The market for growth companies in Chile is relatively well developed within Latin America, although it remains small in scale compared to more mature global ecosystems such as the United States or Europe. Chile consistently ranks among the most advanced ecosystems in the region, with strong institutional, regulatory, and human capital foundations that facilitate the creation and scaling of start-ups.
In terms of trends, the Chilean market largely mirrors global venture capital cycles. Following the investment boom in 2021, the ecosystem underwent a correction between 2022 and 2024, followed by a recovery in 2025, in line with the global dynamic of adjustment and subsequent stabilisation in venture capital. However, this recovery has been more selective: capital is being concentrated in fewer start-ups, but with larger deal sizes, reflecting a global shift toward prioritising quality, efficiency, and proven business models.
In 2025, approximately USD854 million was invested, with an average ticket size of USD4.1 million per start-up. This information was provided by the Chilean Venture Capital Association (ACVC) to the media in Chile (as of the date of writing, the 2026 Impact Report, which covers the funding rounds from 2025, has not been published).
Among the main funding rounds of 2025 were:
In 2025, the Chilean venture capital market was characterised by a more disciplined and selective investment environment, reflecting a broader global normalisation following the post-2021 correction. Financing conditions improved modestly, but capital remained concentrated in fewer start-ups, with investors prioritising companies that demonstrated strong traction, clear paths to profitability, and capital efficiency. While early-stage investment (seed and Series A) continued to dominate, funding criteria became more stringent, and fewer companies advanced to later stages.
In terms of transaction structures, there was a clear shift toward greater valuation discipline and more investor-friendly terms compared to the peak years. Larger, conviction-based rounds became more common, often involving syndication with international investors, particularly in growth-stage financings where local capital remains limited. Overall, deal making reflected a focus on downside protection, sustainable growth, and proven business models, in line with global venture capital trends.
The industries that attracted the most capital in funding rounds were sports/entertainment, accounting for 37.4% of the total. They were followed by fintech/insurtech with 31%, and proptech/contech with 8.2%. These figures were provided by the ACVC (Chilean Venture Capital Association).
VC funds are typically structured through private investment funds managed by an administrator registered with the Financial Market Commission (CMF). Currently, there are corporate venture capital funds, family offices, and conventional VC funds. Some of these funds are composed entirely of private equity, while others combine equity with debt obtained through a CORFO credit line (ranging from USD6.7 million to USD89 million). It is also common to form a joint stock company (SpA) to pool capital, which is then invested in start-ups. In parallel, a separate SpA is often created to manage the fund and bring together the general partners and the VC team.
In general, fund principals participate in the fund’s economics by first charging a management fee, which typically ranges from 1% to 2.5% of the capital managed throughout the duration of the fund. On the other hand, they share in the fund’s success by receiving a carried interest, which is generally around 20%. Finally, it is common and preferred for the general partner(s) to also be contributors to the fund (due to tax limitations, they usually hold no more than 20% of the fund’s capital as contributors).
The Chilean ecosystem remains more focused on traditional fund structures and early-stage investing, with limited development of secondary or continuation-type strategies.
There is no specific regulation for venture capital funds. Both private and public funds are generally regulated by the Single Fund Law (No 20,712). However, there are certain specific benefits aimed at financing private funds, such as CORFO’s credit lines.
VC funds in Chile are supported by CORFO through financing lines that follow an equity/debt ratio of 2:1, 1:1, and 0.5:1. However, in recent years very few funds have been approved by CORFO, with lengthy processes becoming the norm, often leading applicants to drop out along the way.
Generally, these funds earmark a portion of their capital for follow-on rounds, with the objective of gradually liquidating investments throughout the life cycle. Finally, exits are not as common as in other markets.
In general, due diligence processes vary in intensity depending on the stage that the respective start-up is in. The main areas of focus are valuation, financial evaluation, market, founding team, technology used, clients, and governance.
As for legal due diligence, it typically includes reviewing the corporate structure, key contracts with clients, employment matters of employees and founders, tax compliance, litigation, and potentially regulatory issues affecting the company (eg, financial service providers regulated by the CMF).
