Italy is a signatory to several international conventions on bribery and corruption, including:

• the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (signed in Paris on 17 December 1997 and ratified on 15 December 2000);

• the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union (drafted on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on European Union,signed in Brussels on 26 May 1997 and ratified on 6 March 2003);

• the United Nations Convention against Corruption (signed in New York on 31 October 2003 and ratified on 5 October 2010);
• the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (signed in Strasbourg on 27 January 1999 and ratified on 13 June 2013); and
• the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption (signed in Strasbourg on 4 November 1999 and ratified on 13 June 2013).

In the Italian legal system, the legislation concerning corruption offences is provided for in a section dedicated to offences against public administration in the Criminal Code and in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

However, some fundamental provisions specifically applicable to bribery offences can also be found in Legislative Decree No 231/2001 (which refers to the administrative liability of legal entities – see 3.3 Corporate Liability) and in the Civil Code (which covers bribery in the private sector – see 2.1 Bribery).

The interpretation and enforcement of anti-corruption provisions is requested of the Italian courts, whose activity in this respect is facilitated by the legal doctrine. Although Italy does not adopt a stare decisis principle, some important case law rulings play a significant role in the interpretation of anti-corruption rules.

On the administrative side, the National Anti-Corruption Authority has published numerous recommendations and guidelines. Despite many of them not being binding, they assist in the interpretation and enforcement of the rules aimed at preventing corruption. For more on this matter, see 8.2 Compliance Guidelines and Best Practices.

Since 2012, Italy has embarked on a path of wide-ranging structural reforms directly or indirectly relating to anti-corruption provisions, which have significantly amended the Italian Criminal Code (ICC), the Code of Criminal Procedure and even the penitentiary system.

The most effective amendments to the anti-corruption measures were introduced in 2019 by Law No 3/2019 (the so-called Bribe Destroyer Act), which takes a significant step towards further advancing the prevention of bribery.

Legislative Decree No 75 was issued on 30 July 2020 to implement the Directive on the Fight against Fraud to the Union’s Financial Interests by Means of Criminal Law (EU Directive No 2017/1371; the so-called PIF Directive) and strengthen the fight against corruption.

As far as the criminal enforcement of anti-corruption laws is concerned, the institution of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which started operating on 1 June 2021 (see 7.1 Enforcement), is also worthy of note.

Another crucial amendment to the Italian legislation was enacted by Legislative Decree No 150/2022 (published on 17 October 2022), with the purpose of implementing wide-ranging reform of the Italian criminal justice system (the so-called Cartabia Reform). The Cartabia Reform is largely aimed at speeding up criminal trials and makes many modifications to the existing system.

Finally, two significant amendments have impacted Italian legislation in the last few months, namely:

• Law No 114/24, which has repealed the crime of abuse in office (Article 323 of the Criminal Code; for more details, see 2.4. Public Officials – Abuse in Office) and amended the definition of the crime of influence peddling, narrowing the scope of actions that fall under this provision (Article 346-bis of the Criminal Code); and
• Law No 112/24, which introduced Article 314-bis into the Criminal Code, titled “Improper Allocation of Money or Properties”, which punishes certain behaviours previously classified as abuse in office (for more details, see 2.4. Public Officials – Abuse in Office) – this law also classifies such crimes as predicate offences under Legislative Decree No 231/01.

The Italian legislator punishes corruption offences by means of a complex regulatory system aimed at dealing with different types of crimes, which are provided for in Articles 318, 319, 319-ter and 320 (passive bribery), and Articles 321 and 322 (active bribery), of the ICC.

More specifically, the ICC considers a public official or person performing a public service to have committed a criminal offence if:

• to exercise their functions or powers, they unduly receive, for themself or a third party, money or another advantage, or accept a promise thereof (Article 318 – bribery for the exercise of a function);
• they receive money or any other advantage, or the promise thereof, for themself or a third party to omit or delay – or for having omitted or delayed – acts relating to their office, or to perform or for having performed acts in breach of their official duties (Article 319 – bribery for the performance of acts in breach of official duties); or
• they commit the offences described in the foregoing to the benefit or detriment of a party to civil, criminal or administrative proceedings (Article 319-ter – bribery in judicial proceedings).

Punishment for passive bribery shall also apply to whoever gives or promises money or any other advantage to a public official or person performing a public service if the promise is accepted (Article 321 – active bribery).

Conversely, if the offer, promise or request of a bribe is not accepted, mere incitement to corruption is considered as a minor criminal offence (pursuant to Article 322, the punishment provided for in Articles 318 or 319 is reduced by one-third).

Furthermore, even mere agreement (or mere solicitation) to perform the functions of a public official in return for a bribe constitutes conduct punishable under criminal law.

It is important to note that the Criminal Code does not distinguish between a bribe (money or other advantage) and gifts, promotional expenditures or other facilitation payments. Thus, the receipt of even a small amount of money can trigger corruption sanctions if it is related to the exercise of a public function by the receiver.

However, many companies and public authorities have adopted codes of conduct that specifically address this issue by regulating the conditions and extent of facilitation payments.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Italian criminal law system does not consider the conduct of individuals who fail to prevent bribery as an offence. In fact, the general provisions set out in Article 40 of the ICC, for cases in which failing to avert a given result is treated as an active act, do not cover corruption offences.

Public Officials

The definition of “public official” in Article 357 of the Criminal Code is an individual who performs a legislative, judicial or administrative public function (ie, an administrative function) that is:

• regulated by the public law provisions and acts of an authority; and
• characterised by the formation and statement of the public administration’s will or by its implementation by means of authority and certifying powers.

In addition, anti-corruption provisions also cover acts committed by a “person performing a public service”, who, under Article 358 of the ICC, is defined as one who performs any activity that is governed in the same manner as a public function, excluding the performance of “ordinary” tasks and exclusively manual work.

