Categories of Criminal Offences

The French Criminal Code (Code pénal – CP), distinguishes between three categories of criminal offences: contraventions, misdemeanours (délits) and felonies (crimes) (Articles 111-1 and 111-2, CP). The classification depends on the seriousness of the offence and the severity of the applicable penalty:

• Contraventions are the least serious offences (eg, regulatory breaches, minor traffic violations), and are punishable by fines up to EUR1,500 (or EUR3,000 in cases of repeat offence), as well as secondary penalties such as the suspension of certain rights.
• Misdemeanours are mid-level offences (eg, fraud, corruption, money laundering, tax evasion, insider trading) punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment and/or a fine. Most white-collar crime cases fall into this category.
• Felonies are the most serious offences (eg, murder, rape). They are punishable by at least 15 years’ imprisonment up to life imprisonment.

Constituent Elements of a Criminal Offence

For conduct to qualify as a criminal offence in France, both material and moral elements must be established in principle:

• The material element refers to the prohibited act or omission as defined by law. In white-collar matters, this can include concealing the origin of funds (money laundering) or granting an undue advantage (corruption).
• The moral element concerns the offender’s intent (intention coupable). Crimes are necessarily intentional offences. However, misdemeanours may take the form of offences of recklessness or negligence (faute d’imprudence or faute de negligence) where the law expressly provides for it, such as in involuntary manslaughter or accounting irregularities (Article 121-3, CP).

Attempted Offences

Attempts are always punishable in the case of felonies, punishable for misdemeanours only where the law expressly provides for it, and never punishable for contraventions (Article 121-5, CP). An attempt is established when the offender has begun to carry out the offence, but its completion fails or is interrupted due to circumstances beyond their control – for example, an extortion attempt that fails because the victim resists the offender’s threats.

In France, the presumption of innocence applies. Accordingly, the accused is not required to prove their innocence; the burden of proof lies with the prosecution.

Standard of Proof

The prosecution must establish the offence and produce evidence to this end. While French law does not use the common law terminology of “beyond reasonable doubt”, the principle in dubio pro reo applies: an accused person must be given the benefit of the doubt.

Presumptions and Reversals of the Burden of Proof

Statutory presumptions can apply in certain areas. For instance, in money laundering cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the exact illicit origin of assets, but only that a lawful origin cannot be established. The accused is expected to demonstrate the legitimate source of the funds (Article 324-1-1, CP).

According to the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de procedure pénale – CPP), the statute of limitations of prosecution is as follows:

• 20 years for felonies (30 years for terrorism, drug trafficking and certain offences against minors for which the period begins to run from the victim’s 18th birthday); no limitation applies for the most serious crimes such as crimes against humanity (Article 7, CPP);
• six years for misdemeanours (20 years for terrorism and drug trafficking, between 10 and 20 years for certain offences against minors, starting from the victim’s 18th birthday) (Article 8, CPP); and
• one year for contraventions (Article 9, CPP).

Commencement of the Limitation Period

In principle, the limitation period begins on the day the offence is committed. For continuing offences, including concealment or a series of acts, the period begins on the last act of commission of the offence.

Suspension and Interruption

The limitation period may be:

• suspended where prosecution is temporarily impossible or when the law provides for it (eg, while negotiating a deferred prosecution agreement (Convention judiciaire d’intérêt public – CJIP)) (Article 9-3, CPP); or
• interrupted by formal procedural acts, including the initiation of an investigation, issuance of a summons, or filing with a court (Article 9-2, CPP); each act resets the limitation period.

Extraterritorial Reach

In accordance with the principle of territoriality, French criminal courts have jurisdiction with regard to criminal offences having taken place on French territory. An offence is deemed to be committed in France where any one of its constituent elements occurs on French soil.

With regard to cybercrime, jurisdiction is extended to any offence committed via electronic communications networks against a natural person residing in France or a legal entity whose registered office is in France, regardless of the nationality of the victim (Article 113-2-1, CP).

French law also applies in principle to accomplices located in France who aid or incite an offence committed abroad (Article 113-5, CP), the conditions being that the offence is punishable under both French and foreign law, and that a final decision of the foreign court establishes the offence.

In addition, French courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by a French national abroad (Article 113-6, CP) or where a French national is a victim (Article 113-7, CP). French courts also have universal jurisdiction over the most serious crimes committed abroad (eg, crimes against humanity).

Cross-Border Co-operation

Mutual legal assistance and blocking statutes

France participates in broad co-operation mechanisms, including the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959), the European Investigation Order (2014/41/EU), and bilateral treaties with key jurisdictions. Mutual legal assistance is particularly important among EU member states.

In the absence of a treaty, co-operation may be granted under Articles 694 et seq. CPP, subject to reciprocity and double criminality.

France maintains a blocking statute, prohibiting the communication of sensitive information to foreign authorities outside formal co-operation channels. While rarely enforced, it provides a formal legal shield for French companies faced with extraterritorial discovery requests, particularly from US authorities.