The round duration generally depends on the number of investors and the stage the company is in. In early-stage investments, multiple investors usually conduct their own due diligence, which, even if simple, takes time and can distract the founders significantly. This process typically lasts between two to five months. In later stages, there is generally a lead investor who manages the due diligence process along with other VCs. Although more information is available at this stage, it is typically better organised, so the round generally takes between three to four months.
In Chile, the most common financing instrument at the early stage is the SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity), typically based on the Y Combinator model but adapted to comply with Chilean regulations. This facilitates setting up structures abroad (mainly Delaware and the Cayman Islands) in preparation for more advanced rounds, through the FLIP. These agreements allow investors to receive shares in a future funding round (a valuation cap is established, and potentially a discount) and generally do not specify an expiration date or interest associated with them.
Another commonly used instrument is the convertible loan, which is a debt instrument (a credit transaction) that can be converted into equity in future funding rounds, typically including a valuation cap and, in some cases, a discount. This instrument is subject to stamp tax, with the amount depending on various factors (amount, term, etc). To a lesser extent, capital increases with the issuance of ordinary or preferred shares are used. These instruments generally set rules for information and governance, preferential rights in liquidation, anti-dilution provisions, MFN (most favoured nation), etc.
In the Chilean venture capital market, secondary components are not yet a common feature of transactions and are only occasionally combined with primary investments. Most deals – particularly at early- and mid-stages – remain predominantly primary in nature, as the ecosystem continues to prioritise capital injection for growth over liquidity for existing shareholders.
In Chile, a start-up financing round in the growth stage typically involves the following key documents:
In Chile, there is no set of standardised, mandatory documents; however, it is common for ecosystem participants – particularly VC funds and incubators/accelerators – to refer to certain clauses from international models, especially those from the NVCA (National Venture Capital Association) in the United States, adapting them to Chilean legislation.
Early-stage investors are generally not involved in the management of the company. However, in more advanced stages (Seed-Series A and beyond), while investors typically do not engage in the day-to-day operations of the start-ups, they do seek to ensure a significant level of control and influence over the company’s strategic and structural decisions through contractual clauses and corporate governance structures. Some of the most common rights that are negotiated include:
Early Stage
Generally, in SAFE agreements (commonly used in early-stage investments), the investor makes general representations such as having the legal capacity, understanding the investment’s purpose, and acknowledging the risks involved.
The start-up typically declares that it is duly incorporated, in good standing, and in compliance with the laws of its jurisdiction, and that it has the necessary legal capacity to enter into and execute the SAFE agreement. It affirms that the instrument has been validly authorised by its competent corporate bodies and does not contravene any relevant laws, contracts, or active authorisations. The start-up also declares that executing the contract does not create conflicts or adversely affect its assets, operations, or essential licences. Finally, the company states that it possesses the necessary intellectual property rights for the development of its business, without infringing third-party rights.
Later Stages (Especially Series A and Beyond)
Typically, in capital increases, subscription agreements (post-capital increase), and/or shareholders’ agreements, the following conditions are included:
Representations and warranties
The most common include:
Covenants and undertakings (future commitments and obligations)
Common covenants and undertakings include:
Remedies
In the event of breaches or false representations/warranties, the investor may seek various remedies, which are typically specified in the contracts:
On the other hand, start-ups typically negotiate liability limitations, minimum thresholds for claims, and limited prescription periods (eg, 12 or 18 months).
Finally, it is very relevant to review the interpretation of such clauses from a judicial perspective in Chile to have an effective understanding of the scope and viability of each one.
One of CORFO’s financing lines is the FC line, designed for funds that invest in the development and growth of start-ups. This differs from the FE and FET lines, which are granted to funds investing in early-stage companies. A fund that obtains an FC line must focus on investing in start-ups that have a validated product or service with sales.
General Taxation Applicable to All Companies
Start-ups, like any other company in Chile (including those of investors), are subject to the general first-category tax (corporate tax) on their profits. Shareholders/investors (individuals) are taxed with final taxes (global complementary or additional tax) when they receive withdrawals or distributions of profits.
Profits obtained from the sale of start-up shares will be subject to taxes, although in some cases, they may qualify for exemptions or benefits established in the Income Tax Law, depending on the specific case.
