Preliminary Note
In December 2024, a constitutional reform was approved introducing two major changes to the competition enforcement landscape in Mexico.
Importantly, the implementation of this reform remains contingent upon the enactment of new secondary legislation, including a new Competition Law and a new Telecommunications Law. These laws will define the scope of institutional restructuring and may also introduce substantive changes – such as increased sanctions for hardcore cartels, modifications to the leniency programme, or revised rules on attorney-client privilege.
As of early 2025, both COFECE and the IFT remain fully operational, and the existing legal framework continues to apply. The timing and content of the legislative transition remain uncertain, and the practical effects of the reform will depend on how the new legal framework is ultimately defined.
Consequently, the information contained herein may be subject to change depending on the provisions of the forthcoming Competition Law.
Cartel Conduct
Cartel conduct in Mexico is primarily governed by the following legal instruments.
Currently, cartel conduct is investigated and sanctioned by two specialised agencies: the COFECE and the IFT, depending on the sector involved.
In Mexico, two federal agencies are currently responsible for investigating and sanctioning cartel conduct.
These agencies have exclusive authority to investigate and sanction cartel behaviour through administrative proceedings. Civil actions – whether for damages, lost profits, or collective claims – may only proceed once the agency’s decision becomes final and is upheld, if challenged, by the specialised federal courts.
Criminal and Administrative Liability
Cartel conduct may also trigger criminal liability. The agencies can file complaints with the Federal Attorney General’s Office, and individuals found guilty may face prison terms ranging from five to ten years, in addition to any administrative fines.
Entities involved in cartel conduct may be fined up to 10% of their annual income. In addition, individuals may be disqualified for up to five years from holding executive, managerial, or decision-making roles in companies operating in related markets in addition to administrative fines.
If the conduct is repeated, the fine may be doubled due to recidivism.
Judicial Review and Compensation
Specialised courts in competition, telecommunications, and broadcasting review the agencies’ decisions. Their rulings can be appealed before specialised federal courts of appeals. Claims for damages and lost profits may only be brought once the agency’s decision becomes final.
Institutional Reform and Expected Changes
As noted in 1.1 Legal Bases, a constitutional reform was approved in December 2024, which provides for the creation of a new competition authority under the Federal Executive. The implementation of this reform is pending, as it requires the enactment of new secondary legislation, including a new Competition Law and a new Telecommunications Law, which remain under discussion in the legislature.
Private enforcement in Mexico is limited to civil claims for damages and lost profits resulting from cartel conduct. These actions – either individual or collective – can only be filed once the competition authority’s decision has become final. This type of civil claims remains uncommon in practice.
Affected parties may bring civil claims before the specialised competition courts to seek compensation, but they cannot independently initiate proceedings to investigate or sanction cartel conduct. Those authorities remain exclusively with the competition authorities.
Definition of Cartel Conduct
Cartel conduct – legally known as absolute monopolistic practices – is strictly prohibited under Mexican law and is considered illegal per se. This means the conduct is presumed unlawful regardless of its actual effects on the market.
There are five types of conduct explicitly defined as cartel behaviour.
These practices are null and void under the law and can lead to severe administrative and criminal sanctions.
Exemptions or Sector-Specific Exclusions
There are no statutory or jurisprudential exemptions or exclusions for cartel conduct in any industry. All sectors, including regulated ones, such as energy, healthcare and telecommunications, are subject to the same prohibitions.
However, the Mexican Constitution (Article 28) establishes certain areas reserved to the State, which are not subject to competition law. These are not exceptions to cartel rules per se, but rather structural exclusions from the scope of the law. These include:
In Mexico, private parties cannot bring a private lawsuit to challenge cartel conducts directly. Instead, cases must be investigated and sanctioned by the competition authorities through administrative proceedings. The competition authority’s legal power to investigate and sanction cartel conduct is subject to a ten-year statute of limitations, which begins on the date the conduct ends. If this period expires without formal investigative action, the case can no longer be pursued.
In cases of damage and lost profit claims, the limitation period and procedural requirements are tied to the issuance of a final and binding resolution by the authority. Only then can affected parties bring a civil claim before courts.
The Mexican competition authority, based on the effects doctrine, has jurisdiction not only over conduct that occurs within Mexican territory, but also over conduct carried out abroad if it produces effects in Mexican markets or harms Mexican consumers.
Even if conduct among competitors takes place entirely in a foreign country, the agencies may investigate and sanction it if there is evidence that the conduct had an impact on competition conditions in Mexico.
Additionally, the agencies may engage in cross-border co-operation through international agreements and treaties. They regularly collaborate with foreign competition authorities in global cartel investigations, particularly when conduct spans multiple jurisdictions or affects international supply chains.
Although the concept of comity is not explicitly codified under Mexican law, its principles are implicitly recognised and applied through international co-operation mechanisms. Mexico participates actively in bilateral and multilateral agreements that promote co-ordination in competition enforcement, including the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), and engages with global forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Competition Network (ICN).
In practice, the competition authorities apply principles of comity by:
These practices reflect a commitment to international co-operation and mutual respect among enforcement agencies, even in the absence of formal treaty obligations.
In Mexico, most cartel enforcement actions focus on price fixing, which remains the most commonly investigated and sanctioned form of absolute monopolistic practice. Bid rigging is also significant, particularly in sectors where formal procurement processes are used. Additionally, there have been cases involving market allocation and output restriction, which often appear as complementary or associated conduct within broader price-fixing schemes.
Most cartel cases are domestic in nature, with only a small number involving cross-border conduct. However, there is growing engagement in international co-operation, as seen in recent investigations into global industries such as fragrances.
In terms of detection, ex officio investigations currently outnumber leniency applications. While the leniency programme remains a key enforcement tool, its use has declined in recent years despite some rebound. As a result, the competition authorities have relied increasingly on proactive investigation strategies to detect and prosecute cartel behaviour.
COFECE and IFT regularly publish non-binding guidelines to help stakeholders understand cartel enforcement.
COFECE’s guidelines (last revised in 2020), include the following.
These documents are available on COFECE’s website.
IFT guidelines focus on the following.
This information is available on the IFT’s website.
These documents are key interpretative tools but are not legally binding.
Cartel investigations in Mexico may begin in four ways.
To open a case, the authority must identify an objective cause – a preliminary indication of cartel conduct (eg, price alignment or suspicious co-ordination).
Once initiated, the agency has 30–120 business days, extendable up to four times, to investigate confidentially. During the first period, an initial ruling is published in the Federal Official Gazette, describing the relevant market and conduct under review, but not the parties.
