Cartel conduct in Peru is governed by the following legal instruments:

• the political constitution of Peru;
• Legislative Decree No 757, the Framework Law for Private Investment Growth;
• Supreme Decree No 111-2024-PCM, which approves the consolidated text of Legislative Decree No 1034, the Law for the Repression of Anticompetitive Conduct (the “Antitrust Law”);
• Article 232 of the Peruvian Criminal Code; and
• Supreme Decree No 004-2019, which approves the consolidated text of Law 27444, the General Administrative Procedure Law (GAPL).

Cartel conduct with effects within Peruvian territory is primarily investigated and sanctioned by the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual – INDECOPI), the national competition authority. In the telecommunications sector, the Supervisory Agency for Private Investment in Telecommunications (Organismo Supervisor de Inversión Privada en Telecomunicaciones – OSIPTEL) has jurisdiction to enforce competition rules within its sector.

Decisions issued by INDECOPI at first instance may be appealed before the Competition Tribunal of INDECOPI, which acts as the administrative appellate body. Similarly, OSIPTEL decisions may be appealed within the agency before its corresponding appellate body. Once the administrative stage is exhausted, both authorities’ decisions may be challenged before the judicial branch through administrative contentious proceedings.

At the supranational level, pursuant to Andean Community Decision 608, the General Secretariat of the Andean Community may investigate and sanction conduct with cross-border effects. Appeals are resolved by the Court of Justice of the Andean Community.

Since the 2020 amendment to the Criminal Code, participants in a cartel subject to the absolute prohibition rule face the risk of criminal liability, with prison sentences ranging from two to six years, in addition to fines imposed by INDECOPI or OSIPTEL.

In addition, affected parties may bring civil actions before the courts seeking compensation for damages resulting from cartel conduct (private enforcement), which may lead to civil judgment awards depending on the harm proved.

Regarding recent or imminent developments, there have been no major substantive changes in the cartel enforcement regime over the past year. However, a legislative reform is currently under discussion in Congress that would grant INDECOPI constitutional autonomy, transforming it into an autonomous constitutional body, similar to the Central Reserve Bank. If enacted, this reform could strengthen the institutional independence of the competition authority.

Peruvian law recognises a private right of action for damages resulting from cartel conduct. Affected parties may bring a civil claim before the judiciary seeking compensation for harm caused by anticompetitive practices, including cartels.

In practice, these actions are follow-on claims, meaning they are brought after a final administrative decision by INDECOPI confirming the infringement. According to INDECOPI’s Guidelines on Damages for Anticompetitive Conduct, the claimant must generally demonstrate:

• the existence of an anticompetitive infringement, typically evidenced by a final decision of the competition authority;
• the existence of damage; and
• a causal link between the infringement and the damage suffered.

The action is filed before the civil courts, which determine the amount of compensation.

Recent cartel investigations may give rise to follow-on damages claims. For example, INDECOPI sanctioned several pharmaceutical companies in the pharmaceutical procurement cartel case, involving collusion in public procurement for medicines. Once administrative proceedings are final, affected entities could potentially pursue damages.

In addition, it is important to mention that, according to the second paragraph of Article 52 of the Antitrust Law, as well as its Guidelines, INDECOPI may also bring judicial actions seeking compensation on behalf of consumers, provided that:

• there is a final administrative decision by INDECOPI declaring the existence of anticompetitive conduct;
• the Competition Commission (the “Commission”) decides to initiate the action, following a favourable report from the Technical Secretary (currently, the Directorate for Promotion and the Defense of Free Competition, or the “Directorate”);
• the infringement affects collective or diffuse consumer interests; and
• consumers have suffered direct quantifiable harm.

Currently, INDECOPI has filed a damages complaint against three companies in the pharmaceutical sector, related to a final administrative decision in which the authority sanctioned them for a hub-and-spoke price-fixing cartel. To date, this lawsuit is still pending a final judicial decision.

“Cartel conduct” refers to an illegal agreement or concerted practice between competing firms aimed at restricting or eliminating competition between them, thereby reducing incentives to innovate and operate efficiently.

Under the Antitrust Law, such conduct corresponds to horizontal collusive practices subject to the absolute prohibition under Article 11.2, including:

• price fixing;
• market or customer allocation;
• bid rigging; and
• agreements to restrict production or sales (output restriction).

In addition, the Peruvian Antitrust Law distinguishes four modalities in which horizontal collusion can manifest.

• Agreement – any concert of wills by which agents adhere to a common scheme; it requires an explicit or implicit pact of reciprocal wills for its configuration.
• Concerted practice – co-ordinated behaviour that replaces independent action without a formal agreement. It requires parallel behaviours with no logical economic explanation other than co-ordination for its configuration. The line between an agreement and a concerted practice is blurred; therefore, in practice, the authority tends to interpret concerted practices as constituting an agreement.
• Decision – a determination adopted by a trade association or group that binds its members. It requires a governing body that makes the decision and has coercive power.
• Recommendation – a suggestion by an association which, while not binding, is followed by its members.

These practices are treated as absolute prohibitions, meaning that no analysis of effects is required once the agreement between competitors is established.

No industry is exempt from antitrust law, except where another law explicitly protects or authorises the conduct, thereby excluding the application of competition rules.

Finally, under Peruvian antitrust law, competitors are economic agents operating at the same level of the production, distribution or commercialisation chain. They can be classified into two types:

• actual competitors – those currently offering products or services that consumers consider substitutes; and
• potential competitors – agents not currently in the market but possessing the technical and economic capacity to enter within a short timeframe (usually one year) in response to a small but significant price increase.

To understand how the statute of limitation works under Peruvian law, it is important to note that the prosecution of cartels is unique in that these collusive agreements are typically analysed and penalised as a “continuing infringement”. This type of violation is characterised by being composed of a series of actions or omissions that may occur over time and even involve offenders who may change, but which, taken together, follow the same logic, temporal pattern, and objective.

INDECOPI’s case law has consolidated and detailed the scope of this legal concept. Indeed, the Tribunal established that, for a set of anti-competitive arrangements to legally qualify as a continuing infringement, four requirements must necessarily be met:

• multiple instances of conduct – the existence of various actions constituting the violation;
• multiple violations of the same law or a law of a similar nature;
• spatial and temporal proximity of the alleged acts; and
• identification of criminal intent – that the motivation and actions of the offenders stem from execution of the same premeditated plan or exploitation of an identical opportunity.

The classification of cartels as continuing infringements has a direct and fundamental impact on the assessment of the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for imposing administrative sanctions for violations of competition law begins to run from the day on which the last act of the infringing conduct was carried out.

A recent judicial decision held that the applicable statute of limitations is four years, rather than the five-year period established in the Antitrust Law. The decision also held that the act that interrupts the limitation period is the service of the resolution initiating the administrative enforcement proceeding – the statement of objections.

By contrast, the Antitrust Law provides for a five-year statute of limitations and states that such period is interrupted by any act of INDECOPI’s Directorate related to the investigation of the infringement, provided that the relevant act is notified to, or otherwise brought to the attention of, the alleged infringer. This includes, for example, dawn raids and requests for information.

The judicial decision discussed above exhausts the judicial instance and is final and binding. However, there is an extraordinary remedy before the Constitutional Court that the competition authority could consider pursuing, although to date, there has been no official statement regarding this issue.

Pursuant to Article 4 of the Peruvian Antitrust Law, Peru legally adopts the effects doctrine to determine its jurisdiction. Therefore, INDECOPI has full jurisdiction to investigate and sanction anti-competitive conduct that produces or may produce effects throughout all or part of the national territory. This authority applies even if the collusive agreement originated or was executed entirely in a foreign country.

Under this regulatory framework, the determining factor for exercising jurisdiction is the territorial scope of the actual or potential effects of the infringing conduct. In this regard, the location where the responsible economic actors are incorporated or domiciled does not constitute a limitation. Nor is the specific geographic location where such actors carry out their activities or actually engage in unlawful conduct an impediment.