Moreover, according to international conventions ratified by Italy, Article 322-bis of the ICC extends the provisions applicable to domestic public officials to foreign public officials. More specifically, the offences of embezzlement (Article 314 of the ICC), embezzlement by taking advantage of third-party errors (Article 316 of the ICC), blackmail by a public official (Article 317 of the ICC), undue inducement to provide or promise benefits (Article 319-quater of the ICC), active and passive bribery (Articles 318, 319, 319-ter, 320 and 321 of the ICC), and incitement to bribery (Article 322 of the ICC) are triggered in all cases involving:

• members of EU institutions;
• contracted EU officials and agents, in accordance with the respective staff regulations;
• any person seconded to the EU by the member states or by any public or private body that carries out functions corresponding to those performed by officials or agents of the EU;
• members and servants of bodies created on the basis of the founding treaties of the EU;
• individuals within EU member states who carry out functions or activities corresponding to those performed by public officials or persons providing a public service;
• members of the International Criminal Court;
• persons exercising public functions or activities within the framework of international public organisations, members of international parliamentary assemblies or an international or supranational organisation, and judges and officials of international courts (introduced by a paragraph in Law No 3/2019); or
• persons exercising functions or activities corresponding to those of public officials and persons in charge of a public service in states that are not part of the EU, but where the financial interests of the EU are affected (introduced by a paragraph in Legislative Decree No 75/2020).

Private Bribery

In accordance with the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, the Italian legislator criminalises bribery between private parties.

More specifically, Article 2635 of the Italian Civil Code punishes directors, general managers, managers responsible for preparing a company’s financial reports, statutory auditors, liquidators or any other employees of private entities who solicit or receive undue money or other advantages (or accept the promise thereof) to perform or omit an act in breach of their duties.

The same sanctions also apply to anyone who, even through an intermediary, offers, promises or gives money or other undue benefits to the persons mentioned in the foregoing.

It is important to note that Anti-Corruption Law No 3/2019 provides the opportunity to punish ex officio bribery in the private sector by eliminating the procedural requirement of a complaint by the victim.

In addition to corruption offences, the Criminal Code also punishes active and passive trading in influence.

In particular, Article 346-bis of the ICC, as recently reformed by Law No 114/24, punishes any private person or official who, by intentionally exploiting a real influence on a public official or a person in charge of a public service, unduly receives money or some other financial advantage to remunerate a public official or a person entrusted with a public service, or any of the other subjects mentioned in Article 322-bis, in connection with the exercise of their functions or to carry out another illicit mediation. The Article also defines the concept of “illicit mediation”, explaining that this term refers to mediation aimed at inducing a public official (or a person entrusted with a public service or any of the other subjects mentioned in Article 322-bis) to perform an act contrary to their official duties that constitutes a crime, and from which an undue advantage may arise.

Due to the above-described reform, the actions falling within this provision have decreased.

It is important to further highlight the amendments that have been made to Article 346-bis of the ICC.

• For criminal liability, the relationship between the mediator and the public official must be genuine, rather than merely claimed; it is important to reiterate that, as established by Supreme Court ruling No 19357/24, acts committed by the mediator in relation to claimed relationships may have criminal relevance if the conditions of fraud are met. For more details, see 7.5 Recent Landmark Investigations or Decisions.

• The relationship must be used intentionally for the purpose of carrying out actions that constitute a crime.
• The benefit given or promised to the mediator must be economic in nature.
• “Free mediation” is limited to the remuneration of the public official in relation to the exercise of their functions, and no longer extends to the exercise of their powers.
• “Onerous mediation” is considered as such only if it is aimed at inducing the public official to perform an act contrary to their official duties that constitutes a crime, and from which an undue advantage may arise (as clarified in paragraph 2 of Article 346-bis).

As required by international conventions, the Italian legislator criminalises certain conduct deemed “preparatory” to bribery offences. For this reason, Article 2621 of the Civil Code punishes directors, general managers, managers responsible for preparing the company’s financial reports, and statutory auditors and liquidators who, in order to obtain an undue profit for themselves or others, falsify financial statements, reports or other corporate communications addressed to shareholders or the public, thereby presenting a misleading picture of the financial situation of the company (or group).

More severe penalties are envisaged for accounting fraud by listed companies (Article 2622 of the Civil Code).

Within the Criminal Code, the misappropriation of public funds by a public official is considered under the offence of embezzlement, as set forth by Article 314 of the ICC. In greater detail, the Code punishes any public official who takes for their own (embezzles) money or other things in their possession by reason of their functions.

No unlawful request or order should come from the public official. The taking of interest or showing of favouritism by such official might be classified as “endangerment of fairness of tenders” (the crime of abuse in office is no longer punishable under the Criminal Code).

Abuse in Office

The reform of the legislation for crimes against public administration through Law No 114/24 has repealed the crime of abuse in office established by Article 323 of the Criminal Code.

According to Article 323 of the ICC, a public official is punished whenever they intentionally break the law or, in a conflict of interest situation (even in the case of a third-party’s interest), obtain an undue profit for themself or others or act to the detriment of others. However, following the amendment, these actions are no longer criminally relevant.

Law No 112/24 has introduced Article 314-bis into the Penal Code (Improper Allocation of Money or Properties – see 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation). Unless an act constitutes embezzlement, this provision punishes the public official, or the person entrusted with a public service, who, by reason of their office or service, possesses or has control over someone else’s money or properties and allocates it for a use different from that provided by specific legal provisions that leave no room for discretion, thereby intentionally procuring an unjust financial advantage for themselves or others, or causing unjust harm to others.

With this provision, the legislator aimed to prevent the risk of leaving behaviours involving the misappropriation of public assets unpunished; such behaviours would previously have been sanctioned by Article 323. This crime has been included in the list of predicate offences for corporate criminal liability pursuant to Law No 231/2001 (amendment enacted by Law No 112/24 – see 1.4 Recent Key Amendments to National Legislation).

Endangerment of Fairness of Tenders

Conduct linked to favouritism on the part of a public official, who guarantees an undue advantage to a third party by acting in breach of the law by ensuring free and equal access to bidders for the granting of contracts, is relevant from a criminal law perspective and is punished by two different provisions included in the Criminal Code.

The offence under Article 353 of the ICC (“disturbing the fairness of tenders”) punishes anyone who, by means of violence or threat, gifts, promises, collusion or other fraudulent means, prevents or disrupts the fair course of the tender, or prevents tenderers from competing in it.

Moreover, in the event such conduct is carried out by a person designated by law or a public authority to manage the tender, the sanctions (fine and imprisonment) are increased. In this case, the designated person is considered to hold the office of a public official.

The second offence to be considered is the crime or offence of “Disrupting the fairness of the procedure for choosing a bidder”, as set forth in Article 353-bis of the ICC.

This legal provision punishes anyone who, by means of violence or threat, gifts, promises, collusion or other fraudulent means, alters the administrative proceedings intended to determine the content of the call for bids, or any other equivalent notice, with the intention to influence the methods adopted by the tender authority for choosing the successful bidder.

