White-Collar Crime 2026 Comparisons

Under Brazilian law, an offence must be typical, unlawful and culpable: the conduct must correspond to a statutory offence, lack a legal justification and be attributable to a criminally responsible person.

Offences are classified as crimes or misdemeanours. Crimes are punishable by imprisonment or detention, alone or together with a fine, while misdemeanours are subject to simple imprisonment and/or a fine.

Criminal liability generally requires intent, meaning that the offender intended the result or assumed the risk of producing it. Negligent liability, arising from recklessness, negligence or lack of skill, applies only where expressly provided by law.

An attempted crime is punishable under Article 14 of the Criminal Code, with a reduction of the prescribed sentence. Attempts to commit misdemeanours are not punishable.

In Brazilian criminal proceedings, the principles of the presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo apply. Accordingly, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence of the offence, its relevant circumstances and the defendant’s participation. A conviction may only be entered where the evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence.

Brazilian law distinguishes between limitation of the right to prosecute before a final conviction, and limitation of the right to enforce a sentence thereafter.

Under Article 109 of the Criminal Code, the limitation period before final judgment is determined by the offence’s maximum statutory sentence: three years where the maximum is less than one year; four years where it is between one and two years; eight years where it exceeds two but not four years; 12 years where it exceeds four but not eight years; 16 years where it exceeds eight but not 12 years; and 20 years where it exceeds 12 years.

As a rule, time runs from completion of the offence; for continuing offences, from the date the conduct ceases. Limitation may be interrupted by events including acceptance of the indictment and publication of a conviction (Article 117).

After a final conviction, the limitation period for enforcement is generally determined by the sentence actually imposed, applying the same periods under Article 109.

Brazilian criminal jurisdiction is primarily territorial. However, Article 7 of the Criminal Code permits the application of Brazilian law to certain offences committed abroad, including where Brazilian interests or nationals are involved or international obligations require it.

International legal co-operation is generally channelled through the Ministry of Justice, acting as Central Authority through the Department of Asset Recovery and International Legal Co-Operation (DRCI). Assistance may include exchange of legal information, service of summonses and notifications, obtaining evidence or testimony, and freezing, forfeiture and recovery of assets. Extradition is not limited to treaty partners: in the absence of a treaty, it may be sought on the basis of reciprocity and subject to Law No 13,445/2017.

Brazil has extensive cross-border enforcement experience. Operation Car Wash, for example, led to a 2016 co-ordinated resolution involving Odebrecht and Braskem and authorities in Brazil, the United States and Switzerland. Brazil also participates in FATF, the OECD Working Group on Bribery and INTERPOL; the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Brasília forms part of the Federal Police.

In Brazil, legal entities are generally not subject to criminal liability, except for environmental offences. Under Law No 9,605/1998, liability arises where the offence results from a decision of the entity’s legal or contractual representative, or collegiate body, and is committed in its interest or for its benefit. Corporate liability does not exclude individual liability, although the Supreme Court (STF) permits a legal entity to be prosecuted without identifying or prosecuting a natural person. There is no policy preference as to whether an entity or individual should be pursued.

Managers and directors may incur personal liability where their own conduct satisfies the elements of an offence. In environmental cases, this includes people who know of criminal conduct and fail to prevent it when able to do so; Article 13(2) of the Criminal Code more generally recognises liability for omissions where there is a legal duty and ability to prevent the result.

In non-fraudulent mergers, the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) holds that the target’s environmental criminal liability is extinguished because criminal responsibility cannot be transferred to the successor. Likewise, parent companies are not automatically liable for offences committed by subsidiaries or other group companies.

Brazil does not recognise a general corporate “failure to prevent” offence. The omission rules above concern individual liability and do not create autonomous corporate criminal liability.

Article 68 of the Criminal Code establishes a three-stage sentencing process. First, the court sets the base sentence by assessing culpability, criminal record, social behaviour, personality, motives, circumstances and consequences of the offence, and the victim’s conduct. Secondly, statutory mitigating factors, such as confession, and aggravating factors, such as recidivism, are applied. Thirdly, statutory causes of increase or reduction, including continuous offences and attempts, are considered.

