There are two categories of punishable behaviour in Panama:
Both administrative infractions and crimes are defined in legal regulations – the former in the Administrative Code and the latter in the Criminal Code. In both types of offences, the intention to commit the criminal act is punished, and in exceptional cases, negligence or fault that results in criminal consequences is also punished. In Panama, it is not necessary for the criminal result to be achieved, as the attempt to commit the crime is also punished.
In white-collar criminal proceedings, the burden of proof lies with the prosecutor, and, during the course of the investigation and until a verdict declaring guilt is issued, the person under investigation is presumed innocent. The prosecutor must prove that a crime has been committed and must also present evidence that demonstrates that the accused person is guilty of committing it. The current evidentiary standard in Panama is that the commission of the crime must be proven beyond all reasonable doubt. If there is doubt, the defendant must be acquitted.
The general principle in Panama is that the maximum period for investigation of a crime is equivalent to the maximum jail time applicable to it under law. For those offences that are not punishable with imprisonment, the maximum period for investigation is three years. For crimes against the public administration (including corruption, embezzlement of public funds/property and abuse of authority), the period is double the maximum term of imprisonment imposed for these crimes.
In white-collar crimes, Panamanian authorities only have jurisdiction over offences that occur within the national territory. Exceptionally, the Criminal Code provides the possibility for a Panamanian authority to investigate and judge acts committed outside the national territory, such as crimes against humanity, public health and the national economy, among others.
International Instruments and the Application of Criminal Law
A series of instruments have been signed between the Republic of Panama and various countries relating to mutual legal assistance, extradition and investigative co-operation. For example, in the Odebrecht case, there is ongoing judicial assistance from Brazil due to international co-operation between Public Prosecutor’s Offices. The same applies in the case of FCC, where the court has relied on international assistance to carry out the necessary notifications for proceeding with the case.
According to the National Constitution, the Panamanian government cannot extradite its nationals to other countries, which creates an obstacle to prosecuting white-collar crimes that occur outside Panamanian territory. Foreigners, on the other hand, cannot be extradited for political crimes.
Article 20 of Panama’s Criminal Code stipulates that Panamanian criminal law shall also apply to crimes committed abroad when:
A legal entity can be subject to criminal liability when it is created or used to commit a crime. However, in the Panamanian legal system, it is not possible for the legal entity itself to commit a criminal act; it is the natural person who created or used the legal entity to commit the crime who is capable of guilt. This person is usually punished with imprisonment, but in some cases the law also allows the legal entity involved in the criminal conduct to be sanctioned, such as through fines, suspension of operations, or dissolution.
Liability of the Legal Person and the Natural Person: Differences
Regardless of the type of investigation, Panama’s legal system does not establish a difference between investigating legal or natural persons; both will receive the same treatment, and their rights will be respected. Directors and officers (legal representative, president of the board, manager, CEO) of a corporation would only be held responsible for a criminal act if it is proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that said persons knew that the company was created or used to commit the criminal act or if they maintained some degree of participation in the crime as authors or accomplices.
In Panama, punishment is based on the law at the time the criminal act was committed. Therefore, the fact that the company created or used to commit the crime was acquired by or merged with another company does not make the acquirer or counterpart in the merger responsible for a criminal act committed in the past. If the shares of a company are purchased, that company will continue to be liable in the event that it has been used to commit a crime, as long as it is proven, which would only carry sanctions. Likewise, if the company used to commit a crime is absorbed by another company in a merger, the absorbing company would be assuming all the rights and obligations of the absorbed company, which would include – in the author’s opinion – any criminal liability that the absorbed company may have had. This should not affect the directors or dignitaries of the absorbing company, since they had no relationship with the absorbed at the time of the commission of the crime.
It should be made clear that the liability of legal persons in Panamanian legislation is limited, since it does not contain penalties precisely – sanctions are listed in a single article (Article 51 of the Penal Code), which range from a fine to the dissolution of the entity.
Panama’s legal system includes a series of guidelines as to what must be considered when determining a penalty. For example, factors such as whether the perpetrator has a criminal record, the severity of the crime, and the existence of a relationship between the perpetrator and the victim are taken into account.
Once the penalty has been set, and subject to the fulfilment of certain requirements, it is possible for a declared prison sentence to be suspended or replaced by another form of penalty, so that the perpetrator may receive a different type of punishment and avoid serving jail time. There is also the possibility that, before the judge issues a judgment, the prosecutor and the accused person reach a plea agreement. This agreement results in a mandatory reduction of up to one-third of the penalty described in the law as the basis for the prosecutor to negotiate the reduction. Collaboration agreements are also possible in Panama, which empower the prosecutor to dispense with the criminal prosecution in its entirety or grant reductions in the sentence on condition of the accused providing testimony or information relevant to the case.
Regarding mitigation, the norm arguably provides for mitigating circumstances, which reduce not only the penalty to be imposed but also the seriousness of the action, and involve a subjective opinion on the part of the judge. By law, these must be considered when imposing sanctions or penalties; as far as legal entities are concerned, regulatory compliance programmes or criminal compliance would be an element to consider. The Penal Code maintains a list of these – see Article 90, where common mitigating circumstances include the following:
In order to claim compensation, the victim of the crime must first prove the occurrence of the crime and, second, that the crime caused them damage and harm. It is necessary for the victim to prove the amount of damage and harm they claim to have suffered as a result. The trial court is responsible for convicting a person of a crime and at the same time for declaring civil liability arising from the criminal act. No class action procedures or collective redress mechanisms are available in Panama’s criminal justice system; unfortunately, class actions are only found in consumer protection civil actions under Law 45 of 2007.
There is no civil or administrative enforcement in criminal investigations (although evidence of crimes may arise from the investigation of administrative offences, and this evidence would need to be presented to the prosecutor for criminal investigation and/or prosecution). Only the criminal authorities – specifically the Public Prosecutor’s Office – have the competence to investigate white-collar crime.
Under the laws on compliance and on prevention of money laundering, financing of terrorism and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a series of powers has been created for the control entities – namely the Superintendency of Banks, Superintendency of the Securities Market and the Superintendency of Non-Financial Entities. Said entities gather and have the duty to provide information to the prosecutors for the early detection of money laundering, financing of terrorism and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
With respect to public policy/political pressure, in general, corruption and crime in the context of public contracts, as well as related money laundering, have been subject to increased investigation and prosecution. Political pressure affecting enforcement cannot be disregarded, but this has not impeded high-profile politicians and private persons from criminal investigation/prosecution. Cases under the criminal accusatory system (sistema penal acusatorio; SPA), which came into effect in 2012 are expected to expedite investigation and prosecution of said offences (vis-à-vis the prior criminal prosecution system).
Investigations of white-collar crimes can be initiated ex officio, by complaint or by direct accusation. This means that authorities can start an investigation on their own initiative, in response to a complaint filed by an individual or entity, or based on a formal accusation made by an interested party. This approach allows for more flexibility and effectiveness in the detection and prosecution of such crimes, ensuring that appropriate measures are taken regardless of how the crime is discovered.
The authorities responsible for investigating white-collar crime have broad freedom to conduct any type of investigation, if it relates to the facts under investigation. However, they must avoid making broad or vague requests for information in the hope of uncovering incriminating evidence by chance rather than through targeted investigation. Authorities and prosecutors must be careful not to engage in fishing expeditions that lack specific grounds or probable cause. Individuals and authorities are required to provide the information needed to investigate these crimes. The official in charge of the investigation has legal powers to execute all matters related to this inquiry.
