Article 17 of the Anti-monopoly Law (AML) (amended in 2022) stipulates that actual or potential competitors are prohibited from entering into a wide range of agreements and/or concerted practices that eliminate or restrict competition, and is the primary statutory basis for challenging cartel behaviours/effects in China. The AML also provides the exemption, liability, and enforcement procedure for cartels. The Provisions on Prohibition of Monopoly Agreements (the “Provisions on Monopoly Agreement”) implemented in 2023 and the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Monopoly related Civil Dispute Cases (the “2024 Judicial Interpretation”) implemented in 2024 provide further details and elaborations.

There are also certain forms of cartel behaviours elaborated in other laws and regulations, including the Provisions on Prohibition of the Abuse of Intellectual Property to Exclude or Restrict Competition implemented in 2023, the Bidding Law amended in 2017, and the Pricing Law implemented in 1998.

In addition to the above, there are several anti-monopoly guidelines concerning diverse industries and market entities (see 1.9 Guides Published by Governmental Authorities). Though not serving as the statutory basis for challenging cartel behaviours, the guidelines are of essential reference for competition authorities in their administrative enforcement and for undertakings in their compliance efforts.

The primary authority for competition enforcement in mainland China is the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), also known as the State Anti-Monopoly Bureau. Within the SAMR, the First Department of Anti-monopoly Enforcement specifically handles cartel conduct. In 2018, the SAMR empowered the Provincial Administration for Market Regulation (AMR) to take charge of competition enforcement at the provincial level. Therefore, “Competition Authorities” in this article refer to the SAMR and AMR collectively.

Since the amendment to the AML in 2022, the People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of a city with subordinate districts (not traditionally being regarded as the law enforcement authority for cartel conduct) may file civil public interest litigation with the People’s Court based on Article 60 of the AML, if the cartel activities of an undertaking harm social and public interests. The People’s Procuratorate, with extensive power to investigate, is expected to play a more important role in antitrust enforcement in the future.

Liabilities and Penalties

Under the AML and the relevant provisions, cartel behaviours are subject to various liabilities and/or penalties, namely administrative liabilities (most common), potential civil liabilities, and possible criminal liabilities.

Administrative liabilities

For an undertaking that enters into and implements a cartel agreement, Article 56 of the AML provides that competition authorities shall:

• order it to cease the illegal act;
• confiscate its illegal gains; and
• impose a fine of:
1. 1–10% of its sales amount in the previous year;
2. up to CNY5 million in the absence of sales amount in the previous year;
3. up to CNY3 million if the monopoly agreement concluded has not yet been implemented; or
4. up to CNY1 million if the legal representative, principals and directly accountable person of the undertaking are personally accountable for concluding the cartel infringement (such personal liability was introduced by the 2022 amendment); this provision also applies to an undertaking that organises or provides substantial assistance to other undertakings in the reaching of cartel agreements.

When an undertaking hinders the Competition Authorities’ investigation by refusing to provide information, giving false information, hiding, destroying, or transferring evidence, or otherwise obstructing the process, under Article 62 of the AML, the Competition Authorities can:

• order the undertaking to correct its behaviour; and
• impose a fine of:
1. up to 1% of its sales amount in the previous year;
2. up to CNY5 million in the absence of sales amount in the previous year or if the sales amount is difficult to calculate; or
3. up to CNY500,000 in the case of an individual.

The 2022 amendment to the AML (the “2022 Amendment”) also introduces aggravating factors in the calculation of the fine, permitting an increase in the base fine amount by two to five times if “the circumstances are particularly serious, the impact is especially severe or the consequences are especially serious”.

Civil liabilities

If an undertaking violates the AML and causes any loss to others, Article 60 of the AML stipulates that it shall assume corresponding civil liability. This includes liabilities arising from civil public interest litigation initiated by the People’s Procuratorate, as well as those arising from private legal actions.

Criminal liabilities

Before 2022, the AML did not impose criminal liability. However, the 2022 Amendment enhanced the liability framework. Under Article 67, if an undertaking’s violation is grave enough to constitute a criminal offence, it will incur corresponding criminal liability. Such liabilities are pertinent only to violations outlined in the Criminal Law and its amendments, with the People’s Procuratorate having exclusive authority to initiate criminal prosecutions. Under the PRC’s current criminal legislation (for the purposes of this article, the “PRC” refers to the mainland of the People’s Republic of China, excluding the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Macao Special Administrative Region and the Taiwan Region of the People’s Republic of China), only two types of cartel-related conduct are subject to criminal liability per Articles 223 and 277 of the Criminal Law: bid rigging and egregious obstruction of enforcement. Both violations could result in fines and/or imprisonment of up to three years, with penalties initially suggested by the People’s Procuratorate and ultimately determined at the discretion of the People’s Court.

The 2022 Amendment leaves the door open for criminalising other cartel-related misconduct. Further clarification or specific provisions are expected in the future.

Under the AML, undertakings that breach its provisions and cause losses to others may be subject to private enforcement.

Article 2 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation stipulates that the People’s Court shall accept a civil lawsuit filed directly by a plaintiff under the Anti-Monopoly Law or one filed after an anti-monopoly enforcement agency has determined that the defendant’s conduct constitutes monopolistic behaviour, provided the case meets the statutory acceptance criteria.

The statutory acceptance criteria refer to Article 122 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (the “Civil Procedure Law”) amended in 2023:

• the plaintiff must be a citizen, legal person, or organisation with a direct stake in the case;
• there must be specific defendant(s);
• there must be specific claim(s), facts and reasons; and
• the case must fall within the scope of civil lawsuits accepted by the People’s Courts and within the jurisdiction of the court accepting the case.

Notably, Article 2 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation also specifies that the People’s Court shall not accept a lawsuit if the plaintiff merely seeks a declaration that the defendant’s conduct constitutes a monopoly without requesting the defendant to bear civil liability.

Cartel Conduct

There is no statutory definition of “cartel conduct” in the AML. Article 17 of the AML provides the statutory basis for prohibiting cartel conduct and the manifestations thereof: undertakings with competitive relationships are prohibited from reaching monopolistic agreements on the following matters:

• fixing or changing the price;
• limiting the production or sales amount;
• segmenting the sales market or the raw material procurement market;
• restricting the purchase of new technology or equipment or the development of new technology or product;
• boycotting transactions; and
• other matters as determined by Competition Authorities.

Article 19 further prohibits undertakings from:

• organising other undertakings in the reaching of monopolistic agreements; and
• providing substantial assistance to other undertakings in the reaching of such agreements.