Taxation Applicable to Investment Funds
Investors participating through regulated vehicles such as public or private investment funds can benefit from a more efficient tax treatment. The Single Fund Law (LUF) establishes that funds do not pay taxes on their capital gains, but taxes are incurred at the contributor level, which allows for deferral of taxation until the actual withdrawal of profits.
In Chile, recent governments have developed various initiatives to promote financing through capital in early-stage and growth-stage ventures, with a special focus on start-ups and innovative companies. The main public institution responsible for these policies is CORFO (Corporación de Fomento de la Producción), which has played a key role in the development of the venture capital ecosystem.
Some of the most relevant initiatives include:
These public policies have been crucial in building the venture capital ecosystem in Chile, attracting both national and international investors, and promoting a culture more open to risk investment.
In Chile, venture capital investors typically secure the commitment of founders and key employees through vesting clauses (reverse vesting for those who are already shareholders), which allow shares or economic rights to be acquired or consolidated gradually over time. These clauses are complemented by transfer restrictions, buyback rights (under certain conditions, the price per share is penalised), and non-compete agreements, all aimed at aligning the incentives of the founding team with the sustainable development of the business.
The most commonly used instrument to incentivise founders and key employees is primarily the stock option agreement in its various forms (depending on whether it is vesting for founders or stock options for employees).
A typical vesting period of four years with a one-year cliff is usually established, during which the beneficiary gradually acquires rights over the shares. Reverse vesting is also used, especially for founders, where the company has the right to repurchase shares in the event of early departure.
These instruments are usually tied to the beneficiary staying with the company, and the shares can be fully or partially lost if the employment or business relationship ends. It is important to note that the reason for the departure is relevant in these cases, and it could determine the forfeiture of the shares in the event of early departure.
From the worker’s perspective, generally, the stock option and vesting do not trigger taxation. In the case of exercising the option, if there is an increase in value (between the market value of the shares at the time of exercise and the price paid by the worker), the worker may or may not be taxed, depending on whether they have an individual or collective employment contract that addresses this right to stock options. If the benefit is established in the employment contract, taxation will only occur when the worker sells their shares (if there is a higher value), and not when they exercise the option. Otherwise, they will be taxed both when they exercise the option and upon the future sale of the shares (if there is a higher value in either case). It is important that these instruments are addressed from both a tax and labour perspective.
Investors in venture capital rounds typically request that the employee incentive plan be defined by the time the investment is closed. This ensures clear visibility of the fully diluted share capital and helps avoid future surprises regarding ownership stakes. The option pool generally ranges between 5-10%. The dilution resulting from the incentive plan can be absorbed by the founders or by both the founders and investors. Typically, it is the founders who propose the option pool, and the discussion usually focuses not on the need for the option pool itself, but on who will bear the dilution resulting from it.
In Chile, the provisions that establish investors’ rights in the event of an exit or liquidity event are typically included in shareholder agreements. These mainly include pre-emptive rights, tag-along, drag-along, and liquidation preferences. These rules ensure that investors can exit their investment in events such as a trade sale, an initial public offering (IPO), or any other liquidity event. Tag-along rights allow minority investors to participate in the sale if the majority shareholder sells, while drag-along rights compel minority shareholders to sell if the majority shareholder decides to sell. Liquidation preferences ensure that existing shareholders have the right of first refusal to acquire shares from other shareholders who wish to sell.
Additionally, since exits are uncommon in Chile, investors often create funds with longer durations and set longer conversion conditions (eg, in a SAFE). Future investment rounds typically allow investors to sell all or part of their shares to other funds, even when a sale or IPO does not occur. These practices provide greater flexibility for investors in an environment with few liquidity events.
In Chile, IPOs are relatively rare as an exit strategy for start-ups. The path to an IPO is often a longer-term goal rather than an immediate option for early-stage ventures, particularly in the start-up and venture capital sectors.
However, ScaleX (from the Santiago Stock Exchange) allows public offerings that are exempt from the requirement of registration with the Commission for the Financial Market (CMF) of the issuer or securities, in accordance with General Rule No 452. The purpose of this is to facilitate the trading of securities from companies in the expansion stage. This has allowed some start-ups (very few so far) to explore this path, which was previously outright dismissed.