Crimes under both Article 353 and Article 353-bis of the ICC have been included in the list of predicate offences for corporate criminal liability pursuant to Law No 231/2001 (amendment enacted by Law No 137/2023).

Some of the specific offences against the public administration (ie, Articles 317, 318, 319 and 319-quater of the ICC) provide for the liability of a public official, both in the event that the act is committed by them and in the event that an advantage or money (as forms of payment for the performance or omission of a due or undue act, or merely as a result of the role the public official holds) is received by a third party.

Furthermore, all the above-mentioned offences may hypothetically be committed through an intermediary: indeed, the criminal justice system has a general rule, set forth in Article 110 of the ICC, according to which any person who participates in the commission of a crime (through conscious behaviour and causally linked to the fact) is liable for it. In this way, any third party who acts together with the agent is equally liable for the crime committed.

Italian legislation does not provide for a uniform regulation of lobbying activities. However, such activities have been subject to multiple initiatives at both the national and regional level through the issuing of regulatory acts (eg, Toscana Regional Law No 5/2002, Molise Regional Law No 24/2004, Lombardia Regional Law No 17/2016; the Ministry for Economic Development and Ministry of Labour and Social Policy Directive of 24 September 2018; and Ministry of Ecological Transition Decree No 258 of 1 August 2018). It is worth noting that, in 2016, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Code of Conduct for Deputies and the Regulation of Interest Representation Activities, which provided for the introduction of a register of entities that engage in professional interest representation activities before the deputies.

Regarding the regulation of lobbyists and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) recommendations on this matter, see 9.1 Assessment of the Applicable Enforced Legislation.

As a general rule, under Italian criminal law, any crime is extinguished after a period corresponding to the maximum prison term provided for each offence and, in any case, after a period of not less than six years, starting from the day the offence is committed (Article 157 of the ICC).

According to Articles 160 and 161 of the ICC, the limitation period can be suspended by one of the procedural acts specifically determined by law (eg, a request for committal to trial) and may be extended by up to one quarter of its ordinary duration. Suspension of the limitation period may be longer for corruption crimes under Articles 318, 319, 319-ter, 319-quater, 320, 321 and 322-bis of the ICC, for which the extension term is doubled.

The statute of limitations was widely amended by Law No 9/2019 (Bonafede Reform), which introduced a “freezing clause” for the statute of limitations after the first-instance judgment for all crimes committed from 1 January 2020 (meaning that, for these crimes, the limitation period ends with the issue of the first-instance verdict).

This new clause was recently confirmed by Law No 134/2021 (Cartabia Reform), which also sets maximum time limits for appeal proceedings and for proceedings before the Supreme Court with regard to all crimes committed from 1 January 2020. The limits are:

• two years (extensible for one further year in the event of a particularly complex trail) for appeal proceedings; and
• one year (extensible for a further six months in the event of a particularly complex trial) for proceedings before the Supreme Court.

Both time limits run for 90 days after the deadline for filing the grounds of the judgment.

After these maximum time limits have passed, criminal action is time-barred, and the trial is extinguished (Article 344-bis of the Criminal Procedure Code).

On 16 January 2024, the Chamber of Deputies approved Bill C-893, which provides for a new amendment to the statute of limitations. The bill stipulates the repeal of the phase deadlines introduced by the Cartabia Reform. However, its implementation is pending approval by the Senate of the Republic.

As for the administrative liability of legal entities, the limitation period under Article 22 of Legislative Decree No 231/01 is five years after the crime was committed.

This term can be suspended by a request to apply precautionary measures and by an entity being charged with having committed the administrative offence. In the latter event, the statute of limitations does not run until the final judgment becomes enforceable.

Italian criminal law applies to crimes committed on Italian territory. More specifically, under Article 6 of the ICC, territorial jurisdiction is established (i) over conduct that occurred either wholly or partially within the territory of the state and (ii) even in those circumstances where the offence is wholly committed abroad but its effects take place in the national territory.

Nevertheless, with regard to certain serious offences such as corruption, Articles 9 and 10 of the Criminal Code establish national or universal jurisdiction over cases not covered by the above-mentioned Article 6.

Specifically, Italy has extraterritorial jurisdiction over conduct wholly committed abroad that does not have any effect in the national territory when three conditions are met:

• the perpetrator is within Italian territory;
• the double-criminality principle is satisfied; and
• a request for punishment is made by the Minister of Justice or the injured party.

However, it should be mentioned that Anti-corruption Law No 3/2019 has recently facilitated the prosecution of corruption offences committed by a national or foreign citizen by eliminating the condition that a request for punishment for such crimes should be made by the Minister of Justice or the injured party.

Legislative Decree No 231/2001 introduced administrative liability against legal entities in the event that any of the crimes listed in Legislative Decree No 231/2001 (including crimes against public administration) are perpetrated by directors, managers or employees for the benefit of – or in the interest of – the company.

This is an autonomous liability of the legal entity (so-called organisational negligence) for not having adopted organisational models capable of preventing the crimes listed in the Decree from being committed (for further details, see 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme and 8.1 Compliance Obligations).

In connection with this point, it is worth mentioning that a company’s liability arising from crimes committed is completely independent of corporate events following the perpetration of the crimes. Indeed, according to Articles 28, 29 and 30 of Legislative Decree No 231/01, in the case of changes to a legal entity’s organisational structure, the company remains liable for the offences committed before the date on which the changes took effect; in the same way, in the event of a merger or takeover, the resulting legal entity is liable for the offences for which the previous entities were responsible before the merger or takeover. However, in the event of a partial split-up, the divided company remains liable for crimes committed before the split. On 20 February 2024, the chief of staff of the Ministry of Justice established a working group to formulate a proposal for amending the regulations on the criminal liability of entities. The working group will have one year to prepare a document aimed at addressing some of the critical issues related to Legislative Decree No 231/2001.

In general terms, the Italian criminal system is founded on the presumption of innocence, so that the burden of proof in demonstrating that a crime has been committed lies with the prosecutor. This means that, if there is any doubt about the defendant’s guilt, they must be acquitted in accordance with the in dubio pro reo rule.

With regard to an individual’s liability, the first defence for any crime (not only bribery or other crimes against the public administration) may be based on the demonstration that the so-called objective elements of the offence have not been satisfied or sufficiently proved by the prosecutor.