If sufficient evidence is found, the agency issues a Statement of Probable Liability and begins a trial-like procedure. The accused have 45 business days to respond and offer evidence, followed by testimonial or expert submissions, closing arguments, and a hearing before the Board of Commissioners. The Board then decides whether to confirm liability or dismiss the case for lack of evidence.
Dawn raids are a common enforcement tool in cartel investigations by COFECE and IFT and may occur even before the case is formally opened. Entities must fully co-operate; obstruction can trigger enforcement measures and, if supported by other evidence, lead to a presumption that the alleged facts are true.
Inspectors may access offices, devices, emails, and files, take photos or videos, and copy physical or digital documents – except those protected by attorney–client privilege. They cannot seize originals. Company staff must assist by identifying relevant areas, providing requested documents, and answering questions. Two witnesses appointed by the firm must sign the official minutes, which may also include objections or comments.
Procedural Framework
Dawn raids must follow a formal process.
The maximum legal duration of a dawn raid is two months, which may be extended once for an additional two months. However, in practice, the authority conducts continuous, uninterrupted visits, meaning that most dawn raids last anywhere from a few hours to several consecutive days, during which the inspection team systematically reviews documents and extracts information relevant to the investigation.
At the end of the dawn raid, the visited company receives an official record which includes details of the visit, the information extracted, any relevant notes on the chain of custody, and the statements or observations made by the two witnesses appointed by the company.
While companies do not receive full copies of all extracted materials, the agency may grant access to, or copies of, the digital or physical information that was collected – particularly if it is relevant for the company’s defence during the subsequent administrative proceeding.
Destroying, concealing, or altering relevant documents or digital files may be deemed obstruction of the competition authority’s powers. This can result in administrative fines and, if supported by other evidence, lead to a presumption that the facts being investigated are true.
If such conduct is detected – particularly during a dawn raid – it may also be treated as a criminal offence (eg, obstruction of justice), punishable with imprisonment under applicable criminal laws.
Companies and individuals have the right to legal counsel during dawn raids or interviews, but enforcement agents may proceed without waiting for the lawyer’s arrival. Once present, counsel may observe, advise, and request comments be included in the official record, but cannot obstruct the process or speak on behalf of interviewees.
Counsel’s role includes helping employees navigate interviews, ensuring legal safeguards are respected, and assessing potential exposure. In cartel cases, companies often retain external antitrust lawyers and economists early on, though this is not mandatory.
Receiving a request for information or being raided signals the need to begin preparing a defence, even if the company’s role in the investigation is not yet clear.
The enforcement agencies gather key evidence through the following methods.
The Investigative Authority may conduct proactive intelligence through internal monitoring and sector analysis. All evidence must be collected in accordance with due process, and only material directly related to the alleged conduct is admissible. Improperly obtained evidence may be excluded.
Under the Mexican competition framework, attorney-client privilege applies to communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, provided the lawyer involved is legally authorised to practise law, regardless of whether they are external or in-house counsel. COFECE does not distinguish between the two, as confirmed by its 2021 regulatory provisions on the classification of privileged legal communications.
During a dawn raid or investigation, companies may request that certain documents be treated as privileged. The request must be noted in the official minutes of the visit, and the company has up to 20 business days after the conclusion of the raid to formally submit a written request. This request must include the following.
Once the agency determines that the information qualifies as privileged, it cannot use the content as evidence or assign it any legal value, regardless of whether it was labelled “Privileged and Confidential.” Labels are indicative, but not determinative.
Other Legal Protections
Individuals and companies also benefit from constitutional guarantees, including the following.
A key protection is the right against self-incrimination, which has been explicitly recognised by the Mexican Supreme Court (SCJN) and federal courts beyond the criminal context. Individuals involved in cartel investigations – especially during testimonial appearances – may lawfully refuse to answer questions that would expose them to liability for anti-competitive conduct. This right protects both verbal and written statements and applies throughout the proceedings.
The SCJN has held that the investigative powers of COFECE do not override this right, and that failure to co-operate cannot be used as an indication of guilt. Specifically, the Court stated that while economic agents are required to collaborate in investigations, the refusal to provide information that may be self-incriminating does not imply liability. Rather, the burden remains on the authority to prove its allegations using objective evidence.
These constitutional guarantees apply fully during dawn raids, interviews, and formal proceedings, and must be respected by the enforcement authorities at all times.
In general, individuals and companies tend to co-operate with Mexico’s competition authorities. However, there have been isolated cases in which economic agents have resisted or failed to comply with requests for information, obstructed dawn raids, or delayed responses to formal requirements.
Agencies may apply the following enforcement measures in case of non-cooperation:
These sanctions are applicable even during the investigation phase and may escalate if the conduct is deemed to obstruct the agency’s legal duties. The imposition of such measures is recorded and may be considered an aggravating factor when calculating the final penalty.
Although not common, cases of non-compliance – particularly delays in producing requested information or attempts to limit access during inspections – have occurred. Companies are therefore advised to respond promptly and thoroughly to all agency communications and to consult counsel as early as possible in the process.
The competition authority may classify information obtained during investigations as public, reserved, or confidential, depending on its nature and the risk posed by its disclosure.
To request confidentiality, the submitting party must justify the request, provide a non-confidential summary, and show that disclosure would cause harm or breach legal protections. These protections apply to investigated parties, third parties, and witnesses alike.
Classification is governed by the Mexican Competition Law and national transparency and data protection rules.
Legal and factual arguments may be raised at two procedural stages.
During the investigation phase, companies and individuals may receive official requests for information. These notices indicate whether the recipient is under investigation or simply contributing information as a third party. Even at this early point, defence counsel can submit explanations, relevant documents, and supporting materials that help clarify the facts or mitigate suspicion of wrongdoing.
In the trial-like stage, once the agency issues a Statement of Probable Liability, the accused party has 45 business days to submit a formal defence. This includes the following.
Parties may also present closing statements and request a hearing before the agency’s decision-making body. These tools allow the defence to contest the allegations before a final resolution is issued.
Mexico operates a formal leniency programme available to companies or individuals that have participated in cartel conduct. The programme is not limited to a single applicant; several participants in the same case may request benefits depending on their position in the queue and the value of their co-operation.
To qualify, applicants must:
If these conditions are met, the first applicant may receive full immunity or be subject only to a symbolic minimum fine, typically imposed to preserve a formal record of the sanction. This allows the authority to include the participant in the public register of sanctioned entities. Subsequent applicants may also benefit from fine reductions – typically 50%, 30% or 20% – depending on their place in line and the relevance of their evidence.
