In December 2024, a set of major constitutional reforms, including several with significant implications for antitrust law in Mexico, was approved by Congress. These reforms triggered a transformation process that led to the dissolution of the Federal Institute of Telecommunications (“Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones – IFT”) and the Federal Competition Commission (“Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica – COFECE”), two constitutionally autonomous authorities responsible for enforcing competition rules in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors (IFT) and in all other markets (COFECE). Their functions have been transferred to a decentralised agency under the Ministry of Economy: the National Antimonopoly Commission (“Comisión Nacional Antimonopolio – CNA" or the "Commission").

These changes took effect with the publication of the reforms to the Federal Economic Competition Law (“FECL”) on 16 July 2025, and the amendments to the FECL entered into force on 17 July 2025. The CNA's Board of Commissioners, comprising five members proposed by the President of Mexico and ratified by the Senate, was completed on 16 October 2025 with the designation of Andrea Marván Saltiel (previously Chair of the COFECE) as Chairwoman of the CNA, alongside Commissioners Ana María Reséndiz Mora, Oscar Alejandro Gómez Romero, Ricardo Salgado Perrilliat and Soledad Aragón Martínez. The CNA formally began operations on 17 October 2025, replacing the COFECE and the IFT (in respect of the latter's economic competition functions) as Mexico's competition authority.

It is important to highlight that although the FECL was reformed, it still does not provide for private antitrust litigation. In this regard, under the reformed FECL, only the CNA may investigate and sanction anti-competitive practices in every sector and market of the Mexican economy, including telecommunications and broadcasting, which were previously within the IFT's jurisdiction.

However, individuals may still report or, if they fulfil the requirements provided by Article 68 of the FECL, file a complaint against any alleged anti-competitive conduct. The Commission will then analyse these to determine whether there is sufficient basis to initiate a formal investigation.

Following the investigation, considering that the Commission's Investigative Authority finds sufficient evidence to support an indictment, the Board of Commissioners of the CNA will decide on the merits of the case in a trial-like proceeding. If the Board decides to sanction an economic agent for engaging in anti-competitive conduct (cartels, abuse of dominance or unlawful mergers), the sanctioned party may challenge the decision by filing a constitutional appeal (amparo lawsuit). The purpose of this appeal is to determine whether the proceedings conducted by, and the decision of, the CNA were in accordance with the Constitution, specifically whether there is any potential infringement of fundamental rights.

It is important to note that, unlike in other jurisdictions, Mexican courts do not determine whether a violation of the FECL has been committed. Nonetheless, as will be discussed, allegedly affected parties may seek compensation for damages arising from anti-competitive conduct by filing a claim before the federal courts specialised in competition, telecommunications and broadcasting.

In amparo trials challenging antitrust enforcement, courts in Mexico have traditionally deferred to the competition agency, often avoiding substantive review. This has limited the development of antitrust jurisprudence. When rulings favour private parties, they usually address procedural rather than substantive issues.

At the same time, Mexico has undergone a significant judicial reform introducing the popular election of federal judges. The first round of elections took place on 1 June 2025, and the newly elected judges and magistrates took office in September 2025, with official appointments to specific courts published in the Federal Official Gazette on 12 September 2025.

It is important to highlight that this reform directly impacts the specialised courts on competition, telecommunications and broadcasting. All three specialised district judges were elected in June 2025, several of them with prior professional experience at the COFECE or the IFT. Even though the elected judges have profiles with experience in competition matters, this is the first time in which judges have been appointed following an electoral process rather than by having a judicial career, and it remains to be seen whether this will affect the interpretive continuity of antitrust case law.

Separately, the Supreme Court's Second Chamber recently issued key rulings in Amparos en Revisión 428/2023 and 531/2024, recognising the legality of COFECE's investigatory powers regarding the use of information collected during dawn raids. The Supreme Court confirmed that the competition authority may lawfully access and use digital information from computers and mobile devices during dawn raids, as such data is considered as part of the ordinary course of business and not protected by constitutional privacy rights. These rulings are expected to support the continued use of similar investigatory powers by the CNA.