Extradition

Extradition in France is governed by the European Arrest Warrant (2002/584/JHA) within the EU, the European Convention on Extradition (1957), and Articles 696 et seq. CPP.

Extradition for white-collar offences is permitted if the offence is punishable by at least two years’ imprisonment in both France and the requesting state. Grounds for refusal include political offences, risks of inhuman treatment, or if the person is a French national (Article 696-4, CPP).

International task forces and enforcement networks

France is an active member of international enforcement bodies, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), based in Paris, the OECD Working Group on Bribery, INTERPOL, GRECO, Europol, Eurojust, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), charged with prosecuting criminal offences affecting the EU’s financial interests.

French criminal law recognises the criminal liability of legal entities (Article 121-2, CP). With the exception of the state itself, all legal persons, including companies, associations, trade unions, religious congregations and local authorities, may be prosecuted for offences committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives.

Corporate liability is autonomous: it does not exclude the parallel prosecution of the individual who physically committed the offence. In practice, both the company and the natural person involved are often prosecuted together, especially in serious white-collar offences.

Conditions for Liability

A legal entity may only be held liable where the unlawful act or omission is attributable to one of its organs or representatives acting (or failing to act) on its behalf. In the private sector, it could include the managing director, the CEO, the board of directors or the management board for commercial companies, and the general assembly for associations. More broadly, it could also include any organ or representative acting in the name of the legal entity.

Mergers and Acquisitions

Since a landmark decision in 2020 by the Cour de cassation (French Supreme Court), an absorbing entity may be held liable for offences committed by the absorbed company prior to a merger by absorption. This alignment with EU law ensures that companies cannot escape criminal liability for past misconduct through restructuring.

Parent-Subsidiary and Group Liability

Each company within a group retains separate criminal liability. A parent company is not automatically liable for acts committed by a subsidiary unless it can be established that the parent itself, through its organs or representatives, took part in the offence or knew that the offence was being committed. However, prosecutors and investigating judges increasingly scrutinise group structures, especially when the parent company sets compliance policies or financial strategies that enable unlawful conduct.

While “failure to prevent” offences are not codified, the Sapin II Law (Law No 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016) imposes mandatory anti-corruption compliance programmes on large companies. Failure to implement adequate procedures does not in itself constitute a separate offence, but it may amount to evidence of organisational fault and aggravate liability in white-collar cases.

A judge may only impose the penalties expressly provided for by law for the offence in question and cannot go beyond the statutory maximum set by the legislature. The principle of individualisation of penalties further requires the court to adapt the sentence to the seriousness of the offence, the circumstances of the offence, and the personality of the offender (Article 132-24, CP).

While legal entities do not face imprisonment, they risk a fine equal to five times (5x) the fine incurred by individuals (Article 131-38, CP).

In addition to imprisonment and financial sanctions, natural persons and legal entities face additional sanctions which must be taken into account while assessing their criminal exposure (eg, debarment, seizure of assets, etc).

Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

The statutory maximum penalty may be increased where aggravating circumstances are established or in cases of recidivism, in particular:

• Aggravating circumstances are defined in each substantive offence provision, with the legislature specifying the level of increase for each. For example, simple theft carries a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment and a EUR45,000 fine, but it may extend to a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment and a EUR150,000 fine if the offence results in permanent mutilation or disability.
• Recidivism leads to harsher penalties for repeat offending. A second offence committed in a state of legal recidivism increases the maximum applicable sentence for the subsequent offence. By contrast, reiteration, meaning the commission of a new offence after a final conviction for another offence, results in a simple accumulation of penalties.

The statutory maximum may also be reduced in certain cases, such as where the offender has self-reported the offence.

Sentencing in the Context of Plea Agreements

French criminal law allows for negotiated procedures:

• A deferred prosecution agreement is available for certain offences (CJIP) such as corruption, influence peddling or laundering of tax fraud. Under this mechanism, a company may avoid prosecution by agreeing to pay a public interest fine, implement a compliance programme under the supervision of the French Anti-Corruption Agency (AFA), and/or compensate victims. The fine is capped at 30% of the group of companies’ average annual turnover over the previous three years. The National Financial Prosecutor’s Office (Parquet National Financier – PNF) has enacted Guidelines on the implementation of the CJIP last dated 16 January 2023 which provide guidance on financial sanctions that could be imposed under this framework (Guidelines).
• Under certain conditions, a guilty plea procedure is available for individuals and legal entities in cases where the prosecution proposes a sentence that is then validated by a judge (Comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité – CRPC). General principles governing sentencing in French criminal law apply to guilty pleas.

In both frameworks, co-operation, disclosure, remediation, and adoption of compliance measures are factors that are supposed to mitigate penalties.

Victims of white-collar offences may claim compensation for their loss. The French system is characterised by the principle of action civile, which enables victims to seek compensation directly before criminal courts (Article 2, CPP).

Legal Grounds

Victims may initiate or join criminal proceedings as civil parties in criminal proceedings. This allows them to seek damages alongside the prosecution of the offence, while being able to rely on evidence collected during the investigation.