The leniency programme is discretionary: although the requirements are clearly defined, the authority evaluates each case based on the applicant’s co-operation and timeliness.
A marker process exists, allowing an applicant to secure a position in line while finalising their submission. Once a marker is granted, the applicant has a limited period to provide the required documentation and evidence.
Use and Effectiveness
The programme has been an essential tool in uncovering cartels, but its use has varied. Filings peaked in 2016 with 26 applications, dropped to just two in 2021, and later rose again to 15 in 2023 before falling to eight in 2024. While the exact number of successful applications is confidential, COFECE has reported that many investigations originate from leniency, even when initiated ex officio.
To strengthen the programme, COFECE has proposed improvements such as the following.
The authority has also published non-binding guidelines outlining the procedural steps, co-operation expectations, and conditions under which leniency may be revoked.
Mexican law does not provide for a standalone amnesty regime. Instead, a conditional leniency programme allows cartel participants to reduce sanctions by ceasing their conduct, submitting evidence, and fully co-operating with the authority. Full immunity – ie, exemption from administrative fines – is not guaranteed, and no total immunity or unconditional amnesty exists under Mexican law.
Mexico does not have a whistle-blower regime specific to cartel enforcement. The Competition Law provides no protection or incentives for individuals who report cartel conduct without being participants.
However, limited protections exist under anti-corruption laws for whistle-blowers in public procurement cases involving bid rigging. In the competition context, only cartel participants may benefit from the Leniency Programme, which is not a whistle-blower mechanism in the strict sense.
The competition authority may request information or testimony directly from current and former employees, regardless of seniority. This occurs through written requests or summons for interviews. Each request must specify whether the person is contacted as a suspect or third party. Statements are documented and may be used as evidence. Individuals retain the right not to self-incriminate if their involvement is under review.
COFECE and IFT are authorised to request documentary evidence directly from companies under investigation.
This is typically done through formal written requests, which must specify whether the recipient is a target or a third party. The recipient must respond within ten business days, with the possibility of a single ten-day extension upon justified request.
Authorities may issue multiple requests during the investigation. These often require extensive documentation, such as internal emails, contracts, pricing records, meeting minutes, and market data.
Failure to comply may result in daily fines until the information is delivered. Authorities may also reiterate the request or apply additional enforcement measures, such as dawn raids.
There are no limitations on the type of documents that may be requested, except those protected by attorney–client privilege, which must be claimed and justified separately.
Mexican competition authorities can request evidence from companies or individuals abroad, especially in cross-border cartel cases, but depend on co-operation agreements for enforcement. Entities in Mexico must produce documents or data stored overseas, including on cloud platforms, if they have control or access. The use of cloud storage does not limit the authority’s power to request information. Non-compliance may result in daily fines and other enforcement measures.
Co-operation among public agencies is a key element of cartel enforcement in Mexico. Competition agencies maintain formal agreements with entities such as:
These agreements facilitate information exchange, joint studies, and co-ordinated responses to suspected anticompetitive behaviour. PROFECO and the Ministry of Economy may file cartel complaints directly. However, confidential information protected under competition law cannot be shared without legal basis or consent.
Such inter-agency co-ordination has played a critical role in investigations, particularly in sectors like energy, finance, and public procurement.
Mexico’s competition authorities engage actively in international co-operation through bilateral agreements and participation in multilateral fora such as the OECD, ICN, UNCTAD, and APEC. COFECE has signed agreements with agencies like the European Commission, US DOJ, and UK CMA to support information exchange, staff collaboration, and co-ordinated enforcement. Although investigations remain independent, cross-border co-operation can shape priorities and scope. COFECE’s effectiveness depends on technical capabilities and alignment with global enforcement standards.
Criminal prosecution of cartel conduct in Mexico is led by the Federal Attorney General’s Office (FGR), typically following a complaint by the competition authority. Although filing can occur without a final administrative decision, it is rare before administrative proceedings conclude.
Cases are tried before a federal criminal judge (not a jury), and the FGR must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanctions are individualised and follow formal criminal procedures.
Defendants are entitled to constitutional guarantees, including due process and access to evidence used against them. However, discovery is limited, and access to third-party evidence requires court authorisation.
Mexico does not allow private civil actions to enforce competition law directly. Cartel enforcement is handled administratively by COFECE or IFT. However, once a decision becomes final and is upheld by the courts, affected parties may bring civil claims for damages or lost profits before specialised federal courts.
Third parties may also file formal complaints to trigger investigations. These must include the identity of the alleged parties, a description of the conduct and its competitive impact, and supporting evidence (eg, emails, documents, or market data).
The authority may open an investigation, request more information, or reject the complaint. During the confidential investigation phase, defendants do not have access to the file. Full access is granted only after a Statement of Probable Liability is issued, enabling the defence to review evidence and present arguments.
Experts – primarily economists – play a key role in cartel defence, especially in market analysis and pricing assessments. Depending on the sector, parties may also retain specialists in digital, telecom, transport, or other technical fields. Their use is not mandatory but often essential when complex factual or economic arguments are involved. Experts play a key role in cartel investigations and defence strategies. Economists are the most frequently retained experts, especially in complex market analyses or when evaluating pricing behaviour, market shares, or economic effects of the alleged conduct.
Cartel enforcement in Mexico is typically conducted through a single administrative proceeding involving all alleged participants. The Competition Law prohibits parallel investigations on the same facts by the same authority, in line with the constitutional principle of non bis in idem.
However, administrative and criminal proceedings may run in parallel, as they are distinct in purpose and legal framework. Evidence may be shared between authorities but is evaluated independently, with no binding effect across proceedings. See 1.2 Regulatory/Enforcement Agencies and Penalties and 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments.
In Mexico, sanctions for cartel conduct are imposed directly by the enforcement authorities through an administrative resolution issued at the conclusion of the trial-like procedure. These sanctions may include fines of up to 10% of the infringing party’s annual income, and additional penalties such as disqualification of individuals from holding executive or decision-making positions for up to five years.
Affected parties can challenge the resolution by filing an amparo indirecto before the Specialized Federal Courts in Competition, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, which review the legality and constitutionality of the enforcement action.
In cases where a criminal complaint is filed (see 4.6 Issuing Criminal Indictments), criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment of five to ten years, may be imposed exclusively by federal criminal courts following a separate process led by the Attorney General’s Office.