Additionally, the reformed FECL now explicitly excludes public enterprises from its scope, meaning that entities such as Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX, Mexico's integrated oil and gas company responsible for exploration, production, refining, logistics and marketing) and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE, the Federal Electricity Commission, which generates, transmits and distributes electricity across the country) are no longer subject to the FECL, including fines, investigations and other enforcement actions.

The reformed FECL also broadens the definition of absolute monopolistic practices, or cartels, expressly to capture exchanges of information, in addition to contracts, agreements and arrangements, when used to fix prices, restrict output, allocate markets or rig bids. In the authors' view, this amendment is likely to narrow the scope for defences premised on the absence of a formal agreement between economic agents.

Another significant change is that potential competitors – and not only current competitors – may engage in this type of practice.

Finally, although the new National Code of Civil and Family Procedures was recently enacted, it did not alter the framework for antitrust damages or class actions, meaning that very few claims for antitrust damages have been filed or resolved in Mexico, leaving the field largely undeveloped. However, the reform to the FECL now expressly allows plaintiffs to seek damages before the CNA's resolution is final and unappealable, introducing a new dimension to antitrust liability in the country.

As mentioned in 1.1 Current Framework for Private Antitrust Litigation, there are no private antitrust claims in Mexico. The statutory basis for a claim for damages for breach of competition regulation is Article 134 of the FECL. However, as mentioned before, the reformed FECL expressly provides that individuals can bring individual or collective actions for damages in the Judicial Branch before the CNA’s resolution is final and unappealable.

All cases are heard, without exception, by specialised competition judges and courts.

In the event of a recusal or excuse, the case is reassigned to a different judge or court, specialised in competition matters, through an expedited procedure. It should be noted that there is no possibility nor any legal procedure for a non-specialised court or tribunal to hear a case involving the application of the FECL in relation to damages' claims.

Decisions issued by the CNA are non-binding and do not create a precedent for the courts. The role of specialised judges and courts is to review the legality of such decisions and determine whether they infringe upon the fundamental rights of economic agents.

In the context of damages claims, the decision of the competition authority must be treated by the courts as conclusive proof of the existence of the unlawful conduct. Courts cannot disregard the decision or admit evidence intended to disprove it.

Moreover, the competition authority is entitled to intervene and may legitimately file class actions to claim damages. This power was first exercised in October 2024, when the now-extinct COFECE filed its first-ever class action lawsuit against Casa Saba, Casa Marzam, Farmacos Nacionales and the Asociacion de Distribuidores de Productos Farmaceuticos de la Republica Mexicana (the Mexican national association of pharmaceutical distributors), alleging that the companies had colluded for a decade by agreeing not to distribute medicines on certain days of the year, limiting the quantities supplied to pharmacies, and manipulating sale prices and discounts to pharmacies.

The COFECE calculated that this conduct reduced availability and increased medicine prices nationwide, causing harm in excess of MXN2billion. The class action follows a 2021 administrative resolution in which the COFECE fined the companies and 21 individuals MXN903.4 million, the maximum fine permitted by law at the time, and disqualified ten company directors.

Through the class action, the COFECE seeks MXN2,316 million in compensation, to be allocated to the IMSS-Bienestar programme (the Mexican Social Security Institute's public healthcare initiative aimed at providing free, universal access to primary and secondary medical services for people without social security coverage), on the basis that the health sector suffered the harm from the conduct. The outcome of this case is still pending.

The District Court initially dismissed the class action, arguing that the COFECE's resolution was not yet final and unappealable. The COFECE challenged this dismissal and requested the Supreme Court to exercise its power of attraction. In Recursos de Apelación 3/2025 and 4/2025, the Supreme Court's Second Chamber ruled that the COFECE's resolutions become final and unappealable upon issuance, as there is no ordinary appeal available against them under the Mexican legal framework, with only amparo proceedings available as constitutional review. As a result, the Supreme Court revoked the lower court's decision, allowing the class action to proceed. This criterion aligns with the reformed FECL, which allows the authority to file a class action lawsuit as soon as the CNA's decision is issued.

Building on this precedent, on 23 April 2026 the CNA filed a further class action, this time against 53 liquefied petroleum (LP) gas distribution companies, including Grupo Soni, Grupo Simsa, Grupo Nieto and Grupo Tomza, among others, arising from a resolution that found the companies had colluded for over a decade to fix prices and allocate customers across Mexico City, the State of Mexico, and parts of Colima, Tamaulipas and Sinaloa. The CNA estimated the resulting consumer harm at over MXN13 billion and, rather than seeking a direct damages payment, is asking the court to order the infringing companies to grant price discounts to all consumers in the affected areas as a form of redress. As with the pharmaceutical case, the outcome remains pending.