Exchanging competitively sensitive information (such as pricing, cost, profit, production data, commercial strategies, revenue projections, etc) can also be considered a cartel arrangement (and, by extension, an antitrust violation) if the purpose of such exchange is to co-ordinate behaviour among competitors.

Justifications and Exemptions

Article 20 of the AML stipulates that an agreement would not be considered a violation of Article 17 if the undertaking can prove that such agreement serves one of the following purposes:

• improving technologies, researching and developing new products;
• improving product quality, reducing cost, improving efficiency, unifying specifications or standards, or carrying out professional labour division;
• improving the efficiency and enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized undertakings;
• realising public interests such as energy conservation, environmental protection and disaster relief and aid;
• mitigating serious decreases in sales or excessive production during economic recessions;
• safeguarding the legitimate interests in international commerce; and
• others as prescribed by laws and the State Council.

Regarding the first five purposes, the undertaking must also prove that such agreement will not seriously restrict competition and will allow consumers to benefit from the agreement’s outcomes.

In addition, per Article 69, the AML will not apply to alliances formed between, or the co-ordinated activities of, agricultural producers and rural economic organisations in the production, processing, sale, transportation, storage and other business activities related to agricultural products.

Limitation Periods of Administrative Liabilities

The power of Competition Authorities to impose administrative liabilities on those engaged in cartel conduct is subject to Article 36 of the Administrative Penalty Law amended in 2021. No administrative liabilities shall be imposed if the cartel infringement is not discovered within two years, which shall be extended to five years in cases involving personal safety or financial security and resulting in harm. In principle, such limitation period starts from the date the cartel conduct is committed; if the cartel conduct is of a continuous nature, such period starts from the date on which the cartel conduct ceases.

Limitation Periods of Civil Liabilities

For private civil actions, the limitation periods are governed by the Civil Code implemented in 2021 and further clarified by the 2024 Judicial Interpretations.

As prescribed in Article 188 of the Civil Code, civil actions are subject to a three-year limitation period. Such period shall commence from the date when the infringed party becomes aware, or should have become aware, of both the infringement and the identity of the infringer. Under Article 49 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretations, if the infringed party files an administrative complaint with competition authorities, the three-year limitation period is paused and will restart from the moment the complainant becomes aware, or should become aware, of the outcome of the administrative enforcement.

Article 188 of the Civil Code further provides that the civil rights of the infringed party are not protected by the People’s Court if more than 20 years have elapsed since the infringement, except for special circumstances with the approval of the People’s Court. Civil claims seeking injunctive relief, however, are not subject to any of the limitation periods per Article 196 of the Civil Code.

Limitation Periods of Criminal Liabilities

Per Articles 87 and 89 of the Criminal Law, the limitation period for current cartel-related crimes is five years. Such period starts from the date the crime is committed; if the crime is of a continuous nature, such period starts from the date on which the crime ceases.

The PRC antitrust regime has extraterritorial reach. As prescribed by Article 2, the AML shall apply to cartel infringement conduct occurring outside the territory of the PRC, provided that such conduct eliminates or restricts competition within the PRC.

For antitrust enforcement, in practice, whether the case has been, or is currently being, considered by foreign counterparts would not necessarily affect the Competition Authorities’ discretion to initiate investigations or render administrative decisions. Nevertheless, it is believed that the principles of comity would influence the enforcement process/outcome to a certain extent in cases involving foreign entities or international matters, but the precise degree of such influence remains difficult to quantify.

On the judicial front, the Civil Procedure Law amended in 2023 adopts a general rule of comity applicable to monopolistic disputes. According to Articles 280, 281 and 282 of the Civil Procedure Law, the People’s Court may suspend proceedings of a lawsuit where a litigant applies to the PRC court in writing for suspension of the lawsuit, on the ground that a foreign court has accepted the case prior to the PRC court, unless (i) the litigants have agreed on selection of the PRC court with jurisdiction, or the dispute falls under exclusive jurisdiction of the PRC court; or (ii) it is evidently more convenient for a PRC court to try the case. Additionally, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a People’s Court may choose not to accept a lawsuit if it deems itself an inconvenient forum to hear the dispute.

Enforcement actions against cartel behaviour remain robust and continuously prioritise sectors of public interest and welfare. The Competition Authorities published a total of eight cartel administrative enforcement decisions in 2024, slightly fewer than the 11 cases in 2023. All eight cases last year were initiated ex officio and targeted typical cartel conduct, including price fixing, market allocation and output restrictions. It can be observed that enforcement priorities in 2025 have been focused on domestic cartels in traditional industries that are closely related to people’s livelihoods, such as motor vehicle inspection, liquefied gas and rock wool.

In addition, the Competition Authorities have held sessions and lectures on antitrust compliance targeting major companies in certain industrial sectors, like pharmaceutical, automotive, platform economy, etc.

The following regulations/rules/guides can help to understand China’s practice in dealing with cartel conduct (all in Chinese):

• Anti-monopoly Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council in the field of Automotive (2019);
• Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council to the Application of the Leniency System to Horizontal Monopoly Agreement Cases (2019);
• Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council on Undertakings’ Commitments in Monopoly related Cases (2019);
• Anti-monopoly Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council in the field of Platform Economy (2021);
• Guidelines for Overseas Anti-monopoly Compliance of Enterprises (2021);
• Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements (2023);
• Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition (2023);
• The Notice of the Anti-monopoly Commission and the SAMR on Establishing a System of “Three Documents and One Letter” for Anti-monopoly (2023);
• Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Compliance for Undertakings (2024);
• Interpretation of the SPC on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Monopoly related Civil Dispute Cases (2024); and
• Anti-monopoly Guidelines of the Anti-monopoly and Anti-unfair Competition Commission of the State Council for the Pharmaceutical Field (2025).

In practice, cartel investigations can be triggered in one of the following ways.

• Customers, competitors and upstream/downstream parties can act as whistle-blowers (Article 46 of the AML provides that any entity may report alleged monopolistic conduct to the Competition Authorities).
• The Competition Authorities may open an investigation on their own initiative.
• Other governmental authorities may pass on related information to the Competition Authorities.
• A participant in a cartel arrangement may voluntarily confess their involvement to the Competition Authorities to seek leniency.

Following the establishment of the “Three Documents and One Letter” system for anti-monopoly enforcement in December 2023, before officially accepting a case, the authorities can now issue a Reminder Letter to the target undertaking and such undertaking must then provide a written report detailing the remedial actions taken in response.

If the remedial actions outlined in the Reminder Letter are not implemented on time, are insufficient, or if the suspected cartel activity has led to public outcry or negative impacts, the authorities can issue a Notice of Regulatory Talk. The enterprise must then submit a written report on the corrective measures taken. Failure to adequately address the issues within the stipulated timeframe, insufficient rectification, or recurrence of the issue after initial correction will lead the authorities to formally accept the case and initiate a full investigation.