While most cartel investigations lead to formal charges and eventual sanctions, some are closed with no action if the Investigative Authority finds insufficient evidence. COFECE does not regularly publish the exact percentage of investigations that are closed without further action, but public records suggest that a minority of investigations do not proceed to the sanctioning phase.
Mexican law does not allow plea bargaining or settlement in cartel (absolute monopolistic practices) cases. Once an investigation begins, the process follows a formal administrative path. The only available mechanism offering benefits is the Leniency Programme, which may reduce or eliminate fines if strict co-operation conditions are met (see 3.1 Leniency).
A final finding of liability for cartel conduct may trigger collateral effects, particularly in public procurement, where companies and individuals can be barred from future tenders under anti-corruption rules. Final resolutions may also support civil claims for damages. These effects are not automatic and cannot be mitigated through settlement, as no such procedure exists in cartel enforcement.
Cartel conduct is classified as a criminal offence under Article 254 Bis of the Federal Criminal Code, which provides for prison sentences ranging from five to ten years and monetary fines from 1,000 to 10,000 times the daily value of the Unidad de Medida y Actualización (UMA). The UMA is the official economic reference unit in Mexican law used to calculate the amount of fines, fees, and other legal obligations. As of March 2025, total fines can range from roughly USD5,800 (MXN108,570) to USD58,000 (MXN1,085,700).
Criminal sanctions are individualised by the presiding judge according to the role and degree of responsibility of each participant in the cartel. The judge applies the principle of proportionality, considering aggravating or mitigating circumstances under criminal law. These sanctions may only be imposed following a formal criminal procedure initiated by the Federal Attorney General’s Office and resolved by a criminal federal court.
The competition agencies have no role in proposing criminal penalties or calculating fines during these proceedings. Their role is limited to filing the initial complaint, often based on evidence collected during the administrative investigation.
In criminal proceedings, sanctions are not pre-set or automatic. They result from a contested process, where the burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and the applicable standard is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
No individual has been imprisoned in Mexico for cartel conduct to date, and there are no known extraditions or foreign convictions. Although cartel conduct is a criminal offence under Mexican law, enforcement remains primarily administrative. As of April 2025, at least two criminal investigations are ongoing before the Federal Attorney General’s Office, but no final convictions have been issued.
While the agencies encourage the adoption of antitrust compliance programmes, these are not considered a mitigating factor in sanctioning hard-core cartel conduct. Sanctions are imposed per se once liability is established, regardless of preventive efforts. Compliance measures may be relevant in other contexts – such as merger review, but not for reducing fines in cartel cases.
Sanctions imposed by Mexican competition authorities are administrative and do not include mandatory consumer redress. Affected consumers may only seek compensation through separate civil litigation, and only after a final agency decision. The existence of private litigation does not affect the scope of agency-imposed sanctions.
Decisions by COFECE or IFT can only be challenged through an amparolawsuit before Mexico’s specialised federal courts. This constitutional review addresses procedural or substantive violations. Appeals may be filed before specialised appellate courts. While amparoproceedings are relatively common in cartel cases, most agency decisions are upheld, with only limited aspects modified or overturned. No other remedies exist to challenge enforcement decisions.
A full cartel enforcement case in Mexico – from the initiation of the investigation to a final ruling on appeal – typically lasts between five and six years.
These stages are sequential and cumulative, so the total duration reflects the entire enforcement timeline, including possible appeals.
Private rights of action for cartel conduct in Mexico are only available after the competition authority – either COFECE or IFT – has issued a final and binding resolution confirming the existence of a cartel.
Once the agency’s decision becomes final (ie, not subject to further appeal or it is upheld by the courts), any third party that suffered harm as a result of the anticompetitive conduct may bring a civil action before the Specialized Federal Courts on Competition, Telecommunications and Broadcasting to claim damages and lost profits.
The threshold requirements include the following.
The standards of relief in these private civil actions differ from administrative enforcement: while government proceedings focus on public sanctions (eg, fines), civil claims are centred on economic compensation for harm. Punitive damages are not available under Mexican law.
The most common forms of relief sought are monetary compensation, although collective actions may also be brought if multiple consumers are affected by the same conduct.
Collective actions – commonly referred to as class actions – are permitted under Mexican law, including for competition-related harms. These actions may be filed by consumer protection agencies, the enforcement authorities, or qualified non-profit organisations acting in the public interest.
In practice, class actions in antitrust matters are rare. However, in October 2024, COFECE filed the first class action in its history before the federal judiciary. The case involves price manipulation and supply restrictions in the pharmaceutical sector, and it seeks to obtain compensation for affected consumers. The proceedings are currently pending before the Federal Specialized Civil Courts.
While civil claims for damages are allowed after a final decision by the competition authority, Mexican law does not exclude claims by indirect purchasers. However, such actions are rare, and there is no judicial precedent addressing indirect harm or passing-on defences.
Evidence from governmental investigations is admissible in both administrative and civil proceedings. In civil cases, such evidence may support claims for damages once the competition authority’s resolution is final and upheld by the courts.
Civil claims for cartel-related damages are rare in Mexico, as they can only be filed once a competition authority’s decision becomes final and has survived judicial review. This process typically takes four to six years. Civil litigation, once initiated, may take an additional two to four years depending on complexity and appeals. As a result, cases reaching final judgment are infrequent.
Mexican law does not require losing parties to pay attorneys’ fees in cartel-related litigation. In civil claims, fees are privately agreed between clients and counsel. COFECE, IFT and the specialised courts do not award legal fees in administrative or civil proceedings.
In administrative proceedings, there is no mechanism for cost-shifting. In civil litigation, courts may order the losing party to pay legal costs only in cases involving bad faith, procedural abuse, or frivolous claims. Such rulings are exceptional, not automatic.
Civil judgments, including collective actions, can be challenged through amparo once ordinary appeals are exhausted. The amparo reviews constitutional issues, not factual findings. These reviews are rare due to the limited number of private competition claims in Mexico.
In Mexico, information exchange between competitors may constitute a cartel offence (absolute monopolistic practice) when it has the object or effect of restricting competition. This includes scenarios where the exchange leads to price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation, or bid rigging. Such conduct is treated as per se illegal, regardless of whether it is achieved through formal agreements or informal co-ordination mechanisms.