The application of this criterion was evident in the case of a shipping cartel, in which INDECOPI sanctioned several international companies for a global market-sharing agreement in the maritime transport sector. In that proceeding, the authority affirmed its jurisdiction to sanction these foreign companies, rejecting the defence’s arguments that the co-ordination and payment of freight rates occurred outside the country. It was determined that it was sufficient that the conduct had generated anti-competitive effects on routes bound for Peruvian ports, to establish the Peruvian agency’s jurisdiction.

Additionally, agencies may participate in cross-border co-operation activities through inter-agency agreements and international treaties. In this regard, INDECOPI is authorised to co-operate with other foreign competition authorities in investigations into global cartels.

Although Peru does not have extensive legislation on the strict concept of international comity, international co-operation is part of the international commitments assumed by Peru. Article 55 of the Constitution of Peru establishes that treaties adopted by Peru form part of domestic law. In this regard, for example, the Free Trade Agreement between Peru and the United States commits the authorities of both countries to co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure the effective enforcement of competition law.

Furthermore, more specifically, the Peruvian Antitrust Law contains an explicit provision on international co-operation. In particular, the Third Final Complementary Provision empowers INDECOPI to investigate anti-competitive conduct occurring within the national territory that has effects in other countries. This authority is exercised within the framework of international agreements or treaties signed with foreign competition authorities.

Likewise, during the course of these international investigations, the law expressly authorises the Peruvian authority to exchange information with foreign agencies, including confidential information. However, the law establishes a strict limit on this collaboration – the exchange is carried out without prejudice to the duty to maintain absolute confidentiality regarding the procedures and the identity of leniency programme applicants.

In practice, these provisions allow INDECOPI to implement mutual assistance to address cross-border anti-competitive conduct through various inter-agency co-operation agreements, such as those signed with the competition authorities of Chile, Colombia and Brazil.

For example, the agreement with Chile’s National Economic Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscalía Nacional Económica or FNE) aims to leverage mutual experiences, exchange information, and co-ordinate joint activities for the enforcement of their respective regulations. Similarly, the agreement with Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica or CADE) establishes a framework for information exchange and collaboration in preliminary investigations and enforcement proceedings, strengthening the prosecution of cartels in both jurisdictions.

Since ongoing investigations conducted by INDECOPI are confidential, there is no current official information on this matter. However, considering cases sanctioned by INDECOPI during the last ten years (2016–2025), cartel enforcement has primarily focused on prosecuting and sanctioning price-fixing and public procurement bid-rigging agreements. Based on the enforcement record, price-fixing and bid-rigging represent approximately 53% and 21% of the sanctioned cartels, respectively.

Regarding domestic versus international cartels, domestic cartels make up the vast majority of the agency’s sanctioned cases. In fact, only one of the cartel infringements sanctioned in recent years had a strictly international dimension (the shipping cartel case).

Regarding the origin of these cases (leniency versus ex officio), there has been a notable decrease in the filing of leniency applications, with most investigations currently being generated ex officio.

In Peru, INDECOPI has published written guides specifically related to cartel detection and enforcement.

INDECOPI’s guidelines include the following:

• the Leniency Programme Guidelines;
• the Antitrust Rewards Programme Guidelines;
• the Trade Associations Guidelines;
• the Dawn Raids Guidelines;
• the Informative Guide on Anti-Competitive Agreements Between Companies in the Labour Market;
• the Public Procurement Guide; and
• the Guide to Identifying Unusual Consortia in Public Procurement Under the Antitrust Law.

In Peru, administrative proceedings to impose sanctions for anti-competitive conduct, including cartels, are always initiated ex officio by INDECOPI. Specifically, such formal initiation may occur either (i) on the authority’s own initiative; or (ii) as a result of a complaint filed by a party. In both scenarios, the Directorate acts as the investigating body responsible for conducting investigations and issuing an opinion on the existence of the violation.

When the proceeding is initiated through a complaint filed by a party, the complainant acts as a collaborator, while the Directorate retains the inalienable authority to initiate proceedings ex officio. For the authority to accept this request for processing, the complaint must meet the following requirements:

• identification of the complainant;
• reasonable grounds for the alleged existence of anti-competitive conduct;
• identification of those allegedly responsible for the unlawful practice; and
• proof of payment of the corresponding administrative fee.

Prior to issuing a formal decision to initiate proceedings, the Directorate has the authority to conduct preliminary investigative actions. The primary purpose of these preliminary proceedings is to gather information or obtain the reasonable grounds necessary to support a future indictment. Once the existence of reasonable grounds has been verified, the Directorate issues a formal decision to initiate the proceeding. This decision must include, at a minimum:

• the identification of the accused parties;
• a brief statement of the facts;
• the provisional legal classification of the violation; and
• possible applicable sanctions.

The decision to initiate proceedings is served on both the economic agents under investigation and the complainants within a maximum of five business days of its issuance. Furthermore, through the decision to initiate proceedings, the authority will grant the alleged parties a period of 30 business days to submit their statements of defence and present the relevant evidence to support their defence.

Furthermore, if the Directorate deems it relevant to the investigation, it will order the publication of a brief notice regarding the subject matter of the ongoing proceeding. This publication, made in the Official Gazette “El Peruano” and in a national newspaper, allows any third party with a legitimate interest to formally intervene or provide information regarding the case.

Dawn raids, with or without previous notification, are common under Peruvian cartel enforcement. These measures have been identified by the Tribunal of INDECOPI as “the authority’s main tools for identifying or finding evidence of anticompetitive conduct” (Decision No 0486-2017/SDC-INDECOPI). The authorisation of dawn raids is among the powers granted to the Directorate to conduct investigations.

In 2020, the Commission approved the Dawn Raids Guidelines, recognising the importance of ensuring that such actions are not arbitrary or disproportionate, and are subject to the current legal regulations. Therefore, in application of the Administrative Procedure Act, the authority must comply with several duties, such as: identify at the request of the company, cite the legal basis for its powers, provide a copy of the dawn raid record, allowing the company to include observations to it, comply with the requirements of the inspection order (identification of the location that will be the target of the dawn raid; identification of the inspectors that will conduct the raid; the date of the raid; the legal basis of the investigative powers granted to the authority, as well as the documents and information that the inspectors will look for and/or evaluate; the duties and responsibilities of the inspected, as well as the legal consequences of any failure to comply; and the object of the raid), among others.

During dawn raids, the authority is entitled to:

• require the display of all types of documents, including accounting and corporate books, payment receipts, internal or external correspondence and magnetic records, and to request any information regarding the organisation, business and structure of the investigated company;
• summon and question the subjects of the investigation, their representatives, collaborators or third parties;
• perform raids with or without prior notice to the premises and establishments of the economic agents – in the context of these proceedings, inspectors may examine the documentation they find, take photographs and record films, and take the statements they deem necessary, as well as copy the corporate books, physical, electronic or other documents they deem relevant (including corporate correspondence and emails); and
• with the previous agreement of the Commission, freeze books, documents and files of the investigated companies.

As mentioned, the authority can summon and examine employees of the investigated company during a dawn raid. The investigated company and its employees have a duty to collaborate with the authority and allow the exercise of its given powers. This collaboration duty has been expressly recognised by the Tribunal (Resolution No 0486-2017/SDC-INDECOPI) and the Administrative Procedure Act (Articles 68, 173.2, 180 and Article 240, third paragraph). Non-compliance constitutes an infringement as described in 2.7 Non-Cooperation.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (Section 243), investigated companies and their employees subject to a dawn raid have the following duties:

• to perform or provide all the facilities for the execution of the authority’s powers;
• to allow direct access to the facilities, assets and/or equipment, without prejudice to their fundamental right to the inviolability of the home, where applicable; and
• to contribute to the record of the dawn raid.

As a general rule, the exercise of INDECOPI’s inspection powers does not require prior judicial authorisation; a written inspection order signed by the Directorate is sufficient. However, Peruvian law establishes certain exceptional cases where, because they involve a greater infringement of fundamental rights, the Directorate is required to obtain prior judicial authorisation before proceeding.

These specific cases, which constitute intrusive powers and require a court order, include the following.

