Over the past five years, local Chinese banks have become increasingly active in leveraged buyout (LBO) financings, especially those backed by international private equity (PE) firms. These banks offer terms (including loan tenure, pricing, financial ratios and loan size) that are more favourable than those offered by international banks. This trend is particularly noticeable in leveraged financing deals aimed at privatising Chinese companies listed in the US.
International banks remain the preferred financiers for multinational companies operating in China.
Mezzanine debt funds have also been active in the high-yield lending market, targeting Chinese real estate developers affected by a significant liquidity shortage in the real estate capital market. These funds, primarily from insurance companies, provide mezzanine financing to PE sponsors aiming to sustain their senior financing and maintain their loan-to-cost (LTC) ratios when the valuation of their portfolio companies decreases significantly. These aspects will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.
The most common LBO transactions involve PE sponsors and international companies selling their China portfolio companies to international strategic buyers, domestic state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or insurance companies. PRC insurance companies and SOEs are the main buyers in these transactions, and typically do not pursue IPOs or trade sales as exit strategies; instead, they prefer targets that offer stable cash yields. Chinese banks have provided robust financing support to these deals, offering favourable interest rates, financial covenants and large loan sizes, as the targets generally have strong cash profiles and are considered attractive assets. Loan documentation often adheres to standards set by the Loan Market Association (LMA) or Asia-Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA), and is widely accepted by Chinese commercial banks.
Buyers and sellers in the LBO market remain cautious due to the uncertainty surrounding potential geopolitical policies, including those expected to be implemented by the newly elected US government, which could impact cross-border investments and acquisition transactions. Deals were delayed due to various factors, including high USD interest rates, regulatory scrutiny over PRC lenders providing RMB loans to offshore borrowers, geopolitical risks and multiple macroeconomic uncertainties. The declining equity valuations and fewer new IPOs in the region's capital markets have made it challenging for PE sponsors to exit their portfolios. Many PE sponsors in this region are seeking refinancing for their existing leveraged deals or recapitalisation financing for their portfolios to meet the distribution to paid-in criteria required by their limited partners (LPs).
While lenders are familiar with traditional refinancing, they find recapitalisation financing challenging for the following two main reasons.
Another common challenge for PE sponsors in this market is the maximum term for acquisition loans in China, which cannot exceed seven years. Sponsors are often unable to secure an exit through an IPO or trade sale by the time the loan matures, so they must orchestrate a new acquisition transaction (or set up a continuity fund) to finance a new deal on the same target, using the new loan proceeds to retire the debts from existing lenders. This new fund structure allows new investors, seeking fixed returns similar to those of mezzanine credit investors, to join (by contributing new cash) existing LPs, which will roll over their shares into the new fund. Despite significant valuation markdowns demanded by senior lenders and mezzanine investors, this strategy helps to maintain the overall loan-to-value (LTV) ratio based on current market valuations, thereby not materially altering the internal rate of return for original LPs.
Faced with challenges in raising funds from US or European LPs for new transactions, Asian-based general partners (GPs) are now turning to RMB LPs and other Asian sovereign wealth funds. By establishing funds onshore in China, these sponsors can access lower-cost RMB lending sources – the RMB lending base rate is lower than that in Western markets for the first time in 30 years, in a trend expected to continue. This arrangement enhances lenders' risk appetite by aligning them closer to the target assets and the cash flows they generate, while also allowing sponsors to benefit from onshore interest costs as a tax shield, which is not available when acquisition loans are made to an offshore holding company.
The breakthroughs in large AI models achieved by DeepSeek in early 2025 have led to a re-evaluation of Chinese hi-tech company stocks in the Hong Kong and US markets, driving increased activity in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among hi-tech companies, data centres and AI technology firms.
Since 2024, the Chinese government has introduced several policies aimed at encouraging and supporting efficient M&A in the technology sector. For instance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission implemented a series of supportive measures in 2024, such as the “Sixteen Measures for Capital Markets to Support the High-Quality Development of Technology Enterprises” and the “Eight Measures on Deepening the Reform of the Science and Technology Innovation Board (STAR Market), Serving Technological Innovation and the Development of New Productive Forces”. These policies explicitly propose initiatives to promote efficient M&A activities for tech companies, diversify payment instruments and support the acquisition of unprofitable “hard-tech” enterprises.