Prior to the initiation of a criminal investigation, and in terms of prevention related to anti-money laundering (AML) or countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), obligated entities must take measures for registration, liaison, due diligence and reporting of suspicious transactions. These obligated entities include:
In matters of AML/CFT, the above-mentioned entities must report any suspicious transaction that cannot be justified or substantiated against the financial or transactional profile of the client, or any transaction that could be related to money laundering, terrorist financing or the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Internal investigations conducted by individuals or companies are not considered evidence to establish or prove the facts under investigation in a criminal case. Any element provided to the prosecutor is considered an element towards a possible conviction (but not evidence per se) and will help to clarify the facts. In turn, the existence of prevention manuals (and a history of application thereof) can be considered as a bona fide action and may be part of the conditions for a suspension of the criminal process and for exploring an alternative method of conflict resolution.
Some types of internal investigations, such as audit reports, can be presented to the prosecutor as evidence. In a criminal investigation, private statements are not considered evidence. The defendants have the right to a cross-examination, and the use of lie detectors is not valid in the official investigation. Any report made to regulatory entities in the matter of preventing money laundering, financing of terrorism or financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not considered evidence in a proceeding, but rather as indications for the prosecutor in charge to carry out the necessary investigations to verify the commission of crimes.
As far as the Public Prosecutor’s Office is concerned, an AI-based support tool is used to assist prosecutors in preparing criminal charges. The system operates much like a virtual assistant: once the facts under investigation are entered, it generates a draft of the so-called legally relevant facts that can be incorporated into the charging document. Previously, this task had to be performed manually, requiring prosecutors to carefully analyse the facts and frame them within the applicable theory of the crime. While the tool can increase efficiency, some question whether its use may reduce the level of legal analysis and rigour traditionally expected from prosecutors.
Internal investigations are not mandatory, but they provide lines of investigation to the prosecutor – in fact, they are considered elements of conviction and even evidence in an eventual oral trial, and may, in the future, give rise to witness testimony from the individuals who prepared them.
Companies are not generally obliged to share such investigations; however, if the prosecutor knows about them and requests information by law, they are obliged to grant them.
White-collar prosecutions must be initiated by the prosecutor. The prosecutor has full legal authority to refrain from directing an investigation against a person or company involved in this type of crime, as long as the basis for that decision is that the company or individual will contribute to the process in order to uncover and sanction those with a higher degree of participation, if applicable.
Panama’s criminal investigation process begins with a preliminary investigation, which can then lead to the formulation of charges. If the process continues, it will advance to a trial stage. Before this stage, it is possible to conclude the process through mediation, conciliation, withdrawal, suspension of the process subject to conditions, discretionary prosecution and plea agreements.
As long as the crime allows it, in view of the list of withdrawable crimes in the Criminal Code, methods other than a penalty agreement could be explored. For example, the forgery of documents is a crime that can be withdrawn, just as intellectual property crimes can be subject to mediation. Moreover, even if it is explored in the appropriate way, the prosecutor can decide to dispense with the action if it is of low importance to society. For example, the prosecutor has the right not to continue with a criminal case for trademark counterfeiting, provided that the perpetrator reaches an agreement with the trademark owner to pay damages.
Agreements with the prosecutor’s office do not depend on the implementation of improvements in compliance programmes.
Article 51 of the Criminal Code is the only norm that refers to the liability of legal entities, and only contemplates sanctions for them, not penalties. Any crime included in the Criminal Code that refers to the involvement of an entity in criminal conduct, whether by commission or omission, can carry the corresponding sanction, as long as it is proven that the legal entity was used or created for it – these sanctions range from a fine to the dissolution of the entity, without neglecting the attribution of criminal responsibility to those natural persons who had some dominion or control over the act.
The Criminal Code imposes severe penalties for various white-collar crimes. Document falsification, covered in Chapter I of Title XI of the Code (Crimes Section), includes altering public and electronic documents, with penalties ranging from one to 15 years depending on the document type and severity.
Fraud under Article 243 involves the misuse of financial resources and is punishable by four to eight years in prison, with harsher penalties for those exploiting their positions. The crime was designed for financial institutions, with aggravating circumstances for those who had the power to exercise such acts or who were employees of a trust.
Article 244 addresses the falsification of financial records, which is sometimes used to maintain or obtain credit facilities fraudulently. The Article imposes six to eight years of imprisonment.
The newly included crime of tax evasion, under Article 288-G, penalises intentional tax fraud with two to four years in prison, as long as the fraud exceeds PAB300,000 within a calendar year.
Money laundering, detailed in Article 254, involves handling illicit funds from serious crimes and carries a penalty of five to 12 years in prison.
The above-mentioned additions to the law reflect Panama’s commitment to combating financial crimes and enhancing legal transparency. The existence of a preceding crime is at least indicatively necessary.
According to the Criminal Code, bribery involves the unlawful solicitation, acceptance or offering of benefits to influence the actions of a public servant. Criminal law classifies bribery in the following way.
Under Article 354 of the Criminal Code, influence peddling involves the act of using one’s influence, or pretending to have influence, to solicit, receive or accept promises, money, goods, or any other economic or legal advantage. This is done with the aim of obtaining a benefit from a public servant or a foreign public servant of an international organisation in a matter they are managing or may manage.
These crimes must be committed intentionally, meaning that the public official who receives the bribe must be aware that they are receiving a benefit because of not fulfilling their obligations, thus favouring the briber. These crimes are punished with imprisonment and aim to protect the proper functioning of public administration.
Applicable Accessory Penalties
In addition to imprisonment, the person who receives the bribe is sanctioned with accessory penalties of disqualification from holding public office and the confiscation of the money, goods or objects received as a result of the bribery.
In Panama, there is legislation aimed at preventing bribery and influence peddling. This includes (among others):
Additionally, there are regulations that relate to codes of ethics for public officials and integrity pacts that companies contracting with the State must sign. There are also disqualification rules in public contracting that apply to companies and their directors who commit (among other things) falsification and crimes against the public administration.
Supervisory bodies will verify compliance with the mechanisms for AML/CFT control, adopting a risk-based approach that allows for a clear understanding of the risks to which the obligated party is exposed. For this supervision, the regulators may request information and documentation from the obligated companies.
When implementing a risk-based approach, obligated parties must establish processes to identify, evaluate, monitor, manage and mitigate the risks of money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The obligations for obligated parties in accordance with Law 23 of 2015 and its amendments and regulations are as follows.
Registration Obligation
Obligated parties must register with the relevant superintendency, according to the procedure and fees it establishes.
Liaison Obligation
Obligated parties must designate a person or unit responsible for serving as a liaison with the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) and the relevant Superintendency. Until such a person or unit is appointed, the legal representative (in the case of entities) or the natural person will perform the liaison function.
The liaison shall be responsible for attending to the requirements and requests of the UAF and the corresponding supervisory authority. For all non-financial regulated entities subject to the supervision of the Superintendency of Non-Financial Regulated Entities (SSNF), the registration of the liaison, as well as the requirements, guidelines, and any other functions to be performed by the liaison, shall be regulated by the SSNF.
Obligation to Adopt a Prevention Manual
Obligated parties must implement and adopt an AML/CFT manual that allows for the implementation of policies, procedures and controls necessary to reduce exposure to the risks identified in their own risk assessments. This manual must be approved by senior management – ie, partners, directors, officers, representatives, etc. These people will be obligated to monitor the implementation of internal controls, improving or reinforcing them, and will be responsible for maintaining such internal control structures in their company.
Due Diligence Obligation
Obligated parties must take the necessary measures to identify, evaluate and understand their AML/CFT risks relating to clients, countries or geographic areas, products, services, transactions, or distribution or marketing channels.
