Antitrust Litigation 2023

Last Updated September 21, 2023

France

Law and Practice

Authors



Gide Loyrette Nouel was founded in Paris in 1920 and is a leading international law firm with 11 offices worldwide. With 550 lawyers, including more than 100 partners, the firm offers legal advice and assistance across many disciplines to public and private sector institutions. Gide boasts a wealth of experience in antitrust procedures (cartels and abuse of dominant position) before the French Competition Authority, the EC and other national competition authorities. The firm also has extensive expertise in private enforcement cases before commercial and civil courts, both in standalone and follow-on actions, and has gained extensive expertise in managing selective distribution networks for brand owners (analysing their agreements in the light of antitrust rules), as well as in the fight against grey-market players. Gide is also active in merger control before the EC and the French Competition Authority, as well as before national competition authorities outside the EU.

Following the implementation of Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014 into French law by Ordinance No 2017-303 and a Decree on 9 March 2017, the antitrust activity of French courts has intensified. Several issues are recurrent, such as those related to the limitation period (and, in particular, its starting point), the jurisdiction of the courts in cases of international disputes, and compensation for damages. Some key recent cases/decisions are summarised here.

Limitation Period

The French courts ruled that the decision of the competition authority finding anti-competitive practices is the starting point for the limitation period (Council of State, 22 November 2019, SNCF Mobilités; French Supreme Court, 27 January 2021, No S 18-16.279). Conversely, the hearing of the victim by the services of the French Competition Authority (FCA), the knowledge of a cartel gained through a press article, or the imprecise knowledge of a cartel held by a manager of the victim company are not sufficient to start the limitation period (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 April 2021, No 19/19448; French Supreme Court, 27 January 2021, No S 18-16.279; Paris Court of Appeal, 5 January 2022, No 19/22293).

Jurisdiction

As regards the jurisdiction of the courts in the case of an international dispute, the French courts have applied the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ, 5 July 2018, FlyLal, C-27/17; ECJ, Tibor-Trans, 29 July 2019, C-451/18), in which it ruled that the damage materialises at the place where the market is affected by the anti-competitive practices that the victim claims led to their damage (Paris Commercial Court, 9 April 2021, No 2020004977; Paris Court of Appeal, 7 January 2020, No 19/12553).

Procedure and Stay of Proceedings

The Paris Commercial Court ruled in two cases that the judgment of the General Court of the EU (GCEU) confirming the EC’s decision did not constitute a “definitive decision” under European law, on account of the pending appeal before the ECJ (Paris Commercial Court, 4 July 2022, No 2017015670; Paris Commercial Court, 18 July 2022, No 2020004977).

However, in the Twenga case, the Paris Commercial Court refused to stay the proceedings, considering such a stay “prejudicial to the claimant by being contrary to one of the fundamental principles of law set forth in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, the right to be judged within a reasonable time – even though more than 15 years have passed since the facts in dispute”. The Paris Commercial Court then ordered the parties to submit their briefs on the merits.

Damages

As regards damages, the Paris Court of Appeal has accepted compensation of the loss of opportunity (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 February 2019, No 16/06164) and increasingly also accepts compensation for moral damages suffered (Paris Court of Appeal, 17 May 2023, No 21/01033) as a result of “negotiating for years with suppliers who pretend to negotiate” (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 June 2021, No 17/0410) or where the eviction of a daily newspaper had “damaged the confidence and the dynamics created around the launch of this new daily newspaper” (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 February 2022, No 19/19239). See 7.1 Assessment of Damages for further details.

In addition to the guidance provided on 23 March 2017 by the Ministry of Justice, new soft legal instruments are emerging to assist courts and parties in their private enforcement proceedings. On 1 March 2021, the Paris Court of Appeal published methodological sheets (guidance) on the evaluation of economic loss, including regarding private enforcement claims. These sheets provide useful guidelines on applicable law, the limitation period, the damages that can be compensated, and the elements of proof in the context of a claim stemming from an anti-competitive practice.

Furthermore, guidance on damage classification is currently being discussed in working groups involving practitioners, professors and experts, further to the nomenclature “of damages caused by anti-competitive practices” proposed in January 2022 by Professor Rafael Amaro, which distinguishes and specifies five categories of damage:

  • overcharge damage;
  • eviction damage;
  • investment damage;
  • loss of value of intangible property; and
  • moral damage.

This nomenclature is not intended to be binding. Nonetheless, it could be a useful tool to guide interested parties and the courts in the assessment of damages.

Another interesting point is the development of the use of criminal procedural law when launching investigations in relation to competition law issues, which was not particularly common until recently. Several cases initiated in recent years are currently in the hands of investigating judges under criminal law and this raises various issues, such as:

  • potential overlap between the activities of the criminal courts and those of the FCA;
  • the extent of their co-operation;
  • the question of access to the relevant file for the parties; and
  • the effect on leniency policy both in France and within the EU.

Article L420-6 of the French Commercial Code (FCC) provides that any natural person who fraudulently takes a personal and decisive part in the conception, organisation or implementation of an infringement of competition law may incur a fine of EUR75,000 and a maximum prison term of four years.

Article L463-5 of the FCC authorises investigating judges and criminal courts to communicate to the FCA, at its request, documents contained in the criminal case file that are directly related to the facts being investigated by the FCA.

The FCA may also, pursuant to Article L462-6 of the FCC, refer a case to the public prosecutor when it considers that the nature of the facts appears to justify the application of Article L420-6 of the FCC. However, the prosecutors decide at their discretion what further action they intend to initiate further to this referral.

In addition, a law of 24 December 2020 gives the financial public prosecutor, the investigating judge, and the criminal court of Paris concurrent jurisdiction throughout France for the prosecution, investigation and judgment of the offences provided for in Article L420-6 of the FCC. The attribution to a specialised national prosecutor’s office with concurrent jurisdiction in this area could lead to the strengthening of criminal law enforcement with regard to anti-competitive practices.

Ordinance No 2017-303 was adopted on 9 March 2017. Its substantive provisions relating to liability, burden of proof, presumptions, and various questions on the admissibility of evidence are applicable to claims in which the infringement occurred after the Ordinance came into force (ie, 11 March 2017). As an exception, its procedural rules on disclosure and access to evidence are applicable to private enforcement claims brought before the competent courts from 26 December 2014 onwards (Paris Court of Appeal, 28 June 2023, RG No 21/13172).

In this context, some claimants try to use the provisions of the Ordinance before the courts even though there are not applicable ratione temporis. Nevertheless, and recently, the French courts ruled against the provisions of the Ordinance being applicable to private enforcement claims brought on grounds of infringements pre-dating the Ordinance (French Supreme Court, 19 October 2022, No 21-19.197; Paris Court of Appeal, 23 June 2021, RG No 17/0410; Paris Court of Appeal 24 November 2021, No 20/04265, Paris Court of Appeal, 5 January 2022, No 19/22293).