Jurisdiction

Victims may join the criminal proceedings as a civil party before the criminal court that has jurisdiction over the offence (Articles 2 et seq., CPP).

Alternatively, victims may pursue their claim before the civil courts. However, if a parallel criminal proceeding is ongoing, civil courts generally stay proceedings until a final judgment on criminal liability is rendered, in order to avoid contradictory rulings.

Collective Redress

Since 2014, a limited collective redress mechanism (action de groupe) exists. Initially confined to consumer and competition law, it has gradually been extended to discrimination, health and environmental matters, but it remains unavailable for most white-collar offences. In practice, victims of economic and financial crime must either pursue compensation individually or rely on professional bodies (such as trade unions) to bring claims on their behalf. Article 16 of the Law of 30 April 2025 (Law No 2025-391) amended the group action regime, bringing French law into compliance with EU law and opening group actions to legal entities.

Criminal Enforcement

The central authority for criminal investigations and prosecutions in white-collar cases is the public prosecutor’s office (parquet), assisted by the police and specialised investigation services. For the most complex financial crimes, cases are referred to specialised divisions (Office National Anti-Fraude, Office Central de Lutte Contre la Corruption et les Infractions Financières et Fiscales, etc).

The National Financial Prosecutor’s Office (Parquet national financier – PNF), created in 2013, has jurisdiction over serious and complex financial crimes, including corruption, influence peddling, tax fraud and laundering of tax fraud proceeds, money laundering and large-scale market abuse (in co-operation with the Financial Markets Authority).

Administrative and Civil Enforcement

Alongside criminal prosecution, regulatory enforcement plays an important role, in particular:

• The French Anti-Corruption Agency (Agence française anticorruption – AFA) monitors compliance with anti-corruption requirements under the 2016 Sapin II Law and can refer cases to prosecutors.
• The General Directorate for Competition Policy, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF) holds significant administrative authority in the enforcement of measures against economic fraud.
• The Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF) supervises securities markets and enforces insider dealing, market manipulation, and disclosure obligations. It has investigative and sanctioning powers.
• The Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) investigates cartels and abuse of dominance, imposing significant fines.

Special Rules and Conflicts

France does not have a strict division between criminal and administrative enforcement; in practice, parallel proceedings are common. Priority rules or co-ordination mechanisms vary by statute.

For insider trading, market manipulation, and related misconduct, co-ordination between the AMF and the PNF is governed by Articles L. 465-3-6 and L. 621-15-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code (CMF). A formal “orientation mechanism” ensures that either the AMF or the prosecutor handles a case – preventing double proceedings for the same facts. Serious or complex cases with potential criminal intent are generally referred to the PNF, while purely regulatory breaches remain within the AMF’s jurisdiction.

Institutional Changes and Policy Pressure

The creation of the PNF and the AFA reflects France’s policy to strengthen enforcement against financial and corruption-related offences. The PNF, in particular, has become a high-profile actor, dealing with politically sensitive and international corruption cases, increasingly in co-operation with other judicial authorities such as the Serious Fraud Office or the US Department of Justice.

White-collar investigations are primarily initiated by the public prosecutor’s office, which has the authority to open investigations whenever there is sufficient factual evidence to suggest that a criminal offence has been committed. Such evidence may arise from whistle-blower reports, complaints filed by victims, regulatory body reports, press releases, or the prosecutor’s own inquiries.

In France, civil parties may directly seize an investigating judge (under certain conditions) or a criminal court by means of a direct summons (citation directe).

Two types of investigations exist primarily in white-collar cases: the preliminary investigation (conducted by the public prosecutor) and the judicial investigation (conducted by an investigation judge). Depending on the type of investigation, investigating power and safeguards may vary.

Requisitions for Information

Judicial police officers may obtain information relevant to the investigation by issuing requisitions to both private and public actors. These may include public or private entities and administrations (Articles 60-1 and 77-1-1, CPP), public bodies and private law legal entities (Articles 60-2(1) and 77-1-2(1), CPP), as well as telecommunication operators (Articles 60-2(2) and 77-1-2(2), CPP).

Searches and Seizures

As a rule, authorities may conduct dawn raids between 06:00 and 21:00. The scope of a search includes the seizure of papers, documents, or other relevant objects, the seizure or copying of digital data, in the presence of persons attending the search, and remote access to digital data stored on systems accessible from the location searched, including data held on external servers, if accessible through the initial system.

Special rules protect certain professional premises, such as those of lawyers, doctors, journalists, notaries, or judges.

Hearings and Questioning

Any person may be summoned for questioning during an investigation. Persons summoned by the police must appear, and may be compelled with prior authorisation from the public prosecutor (Article 62 CPP). The status of the individual being questioned determines their rights and obligations, depending on whether they are suspected or not:

• Persons not suspected of any offence are considered as witnesses and heard without coercive measures (Articles 61-1 and 77 CPP).
• Suspects and persons under examination retain a certain number of rights, in particular to remain silent and the right to be assisted by a lawyer. They are usually heard under the regime of “free audition” (they are free to leave the premises) or placed under custody (they cannot leave the premises in general for 24/48 hours in white-collar matters).