Obligations to Report Unusual or Suspicious Transactions
Under Law 23 of 2015, obligated entities and supervised professionals in Panama must promptly report any suspicious transactions to the UAF, regardless of the amount. Suspicious transactions include any activity potentially linked to money laundering, terrorism financing, or the proliferation of weapons, even if outside normal business practices. Entities must keep detailed records of these transactions and update due diligence files accordingly.
Additionally, entities must have systems to detect unusual transactions, analyse them and determine whether they should be reported as suspicious. All unusual transactions must be documented, including who analysed them and the decision made. If deemed necessary, these can be reported to the UAF using the same form for suspicious operations, supporting Panama’s efforts to combat financial crimes.
Failure to report suspicious transactions as required by Law 23 of 2015 can result in significant administrative, financial and even criminal sanctions for obligated entities in Panama. These include fines that may exceed PAB300,000 in cases involving serious offences such as tax fraud or money laundering. Entities may also face disciplinary actions, such as the suspension or revocation of operating licences, and criminal liability for compliance officers or directors who knowingly omit reports. The law emphasises immediate reporting upon detection and requires robust internal controls to ensure compliance, reinforcing Panama’s commitment to combating financial crimes.
In Panama, the issues of insider dealing, market abuse and criminal banking law are codified in the Criminal Code under Articles 238, 243 to 253, and 283. These provisions establish the legal framework for addressing and penalising such offences, ensuring the integrity and transparency of financial and market activities within the country.
On conduct that relates to insider dealing, Article 249 of the Criminal Code addresses the misuse of privileged information. It stipulates that anyone who, for personal gain or the benefit of a third party, improperly uses or discloses privileged information obtained through a privileged relationship, relating to securities registered with the National Securities Commission or traded in an organised market, causing harm, shall be punished with a prison sentence of six to eight years. For the purposes of this Article 249, confidential information is defined as information that, by its nature, can influence the prices of securities and that has not yet been made public.
Additionally, Article 251 of the Criminal Code penalises the creation of false or misleading appearances in the trading of registered securities. It states that anyone who, with the intent of obtaining undue profit for themselves or a third party, makes deceptive offers to buy or sell registered securities, creates a false impression of active trading, or manipulates the market price of any registered security to facilitate its sale or purchase, shall be punished with a prison sentence of four to six years.
On market abuse, Articles 238 and 239 of the Criminal Code address market abuse and consumer protection. Individuals who withdraw or withhold essential raw materials or products from the market with the intent to create shortages or manipulate the prices of goods or services, thereby harming consumers, shall be sanctioned with imprisonment from two to five years.
Also, those who, to the detriment of consumers, charge higher amounts for products or services measured by automatic devices or apparatuses shall be sanctioned with imprisonment of four to eight years.
Criminal Conduct in Approvals Outside the Parameters of the Banking Law
In Panama, the Criminal Code criminalises various forms of financial misconduct. Directors, managers, legal representatives, or employees of financial institutions who approve credit facilities or financing in violation of applicable legal requirements, thereby contributing to the institution’s forced liquidation, insolvency, or permanent illiquidity, may face imprisonment of four to seven years. The same penalty applies to beneficiaries who participate in the offence, and it may be increased if the conduct is carried out for personal gain.
Separately, the Criminal Code also sanctions the misuse of privileged information. Individuals who use or disclose non-public, price-sensitive information for their own benefit or that of a third party, causing harm to others or affecting the securities market, may face imprisonment of six to eight years. Privileged information generally refers to confidential information capable of influencing the price of securities and that has not been made available to the public.
Panama has taken a significant step in its fight against financial crimes by enacting Law 70 of 2019, which criminalises tax evasion. The Criminal Code stipulates that anyone who intentionally commits tax fraud against the National Treasury, affecting the accurate determination of a tax obligation to avoid paying taxes in whole or in part, shall be punished with two to four years of imprisonment. Under this regulation, any individual who intentionally evades taxes amounting to PAB300,000 or more in a calendar year faces severe penalties, including a prison sentence of two to five years and a financial penalty ranging from two to ten times the amount evaded. This law aligns Panama with international standards set by organisations such as the Financial Action Task Force, and aims to enhance the country’s compliance with global anti-money laundering and tax transparency norms. The regulation has been well received by local business associations and government agencies, as it strengthens Panama’s legal framework and helps maintain its international investment rating. By criminalising tax evasion, Panama has demonstrated its commitment to upholding the rule of law and fostering a transparent financial environment.
No specific reporting obligations or procedures are provided under the applicable framework. In practice, however, proceedings are generally initiated by the relevant regulatory authority, which submits the corresponding information and supporting documentation to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for its consideration.
Law 70 of 2019 punishes anyone who personally, or through third parties, alters securities, goods and other financial resources in full or partial knowledge against the Panamanian National Treasury. These actions will be punished with a sentence of two to four years in prison and fines of one to three times the amount of the tax defrauded. In addition, if it is determined that the offence was committed through one or more persons, the penalty will be imposed on the legal entities in question and will be a fine of one to three times the amount of the tax transferred. The penalty described is applicable when the amount of the tax is equal to or greater than PAB300,000 in a fiscal period. Cases where the tax amount is less than PAB300,000 will be sanctioned by the General Directorate of Revenue (DGI).
Articles 244 and 245 of the Criminal Code address financial record-keeping offences. Individuals who destroy, conceal or falsify accounting books, financial records or other financial information of a natural or legal person to obtain, maintain or extend credit or capital facilities from financial institutions, resulting in harm, can face six to eight years of imprisonment, and the same applies to those who use or benefit from falsified documents. These penalties are also applicable to those who destroy, conceal or falsify financial records or custody account entries of entities registered with the National Securities Commission or operating as investment advisers, investment companies or intermediaries, also resulting in harm.
With regard to competition-related crimes in Panama, Article 238 of the Criminal Code penalises individuals who withdraw or withhold raw materials or essential products from the market with the intent to create shortages or manipulate prices of goods or services, thereby harming consumers. The punishment for such offences is four to eight years of imprisonment. The Criminal Code also addresses the fraudulent billing of higher amounts for products or services measured by automatic devices, to the detriment of consumers, and imposes a prison sentence of two to five years for such actions. Under Law 45 of 2007, absolute and relative monopolistic practices are fined; nonetheless, these practices are not considered crimes as per the Criminal Code, and therefore can only be prosecuted in the civil courts and under the administrative procedures of the antitrust authority (the Authority for Consumer Protection and Competition Defence; ACODECO).
In Panama, monopolistic practices – both absolute and relative – are subject to strict sanctions under Law 45 of 2007. Absolute monopolistic practices, such as price-fixing agreements or collusion between competitors, can be penalised with fines of up to PAB1 million. Meanwhile, relative monopolistic practices, which involve abuse of market power to displace competitors or impose unfair conditions, may result in fines of up to PAB250,000. These sanctions are enforced by ACODECO, which also has the power to impose administrative measures and pursue judicial actions against violators to safeguard free competition in the Panamanian market.
In Panama, the Criminal Code outlines several criminal offences aimed at protecting consumers. Those who intentionally withdraw or withhold essential raw materials or products from the market to create shortages or manipulate prices, resulting in harm to consumers, face penalties ranging from four to eight years of imprisonment. Also, fraudulent billing practices, whereby individuals charge consumers higher amounts for products or services measured by automatic devices, are punishable by two to five years in prison. Panama also criminalises false advertising, whereby businesses include misleading information or uncertain benefits relating to their products or services in their offers or advertisements, causing significant harm to consumers.