COFECE has issued guidelines that outline the standards used to assess information exchange between competitors. The evaluation considers:
While information exchange may have legitimate, even pro-competitive users – such as improving efficiency or market transparency – it can raise serious competition concerns under certain conditions. These include the sharing of individualised or forward-looking data, frequent contact among competitors, or exchanges in markets with few players or low entry barriers.
COFECE has acknowledged the role that third parties can play in facilitating indirect information sharing. For example, suppliers or industry chambers may unintentionally act as conduits for anti-competitive co-ordination.
Despite the legal framework, enforcement has focused on explicit collusion, such as price-fixing or market allocation. As a result, while information sharing is recognised as a potential infringement, enforcement remains limited and highly context-specific.
COFECE has expressed growing concern over the risks that Artificial Intelligence (AI) and pricing algorithms pose to competition. These tools can facilitate both explicit and tacit collusion among competitors, especially in digital or highly automated markets.
In 2023, COFECE contributed a policy paper to the OECD titled Algorithmic Collusion: Challenges for Competition Policy in the Digital Economy. This document outlines several areas of concern.
COFECE further explored this topic in its 2014 publication Algorithms and Competition in the Digital Environment, which aims to increase awareness of algorithmic co-ordination risks and promote early detection among market participants.
Monitoring and Enforcement Limitations
Despite being proactive in policy discussions, COFECE acknowledges that investigating algorithmic collusion presents technical challenges. Many algorithms are opaque, continuously learning, and difficult to audit without specialised tools. As of today, the Commission has not yet acquired advanced forensic capabilities to analyse algorithmic behaviour in-depth.
Nevertheless, COFECE has taken steps to strengthen its institutional capacity. In 2024 it participated in the International Competition Network (ICN) Technologist Forum, co-hosted by the US Federal Trade Commission. This event brought together over 20 global authorities to promote collaboration and develop shared strategies for regulating digital markets and the use of digital tools.
Current Status and Outlook
To date, COFECE has not launched any formal investigations involving algorithmic collusion or AI-based pricing tools. The absence of live cases reflects the technical complexity of such behaviour and the need for further investment in detection technologies.
Still, algorithmic collusion is recognised as a growing risk area. COFECE’s involvement in international forums and its recent publications demonstrate a clear intention to develop enforcement capabilities in this domain over the coming years.
In Mexico, monopolisation is not treated as a cartel offence. The legal framework distinguishes between cartel conduct, (absolute monopolistic practices) which involves co-ordination among competitors, and unilateral conduct by firms with market power (relative monopolistic practices).
Absolute monopolistic practices include agreements between competitors to:
Monopolisation – understood as the abuse of market power by a single firm – is addressed under a different legal category that covers unilateral conduct. These practices include exclusive dealing, predatory pricing, loyalty discounts, refusal to deal, or other exclusionary strategies are assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether it harms competition. This analysis considers the firm’s market power, the conduct’s effects, and whether efficiencies or objective justifications exist.
While monopolisation is not a cartel offence under Mexican law, it remains sanctionable if it constitutes abuse of dominance under the rules for relative monopolistic practices.
Between 2018 and 2025, COFECE prioritised cartel enforcement in sectors critical to consumers and the economy, particularly health, food and agribusiness, hydrocarbons, and transport – each accounting for over 11% of total investigations. These areas were targeted due to their impact on household budgets, supply chains, and public spending.
This approach aligns with COFECE’s 2022–2025 Strategic Plan, which highlights eight high-risk sectors: food and beverages, transport and logistics, construction and real estate, energy, health, public procurement, digital markets, and financial services. These industries are structurally important and vulnerable to collusion.
Looking ahead, COFECE is expected to maintain strict oversight of food, health, transport, and public procurement sectors, given their complexity, consumer relevance, and history of anti-competitive risks.
COFECE has the authority to investigate all forms of communication, including exchanges through messaging apps and chat platforms. In past cartel cases, digital messages have been used as key evidence to demonstrate co-ordination among competitors.
For example, in a case involving the government bond market, COFECE relied on chat messages to uncover co-ordination among financial institutions. Similarly, in a fuel market case in Baja California, WhatsApp groups and informal meetings were used to co-ordinate discounts, with some chats even operating under code names to conceal their purpose.
However, the agency faces growing challenges in preserving digital communications. Messaging platforms often allow auto-deletion or ephemeral messages, making evidence harder to capture unless secured early. COFECE typically accesses these records through leniency applications, dawn raids, or third-party co-operation.
There is currently no formal guidance from COFECE requiring companies to preserve messaging data, nor are there sanctions solely for deleting such evidence during an investigation. This legal gap creates uncertainty, particularly as chat-based communication becomes more prevalent in business practices.
While COFECE has relied on messaging evidence in the past, the absence of preservation rules and the technical difficulties in retrieving deleted content remain significant obstacles to enforcement.
In Mexico, “no poach” agreements and labour market allocations practices may be treated as serious cartel offences, especially when they are not linked to a legitimate business transaction and have the effect of restricting worker mobility or wages.
Enforcement Approach
COFECE has investigated and sanctioned this type of conduct. A landmark case involved 17 football clubs and the Mexican Football Federation, which were fined for co-ordinating to limit player mobility in the professional Liga MX. Two main practices were identified.
COFECE found these practices to be illegal because they reduced bargaining power, limited job opportunities, and distorted competition in the labour market.
Acceptable Exceptions in Mergers
COFECE does allow certain “no hire” or “no solicitation” clauses when they are part of a legitimate merger or acquisition. These clauses may be accepted if they:
Market Prevalence and Outlook
Outside of M&A contexts, “no poach” and labour market allocation agreements are not common in Mexico. However, if detected, they are likely to be investigated and penalised as unlawful conduct.
Mexico’s competition authority has made it clear that protecting labour market competition is a growing priority. This aligns with a broader international trend to treat unjustified restrictions on worker mobility as a serious antitrust issue.
In Mexico, COFECE operates a leniency programme that allows multiple participants in a cartel – not just a single applicant – to receive reduced sanctions. The extent of the benefit depends on the order in which they co-operate, and the value of the information provided. In practice, up to four or more undertakings involved in the same case may benefit from immunity or fine reductions.
Trends in Leniency Filings
Leniency applications have fluctuated over the years. Applications peaked in 2016 and then declined to their lowest point in 2021. Although there was a rebound in 2023, filings dropped again in 2024. This suggests an overall downward trend in participation despite the advantages offered by the programme, such as full immunity for the first applicant and significant reductions for others.
COFECE has recognised this issue and, in public forums, has cited structural challenges affecting the programme’s effectiveness. These include the following.