Another defence strategy may consist of attempting to demonstrate the lack of intent by the defendant to commit a crime (lack of mens rea), which is a mandatory condition for punishment.

Another argument that may be used as a defence for the above-mentioned offences relates to so-called mitigating or exonerating circumstances (see 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation and 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme).

Regarding the legal entity’s liability, see 8. Compliance Expectations.

There are no exceptions to the aforementioned defences.

In general, there are no de minimis exceptions under Italian Law: a bribe of any value will constitute an offence.

The only exception – the relevance of which is, in any case, subject to the court – is if the “advantage” is permitted by law or if its value is very small as, for instance in the case of a mere courtesy gift (the so-called munuscula). Please note that Decree No 62/2013 provides exceptions for munuscula or donations of modest value to be identified, for public employees, to the amount of EUR150.

According to Article 323-bis of the ICC, the value of the bribe could also be taken into account by the court as a mitigating factor in determining the quantum of sanction to be imposed (see 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation).

In Italy, no sectors or industries are exempt from corruption offences.

It is, however, important to bear in mind that most of the offences described require, as an “objective element” of the crime, the unlawful advantage to be granted or promised to a public official or a public service provider.

With reference to corruption crimes, a new exonerating circumstance is provided by Article 323-ter of the Criminal Code in the event of self-incrimination and effective co-operation with the judicial authority (see 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation).

Regarding the specific exonerating consequence for legal entities arising from the adoption of an adequate compliance system, see 8.1 Compliance Obligations.

Penalties upon conviction for the above offences are different for individuals and legal entities.

With specific regard to the penalties provided for legal entities, those arising from crimes can be “financial” or “disqualifying”; according to Article 10 of Decree No 231/2001, financial penalties are always applied for administrative offences arising from a crime, and they are applied in terms of not less than 100 units (the so-called quotas) and not more than 1,000 units. The amount of each unit is not below EUR258 and not above EUR1,549, according to Article 11 of Decree No 231/2001.

When committed by individuals or legal entities, the penalties for the various offences are as follows.

• Misappropriation – Article 314 of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for four years to ten years and six months (or for six months to three years in the event of temporary misappropriation); and
2. legal entities: fine of up to 200 units (when the act affects EU financial interests).
• Improper allocation of money or other properties – Article 314-bis of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment from six months to three years (or for six months to four years when the act affects EU financial interests and the unjust financial advantage of unjust damage exceeds EUR100,000; and
2. legal entities – fine of up to 200 units (when the act affects EU financial interests).
• Blackmail by a public official – Article 317 of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for six to 12 years; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 300 to 800 units and disqualifying penalties (Article 9, paragraph 2 of Decree 231).
• Bribery - Article 318 of the ICC:
1. individuals: imprisonment for three to eight years; and
2. legal entities – a financial penalty of up to 200 units.
• Bribery – Article 319 of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for six to ten years; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 200 to 600 units (or of 300 to 800 units in the event of significant profit by the company as a consequence of the crime) and disqualifying sanctions (Article 9, paragraph 2 of Decree 231).
• Bribery in relation to judicial acts – Article 319-ter of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for six to 12 years; the penalty is increased if the act results in the unjust conviction of another; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 200 to 600 units (or of 300 to 800 units in the event of significant profit by the company as a consequence of the crime) and disqualifying sanctions (Article 9, paragraph 2 of Decree 231).
• Undue inducement to give or promise benefits – Article 319-quater of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for six years to ten years and six months for the public officer, and for up to three years (or up to four years when the act affects EU financial interests and the damage or profit is greater than EUR100,000) for the corruptor; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 300 to 800 units and disqualification from the “suspension or revocation of authorisations, licences or concessions functional to the commission of the crime”.
• Influence-peddling – Article 346-bis of the ICC:
1. individuals – imprisonment for one year and six months to four years and six months; the penalty is increased if the person who unlawfully obtains or promises – for themselves or others – money or other economic benefits holds the position of a public official or a public service officer, or one of the positions referred to in Article 322-bis, and the penalty is also increased if the acts are committed in relation to the exercise of judicial activities or to reward a public official, public service officer or one of the other subjects referred to in Article 322-bis in relation to the performance of an act contrary to their official duties or the omission or delay of an act of their office; and
2. legal entities – a fine of up to 200 units.
• Disturbing the fairness of tenders (Article 353 of the ICC) and disrupting the fairness of the procedure for choosing a bidder (Article 353-bis of the ICC):
1. individuals – imprisonment for six months to five years and a fine of EUR102 to EUR1,032; and
2. legal entities – a fine of up to 500 units.
• Keeping inaccurate corporate books and records – Article 2621 of the Civil Code:
1. individuals – imprisonment for one to five years; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 200 to 400 units.
• Keeping inaccurate corporate books and records in listed companies – Article 2622 of the Civil Code:
1. individuals – imprisonment for three to eight years; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 400 to 600 units.
• Private corruption – Article 2635 of the Civil Code:
1. individuals – imprisonment for one to three years; and
2. legal entities – a fine of 400 to 600 units and disqualifying sanctions (Article 9, paragraph 2 of Decree 231).

The only guidelines or principles applicable to the assessment of the penalties are provided by the “general part” of the Criminal Code, in Articles 132 and 133. The first legal provision states that the application of penalties shall be at the judge’s discretion, within the limits (minimum and maximum) established by the law for each crime; the second one specifies the principles to be applied by the judge in the exercise of their discretionary power (eg, the judge has to take into account the seriousness of the offence and the individual’s attitude to the crime). Sanctions are increased in the event of a repeat of the crime, in accordance with Article 99 of the ICC.

Articles 11, 14 and 20 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001 state similar principles for the administrative liability of legal entities.

In the Italian criminal system, there is no obligation for individuals who are not public officials or companies to report bribery or other crimes against the public administration, of which they become aware, to the judicial authority.

Regarding the incentives provided by the legal system for reporting acts of corruption, it is important to highlight the presence of two particularly advantageous legal instruments for individuals.

The two special mitigating circumstances are outlined in Article 323-bis, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Code and Article 323-ter of the Criminal Code. Specifically, the first applies when the perpetrator has co-operated with justice, while the second is a cause for non-punishment that applies to those who, before becoming aware of an investigation against them, voluntarily report themselves for corruption within four months. For more details, see 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation.

Regarding the liability of entities, legislative Decree 231/01 provides protection measures for whistle-blowers, who can report illegal activities without fear of retaliation. For more details, see 6.4 Protection Afforded to Whistle-Blowers and 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle-Blowers.