The following are less common but may arise under the Criminal Code when consumer harm involves fraud or public safety.
The Criminal Code addresses various cybercrimes, computer fraud and the protection of company secrets. Articles 289 and 290 penalise unauthorised access, use, modification or interference with databases, networks or computer systems with imprisonment of two to four years. These penalties are increased if the offences involve public offices, financial institutions or medical entities, or if committed for profit. Penalties are increased if the offences are committed by individuals responsible for or authorised to access the systems; this increase is from one-sixth to one-third of the original penalty.
Regarding trade secrets, the Criminal Code punishes the unauthorised use or appropriation of industrial or commercial secrets for economic gain or to cause harm with four to six years of imprisonment.
Unjustified disclosure of trade secrets is punishable by two to four years of imprisonment.
Theft of economic innovations or secrets is also punished by imposing two to four years of imprisonment, or three to six years if committed by public officials, company employees or professional service providers.
The sanctions are as follows, in more detail:
Panama enacted Law No 478 of 4 August 2025, which introduced significant amendments to both the Panamanian Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code concerning cybercrime, digital evidence, international legal cooperation in criminal matters, and investigative powers related to information technologies. The legislation represents one of the most substantial reforms of Panama’s cybercrime framework in recent years and reflects an effort to align domestic law with contemporary technological realities and international standards.
Article 290 (Unauthorized Access and Interference with Data) criminalises the unauthorised appropriation, copying, use, modification, damage, deletion, impairment, alteration, or suppression of computer data, whether the data is in transit or stored in a database or computer system. The offence is punishable by imprisonment of two to four years. Where the conduct causes significant harm to the owner or lawful holder of the data, the penalty is increased by one-sixth to one-third.
Article 290-A (Interference with Computer Systems) establishes a separate offence for unlawfully obstructing or impairing the operation of a computer system. A person may be held liable where, without authorisation, they disrupt the normal functioning of a system through the introduction, transmission, deletion, damage, alteration, impairment, or suppression of computer data. The offence carries a penalty of two to four years’ imprisonment.
Article 291 (Aggravating Circumstances) provides enhanced penalties for offences under this chapter where the targeted systems or data belong to government entities, public service providers, financial institutions, healthcare organisations handling medical information, or critical infrastructure. The penalties are also increased where the offence is committed for financial gain or through the circumvention of security measures. In such cases, the applicable sentence may be increased by one-sixth to one-third. Additional criminal liability may also arise where the compromised information relates to State security.
Article 292-A (Cybercrime Tools and Access Credentials) criminalises the production, acquisition, possession, importation, sale, distribution, or making available of devices or computer programs designed or adapted for the commission of cybercrime offences. It also penalises the obtaining or dissemination of passwords, access codes, or other credentials capable of providing access to a computer system where such conduct is intended to facilitate the commission of a criminal offence. The prescribed penalty is imprisonment for two to four years.
In Panama, the principal offences relating to financial, trade and customs sanctions are governed by a combination of domestic laws and international commitments. While Panama does not maintain an autonomous national sanctions regime, it enforces sanctions derived from international frameworks – particularly those issued by the United Nations and supported by extraterritorial standards such as US and EU sanctions, GAFILAT, and in co-ordination with countries such as the United States. These sanctions may include asset freezes, cancellation of registrations, and trade restrictions.
Panama has cancelled hundreds of vessel registrations linked to sanctioned entities, including 136 vessels tied to the National Iranian Oil Company and 78 vessels involved in IUU fishing.
The main offences include:
Constituent elements of these offences typically involve:
In customs contexts, offences such as contraband and customs fraud – regulated under Law 30 of 1984 – are also relevant, particularly when they involve sanctioned goods or entities.
Sanctions for breaches vary. Administrative penalties include fines ranging from PAB5,000 to PAB1 million, suspension or revocation of licences, and public reprimands. Criminal penalties may apply in cases involving money laundering, terrorist financing, or fraudulent concealment of sanctioned transactions, with imprisonment ranging from five to ten years.
Enforcement authorities include the UAF, the DGI, the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores (SMV) and the Autoridad Nacional de Aduanas. Liability arises when entities fail to implement adequate compliance programmes, ignore red flags, or obstruct regulatory oversight.
Article 254 of the Criminal Code addresses the offence of concealment. It penalises individuals who, either personally or through intermediaries, receive, deposit, negotiate, transfer or convert money, securities, assets or other financial resources, knowing they originate from various serious crimes such as international bribery, human trafficking, drug-related offences, terrorism and more. The intent must be to hide, cover up or disguise the illicit origin of these resources or to help evade legal consequences. The punishment for this offence is imprisonment for five to 12 years. The offence requires the intent to conceal or disguise the illicit origin of the assets or to assist in avoiding legal consequences. This conduct is broadly consistent with what is commonly understood as money laundering, as it involves dealing with the proceeds of crime for the purpose of concealing their unlawful origin.
According to the degree of participation, people can be punished based on the help or collaboration they provide, and, depending on the level of collaboration, a corresponding sanction will be imposed.
Determining sanctions without knowing the crime that the natural person has committed is highly subjective – they may even be responsible for instigation, and this leads to the same result as for the perpetrator of the crime.
Money laundering is attributed to anyone who personally or through an intermediary receives, deposits, negotiates, transfers or converts money, securities and other financial resources, and who should have reasonably foreseen that they came from illicit activities.
To establish the crime of money laundering, the following must be proven:
The illicit activities in money laundering are called predicate offences. These are detailed in the Criminal Code (they include crimes against industrial property rights, financial crimes, forgery of documents in general, organised crime, and many others; see the Criminal Code for further detail). These acts, or helping someone to evade the legal consequences of such punishable acts, will be sanctioned with a penalty of five to 12 years in prison.
Attribution of Criminal Liability
To attribute guilt, it is necessary to prove that the funds came from one of the so-called predicate offences and that the person who received, deposited or transferred them was aware of their illicit origins. The penalty ranges from five to 12 years in prison.
Obligation to Prevent Money Laundering
The legal basis is Law 23 of 2015, which establishes mandatory compliance for:
The nature of the offence for non-compliance is as follows:
Authorities Responsible for Enforcement
Competent authorities include:
Circumstances for liability include:
Penalties include:
Panama does not currently have a comprehensive legal framework that criminalises ESG-related misconduct (such as environmental pollution, human rights violations or modern slavery) under a unified ESG law. However, specific environmental, labour and social laws do exist and can lead to administrative, civil and criminal sanctions depending on the nature and severity of the violation.
Environmental Offences
Under Law 41 of 2004 (the General Environmental Law), companies are required to conduct Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), obtain environmental permits, and manage waste and emissions responsibly. Violations – such as unauthorised emissions, illegal waste disposal or operating without permits – can result in:
Offences against natural resources
Offences against wildlife
Urban planning and environmental compliance offences
Legal entities involved in environmental crimes
Fines range from PAB5,000 to PAB100 million, depending on severity.
Social Offences
Panama’s labour laws regulate working conditions, safety and workers’ rights. While there is no specific law addressing modern slavery, violations such as forced labour or unsafe working conditions may be prosecuted under labour and criminal codes. Companies are expected to comply with:
Sanctions for violations include:
Governance Offences
Corporate governance is regulated primarily by Law 32 of 1927 and Law 5 of 2007, which governs company formation, board responsibilities and shareholder rights. While ESG-specific governance rules are not yet codified, Panama’s alignment with international standards (eg, AML/KYC under Law 23 of 2015) means that companies must maintain ethical governance practices or face regulatory sanctions, loss of licences, and reputational damage.