The Ordinance is deemed to provide “special rules”. Therefore, standard civil law rules on liability and procedure remain in force for all issues not within its scope. The standard provision applicable to private enforcement actions – whether follow-on or standalone – is Article 1240 of the French Civil Code on tortious liability, where the claimant must establish a “fault” (ie, an infringement of competition law), damage, and a direct causal link between the fault and the damage suffered.

Compared with the standard regime, in which the claimant must establish these three fundamental elements, the Ordinance alleviates the claimant’s burden of proof. It creates a non-rebuttable presumption of the existence of a fault for all claims based on final infringement decisions adopted by the FCA or the EC (Article L481-2 of the FCC). Claimants also benefit from a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm (Article L481-7 of the FCC).

Follow-on and standalone proceedings are both available under French law. Although standalone actions are rarer, the Paris Commercial Court recently ruled that a company had implemented several practices of abuse of its dominant position (without prior sanction by the FCA) and, as such, awarded damages to the victim of the anti-competitive practice. In qualifying the abuse of dominant position, the Paris Commercial Court relied on a previous FCA decision concerning the same defendant (Paris Commercial Court, 10 February 2021, Oxone Technologies e.a c/ Google Ireland Ltd RG 2020035242).

Claims for damages resulting from anti-competitive practices fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of specialised judicial courts, pursuant to Article L420-7 of the FCC, or administrative courts where the author (French Supreme Court 29 September 2004, EDF v SNIET) or the victim (Council of State, 19 December 2007, CAMPENON-BERNARD, Council of State, 10 July 2020, Lacroix Signalisation No 420045) of an anti-competitive practice is a public person. If this exclusive jurisdiction is violated, the writ of summons will be sanctioned by a rejection.

Among the judicial courts, eight commercial courts and eight high civil courts of first instance have jurisdiction to deal with competition law litigation, as follows:

  • commercial courts – Marseille, Bordeaux, Lille, Fort-de-France, Lyon, Nancy, Paris and Rennes; and
  • high civil courts of first instance – Marseille, Bordeaux, Lille, Fort-de-France, Lyon, Nancy, Paris and Rennes.

On appeal, the Paris Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction. In addition, specific chambers have been appointed at the Paris Commercial Court and at the Paris Court of Appeal to deal with competition law litigation.

The courts have also set up international chambers responsible for hearing disputes affecting international trade. Pleadings may be conducted in English before these chambers.

For proceedings that fall within the scope of Ordinance No 2017-303, final decisions of the FCA (ie, those that can no longer be overruled through ordinary appeal procedures) are binding and irrefutably establish the existence of a fault (Article L481-2 paragraph 1 of the FCC).

The Ministry of Justice provided guidance in a circulaire (soft legal instrument), dated 23 March 2017, to assist the courts and the parties in private enforcement litigation. The circulaire indicates that Article L481-2 of the FCC is applicable to infringement decisions (including settlement decisions and injunction decisions) before the FCA and/or the EC. Decisions that identify competition concerns (such as interim measures proceedings) or commitment decisions may serve as prima facie evidence.

Final decisions issued by another national competition authority (NCA) constitute evidence in support of the existence of a fault but are not binding (Article L481-2 paragraph 2 of the FCC). Article L481-2 paragraph 3 of the FCC states that national courts may not decide cases in a way that runs counter to a decision adopted by the EC. Before the FCA, the EC (or another NCA) can be involved in damages actions using the amicus curiae instrument. Article 15 of Regulation No 1/2003 allows the EC and any NCA, at the request of a national judge or on their own initiative, to submit their observations in cases where the application of competition law is involved. Such observations are, however, not binding on French courts.

Between 2006 and 2008, the EC intervened – through the amicus curiae instrument – in competition disputes before national judges at least 18 times. More than half of these interventions took place before appellate courts. The instrument of amicus curiae, which is rarely used in practice, seems to have been implemented in the context of actions for damages before administrative courts where the public rapporteur (le rapporteur public) referred to the FCA observations (Council of State, 10 July 2020, Lacroix Signalisation No 420045).

According to the general principle of tortious liability under French law, the burden of proof rests on the claimant.

As discussed in 2.1 Legal Basis for a Claim, the standard provision applicable to private enforcement actions – whether follow-on or standalone – is Article 1240 of the FCC on tortious liability, where the claimant must establish a “fault” (ie, an infringement of competition law), damage, and a direct causal link between the fault and the damage suffered. However, for claims relating to infringements occurring after 11 March 2017, Ordinance No 2017-303 alleviates the claimant’s burden of proof. It creates a non-rebuttable presumption of fault for all claims based on final infringement decisions by the FCA (Article L481-2 of the FCC). Claimants also benefit from a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm (Article L481-7 of the FCC).

In the same way, again regarding the infringements that occurred after the entry into force of the Ordinance, Article L481-4 of the FCC provides that the direct or indirect purchaser of the products or services concerned by the anti-competitive practices is deemed not to have passed on the additional cost to its direct contractors – unless the defendant proves otherwise. Hence, for infringements occurring after 11 March 2017, the burden of proof for the pass-on defence rests on the defendant. In this respect, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the Ordinance was not applicable to a case where the events giving rise to the liability occurred prior to 11 March 2017 and therefore the claimants were required to prove that they had not passed the loss of profit due to the reduced margins resulting from the sanctioned cartel on to consumers (Paris Court of Appeal, 5 January 2022, No 19/22293).

In a recent case, the Paris Court of Appeal rejected the claimant’s argument challenging the expert’s conclusions that there was no damage. The court ruled that the provisions of Article L481-7 of the FCC – according to which, it is presumed until proved otherwise that a cartel between competitors causes harm – is not applicable to a cartel that took place between September 1993 to February 2004. The Paris Court of Appeal then applied the transitional rules of French law strictly (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 June 2021, RG No 17/0410).

Claims can be brought by direct and indirect purchasers, pursuant to Article L481-5 of the FCC, which refers to both types of purchasers. The indirect purchaser, whether of goods or services, is deemed to have provided proof that it incurred overcharges where it can prove that:

  • the defendant has committed an anti-competitive practice mentioned in Article L481-1 of the FCC;
  • this practice has resulted in additional costs for the direct contractor of the defendant; and
  • it has purchased goods or used services affected by the anti-competitive practice or purchased goods or used services derived from or containing them.

The defendant may, however, demonstrate that such additional cost was not passed on to the indirect buyer or that it was only partially passed on by its direct contractor.

The duration of proceedings will vary depending on the complexity of the case (procedural issues, stays of proceedings, communication of documents, expert opinions on the amount of damages, etc).

A stay of proceedings is often requested by defendants in private enforcement litigation pending the outcome of a parallel investigation by a competition authority and/or an appeals court. On the basis of Articles 377 et seq of the French Civil Procedure Code (FCPC), a judge may – depending on the circumstances of the case – decide to stay the progress of the proceeding for a given period or until the occurrence of an event that they specify.