To address these concerns, COFECE has proposed actions such as improving legal certainty, increasing transparency on case outcomes, and reinforcing protections for applicants.
Increase in Ex Officio Investigations
At the same time, COFECE has increasingly relied on ex officio investigations. Although specific figures are confidential, the authority initiates far more cartel investigations on its own than through external complaints or formal reports.
It is worth noting that due to the confidential nature of leniency applications, it is often impossible to determine whether some ex officio cases are later supported by information from leniency applicants. In many cases, the two mechanisms may complement each other.
Conclusion
While COFECE’s leniency programme remains a cornerstone of cartel enforcement in Mexico, participation has declined in recent years. In response, the Commission has expanded its use of ex officio investigations while continuing efforts to restore confidence in its leniency tools. Strengthening outreach, transparency, and safeguards will be key to increasing the programme’s future impact.
In Mexico, cartel investigations are overwhelmingly domestic. Approximately 90% of cases handled by COFECE involve conduct confined to national markets. Only around 10% have a cross-border element.
This pattern is largely due to the nature of the sectors prioritised by COFECE – such as food, health, transport, energy, and public procurement – which are typically composed of local players. In addition, international enforcement requires co-ordination with foreign authorities, which is more complex and resource intensive.
Growing Role of International Co-Ordination
Despite the dominance of domestic cases, COFECE has increasingly engaged in international co-operation. In 2023, the agency began investigating possible collusion in the fragrance and ingredients industry. This move followed public announcements by several competition authorities around the world regarding similar concerns in the same global market.
COFECE confirmed it is co-ordinating with counterparts in the United States and the United Kingdom to determine whether the suspected conduct had effects on Mexican consumers. This case reflects a growing readiness to engage in cross-border investigations when the potential harm to local markets is significant.
Looking Ahead: Global Events and Digital Risks
The authors anticipate a gradual increase in cross-border enforcement, especially in markets shaped by digital transformation. Online platforms and global supply chains make it easier for cartel behaviour to spread beyond borders.
A key area of focus in the coming years may be the sports and entertainment sector, particularly in connection with the 2026 FIFA World Cup. The tournament will be jointly hosted by Mexico, the United States, and Canada. In preparation, COFECE has joined a trilateral initiative with authorities in both neighbouring countries to monitor related markets. Areas of interest include ticketing, broadcasting rights, accommodations, merchandising, and sponsorships.
This type of proactive co-ordination raises the likelihood of joint or parallel investigations in the lead-up to and during the World Cup.
Conclusion
Although cartel enforcement in Mexico remains largely domestic, recent developments point to a slow but steady shift. Cross-border co-operation is expected to grow, especially in digitally connected and globally exposed markets. The success of this transition will depend on COFECE’s ability to strengthen its technical and analytical capabilities to meet the challenges of international cartel enforcement.
Mexico does not currently have specific legal provisions or regulatory guidance on how ESG-related agreements should be treated under competition law. COFECE has not issued formal instructions to companies regarding how to avoid cartel behaviour while participating in ESG-related collaborations or initiatives.
Under existing law, any co-ordination between competitors – even when justified by environmental or social objectives – would be assessed using the same standards that apply to traditional cartel conduct. If the agreement involves fixing prices, limiting supply, or dividing markets, it may still be prosecuted as a serious competition offence.
COFECE’s Evolving Policy Interest
Although enforcement rules have not changed, COFECE has shown increasing interest in the intersection of competition and sustainability. In 2024, the agency introduced a policy initiative known as the Green Competition Strategy. The strategy presents a roadmap for exploring how competition law can support or complement broader sustainability goals.
Key elements of the strategy include the following.
As part of this effort, COFECE also launched a public consultation on the relationship between competition and sustainability. The consultation was open from December 2023 to January 2024, and the agency later published a summary of the responses and conducted interviews with selected participants.
Conclusion
While Mexico does not currently offer differentiated treatment for ESG-related co-operation, COFECE is taking steps to understand how competition policy can support responsible business practices. Until new guidance is issued, agreements between competitors based on ESG goals will continue to be reviewed under the same standards as any other form of co-ordination.
In Mexico, economic disruptions such as inflation and supply chain issues following the COVID-19 pandemic have not led to the creation of exceptions or exemptions in cartel enforcement. Absolute monopolistic practices – such as price fixing, market allocation, or output restrictions – are illegal regardless of market conditions, intent, or crisis-related justifications.
Case Example From the Pandemic Period
During the pandemic, COFECE initiated an investigation in the market for leasing non-residential real estate. The case was opened amid significant economic uncertainty. COFECE found possible evidence of co-ordination among competitors and the case had moved into the trial stage. A final resolution is expected in the near future.
Current Enforcement Context
To date, COFECE has not issued any formal statements suggesting that inflationary pressures or supply chain disruptions are increasing the risk of cartel behaviour. There is also no public evidence of a rise in crisis-driven collusion across markets.
The agency has continued to monitor sensitive sectors, such as food, transportation, and healthcare, which are more exposed to external shocks. However, there has been no indication that these conditions have led to changes in enforcement strategy or the adoption of new investigative tools.
Conclusion
Cartel enforcement in Mexico remains consistent and rule-based. Even in times of crisis, the legal framework does not permit co-ordination among competitors that would otherwise be prohibited. While isolated cases have emerged during periods of disruption, there is no indication that economic conditions have created a broader trend conducive to cartel behaviour.
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info@nhg.com.mx www.nhg.com.mxConstitutional Reform and the Draft Amendments to the Mexican Competition Law: A Comprehensive Analysis of Institutional Transformation and its Ramifications for Cartel Enforcement
Introduction: a watershed moment for Mexican competition policy and the intensified battle against cartels, potentially adrift without a clear compass
The 2024 constitutional reform, which dismantled Mexico’s Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT), represents a monumental institutional upheaval in the nation’s economic governance, carrying profound implications for the state’s capacity to effectively combat the deeply damaging issue of cartels.
This fundamental structural change, mandated by constitutional amendment, fundamentally alters the landscape of competition policy enforcement in North America’s second-largest economy, particularly concerning the investigation, prosecution, and deterrence of sophisticated and often deeply entrenched anti-competitive agreements, most notably cartels.
While this reform necessitates the creation of a new, unified regulatory body, a critical concern arises that the subsequent legislative initiatives, particularly those focused on amending the competition law, appear to be proceeding without a sufficiently rigorous and publicly debated diagnostic foundation regarding the successes and, more importantly, the limitations of the existing legal framework in tackling cartel behaviour. This absence of a clear and comprehensive analysis casts a shadow of uncertainty over the potential effectiveness of the proposed changes, even as they introduce significant alterations to the legal landscape, including revised treatments of information exchange and leniency programmes.