Conversely, resolutions from foreign competition authorities have no legal effect before Mexico's specialised competition courts in damages claims. Nevertheless, in the absence of a sufficient number of domestic precedents, foreign competition authorities' decisions have occasionally been used as a guide by Mexican competition authorities and courts.

No judgments have been issued for damages against those who have violated the FECL.

In a lawsuit seeking damages for anti-competitive conduct, the plaintiff must demonstrate the following:

• the existence of anti-competitive conduct, as established by a decision of the competition authority;
• that damages resulted from such unlawful conduct; and
• the causal link – ie, it must be proven that the damage is a direct and immediate consequence of the unlawful conduct.

In this regard, the decision of the competition authority is conclusive regarding the unlawfulness of the conduct, and no evidence to the contrary is admissible.

However, from the authors’ perspective, there is no legal presumption applicable to damages claims. Therefore, the burden of proof lies entirely with the plaintiff, who must demonstrate, through direct evidence, the existence of harm and its direct and immediate connection to the unlawful conduct.

In Mexico the “pass-on” defence is regulated by the Federal Civil Code and the Federal Code of Civil Procedures. These establish that the claimant for damages must prove that the alleged damage was caused to them, that there is a causal link between the wrongful act and the damage, and that the damage is directly attributable to the party held liable by the competition authority. Thus, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, and the standard of proof is high.

For example, it is possible for the defendant to allege that the plaintiff did not suffer any damage because of an anti-competitive practice, having transferred the overcharge to the next link in the production chain.

Under both the reformed FECL and the prior regime, the competition authority has a ten-year statute of limitations to initiate investigations into anti-competitive conduct, counted from the date the conduct was committed or ceased to exist.

In contrast, the period to initiate a damages claim is currently two years, starting from the date on which a decision by the competition authority is issued.

Regarding class actions, the limitation period is of three and a half years, calculated from the date on which the damage occurred or, in cases where the damage has a continuing nature, the limitation period shall begin to run from the last day on which the damage occurs.

Moreover, as mentioned in 1.1 Current Framework for Private Antitrust Litigation, under the reformed FECL, the initiation of a damages claim does not require the CNA’s decision to be final and unappealable. 

It has been argued that, in Mexico, there is no private antitrust litigation in the strict sense. Regarding “public” procedures, based on the authors’ experience, the processing of a case before the COFECE or the IFT – from the beginning of the investigation to the issuance of the resolution – took at least three-and-a-half years. However, it remains uncertain how long the newly created CNA will take to resolve cases, given the recent nature of its establishment.

Additionally, the trial before a specialised judge may take around two years and the review by the superior specialised tribunal can take at least one more year. If the Supreme Court reviews constitutional matters related to the FECL, this could add at least another year, making the total duration of the trials approximately four years.

Furthermore, considering that damages claims involve two instances, a trial before a federal specialised judge and, where applicable, an amparo lawsuit filed against the court’s judgment, claims for damages may take at least three years to resolve.

Currently, the Federal Code of Civil Procedures and, once it enters fully into force in 2027, the National Code of Civil and Family Procedure, set forth the procedural rules governing claims for damages and evidentiary matters.

An opting-in system has been adopted – ie, any person who does not join a class action, despite having suffered some damage derived from an anti-competitive conduct, will not be able to obtain any compensation from the exercise of the class action.

Although persons who have not joined the class action may still claim damages individually, the small amount of compensation often available on an individual basis can serve as a disincentive to pursue legal action against the economic agent declared liable by the competition authority.

As noted in 1.2 Recent Developments, there are no antitrust damages verdicts in Mexico to date. However, both directly and indirectly affected parties, including any other person, can file claims for damages, provided that the damage is an immediate and direct consequence of the anti-competitive conduct.

The basis for this is Article 134 of the FECL, which establishes that individuals who suffered damages or losses due to anti-competitive conduct may go before specialised courts to defend their rights, as noted previously, once the competition authority issues a resolution, even if it is appealable.