Interception of Electronic Communications

French law also allows investigative authorities to intercept or access communications:

• Remote access to stored electronic correspondence using digital identifiers is authorised both in preliminary and judicial investigations (Articles 706-95-1 and 706-95-2, CPP).
• The recording and transcription of electronic communications are authorised during judicial investigations for the felonies or misdemeanours committed in an organised group listed in Articles 706-73 and 706-73-1, CPP.

Freezing and Tracing of Digital Assets

Under Articles 706-141 et seq. and 706-154 153 et seq., CPP, investigative authorities may seize any movable property, including intangible assets, when it is believed to constitute the proceeds of an offence or to be useful in establishing the truth. These provisions apply to digital assets stored on hardware, online platforms, or blockchain networks.

Administrative Powers

Certain administrative authorities have investigatory powers for offences under their supervision. For instance:

• The AMF may request the submission of documents and conduct auditions in the context of investigations into market abuse. It has also authorised investigators empowered to access business premises and conduct searches under certain conditions (Article L. 621-10, CMF).
• The DGCCRF has administrative investigative powers over economic and consumer fraud offences, and may carry out audits, seizures, and auditions (Articles L. 511-1 et seq. and L. 512-1 et seq. of the Consumer Code – CC).

While there is no specific legislation regulating AI use in investigations, authorities may analyse large datasets with automated tools. The legal framework for these technologies stems from general provisions of the CPP, data protection rules under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the French Loi Informatique et Libertés, and more recently under the EU Artificial Intelligence Act.

Use by Authorities

French authorities have incorporated AI into several administrative and judicial functions. The General Directorate of Public Finances (DGFiP) has deployed projects such as Ciblage de la fraude et valorisation des requêtes (CFVR) to improve tax fraud detection and control operations. In 2024, the Ministry of Justice announced an AI plan focusing on four use cases: automatic transcription of interviews, legal research assistance, translation and case summaries. A transcription tool is expected to be operational in 2025.

The use of AI for surveillance has raised significant debates in France. The experimentation with tools such as the facial recognition software BriefCam, reportedly used by French police for video surveillance without prior declaration, triggered an administrative investigation by the Interior Ministry and a control procedure by the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) (see CNIL Decision No MED-2024-150 of 15 November 2024).

Internal Investigations and Corporate Use

Authorities may consider the results of AI-based internal investigations conducted by companies as supporting material. However, such internal findings do not substitute judicial investigations; they may serve as supporting evidence but remain subject to independent assessment by the prosecutor or judge. Companies must also comply with labour law and data protection rules when deploying AI monitoring systems.

While there is no single statute that imposes a general statutory obligation on companies to conduct internal investigations, several legal sources (labour law, anti-corruption legislation, and regulatory guidance) impose duties or expectations on companies.

The Sapin II Law requires companies with more than 500 employees or a consolidated turnover exceeding EUR100 million to establish an internal whistle-blowing system (Article 17). Once a report is received, the company must conduct an internal investigation to verify the allegations, take corrective or disciplinary measures, and manage its legal risks.

In addition, the Labour Code (Code du travail – CT) requires employers to conduct investigations in response to alerts from the Social and Economic Committee (CSE), particularly in cases of imminent and serious danger or when employees’ rights are at stake (Articles L. 2312-59 and L. 4132-2, CT). These investigations must be conducted jointly with employee representatives.

In their Guidelines on internal investigations, revised in March 2023, the AFA and the PNF indicate that internal investigations combined with early and proactive co-operation with authorities may mitigate sanctions of legal entities: companies facing prosecution can obtain significant reductions in fines through a deferred prosecution agreement (CJIP) if they demonstrate that they have investigated misconduct internally and co-operated with judicial authorities.

Under these guidelines, self-reporting to judicial authorities is now considered an important mitigating factor of the financial sanctions that may be imposed, although self-reporting remains optional.

Data Protection and Labour Law Considerations

Internal investigations necessarily involve processing personal data and are therefore subject to the GDPR and the French Loi Informatique et Libertés. The CNIL’s 2023 guidelines on whistle-blowing require strict limits on data collection, retention, and access.

From a labour law perspective, employees must be informed of the existence and purpose of investigative measures (Article L. 1222-4, CT and Article 5, GDPR), unless this would compromise evidence, in which case information must be given at the close of the investigation.

Legal Privilege

Communications between a company and its external lawyers, including related to internal investigations, are covered by professional secrecy under Article 66-5 of the Law No 71-1130 of 31 December 1971, and may not be seized during investigations. However, communications with in-house counsel are not protected by legal privilege. Accordingly, companies often entrust sensitive internal investigations to external law firms to secure privilege protections.

White-collar prosecutions in France may be triggered by the prosecutor or victims.

France follows the principle of prosecutorial discretion: public prosecutors are not obliged to prosecute every case where an offence is suspected; instead, they may decide whether to prosecute, divert the case, or dismiss it.