Self-Disclosure for Individuals

For individuals who want to self-disclose about their own irregularities, the possibility of self-reporting is grounded in everyone’s right to provide testimony or to approach the competent authority.

Self-Disclosure for Legal Entities

For legal entities, self-disclosure procedures are regulated by the whistle-blowing legislation. Decree No 24/2023 reshaped the Italian regulation on whistle-blowing by dealing with both the public and private sector in the same legislative act. It was approved on 10 March 2023, and its provisions were effective as of 15 July 2023 (as of 17 December 2023 for private sector entities that employed an average of fewer than 250 workers in the last year).

The Decree implements the principles and dictates of EU Directive 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019, on the protection of persons who report breaches of EU law and of persons who report breaches of national laws.

Legislative Decree No 24/2023 has reformed the regulation of reporting channels not only by enhancing protections for whistle-blowers, but also by expanding the obligations and specifying the methods for managing information and documentation related to reports of unlawful conduct.

It is mandatory that public and private entities establish reporting channels managed by specially trained personnel, and that they implement a reporting platform.

For more details on the protection of whistle-blowers, see 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle-Blowers.

The so-called Whistleblowing Decree provides a general framework for both public and private sector whistle-blowing and affords protection to persons who report violations of national or EU regulatory provisions that damage the public interest, or the integrity of the public administration or private entities, of which they have become aware in a public or private employment context.

The Decree expanded the scope of the whistle-blowing regulations to (i) all public sector entities and (ii) private entities that:

• have employed an average of at least 50 employees under permanent or fixed-term employment contracts in the last year;
• adopt organisation, management and control models pursuant to Legislative Decree No 231/2001, even if they have not had an average of at least 50 employees in the last year; and
• operate in European-regulated sectors (eg, the financial market sector), even if they have not had an average of at least 50 employees in the last year.

The subjects and the object of whistle-blowing have also been expanded: the list of individuals who can make whistle-blowing reports includes employees of public administrations, employees of public economic entities, employees of private sector entities, self-employed workers, workers or collaborators who carry out their work activities at entities in the public sector that provide goods or services, or carry out works for third parties, freelancers and consultants, volunteers and trainees, shareholders and persons holding administrative, managerial, supervisory or representative positions, including when such positions are held on a de facto basis.

Whistle-blowers can report actual or potential violations of European and national legislation (related to the areas indicated in the Decree, which are broader for the public sector) and, for entities that adopted organisation, management and control models pursuant to Legislative Decree No 231/2001, violations related to Legislative Decree No 231/2001. It is worth mentioning that the regulations do not apply to disputes of a personal nature or violations concerning certain specific matters indicated in the Decree.

The Whistleblowing Decree provides for a multichannel reporting system:

• public and private sector entities are required to implement an internal channel for the transmission and management of reports – the requirements and management process of such a channel (which must ensure the confidentiality of the identity of the reporter) are set forth in Article 5 of the Decree;
• the Decree also provides for individuals in both the public and private sectors to make a report through an external channel – the National Anti-Corruption Authority (Autorità Nazionale AntiCorruzione; ANAC) is responsible for activating and managing this channel, and the requirements and management process thereof (which must ensure the confidentiality of the identity of the reporter) are set forth in Article 6 onwards of the Decree; and
• the Decree introduces an additional way of reporting by means of public disclosure – with public disclosure, information on violations is brought into the public domain through any medium capable of reaching many people, such as the press, the internet or TV (see Article 15 of the Decree).

Reporting through the external channel and public disclosure are allowed only under certain conditions expressly provided for by the Decree in the above-mentioned Articles.

A pillar of the whistle-blowing regulations is the extensive system of protections afforded to those who blow the whistle on violations, if the conditions set forth in Article 16 of the Decree are met. It consists of:

• protection of the confidentiality of the reporter, the facilitator, the person involved and the persons named in the report, partly by using software protected by cryptographic systems;
• prohibition of and protection from possible retaliation by the entity in response to the report, public disclosure or whistle-blowing;
• support provided to the whistle-blower by non-profit entities (see 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle-Blowers);
• under certain conditions, exemption from liability with respect to the disclosure and dissemination of specific types of information (see 6.5 Incentives Provided to Whistle-Blowers); and
• restrictions on waivers and settlements involving rights and protections afforded by the Decree.

No incentive is offered to whistle-blowers for reporting bribery or corruption.

The only “incentive” (more properly a kind of “protection”) for the whistle-blower is provided by Article 20 of Legislative Decree No 24/2023, where those who disclose or disseminate information about violations covered by the obligation of secrecy will not be punishable when, at the time of disclosure, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the disclosure was necessary to uncover the violation. Unless the act is a crime, the whistle-blower will not incur any liability for acquiring information on violations or accessing the same. In any case, criminal liability and any other liability shall not be excluded for conduct that is not related to reporting or that is not strictly necessary to disclose the violation.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that the Decree provides support via non-profit entities that give information, assistance and free advice on how to report, protection from retaliation, and the terms and conditions of access to legal aid for the person involved (Article 18).

Regarding the exonerating circumstance under Article 323-ter ICC in the event of self-incrimination and effective co-operation with the judicial authority, see 4.5 Safe Harbour or Amnesty Programme.

As mentioned previously, in the Italian jurisdiction, the main anti-bribery and anti-corruption provisions are included in the Criminal Code, which describes conduct that may constitute crimes and provides for sanctions.

At the same time, Legislative Decree No 231/2001 establishes an autonomous administrative liability for legal entities if one of the crimes listed in the Decree (including bribery and corruption offences) is perpetrated in the interest of – or to the advantage of – a company.

All such provisions are enforced by the criminal court (following an initiative put in place by the prosecutor), which has a duty to assess individual and corporate liabilities and deliver judgments of acquittal or conviction.

