Contributed By Bae, Kim & Lee LLC
Compared to 12 months ago, the sanctions landscape may be poised for change following the inauguration of President Lee Jae-myung in June 2025. The Democratic Party, to which the new president belongs, has historically adopted a more conciliatory stance toward North Korea. As such, his administration is expected to take a more moderate approach than the previous government, which had implemented multiple sanctions against North Korea. However, as his presidency has only begun, it remains too early to assess whether any substantive changes to the existing sanctions regime have occurred.
Increased Sanctions Against North Korea
Over the past 12 months, South Korea has imposed multiple unilateral sanctions on North Korea in response to its continued nuclear and missile activities, in line with broader international sanctions regimes. Specifically, on 2 April, 24 May, 1 July, and 19 December 2024, South Korea designated individuals and entities that violated United Nations Security Council (UN) resolutions as sanctioned parties under its own sanctions framework. These individuals and entities were involved in illicit Russia-North Korea military co-operation and in the financing or supply of materials supporting North Korea’s weapons programmes. Additional sanctions were imposed on 18 July 2024 and 10 April 2025, targeting vessels, organisations and individuals similarly engaged in activities contravening UN sanctions. On 26 December 2024, the government also announced its intention to sanction overseas North Korean IT personnel and institutions involved in foreign currency-earning operations used to fund the country’s nuclear and missile programmes.
Strengthening the Export Control Framework
In the area of export controls, South Korea has continued to align its measures with those of the United States (US), particularly regarding Russia and Belarus. One key development was the expansion of the so-called situational-licence list, which covers items that are not generally classified as strategic items but still require export approval from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) due to their potential risk of being diverted for use in weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the MOTIE issued a notification, effective 24 February 2024, adding 682 items to the list, which included heavy construction machinery, secondary batteries, machine tools and aircraft components. A subsequent notification, effective 9 September 2024, added a further 243 items considered to have a high risk of military end use, including metal-cutting machines, machine-tool components, optical-device parts and sensors. With these additions, the total number of items requiring a situational licence for export to Russia and Belarus rose to 1,402.
Additionally, the MOTIE issued a notification, effective 28 February 28, designating an additional 21 advanced-industry items and technologies – covered under international regimes such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group – as strategic items that could be exported despite their connections to sanctioned countries. Under this revision, certain medical devices intended for humanitarian use (eg, diagnostic X-ray and radiographic imaging systems) with a low risk of military diversion may now be exported to Russia without a situational licence, provided that appropriate documentation is submitted.
Separately, a July 2024 amendment to the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Trade Act established a legal basis for South Korea to implement unilateral export control measures independently of international regimes. However, no such independent designations have been made to date.
The manufacturing industry, including insofar as it is related to batteries, automobiles, steel and semiconductors, continues to be most affected by the trade sanctions regulations of the US. A report dated 28 April 2025, issued by the International Trade and Commerce Research Institute of the Korea International Trade Association, revealed that over 60% of South Korean companies were considering adjusting their global supply chains to comply with US trade sanctions. This concern was particularly observed in companies trading secondary batteries, automobiles and automotive parts, steel and metals, computers, telecommunications equipment and networks, and semiconductors, among others.
South Korea implements a range of sanctions, including trade restrictions (such as arms embargoes), economic and financial measures, including asset freezes, travel prohibitions, as well as aviation and maritime sanctions.
As a general rule, South Korean laws apply (i) to Korean nationals, wherever located, and (ii) all entities and individuals within Korean territory. However, sanctions may also have extra-territorial reach and apply to foreign nationals, in accordance with general principles of criminal jurisdiction. For example, Korean sanctions may apply to offences committed abroad against Korean nationals or the Korean government, or to foreign exchange transactions with a Korean nexus, such as those involving Korean residents or the Korean currency.
South Korea imposes sanctions both independently under its domestic laws and in co-ordination with international measures. Although South Korean law permits unilateral sanctions, the government generally aligns its actions with those of international bodies or key allies, such as the UN, US, and the European Union (EU) by incorporating their measures into its domestic framework.
Legal Basis for Sanctions Implementation
The key statutes and regulations that incorporate international sanctions into the Korean legal system include the following.