• Forcible entry, in the event that the subject of the investigation refuses entry to the company’s premises or if the premises are closed. INDECOPI might request a court order to unlock the premises with the support of the police force.
• Forcible reproduction of corporate correspondence, contained in physical or electronic files, where the subject of the investigation expressly refuses to provide it voluntarily. This possibility applies without prejudice to the initiation of separate sanctioning proceedings against the company for refusing to comply with the initial dawn raid ordered by the Directorate (see 2.3 Spoliation of Evidence and 2.7 Non-Cooperation).
• The lifting of the confidentiality of communications to gather information and evidence regarding the violation. This includes access to the mobile devices or call records of the individuals under investigation.
• The removal of books, files or original documents from the subject’s premises for up to a maximum of 15 business days (otherwise, merely to formally freeze/seize the company’s books on site, the authority only needs the prior approval of the Commission for up to ten business days, extendable for an equal period).

Once the intrusive measure has been carried out, the Directorate has a legal obligation to report to the judicial authority. To this end, it must prepare and submit to the judge a report detailing the scope of the information obtained within a period of no more than seven days after the inspection visit is completed, or 30 days after obtaining judicial authorisation to lift the confidentiality of communications.

Pursuant to INDECOPI’s Dawn Raids Guidelines, following the dawn raid, the authority must provide the investigated company with a mirror copy of the information collected. As this file may require forensic software to be accessed, the company may request that the authority also provides a copy of the information in a readable format.

Finally, it is important to note that while economic operators have the right to have a lawyer present during these proceedings, the commencement and conduct of the inspection will not be suspended or indefinitely delayed pending the lawyer’s arrival, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the dawn raid.

A reflection of the investigated company’s duty to co-operate is the authority’s power to impose sanctions for the spoliation of evidence.

Section 46 of the Anticompetitive Conduct Act sanctions:

• the submission of false information, or the concealment, destruction or alteration of information or of any book, record or document required by the authority;
• the unjustified failure to comply with requests for information issued by the authority;
• the refusal to appear; and
• the obstruction of the exercise of functions.

In the Dawn Raids Guidelines, the authority has recognised the following infringing conduct:

• denying or unreasonably hindering inspectors’ access to the company’s premises (or to certain sources of information);
• erroneously identifying those responsible for the areas under investigation (or their offices), as well as providing inaccurate information about their presence or the location of certain sources of information;
• failing to submit (or only partially submitting) the documents or files requested by the inspectors;
• providing false or inaccurate information (either through declarations and/or documents), as well as altering, hiding or destroying any type of item subject to the dawn raid;
• unjustifiably refusing to provide the explanations requested by the inspectors; and
• obstructing the exercise of the inspectors’ functions by violence or threat.

These obligations begin when the authority requests information in writing or during a dawn raid. At this moment, the investigated party is deemed to be aware of the investigation and must refrain from any conduct that may result in the concealment, destruction or alteration of relevant information.

In a 2023 decision, the Free Competition Commission sanctioned the general manager of an inspected company with a fine of approximately USD51,000 for deleting information from her personal email account in the context of a dawn raid.

Counsel assistance is part of the investigated company’s rights (Section 242 of the Administrative Procedure Act). It is up to the company whether the counsel is internal or external. Legal assistance ensures compliance with the investigated company’s rights.

It is important to note that the presence of legal counsel is not mandatory for the commencement of an inspection visit or any investigative measures carried out by the authority; rather, it is a right that may be exercised by the investigated party.

Although the authority may grant a reasonable period of time for defence counsel to arrive at the premises prior to the commencement of an inspection visit, counsel’s presence is not a requirement for the validity or lawfulness of the inspection, nor of any other measure undertaken by the authority, such as an interview.

Counsel may be present during the questioning of the employees or officers of the investigated company. However, the authority will emphasise that the questions are addressed to the investigated party, and counsel may not answer the questions on its behalf.

The role of counsel during the initial stage of the investigation is highly important, as counsel should place on record any legal breach or irregularity observed that may be challenged at a later stage. Likewise, upon instruction from the investigated company, counsel may access the case file and monitor the investigation. Although the investigation is confidential, it is important to conduct a timely review of the information available.

In addition to its investigative powers set out in 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants, the Directorate of INDECOPI has broad procedural authority to request documents and statements related to the facts under investigation.

Statements and Requests for Information

The Directorate may summon and directly question the persons under investigation, their representatives, employees, advisers, and even third parties. During these proceedings, the authority is empowered to use technical means, such as audio or video recordings, to create a complete and accurate record of the statements. Unjustified failure to comply with these requests, as well as the submission of false information or the alteration of documents, constitutes an offence punishable by fines of up to 1,000 Tax Units (UIT).

Dawn Raids and Intrusive Powers

The collection of documentary and digital evidence through surprise inspections (dawn raids), as well as the application of intrusive powers, are subject to the criteria established in 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants. The same requirements and limitations apply when information is requested during these specific investigative measures.

Under Peruvian Law, communications between companies and their legal counsel are protected by attorney-client privilege (Code of Ethics for Attorneys), and legal assistance is a constitutional guarantee expressly recognised in the Administrative Procedure Act (Section 242). According to this provision, it constitutes a legitimate justification to refuse to provide information to the authority when doing so would involve a violation of such privilege (Section 180). According to INDECOPI’s Guidelines on Inspection Visits, during inspection visits, companies may identify and promptly set aside documentation, registries and any goods protected by this legal privilege to prevent their review and copying. Regarding the scope of application of attorney–client privilege with respect to in-house counsel, INDECOPI has not issued a specific ruling on this matter, so it remains a grey area.

With regard to other safeguards, Peruvian law recognises and protects the right against self-incrimination in relation to prosecutable conduct (Section 180). During proceedings, INDECOPI officials are prohibited from asking ambiguous or leading questions that imply a direct admission of guilt; in such cases, the party subject to the proceedings has the right to remain silent. However, this privilege applies exclusively to verbal or written statements and does not apply to requests for the production of documents or files, as these reflect pre-existing objective information regarding the company’s commercial activities and the facts under investigation.

Initial requests for information are not usually resisted. Most companies are aware of the serious consequences of not complying with information requests.

Nevertheless, there have been cases of refusal to collaborate. In one recent example, a company refused to provide the information requested during an inspection, arguing that it was bound by a criminal co-operation agreement with the public prosecutor and that the requested information was subject to confidentiality obligations.

In another example, an undertaking declined to submit the requested documentation during an inspection, invoking concerns regarding the disclosure of its confidential information and inaccuracies with respect to the inspection order. However, the authority found this justification insufficient, as it did not override the company’s duty to co-operate with duly issued information requests in the context of an investigation.

This type of non-cooperation typically takes the form of a refusal to provide documents or information during inspections or in response to formal requests. In the first case, the authority determined that the refusal was unjustified because the criminal co-operation agreement did not prevent the company from providing commercially related information to other authorities exercising their legal powers.

The duty to co-operate is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the authority’s investigative powers, as without it, the public administration will be unable to fully enforce the competition law. This obligation is expressly recognised in Section 243 of the GAPL, which requires parties to allow the conduct of dawn raids, facilitate the work of inspectors, and actively collaborate in clarifying the facts under investigation, including by providing relevant documentation and information. In this context, a breach of this duty constitutes an infringement under Section 46.7 of the Competition Act, which may be sanctioned with fines of up to 1,000 UIT, as it encompasses various forms of obstruction to the functions of the Directorate.

Beyond administrative sanctions, failure to comply with the authority’s requests for information may also entail criminal consequences. Section 368 of the Criminal Code establishes that any person who disobeys or resists an order legally issued by a public official in the exercise of their powers may be punished with imprisonment of three to six years. Accordingly, conduct aimed at obstructing the authority’s investigative powers, including the refusal to comply with lawful requests for information during inspections, may give rise not only to administrative liability but also to potential criminal responsibility.

Investigated companies, as well as any third party, including public entities, may request confidential treatment for information that constitutes a trade or industrial secret, affects personal or family privacy, or the disclosure of which could harm its owner.

There are two ways to request confidentiality, each applicable to different situations. The first is a specific request, which must be submitted each time information is provided, for example, in response to a request for information. The second is a general request, which is only available during an interview or an inspection. In the latter case, after the request is made, the authority will identify the information it considers relevant and will ask the holder to submit a specific confidentiality request.