Supply Chain Monitoring
Panama does not yet mandate supply chain ESG compliance across all sectors. However, companies – especially those with international exposure – are increasingly expected to monitor suppliers for environmental and labour compliance. Failure to do so may result in loss of contracts, exclusion from public tenders, and international sanctions or trade restrictions.
Panama currently lacks a comprehensive legal framework specifically addressing criminal offences related to the misuse of AI, algorithmic trading or automated decision-making in financial or commercial contexts. However, certain regulatory and compliance obligations do apply under existing financial and corporate laws, particularly in the fintech sector.
Algorithmic Trading and AI in Finance
There are no specific laws criminalising the development or use of trading algorithms or AI-based financial tools, as long as the developers are not directly executing trades themselves.
Automated Decision-Making and AI Governance
Panama has no specific criminal offences tied to misuse of automated decision-making systems (eg, biased credit scoring, discriminatory hiring algorithms).
Compliance Expectations
Companies using AI in regulated sectors must ensure transparency, fairness and accountability.
There is no regulatory sandbox for testing AI models, but regulators may issue non-binding opinions on compliance matters.
Gatekeeper Liability
Financial institutions are expected to monitor their platforms for AML compliance. This includes oversight of automated systems used for transaction monitoring and risk scoring.
Corporate Liability
While corporate criminal liability exists for environmental and financial crimes, there is no express provision for AI misuse. However, if AI systems are used to commit fraud, violate AML laws or breach consumer protection standards, companies may be held liable under general criminal or administrative law.
Crypto-assets are not recognised as legal tender, though they are legally used in transactions. Panama does not yet have a unified crypto law, though several offences may apply under general financial and AML laws:
If it is established during the investigation process that all the requirements set forth in both the law and the regulations aimed at preventing money laundering were met, and also that there was no money laundering, an acquittal should consequently be obtained.
Compliance and Regulation of Law
The law establishes requirements that must be included in compliance programmes. If an organisation creates regulations to prevent the receipt of money from an illicit source, the actions of someone within the organisation who, for some reason, receives money from an illicit source should not be considered intentional.
Panamanian criminal law provides very well-defined exemptions from guilt; however, most of these would apply to common crimes – for example, legitimate defence after an unjust aggression, lack of provocation and the use of a rational means to repel the imminent damage. When talking about white-collar crime, everything is reduced to the intentionality of the act. Given that ignorance of the law does not exempt a person from liability, lack of knowledge that an act was illicit could hardly be used as an exception.
Article 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides rules on sentencing agreements, which are divided into two categories, as follows.
Collaboration Agreements
Collaboration agreements are designed so that the prosecutor can dispense with a prosecution in a total or partial manner depending on the information provided by the collaborator, sometimes even negotiating the provision of information in exchange for the imposition of a lesser sentence.
Penalty Agreements
In contrast, a penalty agreement involves the acceptance of criminal responsibility, the penalty for which cannot be less than a third of the penalty that would otherwise be imposed for the crime under investigation.
Panama’s criminal laws provide protections as incentives for whistle-blowers. These protections include the possibility of not appearing in the proceeding and having their identity safeguarded by the prosecutor. However, it is important to note that, during the trial, the defence may have the right to know the identity of the protected witness. This balance aims to encourage the reporting of wrongdoing while ensuring a fair trial process.
In the realm of antitrust law, within the civil and administrative spheres, whistle-blower protections and benefits are granted exclusively to the first individual who reports the wrongdoing. Subsequent witnesses who provide information leading to evidence of monopolistic practices or actions that harm economic free competition and free market entry in the production, processing, distribution, supply or marketing of goods or services do not receive the same benefits. This policy aims to incentivise early reporting while maintaining a fair and competitive market environment.
Whistle-blowing can significantly impact trade secrets and confidential information, potentially causing commercial disadvantages to a corporation. When an employee discloses information about illegal or unethical practices, they might inadvertently reveal sensitive data that competitors could exploit. This could include proprietary technologies, business strategies or customer information. However, there is a delicate balance to maintain. Legal frameworks often provide protections for whistle-blowers to encourage the reporting of wrongdoing while also safeguarding certain types of confidential information. For instance, whistle-blower laws typically include provisions to protect trade secrets and other sensitive information from unnecessary disclosure. The expectation is that only information directly relevant to the illegal or unethical activity should be disclosed, and measures should be taken to minimise any potential harm to the corporation’s legitimate business interests.
The rule that protects a protected witness is set out in Article 340 of the Criminal Code, which states that the prosecutor’s office, within the development of the investigation, at the time of presenting the accusation and announcing its elements of evidence, may accompany this with the identification data of witnesses and experts in a sealed envelope. This measure loses force when the identity of the witness may be known to the defence in the intermediate phase of the criminal process, which leaves them exposed to any danger before the oral trial. The protected witness ceases to be a protected witness in the intermediate phase, since they are revealed to the defence – a situation that could possibly jeopardise the amount of evidence to be debated in oral trial. Everything will depend on the way the defence acts and its procedural loyalty to the process.
There is no anonymous reporting channel provided by regulators or prosecutors – the truth is that criminal actions can begin anonymously and even by reports from the financial analysis unit or another entity without one’s knowledge that this internal or administrative investigation would lead to a criminal case.
The defence is affected due to the complexity of cases, and even more so when the evidentiary flow thereof depends on another jurisdiction, since it does not have the force or the recourse of the punitive power of the State (Public Prosecutor’s Office).
There are no limits to international support or coordinated defence strategies; however, in high-profile cases involving multiple defence teams, counsel frequently coordinate their efforts to challenge forensic evidence and alleged procedural irregularities, which may sometimes benefit co-defendants.
There is much discussion about the forfeiture of property as a method of confiscating property without conviction and even from non-investigated third parties; this project is currently shelved in the Assembly. A project on the criminal liability of the legal person was also initiated but has not passed the first debates. Currently, there are attempts to bring a General Anti-Corruption Law up for discussion, which does not benefit the defence at all but rather the prosecutor, in order to “strengthen” their position. This has been met with opposition from many sectors.
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Digital Threats, Digital Evidence, and White-Collar Enforcement: Panama’s Evolving Response to Technology-Driven Crime
Technology has fundamentally transformed the way crimes are committed, detected, and prosecuted. As digital platforms increasingly underpin commercial activity, government operations, and everyday communications, criminal conduct has evolved beyond traditional schemes into complex, technology-driven models involving cyber-attacks, digital impersonation, data manipulation, and the exploitation of electronic systems. These developments have compelled jurisdictions worldwide to reassess the adequacy of their legal frameworks and investigative capabilities in an environment where evidence is often electronic, transnational, and highly volatile.
Panama is no exception. Recent legislative reforms introduced through Law No 478 of 4 August 2025 demonstrate a clear commitment to strengthening the country’s capacity to investigate and prosecute cyber-enabled crime while adapting procedural mechanisms to the realities of the digital age. At the same time, ongoing high-profile investigations such as “Operation Pandora” illustrate how technological vulnerabilities can extend far beyond conventional cybercrime, creating opportunities for sophisticated fraud, corruption, and potential money laundering schemes. Together, these developments reveal a broader trend in white-collar enforcement: the growing convergence of cybersecurity, digital evidence, corporate compliance, and financial crime investigations. This article examines both dimensions, exploring how Panama’s legal system is adapting to emerging technological risks and what these changes mean for businesses, financial institutions, and practitioners operating in an increasingly digital environment.