Financial Sanctions
In addition to the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act and Anti-Terrorism Act, the following regulations specifically govern financial sanctions in South Korea: (i) the Guidelines on Payment and Receipt of Payment to Perform Duties to Maintain International Peace and Security, and (ii) the Regulation on the Designation of Persons as Subject to Financial Transaction Restrictions and the Revocation of Such Designation.
The second regulation includes the official list of individuals and entities prohibited from conducting financial transactions. The Ministry of Economy and Finance maintains and periodically updates this list. Sanctions targets designated by the UN, US or EU may be included, but the Ministry also has the authority to designate individuals or entities independently, even if they are not listed under international measures.
Export Controls
Export controls are primarily governed by (i) the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items, and (ii) the Public Notice on Special Trade Measure.
The former list is periodically updated to incorporate international export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group. South Korea’s export control is generally aligned with these international export control regimes. Amendments to the Public Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Materials frequently refer to such reasons as the rationale for the revisions.
Trade Sanctions
The MOTIE serves as the primary regulatory authority for trade sanctions, mainly related to dual use items, imposed under the Foreign Trade Act. The following authorities also implement trade sanctions.
Economic and Financial Sanctions
The Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Financial Services Commission and the Bank of Korea are the primary regulators overseeing economic and financial sanctions in South Korea. These sanctions, including asset freezes, are implemented under the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act and Anti-Terrorism Act, and fall within the jurisdiction of the above authorities.
Others
The Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Unification, oversee matters including travel bans, aviation bans, and maritime sanctions, respectively.
Civil Enforcement
Financial sanctions
The Financial Services Commission imposes and collects administrative monetary penalties in violation of financial sanctions (Article 7(2) of the Anti-Terrorism Act).
Export controls
The Minister of the MOTIE, the governor of a province or metropolitan city, or the head of the relevant administrative agency impose and collect administrative monetary penalties regarding export controls (Article 59(4) of the Foreign Trade Act). Specifically, the Minister of the MOTIE or the head of the relevant administrative agency may cancel any export licence, situational licence, transit or transshipment licence, or brokering licence after it has been granted, if it is discovered that the licence was obtained by false or fraudulent means, or in the event of changes in the international landscape, such as war, terrorism, interstate security-related incidents, or concerns arising regarding the movement and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Article 19-7 of the Foreign Trade Act).
Criminal Enforcement
Financial sanctions
Criminal penalties prescribing imprisonment or fines related to financial sanctions are investigated by the police, and prosecuted by prosecutors in Korea (Article 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act).
Export controls
Criminal penalties prescribing imprisonment or fines related to export control are investigated and prosecuted by prosecutors in Korea (Article 2, item 2 and Annex 2, item 5 ma of the Provisions on the Scope of Offences Subject to Prosecutor’s Initiation of Investigation; Articles 53, 53–2 and 54 of the Foreign Trade Act).
Breaching export control-related sanctions could lead to criminal offences under the Foreign Trade Act, as follows.
Breaching financial sanctions could lead to criminal offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The following are examples.
Although there have been no notable civil enforcement cases to date for violations of these sanctions or related export controls, the Korean government has been actively monitoring exporters of strategic and dual-use items for compliance.
Major cases regarding Korea’s criminal enforcement against breaching the sanctions from 2022 to date are as follows:
Under Korean criminal law, compliance efforts may be considered as mitigating factors, depending on the circumstances surrounding the offence, including actions taken both before and after its occurrence, along with other sentencing considerations.
In addition, the Korean criminal law generally permits leniency in sentencing where the offender co-operates with authorities during the investigation, such as by voluntarily self-reporting. This potential benefit of self-reporting may be a relevant consideration for companies when determining how to respond to possible enforcement actions.
Although Korea does not recognise strict liability with respect to its sanctions regime, the financial regulatory authorities sometimes operate on a de facto strict‑liability basis during their regulatory review processes regarding financial sanctions.
Individuals subject to financial transaction restrictions under the Anti-Terrorism Act may proceed with the transaction if approval is granted by the Financial Services Commission. Similarly, individuals subject to financial sanctions under the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act may engage in a foreign exchange transaction with the approval of the Chairperson of the Bank of Korea.