Pre-IPO liquidity in the Chilean ecosystem is still in its early stages but is starting to emerge. These are secondary or structured transactions that allow certain shareholders to sell their stakes in a high-growth start-up before it goes public. Some Chilean start-ups that are expanding internationally (for example, through Delaware structures) may gain access to funds offering secondary liquidity windows. These transactions are generally used to reward early-stage investors, founders, and key team members without having to wait for a full exit. They allow for a cap table reorganisation, facilitating the entry of new investors and retention of talent by providing partial liquidity while maintaining long-term incentives. Common forms include:
The Securities Market Law (Law No 18.045) distinguishes between public offerings and private offerings of securities. Venture capital investments are typically structured as private offerings, which do not require registration with the CMF’s Securities Register, as long as certain conditions are met (eg, being directed to a limited number of investors without mass advertising). In larger transactions, care must be taken not to exceed the thresholds that would trigger a public offering. On the other hand, the Fintech Law opens the possibility for creating alternative transaction systems that could allow a secondary market for shares, subject to certain restrictions.
The Corporate Law (Law No 18.046) addresses closed joint stock companies, a legal structure that is less common for Chilean start-ups (the most widely used is the SpA (Sociedad por Acciones, or Simplified Stock Corporation)), allowing partners to freely agree on terms through shareholder agreements. However, the issuance of new shares must meet certain legal and statutory requirements, including extraordinary meetings and respecting the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders unless expressly waived. SpAs (created by Law No 20.190), on the other hand, provide greater flexibility for these and other types of transactions. In any case, the supplementary rule for SpAs will be the regulations concerning S.A.
There are no significant restrictions preventing a foreign VC investor from investing in a local growth-stage company or withdrawing their profits, but there are some regulatory considerations to keep in mind:
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Rethinking the Playbook: Hyper-Growth, New Business Models and the Emerging Exit Landscape in Latin America
Abstract
Venture capital was built on a single premise: that explosive, non-linear growth exists in sufficient quantity to justify the entire architecture of the asset class. In Latin America, that premise is now being tested with unusual honesty. Capital has concentrated around companies with demonstrated efficiency and recurring revenue quality, while global AI benchmarks – Anthropic surpassing USD19 billion in ARR, Harvey reaching USD100 million in under 12 months – have permanently raised the bar for what “fast growth” means.
The result is a forced conversation the region has long avoided: does Latin America generate enough outlier growth to sustain the volume of VC infrastructure built around the assumption that it would? This article argues that the answer opens into two legitimate paths – the classic hypergrowth-to-large-exit route for the rare company that can compete on velocity, and a newly viable second path: capital-efficient, AI-enabled, profitable at scale, supported by private equity’s growing appetite for mature regional tech assets and an M&A market that produced USD13.2 billion in exits in 2025.
The central open question is whether AI commoditisation will compress the SaaS multiples underpinning that second path – a question that will define the exit landscape for the next several years.
The only variable that has ever mattered
There was a time when the venture capital narrative in Latin America was built on a fairly simple premise: raise a round, grow fast, raise the next one, and eventually – somewhere on the horizon – something big would happen. A unicorn, an IPO, a landmark acquisition. The ecosystem produced headlines with reasonable regularity, capital flowed with unusual generosity, and there was a collective faith that the region was, at last, having its moment.
That moment did not simply end. It revealed something more important: the entire architecture of venture capital is predicated on one thing, and one thing only – explosive, non-linear growth. Marc Andreessen has noted publicly that of the thousands of technology start-ups seeking VC funding each year, a tiny fraction generate the vast majority of all economic returns across the entire industry, and that even the top VCs write off a significant portion of their deals. The implication for any fund is direct: a small number of outsized outcomes must compensate for the majority of investments that will underperform. The outliers are large enough to absorb the losses of everything that did not work. But they must exist, and they must be large enough. Everything else is downstream of that.
The honest question that Latin America is now being forced to answer, perhaps for the first time, is whether the region generates enough explosive growth to sustain the volume of VC infrastructure built around the assumption that it would. Total venture funding in Latin America recovered to approximately USD4.1 billion in 2025, a 14.3% increase from USD3.6 billion in 2024, according to PitchBook data. But the headline figure says less than its composition: capital has concentrated around companies with demonstrated traction, capital efficiency and credible governance. Brazil and Mexico absorbed approximately 78% of regional VC flows, while Chile – with a smaller share of volume – ranked first in Cuantico VP's VC Efficiency Index with a score of 40.2, ahead of Uruguay and Brazil. The index measures the quality of venture capital deployment relative to ecosystem size, weighting outcomes such as exits, unicorn formation and follow-on funding rates against total capital invested – rewarding ecosystems that do more with less.