In addition, the National Financial Regulatory Administration launched a pilot policy on acquisition loans related to tech company M&A, under which the maximum loan-to-cost ratio for M&A deals involving tech companies was raised from 60% to 80%, reducing the mandatory equity contribution from 40% to 20%. Furthermore, the maximum loan term for tech company M&A transactions was extended from seven years to ten years. This policy significantly eases funding and repayment pressures, creating a more favourable environment for tech company M&A activities.
For complex acquisition finance/LBOs where the borrower is an offshore entity, Hong Kong law is frequently used and accepted by lenders and sponsors.
PRC law has been the prevailing choice for domestic corporate and acquisition loans where both lenders and borrowers are onshore entities.
APLMA standard documents are widely used in cross-border transactions in this region. For domestic transactions (particularly where the lenders are Chinese banks), local Chinese banks normally encourage the use of template documents formulated by each bank or those prepared by the China Banking Association.
For complicated leveraged financing transactions with foreign sponsors, Chinese banks can accept and execute the English version of loan documents (with no Chinese translation or Chinese version), according to the PRC counsel’s opinion in reconciling the consistency of English terms with their credit committee approvals.
PRC branches of international banks can only accept and execute the Chinese version of loan documents when their borrowers are PRC local companies, while the prevailing market practice is to adopt the English version for the facility agreement (with the Chinese translation or summary) and the Chinese version for security documents, to accommodate local registration requirements.
Counsels are expected to cover the following aspects in their opinion:
PRC lenders may also look for opinions on compliance with certain regulatory requirements, including the foreign debt registration as required by the National Development and Reform Commission of China and/or the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China (SAFE), the LTV/LTC regulatory ratio, etc.
To contemplate an easier route of investment exit given the cross-border foreign exchange control (from the investor’s perspective) and enjoy certain tax benefits offered by an offshore sale structure (from the seller’s perspective), sellers of PRC assets prefer, or are asked by investors, to set up an offshore investment holding structure and place their PRC operating companies or assets under such offshore holding companies. The acquisition is usually constructed as a sale and purchase of shares in offshore holding companies.
In such a deal construct, the senior loans normally comprise two tranches:
The offshore tranche is still categorised and priced as a senior loan, but the offshore loan is technically structurally subordinated to the onshore loans. For real estate loans, offshore lenders will seek to have a second lien mortgage over the onshore real estate properties to improve their subordination position, which may face challenges as outlined in the upstreaming security section in 3.4 Bonds/High-Yield Bonds (Offshore Issuer). Hence, this request is rarely accepted in sponsor-financed transactions.
Many offshore lenders also manage to enter into intercreditor agreements with onshore lenders to share security or achieve co-ordinated security enforcement arrangements, which can also prove to be quite challenging, as discussed in 4. Intercreditor Agreements.
For those domestic LBO deals where both lenders and borrowers are PRC entities, an offshore investment holding structure is not a must. There will be only one senior acquisition loan, to be provided by onshore lenders to the onshore borrower for its acquisition of the equity interest of the onshore target company from the seller.
Mezzanine loans are not commonly seen in sponsor financing, as PE sponsors may easily access 60‒65% LTC loans from senior lenders in this market (with combined use of onshore and offshore loans, since onshore lenders are subject to a regulatory cap of 60% LTC for acquisition loans).
Mezzanine loans are more frequently seen in real estate financing extended to real estate developers, which cannot use bank loans to finance their land acquisitions or are restricted to bank loans to finance their operating expenditures or capital expenditures when they fail to meet certain regulatory financial ratios. Such real estate developers will place their onshore development companies under an offshore holding company, which will utilise mezzanine loans from credit funds and then infuse equity into onshore project companies. Such a mezzanine loan will normally yield 12‒18% interest but will obviously be structurally subordinated to onshore senior creditors without the protection of an intercreditor arrangement.