The court must also assess whether imprisonment may be replaced by an alternative sanction or whether enforcement may be suspended subject to probation. Fines are calculated in day-fines: the court determines both the number, from ten to 360, and the value of each day-fine within the statutory limits, subject to monetary adjustment.

For deferred prosecution, non-prosecution and plea agreements, see 2.7 Deferred Prosecution and 4.3 Please Agreements, Co-Operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency.

Brazilian law does not recognise a “corporate culture” doctrine as a specific sentencing factor, consistent with the limited scope of corporate criminal liability.

Under Article 387, IV, of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPP), the judge, when delivering a convicting sentence, will set a minimum amount for the compensation of damages caused by the offence, considering the losses suffered by the victim. The determination of the compensation amount must also consider the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the intensity of the victim’s suffering, the severity of the harm, the economic condition of the defendant, and the compensation–punishment balance.

In addition, Article 63, sole paragraph of the CPP also states that the amount set in the criminal sentence does not prevent the party from seeking liquidation to determine a higher amount, thereby obtaining full compensation for the damage. Lastly, according to Brazilian Superior Courts (STF and STJ), it is possible to claim compensation for collective moral damages in criminal actions.

White-collar offences are investigated principally by the Civil Police and Federal Police and prosecuted by the Public Prosecution Office, before state or federal courts. Specialised police units, prosecutors and courts may exist depending on the subject matter and jurisdiction.

Under Article 144 of the Constitution, the Civil Police investigates state offences, while the Federal Police investigates, among other matters, offences affecting federal interests and offences with interstate or international implications. The Public Prosecution Office brings criminal prosecutions through federal or state prosecutors, as applicable.

Administrative and civil enforcement may proceed in parallel. COAF performs financial-intelligence and administrative functions under the Anti-Money Laundering Law; the CGU and TCU may act in matters involving public officials or public funds; the Central Bank and CVM conduct administrative enforcement in the financial and securities markets; and CADE investigates competition infringements.

Public policy may influence enforcement priorities, resources and senior appointments, but the Public Prosecution Office and judiciary have constitutional independence. Accordingly, political influence should not lawfully determine the outcome of individual investigations or prosecutions, although concerns regarding institutional pressure continue to form part of the broader public debate.

White-collar crime investigations can be initiated based on complaints or reports made by individuals, companies or other entities. These reports can be submitted to authorities such as the Federal Police, the Public Prosecution Office, or regulatory agencies. Also, they can be initiated throughout routine audits and inspections by regulatory agencies, like the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Revenue Service, and the Central Bank, which conduct routine audits and inspections that might uncover irregularities or signs of white-collar crimes.

Moreover, the Federal Police can initiate investigations into white-collar crimes based on intelligence, ongoing operations, or referrals from other agencies. The Public Prosecution Office may also initiate investigations, and, according to the Supreme Court, it requires: (i) immediate notification to the competent judge regarding the initiation and conclusion of the investigative procedure, with proper registration and distribution; (ii) adherence to the same deadlines and rules established for the completion of police inquiries; and (iii) the need for judicial authorisation for any extensions of deadlines.

Under Brazilian criminal law, a judge must be presented with probable cause to authorise dawn raids and search warrants. When the investigating authority deems that a search and seizure are necessary, it must request a search warrant from a competent judge, providing justified reasons for the need to employ this measure.

It is important to note that, according to the Supreme Court, generic search and seizure warrants, without individualisation, can constitute a form of fishing expedition; a tactic that is prohibited.

The court’s decision to authorise a raid must detail the scope of the measure, specifying which papers, documents or objects are to be searched and seized. The court order must also include the reasons for the investigation and its objectives.