Cybercrime, digital evidence, and technological challenges in Panama’s criminal justice system
The increasing digitalisation of society has transformed the landscape of white-collar crime. Fraud schemes, identity theft, cyber-enabled extortion, unauthorised access to information systems, and the dissemination of illicit digital content have become some of the most prevalent criminal threats faced by states and private actors alike. As businesses, governments, and individuals increasingly rely on technology, criminal conduct has evolved at a pace that often challenges traditional legal frameworks and investigative techniques.
In response to these developments, Panama enacted Law No 478 of 4 August 2025, which introduced significant amendments to both the Panamanian Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code concerning cybercrime, digital evidence, international legal cooperation in criminal matters, and investigative powers related to information technologies. The legislation represents one of the most substantial reforms of Panama’s cybercrime framework in recent years and reflects an effort to align domestic law with contemporary technological realities and international standards.
New concepts and emerging forms of cybercrime
One of the most noteworthy contributions of Law No 478 is the introduction of modern legal terminology specifically designed to address contemporary digital threats. Among the concepts incorporated into the legislation are:
These concepts reflect criminal practices that have become increasingly common as social interaction, commerce, and communications migrate to digital platforms. The introduction of these definitions provides prosecutors, investigators, and courts with greater legal certainty when addressing conduct that previously existed in a legislative grey area or required extensive judicial interpretation.
The incorporation of these concepts is particularly relevant in an era marked by social media platforms, encrypted communications, AI applications, and transnational digital networks. Criminal behaviour today frequently transcends geographical borders, requiring legal systems to adapt rapidly to technological innovation while balancing constitutional guarantees and individual rights.
Criminalisation of the non-consensual dissemination of intimate content
Among the most significant innovations introduced by Law No 478 is the criminalisation of conduct involving the commercialisation or dissemination of intimate or nude content without the consent of the person depicted.
The offence encompasses the unauthorised distribution of photographs, graphic images, audio recordings, or videos containing intimate content. Under the new provisions, such conduct may be punished with imprisonment ranging from three to six years, accompanied by various aggravating circumstances.
The penalties may be increased when:
This reform reflects a growing international trend recognising that technological tools can be weaponised to inflict significant reputational, psychological, professional, and economic harm. The widespread availability of social media and instant communication platforms has amplified the impact of such conduct, often allowing unlawful content to spread globally within minutes.
Consequently, the legislation seeks not merely to punish offenders but also to provide greater protection for privacy, dignity, and personal autonomy in the digital environment.
Identity theft and the challenges of AI
Another particularly relevant offence introduced by the new legislation concerns identity theft and digital impersonation for unlawful purposes.
The law criminalises the impersonation of another individual through the use of computer data, databases, electronic systems, or any other technological means. The offence carries penalties ranging from five to ten years of imprisonment, demonstrating the seriousness with which the Panamanian legislature views this conduct.
The significance of this provision cannot be overstated in light of the rapid development of artificial intelligence technologies. Deepfakes, synthetic media, voice cloning, and AI-generated content have dramatically increased the sophistication of fraud schemes. Criminal organisations can now create highly convincing digital replicas of individuals, making traditional methods of identity verification increasingly vulnerable.
As technology continues to evolve, legal systems inevitably confront the challenge of keeping pace with criminal innovation. The gap between technological advancement and criminal investigation can create opportunities for offenders to exploit emerging digital tools before regulatory frameworks are fully developed. Consequently, strengthening investigative capacities and digital forensic expertise becomes essential to ensuring effective enforcement.
Protection of digital data and information systems
Law No 478 also expands criminal liability concerning the integrity of digital information.
Historically, Panamanian cybercrime provisions focused primarily on unauthorised access, appropriation, use, copying, or modification of computer data. The new legislation broadens this scope by expressly criminalising the deletion, destruction, or alteration of computer data even when no direct appropriation occurs.
Under the amended provisions, individuals who unlawfully damage, delete, or alter computer data may face imprisonment ranging from two to four years. The penalties may be increased significantly when the conduct causes serious harm to the owner or controller of the information.
This development is particularly important in the context of ransomware attacks, insider threats, corporate sabotage, and retaliatory cyber-incidents. In many contemporary cyber-attacks, the principal harm stems not from theft but from the destruction or corruption of critical information. By explicitly addressing such conduct, the legislation closes potential gaps that may have previously limited criminal prosecution.
Enhanced protection of critical infrastructure
Cybercrime has long been regulated under Panamanian law, particularly in cases involving banks, insurance companies, financial institutions, and governmental entities. However, Law No 478 significantly expands the protected scope of computer systems.
The legislation now provides enhanced protection for:
This expansion reflects modern concerns regarding cyber-attacks against essential services. Healthcare systems, energy networks, telecommunications platforms, transportation systems, and other critical infrastructures present attractive targets for cybercriminals due to the potentially severe consequences of operational disruptions.
By broadening the range of protected victims, the law strengthens prosecutorial tools and removes unnecessary limitations that previously confined enforcement to specific categories of institutions. From a policy perspective, this approach provides law enforcement authorities with greater flexibility in addressing attacks against increasingly interconnected sectors of the economy.
Public action crimes dependent upon private complaint
Another notable amendment concerns procedural aspects of criminal prosecution.
The legislation classifies certain offences, including the non-consensual dissemination of intimate content, sexual harassment, and indecent acts involving adult victims, as crimes subject to public prosecution dependent upon a private complaint.
Under Panamanian criminal procedure, this means that the Public Prosecutor’s Office may conduct a criminal investigation and pursue prosecution only after the victim files a formal complaint.
This procedural mechanism seeks to balance competing interests. On one hand, it preserves the state’s interest in prosecuting criminal conduct. On the other, it recognises the deeply personal nature of offences that may involve issues of privacy, dignity, sexuality, or reputation.
In practical terms, the victim retains a significant degree of autonomy regarding whether criminal proceedings should be initiated, while the Public Prosecutor remains the constitutional authority responsible for directing criminal investigations and promoting the public interest.
Digital evidence and the preservation of electronic data
Perhaps one of the most important developments introduced by Law No 478 concerns digital evidence preservation.
In contemporary criminal investigations, digital evidence often determines whether a case can be successfully prosecuted. Surveillance recordings, electronic communications, metadata, server logs, location information, subscriber records, cloud-based files, and transactional records frequently provide the key evidentiary foundation for modern criminal cases.
Recognising this reality, the law authorises the Public Prosecutor’s Office to order any natural or legal person to preserve specific electronic data, including traffic data stored through computer systems that are within their possession or control.
The purpose of the measure is to prevent the destruction, alteration, or loss of evidence when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant data may be particularly susceptible to modification or deletion.
The preservation order may remain in effect for up to ninety days, with the possibility of extension for an equivalent period.
From an investigative standpoint, this authority substantially strengthens the prosecutor’s ability to secure critical evidence before it disappears. Given the volatile nature of digital information, delays often result in lost investigative opportunities and, ultimately, impunity.
Nevertheless, the breadth of this authority will likely generate significant debate among defence attorneys, privacy advocates, and legal scholars. Questions may arise regarding proportionality, due process, judicial oversight, and the permissible duration of preservation measures. While the legislation requires appropriate justification, the possibility of repeated extensions may attract future judicial scrutiny concerning constitutional safeguards.
Importantly, the law also imposes confidentiality obligations upon individuals or entities responsible for preserving the data. Those subject to preservation orders are prohibited from disclosing the existence of the measure, thereby protecting the integrity of ongoing investigations.
Preservation of traffic data and cooperation from service providers
The legislation further empowers the Public Prosecutor’s Office to issue orders directed at service providers involved in the transmission of communications.
Where a service provider determines that additional providers participated in the transmission process, it must swiftly disclose information sufficient to identify all relevant providers as well as the route through which the communication was transmitted.