Finally, the authors’ opinion is that anyone can file complaints because Congress deemed it important to broaden the scope for pursuing such cases. Therefore, regardless of any influence the offenders may have over those directly or indirectly affected parties, illegal practices can still be reported and will be duly investigated.

The Federal Code of Civil Procedures establishes that the person acting as the common representative of a class must be part of the group, which must consist of at least 30 individuals. Civil associations or non-profit organisations that were legally constituted at least one year prior to filing the action may also be certified, provided their corporate purpose includes the promotion or defence of the rights and interests relevant to the matter, and they comply with the requirements set forth in the Code. Additionally, the Office of the Attorney General and the Federal Institute of Public Defender’s Office may be certified to represent the class.

At the certification stage, the judge must determine whether the claim meets the requirements established by the Federal Code of Civil Procedures. This includes, for example, a clear identification of the affected diffuse, collective, or individual homogeneous right, as well as the supporting considerations and facts that justify pursuing the matter through collective rather than individual action.

The judge must also assess whether the claim satisfies specific standing requirements, such as:

• if the alleged conduct harmed consumers as a result of anti-competitive practices, based on a resolution issued by the competition authorities;
• whether there is a clear connection between the object of the action and the harm suffered; and
• whether the action is not time-barred.

If the judge concludes that these requirements are not met, the class action will be dismissed.

Collective actions may be brought by communities of consumers or by companies that were directly or indirectly affected – such as direct competitors or businesses within the same value chain.

In Mexico, there is a single antitrust statute – the FECL – which applies throughout the entire national territory. The CNA has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce antitrust matters (in all sectors of the economy, including telecommunications and broadcasting, and only specialised federal antitrust courts are competent to hear claims for damages arising from anti-competitive conduct.

The applicable laws governing the substantive resolution of the dispute and the procedural aspects of such claims are the Federal Civil Code and the Federal Code of Civil Procedures.

The FECL does not provide for any discovery procedures; however, in the authors’ experience and following the US authorities’ practice, the now-extinct IFT and the COFECE have informally initiated requests with the characteristics of a discovery.

It is worth noting that attempts by the previous competition authorities to carry out discovery proceedings have been unsuccessful, as economic agents have argued successfully that discovery is not recognised under Mexican law.

In damages proceedings, however, parties may request the court to order the production of documents held by any person, subject to certain limitations. Such requests may only be granted if:

• the documents are not protected by professional secrecy or considered private communications; and
• the documents are relevant to the damages claim.

Legal professional privilege is a constitutional right, provided for in Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution.

In this regard, the reformed FECL incorporates in its legal text a specific procedure to guarantee the protection of communications between clients and their external lawyers. This regulatory provision represents an advance over the previous regime, in which the COFECE had established a procedure through regulatory provisions. Nevertheless, the reformed FECL clarifies that legal professional privilege applies only to communications with external counsel; communications with in-house lawyers are not protected.

With the inclusion of Article 77 Bis, the mechanism for the classification and protection of information is given greater hierarchy, aligning this right with basic principles of due process and adequate defence.

However, in the authors' view, this exclusion of in-house counsel is legally questionable. Professional secrecy in Mexico is not governed by a single unified statute, but the broader legal framework recognises it as a guarantee tied to the fundamental right to a defence, without distinguishing between external and in-house lawyers. Neither the Constitution nor the regulatory law implementing Article 5 of the Constitution draws such a distinction; the latter simply requires lawyers to keep confidential the facts they learn in the exercise of their profession, regardless of the type of engagement.

This is reinforced in the criminal sphere: the National Code of Criminal Procedure guarantees the right to a defence through licensed counsel, recognises the accused's right to confidential communication with their defence lawyer, and bars the seizure or evidentiary use of communications protected by professional secrecy, again without conditioning that protection on the nature of the lawyer's contractual relationship with the client.

Other jurisdictions, including the US and Brazil, likewise extend privilege to in-house counsel on the basis of the function performed rather than the employment relationship. On this basis, the authors consider that the FECL’s exclusion of in-house lawyers lacks normative or functional justification and creates an unwarranted procedural asymmetry to the detriment of corporate economic agents.