However, Law No 190/2012 established ANAC, an administrative authority aiming to prevent corruption in public administrations. ANAC has a broad range of powers – provided for in the new Public Procurement Code (Legislative Decree No 36/2023) – including the following:

• analysis of the factors that facilitate corruption to identify prevention initiatives (for this purpose, ANAC issued the three-year National Anti-Corruption Plan for the prevention of corruption and transparency, which assesses the risk of corruption related to the office and points out potential initiatives to be carried out to mitigate the risk);

• inspections through requesting information, acts and documents, and the execution of the initiatives required by the National Anti-Corruption Plan;
• supervision of public contracts and public tenders;
• reporting to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the event of crimes or to the Court of Auditors in the event of crimes detrimental to the Treasury;
• regulation by issuing guidelines (also having a binding value);
• management of a national database of public contracts, digital records of public contracts and a national register of Evaluation Commission members;
• the imposition of disqualifying and pecuniary sanctions in the event of a failure, without justification, to provide the information requested by ANAC or contracting authorities, or in the event of the provision of false information or documents; and
• having a key role in the new whistle-blowing rules (Legislative Decree No 24/2023), being responsible, inter alia, for (i) receiving and following up whistle-blowing reports (so-called “external reporting”), as well as assessing the accuracy of the allegations made and, where relevant, addressing the reported breach; and (ii) imposing sanctions against those who breach the provisions of Legislative Decree No 24/2023, ensuring a high level of protection of persons who report violations of domestic and EU law.

Concerning ANAC’s sanctioning powers, with Resolution No 380/2024, dated 30 July 2024, ANAC declared that the measures taken by a general director of an agency in the agricultural sector against a manager who had reported irregularities were retaliatory in nature. Consequently, those measures were revoked, and the director was fined EUR10,000.

On 1 June 2021, EPPO began undertaking its investigatory and prosecutorial tasks. EPPO is an independent and decentralised prosecution office of the EU with the competence to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment crimes against the EU budget, such as fraud and corruption.

Pursuant to EU Regulation No 2017/1939 and the PIF Directive, which sets forth the minimum provisions that must be adopted and transposed into national law by the participating member states, EPPO is empowered to investigate and prosecute some offences against EU financial interests (eg, fraud relating to EU expenditures and revenues, passive and active corruption likely to damage EU’s financial interests and misappropriation of EU funds by a public official).

Concerning the enforcement bodies, see 7.1 Enforcement.

For more on the jurisdictional reach of the enforcement bodies, see 7.1 Enforcement, and for more on temporal jurisdiction, see 3.1 Limitation Period.

Mitigation

With reference to mitigation powers, it is important to highlight that they concern two different fields: administrative law and criminal law.

From the administrative perspective, ANAC Resolution No 949/2017 introduced the possibility of extinguishing the administrative pecuniary sanctions issued by ANAC, in the event that no disqualifying sanctions are applicable, by means of the payment of a reduced fine.

Payment of the fine is due within 60 days from the notification of the violation, at a rate of EUR500 in the case of failure to provide the information requested and EUR1,000 in the case of providing false information.

However, regarding potential mitigation powers in the criminal field, the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code provide for three different mitigation measures that may be applied by the criminal courts to reduce the sanctions described in 5.1 Penalties on Conviction.

Plea Bargain Proceedings

According to Article 444 onwards of the Criminal Procedure Code, individuals may settle a charge through a plea bargain agreement, with the prosecutor setting out the pecuniary sanctions (fines) and the duration of imprisonment.

The main positive outcomes of plea bargain proceedings are as follows:

• the sanctions agreed with the prosecutor are reduced by a maximum of one-third;
• if the judgment does not exceed two years of imprisonment (or two years of imprisonment combined with a financial penalty), the judgment itself does not entail the cost of the proceedings or the application of ancillary penalties and security measures, except for confiscation in cases set forth by Article 240 of the ICC;
• if the judgment does not exceed two years of imprisonment (or two years of imprisonment combined with a financial penalty), the offence shall be extinguished if, within five years (if the judgment concerns a crime) or two years (if the judgment concerns a misdemeanour), the accused does not commit a crime or misdemeanour of the same kind;
• according to Article 445, paragraph No 1-bis of the Criminal Procedure Code, the plea bargain sentence has no effect and cannot be used as evidence in other judicial proceedings (such as civil cases, disciplinary proceedings, tax proceedings or administrative proceedings); and
• the Cartabia Reform, by amending Article 444, paragraph 3-bis, has allowed the parties who request a plea bargain to condition its effectiveness on the exemption from the accessory penalties referred to in Article 317-bis ICC, or on the extension of the effects of conditional suspension to those penalties as well – should the court deem it mandatory to apply these accessory penalties, it shall reject the plea bargain request.

Finally, it is important to highlight that, pursuant to Article 63 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001, administrative liability may also be settled through a plea bargain agreement. Indeed, a company is entitled to settle its potential administrative liability with an agreement on pecuniary sanctions and on the duration of disqualifying measures.

Two Special Mitigating Circumstances Set Forth by Article 323-bis of the ICC

The special mitigating circumstance under the first paragraph is met when the offences under Articles 314, 316, 316-bis, 316-ter, 317, 318, 319, 319-quater, 320, 322 and 322-bis of the ICC are particularly mild. In such an event, the sanction is reduced by up to one-third.

Such a mitigating circumstance occurs when the whole offence is “barely offensive” with reference to the conduct carried out, the amount of economic damage or profit attained, the subjective attitude of the perpetrator and the event.

The second mitigating circumstance occurs if the perpetrator made effective efforts to:

• prevent any further consequences of the criminal activity;
• provide evidence of criminal offences and identify other perpetrators; or
• allow the seizure of the profits.

In accordance with Article 25, paragraph 5-bis of Legislative Decree No 231/2001, the same mitigating measure is applicable to the benefit of a legal entity that meets all the above-mentioned conditions and adopts an organisational model suitable to prevent crimes of the same type.

This circumstance (which is applicable only with reference to the offences under Articles 318, 319, 319-ter, 319-quater, 320, 322 and 322-bis of the ICC) is a kind of active repentance post delictum that provides a reduction of from one-third to two-thirds of the penalties. The collaboration is required to be full and effective.

Non-punishable Clause Set Forth by Article 323-ter of the ICC

Law No 3/2019 introduced a special non-punishable clause in the event of self-incrimination and effective co-operation with the judicial authority.

This clause requires that:

• one of the offences pursuant to Articles 318, 319, 319-ter, 319-quater, 320, 321, 322-bis, 353, 353-bis and 356 of the ICC is perpetrated;
• the author voluntarily reports the crime to the authority, provides evidence of the crime and helps to identify the other perpetrators; and
• the perpetrator discloses the crime before being informed that they are under investigation and within four months of the offence being perpetrated.

Furthermore, the perpetrator is required to make available the benefit received or, where this is not possible, a sum of money of equivalent value, or to provide information useful to identify the beneficial owner of the advantage. This initiative must also be carried out within four months of perpetration of the crime.