Article 47 of the AML grants the Competition Authorities relatively broad investigative powers, including entering and conducting inspections at the business premises and other relevant locations of target undertakings (commonly referred to as dawn raids or surprise visits). Dawn raids are commonly employed in cartel-related cases, particularly those that are high-profile and complex or where the evidence is not easy to obtain. Obtaining the approval from the principal of the Competition Authorities would be sufficient to initiate dawn raids.

Throughout the investigation process (including dawn raids), the Competition Authorities may undertake various investigation measures (see 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony). The undertaking and its employees, or other entity/person related to the case, are required to co-operate and respond to inquiries from the Competition Authorities, to be interviewed and to submit/copy any documents and materials as requested. The competition authorities can have extensive access to all potential sources of evidence, including access to computers and working emails, account books, bank accounts, business agreements, seizure of relevant documents, etc, as deemed necessary by the authorities.

During dawn raids, the target undertaking is permitted to have legal representation, either through outside or in-house counsel, to provide on-site legal assistance. It is typically required that power of attorneys be presented to the authorities to facilitate this (see 2.4 Role of Counsel).

The spoliation of information is regarded as a refusal or impediment to the investigation. As the AML mandates full co-operation with Competition Authorities from undertakings (including its employees) being investigated during the investigation, Article 62 provides that the following actions are typically viewed as or refusals or impediments to the investigation:

• refusing to provide materials or information;
• providing false materials or information; and
• hiding, destroying or transferring evidence.

Engaging in such actions could lead to administrative or even criminal liabilities (see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties).

The AML does not provide clear rules concerning the right to counsel during the cartel investigation, nor detail the scope and limitations of such counsel’s role. In practice, any entity involved in the investigation retains the right to both in-house and outside counsel. Typically, the counsel is allowed to provide legal assistance in a variety of ways. They can assist the entity in preparing the information requested and in responding to inquiries made by the Competition Authorities, and can accompany the individual in interviews conducted by the Competition Authorities.

It is important to note that, with the introduction of personal liabilities for involvement in cartel arrangements, potential conflicts of interest may arise between the target undertaking and its legal representatives or directly accountable officers. In such scenarios, individuals may secure a separate legal counsel if needed.

At the outset of defending against a cartel investigation, the counsel would swiftly prioritise the following actions, which typically involve a swift collection and review of relevant documents, conducting interviews with key personnel and stakeholders, and maintaining effective communication with the Competition Authorities:

• identifying the concerns and the focus of the investigation;
• understanding the fundamental aspects of the undertaking and the business under investigation;
• developing the defence strategy, and organising relevant facts and evidence accordingly;
• preparing responses to inquiries from the Competition Authorities; and
• assessing the applicability of leniency, exemptions, or suspension mechanisms to mitigate potential penalties.

Article 47 of the AML allows the Competition Authorities to obtain evidence, both documentary and non-documentary, via a range of measures, provided that a written report has been submitted to and approved by the principal of the Competition Authorities:

• entering the business premises and other relevant locations of the target undertaking for inspection;
• questioning individuals from the target undertaking and other relevant parties involved in the case;
• inspecting and making copies of documents and materials (vouchers, agreements, accounting books, business correspondence, electronic data, etc) of the target undertaking and other relevant parties involved in the case;
• seizing or detaining evidence; and
• inspecting the bank accounts of the target undertaking.

Article 48 further provides that, when investigating alleged monopolistic conduct, there shall be at least two law enforcement officers present. They must show their credentials and keep written records of interviews, signed by the individuals questioned.

The Competition Authorities are also obliged to adhere to the duty of confidentiality – protect the confidentiality of the informant’s identity (Article 46) and keep confidential the trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information they learn during the course of their law enforcement activities (Article 49).

Under the PRC antitrust legal framework, attorney-client privilege, as recognised in jurisdictions such as the US and the EU, is not explicitly established. While the amended Article 38 of the Lawyers Law (2017) mandates that lawyers must maintain confidentiality for their clients, this requirement only applies to outside counsel admitted to practice in the PRC and is not generally regarded as an equivalent to attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, this confidentiality obligation is not absolute. There are certain situations where lawyers may be compelled or permitted to disclose client information, particularly when the client or others are involved in preparing or carrying out actions that threaten national security, public safety, or seriously jeopardise the personal safety of individuals.

Similarly, the privilege against self-incrimination is not explicitly recognised. In the meantime, target undertakings are required to co-operate with competition authorities and must not refuse or obstruct investigations (see 2.3 Spoliation of Evidence).

In the PRC, it is unadvisable for undertakings to resist requests from the Competition Authorities, as such resistance could be interpreted as non-compliance or interference with the investigation.

Resistance could not only carry potential legal liabilities (see 2.3 Spoliation of Evidence) but may also negatively impact the outcome of the case or result in harsher penalties for the alleged cartel activities under investigation.

However, in practice, if undertakings have reservations or concerns about the requests made by the Competition Authorities, they are permitted to engage in discussions with the authorities, which can explore the possibility of excluding information that is either irrelevant or unobtainable.

The Competition Authorities are legally obliged to comply with their duty of confidentiality regarding trade secrets, personal privacy and personal information (see 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony). Furthermore, Article 66 of the AML generally stipulates that officers of the Competition Authorities who violate these confidentiality obligations shall be disciplined in accordance with relevant regulations.

Throughout a cartel investigation, defence counsel can assist the target undertaking in presenting legal and factual arguments and mounting a reasonable defence. To this end, defence counsel may accompany the target undertaking during interviews conducted by the Competition Authorities, respond to information requests, and even proactively apply for and arrange meetings with the Competition Authorities.

Upon receiving the preliminary notice of administrative penalties, defence counsel can help the target undertaking exercise its rights to make statements, defend itself and request a hearing if the target undertaking is dissatisfied with the administrative penalties.

After the administrative penalties are finalised and the enforcement decision is issued, defence counsel may assist the target undertaking in seeking administrative reconsideration and/or applying for judicial review (ie, initiating court proceedings against the decision) should it be dissatisfied with the outcome.

Leniency Regime

Competition Authorities may waive or reduce the liabilities for the first undertaking that voluntarily reports the cartel conduct it has participated in or is participating in and that provides essential evidence. Subsequent undertakings that do the same may also receive varying degrees of leniency. The leniency regime is generally outlined in Article 56 of the AML, and further detailed in the Guidelines for Application of the Leniency Programme to Cases Involving Horizontal Monopolistic Agreements (the “Leniency Guidelines”) published in 2019. According to rough desktop statistics, among cartel cases, the percentage of cases that involve the application of leniency is relatively low.