The grounds for a stay are the effect a public enforcement decision can have on the judgment to come in a compensation claim and the need to guarantee the proper administration of justice. On such grounds, French judges often grant stays of proceedings until the competent competition authority issues a final decision. The stay can be extended at the request of any party pending the decision of appeal courts, as long as the judge is satisfied that the aforementioned conditions are fulfilled.

Hamon Law

Law No 2014-344 of 17 March 2014, the so-called Hamon Law, introduced a new form of collective action under French law in the event of damage resulting from various infringements – including, notably, anti-competitive practices – under a regulated regime open only to individual consumers. This collective action may only be initiated:

  • after a final decision establishing the infringement has been issued by the “competent national or European Union authorities or courts”; and
  • within a limitation period of five years from the final decision (Articles L623-24 and L623-25 of the French Consumer Code).

The action allows consumers who consider themselves to be victims of similar kinds of damage caused by one or more professionals – for which they would not bring an action before the courts, owing to the low amount of potential compensation or because they are unaware of existing actions and procedures – to have their rights collectively recognised. Consumers must be in a similar legal situation with regard to the identified breach. However, the damages suffered need not be identical.

Consumers must have expressed their unequivocal willingness to participate in the collective action (ie, an opt-in system). Only consumers, defined as natural persons acting for non-professional purposes, can seek compensation for their loss through collective action. A collective action can be brought on behalf of both direct and indirect purchasers.

So far, this new set of rules has been used in consumer law proceedings more often than in competition law matters.

Syndicate Actions

Aside from this specific form of collective action, associations and syndicates gathering economic operators together can claim for compensation of the “collective interest” of a given profession or business sector. This collective interest is distinct from the cumulative individual interests of their members.

The High First Instance Civil Court of Rennes ruled in a case initiated by a professional syndicate seeking compensation for the damage caused by the phosphates cartel condemned in 2010 by the EC. The court held that the syndicate had both the collective interest and the standing to sue for compensation for the harm caused by the actions of a cartel to the community of the syndicate’s members (High First Instance Civil Court of Rennes, 7 October 2019, FRSEA v Roullier). This is known under French law as an action syndicale, based on Article L2132-3 of the French Labour Code and Article L490-10 of the FCC.

Class Actions

Discussions are currently underway in the French Parliament to implement a new class action regime, which is expected to extend to actions for damages arising from anti-competitive practices. This should be adopted in the second half of 2023.

Article L623-1 of the French Consumer Code provides that only nationally representative consumer associations authorised by public authorities may bring a collective action against one or more professionals. In this respect, consumers are not parties to the proceedings in the procedural sense.

In France, the associations which are legally authorised to bring collective actions are the following:

  • Conseil National des Associations Familiales Laïques (Cnafal), the Confédération des Associations Familiales Catholiques (CNAFC), the Confédération Syndicale des Familles (CSF), Familles de France and Familles Rurales, grouped together within the Union Nationale des Associations Familiales (Unaf) for family matters;
  • Association de Défense, d’Éducation et d’Information du Consommateur (Adeic), Association Force Ouvrière de Consommateurs (AFOC), Indecosa-CGT and the Association Léo Lagrange pour la Défense des Consommateurs (ALLDC) for trade unions;
  • UFC-Que Choisir and the Consommation Logement Cadre de vie (CLCV) for consumer issues;
  • Confédération Générale du Logement (CGL) and the Confédération Nationale du Logement (CNL) for housing; and
  • Fédération Nationale des Associations d’Usagers des Transports (Fnaut) for transport.

Article L623-22 of the FCC provides that only the applicant association may take part in a mediation in order to obtain compensation for the individual losses suffered by the consumers that it represents.

The agreement resulting from the mediation must be submitted to the judge for approval (Article L623-22 of the FCC). This certification will ensure that the agreement is in accordance with the interests of the parties and will make it enforceable.

Before French high first instance civil courts and commercial courts, a pre-trial judge is designated to guarantee the fairness of the proceedings – in particular, regarding the timely exchange of pleadings and the production of documents, when applicable.

Pre-trial judges are also competent to rule on various procedural issues – although they cannot issue summary judgments on the merits of a case. All claims are answered by the court within the final ruling on the merits.

In international disputes, the relevant jurisdiction is determined pursuant to EU international private law or French international private law, depending on the foreign state or states involved. The relevant rules of EU international private law can be found in Regulation No 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 (Brussels I Recast Regulation). A defendant domiciled in an EU member state may be sued in the courts of that state (Article 4 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation). It may only be sued in the courts of another member state under certain conditions.

In matters relating to tort (delict or quasi-delict), the general rule is that the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred have jurisdiction (Article 7 Section 2 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation). This covers both the place where the event giving rise to the damage occurred and the place where the damage was suffered.

As regards the concept of “harmful event”, the French courts have applied the principle of the FlyLal and Tibor-Trans judgments (ECJ, 5 July 2018, FlyLal, C-27/17; ECJ, Tibor-Trans, 29 July 2019, C-451/18) – ie, the damage materialises at the place where the market is affected by the anti-competitive practices within which the victim claims to have suffered their damage. Indeed, in a recent case concerning an action for damages by the price comparison service Twenga as a result of anti-competitive practices implemented by Google and sanctioned by the EC, the Paris Commercial Court considered that it had jurisdiction, given that:

  • Twenga provided evidence that it carried out all of its price comparison activity from its head office in Paris (and not from its foreign subsidiaries); and
  • Twenga’s French entity was solely responsible for the design, publication and management of all websites, whether they were intended for a French or foreign audience (Paris Commercial Court, 9 April 2021, No 2020004977; see also Paris Court of Appeal, 7 January 2020, No 19/12553).

Where the defendant is not domiciled in a member state, French courts will apply French international private law. Under French law, in matters relating to tort (delict or quasi-delict), the alleged victim shall bring their claim before the courts of the country where the defendant is domiciled or before the courts of the places where the harmful event occurred or where the loss was suffered (Article 46 of the FCPC).

Applicable Law

Under French law, the law applicable to contractual obligations is determined in accordance with the provisions of Regulation No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 (Rome I Regulation), whereas the law applicable to non-contractual obligations is determined pursuant to the provisions of Regulation No 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 (Rome II Regulation). Whether an obligation is contractual or non-contractual (ie, tortious) must be assessed from an EU law perspective, in light of the rulings of the ECJ.

From a general perspective, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from a tort is the law of the country in which the damage occurred (Article 4 Section 1 of the Rome II Regulation), unless the alleged liable person and the alleged victim both have their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs – in which case, the law of that country will apply (Article 4 Section 2 of the Rome II Regulation) – or unless the tort is manifestly more closely connected with another country (Article 4 Section 3 of the Rome II Regulation). This set of rules also applies in the specific case of an act of unfair competition exclusively affecting the interests of a specific competitor (Article 6 Section 2 of the Rome II Regulation).