The recalibration – and its deeper cause
The scarcity of growth capital in Latin America today cannot be explained by interest rates alone, although the Federal Reserve’s rate cycle of 2022 was a genuine shock to a region that carries an additional risk premium. The deeper issue is one of opportunity cost, and it has shifted the calculus for global capital allocators in ways that are structural rather than cyclical.
Much of the institutional capital that arrived in Latin America during 2020 and 2021 is now being deployed toward a different set of opportunities: the infrastructure and application layers of AI, primarily in the United States. The numbers involved are of a different order of magnitude. Anthropic’s ARR surged to approximately USD19 billion by early 2026, making it one of the fastest-growing companies in the history of enterprise software. That velocity is no longer exclusive to model builders: Harvey, an AI platform for law firms that sits at the application layer – companies that take foundational AI models and build products for specific industries on top of them – reached USD100 million in ARR in under 12 months. For a global LP or a crossover fund, the question is not whether Latin America has good companies – it does. It is whether the risk-adjusted return of investing in a Series B SaaS company in Santiago or Bogotá compares favourably with those growth curves. Capital flows toward the fastest, most visible growth.
The constructive conclusion from this dynamic is counterintuitive: geography matters less than it ever has, in both directions. When a Latin American company demonstrates genuine explosive growth, global capital follows without friction – there is no structural impediment, no regional discount sufficient to deter serious investors when the trajectory is unmistakable. The evidence is visible in the most recent late-stage rounds in the region: the capital was there, and it moved quickly. The bar has been raised permanently by global AI competition – but for founders who can demonstrate that kind of velocity, the opportunity is genuinely global.
The companies that have not achieved that velocity – the majority, by definition – are navigating a harder reality. In Chile, venture capital investment fell sharply in 2024, with capital deployed at growth stage falling to approximately USD100 million, six times less than the prior year, according to Endeavor’s 2025 report. Approximately 85 fund managers who raised their first vehicle between 2021 and 2023 now need to raise a second fund in a market where their portfolios have not yet generated meaningful distributions. This is the structural tension the ecosystem is managing: a handful of genuine outliers validating the model, and a much larger cohort of companies that need a different kind of outcome.
A second path – now more viable than ever
What is new in the current environment – and what is generating some of the most substantive conversations we have had with clients in years – is that the alternative to the classic venture route has become meaningfully more attractive, and more achievable, than it was three years ago.
The classic venture route remains valid for the right company: raise successive rounds, prioritise growth over profitability, build toward a large-scale exit or a public listing. For a typical Chilean early-stage fund with a USD20 million vehicle, a fund-returning outcome requires a company sale north of USD133 million at a 15% ownership stake. The companies capable of that outcome – those with genuine network effects, large addressable markets, and defensible competitive positions – should pursue it. The mathematics of VC only work if some companies produce extraordinary outcomes, and those companies exist in the region.
But there is a second path that is gaining real traction, and AI has fundamentally altered its economics. A company that previously needed USD3 million to reach a meaningful revenue milestone may today reach the same point with half that capital. AI tools are automating functions that previously required dedicated headcount – finance operations, compliance monitoring, customer support, even initial contract review – allowing companies to extend their runway without proportional cost increases. More significantly, AI-native business models are enabling companies to reach tens of millions in ARR with lean teams and in timelines that would have been implausible three years ago – not through hypergrowth venture math, but through efficient, scalable operations. According to available data, top SaaS start-ups in Latin America are achieving customer acquisition cost payback periods of only 1.6 months, compared with 4.8 months in the United States – a directional trend that reflects both the region’s labour dynamics and the efficiency dividends of AI tooling.