Qualifications and requirements to obtain leniency

Undertakings must apply for leniency before receiving a preliminary notice of administrative penalties. Early reporting of cartel involvement is encouraged, and undertakings can, before filing an official leniency application, engage with the Competition Authorities either anonymously or under their real name.

To obtain leniency, the undertaking(s) must provide information and substantial evidence about the cartel conduct not already known to the Competition Authorities. It is important to note that the requirements for the scope of the information and evidence vary for the first and subsequent undertakings.

To secure leniency, the undertaking(s) must also meet all of the following requirements:

• immediately cease the cartel conduct after the application unless the Competition Authorities require the continuation of conduct to ensure the smooth progress of the investigation, and report to the Competition Authorities any existing application for leniency to foreign Competition Authorities and any requirements to continue the cartel conduct (if any);
• swiftly, continuously, comprehensively and sincerely co-operate with the investigation;
• properly preserve and provide relevant evidence and information, and refrain from concealing, destroying or falsifying relevant information;
• refrain from disclosing, without the Competition Authorities’ consent, the fact that leniency was applied; and
• refrain from any other conduct that could affect the investigation.

Exemption or reduction bands for fines under the leniency regime

For qualified applicants, the Competition Authorities may grant exemptions or reductions in fines within the following bands.

• The first undertaking providing essential evidence will obtain a reduction of 80–100%. If this undertaking submits the application and receives the Competition Authorities’ written confirmation for its application as the first in line before the initiation of the investigation, the reduction shall be 100%, provided that it has neither organised nor coerced others into reaching and implementing the cartel agreement.
• The second undertaking will obtain a reduction of 30–50%.
• The third undertaking will obtain a reduction of 20–30%.
• Subsequent undertakings will obtain a reduction of no more than 20%.

Immunity Regime

The AML also establishes the exemption system for monopolistic agreements, and the justifications and exemptions are specified in Article 20 of the AML (see 1.4 “Cartel Conduct”).

There is no separate amnesty regime applicable for any cartel-related violations under PRC legislation.

It can be said that the whistle-blower regime in China for all cartel conduct includes the leniency programme under the AML and certain public reporting mechanisms.

• Leniency Programme (see 3.1 Leniency for details).
• Public reporting – the Competition Authorities accept reports of suspected monopoly agreements, including cartels, from the public. Whistle-blowers must provide written facts and corresponding evidence of the alleged conduct.

China does not currently offer financial rewards to whistle-blowers who are not one party of the cartel (who can benefit from waived/reduced penalties through leniency).

There are no explicit legal requirements for companies to set up internal whistle-blower hotlines for cartel reporting. However, in practice, the Anti-monopoly Compliance Guide for Undertakings issued by SAMR encourages companies to establish robust internal compliance programmes, including mechanisms for employees to report potential antitrust violations internally.

Antitrust lawyers are readily available to represent clients as whistle-blowers seeking damages (via initiating a lawsuit) or a fair competition environment (via reporting to the Competition Authorities) resulting from cartel conduct.

During an antitrust investigation, all individuals related to the case, including current and former employees, shall fully co-operate with the Competition Authorities, furnishing the information and materials as requested (see 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants and 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony).

During an antitrust investigation, the Competition Authorities can inspect and make copies of documentary information from the target undertaking and others related to the case, including working emails, account books, bank accounts, business agreements, etc. The target company and others shall fully co-operate with the Competition Authorities, furnishing all requested information (see 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants and 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony).

In practice, if the target undertaking located outside the PRC has domestic affiliates, Competition Authorities would typically first approach these domestic entities. If the target undertaking has no domestic presence, Competition Authorities may request information directly from the foreign entities, provided that the suspected cartel conduct eliminates or restricts competition within the PRC, as stipulated by Article 2 of the AML (see 1.6 Jurisdiction).

Normally, without legitimate and acceptable reasons, a company or individuals within the PRC shall produce documents or evidence even if physically located abroad, provided that they have control or access to such data. Cloud storage may to a certain extent complicate such compliance duty due to cross-border data flows, but does not negate the obligation to co-operate, and the company or individuals have to navigate both submission requirements and potential applicable foreign data laws and requirements.

There are various forms of inter-agency co-operation and co-ordination within the PRC antitrust enforcement framework.

• Regarding the initiation of cartel investigations, some investigations originate from referrals by other government agencies. These agencies may identify potential antitrust violations in the course of their duties and subsequently pass on relevant clues and information to the Competition Authorities. Such referrals are not rare in practice, and serve as an important source for detecting antitrust violations.
• Throughout the investigation process, to evaluate the anti-competitive impact of the case under investigation, the Competition Authorities may engage with other agencies to solicit comments and insights on market- or industry-related issues. The Competition Authorities may also request manpower or technology support from other agencies, especially in dawn raids where it is common for personnel from different agencies to form a special task group.
• In addition, it is worth mentioning that collaboration between the Competition Authorities and judicial and prosecutorial bodies has been reinforced in recent years.

For example, on 1 November 2023, the SAMR and the Beijing Intellectual Property Court held a conference on the mechanism for linking antitrust administrative enforcement and judicial proceedings, during which they agreed to, inter alia:

• establish a routine communication and liaison mechanism;
• strengthen data and information sharing; and
• explore a mechanism for the better use of case clues and investigative evidence.

Further, on 27 March 2024, the Beijing AMR and the Beijing Municipal People’s Procuratorate signed a memorandum and reached a consensus on strengthening the transferring of case clues, enhancing collaboration, conducting joint personnel training, etc.

There are no specific rules limiting the exchange of information regarding inter-agency co-operation/co-ordination. However, during the process of antitrust enforcement, when co-operation and co-ordination between agencies are involved, the Competition Authorities must comply with the confidentiality obligation under Article 49 of the AML (see 2.8 Protection of Confidential/Proprietary Information).

The Competition Authorities actively engage in communications and co-operation with numerous foreign agencies concerning general competition policy. For instance, memoranda of understanding were signed with many enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions, including the EU, the USA, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Brazil, etc. While co-operation on specific cases is more common in merger control reviews, there has been a growing trend toward collaboration and information exchange on cross-border investigations, including those related to cartel conduct.