A new mezzanine structure has been seen in continuity fund deals, as discussed in 1.2 Corporates and LBOs.
There are bridge loans in LBO deals, where the target is cash-rich but cannot provide cash security to the acquirer due to financial assistance restrictions. In a typical reverse merge deal, the lenders may extend a cash bridge facility to the merger subsidiary of the sponsor, supported by the agreed amount of cash from the target company being placed into an escrow account opened with the lender (not a security, given the financial assistance restriction). Such escrow arrangement will be replaced by a cash pledge or account charge arrangement after closing the contemplated merge. The cash bridge loan will remain if the target’s PRC operating subsidiaries do not want to pay dividends from the charged cash to the offshore borrower due to the potential tax leakage, but will otherwise be paid off if they want to distribute dividends to an offshore borrower.
PRC companies may adopt two different types of issuer structures to issue bonds/high-yield bonds in the offshore capital market:
Offshore Issuer
The founders of a PRC company may establish a Cayman entity as an offshore holding company and bond issuer, which will, in turn, own a series of PRC operating entities via one or more British Virgin Islands and/or Hong Kong intermediary holding companies. Bonds issued by such issuer may utilise the following credit enhancement routes.
Onshore/Domestic Issuer
PRC companies may issue bonds/high-yield bonds directly into the offshore capital market. Typical credit enhancement measures may include:
The structure for private placements/loan notes is almost identical to that outlined in 3.4 Bonds/High-Yield Bonds.
In the acquisition finance area, direct purchase of the assets may not be a preferred choice mainly due to tax considerations. As mentioned, PE sponsors typically carry out acquisitions by way of equity rather than asset transactions. Therefore, in the PRC market, asset-based financing deals are not frequently seen in industries other than real estate. For real estate loans, lenders usually adopt similar secured lending structures to those discussed in 3.1 Senior Loans, with the typical security package comprising the following, with the purpose of ring-fencing the asset values and the future cash flows of the borrower:
In asset-based lending, considering the assets will be the core repayment sources (together with the cash flow generated during the loan tenor), this structure is less attractive to international banks if there is an offshore tranche, because of the structural subordination issue.
On the contrary, some PRC banks will consider extending the offshore tranche loans through their free trade zone (FTZ) branches. As the FTZ branches are PRC entities, second lien mortgages created in favour of those bank branches will not constitute outward security requiring SAFE registration. As such, PRC banks with FTZ branches are key participants in this niche market.
A typical intercreditor agreement under an offshore/onshore dual tranche transaction includes the following arrangements.
Priority of Payments
As discussed in 3.1 Senior Loans, the offshore loan is structurally subordinated to the onshore loan, and the intercreditor agreement will specify the types of payments that the onshore lenders can receive pursuant to the onshore finance documents. While the scope of such types of payments is deal-specific and will be negotiated, the market consensus is that only enforcement proceeds recovered by the onshore lenders should be subject to payment subordination, while other regular payments under the finance documents (including payment of interest or default interest, repayment or prepayment of onshore loans, and payment of indemnities, costs and expenses) should be permitted as long as no default has occurred and/or is continuing.
As a new development in the market, there is an increasing trend of offshore lenders being able to secure a second lien mortgage even though it is still not prevailing market practice in sponsor-financed transactions. In turn, borrowers will argue that, given the new security, an intercreditor agreement is no longer required, as the typical intercreditor agreement is intended to solve the structural subordination issue. However, most lenders still deem it necessary to have the intercreditor agreement in place for the following reasons.
Standstill
All the lenders must refrain from taking any action to accelerate the loan or otherwise enforce any part of the security package within 90 days of the occurrence of an event of default (and, if agreed, for a further 90 days), and must do their best to reach a consensus on how to enforce the security package (either an offshore sale of shares or an onshore sale of real properties and other operational assets).