Specific rules apply to other unfair competition acts and acts restricting free competition. Under Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an act of unfair competition is the law of the country where competitive relations or the interests of consumers are – or are likely to be – affected (Article 6 Section 1 of the Rome II Regulation). The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from a restriction of competition is the law of the country in which the market is – or is likely to be – affected (Article 6 Section 3(a) of the Rome II Regulation). Where several markets may be affected, the law of the court of the defendant may also apply, under certain conditions (Article 6 Section 3(b) of the Rome II Regulation).

The limitation period applicable to actions for compensation in connection with anti-competitive practices is five years (Article L482-1 of the FCC), which is identical to ordinary civil law actions (Article 2224 of the French Civil Code). The period begins to run from the day on which the victim knows or ought to have known (Article L482-1 of the FCC) of the existence of an infringement, the fact that such infringement caused them harm, and the identity of at least one infringing party.

In the event the contemplated action concerns a continuous infringement, the limitation period does not run until the practice has ceased (Article L482-1 of the FCC). All the standard provisions of the French Civil Code relating to the postponement, suspension and interruption of the limitation period are applicable to these actions unless other special rules should be taken into account.

Furthermore, acts of competition authorities (the FCA, other NCAs or the EC) aimed at investigating, detecting or punishing anti-competitive practices also interrupt the limitation period of private litigation until the issuance of a final decision from the relevant competition authority (Article L462-7 of the FCC).

Limitation Litigation

Determining the starting point of the limitation period for actions for damages caused by anti-competitive practices gives rise to extensive litigation. When Article L482-1 of the FCC is not applicable ratione temporis to the case, it is the general law of Article 2224 of the French Civil Code that applies, and which makes the limitation period begin to run from the date on which the victim becomes aware of the damage they have suffered.

Recently, the method used by the courts to determine the starting point of limitation periods on the basis of Article 2224 of the French Civil Code has been close to that provided for by Article L482-1 of the FCC, even if it is not applicable ratione temporis. So, in most cases, the competition authority’s decision that finds anti-competitive practices is the starting point of the limitation period (Paris Commercial Court, 23 January 2023, RG No 2021037634).

Otherwise, a reading of recent case law suggests that – in the presence of a decision on provisional measures – decisions on the merits are most often taken as the starting point for the limitation period. Decisions on provisional measures are less likely to be taken into account; however, in view of the in concreto approach to be adopted by judges, this possibility cannot be ruled out (eg, Paris Court of Appeal, 6 March 2019, SARL Arkeos v SA EDF, No 17/21261).

The Paris Court of Appeal also held that the hearing of the victim by the services of the FCA or knowledge of a cartel gained through a press article is not sufficient to start the limitation period (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 April 2021, No 19/19448). The Paris Court of Appeal also ruled, on the basis of Article 2224 of the French Civil Code, that – although the companies in the case may have suspected that they had been victims of an anti-competitive cartel through press articles and, more specifically, during their hearing by the Competition Authority – the materiality of the facts and the identification of the companies that had taken part in the cartel were not specified at the time and thus the injured companies were not in a position to take legal action (Paris Court of Appeal, 5 January 2022, No 19/22293). Conversely, a competition authority’s press release relating to the decision may be sufficient to start the limitation period according to the courts’ in concreto assessment (Paris Court of Appeal, 1 June 2023, RG No 468098).

As regards horizontal practices, hearings of alleged victims as witnesses during the investigation before the FCA are unlikely to be the starting point of the limitation period (eg, High First Instance Civil Court of Paris, 23 September 2019, Carrefour v Johnson & Johnson, No 2017013944).

The Paris Court of Appeal ruled that the claimant, having initially participated in the cartel, had been aware of all the necessary facts to bring an action before the commercial court, even before the date of the FCA’s decision. The limitation period had therefore begun to run before the date of the FCA’s decision (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 September 2022, RG No 20/17560).

Recently, the French Supreme Court confirmed that the knowledge of pre-existing and distinct cartels or the imprecise knowledge of the cartel in question by a manager of the victim company does not constitute the starting point of the limitation period (French Supreme Court, 27 January 2021, No S 18-16.279).

As regards abuse of dominant position, certain replies by alleged victims to requests for information from the investigation services may be taken as the starting point for the limitation period. Again, this will depend on the information provided to the FCA’s investigation services in the context of those replies.

Courts apply the provisions of the FCPC (Articles 132–142 and Article 145) to disclosure requests and the production of documents filed for or in connection with private enforcement litigation (Article L483-1 of the FCC).

For each request for disclosure, a judge must balance the legitimate interest of the claimant with the need to guarantee the protection of confidential information (Article L483-1 paragraph 2 of the FCC). This means:

  • checking the usefulness of evidence;
  • protecting the confidentiality of documents, particularly with regard to business secrets; and
  • preserving the effectiveness of competition law (implementing Decree No 2017-305 of 9 March 2017).

Several categories of documents are distinguished (Articles L483-2 to L483-11 of the FCC), such as business secrets, privileged documents, and certain categories of evidence submitted or held by the FCA.

Fines of up to EUR10,000 may be imposed in the case of a failure or refusal to comply with the court’s order of disclosure or if the evidence is destroyed (Article R483-14 of the FCC).

Article 145 of the FCPC allows for in futurum disclosure measures. This provision allows a party to seek an ex parte judicial order to force the opposing party to produce documents and information that are considered useful for its lawsuit. The judge may order a set of measures such as a bailiff’s inspection, the hearing of individuals, or the disclosure of evidence by third parties.

Recently, in an interlocutory proceeding based on Article 145 of the FCPC, the Paris Court of Appeal ordered (inter alia) the production of the statement of objections that the EC had addressed to Renault Trucks in connection with the trucks cartel, along with the list of documents supporting that statement. However, it refused to order the production of documents such as the list of gross prices and Renault Trucks’ costs and margins, as these requests were not proportionate to the damage they would cause to the defendant in its future negotiations with the applicant (Paris Court of Appeal, 25 October 2019, X Y v Renault Trucks, No 19/05356). Nevertheless, this decision was partially overturned by the French Supreme Court, which criticised the Paris Court of Appeal for not having examined whether the statement of objections was proportionate with regard to the confidential nature of the proof and the preservation of the effectiveness of competition law implemented in the public sphere (French Supreme Court, 8 July 2020, No 19-25.065). The Paris Court of Appeal, to which the case was subsequently referred, ultimately rejected the disclosure of the requested documents (Paris Court of Appeal, 18 May 2022, No 20/13878).

More recently, still in the “trucks cartel case” and in proceedings based on Article 145 of the FCPC, the Paris Court of Appeal refused to order the disclosure of extracts from the confidential version of the EC’s cartel decision – given that the claimants did not justify the usefulness of obtaining these documents for their assessment of their alleged damage. The court also refused to order the disclosure of the index of the EC’s file because such disclosure would undermine the leniency procedure. However, the court ordered the disclosure of the average sales prices of heavy trucks applied by the manufacturer in question in France and in each EU member state, as these average prices would facilitate the assessment of the damage that the companies believe they have suffered as a result of the anti-competitive practices (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 April 2022, No 21/06313).