Additionally, the Competition Authorities and enforcement agencies from other jurisdictions engage in mutual visits and meetings from time to time. Most recently, on 11 December 2024, the SAMR Deputy Commissioner met with the Minister of Competition and Antitrust Regulation of the Eurasian Economic Commission, to exchange views on antitrust legislation, enforcement, and strengthening practical co-operation in the competition field. On 18 March 2024, the Competition Authorities hosted the European Commission’s delegation in Beijing, where they conducted the China–EU competition policy dialogue and discussed fair competition review and other related issues – to date, the SAMR and the European Commission have successfully hosted 27 sessions of the China–EU Competition Policy Week. Previously, in 2019, the SAMR led delegations to Serbia, Morocco, Portugal, South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, engaging in high-level exchanges on competition policy and antitrust enforcement. Through these activities, the Competition Authorities and foreign enforcement agencies exchange information about their significant policies, legislative updates, and enforcement actions. Meanwhile, informal interactions and exchanges of views on specific competition issues between officials from the Competition Authorities and foreign enforcement agencies may also take place.

Only the People’s Procuratorate has the authority to initiate criminal proceedings against specific cartel-related activities (see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties). If the People’s Procuratorate determines that the evidence meets the statutory threshold for prosecution, it formally files an indictment with the appropriate People’s Court to commence criminal proceedings.

According to the Criminal Procedure Law amended in 2018, jurisdiction over a criminal case lies with the court located either in the place where the crime was committed or where the defendant resides, based on which location’s court is deemed more appropriate for the handling of the case. The severity of the crime determines the level at which cases are brought. Minor offences may be heard by a basic People’s Court, while more severe cases may escalate to intermediate or high courts, or even the SPC.

Before trial, the People’s Court may convene a pre-trial meeting with the public prosecutor, the defendant, defence counsel, and litigation representatives to address procedural and evidentiary matters. The pre-trial meeting may cover the review of requests for recusal due to potential conflicts of interest or bias and exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence, etc.

The People’s Procuratorate bears the burden of proof and must present sufficient evidence to establish the defendant’s criminal conduct before the People’s Court. Defendants have the right to request that the People’s Court exclude evidence collected through illegal methods, providing relevant clues or materials to support their claims. The attorney of the defendants may gather information related to the case from consenting entities and can also request the People’s Procuratorate or the People’s Court to collect and obtain further evidence. Additionally, defendants can apply to the People’s Court to compel witnesses to appear and testify.

In the PRC, according to the Civil Procedure Law, civil proceedings are initiated by submitting a complaint to a competent court. This complaint should detail the parties involved, the factual basis of the claim, and the relief sought. Under the AML, civil proceedings could be initiated by the entity that suffers losses due to the cartel conduct or by the People’s Procuratorate at or above the level of a city with subordinate districts, in cases where the cartel conduct harms social and public interests.

For the hierarchical jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, see 6.1 Private Rights of Action.

Before trial, the court may hold a pre-trial meeting to organise evidence, clarify disputes, and address procedural issues. According to Article 225 of the Interpretation of the SPC on the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in 2022), the pre-trial conference may cover:

• clarification of claims and defences;
• examining and handling the addition to the parties, application for change in claims and counterclaim proposed, as well as claims regarding the case brought forward by a third party;
• deciding the investigation and collection of evidence according to the application of a party, entrusting an expert to conduct examination, requiring the party to provide evidence, conducting inspection, and conducting evidence preservation;
• exchange of evidence between the parties;
• summarising key disputed issues; and/or
• conducting mediation to explore the possibility of settlement before trial.

During the trials/hearings, both parties are required to present relevant evidence to support the claims they have made, and the People’s Court may also actively engage in collecting evidence. The evidence shall be presented in the courtroom and be subject to examination/cross-examination by the court or the other party. While there is no formal discovery process as seen in common law jurisdictions, parties have the option to request that the People’s Court gather evidence if it is deemed crucial by the People’s Court and cannot be obtained by the requesting party through other means. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving their claims and must demonstrate a high degree of likelihood that the fact exists.

Experts can be engaged in all types of legal proceedings, and their statements or research may be used as evidence. It is common in investigations and civil litigation for economists to be engaged in order to demonstrate how alleged cartel behaviour affects markets and competition in practice. Experts from other fields (such as technical experts from specific industries) may also be brought in to explain and clarify the definitions of relevant markets, providing a clearer understanding of the industry context and technical details – this is crucial for accurately assessing the implications of the conduct under investigation or subject to litigation.

It is possible for multiple or simultaneous legal proceedings to occur concerning the same or related facts involving a cartel infringement – administrative investigations by the Competition Authorities, civil actions by affected entities, and criminal prosecution if the conduct violates the Criminal Law.

In practice, such cases are not uncommon. For example, when antitrust litigation is initiated, it not only faces scrutiny from the courts but may also attract the attention of the Competition Authorities, potentially triggering an antitrust investigation. Moreover, administrative penalties can encourage entities that have suffered losses due to cartel activities, or are embroiled in disputes over such activities, to pursue follow-on civil litigation. If the cartel behaviour amounts to a criminal offence, the case might also be subject to criminal prosecution by the People’s Procuratorate.

The Competition Authorities have the authority to impose sanctions directly.

In accordance with the AML, the Competition Authorities can order the undertaking to cease the illegal act, confiscate illegal gains, and impose a fine up to 10% of its sales amount in the previous year. The 2022 Amendment also introduces aggravating factors on the calculation of the fine, permitting an increase in the base fine amount by two or five times (for details, see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties).

Prior to the imposition of sanctions, the Competition Authorities shall notify the target undertaking in writing of the proposed sanction and the basis thereof and notify it of its right to make statements, right to defend and right to request a hearing pursuant to the law. If such undertaking requests a hearing within the stipulated timeframe, the Competition Authorities must hold a hearing before imposing any sanctions.

Once an investigation is initiated by the Competition Authorities, it has become increasingly rare for the case to end with no action taken. Since 2021, the Competition Authorities have rarely publicly announced any decisions to suspend or terminate investigations (for reference, there was an average of three such cases per year from 2018 to 2020). However, the Competition Authorities sometimes announce ongoing investigations without disclosing the results. For example, in January 2021, the Competition Authorities publicly announced that it had launched an investigation into the China Architectural and Industrial Glass Association for allegedly facilitating certain glass companies to reach a monopolistic agreement. The results of that investigation remain undisclosed.

Article 53 of the AML has established “the Undertakings’ Commitments Regime”. During the administrative investigation of the alleged cartel conduct, the AML allows the target undertaking to commit to adopting specific measures to eliminate the impact of its behaviour within a time limit approved by the Competition Authorities and apply for suspension of the investigation. Where the commitments are sufficiently and fully fulfilled, the Competition Authorities will issue a decision to terminate the investigation.

The Provisions on Monopoly Agreement has set out detailed criteria and aspects regarding the Undertakings’ Commitments Regime and the application for suspension.