With regard to questioning employees, officers, directors, or third parties, the authorities may issue subpoenas requiring them to provide testimony or information. The questioning must be conducted following legal procedures to ensure that the rights of the individuals are protected, such as the presence of a lawyer and the right to remain silent.

Moreover, Brazilian law enforcement authorities have the power to trace, freeze and seize digital assets in the course of criminal investigations, subject to prior judicial authorisation. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, courts may order precautionary measures over assets connected with criminal activity. In money laundering cases, for example, Law No 9,613/1998 authorises a judge, where there is sufficient evidence of a criminal offence, to impose precautionary measures over assets, rights or values belonging to the investigated or accused person, or held in the name of third parties, where they constitute an instrument, product or proceeds of money laundering or of the underlying offence.

Brazilian enforcement authorities are increasingly using AI and other advanced digital tools in criminal investigations. However, there is still no general legislation specifically governing the use of AI for investigative purposes. Ordinance MJSP No 961 of 24 June 2025, issued by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, is the first instrument to specifically regulate the use of AI in criminal investigations. It requires such technologies to be used in accordance with the principles of legality, adequacy, necessity and proportionality, and requires the preservation and verification of the chain of custody to safeguard the authenticity and integrity of evidential material. The Ordinance also prohibits the indiscriminate use of technological solutions without a defined and declared purpose and provides that access to data protected by legal secrecy requires a specific judicial order.

Internal investigations are not considered necessary nor mandatory in Brazil. Therefore, their conduct is governed by a fragmented body of rules which, although relevant, do not directly address the specific features of this type of inquiry. In addition to the Anti-Corruption Law, which establishes the strict administrative and civil liability of legal entities for unlawful acts against the public administration, there is the State-Owned Enterprises Law (Law No 13,303/2016), which sets out guidelines on corporate governance and compliance, and the General Data Protection Law (Law No 13,709/2018), which imposes restrictions on the processing of personal data and therefore directly affects the collection of information during internal investigations. In addition, guidance issued by public authorities, such as the Office of the Comptroller General and the Public Prosecution Service, provides recommendations on best practices, although such guidance does not have binding legal force.

Generally, there is no legal obligation for a company to voluntarily provide enforcement authorities with the findings or final report of an internal investigation.

Once an investigation is concluded, the Public Prosecution Office assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to bring charges. If so, it files a formal indictment with the competent court, which then determines whether the statutory requirements for the prosecution to proceed have been met.

The Public Prosecution Office has discretion to assess whether the evidential and legal basis for prosecution is sufficient, but that discretion is subject to statutory requirements. It may decline to prosecute where, for example, the facts do not constitute a criminal offence or there is insufficient basis for criminal liability. Where the legal requirements for prosecution are satisfied and no statutory ground for dismissal or alternative resolution applies, criminal proceedings must be pursued.

Article 89 of Law No 9,099/1995 provides for the conditional suspension of criminal proceedings where the minimum statutory penalty is one year or less. When filing the indictment, the Public Prosecution Office may propose suspension for a period of two to four years, provided that the defendant is not being prosecuted for, and has not been convicted of, another criminal offence. During the probationary period, the defendant is generally required to compensate the damage, where possible; refrain from attending certain places; obtain judicial authorisation before leaving the jurisdiction; and report to the court monthly to provide information on their activities.

Article 76 of the same Law provides for a further alternative resolution mechanism for misdemeanours and offences punishable by a maximum sentence of up to two years. In such cases, the Public Prosecution Office may propose the immediate imposition of non-custodial sanctions or a fine, thereby avoiding the commencement of criminal proceedings. The benefit is generally unavailable where the defendant has a final conviction resulting in imprisonment, has received the same benefit within the previous five years, or does not present favourable personal and case-specific circumstances.

Finally, Article 28-A of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for non-prosecution agreements where the minimum statutory sentence is less than four years and the offence was committed without violence or serious threat. Among other requirements, the defendant must formally and substantially confess to the offence, compensate the damage where possible, surrender assets or proceeds connected with the offence, and comply with any other proportionate condition imposed by the Public Prosecution Office.