According to the Law of 31 December 1971, the following – in all matters, whether in the field of counsel or defence – are covered by professional secrecy:

  • written advice addressed by a lawyer (subject to that lawyer being an outside counsel) to, or intended for, their client;
  • correspondence exchanged between the client and their lawyer; or
  • correspondence between the lawyer and their colleagues (unless expressly identified as “official”).

A judge cannot order the disclosure of the “written statement or the transcription of oral statements” by leniency applicants and undertakings involved in a settlement procedure before a competition authority (Article L483-5 of the FCC). The text extends this protection to “parts of a document drawn up in the course of the investigations and which would include a transcription or literal citation of these statements”.

Third-party statements may be requested by a judge or the parties and provided in writing or orally (Articles 199 et seq of the FCPC). Judges can ask questions after the witness has submitted its statement (Article 213 of the FCPC). Cross-examination is not usually performed in French courts, except in the International Chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, where the parties may be allowed to rely on various common-law procedural rules under the control of the judge.

Summons to appear in front of a judge are mandatory. Defaulting witnesses who, without legitimate reason, refuse to testify or to take the oath may be fined a maximum of EUR10,000 (Article 207 of the FCPC).

It is common practice for economic experts to be consulted to determine the existence and extent of possible damages suffered by the claimant or caused to the market. Very recently, in the context of an interim payment procedure, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Nantes relied on the observations of the FCA to demonstrate the existence of a fault (a horizontal price cartel) and on the conclusions of the expert to increase the amount of an interim payment granted in the first instance (Administrative Court of Appeal of Nantes, 22 January 2021, No 19NT05057).

The parties can, of their own volition, submit expert reports. Furthermore, an expert report can be ordered by the court when the judge is not supplied with sufficient material to determine the matter (Articles 263 of the FCPC). When a judge orders an expert report, they must determine the scope of the issue assigned to the expert and specify the period during which the expert will work on it (Article 265 of the FCPC).

Usually, only one person will be appointed as an expert, unless the judge deems it appropriate to appoint more than one (Article 264 of the FCPC). If the expert opinion does not require written explanations, the judge may allow the expert to present it orally at the hearing; it will be recorded in the minutes. The drafting of the minutes may, however, be replaced by a reference in the judgment if the matter is judged in a court of final resort (Article 282 of the FCPC). The judge may – at any time, on their own initiative or at the request of the parties – increase or restrict the scope of the investigative measures they have organised and amend the terms of the assignment given to the expert (Article 236 of the FCPC).

The expert must take into consideration the findings or claims of the parties and, where they are written, will attach them to their opinion if the parties so request. The expert must state in their opinion the decision they have taken in respect of these findings or claims (Article 276 of the FCPC). The expert cannot decide questions of law (Administrative Court of Appeal of Nancy, 22 September 2022, No 21NC0297).

Article L481-3 of the FCC provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of damage for which victims of competition infringements may seek compensation, as follows:

  • the loss resulting from an overcharge or from excessively low prices;
  • the loss resulting from the decrease in sales volume;
  • loss of opportunity; and
  • non-pecuniary harm.

In a recent standalone action concerning an abuse of dominant position, the Paris Court of Appeal accepted the necessity of compensation for the loss of opportunity (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 February 2019, No 16/06164).

Again, as mentioned in 1.1 Recent Developments in Antitrust Litigation, a judge recently recognised that the victim of a cartel who brought a private enforcement claim suffered moral damage as a result of “negotiating for years with suppliers who pretended to negotiate” (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 June 2021, No 17/0410). The Paris Court of Appeal also recently ruled that the eviction of a daily newspaper due to abuse of a dominant position could cause moral damage. Indeed, the court ruled that the eviction of the daily newspaper “tarnished the image and reputation” of the publishing company and “damaged the confidence and dynamics created around the launch of this new daily newspaper, undermining its ability to attract and retain new talent” (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 February 2022, No 19/19239).

In order to determine the damage, the courts have various procedural and non-procedural tools at their disposal, such as:

  • an expert opinion in the event that the victim encounters difficulties in assessing the economic loss suffered;
  • the opinion of the competition authority (Article R.481-1 of the FCC);
  • the collection of methodological sheets on the evaluation of damages of the Paris Court of Appeal, updated in 2021 (see 1.1 Recent Developments in Antitrust Litigation for further detail); and
  • the nomenclature of damages caused by anti-competitive practices proposed by Professor Rafael Amaro in January 2022 (see 1.1 Recent Developments in Antitrust Litigation for further detail).

Damages awarded by French courts are compensatory in nature. They correspond to the full damage suffered by the victim but are limited to this amount (ie, the amount necessary to place the victim in the position in which the victim would have been in the absence of the infringement). French law does not provide for any additional damages (eg, punitive damages).

When the court finds that the plaintiff’s quantification of damages is insufficiently demonstrated, it may rely on the facts of the case to assess damages and award a minimum amount of compensation to the plaintiff (Paris Commercial Court, 9 March 2023, No 2019063474). In this respect, compensation for damages is paid as a nominal amount, increased by the payment of either the statutory (legal) interest rate or a compensatory rate – for example, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).

Recently, the French Supreme Court confirmed the approach taken by the Paris Court of Appeal that rejected the application of the WACC method on the grounds that the claimant “failed to demonstrate that the non-availability of the sums it was deprived of had led it either to restrict its activity without being able to find alternative financing through loans or equity, or to abandon duly identified investment projects that were likely to yield the equivalent of the average cost of capital” (French Supreme Court, 1 March 2023, No 20-18.356 and 20-20.416). In another case, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled that – unless it can be presumed that the victim company was deprived of the opportunity to invest the sums as a result – the application of the WACC to a failed project requires prior proof that the project could not be carried out because of the unavailability of capital. The WACC includes a component remunerating the risk so that it does not apply to known and determined past flows when no alternative investment is proved to have been lost. Therefore, the “hazardous” listing of projects that are not proven to have been thoroughly studied is not sufficient for the application of the WACC (Paris Court of Appeal, 23 February 2022, No 19/19239).

It is also possible that the cartel caused “umbrella effects”. This raises the question of whether “indirect” buyers, who are collateral victims of the price increase, are entitled to claim compensation. The Council of State has acknowledged compensation for damage caused by an umbrella effect. In that case, the decision of the EC had established that the practices of the cartelists had a general effect on market prices, including those of companies – such as the plaintiff’s main supplier during the period – that were not members of the cartel (Council of State, 12 October 2020, SNCF Mobilités, No 432981; Paris Administrative Court of Appeal, 17 February 2023, No 14PA02419).