• Timing for the application matters as the Competition Authorities will not suspend the investigation if they have collected and verified sufficient evidence to conclude that the alleged cartel behaviour constitutes a monopoly agreement.
• Not all forms of cartels are qualified for applying for suspension. For suspected cartels in the form of pricing fixing, allocating markets or output/sales restrictions, the Competition Authorities will not accept the application for suspension.
• Upon the receipt of the application for suspension, depending on the nature, duration, consequences, social impact of the alleged behaviour, measures committed by the target undertaking and the expected effects, etc, the Competition Authorities may decide on suspension or not. In the enforcement practice, the Competition Authorities may also consider whether or not the undertaking would admit the existence of an infringement.

Although the Competition Authorities may decide to suspend the investigation, such suspension may not always be followed by a termination. Article 53 of the AML and Article 35 of the Provisions on Monopoly Agreement stipulate that the Competition Authorities may resume the investigation under the following circumstances, after which the undertakings’ commitments will no longer be accepted by the authority:

• the target undertaking does not comply or does not fully comply with the commitments;
• there is a significant change to the facts on which the decision on suspension of investigation is based; or
• the decision on suspension of investigation is based on incomplete or untrue information provided by the target undertaking.

Engaging in the Undertakings’ Commitments Regime allows an undertaking to avoid administrative penalties, mitigate reputational damage, and reduce the significant financial and operational burdens associated with a full investigation and potential litigation. However, if the undertaking is unable to provide effective and enforceable commitments, the Competition Authorities will continue the investigation and impose penalties, which may include substantial fines and mandatory corrective measures.

If liability or responsibility were to be established in cartel cases, there could be collateral effects in follow-on private civil litigation or the undertaking’s credit record and business activities.

Collateral Effects on Follow-On Private Civil Litigation

According to Article 10 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, if an administrative decision made by the Competition Authorities on rendering a monopolistic behaviour unlawful has not been subject to administrative litigation within the statutory period or has been confirmed by a court, there is no need for the plaintiff to provide additional evidence to prove the constitution of monopolistic behaviour, unless there is evidence to the contrary that is sufficient to overturn the conclusion.

The 2024 Judicial Interpretation also authorises the courts to require the Competition Authorities who made the administrative decision to explain the relevant circumstances, which means that the plaintiff may have the opportunity to apply to the court for evidence supporting the decision.

Collateral Effects on the Undertaking’s Credit and Business Activities

The administrative penalty decision will be announced to the public and recorded in the undertaking’s credit record in accordance with Article 64 of the AML, leaving a profound influence on the undertaking’s business activities, including but not limited to the following.

• Potential trading partners may be more cautious when considering business co-operation with such undertaking.
• The undertaking may be listed in the blacklist if the punishment is rather heavy or the undertaking refuses to enforce the administrative decision despite its ability to do so and therefore, may lose the qualification to be awarded in government procurement/bidding projects (based on the Administrative Measures for the List of Subjects with Seriously Illegal or Dishonest Acts under Market Regulation).
• The undertaking may face difficulties in the listing process.

The Undertakings’ Commitments Regime may potentially mitigate these collateral effects if the Competition Authorities decide to terminate the investigation thereof.

If the undertaking’s cartel-related infringement is serious enough to constitute a criminal offence, criminal liabilities would arise. For details, see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties.

No publicly known criminal penalties have been imposed on companies or individuals in cartel cases so far. According to publicly available information, no Chinese citizens have been extradited for antitrust cases or detained for plea bargaining in other jurisdictions.

Since the implementation of the AML in 2008, the largest fine in amount was imposed by the National Development and Reform Commission (the NDRC) on eight Japanese auto parts makers in 2014, for reaching and implementing the price-fixing agreements, with a total fine of CNY831.96 million, which is the largest amount of fine in cartel cases to date.

From the perspective of penalty severity, the Guangdong sea sand case saw the highest percentage-based fine, with the authority imposing the maximum possible fine of 10% of the previous year’s revenue – over 20 companies were found to have formed an alliance to negotiate production fees and fixed sales prices, which resulted in a surge in sea sand prices in the province, and as a result, the Hong Kong Zhuhai Macau Bridge artificial island project was delayed due to budget over-expenditure.

Over the past five years, based on publicly known information, the average total penalty per cartel case was around CNY50 million, though total amounts have varied widely – from as low as about CNY70,000 to over CNY700 million.

Under China’s antitrust legal framework, there is no statutory provision requiring the Competition Authorities to consider an undertaking’s “effective compliance programme” when determining sanctions and penalties for cartel infringements.

However, the 2024 revised Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Compliance for Undertakings have introduced a compliance incentives mechanism. This allows the Competition Authorities to conduct a substantive review of the target undertakings’ antitrust compliance programme – assessing its completeness, authenticity and effectiveness, and considering the findings as a mitigating factor when evaluating suspension applications, leniency applications, sanctions and penalties.

The criteria for this substantive review are comprehensive, including but not limited to:

• whether there is a systematic management system, a full-fledged compliance management organisation, and a proportionate compliance risk management mechanism;
• whether the undertaking has strictly implemented the compliance programme and truly fulfilled its antitrust commitments; and
• whether the undertaking has adopted effective compliance supervision and supporting measures.

Sanctions imposed through an administrative penalty decision do not include mandatory consumer redress. However, consumers affected by cartel infringements may seek compensation by filing a lawsuit in the People’s Court if they have suffered damages.

Article 65 of the AML allows an undertaking who disagrees with the administrative decision made by the Competition Authorities against its cartel infringement to either apply for administrative reconsideration, or to apply for judicial review. According to the Administrative Reconsideration Law and the Administrative Procedure Law, administrative reconsideration can be applied within 60 days from the date of receiving the decision; judicial review can be applied within six months from the date of receiving the decision. In addition, if the undertaking applies for administrative reconsideration and is not satisfied with the outcome, it can also apply for judicial review within 15 days from the date of receiving the reconsideration outcome. For judicial review, if the undertaking is not satisfied with the judgment of first instance, it can appeal to a court of a higher level.

Compared to the number of antitrust civil litigation cases, the number of judicial reviews towards administrative decisions on monopolistic conduct is relatively low, among which the cases concerning cartel infringement amount to a large proportion. In addition, Competition Authorities were supported in all cases except those in which a final outcome has yet to be made.

According to the Provisions on the Administrative Punishment Procedures for Market Regulatory Departments, the Competition Authorities shall verify the clues of violations discovered within 15 working days of the discovery to decide whether to place the case on file, and the time period may be extended for 15 working days under special circumstances. Once the case is filed, a decision shall be made within 90 days, which may be extended for 30 days due to complicated case factors or other reasons. Where a decision cannot be made after an extension, the Competition Authorities may continue the extension within a reasonable period.