Regarding claims procedures, the Federal Code of Civil Procedures provides that those individuals required to maintain professional secrecy are not obliged to present documents related to the party with respect to whom the professional privilege exists.

Leniency and settlement agreements are protected by the reformed FECL, which establishes that the full benefit of the leniency programme may only be granted to companies which apply to join before the formal initiation of the investigation. Those which do so later, and until the third extension of the investigation, will be able to access minor fine reductions.

However, Article 103, applicable to leniency, does not specify clearly what is meant by “total benefit” and whether it implies exclusively to the exemption from administrative fines, or whether it also includes leniency from prosecution and the non-imposition of disqualification sanctions. In this regard, the law also establishes that Economic Agents and individuals who receive any of the benefits under this article will not be disqualified under Article 127 of the FECL and will not be subject to class actions filed by the CNA. This is without prejudice to actions that third parties may pursue.

Given that uncertainty about these scopes can neutralise the incentives to join the programme, it will be essential for the CNA to define these aspects in its secondary regulations. As of the date of writing, the FECL Regulations have not yet been issued, and the Commission continues to apply the COFECE’s pre-existing regulatory provisions on a supplementary basis in the interim.

Regarding the Procedure for Exemption or Reduction of Fines, applicable to abuse of dominance or unlawful merger cases, two scenarios are established:

• if the application is filed before the Investigative Authority of the CNA orders a third extension of the investigation period, the applicant will be able to access the “full benefit” (not yet defined); and
• if the application is filed during the Trial-Like Procedure, but before the integration of the file, a 50% reduction in the amount of the fine may be obtained.

As in the case of the leniency programme, it will be key that the regulations issued by the CNA clearly define the criteria, scope and specific benefits of each modality, to provide legal certainty to the companies interested in collaborating with the authority.

Testimonies are subject to examination and cross-examination. If someone refuses to testify, without reasonable cause, they may be fined or even subject to administrative arrest. 

While there are certain parameters for factual witnesses to be considered reliable, it is generally necessary for testimony to be bolstered by the existence of other evidence for factual witnesses to support liability for antitrust violations.

Although the FECL allows expert witness opinions as evidence, in the authors’ experience, the Mexican competition authorities do not allow them, and the CNA almost never gives weight to any such testimony. In practice, expert opinions are not treated as evidence that can support the arguments of the investigated party or help prove its position.

Expert testimony is submitted in writing, responding to questions posed by companies, the competition authorities and prosecutors.

In court, experts – who only need to demonstrate expertise in their field – present their opinions separately, and there are no alternative methods for presenting expert evidence.

In Mexico, there have been no damages awards in antitrust cases, whether in individual or class actions. Moreover, current Mexican law does not provide for exemplary or punitive damages.

However, in civil matters, there is at least one precedent in which the Supreme Court ordered a company to pay punitive damages, raising the possibility that this criterion could, as an exceptional measure, be applied in antitrust cases deemed particularly harmful (such as cartel cases).

Mexican law does not expressly provide for the payment of interest in antitrust damages cases, nor is there judicial precedent clarifying the courts’ approach, given the absence of damages' awards in this area.

Nonetheless, the authors consider it possible that courts would require that damages amounts be adjusted for inflation or updated to present value to reflect the harm caused by the anti-competitive conduct over time.

Liability is not joint and several. It is important to highlight that, for applicants to the leniency programme, the benefits granted are limited to the reduction or elimination of administrative fines and criminal immunity. However, obtaining immunity does not exempt the applicant from being sued for damages by third parties affected by anti-competitive conduct.

In other words, immunity does not prevent civil actions for damages, nor does it provide any reduction or discount on the amount of compensation owed, even if the offender has been granted administrative or criminal immunity. Therefore, the granting of immunity by the competition authority does not limit the civil liability of the applicant towards those harmed by the conduct.

There is no legal basis or procedure for claiming contributions from third parties in Mexican law, nor is there clarity on the criteria used by the courts, as there have been no judgments for damages related to violations of the Antitrust Law in Mexico.

The FECL provides for injunctive relief measures during investigations by the competition authority.