A confidentiality request is decided by either the Directorate or the Commission, depending on the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed. A denial of confidential treatment may be appealed before the Tribunal of INDECOPI.

Information that constitutes incriminating evidence may not be declared or maintained as confidential vis-à-vis the parties charged in the administrative sanctioning proceeding, whether already initiated or pending initiation. The classification of information as incriminating evidence falls to the Directorate, in its capacity as the investigating body in the administrative sanctioning proceeding, and it is also the body responsible for deciding confidentiality requests relating to such evidence.

Opportunities for Counsel to Respond

During the Preliminary Investigations phase, counsels can submit any complementary information that could prevent the authority from taking action (ie, present alternative explanations to any suspicious conduct). In addition, they can submit a request to apply for the leniency programme.

It is important to highlight that the defence counsel may present legal and factual arguments at various stages of the proceedings. While companies may provide explanations in response to requests for information during the preliminary investigation phase, the formal defence phase begins once the Directorate issues the resolution initiating the sanctioning proceedings. Upon notification, the economic agents under investigation have a statutory period of 30 business days to submit their defence, present arguments, and offer the evidence they deem relevant.

At a later stage of the proceedings, once the Directorate concludes its investigation and issues the Technical Report, the defence has another opportunity to respond. At this point, attorneys may submit written closing arguments to challenge the conclusions of the report and request the opportunity to speak at an oral hearing. These tools allow the defence to present its legal and economic arguments directly to the Commission before the final decision is issued.

Common Legal Defences in Cartel Cases

With regard to substantive arguments, one of the most common legal defences in cartel cases is to argue that the statute of limitations on the authority to impose sanctions has expired. Because the authority typically classifies cartels as a continuing infringement to calculate the five-year statute of limitations from the last infringing act, the defence often argues that the events actually constitute isolated and independent incidents. By attempting to fragment the conduct, attorneys seek to demonstrate that the statute of limitations has already expired for specific events that occurred years ago.

Another key argument focuses on challenging the legal characterisation of the conduct, claiming that it involves intra-brand co-ordination or that it constitutes ancillary and complementary agreements to a lawful main agreement (such as a joint venture or joint service). By invoking this doctrine, the defence seeks to ensure that conduct is not evaluated under an absolute prohibition (applicable to inter-firm cartels), but rather under a relative prohibition. If successful, this would require the authority to demonstrate not only that the conduct occurred, but also that it generated actual or potential negative effects in the market which, when weighed against its pro-competitive effects, ultimately outweigh the latter, and only then can sanctions be imposed in such a scenario.

Peruvian competition law provides a leniency programme regulated in Article 26 of the Antitrust Law and further developed in INDECOPI’s Leniency Programme Guidelines.

Under this regime, undertakings or individuals that participated in a cartel may obtain full immunity from fines, or a reduction of fines, if they voluntarily provide information and evidence that allows INDECOPI to detect or prove the infringement.

Applicants must generally:

• admit participation in the cartel and provide relevant evidence;
• co-operate with the authority; and
• cease participation in the conduct.

The programme is discretionary. Full immunity (from fines and imprisonment) is granted to the first applicant (Type A leniency), while subsequent applicants may obtain reductions in fines, as outlined below. Type A leniency is a request submitted before INDECOPI has any evidence to suspect the existence of the cartel.

Type B leniency applies where the authority already holds some evidence of a cartel, but no formal sanctioning procedure has yet been initiated. In this scenario, the first applicant may obtain a fine reduction of between 50% and 100%, provided it submits a complete application, offers all available evidence to support the initiation of proceedings, fully co-operates, ceases its participation in the cartel, maintains confidentiality, and has not coerced others to participate. The exact reduction depends on the added value of the information provided.

Type C leniency applies where a prior leniency applicant exists, or proceedings are already underway. Subsequent applicants may obtain a reduction of up to 50% of the fine if they provide additional evidence of significant added value. They must also co-operate fully, cease participation in the cartel, and comply with confidentiality obligations. The reduction is granted on a sliding scale depending on the applicant’s speed with coming forward and the usefulness of the information, and remains subject to the authority’s discretion.

In Peru, the use of the leniency programme has declined significantly following the reintroduction of criminal liability for cartels. After the enactment of Law No 31040 and the reinstatement of Article 232 of the Criminal Code, no leniency applications were submitted in 2021, the year following the reintroduction of Article 232. Moreover, only two applications were recorded in 2022, indicating a substantial decrease compared to the period prior to the reform.

Public information on how often leniency is granted once an application is submitted and the scope of the benefits is limited, as INDECOPI does not provide statistics on the number of applications granted. Furthermore, the Peruvian leniency regime includes a marker system. Under INDECOPI’s Leniency Programme Guidelines, an applicant may request a marker to reserve its position in the leniency queue while gathering the information and evidence required to submit a complete application.

Peru does not have an independent amnesty programme; instead, full immunity is granted as the maximum conditional and definitive benefit under the Leniency Programme. To obtain full exemption from fines, the applicant must be the first to disclose the cartel and provide decisive evidence

Type A and Type B Leniency

This benefit is legally classified as “Type A Leniency” (guaranteeing 100% immunity if requested before the authority has any evidence or conducts inspections) and “Type B Leniency” (granting between 50% and 100% immunity if the authority already has prior evidence but has not yet initiated formal proceedings). To qualify for this immunity, the law requires strict compliance with certain fundamental requirements of the agreement.

Applicants must immediately cease their participation in the unlawful conduct, co-operate fully, continuously and diligently with the authority, and maintain strict confidentiality regarding the existence of their application. Additionally, this regime contains an exclusion provision stating that no economic agent may benefit from full exemption from penalties if they used coercion against other participants to force them to join or remain in the cartel.

With regard to its scope, Type A Leniency grants full exemption not only from administrative fines imposed by INDECOPI but also from criminal penalties, including imprisonment, effectively shielding the beneficiary from prosecution for the disclosed cartel activities. No other administrative authority may initiate proceedings against the offender for the same acts. Furthermore, under Type A Leniency, the beneficiary may be exempt from the imposition of corrective restitution measures (aimed at reversing the harmful effects), provided that they waive the confidentiality of their identity. However, obtaining this administrative and criminal immunity does not eliminate or limit the offender’s civil liability for potential claims for damages caused to third parties.

Unlike other jurisdictions in the region, Peru does have a specific whistle-blower programme for cartel-related conduct known as the Antitrust Rewards Programme Guidelines, which was established by law to complement the effectiveness of the Leniency Programme.

This programme provides financial incentives to individuals who co-operate by providing decisive information to detect, investigate and punish these illegal practices. Its scope of application is broad, with this mechanism available for all hard-core cartels, and it includes price fixing, output restriction, allocation of customers or geographic areas, and bid rigging.

To qualify for and participate in this programme, INDECOPI’s Rewards Programme Guidelines establish the following requirements.

• The applicant must be an individual, as legal entities are expressly excluded from the programme.
• The whistle-blower must not have participated in the planning, execution, implementation, facilitation or concealment of the cartel; however, in exceptional cases, those who played a peripheral role or merely carried out instructions without decision-making authority or control over the conduct may be admitted. For example, secretaries, employees and former employees, family members, and distributor staff, among others, may apply to this programme.
• Attorneys, compliance officers, INDECOPI officials and public servants who obtained the information in the course of their duties are excluded.
• The applicant must provide timely, credible, and decisive information (such as emails, minutes, travel records, receipts, etc) that adds significant value to the investigation.

Regarding the potential rewards, the Directorate determines them at its discretion by adding a base amount and a variable amount. The base amount has a maximum cap of approximately USD59,000 and is calculated based on the value of the information and the risks or costs assumed by the whistle-blower. Additionally, in cases of particularly active co-operation, an extraordinary variable amount equivalent to up to 5% of the fines actually paid by the violators may be awarded, subject to an additional cap of approximately USD59,000.

INDECOPI has already initiated sanctioning proceedings thanks to the information provided by applicants to the rewards programme.