Criminal company law and corporate fraud offences are primarily governed by Law No 7,492/1986.

Article 4 of the law criminalises fraudulently managing a financial institution, which is defined by unlawful acts performed by those responsible for managing a financial institution, involving deceitful practices and deliberate fraud. The penalty for this crime is imprisonment for a period ranging from three to 12 years, and a fine. Moreover, the sole paragraph of this Article typifies reckless management, which is characterised by the impetuousness with which business is conducted, which increases the risk that business activities may end up causing harm to third parties or misusing the money invested in the company. The penalty provided is imprisonment for two to eight years, and a fine.

Misappropriation and embezzlement of funds is dealt with in Article 5. This crime involves administrators of a financial institution appropriating or diverting funds, money, or movable property for personal benefit or that of others. The penalty is imprisonment for a period ranging from two to six years, and a fine.

Article 9 provides a penalty of imprisonment for a period ranging from one to five years and a fine for those who defraud regulatory authorities or investors, inserting a false or differing statement in a document evidencing investment in securities or financial assets. Finally, Article 11 provides the same penalty for those who maintain or handle resources or values in parallel to the accounting required by law.

The principal bribery offences are active and passive corruption under the Criminal Code.

Active corruption (Article 333) consists of offering or promising an undue advantage to a public official to induce the performance, omission or delay of an official act. It is punishable by two to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine, increased by one-third if the official consequently delays, omits or improperly performs the act.

Passive corruption (Article 317) consists of a public official requesting or receiving, for themselves or another, an undue advantage connected with their office, or accepting its promise. The basic penalty is also two to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine. A lesser form applies where the official improperly acts or refrains from acting in response to another person’s request or influence, punishable by three months to one year’s detention or a fine.

Extortion by a public official (Article 316) differs in that the official demands, rather than merely requests, an undue advantage because of their position. It carries the same basic penalty of two to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Influence peddling (Article 332) consists of requesting, demanding, charging or obtaining an advantage, or its promise, on the pretext of influencing a public official. The penalty is two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine.

The Criminal Code also criminalises active bribery of a foreign public official (Article 337-B), punishable by one to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine, and influence peddling in international business transactions (Article 337-C), punishable by two to five years and a fine, increased where the offender represents that the advantage is also intended for the foreign official.

In addition to the Criminal Code, Law No 12,846/2013 (the Anti-Corruption Law) establishes strict administrative and civil liability of legal entities for harmful acts against Brazilian or foreign public administrations.

Such acts include offering or giving undue advantages to public officials; financing unlawful conduct; using intermediaries to conceal the parties or beneficiaries involved; fraud or interference in public procurement and government contracts; and obstruction of investigations or supervisory activities.

Related legislation includes Law No 8,429/1992 on misconduct involving public officials and Law No 14,133/2021 on public procurement.

Compliance programmes are not generally mandatory. However, Decree No 11,129/2022 provides that an effective compliance programme may be taken into account when sanctions under the Anti-Corruption Law are assessed.

There is also no general obligation on private companies or individuals to report suspected bribery merely because they become aware of it. Specific reporting duties may nevertheless arise under sectoral legislation, including anti-money laundering rules.

Article 27-C of Law No 6,385/1976 criminalises market manipulation, defined as carrying out simulated transactions or other fraudulent manoeuvres intended to raise, maintain or lower the price, quotation or trading volume of a security, with the purpose of obtaining an undue advantage or profit for oneself or another person, or causing loss to a third party. The offence is punishable by one to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to three times the amount of the unlawful advantage obtained.

Article 27-D criminalises insider dealing, which consists of trading securities on the basis of material information that is known to the offender, has not yet been disclosed to the market and is capable of providing an undue advantage to the offender or another person. The penalty is one to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to three times the unlawful advantage obtained.

The same penalty applies to anyone who discloses material confidential information obtained by reason of their position or role within a securities issuer, or through a commercial, professional or fiduciary relationship with the issuer. The sentence for insider dealing is increased by one-third where the offender was under a duty to keep the information confidential.