The Ministry of Justice periodically issues general instructions of criminal policy that shape how prosecutors prioritise certain offences, including financial and corporate crime. Within this framework, prosecutors enjoy autonomy in assessing whether prosecution is appropriate.

Victims retain rights to initiate or compel prosecution by filing complaints directly before the investigating judge (under certain conditions), effectively bypassing prosecutorial discretion if the prosecutor declines to act. Additionally, regulatory authorities such as the AMF, the AFA, and the PNF play active roles in reporting to prosecutors.

Recent enforcement trends show the PNF proactively pursuing deferred prosecution agreements (CJIPs), negotiating settlements conditional upon corporate co-operation and remediation efforts. This evolution reflects a more transactional approach to prosecution.

French law provides for a specific mechanism allowing the resolution of certain corporate criminal investigations without prosecution: the CJIP (Article 41-1-2, CPP). This deferred prosecution agreement is available exclusively to legal entities (not individuals) prosecuted for certain offences, including corruption, influence peddling or tax fraud.

Conditions for Agreement

As long as public prosecution has not been initiated, the public prosecutor may propose that the legal entity involved conclude a CJIP imposing one or more of the following conditions:

• pay a public interest fine of up to 30% of the average annual turnover of the group of companies over the last three years;
• implement or strengthen a compliance programme, under the supervision of the AFA, for a maximum period of three years; and/or
• compensate victims for damages caused.

CJIPs are often contingent on the company’s proactive co-operation, including self-reporting, comprehensive internal investigations, and implementation of corrective measures to reduce fines.

Judicial Approval and Effects

The proposed CJIP must be validated by a judge in a public hearing (Article 41-1-2, II, CPP). Once approved and executed, the agreement extinguishes the public prosecution of the legal entity. The legal representatives of the legal entity involved remain personally liable.

Unlike a criminal conviction, the CJIP does not entail an admission of guilt but requires the company’s acknowledgement of the facts. No conviction is entered on the company’s criminal record, though the agreement is published on the AFA’s website to ensure transparency.

If the company refuses the CJIP or fails to comply with its obligations, the prosecutor may resume prosecution (Article 41-1-2, III, CPP).

Under Article 121-2, CP, legal entities can be held criminally liable for offences committed on their behalf by their organs, representatives, or agents.

Key offences in corporate criminal law are misappropriation of assets and embezzlement (Articles 314-1 to 314-3, CP), abuse of corporate assets (Articles L. 241-3 and L. 242-6 of the Commercial Code (C.Com. – Code de commerce), fraud (Articles 313-1 to 313-3, CP), forgery and use of forged documents (Articles 441-1 to 441-12, CP), falsification of corporate documents (contracts, financial statements) or false accounting (Articles L. 241-3 and L. 242-6, C.Com.), and bankruptcy-related offences (Articles L. 654-1 et seq., C.Com.).

Bribery

French law distinguishes between two types of bribery:

• Passive Bribery (Articles 432-11, 445-1 and 445-2, CP): This is the act of soliciting or accepting offers, promises, gifts or benefits of any kind on one’s own behalf or that of a third party (bribery can be direct or indirect through a third-party accomplice).
• Active Bribery (Articles 433-1 and 445-1, CP): This is the act of giving or proposing offers, promises, gifts or benefits of any kind on one’s own behalf or that of a third party.

Bribery in the public sector is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR1 million, or even EUR2 million if the offence is committed by an organised group (Articles 432-11 and 433-1, CP). If the perpetrators of corruption are elected officials, civil servants, holders of public authority in a foreign state or employees of a public international organisation, the same penalties apply (Articles 435-1 and 435-2, CP). Corruption between persons in the private sector is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR500,000 (Articles 445-1 et seq., CP). In all cases, additional penalties may apply.

Influence Peddling

As with bribery, there are two offences, which are independent of each other: passive influence peddling (Articles 432-11 and 433-2, CP) and active influence peddling (Articles 433-1 and 433-2, CP). The means of the action are the same as for bribery: offers, promises, gifts, presents or advantages of any kind. Influence peddling can also be direct or indirect, and occur at any time. To be recognised by law, it must necessarily be an intentional offence.

The perpetrator of the offence pays a person who, unlike in the case of bribery, has no direct power but who has a “network”: they are paid to exert influence on a third party – ie, to act as a kind of intermediary, thanks to the influence they have because of their social position. The proposal or solicitation is made with a view to obtaining awards, jobs, contracts, tenders or any favourable decision – this last purpose being so broad that it covers virtually all situations.

The sanctions imposed for influence peddling are comparable to those applicable to corruption offences.

The framework for anti-bribery regulation primarily stems from the Sapin II Law and related provisions in the Criminal Code.

Compliance obligations are mandatory for private entities or public industrial or commercial undertakings that meet the two following cumulative criteria (Article 17-I of the Sapin II Law):

• employing at least 500 employees, or belonging to a group whose parent company meets that threshold; and
• having a turnover, or consolidated turnover, exceeding EUR100 million.