Pursuant to Article 15.3 of the Administrative Procedure Law, the Directorate of INDECOPI may summon and question representatives, officers, employees and consultants of companies. This authority also extends to former employees, whom the agency may summon to testify as third parties.

The process for obtaining these statements can be carried out primarily through the mechanisms described in 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants and 2.5 Obtaining Evidence/Testimony. 

In practice, INDECOPI frequently exercises these powers to interview company officials, generating crucial evidence for its investigations.

With regard to the applicable rules, employees and former employees have a strict legal duty to co-operate with the authority and answer questions truthfully. Unjustified refusal to appear, providing false information, or concealing relevant facts constitutes an offence of obstruction of the agency’s work. This offence may be penalised by the Commission with severe fines of up to 1,000 Tax Units (UIT).

Despite these broad powers, the agency’s actions are subject to limitations designed to protect the fundamental rights of those being questioned. The main limitation is the right against self-incrimination, under which inspectors are prohibited from asking leading questions that imply direct admission of a violation, allowing the employee to remain silent in the face of incriminating questions. Additionally, individuals have the right to have their legal counsel present during statements, although during surprise visits, the authority will not suspend the proceedings indefinitely while waiting for the counsel’s arrival.

The Directorate has expressed legal authority to request documentary evidence directly from the companies under investigation. In addition to dawn raids, documentary evidence is also obtained through requests for information and formal subpoenas. These powers may be exercised broadly both during the preliminary investigation phase and during the administrative sanctioning proceedings.

Regarding Requests for Information (RFIs), Article 15.3(a) of the Antitrust Law empowers the authority to require companies to produce all types of documents related to their business activities. This legal scope expressly covers the submission of accounting and corporate books, payment receipts, internal or external correspondence, and magnetic or electronic records. Furthermore, through these requests, the authority may seek detailed and specific information regarding the organisation, business operations, shareholding, and ownership structure of the companies under investigation.

With regard to summonses for interviews, Article 15.3(b) authorises the Directorate to summon and question the persons under investigation, as well as their representatives, employees, officials and advisers. During these appearances, which must be formally notified in writing with details regarding the purpose and subject matter of the summons, the authority may require the production of documents or records to support the statements provided.

Finally, although the authority’s powers to request documentary evidence are extremely broad, they are subject to legal limitations designed to protect the fundamental rights of the subjects of administrative proceedings; it is legitimate to refuse to provide information if doing so would violate attorney-client privilege. Apart from these protections, unjustified non-compliance, failure to appear in response to summonses, and the concealment of requested documents all constitute offences of obstruction punishable by fines of up to 1,000 Tax Units.

The Directorate has previously requested information and served notice to companies and people located outside the jurisdiction. In these cases, the authority serves notices through the Peruvian consular office, pursuant to the exercise of the notarial function provided for in the consular regulations. It is also customary to serve notice through an official email address of the company; however, such notice is not binding.

Likewise, INDECOPI has entered into co-operation agreements with various foreign competition authorities, pursuant to which both authorities undertake to carry out requests for information, interviews, and other investigative measures on behalf of the other authorities.

During the period in which mobility restrictions were in force as a result of the pandemic, the Directorate also conducted “remote” inspection visits by means of video calls and using tools that allowed it to take remote control of the investigated party’s computer.

In cases of cloud storage where the authority faces difficulties in obtaining copies from the email inbox, the authority may review the email account of the individual on-site during the inspection and copy the specific emails with relevant information.

There is no separate competition authority in Peru, as competition enforcement is geographically centralised within INDECOPI, which operates at the national level.

However, antitrust enforcement in Peru is vested in two agencies – INDECOPI and OSIPTEL, the telecommunications regulator. In this respect, INDECOPI has general jurisdiction over competition matters, whereas OSIPTEL has exclusive jurisdiction in the telecommunications sector. In this sense, INDECOPI does engage in inter-agency co-operation with OSIPTEL. Both entities have entered into a framework co-operation agreement aimed at strengthening co-ordination between them, particularly in matters relating to consumer protection and competition enforcement. This agreement promotes mechanisms for information exchange and institutional support, with the ultimate goal of enhancing regulatory effectiveness and benefiting consumers.

INDECOPI actively co-operates with other jurisdictions, mostly through international organisations such as the OECD. This collaboration primarily focuses on technical co-operation. In addition, INDECOPI has signed specific bilateral co-operation agreements with other agencies, such as the Fair Trade Commission and the Chilean FNE. These agreements focus mainly on the exchange of relevant information (ie, preliminary investigations, market studies) that is not classified or confidential; technical assistance (bilateral training, internships, etc); and the notification of any relevant case that may have an impact in the other country’s jurisdiction. 

While technical and policy co-operation is constant, direct case-specific co-ordination in cartel investigations is less frequent and it is difficult to estimate the percentage of cartel enforcement that involves co-ordination with enforcement bodies in other countries. However, the shipping cartel case was a notable case in which international co-operation was relevant. In this case, the US Department of Justice, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, and the Chilean FNE simultaneously investigated a global cartel. INDECOPI co-ordinated with some of these foreign authorities to understand the scope of the conduct and to align its approach with that of the other authorities.

Under Law 31775 (which regulates the criminal enforcement of anti-competitive conduct), only hard-core cartel offences are subject to criminal enforcement. As established in 5.3 Effect of Liability Being Established, in order to issue a criminal complaint, the prosecutor must have a final and non-appealable decision of INDECOPI or OSIPTEL on a hard-core cartel case. Without this, no complaint can proceed.

Pursuant to the law, once the administrative decision becomes final, INDECOPI or OSIPTEL has a maximum of five business days to officially submit this resolution to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Crucially, the agency must also disclose the identity of the leniency programme beneficiary. The specific purpose of sharing this identity is that the applicant who obtained full immunity (Type A Leniency) under the administrative proceeding is legally exempt from criminal prosecution and penalties.

With the agency’s decision and the identification of the exempted whistle-blower, the Public Prosecutor’s Office begins its preliminary investigation against the remaining individuals involved, requesting and gathering evidence. The standard is “beyond any reasonable doubt”, and the burden of proof lies with the prosecutor.

The procedure follows the same rules as any other criminal case, with the following important pre-trial procedure – control de acusación, an audience in which the judge decides which evidence will be considered for trial.

Regarding discovery rights, according to the New Code of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution must disclose all evidence gathered, including exculpatory evidence. Defendants can also request the court to compel third parties or government agencies (eg, INDECOPI) to produce specific documents via an exhibición de documentos (document production).

In Peru, civil claims for damages arising from anti-competitive conduct are litigated before the courts of the judiciary. According to Article 52 of the Antitrust Law, this civil proceeding may only be initiated once INDECOPI’s administrative decision declaring the existence of the violation has become final and non-appealable. From that point on, there is a two-year statute of limitations to file the corresponding claim for compensation.

Filing the Lawsuit

From a procedural standpoint, INDECOPI has exceptional standing to initiate this judicial proceeding in defence of the diffuse and collective interests of consumers. The steps to file this lawsuit begin with the preparation of a favourable report by the Directorate, which must reasonably define the class of affected consumers. Subsequently, the Commission approves said report and instructs INDECOPI’s legal department to formally file the lawsuit with the competent civil judge, as well as to conduct the necessary procedural actions.

Notice to Opt-Out

Once the court accepts INDECOPI’s complaint for consideration, the Directorate must publish a notice on its website and social media within a maximum of ten business days, summarising the claim. This notice informs consumers of their right to opt out of the class action within the following 30 business days, should they prefer to reserve their right to file an individual lawsuit. Furthermore, as a pre-trial or mid-trial mechanism, the law allows the parties to reach an agreement or settlement to resolve the dispute, provided that the agreed compensation is allocated solely and exclusively to the affected consumers.

Proof of Damages Suffered

The evidence and defence arguments are presented directly to the presiding civil judge. Regarding the standard of proof and the burden of proof, the final administrative decision issued by INDECOPI already serves as legal proof of the existence of the anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, the plaintiff (whether INDECOPI or a private party) only bears the burden of proving the damages suffered (such as the price premium) and the direct causal link to such unlawful conduct. To determine the affected group in lawsuits brought by the agency, the Guidelines on Compensation for Damages Caused to Consumers as a Result of Anti-Competitive Conduct, issued by INDECOPI, establish a flexible standard, requiring only a “reasonably substantiated estimate” without the need for exact initial calculations for all members.