According to Article L481-4 of the FCC, introduced into French law by Ordinance No 2017-303, the direct or indirect buyer is deemed not to have passed on the overcharge to its direct clients. In other words, the new regime applicable to private enforcement litigation provides for rebuttable presumptions regarding passing on, with the burden of rebutting the presumption resting on defendants. It should be noted that this presumption counts among the substantive provisions of the Ordinance, which are not applicable retroactively.

For all claims falling outside the scope of the Ordinance, one should refer to previous case law on this specific question. In this respect, the French Supreme Court ruled that no compensation is due if the claimant has passed on its loss to its clients and that the burden of proof of the absence of passing on lies on the claimant (French Supreme Court, 19 October 2022, No 21-19.197; French Supreme Court, 15 June 2010, No 09-15.816).

In other words, the claimant requesting the reparation of harm must prove that it actually suffered such harm and thus must provide evidence that it did not pass on the overcharge allegedly causing such harm. It should be noted that, recently, the Paris Court of Appeal found that the extra costs could only have been partially passed on to final prices in the case at hand (Paris Court of Appeal, 24 November 2021, No 20/04265).

Indeed, under French law (and as discussed in 7.1 Assessment of Damages), damages awarded are compensatory in nature – meaning that they must correspond to the full damage suffered by the victim but cannot exceed the damage actually suffered. Under this general principle, claimants can only recover the amounts actually lost and not the amounts passed on.

Finally, the Council of State ruled that the burden of proof relating to the passing on of the extra costs to customers was not exclusively on the claimant. The solution thus adopted seems to comply with Directive 2014/104/TFUE and Ordinance No 2017-303 (Council of State, 12 October 2020, SNCF Mobilités No 432981).

According to Article L481-8 of the FCC, damages awarded are to be assessed on the day of the decision, taking into account the passage of time. This is consistent with the general principle applicable under French law – according to which, damages are assessed at the time of the judgment.

Claimants are automatically entitled to statutory interests, but only as from the ruling (Article 1231-7 of the French Civil Code). The applicable interest rates are published on the website of the Banque de France.

A French court has discretion to award interest from an earlier date in order to fully compensate for the damage suffered. Such interest is known as “compensating interest” related to the unavailability of capital during the period of the infringement (ie, the amount of damages). Unlike statutory interest, which is granted by law, compensating interest is granted subject to the claimant evidencing a specific loss due to the unavailability of capital. Compensating interest may be based either on the statutory interest rate – possibly increased by a co-efficient decided by the courts – or on the WACC. Additionally, although interest granted does not automatically produce compound interest, the claimant can make such a request.

The Paris Court of Appeal notably awarded more than EUR180 million to an electronic communications operator (Digiciel Antilles) as compensation for damages caused by the anti-competitive practices of Orange Caraïbes. Specifically, the court agreed to compensate for the loss suffered as a result of the additional costs incurred by the company owing to the disputed practices (for distribution exclusivities and under the exclusive rights of repair). As compensation for its financial loss, the Paris Court of Appeal rejected the application of the WACC method, as Digiciel Antilles had not succeeded in showing that the unavailability of the sums of which it was deprived had led it either:

  • to restrict its activity because of an inability to find alternative financing; or
  • to abandon duly identified investment projects that were likely to yield the equivalent of the average cost of capital.

However, the Paris Court of Appeal noted that the financial loss could be assessed until 31 December 2005 on the basis of the average interest rate paid at the time by the victim of the practices, and then on the basis of the legal interest rate (Paris Court of Appeal, 17 June 2020, Orange Caraïbes v Digicel Antilles Françaises Guyane, No 17/23041). Recently, the French Supreme Court censured the Paris Court of Appeal on the assessment of the starting point of such compensatory interest, which must be awarded taking into account the progressive nature of the creation of this loss and not from the moment when the entire loss was created (French Supreme Court, 7 June 2023, No 22-10.545).

Ordinance No 2017-303 created, by law, a principle of joint and several liability between undertakings found to have breached competition law. For all claims falling outside the scope of Ordinance No 2017-303, the general standards of French tort law – and, in particular, of Article 1240 of the French Civil Code – are applicable. On these grounds, French courts may find that the co-authors of a breach of competition law are liable in solidum towards victims of anti-competitive practices. French law distinguishes joint and several liability (responsabilité solidaire), which can only be based on legal or conventional provisions (Article 1310 of the French Civil Code), from in solidum liability, which may only be ordered by courts in the absence of a legal textual basis.

Under the new regime of joint and several liability introduced by Ordinance No 2017-303, leniency applicants benefiting from a total exemption from fines are only required to compensate the harm caused to their direct or indirect contracting parties. They may still be liable to other victims if such victims are unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers (Article L481-11 of the FCC).

Under French law, contribution proceedings against a third party may be brought by means of a writ of summons in an intervention forcée (Article 331 of the FCPC). The right to initiate requests for bringing contribution proceedings is not reserved to the parties. The judge may invite them to question all the interested parties whose presence seems necessary to resolve the dispute (Article 332 of the FCPC).

Depending on the case, a judge may order a wide range of interim or final measures, such as resuming business relations or granting access to essential facilities. Injunctions are often backed up by a daily penalty (astreinte). Such measures are available when the case is decided on the merits or through summary proceedings (référé).

In all cases of urgency, the president of the court may order in summary proceedings any measure that does not encounter any serious challenge or that the existence of the dispute justifies (Articles 808 and 872 of the FCPC). In certain circumstances, the president may – even where confronted with a serious challenge – order in summary proceedings such protective measures as are required to restore the parties to their previous state. This is done either to avoid imminent damages or to abate a manifestly illegal nuisance. In cases where the existence of the obligation is not seriously challenged, the president may award an interim payment to the creditor or order the mandatory performance of the obligation even where it is an obligation to perform (Articles 809 and 873 of the FCPC).

These are “regular” summary proceedings, enabling a preliminary decision to be issued within a few weeks or months. However, the judge will not rule on the merits of the case but will only order interim measures. In cases of extreme emergency, an expedited proceeding can be requested, whereby the judge sets a binding hearing date within a few days of receipt of the claimant’s request (Article 485 of the FCPC). In this situation, a preliminary decision may be issued within a few days. In all cases, both parties are heard at a final hearing, during which they must develop their arguments.

The summary proceeding orders are provisionally enforceable. However, the judge may make provisional enforcement subject to the granting of a guarantee in the form of security of real or personal property, sufficient to cover all restitutions and damages (Articles 489 and 517-522 of the FCPC).

The parties may, on their own initiative or upon a judge’s request, use ADR methods such as conciliation (Article 128 of the FCPC) or mediation (Article 131-1 of the FCPC). This is a voluntary process, which cannot be imposed by a judge. Also, the initiation of a mediation or conciliation procedure will suspend the limitation period (Article 2238 of the FCC).

