Antitrust Litigation 2026

Big Tech in Focus

The past year has delivered a series of antitrust decisions that will impact competition law for years to come. In August 2024, the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that Google had illegally maintained a monopoly in general search and search text advertising. The remedies phase, which occupied much of 2025, proved even more consequential: the Department of Justice (DOJ) sought the divestiture of the Chrome browser, mandatory licensing of Google’s search index, and behavioural obligations designed to prevent the recycling of search data as a barrier to entry. The US District Court for the District of Columbia, while barring certain exclusive deals with device manufacturers and ordering the sharing of data, refused to order a divestiture of Chrome. In April 2025, Judge Leonie Brinkema delivered a second ruling against Google, finding in United States v Google LLC that the company holds an illegal monopoly in the markets for publisher ad servers and open-web display advertising exchanges.

Digital Markets: Regulation and Litigation Converge

In the European Union, 2025 marked the first use of enforcement powers under the Digital Markets Act (DMA). In March 2025, the European Commission issued its first DMA fines: Apple was penalised with EUR500 million for failing to comply with interoperability obligations governing its App Store, and Meta was fined EUR200 million for its “consent or pay” advertising model. These decisions represent a significant shift in the enforcement model: rather than requiring proof of harm in a specific market, the DMA imposes ex ante obligations whose breach is, in itself, a sanctionable infringement. Parallel Article 102 investigations against the same companies remain active, and the interaction between the two regimes – their respective standards of proof, remedial tools, and appeal routes has become a highly debated question in EU competition law.

In the United Kingdom, the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 equipped the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) with a new “strategic market status” (SMS) designation power. By mid-2025, the CMA had opened formal investigations into both Google, in relation to its dominance in search and search advertising, and Apple, following a market investigation. Both Google and Apple ended a respective investigation by accepting commitments.

AI Infrastructure, Monopolisation and Algorithms

Competition authorities have identified the artificial intelligence sector as an enforcement priority – not merely because AI tools may be used for anti-competitive purposes, but because the infrastructure underpinning the AI economy is itself becoming highly concentrated. In September 2024, the CMA published its final report on AI foundation models, identifying significant risks arising from the market power of a small number of technology companies over cloud capacity, semiconductor supply chains, and foundational model development. Investigations followed in 2025, for example against Meta with respect to its policy regarding the restriction of access to WhatsApp for AI providers. The European Commission has made AI market structure a priority in its 2025–2029 enforcement agenda focusing on the active implementation of the EU AI Act.

In the United States, the FTC v Meta Platforms trial, which commenced in April 2025, raises the questions whether established platforms (Facebook) can use acquisitions (Instagram, WhatsApp) to entrench dominance in adjacent markets. In November 2025, the US District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) lawsuit on the basis that Meta did not monopolise the market due to competition from TikTok and YouTube.

The DOJ’s civil antitrust complaint against RealPage, filed in August 2024, addresses another concern: that the use of common pricing algorithms by competing firms can generate co-ordinated outcomes without any direct communication. The Department of Justice (DOJ) settlement with RealPage outlines the framework for the permitted use of historical price data for the training of pricing algorithms. Enforcement actions in Europe apply similar reasoning to algorithmic pricing in several industries, investigating alleged “Collusion by Code”.

EU Merger Control: Closing Gaps

Two structural questions about the reach of EU merger control have recently become prominent in the enforcement debate. The first concerns below-threshold transactions. The European Court of Justice’s (CJEU) ruling in Towercast v Mediaset (Case C-449/21, March 2023) confirmed that a concentration falling below the EU Merger Regulation’s (EUMR) notification thresholds can still be reviewed under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by a national competition authority where the acquirer is dominant.

The Commission’s own attempt to extend its reach through the referral mechanism of Article 22 of the EUMR was rejected by the courts. In Illumina/GRAIL, the CJEU ruled in 2024 that Article 22 referrals require the transaction to be notifiable in the referring member state. The Commission intends to address the impact of the decision in its pending amendment of the EUMR.

Another question concerns non-controlling minority shareholdings. In December 2025, the European Commission published its decision approving the acquisition of Just Eat takeaway by Prosus N.V., subject to several commitments. One commitment concerned the divestment of Prosus’ minority interest in one of Just Eat’s main competitors, Delivery Hero. The European Commission held that with its 27% stake Prosus was able to influence the competitive strategy of Delivery Hero. Further, the European Commission held that the structural link between Just Eat and Delivery Hero reduced their incentive to compete.

Asia-Pacific: China Sets the Pace

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), comprehensively revised in August 2022, has established the country as one of the world’s most active antitrust enforcement environments. The State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) has demonstrated both the willingness and the capacity to pursue major cases. The SAMR fined Alibaba with CNY18.2 billion and Meituan with CNY3.44 billion. Both cases focused on abuses of dominance in digital platform markets.

China’s merger control has also become a critical variable in cross-border transactions. The SAMR’s review of the proposed Synopsys/Ansys combination in 2024–2025 exemplifies a pattern in which Chinese clearance has become the critical path for transactions with limited direct nexus to Chinese markets.

Elsewhere in the region, Japan’s Mobile Software Competition Act brought Google and Apple under monitoring obligations. In South Korea, the Korea Fair Trade Commission’s (KFTC) fine against Google for anti-competitive conduct in the Android market is proceeding through the appellate courts. In Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) recommendations for mandatory platform codes of conduct are under active legislative consideration.

Labour Markets: A New Enforcement Area

Antitrust enforcement in labour markets has gained substantial momentum globally, reflecting a broader recognition that competition law applies not only to product and service markets but to the markets in which workers are employed. No-poach agreements – arrangements between competing employers not to hire or solicit each other’s staff – and wage-fixing agreements are now treated as presumptively anti-competitive in a growing number of jurisdictions.

In the United States, the DOJ’s early criminal prosecutions of no-poach agreements ended in acquittals. In April 2025, however, a home health executive was convicted by a Federal Jury for fixing nurses’ wages.

In Europe, the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (CMA) has been among the most active enforcers. The European Commission has signalled that no-poach clauses in non-M&A contexts attract the full rigour of EU competition law.

Private Damages and the Increasing Role of Litigation Funding

Private antitrust litigation has matured into a major feature of the landscape in its own right, particularly in Europe. The wave of follow-on damages claims arising from the European truck manufacturers’ cartel – in which MAN, Volvo/Renault, Daimler, Iveco, and DAF were found to have operated a price-fixing cartel for 14 years – continues to generate significant jurisprudence on the passing-on defence, overcharge quantification, and limitation periods across Spain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Portugal. In the United Kingdom, the Merricks v Mastercard collective proceedings, seeking damages on behalf of approximately 46 million consumers for interchange fee overcharges, were settled in May 2025 for a payment of GBP200 million by Mastercard.

The importance of third-party litigation funding has been explicitly recognised by the UK’s Competition Appeals Tribunal (CAT) and has transformed the economics of private claims, enabling better-resourced claimants to pursue cases that would previously have settled at a discount. Understanding the disclosure obligations, settlement dynamics, and regulatory treatment of litigation funding has become an essential component of antitrust practice across major jurisdictions.