In practice, the duration of a cartel enforcement investigation can vary considerably depending on the complexity of the case, the availability of leads and the difficulty of the investigation. Based on the cartel enforcement practice over the past five years, the entire process – from the case being placed on file to the issuance of the administrative decision – may take around two years on average, with the shortest lasting over 100 days and the longest exceeding 2,000 days.

Any private firms and/or individuals who suffer losses attributed to a cartel infringement may bring a civil lawsuit before the People’s Court pursuant to Article 60 of the AML and Article 2 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation. The People’s Court will accept the case if it meets the legal requirements for case acceptance. Notably, the Competition Authorities’ formal decision of the existence of a cartel infringement is not a necessary element for the private actions to proceed.

The 2024 Judicial Interpretation further stipulates hierarchical and territorial jurisdiction for a private right of action against cartel infringement. For hierarchical jurisdiction, the court of first instance would be (i) intellectual property courts and (ii) intermediate People’s Court designated by the SPC. For territorial jurisdiction, it shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Law and the relevant judicial interpretation on the jurisdiction for tort disputes, contractual disputes, etc, based on the specific circumstances of the case.

Regarding the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, they typically include cessation of infringement, compensation of losses, etc. With the introduction of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, the People’s Court can also order the defendant to bear the legal liability of making necessary acts to restore competition where it finds the defendant’ cease of the alleged monopolistic behaviour is insufficient to eliminate the effect of exclusion or restriction of competition.

The types of collective actions against cartel infringement include public interest litigation and representative action.

Public Interest Litigation

Article 60 of the 2022 Amendment empowers the People’s Procuratorate to bring a civil public interest litigation with the People’s Court (see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties).

Representative Actions

The representative actions mechanism within the civil procedure legal regime can theoretically be applied against cartel infringement, if several individuals or companies suffered damages caused by the same cartel infringement (eg, several buyers of a price fixed products).

According to Articles 56 and 57 of the Civil Procedure Law, in a representative action, the representative plaintiff can be elected by consensus or the People’s Court may assist in appointing a representative plaintiff. The judgment or ruling made by the People’s Court shall be binding upon all the right holders being represented, and those unregistered right holders who file a lawsuit within the limitation of action.

At present, there is no statutory basis on how the People’s Court would handle claims brought by indirect purchasers or “passing-on” defences. There are limited precedents in this regard. Despite this, as mentioned in 6.1 Private Rights of Action, any natural person, legal person or unincorporated organisation, regardless of being direct or indirect purchasers, who suffer losses attributed to a cartel infringement is entitled to file an antitrust civil lawsuit.

Judicial practice has also affirmed the plaintiff standing for indirect purchasers. In the case Tian Junwei v Carrefour et al Monopolization Dispute (case No (2014) Jing Zhi Min Chu Zi No 146), the Judge found that the current antitrust legislation framework “does not exclude indirect purchasers’ right to bring an anti-monopoly civil litigation”. However, the Beijing IP Court did not expand further on any specific rules such as the standard for recognising an indirect purchaser or the process to be applied.

The People’s Court may request and use evidence obtained in administrative proceedings, based on the following.

Under Article 67 of the Civil Procedure Law and Article 94 of the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretation of the Application of the Civil Procedure Law, the People’s Court should investigate and collect evidence that parties cannot obtain on their own due to objective reasons, which includes evidence held by relevant state authorities that parties and their legal representatives do not have the right to access or retrieve. Additionally, Article 10 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation allows the People’s Court to request the Competition Authorities to clarify relevant aspects of that decision when necessary.

Moreover, the SPC has indirectly affirmed this principle in a ruling on a vertical monopolistic agreement (case No 2020, Supreme Law Zhi Min Zhong, No 1137). While not related to cartel behaviour, this case offers relevant insights. In that instance, after the Competition Authorities concluded that the defendant had engaged in a vertical monopolistic agreement in violation of the AML, the plaintiff pursued a civil lawsuit. The judicial opinion indicated that the trial court obtained certain evidence from the Competition Authorities, such as distribution contracts forming the basis of the administrative decision (for further information, see 5.3 Effect of Liability Being Established).

Based on publicly available information, the People’s Court has accepted over 1,000 first-instance cases concerning antitrust disputes since the implementation of the AML in 2008. There are no official statistics as to the ratio of cases being dismissed or settled. Among those, cases relating to cartels amount to a small portion of less than 20%.

China does not have a discovery process as seen in the common law jurisdictions. Instead, the People’s Courts rely on a civil law approach, where parties submit evidence independently. However, according to the AML and Civil Procedure Law, the People’s Courts can request specific evidence, and parties may apply for court-facilitated evidence collection, particularly when the information is held by the opposing party or third parties. For details of the allocation of burden of proof, see 4.7 Issuing Civil Complaints; for details of the People’s Courts' power to require evidence from the third party, see 6.4 Evidence Obtained From Governmental Investigations/Proceedings.

As regards the typical timeframe of cartel-related litigations from the acceptance of the cases by the People’s Court to resolution, according to the Civil Procedure Law, cases of first instance are generally subject to ordinary procedures and the People’s Court should complete the review within six months from the date of case acceptance. The review of cases of second instance should be completed within three months from the date of case acceptance for the second instance. The aforementioned timeframes can be extended upon approval. However, it is important to note that cases involving foreign elements are not bound by these timelines and can last for several years.

According to Article 45 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation, the People’s Court may, based on the plaintiff’s request, include reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff for investigation and curbing of the anti-competitive behaviour. In several established rulings, the SPC has recognised that the attorney fee amounts to the “expenses incurred by the plaintiff for investigation and curbing of the anti-competitive behaviour”. Therefore, successful and reasonable attorney fees paid by the plaintiff can be compensated by the defendant. Usually, the plaintiff needs to submit the engagement agreement and relevant invoices, etc, to substantiate its claim.

Typically, unsuccessful claimants are not obliged to pay defence costs and/or attorney fees to the defendant but would need to bear litigation fees.

Trial of Second Instance

According to the Civil Procedure Law and relevant rules, any litigants who disagree with the judgment of the first instance relating to an antitrust dispute can appeal to the Intellectual Property Tribunal of the SPC within the timeframe set by the Civil Procedure Law. To start the proceedings, the litigant shall formulate a petition as per Article 172 of the Civil Procedure Law and submit the petition to the court that originally heard the case, which would then transfer the petition, together with the case files and evidence, to the SPC. The SPC would examine the relevant facts and applicable laws relating to the appeal.

Re-Trial

Re-trial is targeted at a judgment or ruling which has already come into effect. A litigant who deems that there is an error in such judgment or ruling may apply for re-trial. The standards for the People’s Court to successfully initiate a re-trial are rather strict (more details can be found in Article 211 of the Civil Procedure Law) and a re-trial in relation to a cartel infringement is rarely seen in practice.