Ordinance No 2017-303 anticipated the recourse to alternative modes of resolution and their effect on compensation from joint and several co-debtors. Victims who have settled a dispute with one co-debtor may only claim compensation from the other co-debtors not party to that settlement. Such compensation should not include the amount attributable to the co-debtor that is party to the settlement (Article L481-13 of the FCC). In addition, while ruling on contribution claims between co-debtors, courts must take into account the amounts already paid to victims following previous settlements (Article L483-14 of the FCC).

In France, although third-party funding is not prohibited, it is not governed by any specific regulation. Ruling on a funding contract in the context of an international arbitration case, the Court of Appeal of Versailles indicated that “a contract for the funding of trials is sui generis and unknown in most member states of the EU except countries with a Germanic legal culture” (CA Versailles, 1 June 2006, No 05/01038). On 21 February 2017, the Paris Bar Council issued a resolution on the practice of third-party funding in international arbitration, whereby it set out out basic principles applicable to such cases.

Costs pertaining to proceedings, processes and enforcement procedures include fees, taxes, government royalties, cost of translation, allowances for witnesses, and expert fees. These legal costs are usually borne by the losing party, unless the judge imposes the entirety or part of them on another party by a reasoned decision (Articles 695-696 of the FCPC).

Attorney’s fees are not included in the legal costs. A judge may, however, order the losing party to pay additional sums that are not part of the legal costs – taking into consideration the rules of equity and the financial condition of this party (Article 700 of the FCPC).

Orders to deposit funds as security to cover costs are rarely granted. They usually only concern experts’ fees.

According to Article R420-3 of the FCC, the Paris Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction to rule on appeals against decisions rendered in private enforcement competition cases. In September 2016, Chamber 5-4 of the Paris Court of Appeal specialised in hearing appeals against first-instance judgments on private enforcement antitrust cases. Additionally, in 2018, an international chamber was created within the Paris Court of Appeal allowing the parties to plead in English.

The decisions of the Paris Court of Appeal are themselves subject to appeal to the French Supreme Court. This is not a third level of jurisdiction, as the French Supreme Court does not rule on the merits of a case. Instead, the French Supreme Court is only required to decide whether the rules of law have been correctly applied.

Gide Loyrette Nouel

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Signature Litigation is a law firm dedicated to dispute resolution with offices in London, Paris and Gibraltar. It has 23 lawyers in Paris (five partners, three counsel and 15 associates), who all practised at major international law firms before joining Signature Litigation. The team mainly represents clients in commercial, antitrust, banking, corporate and post-M&A disputes, complex and international litigation, arbitration, product liability and insurance/reinsurance. The firm advises companies on the scope of their compliance with vigilance duties. Thomas Rouhette and Claire Massiera have developed the firm’s antitrust litigation practice in Paris.

Introduction

As pointed out by the French Competition Authority in its 2022 annual report published in July 2023, “anti-competitive practices are now even more risky for companies, which are faced with significant additional financial risks as a result of the rise in actions for damages”. The trending rise of such actions is an observation made year on year which is unlikely to be reversed.

Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions has set out several rules to ensure that undertakings “can effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation”. Several mechanisms are provided for in the directive, which are innovative for some jurisdictions, such as the rebuttable presumption of fault in follow-on cases or access to evidence aimed at ensuring the effectiveness of the right to compensation. 

While we have been witnessing an increase in follow-on cases, courts are still in the process of clarifying the rules governing actions for damages in light of the core foundations of civil liability. This chapter will focus on recent decisions handed down by the French Cour de Cassation and their takeaways.

The Quantification of Losses

The quantification of losses is one of the thorniest issues which courts have to address considering the technicality of the matters at hand. The Commission has provided a general communication on quantifying harm in which it acknowledged that “A major difficulty encountered by courts, tribunals and parties in damages actions is how to quantify the harm suffered. Quantification is based on comparing the actual position of claimants with the position they would find themselves in had the infringement not occurred. In any hypothetical assessment of how market conditions and the interactions of market participants would have evolved without the infringement, complex and specific economic and competition law issues often arise. Courts and parties are increasingly confronted with these matters and with considering the methods and techniques available to address them” (Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2013/C 167/07)).

The Commission has drawn up a practical guide detailing the methods to use for quantifying harm. The Paris Court of Appeal has also issued several very useful guides on the quantification of losses which cover topics such as “How to compensate for damage caused by the passage of time”, “What consideration is to be given to the role of victims of economic loss?”, “How do you compensate for the damage caused by an anti-competitive practice?” or “What are the economic methods that can be used to assess loss?”.

This guide notably explores the use of the counterfactual method which has been retained in a recent landmark decision by the Cour de Cassation in order to assess the loss resulting from the barriers to the growth from which the victim would have benefited had anti-competitive practices not been carried out (Cour de Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 1st March 2023, nos. 20-18.356 and 20-20.416).

The proceedings were brought by Digicel, a mobile telephone operator, which had sustained damage due to exclusionary practices implemented by the incumbent operator in the French West Indies-Guyana region. Such practices included exclusive agreements entered into with independent local distributors and with the only authorised cell phone repair center in the Caribbean, a customer loyalty program acting as deterrent for consumers to change their mobile operator at the end of their subscription period and price discrimination.

The takeaways from this decision regarding loss assessment are the following.

  • The Cour de Cassation acknowledged the possibility of an overall assessment of the damage, even though several practices had been identified. The Cour de Cassation considered that insofar as “the various practices implemented accumulated over time and reinforced one another” (Section 22), and that they led “to a single overall outcome hindering Digicel’s development on the mobile telephone market in the West Indies-Guyana region, thereby jeopardising its growth” (Section 22), the Court of Appeal therefore rightly “decided that the loss should have been assessed globally” (Section 23).
  • The Cour de Cassation considered that the harm to Digicel’s growth was not a loss of opportunity, but a lost profit and that this loss was duly quantified using a dual counterfactual analysis based on a comparison over time (before/after the practices) and with similar geographic areas.  The Cour de Cassation considered that “the loss sustained by an operator active on a market distorted by abusive loyalty, price discrimination and exclusivity practices that foreclose access to customers consists of restrictions on sales, the amount of which was recovered by implementing counterfactual methods, acknowledged by economic legal authors and necessarily based on theories whose relevance has been discussed by the parties and analysed by the judgment, on the grounds of a market functioning that would not have been distorted by the wrongful conduct identified” (Section 25).
  • The Cour de Cassation acknowledged the existence of an additional loss that could be compensated alongside the loss resulting from the eviction practices implemented by the incumbent operator. According to the Cour de Cassation, Digicel “may, in addition, request compensation for additional loss resulting, the case arising, from the loss of the opportunity to re-use, with remuneration, the sums of which it was deprived. Where the loss of opportunity claimed arises from the impossibility of carrying out an investment, the requested compensation for which is assessed at the average profitability on the capital invested in the sector at stake, it is for the victim to establish the certain and direct nature of this loss of opportunity, by providing evidence for the reality of the investment project that could not have been carried out as well as the impossibility of financing it other than with the sums of which it was deprived” (Section 37).
  • Regarding the starting point for the damages, the Cour de Cassation considered that the Court of Appeal wrongly took into account the beginning of the wrongful practices as the starting point of the interests attached to the compensation for the additional loss arising from the unavailability of the sum allocated by it for the loss of development. The Court in fact considered that such practices have lasted for several years and that at their beginning, the above-mentioned loss had not been fully established and was necessarily progressive (Section 49).
  • Lastly, the Cour de Cassation considered that the Court of Appeal had properly assessed the parties’ competing private expert opinions on loss assessment, and that it had correctly arbitrated between the diverging expert reports filed by the parties. The Court hence considered that the Court of Appeal could not be criticised for deciding to follow the analysis resulting from the expert report of one of the parties.