In judicial proceedings for antitrust damages, the law also allows for precautionary measures, such as the attachment and seizure of property and other actions necessary to preserve the claim and ensure the effective enforcement of any judgment, provided that

• the status quo as of the date of service of the order is maintained;
• public order, public interest, or the rights of third parties are not affected, and
• no rights are granted to the claimant equivalent to those that would be obtained through a favourable final judgment.

These measures may apply not only to the potential debtor but also to individuals who act as partners or administrators of the debtor’s assets.

There are no alternative methods to resolve disputes for damages; however, there are some authors who point out the possibility of resorting to mediation or arbitration.

However, these alternative resolution methods cannot be considered as mandatory when deriving from a non-contractual liability, that is, for the violation of the FECL.

There is no litigation funding in Mexican law. However, in certain cases, the payment of expenses and costs may be requested from the party who lost the trial for a claim for damages.

Whether the payment of costs can be awarded is determined in the respective judgment. The need to guarantee expenses and costs is not specifically foreseen in advance. The amount of costs can be determined based on the fee established by law or based on the fees that the prevailing party has paid to its attorneys during the trial of claim for damages.

Challenges to decisions of the competition agency are brought through amparo proceedings before federal specialised judges and courts (review appeal).

In contrast, appeals in damages cases are reviewed by appellate courts, which assess whether the lower court analysed the existence of harm properly, the causal link between the antitrust violation and the harm, and whether the amount awarded was determined correctly.

The parties may then challenge this appellate decision through amparo directo proceedings, allowing a higher court to review the constitutionality of the resolution. Under certain conditions, an amparo en revisión may be heard by the Supreme Court.

The reform to the FECL brought about tougher enforcement tools, including significantly increased fines, up to 15% of income for cartels and 10% for abuse of dominance, lowered merger control thresholds (reduced by approximately 11–17%, depending on the specific threshold), a shorter merger review period (reduced from 60 to 30 business days), and a streamlined process for civil antitrust litigation.

Notably, the reformed FECL now facilitates class and individual actions for damages, which can be initiated once an administrative resolution is issued, even if appeals are pending. Building on the precedent set by the COFECE’s first-ever class action in October 2024 against pharmaceutical distributors (MXN2,316 million; see 2.3 Impact of Competition Authorities), the CNA exercised this power for the first time in its own right in April 2026, filing a class action against 53 LP gas companies (approximately MXN13 billion).

The reformed FECL also shields leniency applicants from class actions brought by the authority, though not from private claims, to preserve co-operation incentives.

The CNA is also empowered to certify compliance programmes, which may serve as mitigating factors in enforcement actions, and the law explicitly excludes public enterprises in strategic sectors from its scope of application.

Under the reformed FECL there were no changes to conducts that amount to abuse of dominance. It is worth noting that, in Mexico, there are no specific provisions in competition law that refer to exploitative conduct.

However, the new framework includes several changes related to abuse of dominance. For example, an additional object or effect related to the alleged offender’s capability to limit competition is included, and additional factors for determining dominance and criteria for joint dominance are elevated to the new Law from regulatory provisions. This context reflects a growing emphasis on abuse of dominance cases alongside traditional cartel enforcement. The reform also incorporated into the FECL additional factors for assessing substantial market power and criteria for determining joint dominance that were previously contained in regulatory provisions.

The pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors remain a priority, particularly regarding cartel conduct in public procurement and drug distribution, with ongoing and new investigations in these areas. Public procurement and financial services also continue to be major enforcement and litigation arenas, especially concerning bid-rigging and barriers to entry.

In April 2026, the CNA published a draft 2026-2030 Institutional Programme outlining enforcement priorities for the coming five years, identifying six priority sectors, including food and basic consumer goods, energy, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, financial services, digital markets and telecommunications, and public procurement. Consistent with this focus, the CNA has already taken enforcement action in the corn flour and tortilla market, securing a commitment from Gruma, the country’s largest corn flour and tortilla producer, to eliminate exclusivity and minimum-purchase obligations previously imposed on tortillas sellers.

That said, it remains uncertain what criteria the newly elected judges will follow when applying the enhanced FECL provisions. The created Tribunal de Disciplina Judicial now has oversight responsibilities over the judiciary, though its practical impact on judicial independence remains to be seen.

As a result, although the FECL reform strengthens enforcement tools, its practical impact on antitrust litigation will depend heavily on how these new judicial actors interpret and implement the law.