Finally, Peruvian civil procedure law does not provide for a discovery procedure (mandatory disclosure of evidence) with the same broad scope as that found in common law jurisdictions. However, information gathered during the government investigation may be used in civil proceedings.

Protection of the Whistle-Blower

As a fundamental safeguard, the confidential information provided by the applicant under the Leniency Programme is protected and will not be disclosed or used by INDECOPI against the co-operating party in a civil damages’ lawsuit. Furthermore, the authority will refrain from suing the beneficiaries of Type A Leniency (those who reported the cartel before the authority had any evidence), reserving only the right of private parties to sue them on their own behalf.

The bodies responsible for the investigation and enforcement of cartel infringements are composed of both lawyers and economists.

Typically, in cartel investigations or sanctioning proceedings, the investigated parties engage economists to assess the economic evidence and provide expert opinions, including on the calculation of fines.

Although less common, in certain proceedings the parties have also engaged IT experts to examine issues relating to the chain of custody of electronic evidence obtained during dawn raids.

Finally, given the technological complexity of certain markets, engineers may also be included in the team, for example, in telecommunications cases.

Pursuant to Article 248 of the GAPL, one of the principles governing the sanctioning power of the administration is the prohibition against imposing, successively or simultaneously, both a criminal penalty and an administrative sanction or two administrative sanctions for the same act where there is identity of subject, facts, and legal basis (non bis in idem).

Without prejudice to the foregoing, where there is no concurrence of these three elements, the authority may conduct two or more proceedings in parallel based on similar facts. However, the authority must gather sufficient evidence for each proceeding.

For example, in the past, the authority has conducted parallel proceedings involving similar facts but different products (such as different types of gasoline) or different cities, in which some of the investigated companies overlapped.

Multi-defendant cases are the standard in cartel cases – the authority does not open one proceeding for each defendant, but one general proceeding involving the investigated cartel and every company that participated in or facilitated it.

As detailed in 2.2 Dawn Raids/Search Warrants, when carrying out inspection visits or issuing requests for information, the authority must specify the market and the conduct under investigation. As a general rule, any evidence obtained during the inspection must be limited to the scope set out in the inspection order.

However, under Article 240 of the GAPL, the authority is empowered to broaden or modify the scope of an inspection. Accordingly, if as a result of an inspection visit, the Directorate uncovers information that may indicate a possible anti-competitive infringement other than the one initially under investigation (included in the scope of the inspection order), the authority will be entitled to rely on such evidence and adopt any appropriate measures, including expanding the scope of the investigation or initiating a new investigation. These findings are considered “incidental findings”.

INDECOPI has the authority to impose sanctions and fines directly through its Commission, as established under Article 43 of the Antitrust Law. The Commission adopts its decisions based on the criteria set out in Article 44 of the same law.

Pursuant to Supreme Decree No 032-2021-PCM, INDECOPI applies a specific three-step methodology to calculate these fines. First, a “base fine” is determined, typically by dividing the expected illicit benefit by the probability of detection. In price-fixing cartels, the illicit benefit is usually estimated by calculating the anti-competitive margin (the difference between the collusive price and the estimated competitive price) multiplied by the affected quantity. Second, this base fine is adjusted by a factor that incorporates any applicable aggravating or mitigating circumstances, such as recidivism or the implementation of an effective compliance programme. Finally, the resulting preliminary fine is verified against the statutory caps to ensure it does not exceed the maximum legal limits, thereby determining the final fine.

Therefore, under Article 43 of the Antitrust Law, fines are determined based on the seriousness of the infringement. For minor infringements, fines may reach up to 500 Tax Units (approximately USD751,400), capped at 8% of the infringer’s (or its economic group’s) gross revenues from the previous fiscal year, as long as this information is submitted by the infringer. In cases of serious infringements, fines can go up to 1,000 Tax Units (approximately USD1.5 million), with a ceiling of 10% of such revenues. For very serious infringements, fines may exceed 1,000 Tax Units, although they remain capped at 12% of the relevant revenues.

In all cases, fines are subject to statutory limits and must be proportionate to the gravity of the infringement, the benefit obtained, and other relevant factors. In addition, due process guarantees apply throughout the administrative procedure.

On average, sanctions in cartel cases vary significantly depending on the duration, scope and gravity of the infringement, as well as the value of affected sales, but over the last five years (2021–2025), the average was approximately USD134.3 million.

At present, the case involving the highest aggregate fines on record is the construction cartel case, in which INDECOPI’s Commission imposed aggregate fines of more than USD800 million for bid rigging in public procurement between 2002 and 2016. The case also includes the highest fine ever imposed on a single company for participation in a cartel, amounting to USD95.5 million. The case is currently pending review before the Tribunal.        

Peruvian antitrust law does not contain provisions that strictly correspond to civil settlement or plea bargaining in the criminal sense. However, the Antitrust Law regulates two mechanisms that constitute the closest equivalent to these concepts, allowing parties subject to administrative proceedings to seek early termination or admit to the charges in exchange for specific benefits. These mechanisms are the Settlement Agreement and the Admission of Liability.

The Settlement Agreement

The Settlement Agreement (the “Settlement”) is a mechanism through which the parties under investigation may offer early termination of the proceedings in exchange for implementing effective corrective measures to counteract the effects of their potentially anti-competitive conduct.

This request must be submitted within a maximum period of 45 business days from the date of notification of the decision to initiate proceedings. Its approval is discretionary, and if accepted, the information provided may not be used against the applicant in the main case file; however, approval of this settlement does not eliminate or limit civil liability for damages caused to third parties.

Since 2010, 31 Settlement requests have been filed.

The Admission of Liability

For its part, the Admission of Liability allows the agents under investigation to voluntarily accept the charges brought by the Directorate. This admission must be formally submitted within the legal deadline for filing initial defences.

In exchange for not disputing the facts and promoting procedural efficiency, the offender receives a legal reduction of up to 15% on the fine applicable to the acknowledged violations, although this benefit is automatically forfeited if the party decides to challenge the Commission’s final decision regarding the determination of their liability.

According to the Second Final and Complimentary Disposition of the Antitrust Law, if INDECOPI issues a final decision within an administrative procedure related to bid rigging that establishes liability, those companies involved are debarred from future government bidding processes. This effect can be avoided by settlement, as detailed previously.

Another possible consequence of a finding of infringement is the imposition of corrective measures, such as an obligation to implement an Antitrust Compliance Programme designed and approved in accordance with the authority’s requirements.

Furthermore, the establishment of liability through a final and non-appealable administrative decision triggers other significant collateral effects. First, regarding criminal enforcement, a firm decision by INDECOPI declaring the existence of a hard-core cartel is a mandatory legal prerequisite for the Public Prosecutor’s Office to initiate criminal proceedings against the individuals involved.

Second, regarding civil liability, a firm administrative decision enables affected individuals, companies, or INDECOPI (acting on behalf of consumers) to file civil lawsuits for damages. As an evidentiary consequence, the final decision issued by INDECOPI serves as binding legal proof of illegal conduct. In these judicial proceedings, the existence of anti-competitive conduct and the identities of the responsible parties are legally established by INDECOPI’s binding resolution and cannot be challenged.

Therefore, plaintiffs only bear the burden of proving the damage suffered and the causal link to the already established unlawful conduct. It is important to note that participating in the leniency programme or reaching early settlements does not eliminate, nor limit, the civil liability of the infringing parties for the damage caused.

In Peru, criminal sanctions for anti-competitive conduct are limited to cartel behaviour under Article 232 of the Criminal Code and apply primarily to individuals. In this regard, the aforementioned provision establishes that any person who participates in an anti-competitive agreement or practice subject to an absolute prohibition under the Antitrust Law, with the intent to prevent, restrict or distort free competition, will be punished with imprisonment for a term ranging from two to six years, as well as a fine of between 180 and 365 day-fines.