Sharing of Security Proceeds
Onshore and offshore lenders agree to share the security enforcement proceeds on a pro rata basis. This is not easily achievable due to PRC foreign exchange control rules, including that:
Call Option
Onshore and offshore lenders will grant each other a call option to purchase the entire portion of outstanding loans held by another group of lenders when both sides cannot reach a consensus on how to enforce the security package.
The approach to bank/bond deals is similar to that detailed in 4.1 Typical Elements.
The role of hedge counterparties is similar to the roles described in standard LMA International Council on Archives documents. The hedging arrangements may be put in place prior to or post signing. Typically, the hedging liabilities for the senior debt and the senior debtor will rank pari passu, and the hedging counterparties will benefit from the same guarantees and security package of the senior debt.
In sponsor financing, the borrower will also request to select, at its discretion, a hedge counterparty that is not a syndication lender. However, the lender will usually ask for a first right to offer and a last right to match the hedging terms, thereby limiting the possibility for a third-party creditor to come in and share the guarantees and securities.
Shares
Pledges can be created over shares in a limited liability company.
Inventory
A mortgage on the inventory, including raw materials, semi-finished products and finished products, can be created.
Bank Accounts
A pledge over bank accounts (in essence, a pledge over the deposits therein) will only be recognised when:
Receivables
Pledges of account receivables can be used rather than the security assignment or the debenture, as frequently used in other jurisdictions.
IP Rights
A pledge over IP rights can be created.
Real Property
Mortgages over real properties can be created.
Movable Properties
A pledge over movable properties is possible when possession of such properties could be delivered to the creditors. If possession is not deliverable, then a mortgage over movable properties can be created.
There are no form requirements under PRC law.
Share Pledge
Shares of a non-public company are to be registered with local branches of the State Administration of Market Regulation, and shares of a listed company are to be registered with the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation (CSDCC).
Bank Account Pledge
There is no registration requirement, but the pledgee should either control such an account or designate an agent to control the account.
Receivables Pledge
Registration with the online registration platform of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) is required – ie, registration with the Unified Registration and Publicity System for Movable Property Financing of the Credit Reference Centre of the PBOC (the “PBOC System”).
IP Rights Mortgage
Registration of trade mark rights and patent rights with the China National Intellectual Property Administration is required, as is registration of copyrights with the Copyright Protection Centre of China.
Real Property Mortgage
Registration with the real estate exchange centre in different localities is required.
Movable Property Mortgage
Registration with the PBOC System is required.
When both the parent company (“ParentCo”, LBO loan borrower) and operating subsidiaries (“OpCo”) are PRC domestic companies, there appear to be no legal constraints preventing OpCos from providing upstream security to the ParentCo. When the OpCo is a joint venture with a partner outside the ParentCo group, then such upstreaming security must be approved by the shareholders’ meeting of the OpCo, with the ParentCo refraining from voting.
When the ParentCo is an offshore company and the OpCos are PRC domestic entities, the OpCos are unable to provide upstream security to the ParentCo unless they can register such upstream security with SAFE as an outward security for offshore debts, which is not easily achievable, as discussed in 4.1 Typical Elements.
The Administration Rules for a Listco Takeover provide that a listed company in the PRC is not permitted to provide financial assistance to an acquirer. Such restriction does not apply to non-public companies, which can provide security to support the financing of an acquirer subject to compliance with the requirements below, including such security being properly approved by the shareholders/directors.
The amended Company Law came into effect on 1 July 2024, and Article 163 states that a joint stock company is prohibited from providing gifts, loans, guarantees or other financial assistance to any person for the purpose of acquiring shares in the company or its parent company.
Exceptions to this rule are allowed if the assistance is intended to implement employee stock ownership plans or if it benefits the company as approved by the shareholders' meeting or the board of directors. Such approval must comply with the articles of association or be authorised by the shareholders' meeting, and must receive affirmative votes from at least two-thirds of all directors. In addition, the total financial assistance provided under these exceptions must not exceed 10% of the company's issued share capital.
It is important to note that this provision does not specify the precise approval requirements for the shareholders’ meeting, such as when approval is mandatory or the exact voting thresholds. These procedural details are expected to be clarified in future judicial interpretations or listing rules.