Tax offences are principally governed by Law No 8,137/1990.

Article 1 criminalises suppressing or reducing taxes or social contributions through conduct including false or omitted information to tax authorities; fraudulent entries or omissions in mandatory books and records; forged or altered invoices or other tax documents; use of documents known to be false or inaccurate; and failure to issue a legally required invoice or equivalent document. The penalty is two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Article 2 criminalises related conduct including fraudulent declarations or omissions intended to evade tax; failure to remit taxes or contributions withheld or collected from third parties; unlawful dealings involving tax incentives; misuse of fiscal incentives; and use or disclosure of software designed to maintain accounting information different from that supplied to tax authorities. The penalty is six months to two years’ detention and a fine.

Brazil does not recognise a general criminal offence of “failure to prevent tax evasion”. Liability depends on the individual’s own participation in conduct satisfying the statutory elements, while companies and responsible persons may also be subject to separate tax and administrative consequences.

Article 10 of Law No 7,492/1986 criminalises the act of inserting false elements or omitting required elements in the financial statements of specific entities, including financial institutions, insurance companies and institutions involved in the securities distribution system. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to five years, and a fine.

Cartel conduct is both a criminal offence and an administrative competition infringement in Brazil.

Article 4 of Law No 8,137/1990 criminalises abuse of economic power through agreements intended to dominate the market or eliminate competition, and agreements among suppliers aimed at fixing prices or quantities, allocating markets, or controlling distribution networks or suppliers to the detriment of competition. The penalty is two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Article 337-F of the Criminal Code separately criminalises agreements or other conduct intended to frustrate or defraud competition in public procurement in order to obtain an advantage arising from the award. The penalty is four to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Administratively, Article 36 of Law No 12,529/2011 prohibits agreements between competitors concerning prices, output, market allocation or bidding conditions. Companies may be fined between 0.1% and 20% of gross revenue; other individuals or entities may face fines from BRL50,000 to BRL2 billion.

Article 195 of Law No 9,279/1996 also criminalises specified unfair competition practices involving fraudulent or otherwise unlawful means to divert customers, punishable by three months to one year’s imprisonment or a fine.

Article 7 of Law No 8,137/1990 establishes the principal criminal offences against consumer relations. It criminalises, among other conduct:

• unjustifiably favouring one buyer or customer over another;
• selling goods that do not comply with legal requirements or their official classification;
• adulterating or mixing goods and presenting them as having a different nature or quality;
• fraudulently altering the price or presentation of goods or services;
• imposing unlawful charges in instalment sales;
• withholding goods or refusing sales under publicly offered conditions for speculative purposes;
• misleading consumers as to the nature or quality of goods or services, including through advertising;
• destroying or wasting goods to cause price increases; and
• selling or supplying products unfit for consumption.

These offences are punishable by two to five years’ detention or a fine.

Article 154-A of the Criminal Code criminalises unauthorised access to computer devices, with the intent to obtain, alter or destroy data or information without the authorisation of the device’s user, or to install vulnerabilities to obtain an illicit advantage. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to four years, and a fine. The same penalty applies to anyone who produces, offers, distributes, sells or disseminates a device or computer program with the intent of enabling the conduct defined above.

If the invasion results in the obtaining of content from private electronic communications, trade or industrial secrets, confidential information, or unauthorised remote control of the invaded device, the penalty is increased to imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.

Moreover, Article 154 criminalises the unjustified disclosure of a secret learned by reason of a person’s function, ministry, occupation or profession where the disclosure is capable of causing harm to another person. The penalty is detention for three months to one year or a fine. This provision may be relevant, for example, where confidential corporate information becomes known to an individual because of their professional role and is subsequently disclosed without justification.