This provision reflects the complex nature of modern electronic communications, which frequently involve multiple intermediaries operating across different jurisdictions. Investigators often encounter difficulties tracing the origin and path of communications without timely cooperation from these entities.
The new framework is therefore intended to improve the efficiency of cybercrime investigations and facilitate the identification of digital evidence before it is lost or overwritten.
The introduction of production orders
Another innovative aspect of Law No 478 is the introduction of production orders as a distinct investigative mechanism within Panamanian criminal procedure.
Under this authority, the Public Prosecutor may order natural or legal persons to provide computer data that is stored within their possession or control, whether located in:
Likewise, service providers operating within Panamanian territory may be required to supply subscriber information and other relevant data that fall under their control.
This represents a significant modernisation of investigative powers. Production orders have become a common feature of cybercrime legislation worldwide because they enable investigators to obtain information efficiently while maintaining evidentiary integrity.
Balancing investigative powers and fundamental rights
Perhaps the most controversial feature of the legislation is the apparent authority granted to prosecutors to order the production of information without an expressly stated requirement for prior or subsequent judicial authorisation in certain circumstances.
From a practical perspective, this may substantially accelerate cybercrime investigations, allowing authorities to respond rapidly to situations involving volatile digital evidence. Time frequently plays a critical role in cyber-investigations, particularly when dealing with temporary logs, subscriber information, encrypted communications, or active cyber-attacks.
However, these enhanced powers inevitably raise important constitutional considerations. The collection of subscriber information, digital records, and electronic data may implicate rights related to privacy, due process, confidentiality of communications, and judicial oversight.
As a result, legal practitioners, courts, and scholars will likely play a significant role in defining the limits of these powers through future litigation and judicial interpretation.
Law No 478 of 4 August 2025 represents a landmark step in the modernisation of Panama’s criminal justice framework concerning cybercrime, digital evidence, and technology-driven offences. The legislation recognises the growing impact of digital platforms, artificial intelligence, electronic communications, and information systems on both legitimate economic activity and criminal conduct.
By introducing new offences such as non-consensual dissemination of intimate content and identity theft, strengthening protections for critical infrastructure, expanding safeguards for digital information, and creating sophisticated mechanisms for preserving and obtaining electronic evidence, Panama has significantly enhanced its ability to investigate and prosecute modern cyber-enabled crimes.
At the same time, the reforms underscore a broader challenge faced by legal systems worldwide – that of maintaining an appropriate balance between effective law enforcement and the protection of fundamental rights. As cybercrime becomes increasingly sophisticated and transnational, prosecutors require powerful investigative tools to preserve evidence and identify offenders. Yet the exercise of such powers must remain consistent with principles of legality, proportionality, privacy, and due process.
The success of these reforms will depend not only on the text of the legislation itself but also on its practical implementation by prosecutors, courts, law enforcement agencies, service providers, and digital forensic specialists. In an age where technology evolves faster than ever, Law No 478 reflects Panama’s recognition that combating cybercrime requires both legal innovation and continuous adaptation to emerging digital threats.
Ultimately, the true significance of Panama’s recent cybercrime reforms lies not only in the creation of new offences or investigative mechanisms, but in their relevance to a rapidly evolving risk environment in which technology serves as both a target and an enabler of criminal activity. This evolution is reflected in the country’s most prominent ongoing white-collar investigations, where alleged misconduct is no longer limited to physical documents or traditional financial transactions, but is instead embedded within digital systems and electronic records. Against this backdrop, “Operation Pandora” offers a compelling case study of how deficiencies in digital governance and technological controls can allegedly evolve into complex schemes involving fraud, corruption, asset monetisation, and potential money laundering exposure.
From tax credits to criminal proceeds: the five mechanisms under investigation in Panama’s “Operation Pandora”
By 2026, Panama had become the centre of one of the most significant corruption and tax fraud investigations in its recent history. The investigation known as Operation Pandora concerns allegations that public officials within the Dirección General de Ingresos (DGI), Panama’s Tax Authority, acting together with private individuals, intermediaries, lawyers, and corporate actors, manipulated the country’s tax administration platform, e-Tax 2.0, to generate, transfer, and monetise fraudulent tax credits.
Authorities estimate the alleged losses to the Panamanian State at approximately USD40 million, although certain audits suggest the potential exposure could be significantly higher. The response has been extensive. Prosecutors have executed search warrants across multiple provinces, ordered arrests, seized electronic devices and records, frozen disputed tax-credit transactions, and opened investigations involving corruption, organised crime, fraud, and money laundering. Simultaneously, the Ministry of Economy and Finance initiated audits and removed officials allegedly connected to the irregularities.
What distinguishes Operation Pandora is not only the scale of the suspected losses but also the sophistication of the methods allegedly used to create and commercialise unlawful tax credits. Public reports and audit findings describe at least five principal mechanisms, as follows.
i. Conversion of historical tax payments into artificial credits
The principal scheme allegedly involved manipulating historical tax transactions that had already been completed and paid years earlier. Investigators contend that insiders altered records associated with prior taxable transactions, including transfers of real estate, shares, equipment, and other assets.
By modifying or annulling historical entries within the system, legitimate tax payments allegedly appeared as “unapplied payments”, allowing fraudulent tax credits to be generated without legal basis. Because the underlying transactions were genuine, this mechanism was particularly difficult to detect.
Authorities have indicated that some of the affected transactions exceeded USD8 million and dated back more than a decade. The use of legitimate historical records provided an appearance of authenticity that allegedly helped conceal the irregularities.
ii. Unauthorised creation of credits through system manipulation
A second mechanism allegedly involved the direct creation of tax credits through unlawful modifications within the e-Tax platform.
According to investigative reports, fraudulent resolutions and administrative authorisations were generated or altered to recognise tax credits that never legally existed. Once entered into the system, the credits were recorded as valid fiscal assets capable of being used or transferred.
Unlike the first modality, which relied upon modifying preexisting tax transactions, this method allegedly generated credits without any legitimate underlying fiscal event. The scheme highlights the importance of internal controls, authorisation procedures, and segregation of responsibilities within public administrative systems.
iii. Fraudulent assignment and commercialisation of tax credits
Investigators further allege that the artificially generated credits were systematically transferred through assignment agreements to intermediary entities and third parties.
Audit findings suggest that credits identified as unapplied payments were first assigned to intermediary corporations and subsequently transferred to financial institutions or other purchasers. Through this process, tax fraud was allegedly transformed into a tradable financial asset.
The structure purportedly gave the credits an appearance of legitimacy while enabling their monetisation through commercial transactions. By distancing the credits from their original fraudulent creation, participants allegedly made complicated efforts to trace their source and identify the ultimate beneficiaries.
iv. Diversion of credits belonging to legitimate taxpayers
A fourth modality involved the alleged appropriation of tax credits belonging to legitimate taxpayers. Investigators have reported that credits appearing within taxpayer accounts were altered, transferred, reassigned, or diverted to third parties through unauthorised interventions inside the tax administration system. Some affected taxpayers reportedly discovered that credits had been modified or moved without their consent.
This variation is particularly serious because it potentially combines fraud against the State with direct economic harm to private individuals and businesses. If proven, the scheme would not only affect public finances but also undermine taxpayer confidence in the integrity of the tax administration.
v. Exploitation of systemic control failures
Perhaps the most concerning mechanism was structural rather than transactional.
Investigations suggest that weaknesses in audit trails, traceability controls, and authorisation procedures within e-Tax 2.0 permitted users with system access to modify tax information without maintaining a reliable record of who performed the action, when it occurred, or how access was obtained.