This transition period, therefore, not only creates substantial uncertainty for market participants, regulatory stakeholders, and international observers but also raises serious questions about the evidence-based nature of the proposed reforms. The initiative to overhaul the competition law, while ostensibly ordered by the constitutional changes, gives the legislature broad discretion to completely rewrite the rules of the game.
However, a significant apprehension is that this extensive revision is not being guided by a transparent and robust diagnosis of what has worked well and what has fallen short under the current legal regime, especially in the crucial area of cartel deterrence and enforcement. This lack of a clear analytical underpinning risks leading to reforms that are not precisely targeted at addressing the root causes of past failures, potentially undermining their ultimate effectiveness in the fight against cartels, despite introducing seemingly impactful changes like significantly increased sanctions and altered leniency rules.
Historical context: the evolution of competition institutions in Mexico and the protracted struggle against cartels, marked by unfulfilled potential
To fully appreciate the new institutional framework for competition policy following the 2024 constitutional reform and to critically evaluate the rationale behind the proposed presidential initiative to amend the Federal Economic Competition Law (LFCE), it is essential to understand the institutional evolution of Mexican competition policy and its historical struggles against anti-competitive collusion, particularly the persistent challenge posed by cartels. The original Federal Competition Commission, established in 1992, marked Mexico’s first serious attempt to create a modern antitrust framework.
While lacking constitutional autonomous status, this initial authority developed considerable technical capacity and de facto independence from the Executive Branch over its two-decade existence, initiating important, albeit sometimes limited, actions against cartel behaviour in key industries. However, its efforts were often hampered by limitations in its legal powers and budgetary constraints, leaving significant gaps in the effective prosecution and deterrence of sophisticated cartel operations.
The landmark 2013 constitutional reform represented a major institutional advancement, establishing two seemingly empowered and autonomous antitrust regulatory bodies: the IFT for the specific and crucial sectors of telecommunications and broadcasting and COFECE as an antitrust authority for all other sectors of the Mexican economy. This grant of constitutional autonomy was intended to provide the necessary insulation from external pressures and ensure consistent enforcement.
Indeed, both COFECE and IFT developed considerable expertise and achieved some notable successes in investigating and sanctioning anti-competitive conduct, including cartel behaviour. However, even under this enhanced institutional framework, significant challenges persisted in effectively tackling the deeply entrenched nature of cartels in various sectors. This history of both progress and persistent limitations underscores the critical need for a thorough and honest assessment of what worked and what did not under the previous legal and institutional arrangements before embarking on a wholesale reform.
The 2024 reform: disbanding autonomous regulators and shifting the paradigm
In December 2024, a new constitutional reform, championed by former President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, dismantled COFECE and the IFT as independent regulators. Instead, their functions will be absorbed by a new government-dependent body lacking constitutional autonomy. Officially, this reform was justified under the banner of austerity and streamlining government operations. However, critics argue that the move was politically motivated, given COFECE’s history of resisting policies that distorted competition, including key energy reforms of President López Obrador.
The elimination of an autonomous antitrust watchdog represents a significant paradigm shift, raising concerns among domestic and international observers about the future of market fairness and the robustness of cartel enforcement in Mexico. This move fundamentally alters the institutional landscape and creates a context where the design and operation of the new competition authority become even more critical.
President Sheinbaum’s LFCE Reform Initiative: defining the new legal framework
It is important to clarify that President Sheinbaum’s initiative to amend the LFCE is not a parallel development separate from the 2024 constitutional reform. Rather, the constitutional reform, which eliminated COFECE and IFT, necessitates changes to the secondary legislation, namely the LFCE, to align it with the new institutional structure.
In this context, President Sheinbaum has proposed specific amendments to the LFCE. While the constitutional reform mandates the legislative changes, it provides broad scope, leaving many key details to be defined in the LFCE amendments. The LFCE reform initiative addresses certain concrete points, such as the nature and structure of the new unified competition authority.
However, beyond these specific areas directly dictated by the constitutional changes, the LFCE reform opens the door to a wide range of policy choices that will significantly impact competition policy in Mexico in the coming years. The specific details of the new LFCE are still under discussion. Proponents argue these changes will improve regulatory efficiency and better align competition policy with national development objectives. Yet, skeptics warn that without the crucial element of institutional independence that COFECE and IFT previously enjoyed, Mexico risks regulatory capture.
In such a scenario, powerful economic interests – including the state itself or entities closely aligned with it – could exert undue influence over the application and enforcement of competition rules, potentially weakening the state’s ability to effectively combat cartels that might operate within or alongside these powerful interests.
Concerns regarding the quality of future judicial review of the new authority’s decisions
Legal professionals and the business community have expressed significant concern regarding the potential impact of another controversial reform (the recent 2024 judicial reforms) on the quality and impartiality of the judicial review of future decisions made by the new competition authority. The controversial 2024 reforms to the judiciary in Mexico have raised concerns about its independence and its ability to provide effective judicial review of administrative decisions, including those made by regulatory bodies.
This context amplifies the apprehension about the new competition authority, as the legal and business sectors worry whether its resolutions will be made with the necessary technical rigor and due process. The concern is that a weakened or less independent judiciary may be less likely to effectively check potential abuses or errors by the new competition authority, further exacerbating the risks associated with the loss of its constitutional autonomy.
The crucial question of technical autonomy under the new framework
A key aspect of the ongoing debate centres on the technical autonomy of the new competition authority. Despite the fact that it will no longer possess the constitutional protections afforded to COFECE and IFT, the question remains whether the new antitrust authority can operate free from undue political pressures.
It is important to recall that prior to the establishment of COFECE as a constitutionally autonomous body, Mexico’s first competition authority, operating from 1992 until the 2013 reform, enjoyed a significant degree of de facto autonomy. This was partly due to a prevailing consensus among governments during that period regarding the importance of an independent competition watchdog.
It is within this historical context that the current apprehension arises regarding the situation of the new authority. Will the new authority have sufficient safeguards to protect its technical decision-making? Equally critical is the future attitude of the government towards respecting this operational autonomy in practice. The worst-case scenario is that behind a seemingly autonomous authority, political pressures could severely undermine competition policy in the country or even weaponise it for political ends.