This landmark decision is in line with the principle of full compensation, with the Cour de Cassation affirming the Court of Appeal’s decision to acknowledge both the eviction loss and additional loss.

While there has been a strong tendency to rely on court-appointed experts for damage assessment rather than on private experts, such finding is a strong reminder that parties should absolutely appoint private experts. The parties should also ensure that they provide the court with a solid and comprehensive expert opinion, that addresses the opposing party’s potential criticisms.

Temporal Applicability of Article 13 of the Damages Directive on the Passing-On Defence

While the Damages Directive was to be transposed into national laws in December 2016 at the latest (it was transposed into French Law by Order of 9 March 2017), issues relating to the application ratione temporis remain frequent issues in antitrust litigation.

The CJEU handed down an important decision on this matter (CJEU, 22 June 2022, C-267/20, Volvo AB/DAF Trucjs NV), in which it set out the analysis to be carried out by national judges in order to determine the temporal applicability of the provisions of Directive 2014/104. The CJEU’s decision provided that “it is necessary to establish, in the first place, whether or not the provision concerned constitutes a substantive provision”. As a second step in the analysis, the CJEU ruled that “Once it has been determined whether the provision concerned is substantive or not, it is necessary to ascertain, in the second place, whether, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, in which that directive was transposed late, the situation at issue, in so far as it cannot be described as new, arose before the expiry of the time limit for the transposition of that directive or whether it continued to produce effects after the expiry of that time limit.” The Court added that “The fact remains that, where a national court has to determine a dispute between individuals, it is for that court, where appropriate, to interpret the national provisions at issue in the main proceedings, so far as possible, in the light of EU law and […] without, however, interpreting those national provisions contra legem”.

The Cour de Cassation applied this ruling in a case between Carrefour and Johnson & Johnson relating to the temporal applicability of Article 13 of the Damages Directive per which the burden of proving, in a passing-on defence, that an overcharge was passed on lies with the defendant (Cour de Cassation, 19 October 2022, no. 21-19.197). In this case, Carrefour had brought an action for damages against Johnson & Johnson, its supplier of hygiene products, on 23 January 2017, ie, after the expiry of the deadline for transposing the Damages Directive, but before the transposition into French Law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Carrefour’s action as it failed to prove it did not benefit from the anti-competitive practices, prompting it to lodge an appeal on the ground that direct effect of EU law should have led the Court to apply Article 13 of the Damages Directive and therefore reverse the burden of proof, the transposition period having expired.

The Cour de Cassation reminded that based on CJEU case law, a directive cannot, by itself, create obligations for an individual and cannot therefore be invoked as such against them. The Cour de Cassation then applied the Volvo case, ie, it considered whether it could interpret national law, upon expiry of the time limit for transposing the Damages Directive not yet transposed, “so as to render the situation at stake immediately compatible with the provisions of that directive” without interpreting French law contra legem. The Cour de Cassation considered “for acts committed prior to the entry into force of these provisions, pursuant to Articles 1382 and 1315 of the Civil Code, which have become Articles 1240 and 1353 of the Civil Code […] that the burden of proving the existence of the damage caused by an anti-competitive practice lies with the claimant for compensation and that the claimant must, in light of the usual business practices, establish that it did not pass on the additional costs arising from a cartel to its own customers […]” (Section 11).

The Cour de Cassation therefore considered that “After having established that the facts giving rise to the liability action brought by the Carrefour companies predated the entry into force of Article L. 481-4 of the Commercial Code and after having ruled that the provisions of Article 13 of the Directive were incompatible with the national law in force on the date of its transposition, the Court of Appeal rightly inferred that it could not interpret the rules of evidence applicable to the action referred to it in light of the latter text […]” (Section 12).

While this decision clarifies the issue on the temporal applicability for the passing-on defence, it is not exempt of criticism. One might argue that Article 13 should not have been considered as a substantive provision but rather a procedural one. In fact, in the Volvo case, the CJEU underlined that “it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the rules on the burden of proof and the standard of proof are, in principle, classified as procedural rules”.

Liability of Parent Companies for their Subsidiaries’ Practices

A recent decision handed down by the Cour de Cassation (Cour de Cassation, 7 June 2023, no. 22-10.545) in the scope of the so-called dairy products cartel (French Competition Authority, no. 15-D-03, 11 March 2015) has enshrined vicarious liability in a private enforcement case: the Court relied on the European case law relating to the requirement lying with the parent company to bear the burden of its subsidiary’s condemnation over which it exercises decisive influence which had been applied in the public enforcement field and ruled that it ought to be extended to actions for damages.

The Court specified that such presumption could be rebutted if the parent company provides “any evidence relating to the organisational, economic and legal links between itself and its subsidiary such as to show that the latter acted autonomously on the market and that they do not form a single economic entity” (Section 7).

Signature Litigation

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+33 1 70 75 58 00

thomas.rouhette@signaturelitigation.com claire.massiera@signaturelitigation.com www.signaturelitigation.com
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Gide Loyrette Nouel was founded in Paris in 1920 and is a leading international law firm with 11 offices worldwide. With 550 lawyers, including more than 100 partners, the firm offers legal advice and assistance across many disciplines to public and private sector institutions. Gide boasts a wealth of experience in antitrust procedures (cartels and abuse of dominant position) before the French Competition Authority, the EC and other national competition authorities. The firm also has extensive expertise in private enforcement cases before commercial and civil courts, both in standalone and follow-on actions, and has gained extensive expertise in managing selective distribution networks for brand owners (analysing their agreements in the light of antitrust rules), as well as in the fight against grey-market players. Gide is also active in merger control before the EC and the French Competition Authority, as well as before national competition authorities outside the EU.

Trends and Developments

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Signature Litigation is a law firm dedicated to dispute resolution with offices in London, Paris and Gibraltar. It has 23 lawyers in Paris (five partners, three counsel and 15 associates), who all practised at major international law firms before joining Signature Litigation. The team mainly represents clients in commercial, antitrust, banking, corporate and post-M&A disputes, complex and international litigation, arbitration, product liability and insurance/reinsurance. The firm advises companies on the scope of their compliance with vigilance duties. Thomas Rouhette and Claire Massiera have developed the firm’s antitrust litigation practice in Paris.

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