According to public reports, these deficiencies enabled the other schemes to operate and remain undetected. The allegations have therefore generated broader concerns regarding cybersecurity, public-sector governance, internal controls, and institutional accountability.
The commercialisation structure
A particularly significant aspect of Operation Pandora is that the alleged misconduct did not end with the creation of fraudulent tax credits. Investigators describe what appears to have been a commercialisation structure designed to convert unlawfully generated credits into assets capable of circulating within the formal economy.
According to public reports, once credits were generated through system alterations or the conversion of historical payments, they were transferred through assignment agreements and other transactions involving intermediary entities. These entities allegedly functioned as transfer vehicles before the credits reached their final purchasers.
The alleged objective was to create sufficient transactional distance between the original manipulation and the end purchaser, thereby making the source of the credits more difficult to identify.
Because tax credits possess economic value and can lawfully be transferred under certain circumstances, the alleged participants reportedly did not need direct access to government funds. Instead, they allegedly converted manipulated records into fiscal assets that could be sold, assigned, pledged, or used to offset tax obligations.
The role of financial institutions
Public reporting indicates that a significant volume of the questioned tax credits ultimately reached the portfolio of an important banking entity through successive assignment transactions.
The bank has publicly maintained that it acquired the credits in good faith, relied upon official governmental approvals, complied with applicable due-diligence obligations, and cooperated with authorities throughout the investigation. To date, public reporting has not established criminal responsibility on the part of the institution, and all parties continue to benefit from the presumption of innocence.
Nonetheless, the case raises important compliance questions for the financial sector. Financial institutions routinely rely on public records, governmental certifications, and official approvals when evaluating assignable assets. Where the alleged source of the fraud lies within the governmental system responsible for validating those assets, conventional verification mechanisms may prove insufficient.
As a result, Operation Pandora may influence future discussions regarding enhanced verification measures for tax-credit acquisitions, particularly where transactions involve significant values, multiple intermediary transfers, or unusual transactional patterns.
Intermediary companies and professional facilitators
Another important feature of the investigation is the alleged use of intermediary corporations to facilitate transfers between the creators of questioned credits and their ultimate purchasers.
The use of corporate vehicles is not inherently unlawful. However, investigators are examining whether certain entities functioned primarily as conduits intended to obscure the origin of the credits, fragment ownership interests, or facilitate rapid transfers among multiple actors.
Authorities have also examined the role of lawyers and other professionals involved in documenting and processing assignment transactions. Public reports indicate that legal professionals participated in various capacities, including drafting agreements, representing parties, and preparing supporting documentation.
The key issue remains whether such professionals merely provided services associated with transactions that appeared legitimate or whether some knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent scheme. These questions remain subject to judicial determination.
From a white-collar crime perspective, the investigation underscores the importance of compliance controls among professional service providers. Lawyers, accountants, fiduciaries, and other intermediaries often occupy critical positions capable of identifying suspicious transactions before they are completed.
Impact on legitimate taxpayers
Although much public attention has focused on losses allegedly suffered by the State, another important consequence relates to taxpayers whose accounts were reportedly manipulated without authorisation.
According to public reports, legitimate taxpayers may have experienced disruptions to their fiscal planning, uncertainty regarding their tax status, delays in accessing valid tax benefits, or even the loss of credits lawfully accrued to them.
If substantiated, these allegations could generate disputes regarding ownership rights, compensation claims, administrative liability, and the validity of prior assignments. Additional litigation may arise from efforts to balance the protection of public finances with the rights of taxpayers and third parties who acquired credits while allegedly acting in good faith.
Asset recovery and money laundering considerations
Operation Pandora illustrates how tax fraud investigations can evolve into broader financial crime cases.
The allegations concern not only the creation of fraudulent tax credits but also the movement, monetisation, and potential concealment of the proceeds generated by those credits. Prosecutors have therefore pursued investigative theories involving corruption, organised crime, asset concealment, and money laundering.
As investigations continue, authorities are expected to focus increasingly on tracing financial flows, identifying beneficial owners, analysing corporate structures, and locating assets potentially derived from the questioned credits. Asset freezes, precautionary seizures, and recovery proceedings may become central components of the enforcement strategy.
The case demonstrates the growing overlap among tax enforcement, anti-corruption investigations, and anti-money laundering frameworks. Activity initially appearing to be a tax administration irregularity can ultimately evolve into a complex financial crime investigation involving multiple authorities and regulatory regimes.
Potential legal proceedings arising from Operation Pandora
Beyond the criminal investigation itself, Operation Pandora is likely to trigger a broad range of parallel legal proceedings involving taxpayers, financial institutions, assignees of tax credits, professional intermediaries, and public authorities. A particularly significant aspect of the case is that many of the allegedly irregular transactions appear to have originated from actions performed within the government’s own tax administration systems, raising questions regarding institutional accountability, administrative oversight, and the protection afforded to taxpayers who relied in good faith on official records and authorisations.
As the investigations advance, several categories of disputes are likely to emerge, including the following.
From a broader policy perspective, the dispute may ultimately require courts to examine how the risks associated with failures in public digital infrastructure should be allocated. Where taxpayers and market participants relied upon information, approvals, and registrations generated by official government platforms, a central legal question will be whether the consequences of alleged system manipulation should fall upon private actors acting in good faith or upon the State entities responsible for maintaining the integrity, traceability, and security of those systems. The answer to that question may become one of the most important legal legacies of Operation Pandora, extending well beyond the criminal investigation itself and shaping future jurisprudence on governmental accountability in the digital age.
Enforcement response and regulatory reform
Panamanian authorities have responded aggressively to the allegations through searches, arrests, asset tracing efforts, evidence seizures, judicial proceedings, and extensive audits. Questioned tax-credit transactions have been frozen while administrative reviews continue.
The case is expected to influence future reforms involving tax-credit transfers, digital record security, auditability requirements, cybersecurity controls, and institutional accountability.
Authorities have also announced plans to replace or substantially redesign the e-Tax platform. Public officials have acknowledged weaknesses in audit logs, traceability mechanisms, and authorisation controls, and have stated that technological reforms are being evaluated to strengthen transparency and security within the tax administration.
Conclusion
The reforms introduced by Law No 478 and the allegations currently being examined in Operation Pandora ultimately reflect the same underlying reality: in today’s environment, technology is both a critical asset and a potential source of criminal exposure. As digital systems become increasingly integrated into commercial transactions, public administration, and financial operations, the distinction between cybercrime and traditional white-collar crime continues to narrow. The investigation of technological misconduct now frequently requires the same tools, expertise, and evidentiary mechanisms traditionally associated with financial crime enforcement, while economic crimes increasingly depend on digital infrastructure and electronic records.
Panama’s recent legislative response represents an important step towards addressing this convergence. Through expanded cybercrime offences, enhanced protection of digital information, and new mechanisms for the preservation and production of electronic evidence, the country has strengthened its ability to confront modern forms of criminal conduct. However, Operation Pandora serves as a reminder that legal reform alone is not sufficient. Effective prevention and enforcement also depend on robust technological controls, transparent governance, diligent compliance practices, and the capacity to detect and respond to vulnerabilities before they are exploited.
For businesses, financial institutions, and legal practitioners, the message is clear. Cybersecurity, digital governance, and compliance can no longer be viewed as separate disciplines. They are increasingly interconnected components of risk management and regulatory strategy. As Panama continues to refine its legal and technological infrastructure, organisations that proactively strengthen their controls over digital assets, information systems, and transactional oversight will be better positioned to navigate a landscape in which technological innovation and criminal sophistication evolve side by side.
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