PRC law does not have a general corporate benefit test requirement, although if a company is to provide security for the indebtedness of a third party, this security must be approved by the shareholders’ meeting or board meeting, pursuant to the stipulations of the articles of association of the company.
The PRC Company Law provides that a connected shareholder must refrain from voting on resolutions regarding the company providing security to a creditor for the benefit of such connected shareholder, to avoid the majority shareholders of a company abusing the assets and resources of the company.
In a typical onshore/offshore PRC acquisition financing, there are three principal methods of loan enforcement for the offshore lenders.
Option 1: Enforcement of the Offshore Security
This involves the sale of the offshore borrower’s equity interests pursuant to the enforcement of the relevant share charge, or the sale of the PRC WFOE, which is owned by the offshore borrower, pursuant to the enforcement of the equity pledge. The objectives of taking enforcement steps offshore are to:
These objectives are driven by the fact that substantially all the valuable assets of the group obligors are held by the WFOE. However, the offshore lenders do not have any direct security over such assets, nor do they have the right to share in any recoveries from the enforcement of the onshore security documents.
Subject to the stipulations under the borrower share charge and the applicable laws in the foreign jurisdiction where the borrower is incorporated, the offshore lender typically has contractual rights under the borrower share charge to effect certain self-help remedies to sell the shares of the offshore holding company to a third party. This would be the quickest method, if the offshore lender can locate a third-party purchaser ready to close the deal.
Option 2: Sale of the Onshore Business/Assets in Connection With Exercising the Offshore Security
By enforcing the security over the shares in the offshore borrower (by appointment of a receiver or, if permitted, sale to a nominee of the offshore security agent), the offshore lender can effectively control the borrower and the WFOE from offshore.
The benefit of obtaining management control of the WFOE is that it will give greater flexibility for the offshore and onshore lenders to co-operate to effect a consensual enforcement of the onshore securities (rather than a court-based enforcement). In the event that enforcement action is taken onshore, it will also be necessary for the offshore lender to have control of the WFOE in order to control the upstreaming of any excess proceeds from the enforcement (after discharge of the onshore loan) to repay the offshore loan.
In particular, upon taking such control, the offshore lender can:
Option 3: Enforcement of the Onshore Property Mortgage
This involves enforcement of the first-priority mortgage over onshore assets (including real property and other movable assets) and then the repayment of the onshore loan and repatriation of the sale proceeds outside the PRC to repay the offshore loan through repayment of a shareholder loan, a declaration of dividends or the winding-up of the WFOE.
The attractiveness of enforcing through the property mortgage will depend on a number of factors, including:
Unless the onshore borrower agrees, the enforcement of mortgages is a court process, which could be time-consuming. An offshore lender is unlikely to look to the mortgage as a means of enforcement if it has no or limited mortgage coverage (often the case), while an onshore lender will view mortgage enforcement as one of its primary means of enforcement.
Under PRC law, a creditor with a mortgage over a debtor’s property may enforce its remedies under the mortgage through a consensual sale and/or a judicial sale. In each case, the creditor will have lien priority over all junior secured creditors and all unsecured creditors with respect to the proceeds of the sale of the property.
Since sponsor deals are usually non-recourse deals, there will be no sponsor guarantees, and the typical type of guarantees will include:
When both the ParentCo/LBO loan borrower and the OpCo are PRC domestic companies, there are no legal constraints preventing the OpCos from providing upstream guarantees to the ParentCo.
When the ParentCo is an offshore company and the OpCos are PRC domestic entities, the OpCos are unable to provide an upstream guarantee to the ParentCo unless they can register such upstream guarantee with SAFE as outward security, which is not easily achievable.
The Administration Rules for Listco Takeover provide that a listed company in the PRC is not permitted to provide financial assistance (including a guarantee) to an acquirer. This restriction does not apply to non-public companies, however, which can provide security (including a guarantee) to support the financing of acquirers subject to compliance with certain requirements, including such security being duly approved by the shareholders/directors (and, in the case of a listed company, making a public announcement via the relevant stock exchange).
