision would harm the competitiveness of Arianespace, as foreign clients might be deterred from using its services for fear of infringement claims.

Second, the clause was introduced on the basis of reciprocity with United States law. The USA offers this exemption to foreign nationals only if their governments offer equivalent protection to American nationals.

If France had not adopted a reciprocal clause, French operators using unpatented technology in France but subject to a US patent could have been exposed to infringement actions when using services such as those offered by SpaceX.

This mutual arrangement benefits all parties. As a result, for reasons of both competitiveness and legal reciprocity, it is unsurprising that most launching states have adopted similar legislative provisions.

In industry, patents play a key role in securing research and development results, while increasing attractiveness and potential return on investment. The space sector is no exception: in the past two decades, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of patent applications filed for space-applied inventions, following an exponential dynamic.

Companies traditionally file an initial patent application before the national office of their country. This is even more the case in the space sector given the generally widespread legal requirement to file patent applications before the national office for technologies that could be of interest to national defence. It is intended to avoid any uncontrolled sensitive disclosure.

On this basis, we can reasonably correlate the number of patent applications filed before the French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) to the activities of French companies. Accordingly, we can report that French companies are very involved in securing innovation efforts through the patent mechanism, although a substantial portion of filings are issued by established industrial players such as ArianeGroup (launchers), Thales (satellites), rather than start-ups.

When examining the few – or sometimes only – patent families held by a representative sample of French start-ups, it is frequently observed that protection is sought in key launching states. These typically include France (via a European patent), the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Israel.

This pattern supports the idea that companies have increasingly understood the strategic value of securing patent rights in launching states as a means of preventing unauthorised use of their inventions in space, since these states retain jurisdiction over space objects registered in their name.

There is no applicable information in this jurisdiction.

Given that most commercial contracts and related arbitration proceedings are confidential, records are scarce. Court proceedings seeking the annulment of arbitral awards are an interesting, yet limited, source of information.

A decision from the Paris Court of Appeals from 10 May 2007(05/19814) is a rare example of one of these cases. The Court of Appeals ruled on the request for annulment of an award rendered ex aequo et bono in an ad hoc arbitration between a reinsurer and Arianespace. The court confirmed that the arbitration was international because the contract, which related to satellite launches, was not exclusively French according to the meaning of Article 1492 of the French Code of Civil Proceedings. The choice of an ad hoc arbitration and of an ex aequo et bono ruling is, however, an outlier in the field of space activities.

Indeed, authors and commentators report on the sector’s preference when it comes to dispute resolution clauses. It is generally accepted that arbitration is the preferred forum for dispute resolution in the space sector and that users refer to generalist arbitral institutions such as the ICC, AAA or the LCIA.

There are no public records of investment claims launched by foreign investors against France for space-related activities.

Space-related disputes are generally referred to confidential arbitration. The limited information available concerns (i) telecommunications disputes and (ii) disputes related to the insurance and reinsurance of space activities. These include claims by insurance companies against satellite manufacturers related to technical malfunctions.