For these companies, the law prescribes that a compliance programme includes (but is not limited to) the following measures (Article 131-39-2, CP):

• a code of conduct defining prohibited behaviours that could constitute offences of bribery or influence peddling;
• an internal whistle-blowing system to collecting reports;
• a regularly updated risk map of exposure to bribery risks;
• procedures for evaluating clients, major suppliers and intermediaries according to the risk map;
• internal or external accounting controls;
• training for staff and managers that are the most exposed to risks of bribery and influence peddling;
• a disciplinary sanction regime for violations; and
• a system of internal monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of the measures adopted (Article 17-II, Sapin II Law).

Sanctions for Non-Compliance

Failure to comply with these obligations can lead to both administrative and criminal repercussions:

• The AFA is empowered to conduct controls and issue sanctions for companies that breach their compliance obligations. Fines for legal entities can reach EUR1 million, and fines for individuals EUR200,000.
• A compliance order may be imposed on a legal entity convicted for an offence of bribery or influence peddling and require the company to implement the measures listed above, under the control of the AFA, for up to five years (Article 131-39-2, CP).
• The act of refraining from taking the measures imposed by the AFA is punishable for the representatives of legal entities by two years’ imprisonment and a EUR50 000 fine (Article 434-43-1, CP). Additional fines and sanctions may apply.

Insider Dealing

The offence of insider dealing, punishable under Articles L. 465-1 et seq., CMF, constitutes one of the main forms of market abuse under French law. It is generally the AMF, rather than the criminal court, that imposes stock market sanctions.

To establish insider dealing, two main elements must be proven: the existence of inside information and the existence of an insider.

The CMF distinguishes three forms of insider dealing:

• use of inside information to acquire or dispose of financial instruments;
• recommendation or inducement to engage in a transaction based on inside information; and
• unlawful disclosure of inside information to another person.

The offence is intentional and carries criminal sanctions of five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to EUR100 million, which may be increased to ten times the amount of the illicit profit, provided that the fine is not less than the benefit obtained. When the offence is committed as part of an organised group, penalties may increase to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to EUR100 million, potentially raised to ten times the profit gained (Article L. 465-1, CMF). Additional fines may apply.

Market Abuse

Market abuse covers a broader range of manipulative practices, including market manipulation, false or misleading transactions, and the dissemination of false information, all prohibited under the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 (MAR), directly applicable in France and complemented by the domestic enforcement powers of the AMF and the criminal courts.

Banking Offences

French criminal banking law derives primarily from two sources: the CC and the CMF. These frameworks penalise various forms of illicit financial activity, including unauthorised banking or financial solicitation, credit-related offences, and violations of consumer protection provisions.

Tax fraud is a criminal offence committed when a taxpayer uses any of the following means to deceive the tax authorities in order to avoid paying or reduce the amount of tax due (Article 1741 of the General Tax Code):

• failure to file tax returns within the prescribed deadlines (simply failing to submit the required tax documents on time constitutes an offence, even if the taxpayer ultimately owes no tax);
• concealment of taxable income or assets;
• organising insolvency or obstructing tax collection; and
• acting “in any other fraudulent manner” (this final category is intentionally broad and covers all conceivable methods that might be used to evade or diminish tax liability).

The offence therefore requires both:

• a material element, consisting of one or more fraudulent acts; and
• an intentional element, which results from the taxpayer’s awareness of the inaccuracy of the declarations made to the tax administration; mere negligence or error is insufficient.

Penalties

Tax fraud is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR500,000, which may be increased to twice the amount of the proceeds of the offence. The attempt to commit tax fraud is punishable under the same terms.

The penalties may be increased to seven years’ imprisonment and to a fine of EUR3 million where the acts were committed by an organised group or carried out in certain circumstances.

Every trader or company must record all transactions affecting its assets and liabilities and prepare annual financial statements that give a true and fair view of its financial situation. Certain accounting rules carry criminal sanctions, although not all entities are affected by this repressive regime. It mainly applies to company directors of limited liability companies (sociétés à responsabilité limitée – SARL) and public limited companies (sociétés anonymes – SA). By contrast, individual traders and artisans, while required to maintain accounts, do not commit a criminal offence for breaching these obligations, except in the context of insolvency proceedings, where the absence or falsity of accounting records may amount to bankruptcy under the Commercial Code.

Anti-competitive practices are primarily governed by Articles L. 420-1 to L. 420-7, C.Com. and are complemented by the enforcement powers of the French Competition Authority.

Such offences committed by individuals (not legal entities) are punishable by four years’ imprisonment and a EUR75,000 fine (Article L. 420-6, C.Com.). The Competition Authority may impose pecuniary sanctions on legal entities (Article L. 464-2, C.Com.), the maximum fine being 10% of the global turnover achieved by the company or group of companies during the preceding financial year or a EUR3 million fine.