It is not mandatory under PRC law for parties to collect guarantee fees. In the market, it is also rare for an affiliated guarantor to charge guarantee fees to another guaranteed affiliate.
There are no enacted laws or regulations clearly recognising equitable subordination. Contractual subordination arrangements between the senior creditor, the subordinated creditor and the debtor are generally recognised by PRC law.
When the target company provides security to an acquirer within the claw-back period before filing for bankruptcy (one year before the court’s acceptance of a bankruptcy petition), such security may be viewed as a preferential or fraudulent property transfer by the target company. The bankruptcy administrator may then decide to void such security provision and recover the property if they can prove that the property transfers were made with the intent to hide assets or that the transfers of property were for less than the fair market value before the bankruptcy of the target company. There are not many such precedents in PRC insolvency law practice.
The main mitigant could be that such security creation was approved by a shareholders’ meeting of the target company, with the connected shareholder refraining from voting on said resolution.
PRC tax authorities will generally charge each lender and borrower stamp tax of 0.05% of the committed loan amount.
There is no withholding tax if both the borrower and the lender are PRC entities. An offshore lender that does not have any presence in the PRC but receives profits, interest or other income from the onshore borrower is subject to withholding tax on that income. The withholding tax rate is 10%, unless the offshore lender is from a jurisdiction with which the PRC has entered into a tax treaty that allows a preferential rate.
According to the PRC Enterprise Income Tax Law, the interest expenses paid by a PRC company to its affiliates for outstanding loans not exceeding the prescribed ratio of the debt investment and equity investment from its affiliates are deductible for corporate income tax purposes, while the interest expenses for the excess portion of loans may not be deductible.
The prescribed ratio of debt investment and equity investment is generally 2:1, except in the case of financial enterprises, where the ratio will be changed to 5:1.
The PRC Company Law regulates the joint stock company’s provision of financial assistance in the context of such company being taken over. The company shall not provide gifts, loans, guarantees or other financial assistance to another person to facilitate its acquisition of shares of the company or its parent company, unless doing so is:
Notably, the provision does not apply to the takeover of limited liability companies.
In respect of a tender offer on a listed target, the financial adviser must conduct due diligence over the acquirer’s financial capability and source of funds. The acquirer must provide at least one of the following facilities to demonstrate its payment ability:
For leveraged deals where banks provide financing, the lenders can provide debt commitment to sponsors on a certain funds basis, on terms conforming to LMA standards.
There are no other relevant acquisition finance issues in the PRC.
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zhouh@junhe.com www.junhe.comOverview of Key Policies on Acquisition Finance
Targeted convertible bonds emerge as a key financial instrument for listed company M&A restructuring
On 24 September 2024, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Opinions on Deepening Market Reform of M&A Restructuring for Listed Companies (hereinafter referred to as the “Six M&A Guidelines”), encouraging listed companies to comprehensively utilise equity, targeted convertible bonds, cash and other payment instruments in M&A restructuring to enhance transactional flexibility and improve capital efficiency. On 15 May 2024, multiple authorities – including the Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Science and Technology, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, People’s Bank of China, State Taxation Administration, National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA), CSRC and State Administration of Foreign Exchange – jointly released the Policy Measures on Further Supporting Overseas Institutions in Investing in Domestic Technology Enterprises. This document explicitly supports listed companies in the usage of diversified payment instruments, such as equity and targeted convertible bonds, to acquire technology enterprises and facilitate smoother exit channels through buyout. Listed companies may independently determine whether to structure the entire consideration for restructuring transactions using targeted convertible bonds or a combination of equity, cash and other instruments. They are permitted to design the payment structure of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions flexibly based on practical needs.
Relaxation of M&A loan restrictions for technology companies, encouraging financial institutions to support tech-driven M&A financing
On 5 March 2025, officials from China’s National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) addressed media inquiries regarding policies to facilitate M&A financing for technology enterprises, outlining the following support measures.