For founders on this second path, the objective is not the abandonment of ambition – it is a redefinition of what a successful outcome looks like. A company generating USD5–USD8 million in ARR with positive EBITDA and a clear market position is, in the current environment, an attractive and achievable target that may generate more value for founders, employees and early investors than spending three more years diluting equity in pursuit of a valuation the market may not support. The key, and this is a point that is consistently underestimated at the term sheet stage, is ensuring that the capital structure, shareholder agreements and investor expectations are aligned with this path from the outset. Liquidation preferences, anti-dilution provisions, and pro-rata rights negotiated in 2021 – in a world that assumed rapid graduation between financing rounds – can produce outcomes that serve neither founders nor investors well when the company has chosen profitability over hypergrowth. Managing that realignment is increasingly a central part of our advisory work.
Private equity, M&A and the exit landscape taking shape
The shift described above – a growing cohort of profitable, mature Latin American technology companies that are too advanced for early-stage VC and too regional for large-scale buyouts – has created a structural gap that private equity is beginning to fill with genuine intent.
For Chile specifically, this dynamic may carry an additional tailwind: the country’s ranking first in Cuantico VP’s VC Efficiency Index suggests that Chilean assets tend to be built with more capital discipline than their regional peers – precisely the profile that PE acquirers price as a premium.
There is a cohort of Latin American start-ups founded between 2015 and 2019 that today have material recurring revenues, sustainable operations, and in several cases positive margins, yet remain privately held, with no near-term IPO prospect, and with VC fund managers under increasing pressure from their LPs to generate distributions. For founders and their advisers, the entry of PE as a buyer or growth investor creates real optionality that did not exist three years ago. But it changes the language of the negotiation in meaningful ways: PE arrives with a different set of expectations: positive EBITDA or a credible path to it, board rights that go well beyond what most founders have experienced, and incentive structures for management that rarely resemble what was agreed with early VCs. Managing that transition – particularly when prior VC investors remain on the cap table with their own preferences and rights – is today one of the most complex and consequential pieces of work we see in practice.
On the M&A front, the IPO window that briefly opened in 2021 has remained largely closed. PicPay’s Nasdaq debut in early 2026 – the first Brazilian listing on a US exchange in nearly four years – priced at a considerably more conservative valuation than peak-cycle expectations. In practice, strategic sales remain the dominant exit mechanism. LAVCA reported that private capital exits in Latin America rebounded to USD13.2 billion in 2025, with strategic sales accounting for USD4.5 billion – the largest single component. Among the most consistently active acquirers in the regional software ecosystem, Visma and Constellation Software stand out for their disciplined appetite for profitable, well-run businesses. In every case, the underlying logic is the same: recurring revenue quality, strong customer retention, and operational discipline.
A critical open question looms over this landscape: what happens to SaaS valuations as AI erodes the historical certainty of their revenue base? The multiple expansion that made traditional software businesses attractive acquisition targets was predicated on the predictability of ARR. If AI-native alternatives can replicate core functionality at a fraction of the cost, the revenue certainty that justified those multiples begins to erode. Will serial acquirers continue acquiring Latin American SaaS businesses at strong multiples, or will the center of gravity for M&A shift toward AI-capable companies? The answer will shape the exit landscape for the next several years, and it is a question every founder and fund manager in the region should be thinking about today.
That question does not have a clean answer yet. What is clear is that the pessimism of the last two years has been as poor a guide to reality as the euphoria that preceded it.
The market is honest now
The media pendulum has swung hard: from the hype rounds and unicorn announcements of 2021, to the pessimism of 2025 and 2026, focused disproportionately on the companies that did not generate outlier returns. Neither extreme has been an accurate representation of what is actually happening in the ecosystem.
What is accurate is this: beneath the noise, new businesses are being built. Seed rounds are returning to historically strong levels. Several regional funds did return their capital thanks to the outliers that everyone knows. And the structural conditions for the next generation of outliers – a larger regional talent pool, dramatically lower build costs, global market access from day one – are better today than they have ever been. The formula has not changed: explosive growth attracts capital, regardless of geography. But for the companies that choose a different path – profitable, efficient, strategically positioned – the exit infrastructure is forming around them in ways that make that choice genuinely viable for the first time.
For those of us advising on the transactions and structures that help a company’s trajectory make sense to the buyers, investors and partners evaluating it, that convergence is where we are spending most of our time. For good reason.
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