Most consumer criminal practices are prohibited and sanctioned under the offence of misleading commercial practices. A commercial practice is misleading when it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and materially distorts, or is likely to materially distort, the economic behaviour of the average consumer (Article L. 121-1 et seq., CC). It can be characterised by its circumstances (when it creates confusion with another good or service, a brand, a trade name, or another distinctive sign of a competitor, or relies on false or misleading claims), by its advertising or promotional campaigns, or by statutory presumption (Article L. 121-4, CC).

The offence is intentional: the trader or professional must have acted knowingly to mislead consumers. It is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR300 000, which may be increased to 10% of the average annual turnover, calculated on the basis of the last three annual turnovers, or 50% of the advertising expenses incurred.

Other commercial practices are prohibited and sanctioned by the Consumer Code.

Cybercrime is mainly provided for under Articles 323-1 to 323-8, CP, which criminalise unlawfully accessing, remaining within, disrupting, or introducing data into an automated data processing system (système de traitement automatisé des données – STAD). These offences are generally punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR150,000 (Article 323-2, CP). These penalties can be increased to a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment when the offence is committed by an organised group and against a STAD operated by the state.

The CMF provides a framework for the freezing of assets and the prohibition of payments in application of EU and UN sanctions (L. 562-2, L. 562-3 and L. 562-4, CMF). Article L. 562-4, CMF, provides for the obligation to comply without delay with asset freezing measures decided by ministerial order.

The illegal importation or exportation of prohibited goods is sanctioned by three years’ imprisonment. The sanction can be increased to five years’ imprisonment for contraband involving dual-use goods subject to EU export restrictions and up to ten years’ imprisonment in cases involving goods posing a threat to public health and safety, or offences committed in an organised group (Article 414 of the Customs Code).

Concealment is either the act of withholding, possessing or transferring an item, or acting as an intermediary in order to transfer it, knowing that this item is the proceeds of a crime or offence, or the act of knowingly benefitting, by any means, from the proceeds of a crime or offence (Article 321-1, CP).

Concealment is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR375,000 (Article 321-1(3), CP). Attempted concealment is not punishable. The penalty may be increased to a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR750,000 when the concealment is committed habitually or through the facilities afforded by a profession, or when it is committed by an organised group.

The punishment of complicity is subject to two conditions: a punishable principal offence and an act of complicity. The accomplice does not commit an independent offence, but rather borrows their criminality from that of the principal offender.

There are two main types of complicity (Article 121-7, CP):

• Complicity Through Aid or Assistance: The knowing facilitation of the preparation or commission of a felony or misdemeanour by providing aid or assistance is punishable if the complicity is analysed as a proactive act, proposed prior to or concurrently with the main offence.
• Complicity by incitement is characterised by a person who, by gift, promise, threat, order, abuse of authority or power, incites an offence. Incitement is only considered aiding and abetting if it is sufficiently specific and followed by an action of the principal offender.

Complicity is necessarily an intentional offence. The accomplice must not only be aware of the intended offence, but also have the will to participate in it. The accomplice is punished as if they were the principal offender.

Money laundering is defined as a consequential offence, since it presupposes the existence of a prior offence which must consist of a felony or a misdemeanour. However, there is no requirement for the original offence to have been prosecuted. The object of money laundering can be assets, income or any direct or indirect proceeds of the felony or misdemeanour, which includes any movable or immovable and any tangible or intangible property.

The offence can take two forms: money laundering by false justification (Article 324-1(1), CP) or money laundering by participating in a financial transaction (Article 324-1(2), CP).

Presumption of Illicit Origin

For details on this presumption, see 1.2 Burden of Proof.

Penalties

Money laundering is punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR375,000, though additional penalties may also be imposed. Attempted money laundering is also punishable by the same penalties (Article 324-6, CP).

The offence is subject to aggravating circumstances: money laundering is punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR750,000 in two cases: when it is committed habitually or using the opportunities provided by the exercise of a professional activity, or when it is committed by an organised group (Article 324-2, CP). Fines may be increased to up to half the value of the property or funds involved in the money laundering operations (Article 324-3, CP). Legal entities face five times the fine incurred by natural persons.

Environmental offences include pollution, illegal waste management, and harm to biodiversity (Articles L. 173-1 et seq. of the Environmental Code). These require intentional or negligent breach of environmental regulations and can result in fines of up to several million and imprisonment for company directors, alongside possible corporate liability. French criminal law has allowed the use of the CJIP for environmental offences since 2020. It enables companies to avoid prosecution by paying a fine, implementing compliance measures, and repairing environmental damage under judicial supervision.

Social offences include violations of labour law, such as hidden work (travail dissimulé), endangerment of employees, and modern slavery (réduction en servitude, traite des êtres humains) under Articles 225-4-1 et seq., CP. These may entail imprisonment (up to 20 years in aggravated cases) and heavy corporate fines.

Under the “duty of vigilance” Law No 2017-399 of 27 March 2017, large companies must monitor their supply chains to prevent serious human rights, health, safety, and environmental violations. Failure to implement or enforce a vigilance plan may lead to civil liability and reputational consequences, though specific criminal sanctions are not yet attached to this obligation.