Article 154-A of the Criminal Code criminalises unauthorised access to computer devices, with the intent to obtain, alter, or destroy data or information without the authorisation of the device’s user, or to install vulnerabilities to obtain an illicit advantage. The penalty for this offence is imprisonment for a period ranging from one to four years, and a fine. The same penalty applies to anyone who produces, offers, distributes, sells, or disseminates a device or computer program with the intent of enabling the conduct defined above.

If the invasion results in the obtaining of content from private electronic communications, trade or industrial secrets, confidential information, or unauthorised remote control of the invaded device, the penalty is increased to imprisonment for a period ranging from two to five years, and a fine.

Moreover, Article 154 criminalises the unjustified disclosure of a secret learned by reason of a person’s function, ministry, occupation or profession where the disclosure is capable of causing harm to another person. The penalty is detention for three months to one year or a fine. This provision may be relevant, for example, where confidential corporate information becomes known to an individual because of their professional role and is subsequently disclosed without justification.

Concealment is criminalised as handling or receiving goods of illicit origin under Article 180 of the Criminal Code, which can consist of concealing, for one’s own benefit or that of another, property known to be the proceeds of a criminal offence or influencing an innocent third party to conceal such property. The basic offence is punishable by one to four years’ imprisonment and a fine. More severe penalties apply where the conduct occurs in the course of commercial or industrial activities.

Brazil’s Criminal Code determines that anyone who, in any way, contributes to a crime is subject to its prescribed penalties, according to their level of involvement (Article 29). In case the assistance is of minor importance, the penalty may be reduced by one-sixth to one-third. Also, if any of the participants intended to commit a less serious crime, they will be subject to the penalty for that crime; this penalty will be increased by up to half if a more serious outcome was foreseeable.

Article 1 of Law No 9,613/1998 criminalises concealing or disguising the nature, origin, location, disposition, movement or ownership of assets, rights or values derived directly or indirectly from a criminal offence. Since Law No 12,683/2012, any criminal offence capable of generating illicit assets may serve as a predicate offence. The penalty is three to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine.

The same penalty applies to specified conduct intended to conceal or disguise criminal proceeds, including converting them into lawful assets; acquiring, receiving, exchanging, negotiating, storing, moving or transferring them; importing or exporting goods at false values; using criminal proceeds in economic or financial activities; or knowingly participating in an organisation whose activities include money laundering.

People and entities listed in Article 9 are subject to AML obligations, including customer identification and record-keeping, transaction records, proportionate internal policies and controls, regulatory registration and compliance with COAF requests. Failure to comply may result in administrative sanctions including a warning, fine, temporary disqualification of managers for up to ten years, and suspension or revocation of authorisation to operate.

Brazil does not have a specific “ESG offence”, but a significant range of conduct falling within the environmental, social and governance sphere is criminalised under existing legislation.

The Environmental Crimes Law (Law No 9,605/1998), for example, criminalises pollution, damage to protected vegetation and conservation areas, unlawful mineral extraction, and the unlawful handling, storage, transport or disposal of hazardous substances and waste, among other conducts.

In the social sphere, Article 149 of the Criminal Code criminalises reducing a person to a condition analogous to slavery. The offence includes subjecting a person to forced labour, excessive working hours, degrading working conditions or restricting their freedom of movement because of a debt owed to the employer or its representative. The penalty is two to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine, in addition to any penalty arising from violence, and is increased by one-half where the victim is a child or adolescent or where the offence is motivated by racial, ethnic, religious or origin-based prejudice.

Human trafficking may also arise in supply-chain and labour exploitation cases. Article 149-A criminalises recruiting, enticing, transporting, transferring, purchasing, harbouring or receiving a person through serious threat, violence, coercion, fraud or abuse for specified exploitative purposes, including subjecting the victim to conditions analogous to slavery or servitude. The penalty is four to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine, subject to statutory increases in certain circumstances.

Other ESG-related conduct may also fall within specific legislation concerning discrimination, consumer protection and the capital markets.