The non-punishable clause is not applicable if the self-incrimination is aimed at perpetrating the crime reported or at uncovering the agent who has acted in breach of the law.

Exonerating Circumstance for Legal Entities

Article 17 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001 states that disqualifying sanctions are not applicable if, after the unlawful behaviour but before the beginning of the trial, the company is able to meet three requirements:

• full compensation for damage and removal of any detrimental consequence of the crime;
• removal of the organisational inefficiencies that determined the crime through the adoption and implementation of an organisational model pursuant to Legislative Decree No 231/2001; and
• making the “profit” arising from the crime available for confiscation.

Aggravation

Over the years, the offences against public administration have been reformed, increasing the negative consequences that can be added to the main penalty to strengthen deterrence. These negative consequences include the following.

• Accessory penalties – Article 317-bis of the ICC provides that, in case of conviction for certain offences, the following accessory penalties are applied:
1. permanent disqualification from public office; and
2. permanent incapacity to contract with public administration except to obtain public services (however, if imprisonment is imposed for a period not exceeding two years, or if the mitigating circumstance under Article 323-bis, paragraph 1 of the ICC applies, the disqualification and prohibition are temporary).
• Confiscation – Law No 300/2000 has provided for mandatory confiscation of the product, profit or price derived from the commission of one of the offences specified in Articles 314 to 321 of the ICC, if confirmed by conviction or subject to a plea agreement. Regarding the assets seized in relation to the crimes referred to in Article 322-ter of the ICC, those other than money may then be entrusted to judicial custody.
• Monetary compensation – Article 322-quater of the ICC provides that, in case of conviction for certain offences against public administration, the payment of an amount equivalent to the price or profit of the offence is always ordered as monetary compensation in favour of the injured administration. This amount is added to the compensation for damages. It constitutes the necessary condition for the application of certain procedural institutes, such as conditional suspension of the sentence and plea bargaining.

For the crimes referred to in Articles 314 (paragraph 1), 317, 318, 319, 319-bis, 319-ter, 319-quater (paragraph 1), 320, 321, 322 and 322-bis of the ICC, the offence cannot be considered particularly insignificant; therefore, Article 131-bis of the ICC cannot be applied.

In the Italian criminal system, there is also an additional aggravating circumstance, known as recidivism, which refers to an individual who, having previously been convicted of a crime, subsequently commits other offences. This circumstance is thus related to the offender’s behaviour and entails different increases in the penalty depending on how the individual commits another crime. Simple, aggravated and repeated recidivism are distinguished.

In addition to increases in the penalty, recidivism produces further negative and indirect effects for the offender (eg, increasing the statute of limitations and the time necessary to obtain rehabilitation).

Aggravation for Legal Entities

On top of the monetary penalty for the offences under Decree No 231/2001, disqualifying measures regulated by Article 9, paragraph 2, of the same Decree can be applied to the legal entities convicted. These measures are temporary and include:

• prohibition of exercising activities;
• suspension or revocation of authorisations related to the commission of the offence;
• prohibition of contracting with public administration, except for obtaining public services;
• exclusion from benefits and possible revocation of those already granted; and
• prohibition of advertising goods or services.

Under Article 13 of the same Decree, those measures are applied in relation to the offences for which they are expressly provided.

Furthermore, according to Article 21 of Decree No 231/2001, when the entity is responsible for multiple offences committed through a single act or omission, or committed during the same activity, the monetary penalty applicable for the most serious offence is increased by up to three times.

Many recent Italian cases could be considered as landmarks in case law. On 15 May 2024, the Court of Cassation, sitting as a unified section, affirmed that there is no normative continuity between the crime of fraudulently claiming credit (Article 346, paragraph 2, of the ICC – abolished by Law No 3 of 2019) and influence peddling (Article 346-bis of the ICC).

The Court of Cassation has clarified that, following the 2019 reform, falsely claiming non-existent relationships no longer constitutes the offence of influence peddling. The latter, in fact, is distinguished from fraudulently claiming credit for this reason. However, anyone who pays a mediator who falsely claims to have non-existent relationships may, at most, be considered a victim of fraud (if the relevant elements are present). In conclusion, with Article 346-bis of the ICC, the legislator intended to refer not to a scenario where a subject is deceived by a mediator, but rather to one where an individual is participating in a criminal agreement. In fact, such individual is punishable precisely because they choose to rely on the mediator’s potential ability to establish a business relationship, thereby endangering the fairness of the public administration.

On 22 July 2024, the Unified Sections of the Italian Supreme Court clarified the application boundaries of Article 629 of the ICC, which punishes the crime of extortion, and Article 353 of the ICC, which punishes the offence of disturbing the fairness of tenders.

The Court noted that, for the purposes of assessing the financial damage caused by the loss of a chance due to the coercive removal of a bidder from a competition, the specific position of the bidder is relevant: it is necessary that they have submitted a suitable and serious offer.

Therefore, the Court specified that if the coercive removal from a competition results in identifiable harm, the crimes under both Article 353 and Article 629 of the ICC may be considered.

Concerning the level of sanctions imposed so far for the foregoing offences, see 7.5 Recent Landmark Investigations or Decisions and 5.1 Penalties on Conviction.

Legislative Decree No 231/01 provides for an autonomous administrative liability of legal entities if one of the crimes listed in the Decree (including bribery and corruption offences) is perpetrated in the interest – or to the benefit – of a company by persons who have representative, administrative or management functions, or by persons under the direction or supervision of one of these persons.

All such provisions are enforced by the Criminal Court (following an initiative put in place by the prosecutor), which has the duty to assess – usually in the same proceedings – both individual and corporate liabilities, and to issue judgments of acquittal or conviction to the pecuniary and disqualification sanctions provided for in Article 9 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001.

According to Articles 6 and 7 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001, in the event that a crime has been committed in the interest or to the benefit of a company, in order to avoid liability, entities should (i) adopt the so-called organisational model in order to prevent the crimes listed in the Decree from being committed, (ii) appoint a supervisory board to oversee the implementation of the organisational model and its updating, and (iii) prove that there was no omission of – or insufficient – supervision of the supervisory board, and that individuals committed the offence by fraudulently circumventing the organisational model.