French criminal courts increasingly prosecute companies for human rights violations, particularly in cases involving forced labour, human trafficking, or unsafe working conditions. This reflects a broader trend toward corporate accountability for global supply chain abuses.

France does not yet have specific criminal offences targeting the misuse of AI, algorithmic trading, or automated decision-making. However, such conduct may fall within existing offences, including fraud, market manipulation, and breach of professional duty under the CMF and the CP. For example, algorithmic trading that creates false or misleading market signals can constitute market manipulation (Articles L. 465-2 and L. 465-3-1, CMF), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment and EUR100 million in fines, or up to ten times the profit made. The use of AI systems for deceptive commercial practices may also trigger fraud offences (Article 313-1, CP).

In France, crypto-assets are classified as digital assets (actifs numériques) under Article L. 54-10-1, CMF, encompassing utility tokens and digital currencies not issued or guaranteed by a central bank. Misconduct involving such assets may constitute fraud, money laundering, market manipulation, or unauthorised provision of investment services.

Crypto-asset service providers (CASPs) – including exchanges, trading platforms, and wallet custodians – must be registered with the AMF and comply with AML/KYC, governance, and internal control obligations. Failure to register or comply with these requirements may lead to criminal prosecution, administrative fines, or prohibition from operating in France.

Since January 2025, the EU Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation has introduced a harmonised framework, strengthening licensing and compliance obligations. French enforcement authorities (the AMF and the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority or ACPR) are expected to increase scrutiny of AML breaches and unlicensed activities, integrating MiCA’s requirements into their criminal and regulatory enforcement strategy.

In France, common defences to white-collar offences include lack of criminal intent, error of facts or law, and compliance with regulatory obligations. For individuals, demonstrating that the alleged act was performed without fraudulent intent or outside the scope of one’s duties can exclude liability.

For legal entities, criminal liability under Article 121-2, CP, requires that the offence be committed “on behalf of” the company by its representatives. Showing that the company maintained an effective internal control and compliance framework may help demonstrate the absence of organisational fault.

While the existence of a compliance programme is not a formal defence under French law, it is a key mitigating factor. Under the Sapin II Law, companies that implement robust anti-corruption compliance systems may benefit from reduced penalties.

There are no de minimis exceptions for white-collar offences in France worth mentioning.

French law provides for a specific mechanism allowing the resolution of certain corporate criminal investigations without a trial: the CJIP, introduced by the Sapin II Law and codified in Article 41-1-2, CPP, which is exclusively available for legal entities. It does not entail an admission of guilt but requires the company’s acknowledgement of the facts.

CJIPs are often contingent on the company’s proactive co-operation with investigators and prosecution, including self-reporting, comprehensive internal investigations, and naming culpable individuals to reduce fines. According to the PNF’s guidelines for CJIPs, self-disclosure and active co-operation may be considered as mitigating factors reducing the amount of the fine.

For detail on CJIPs, see 2.7 Deferred Prosecution.

For individuals and legal entities, the prosecution can propose a guilty plea procedure, the CRPC, that must be validated by a judge (see 1.6 Sentencing and Penalties). Co-operation and disclosure can influence the assessment of penalties.

The framework for whistle-blower protection stems primarily from the Sapin II Law, dedicated to strengthening transparency and fighting corruption. The law mandates that public and private legal entities with either more than 500 employees, or belonging to a group whose parent company meets that threshold, or having a consolidated turnover exceeding EUR100 million, implement internal reporting for suspected illegal activities or breaches.

The reporting channel must guarantee strict confidentiality regarding the identity of the persons making the report, the persons concerned by the report and the information collected by all recipients of the report. Whistle-blowers are encouraged to initially use internal channels to report violations. If no action is taken or in the event of serious or imminent danger, they can escalate the issue to external authorities or disclose it publicly. In France, there are no direct financial incentives for whistle-blowers.

Unauthorised disclosure of the reported information is punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of EUR30,000. Retaliation against a whistle-blower is prohibited: no person can be excluded from a recruitment process and no employee can be penalised, dismissed, or subjected to any discriminatory measure for having raised a concern in compliance with Articles 6 to 8 of the Sapin II Law (Article L. 1132-3-3, CT).

In France, white-collar investigations with a cross-border dimension – such as corruption, money laundering, or tax fraud – often involve co-operation with foreign authorities, in particular through mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs), EU judicial co-operation instruments, Eurojust, and Europol. Defence strategies must therefore address questions of jurisdiction, double jeopardy (non bis in idem), data transfer, and evidentiary admissibility.

There are no formal co-ordinated defence mechanisms, but effective defence requires close collaboration among counsel in different jurisdictions to ensure a coherent strategy, particularly regarding privilege, disclosure, and self-reporting.

The introduction of the CJIP has facilitated cross-border coordination with foreign authorities, particularly between PNF, the US Department of Justice and the UK Serious Fraud Office. French prosecutors increasingly align settlements to avoid double penalties and promote co-ordinated global resolutions.

See the French Trends and Developments article.