Brazil does not currently have a general criminal offence specifically addressing the misuse of artificial intelligence, algorithmic trading or automated decision-making in financial or commercial activities. The use of AI or an algorithm is generally treated as the means by which an existing offence is committed. Accordingly, liability depends on whether the underlying conduct satisfies the constituent elements of an existing criminal provision.

Brazil has a specific statutory and regulatory framework for crypto-assets, principally established by Law No 14,478/2022 (the “Virtual Assets Law”) and supplemented by regulations issued by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB). Crypto-assets are not treated as a single legal category; their classification depends on their characteristics and economic function.

Virtual assets are defined by Law No 14,478/2022 as digital representations of value that may be electronically traded or transferred and used for payment or investment purposes. These assets generally fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the BCB.

Where a crypto-asset qualifies as a security – for example, because it represents a collective investment contract or other instrument within Law No 6,385/1976 – it is instead subject to the securities regime and supervision by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM).

For civil and tax purposes, crypto-assets may also be treated as intangible assets, including for capital gains taxation and reporting obligations before the Federal Revenue Service.

Article 171-A of the Criminal Code specifically criminalises fraud involving virtual assets, securities and other financial assets. The offence consists of organising, managing, offering or distributing portfolios, or intermediating transactions involving such assets, with the purpose of obtaining an unlawful advantage, causing loss to another person and inducing or maintaining that person in error through fraudulent means. The penalty is four to eight years’ imprisonment and a fine.

Crypto-assets may also constitute the proceeds, object or instrument of money laundering under Law No 9,613/1998. Where the statutory elements of laundering are satisfied, the ordinary money laundering penalties apply.

Virtual-asset service providers are expressly subject to Brazil’s anti-money laundering framework. They must comply with the customer identification, record-keeping, internal control and suspicious transaction reporting obligations set out in Articles 10 and 11 of Law No 9,613/1998, together with the applicable BCB regulations. They are also subject to the authorisation and supervisory requirements established under the Virtual Assets Law and BCB regulations. Failure to comply with these obligations may result in sanctions.

In Brazil, the main defences used in cases involving white-collar offences are:

• lack of intent – where the offence requires intent, the defence may argue that the defendant did not knowingly or deliberately engage in the prohibited conduct;
• lack of evidence – the defence may argue that the prosecution has failed to prove the offence or the defendant’s participation beyond a reasonable doubt;
• procedural violations – evidence or proceedings may be challenged where constitutional or procedural safeguards have been breached, including rules governing searches, seizures, access to evidence and due process; and
• statute of limitations – the defence may argue that the state’s right to prosecute or enforce the sentence is time-barred.

It is important to note that an effective compliance programme is not a criminal defence, however it plays a crucial role in mitigating criminal corporate liability and influencing penalties, especially under the crimes set forth by the Anti-Corruption Law (Law No 12,846/2013).

Brazilian law does not provide a general statutory de minimis exception for white-collar offences, nor are any industries or sectors generally exempt from criminal liability.

However, the Superior Court of Justice recognises the de minimis principle in federal and state tax offences and smuggling, holding that criminal liability may be excluded on the grounds of material atypicality where the total amount of unpaid tax does not exceed BRL20,000, provided that there is no habitual tax evasion.

Law No 12,850/2013, as amended by Law No 13,964/2019, provides for plea agreements (colaboração premiada) based on a suspect’s effective co-operation. The collaborator, assisted by counsel, waives the right to remain silent in their statements, must tell the truth and must cease the unlawful conduct covered by the agreement.

Effective co-operation must produce at least one statutory result: identification of other participants and offences; disclosure of the criminal organisation’s structure and division of tasks; prevention of further offences; recovery of criminal proceeds or benefits; or location of a victim with physical integrity preserved. Depending on the timing and effectiveness of the assistance, benefits may include judicial pardon, a sentence reduction of up to two-thirds, substitution of imprisonment with a restrictive penalty, procedural immunity in the circumstances set out in Article 4(4), a reduction of up to half for post-sentence co-operation, or progression to a less restrictive prison regime.