Provincial and municipal governments roll out supportive financial product policies for M&A restructuring in 2024
On 6 December 2024, the Shanghai municipal government issued the Shanghai Action Plan to Support Listed Companies in M&A Restructuring (2025–27), proposing to strengthen comprehensive supportive policies and requiring financial institutions to provide diversified M&A financial products such as loans, insurance and bonds for restructuring and subsequent operations. It emphasised co-ordinated utilisation of financial instruments, including free trade accounts and cross-border cash pools, piloting cross-border transfers of syndicated loan portions and optimising foreign debt registration management and cross-border guarantee procedures to meet cross-border M&A financing needs.
On 27 November 2024, the Shenzhen municipal government released the Shenzhen Action Plan to Promote High-Quality Development of M&A Restructuring (2025–27) (Draft for Public Comments), guiding financial institutions towards innovating financial products and providing various financial instruments – including M&A loans, M&A insurance and M&A bonds – to offer comprehensive funding support for listed companies’ restructuring. It proposes providing low-cost, full-cycle investment and financing services through establishing M&A funds and issuing bonds, while supporting institutional investors such as banks, social security funds, enterprise annuities, insurance companies and private equity (PE) funds to participate in listed companies’ M&A restructuring. The plan also encourages qualified foreign investors to participate through the qualified foreign institutional investor (QFII), renminbi qualified foreign institutional investor (RQFII) and qualified foreign limited partner (QFLP) schemes.
On 10 January 2025, the Anhui provincial government promulgated Several Policies of Anhui Province to Support Enterprise M&A Restructuring, encouraging the adoption of various support methods including syndicated loans, M&A loans and debt financing instruments in large-scale restructuring projects. The policies emphasise the credit-enhancing functions of financing guarantee and re-guarantee institutions, which can provide guarantee support for qualified restructuring projects. The policies also encourage eligible enterprises to finance their M&A activities through IPOs, additional share offerings, corporate bonds, enterprise bonds, convertible bonds, private placement bonds for M&A restructuring and other non-financial enterprise debt financing instruments. Finally, they support qualified enterprises in issuing preferred shares and targeted convertible bonds as payment methods for M&A restructuring.
Structural reshaping of M&A financing by the Private Economy Promotion Law
As a pivotal variable in the 2025 M&A financing landscape, the enactment of the Private Economy Promotion Law marks a qualitative shift in the financing environment for private enterprises – from policy relaxation to institutional empowerment. This legislation represents the first specialised legal framework to systematically address the long-standing financing barriers faced by private enterprises. Particularly in M&A transactions, its innovative mechanisms are set to significantly enhance private enterprises’ capital operation capabilities and market competitiveness.
The current financing challenges for private enterprises in M&A are primarily structural. Despite contributing over 60% of GDP and 70% of technological innovations, private enterprises receive less than 30% of bank loans, with financing costs typically being 20–30% higher than those for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This imbalance is more pronounced in the M&A sector: large-scale M&A transactions often favour SOEs in credit allocation, while private enterprises – especially small and medium-sized tech firms – frequently forfeit strategic M&A opportunities due to insufficient collateral or lower credit ratings.
The Private Economy Promotion Law introduces a three-pronged solution through its dedicated “Investment and Financing Promotion” chapter:
The Private Economy Promotion Law’s early impact on the M&A market is already visible. In Q1 2025, private enterprise participation in high-tech-sector M&A transactions rose 18% year on year, with particularly notable growth in deal volumes within pilot cities for tech enterprise M&A loans. A biopharmaceutical firm’s acquisition of a peer technical team – financed entirely through intellectual property pledge financing without fixed-asset collateral – exemplifies the law’s advocated “credit evaluation model restructuring”. However, policy dividends must be balanced with risk control: some regional banks note that while non-performing loan tolerance has increased, full-cycle risk assessment systems for M&A projects must be concurrently implemented to prevent asset quality deterioration driven by blind policy target chasing.
Long term, the Private Economy Promotion Law will steer M&A financing from “scale-oriented” to “value-oriented” models. By requiring financial institutions to develop products tailored to private enterprises’ characteristics, future M&A loan designs may prioritise targets’ technological synergies over short-term asset scale. As the integration of the private economy development fund with multi-tiered capital markets continues, 2025 could see private enterprises break institutional ceilings in cross-border deals and industrial chain consolidation, emerging as the dominant force in the M&A market.