According to Legislative Decree No 231/2001, the model must be considered “effective”; this means that, according to Article 6, paragraph 2 of the Decree, the model must:

• identify the activities through which the crimes listed in the Decree could be committed;
• provide specific protocols designed to assist the company in taking and implementing company decisions in relation to the crimes to be prevented;

• identify suitable procedures for managing financial resources to prevent crimes from being committed;

• provide disclosure obligations to the supervisory board; and
• provide a suitable disciplinary system.

The adoption of the model is not mandatory for the company but is a necessary condition to avail of the exonerating circumstance provided for by Legislative Decree No 231/2001.

Indeed, as highlighted in 3.3 Corporate Liability, the company has a duty to prevent bribery as an offence (as well as all the other crimes listed in Legislative Decree No 231/2001); in the event of failure to fulfil that obligation, an autonomous liability might arise for not having adopted organisational models capable of preventing the crimes listed in the Decree from being committed.

Other tools essential for the implementation of the model – as usually stated by the courts – are disclosure of the content of the model and staff training:

• communication is usually reserved for HR functions and is necessary to ensure employees are completely aware of the organisational model and the code of ethics; and
• training is crucial to comply with the requirement of Article 6 of Decree 231/2001, according to which – in order to be able to determine an “exonerating effect” in favour of the company – the model must be “effectively implemented”.

For public and private entities subject to Italian law, the organisational model may be complemented by International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 37001 (“Anti-Bribery Management Systems”), which represents the first international standard designed to prevent, detect and address bribery involving a company, its personnel and its business partners.

The ISO 37001 standard is designed to help legal entities maintain a proactive anti-bribery management system by establishing procedures, policies and controls that companies are urged to implement to prevent bribery, or at least to respond to it promptly.

For further clarification regarding the penalties upon conviction for these offences, see 5.1 Penalties on Convictions.

Concerning entity liability, under Legislative Decree 231/2001 it is noteworthy that, within the Italian legal system, there are multiple guidelines and best practices aimed at guiding businesses in implementing compliance programmes, especially concerning the creation of organisational, management, and control models that companies must adopt, as previously explained in 6.4 Protections Afforded to Whistle-Blowers and 7.4 Discretion for Mitigation and Aggravation.

ANAC Guidelines

Following the approval of Decree No 24/2023, which reshaped the whistle-blowing legislation, ANAC approved – via Resolution No 311 of 12 July 12 2023 – the "Guidelines on the protection of persons who report violations of Union law and protection of persons who report violations of national regulatory provisions – procedures for the submission and management of external reports”, which provide an overview of the new regulations and also compare them with the former ones. Finally, Decree No 24/2023 states that any processing of personal data, including that involving communication between competent authorities, provided for in the Decree shall be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Legislative Decree No 196 of 30 June 2003, and Legislative Decree No 51 of 18 May 2018. Disclosure of personal data by the institutions, bodies or organs of the EU shall be carried out in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725.

Confindustria Guidelines

Starting in 2021, Confindustria, the main representative organisation for manufacturing and service companies in Italy, developed compliance Guidelines, which have been modified over the following years to adapt to regulatory updates. These Guidelines are based on a thorough analysis of business practices and aim to indicate measures that are abstractly suitable to meet the needs outlined by Decree 231.

Convention Between Transparency International Italy and ANAC

In January 2024, Transparency International Italy (the Italian branch of a non-governmental, non-profit organisation that promotes transparency and prevents corruption) and ANAC entered into a convention aimed at supporting whistle-blowers and promoting best practices to counter potential irregularities, illegal activities and maladministration in the workplace. As part of this initiative, in June 2024, ANAC published a report on the implementation of the new whistle-blowing regulations in Italy.

Bank of Italy’s (Banca d’Italia’s) Anti-Money Laundering Notebooks on Corruption Risk in Public Procurement

In September 2024, the financial intelligence unit for Italy (a body of Banca d’Italia) published Anti-Money Laundering Notebook No 23, titled “Corruption Risk Indicators in Public Procurement: A Proposal Using Italian Open Data”. Analysing public data from ANAC, the study identifies 12 indicators, calculated for tenders published in Italy between January 2018 and June 2023, which pertain to the specific characteristics of the tender or the contract-awarding process that may signal potential proximity to corruption.

Regarding whether enforcement bodies can seek a compliance monitor as part of corporate resolutions, see 8.1 Compliance Obligations.

Italian legislation is regularly monitored and periodically assessed both by national authorities (such as the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court) and by several international organisations. The most recent reports on bribery and corruption in Italy have been provided by the OECD and GRECO, as well as by ANAC.

OECD

On 10 October 2024, the OECD published its Phase 4 Two-Year Written Follow-up report on Italy, which assesses Italy’s implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Paris, 1997) and the 2021 Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The report shows that Italy has promoted significant initiatives to raise awareness about corruption, especially by enhancing legislative framework to protect whistle-blowers. On the other hand, the OECD still has some objections regarding the anti-corruption policies implemented in Italy. Notably, despite the extension of the statute of limitations in recent years, the duration of the statute of limitations for offences against public administration is still considered too short, and the countermeasures against international corruption are still deemed too weak.

GRECO

On 26 March 2024, GRECO published its Fourth Evaluation Round Second Addendum to the 2nd Compliance Report on Italy. This report was adopted by GRECO at its 96th Plenary Meeting in Strasbourg (18–22 March 2024). GRECO focused on the implementation status of the Council of Europe Anti-bribery Conventions in Italy, which concern corruption of parliamentary members, judges and public prosecutors.

In general terms, the report recognised the effectiveness of the initiatives launched following the recommendations concerning the status of judges and prosecutors, although a similar result has yet to be achieved regarding members of parliament due to the persistent absence of codes of conduct for chambers. However, GRECO emphasises that the authorities have expressed their aim to integrate the Code of Conduct for Deputies, to establish a consistent framework on gifts and other benefits, and to develop rules on how parliamentarians engage with lobbyists and other third parties.

ANAC Annual Report on Activities Conducted in 2023

In May 2024, ANAC presented its annual report to parliament on the activities carried out in 2023. The report covers several crucial topics, including:

• the interactions between ANAC, institutional bodies and stakeholders over the past year;
• international relations (maintained and implemented);
• the 2023 update to the National Anti-Corruption Plan;
• oversight activities for preventing corruption and ensuring transparency;
• the protection of employees who report illicit activities through new whistleblowing channels; and
• the reforms introduced by the Public Contracts Code.

Concerning whether changes to applicable legislation or the enforcement body are likely, see 2.6 Lobbyists.