Legal entities may also enter into leniency agreements in competition and anti-corruption matters. Under Law No 12,529/2011, CADE may terminate administrative punitive action or reduce the penalty by one to two-thirds where effective co-operation identifies other participants and produces evidence of the infringement. The applicant must, among other requirements, be the first to qualify, cease participation, confess and co-operate fully; CADE’s General Superintendence must not already possess sufficient evidence to secure conviction.

For harmful acts against the Public Administration, an Anti-Corruption Law leniency agreement may exempt the company from specified sanctions, including publication of the adverse decision, and reduce the applicable fine by up to two-thirds.

In Brazil, Law No 13,608/2018, which deals with telephone service for receiving complaints and rewards for information that aids in police investigations, established the concept of the so-called whistle-blower within the public sector. In this regard, there has been recognition of some important components of whistle-blowing policy for the prevention, suppression, or investigation of crimes or administrative violations:

• guarantee of anonymity (Article 1, Item II);
• confidentiality of the informant’s data (Article 3); and
• reward (Article 4).

In 2019, additional enhancements to this policy in the public sphere were introduced with the enactment of Law No 13,964/2019, including:

• an institutionalised channel for receiving reports;
• full protection against retaliation and exemption from civil or criminal liability for the reporter regarding the report;
• disclosure of the reporter’s identity will only occur with prior notification and formal consent from them;
• dismissal for the public good in cases of severe disciplinary misconduct by the individual who retaliated;
• double compensation to the reporter for any material damages caused by actions or omissions related to the retaliation, without prejudice to moral damages; and
• a reward for the reporter of up to 5% of the recovered amount.

However, there is still no mandatory regulation requiring private companies to implement reporting channels. Among private companies, adopting reporting channels as part of a broader integrity system is a decision made:

• as a strategy to add value to their activities;
• to enhance their capacity to conduct business, and/or
• to obtain benefits provided by law in the event of an investigation and accountability for any illegal activities conducted within the company.

White-collar investigations involving more than one jurisdiction can materially affect defence strategy in Brazil. A company or individual may face parallel investigations, prosecutions, regulatory proceedings, asset-freezing measures or settlement negotiations in different countries arising from the same underlying conduct. Defence counsel must therefore consider not only Brazilian criminal procedure, but also how statements, documents and settlements made in one jurisdiction may be obtained or used by authorities in another. There is no formal Brazilian mechanism for a “co-ordinated defence” across jurisdictions. In practice, however, defendants and companies commonly instruct counsel in the relevant countries and co-ordinate strategy.

Cross-border evidence-sharing is extensive, but it is not unlimited. Requests for criminal legal assistance are ordinarily channelled through the relevant Central Authorities. In Brazil, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security performs this role through the Department of Asset Recovery and International Legal Co-operation (DRCI), which assesses incoming and outgoing requests for compatibility with Brazilian law and the applicable bilateral or multilateral treaty. The precise limits on co-operation depend on the applicable treaty and the type of assistance sought.

White-collar investigations involving more than one jurisdiction can materially affect defence strategy in Brazil. A company or individual may face parallel investigations, prosecutions, regulatory proceedings, asset-freezing measures or settlement negotiations in different countries arising from the same underlying conduct. Defence counsel must therefore consider not only Brazilian criminal procedure, but also how statements, documents and settlements made in one jurisdiction may be obtained or used by authorities in another. There is no formal Brazilian mechanism for a “co-ordinated defence” across jurisdictions. In practice, however, defendants and companies commonly instruct counsel in the relevant countries and co-ordinate strategy.

Cross-border evidence-sharing is extensive, but it is not unlimited. Requests for criminal legal assistance are ordinarily channelled through the relevant Central Authorities. In Brazil, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security performs this role through the Department of Asset Recovery and International Legal Co-Operation (DRCI), which assesses incoming and outgoing requests for compatibility with Brazilian law and the applicable bilateral or multilateral treaty. The precise limits on co-operation depend on the applicable treaty and the type of assistance sought.