Accordingly, penalties are imposed by the criminal courts within statutory ranges and are subject to judicial discretion, rather than being determined on the basis of a fixed formula. INDECOPI does not impose criminal sanctions but may refer cases to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and provide technical support. In practice, enforcement remains predominantly administrative.

In Peruvian history, there are no cases in which individuals have served custodial sentences or have been imprisoned for cartel conduct. Similarly, there are no reported cases of Peruvian nationals being extradited to another jurisdiction for cartel-related offences, nor are there known instances of individuals agreeing to serve custodial sentences abroad as part of a plea agreement.

Although cartel conduct is a criminal offence under Peruvian law, enforcement remains primarily administrative, with criminal provisions playing a largely deterrent role. As a result, all the most significant penalties and fines to date have come from administrative proceedings before INDECOPI. It should also be noted that, of the cases currently pending before the courts, none has been resolved to date; therefore, there is currently no information available regarding the penalties imposed.

In Peru, an “effective compliance programme” may be considered as a mitigating factor in the determination of sanctions by INDECOPI. However, there is no automatic reduction of fines solely based on a programme’s existence.

According to INDECOPI’s Compliance Programme Guidelines, effectiveness is not presumed from the mere formal adoption of a programme. Instead, the authority assesses whether it has been genuinely implemented, is capable of preventing infringements, and follows the parameters set out in INDECOPI’s model Compliance Programme Guide. In doing so, it considers elements such as:

• management commitment;
• risk identification and management;
• internal procedures and protocols;
• employee training;
• continuous monitoring and updating of the compliance programme;
• audits;
• reporting mechanisms; and
• the designation of a compliance officer or committee.

Whenever an infringement occurs, INDECOPI assesses whether the compliance programme was effectively implemented before the conduct and whether it operated in practice. Programmes that are merely formal or poorly enforced are unlikely to be regarded as effective. The application of this mitigating factor also requires additional considerations, such as the infringement being reported to the authority, senior management not being involved in the conduct, and the violation constituting an isolated incident.

While compliance programmes may, in principle, serve as a mitigating factor, they do not exempt companies from liability, particularly in cartel cases. Notably, to date, there are no known cases in which INDECOPI has reduced fines based on the application of this provision.

Since sanctions are imposed in administrative proceedings by INDECOPI, they do not extend to mandatory consumer redress or restitution. The competition authority is empowered to impose fines and corrective measures, but it does not order compensation to affected consumers or third parties.

Consumer redress is instead pursued through private litigation before the civil courts. In this regard, the existence of private actions does not influence the imposition of administrative sanctions, as both regimes operate independently. Accordingly, while INDECOPI may sanction anti-competitive conduct, compensation for damages must be sought separately by affected parties through judicial proceedings.

Decisions issued by the Competition Division of the Tribunal of INDECOPI are final within the administrative process, but they are subject to judicial review. Specialised administrative courts (in the first instance) and Superior Courts (for appeals) examine the ruling. The cassation (Recurso de Casación) can be filed as a last resort before the Supreme Court.

The standard of review by the courts is a legality test. They verify whether INDECOPI followed the rules of due process and correctly interpreted the law. As a consequence, the courts can overturn INDECOPI’s decisions on the grounds of procedural errors, lack of evidence or arbitrariness.

Judicial reviews are very common, especially in high-stake cases (ie, cartels or where high fines are involved). In most of them, the judiciary affirms INDECOPI’s decisions, but sometimes they overturn them, mostly regarding the amount of the fine imposed by the administrative authority.

Although there is no formally established average duration in Peru, enforcement practice suggests that the preliminary investigation phase typically lasts around two years.

After this stage, the full proceeding lasts seven months plus 145 working days (in total, approximately 14 months, which may be extended by the Commission’s decision up to 19 months). This period is subject to a statutory limitation. Accordingly, if the Directorate does not issue a decision before the 14- or 19-month period expires, the proceeding automatically lapses and must be closed. The authority may restart the proceeding if the applicable prescription rules allow.

Overall, while durations vary significantly depending on the case, particularly in complex or international cartels, the full process from dawn raids to final resolution may extend over several years.

As noted in 4.7 Issuing Civil Complaints, Peruvian law expressly recognises the right to bring private actions for violations of free competition. Pursuant to Article 52 of the Antitrust Law, any individual or legal entity that has suffered damages as a result of anti-competitive conduct may file a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages. This right applies to both consumers and affected companies, regardless of whether or not they participated in the prior administrative proceeding before INDECOPI.

To file this civil action before the courts, the law requires compliance with two fundamental procedural requirements or thresholds. First, it is essential that a final administrative decision has been issued by the competition authority establishing the existence of the infringing conduct. Second, the private plaintiff bears the legal burden of proving that there is a causal link between the sanctioned anti-competitive conduct and the damages it alleges to have suffered.

With regard to standards of relief, these differ substantially from those applicable in administrative proceedings. While INDECOPI’s actions focus on imposing fines for punitive and deterrent purposes, as well as on ordering corrective measures aimed at restoring the competitive process, private civil actions pursue a strictly compensatory purpose. For this reason, the form of relief commonly sought is monetary compensation, which typically prioritises compensation for actual damages (eg, reimbursement for the overcharge paid), although the possibility of claiming lost profits is not excluded.

Although Peru does not have a formal class action system identical to that of common law jurisdictions, its legal system does provide for collective or representative actions aimed at achieving very similar objectives. These actions are designed to protect the diffuse and collective interests of consumers who have suffered harm as a result of anti-competitive conduct.

For the processing of these claims, INDECOPI’s damages guidelines have recently adopted an opt-out model, under which all affected consumers are considered included in the lawsuit unless they expressly request to be excluded in order to litigate individually.

With regard to standing, individual consumers do not have the legal authority to file claims for damages on behalf of or representing an entire affected class (although they may file a complaint on their own behalf as individuals). Instead, the Antitrust Law grants special standing to the competition agency itself (INDECOPI). Thus, the Commission may initiate civil proceedings seeking damages on behalf of consumers once the administrative decision sanctioning the cartel becomes final.

As for other entities, consumer associations and public interest groups do have standing to initiate this type of class action. According to Article 130 of the Consumer Protection and Defence Code, in accordance with Article 82 of the Civil Procedure Code, duly recognised consumer associations are legally empowered to bring legal proceedings in defence of the diffuse interests of those affected. Therefore, collective redress in Peru operates primarily through these representative actions led by the State or by consumer associations.

Under the general rule of the Antitrust Law, any person who has suffered damages as a result of a cartel has the right to seek compensation through the courts. Therefore, the Peruvian legal framework does not prohibit indirect purchasers from filing civil actions on their own behalf, provided they can prove the existence of the violation, the damages suffered, and a direct causal link.

However, the situation is different when it comes to class-action lawsuits brought directly by the State. According to INDECOPI’s guidelines, the authority has adopted a cautious stance regarding the evidentiary challenges posed by indirect damages. Consequently, the Commission will only pursue legal action and seek compensation on behalf of end-consumers who were direct purchasers of the cartelised products.

With regard to the passing-on defence, there is no specific or highly developed legal framework governing it. However, since purchasers at later stages of the commercial chain are not directly harmed by the cartel, they bear the burden of proving in court whether the price increase was actually passed on to them (downstream) and by what percentage. Therefore, disputes regarding indirect damages and passing-on are evaluated by judges on a case-by-case basis under the general rules of tort liability.

As detailed in 5.3 Effect of Liability Being Established, according to Article 52 of the Antitrust Law, the evidence of the administrative authority (or other government authority) is highly admissible. In fact, the final decision issued by INDECOPI is considered prima facie evidence of the illegal conduct.

Furthermore, the underlying evidence and documents gathered by the antitrust authority during its investigation may also be requested and admitted by the civil judge to support the assessment of damages.

Considering that a final decision regarding the existence of anti-competitive conduct must have been affirmed by the judiciary, if any party requested judicial review, these cases are not frequent.