Exchanging competitively sensitive information among undertakings may be deemed a cartel arrangement if such conduct amounts to a concerted practice as defined by Article 16 of the AML.

It is important to first clarify what constitutes competitively sensitive information. While the AML does not explicitly define its precise scope, the 2024 revised Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Compliance for Undertakings gives some insights – including the cost, price, discount, quantity, quality, turnover, profit or profit margin of the goods, as well as the research and development investment, production and development, investment, production, marketing plans, customer list, future business strategies and other information closely relating to market competition of an undertaking, except for information that has been publicly disclosed or is available through open channels.

Secondly, the exchange of competitively sensitive information does not necessarily constitute a violation, but will amount to a “concerted practice” under the AML if certain conditions set out in Article 18 of the 2024 Judicial Interpretation are met. When determining whether a concerted practice exists, the People’s Court shall take into account the following factors.

• (1) Whether there is a consistency of the market behaviours of the undertakings.
• (2) Whether there has been any meaningful contact, information exchange or transfer between the undertakings.
• (3) The market structure, competition, market changes and other information in the relevant market.
• (4) Whether the undertakings can provide a reasonable explanation for the consistency of their behaviours.

Where the preliminary evidence provided by the plaintiff in items (1) and (2), or in item (1) or (3), can prove that there is a relatively high possibility of concerted practice, the defendant shall provide evidence or make a full explanation to reasonably explain the consistency of their behaviours. If no reasonable explanation can be made, the People’s Court may find that the concerted actions are established.

In practice, cartel cases in relation to information sharing are not uncommon, especially in cases involving price-fixing, market allocation, and other hard-core behaviours. What is more, in recent years, guidelines in relation to antitrust compliance issued by the Competition Authorities for different fields and subjects (such as intellectual property, trade associations, pharmaceutical field, and internet platforms) have clearly noted the risks of competitively sensitive information exchange and given appropriate warnings.

The Competition Authorities have shown increasing concern about the use of AI and pricing algorithms in antitrust area, which is reflected in the regulations and guidelines issued by the authority. In particular, Article 9 of the 2022 Amendment stipulates that undertakings shall not use data, algorithms, etc, to engage in any monopolistic practice, which provides a statutory basis for the enforcement agency. The State Council and various provincial competition authorities have also issued anti-monopoly guidelines for the platform economy – warning platform operators against using algorithms to reach monopolistic agreements, such as fixing or altering prices. In addition, the Interim Measures for the Administration of Generative AI Services specifically stipulates that the provision and use of generative AI services must respect intellectual property, commercial ethics, and confidentiality, and must not use algorithms, data, or platform advantages to engage in monopolistic or unfair competition behaviour.

While the PRC has not yet seen an established cartel case solely based on AI-driven tools or pricing algorithms, there have been other anti-competitive enforcement actions involving the use of such tool. In the two well-known “either/or choice” cases in 2021 where two platform companies in China were punished by the Competition Authorities for abuse of dominance, AI systems were employed to facilitate monopolistic behaviour.

Monopolisation and cartel offences are normally regulated under different provisions of the AML. Monopolisation is primarily addressed under the Articles in relation to the abuse of dominance, while cartel offences fall under the Articles in relation to monopolistic agreements. Therefore, monopolisation is not directly viewed as a cartel offence.

In recent years, the pharmaceutical and public utilities sectors have consistently been key regulatory focuses.

For the pharmaceutical industry, the Competition Authorities have published at least 18 decisions from 2021 to 2024, of which eight cases involve cartel offences. On 19 March 2025, the Shanghai AMR penalised three pharmaceutical companies for a horizontal monopoly agreement, and for the first time, individuals responsible for the monopoly agreement were also held accountable, marking a significant breakthrough in enforcement. From the statutory perspective, following the Guidelines on Antitrust in the field of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients published in 2021, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Pharmaceutical Sector was published on 23 January 2025, replacing the old guidelines and indicating the Competition Authorities’ focus on this particular sector.

As it is directly connected with people’s livelihoods, the public utilities sector has always been a key focus of law enforcement. Based on the estimated data, over 20% of cartel cases from 2021–2024 involve the public utilities sector.

In addition to the above-mentioned industries, at the beginning of 2025, SAMR said that the platform economy and other sectors related to public welfare (including natural monopolies) will still remain the key regulatory focus.

For more information, see 1.8 Enforcement Priorities.

The Competition Authorities rely on the general rules on evidence preservation under the AML to deal with the preservation and potential loss of evidence in cartel cases involving messaging applications and chat platforms. According to the AML, if a company is found to have deliberately destroyed or failed to produce relevant evidence, it may face severe consequences (see 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties).

SAMR has not issued specific guidelines on this matter.

Although the AML and its supporting regulations do not explicitly classify “no poach” agreements or labour market allocation as monopoly agreements, nor have there been any known enforcement actions, there are indications that these issues have been under the Competition Authorities’ radar. On 31 July 2023, the Competition Authorities disclosed that it had interviewed four major hog farming companies, informing them that their agreement to sign a “Mutual Non-Poaching Pact” violated the spirit of the AML, which was interpreted as China’s first antitrust enforcement action targeting “no poach” agreements.

However, the standards for determining when a no-poach agreement constitutes cartel behaviour have not been clearly defined, and no further legal clarification has been provided.

See 3.1 Leniency.

Over the past five years, the majority of publicly known cartel cases in practice concern the Chinese market only.

However, China’s international antitrust enforcement might be intensified, as seen in SAMR’s recent investigations into NVIDIA, Google and DuPont. Meanwhile, China is enhancing co-operation with foreign regulators, exemplified by the first China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Antitrust Dialogue in March 2024. These developments suggest that cross-border enforcement actions may increase, particularly in technology, semiconductors and digital platforms.

China’s AML and its supporting regulations have not yet established explicit provisions or guidance on antitrust issues related to ESG, but it is understood that cartel co-ordination (collusion among competitors, standard manipulation, industry alliances, joint commitments, sustainability pacts, etc) under the guise of ESG would be strictly scrutinised and prohibited, and the Competition Authorities have already monitored ESG-themed cartels.

The post-pandemic inflationary pressures and supply chain disruptions have led to rising costs and intensified price competition, which may increase the likelihood of cartel agreements among undertakings.

A notable cartel case involved motor vehicle inspection companies in Liupanshui City, where firms colluded to raise service prices. The Competition Authorities found that heightened price competition following the pandemic was a key factor that drove these businesses to reach and implement a monopoly agreement.