Vulnerability of the budgetary resources for effective enforcement
Beyond the approval of a new legal framework, a critical ongoing discussion revolves around the budgetary resources that will be allocated to the new competition authority. While it is conceivable that cost-cutting measures could be implemented in certain administrative areas previously overseen by COFECE and IFT, there remains significant uncertainty regarding the financial resources that will be available to the core operational units responsible for conducting investigations into violations of the competition law, particularly complex cartel investigations.
This issue is considered central to determining whether the activity level of the new authority will be able to maintain pace with that of COFECE, increase its effectiveness, or, conversely, suffer a reduction in its capacity to pursue impactful enforcement actions against cartels and other anti-competitive practices.
The looming threat of talent flight and loss of technical capacity
A pressing concern in current debates centres on the fate of Mexico’s antitrust specialists – the highly skilled professionals who have developed specialised knowledge and gained invaluable practical experience within COFECE and IFT over the past decade. There is growing apprehension that the new regulatory body may lack both the budgetary resources and institutional commitment to retain these veteran officials.
Such brain drain would represent a dual failure: the irreversible loss of technical capabilities and the squandering of decades of public investment in human capital. The potential departure of experienced cartel investigators, antitrust economists, and competition lawyers would critically impair the new authority’s ability to investigate complex anti-competitive practices, weakening Mexico’s overall competition enforcement capabilities.
Specific areas highlighting the lack of robust diagnostic underpinning: damage claims, criminal penalties, increased sanctions, information exchange, and leniency programmes
The issues of damage claims and criminal penalties, alongside the proposed increases in sanctions and the significant changes to the treatment of information exchange and the leniency programme, serve as stark illustrations of the apparent lack of a serious diagnostic foundation for the current legislative initiatives.
Dysfunctional Damage Claims Regime
Mexico’s chronic failure to operationalise damage claims reflects deep systemic flaws that the current legislative proposal attempts to address, yet without the comprehensive diagnostic approach this multifaceted problem demands. While the initiative seeks to accelerate claims by allowing damages actions upon issuance of an administrative ruling (a controversial proposal since it does not require the existence of a final judicial confirmation), it nevertheless lacks a rigorous examination of why past efforts failed to establish functional private enforcement mechanisms. By not first identifying and addressing all root causes, these modifications, aside from potential unconstitutionality concerns, risk repeating past shortcomings in a system that requires nothing less than a complete overhaul of its enforcement ecosystem.
Absence of criminal cartel prosecutions
Mexico’s persistent failure to secure criminal convictions for cartel conduct exposes systemic weaknesses in antitrust enforcement. The current reform proposal seeks to address one procedural hurdle by specifying that the statute of limitations for criminal sanctions begins with the issuance of the statement of objections – rather than at the time of the conduct – acknowledging that authorities cannot be expected to detect violations immediately. However, this change alone is unlikely to resolve deeper problems, such as the lack of specialised prosecutorial capacity and a broader legal culture that remains reluctant to embrace criminal antitrust sanctions. Without addressing these interconnected issues, the modified statute of limitations may prove inadequate to activate Mexico’s dormant antitrust criminal enforcement regime.
Dogmatic reliance on increased sanctions
The proposed doubling of maximum fines for cartel conduct and substantial increases for other violations lack a clear justification based on a rigorous analysis of why previous sanction levels were insufficient.
Elimination of information exchange as an independent monopolistic practice
The initiative proposes a fundamental shift in how information exchange is treated under competition law. Instead of being considered an independent monopolistic practice, it would only be deemed illegal if its object or effect is to facilitate absolute monopolistic practices such as price-fixing, market segmentation, or bid rigging. While this change might aim to align with international standards that focus on the anti-competitive effects of information exchange, the absence of a clear diagnostic rationale raises concerns.
More restrictive leniency programme rules
The presidential initiative also contemplates significant restrictions to the leniency programme. Notably, a participant who comes forward after an investigation has already been initiated would only be eligible for a maximum benefit of 50% reduction in sanctions. This contrasts sharply with the current scheme, which does not explicitly differentiate the level of benefit based on the timing of the leniency application relative to the start of an investigation. While there might be arguments for incentivising early reporting, the lack of a clear diagnostic analysis of the current leniency programme’s effectiveness and potential shortcomings is concerning. Is the current programme being exploited? Are there specific reasons why later applicants should be so significantly penalised? Without a clear understanding of the rationale behind this proposed change, it risks undermining the effectiveness of the leniency programme as a crucial tool for detecting and dismantling cartels, potentially discouraging later participants with valuable information from coming forward.
Expansion of cartel definition to include potential competitors
The presidential initiative also introduces a significant broadening of the definition of absolute monopolistic practices (cartels). While the current law prohibits agreements with competitors, the proposed amendment extends this prohibition to agreements with potential competitors. This expansion raises substantial uncertainty and concerns within the legal and business communities. The concept of a “potential competitor” is inherently ambiguous and open to broad interpretation. It is unclear how this will be defined in practice, and what criteria the new authority will use to determine whether a company is a “potential competitor”. This ambiguity could create a chilling effect on legitimate business collaborations and strategic planning, as companies may be hesitant to engage in activities that could be construed as agreements with potential competitors, even in the absence of any real anti-competitive intent. The lack of clarity and the potential for overreach in this expanded definition could lead to increased litigation and uncertainty, ultimately harming competition rather than promoting it.
Modifications to provisional measures
The fact that provisional measures have never been utilised in the past necessitates a thorough diagnosis of the reasons behind this before introducing regulatory changes.
Reduction of investigation timelines
The push for shorter investigation timelines needs to be carefully evaluated to ensure it does not compromise the quality and thoroughness of cartel investigations.
Conclusion: lingering uncertainty regarding the future of Mexico’s anti-cartel policy
It is evident that significant uncertainty exists regarding the future trajectory of Mexico’s economic competition policy, particularly in combating cartels. The 2024 constitutional reform has ushered in a new era, marked by the dismantling of autonomous regulatory bodies and the creation of a government-aligned authority.
While the legislative process to define this new framework continues, the lack of robust, transparent diagnostic analysis of the previous system’s strengths and weaknesses casts doubt on the evidence-based nature of proposed reforms. The potential for political influence, uncertainty about budgetary allocations and talent retention, and fundamental changes to key enforcement tools all compound this uncertainty.
The coming months will prove crucial in determining whether Mexico can establish an effective, resilient cartel enforcement regime, or whether losing institutional autonomy and lacking a clear diagnostic roadmap will ultimately weaken its ability to ensure competitive markets.
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