Civil litigation cases are ruled by the Code of Civil Procedure which, unlike in common law jurisdictions, does not have a discovery phase. Instead, parties must present almost all their evidence with the initial complaint or the defence, and the judge has all the power to order the “exhibition” of specific documents, but only if the requesting party identifies them precisely. “Fishing expeditions” are not allowed.

There is currently no significant register of case law involving claims for damages following rulings in cartel matters. There is only one relevant case in civil litigation (the pharmacies case) which is still pending. However, since it can take from six to nine years to conclude a regular civil litigation case (after all instances), it is fair to project that complex cases (such as antitrust ones) will take longer.

The outcome of the damages action will be an order requiring payment of compensation to the injured party. The purpose of the proceeding is not to compensate counsel, without prejudice to any award of procedural costs and fees referred to in 6.7 Costs/Fees.

Under Article 412 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defeated party is automatically obliged to pay costs (costas – court fees, expert fees) and attorney’s fees (costos), unless the judge explicitly issues a reasoned exemption. An unsuccessful claimant must reimburse the defendant for the expenses incurred during the trial. Article 417 of the aforementioned Code determines that the winning party must demonstrate the fees requested. The losing party can challenge that fee, with prima facie evidence. If not, the fee is approved.

In Peru, private civil litigation follows a two-tier system plus an extraordinary review:

• Appeal (Recurso de Apelación) – The standard remedy against a first-instance judgment. It allows a full review by a Superior Court (Sala Superior). The standard of review is ordinary, reviewing both facts and legal application.
• Cassation (Recurso de Casación) – An extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court, it is restricted to specific legal errors (ie, misinterpretation of the law or lack of motivation). Its standard of review is strict legality review.

Both appeals are highly common (almost 100% of cases are appealed). However, while cassations are common, most of them are rejected due to strict procedural rules.

In the Guidelines on Trade Associations and Competition the authority has stated that although “the exchange of sensitive information doesn’t constitute by itself an infraction to the Competition Act, under certain circumstances it can provide important evidence of an anticompetitive agreement”.

In other words, even when the exchange of information is not an infringement itself, by adding other evidence, it could be used by the authority to declare the existence of a cartel offence.

In those guidelines, the authority has defined sensitive information as “Information that, due to its nature and the characteristics from the markets associated to the exchange, can increase the probability of anticompetitive practices (risks on competition), particularly cartels”. In addition, the authority has identified information and market characteristics that increase risk:

• information characteristics – information that allows an agent to get to know what decisions the competitors will adopt, eliminating the uncertainty in the decision-making process inherent to competitive scenarios, disaggregated information, recent or future information, confidential information and frequent exchanges; and
• market characteristics – concentrated markets, stable markets, markets in which the competitors have similar cost-price structure, existence of significant barriers to entry or other factors that facilitate collusion.

There is no public information about the use of AI in cartel enforcement.

However, the authority uses web scraping as a proactive cartel-detection tool by automatically collecting publicly available data from company websites, e-commerce channels, and public procurement portals, and then applying screening techniques to identify suspicious patterns such as parallel price changes, unusual price stability, repeated bid rotation, or other anomalies consistent with collusion. If those patterns provide sufficient indications of possible cartel conduct, the authority could use them to prioritise sectors, open an ex officio investigation, and then seek additional evidence through its formal investigative powers, such as requests for information, statements and inspections, since scraping and screening alone would ordinarily serve as an initial detection tool, rather than conclusive proof of infringement.

Monopolisation as a unilateral conduct might qualify as an abuse of dominance but not as a cartel offence. Joint abuse of dominance is not contemplated under Peruvian Antitrust Law.

Cartel offences are limited to the practices described in 1.4 “Cartel Conduct” (eg, price-fixing, output restriction, market or customer allocation, and bid rigging). However, other forms of horizontal collusion may also be assessed under the Antitrust Law, such as the unjustified joint obstruction of a competitor’s entry into a market or trade association. This type of conduct falls outside the concept of a hard-core cartel and is therefore assessed under the rules applicable to relative prohibitions.

The greatest scrutiny over the past ten years has been on the healthcare sector (healthcare services and products), energy (especially fuels), and public procurement, due to their impact on society. It is anticipated that the authority’s focus will continue to be on public procurement (eg, the purchase of food and beverages for social assistance programmes), medicines, digital platforms and basic household basket products.

The use of instant messages as evidence has become increasingly relevant in recent years. As methods of interpersonal communication have evolved, anti-competitive co-ordination is now more commonly carried out through instant messaging rather than through emails, as was more often the case in the past.

More recently, INDECOPI initiated sanctioning proceedings concerning the alleged co-ordination of chicken prices, relying almost entirely on WhatsApp conversations.

As noted above, INDECOPI requires judicial authorisation in order to access personal communications (eg, on mobile devices). The authority also has forensic software for data recovery and the analysis of messaging applications. There is no public information regarding the possibility of recovering or accessing ephemeral communications, nor are there official guidelines addressing this type of messaging.

In Peru, non-poaching agreements and labour market allocation agreements are considered and penalised as antitrust violations. According to Articles 11.1 and 11.2 of the Antitrust Law, these agreements constitute an unlawful form of supplier allocation, as companies divide up or restrict access to the labour market. Through the Informative Guide on Anti-Competitive Agreements Between Companies in the Labour Market, INDECOPI has explicitly confirmed that companies are competitors in the labour market when seeking to attract and retain talent, and therefore these practices directly restrict free competition.

Regarding the applicable standard of evaluation, Antitrust Law classifies no-poach agreements and concerted wage-fixing as hard-core cartels subject to an absolute prohibition. Since these are horizontal agreements that are neither complementary nor ancillary to other lawful commercial agreements, the authority does not accept justifications of any kind based on operational efficiencies or intentions to reduce costs. Consequently, to sanction offending companies, it is sufficient for the authority to prove the mere existence of the conduct and the agreement, without needing to demonstrate their negative effects on the market.

Although such agreements were not historically a common focus of regulatory scrutiny, they have recently gained prominence following a landmark case involving construction companies. In this proceeding, there was found to be a nationwide “non-aggression pact” that involved avoiding contact with or hiring workers from the colluding companies through a system of cross-checks, blockades and complaints. As a result, the investigated companies ultimately agreed to early termination commitments, undertaking to implement compliance programmes and pay significant financial compensation. Only one of the investigated companies was sanctioned.

Although there are no official statistics from INDECOPI, there has been a notable decrease in the filing of leniency/amnesty applications. Most of the investigations are generated from ex officio investigations. This trend may be due to the impact of criminal prosecution (which is still incipient).

In the last five years (2021–2026), seven leniency applications have been filed, compared with 19 applications filed during the preceding five-year period (2016–2020). It is remarkable that the last recorded leniency application was dated 2024.

Since the application of the merger control regime in 2021, ex officio cartel investigations have also reduced in number.

Although there is no official information on the overall nature of cartel investigations, only one of the cartel infringements sanctioned in the last ten years in Peru has had an international dimension (the shipping cartel case). In addition, in the toilet paper case, similar conduct to that sanctioned in Peru was also identified in Chile and Colombia.              

The authority maintains close co-ordination with other authorities in the region, such as the Chilean authority, and pays particular attention to markets that have been or are currently under investigation by other authorities in the region.

In Peru, while ESG is increasingly mandatory for listed firms, there is no “safe harbour” for sustainability agreements. According to the Draft Guidance on Collaboration Between Competitors, published by INDECOPI in August 2025, companies must ensure that ESG co-operation does not involve sensitive information exchange (prices or margins) and that any restriction of competition is strictly indispensable to achieving an environmental goal.

Crisis cartel defence is not possible under the Peruvian Antitrust Law regime. For instance, in the bread cartel, in 2016, the bakers defended themselves by saying that they were undergoing a shortage of raw materials, which was responsible for the consequent price increase. INDECOPI responded by saying that, under absolute prohibitions, no justification is applicable.

In recent years, INDECOPI has been attentive to certain market conditions that may facilitate collusion and has either strengthened its enforcement in such scenarios or issued guidelines to deter anti-competitive behaviour. For example, during the pandemic, INDECOPI was particularly concerned with co-operation agreements between competitors and, more recently, with the formation of consortiums.