New Trends in the Development of M&A in the PRC Market
Buyout funds are highly likely to be the most active investors
At both the national and local levels, governments have introduced policies to encourage vertical industry chain integration and cross-sector M&A restructuring, with SOEs progressively establishing M&A funds. On 21 January 2025, China’s first M&A fund-led organisation, the Shenzhen M&A Fund Alliance, was established, accompanied by the launch of an CNY4 billion M&A fund. Since 2024, Beijing, Shanghai, Suzhou, Nanjing, Anhui, Sichuan and other regions have announced plans for – or have already initiated – M&A funds primarily led by SOEs, with fund sizes ranging from several billion to tens of billions of yuan. These funds focus on industries such as pharmaceuticals and next-generation information technology to drive sector-specific M&A activity.
Listed companies are accelerating their deployment of M&A funds to capitalise on intra-industry and upstream/downstream consolidation opportunities. By establishing sector-focused M&A funds, these companies aim to integrate upstream and downstream resources. M&A transactions targeting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with valuations below CNY100 million are gradually increasing in number, with primary acquirers including:
PE funds in China are expected to more actively pursue M&A as an exit route for investments. Tens of thousands of projects invested in by Chinese PE funds over the past two decades now face significant “exit challenges”. Since 2024, investment institutions have increasingly shifted from relying solely on IPOs as an exit channel to outright sales and M&A restructuring. Some have even established dedicated M&A funds to acquire controlling stakes in listed companies.
Emerging markets (Middle East and Southeast Asia) become the main battlefields for Chinese companies going global
According to statistics from the Ministry of Commerce and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China’s outward direct investment (ODI) across all industries reached CNY1,159.27 billion in 2024, representing an 11.3% year-on-year increase (USD162.78 billion, up 10.1%). Specifically, Chinese investors made non-financial direct investments in 9,400 overseas enterprises across 151 countries and regions, totalling CNY1,024.45 billion, an 11.7% increase (USD143.85 billion, up 10.5%). This growth reflects the resilience of Chinese capital amid global economic headwinds, with the manufacturing and technology sectors accounting for over 60% of the total ODI volume, underscoring China’s strategic focus on industrial upgrading and global supply chain integration.
Due to the increasingly severe geopolitical scrutiny faced by Chinese companies acquiring small and medium-sized technology firms in the USA, Europe, Japan and South Korea – often resulting in substantive government intervention and terminated deals – Southeast Asia, Latin America and the Middle East (particularly Belt and Road Initiative partner countries) have emerged as preferred investment destinations. Key sectors include new energy and new energy vehicle manufacturing, industrial and consumer goods production, and infrastructure development. Notably, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations attracted 38% of China’s regional ODI flows in 2024, driven by tariff advantages under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and lower regulatory barriers for greenfield investments compared to developed markets.
Under the dual impetus of the Belt and Road Initiative and the active national development strategies of Middle Eastern countries, the Middle East has become one of the most important overseas destinations for Chinese enterprises. According to data from fDi Markets, China has gradually become Saudi Arabia’s largest source of greenfield investment, with total investments reaching USD21.6 billion from 2021 to October 2024, of which approximately one-third was invested in clean technologies such as batteries, solar and wind energy. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and the UAE’s Net Zero 2050 strategy have further aligned with Chinese expertise in renewables, fostering joint ventures in hydrogen energy and smart grids. The Middle East is becoming a crucial market for Chinese electric vehicles. By 2024, more than ten Chinese automakers had introduced electric vehicles in the Middle East.
The primary funding sources for Chinese companies’ overseas investments, in addition to companies’ own capital, include:
Multilateral institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund also provide co-financing for large-scale projects, mitigating currency mismatch risks. The China Export & Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure) provides policy insurance support for Chinese companies’ overseas investment projects, covering political risks, foreign exchange risks, default risks, war risks and other risks.
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