However, neither the relevant laws nor their subordinate regulations specify the criteria or circumstances under which such approvals may be granted in detail. In practice, approvals are rarely issued.
Korean law does not provide a general licence permitting the provision of legal services to designated persons.
The Anti-Terrorism Act requires financial companies to report to the local police if they identify that assets received from a financial transaction are being used to fund terrorist activity or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or if the counterparty is conducting a transaction or making or receiving a payment without proper authorisation (Article 5(2)).
More broadly and generally, under Article 4(1) of the Act on Reporting and Using Specified Financial Transaction Information, which is the primary anti-money laundering legislation in Korea, financial institutions are required to promptly report to the Commissioner of the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (KoFIU) when:
Otherwise, there is no general legal obligation to self-report in relation to sanctions enforcement.
Please refer to 1.2 Key Trends regarding the expansion of export control items and 2.2.4 Criminal Enforcement Action regarding the judgments concerning sanctions.
The Anti-Terrorism Act has been amended to expand the application of financial‑transaction restrictions to downstream subsidiaries as follows.
Article 4(9) of the Anti-Terrorism Act states that “[…] the term “owning or controlling corporation” means any corporation in which an individual, corporation, or organisation involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – or a person designated as subject to financial‑transaction restrictions – directly or indirectly contributes or owns 50 percent or more of the total contributed assets, total issued shares, or total equity interests, or any corporation that in fact exercises influence, as prescribed by Presidential Decree.”
Although the Enforcement Decree of the Anti-Terrorism Act has not yet been enacted to provide detailed guidance on implementation, the Financial Services Commission issued a draft partial amendment to the Enforcement Decree for public comment on 19 March 2025. Under the draft amendment, a sanctioned person will be deemed to exercise de facto control over a subsidiary if any of the following conditions are met (Article 2-2 of the draft decree):
If enacted, the draft decree would expand the scope of entities subject to sanctions compliance obligations. In effect, companies will need to assess not only their direct dealings with sanctioned persons but also their relationships with subsidiaries or affiliates over which such persons may exercise de facto control.
The Anti-Terrorism Act and its Enforcement Decree outline the following process to object to a designation by the Financial Services Commission as a person subject to restrictions on financial transactions.
Note that the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act does not provide a specific objection process for designations.
It is difficult to achieve any outcome other than the actual delisting through a delisting challenge.
A person subjected to sanctions may consider asserting a claim for damages under the State Compensation Act by filing a separate lawsuit. However, relief under the State Compensation Act is available only where a public servant, in the course of performing official duties, intentionally or negligently violates statutes or regulations, which results in causing harm to another (Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act). Accordingly, absent any wilful or negligent breach of law during the sanctions‑enforcement process, a claim for damages under a separate lawsuit is unlikely to succeed. In addition, the lack of reported precedents awarding damages related to the designation of sanctions makes it difficult to estimate potential damages.
It is expected to take at least six months to obtain delisting due to administrative procedures. However, since there are no known delisting precedents, it may take longer depending on the specific facts of each case.
Under Article 11 of the Foreign Trade Act and the related export and import notifications, the export or import of goods and certain services may be restricted or prohibited for reasons including the following.
The list of prohibited items and restricted items that are permitted for export or import if the MOTIE’s approval is obtained are as follows.
In addition, the export of goods and certain services related to military technical support or training to conflict zones or hostile countries – such as Iraq, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and North Korea – is prohibited unless the exporter obtains prior approval from the MOTIE for limited and specified purposes.
On a separate note, there are specific restrictions regarding trade with North Korea under the Act on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation. The key provisions are as follows.
As explained in 5.1 Services, the Foreign Trade Act imposes restrictions on export or import of certain goods.
Separately, pursuant to Article 5 of the Foreign Trade Act and the Public Notice on Special Trade Measure, the following special trade measures are implemented to fulfil obligations for maintaining international peace and security.
Korean courts generally find that if sanctions make it impossible to carry out a contract, the person responsible is not at fault. The following are some example cases.
A review of South Korean enforcement practice reveals no reported cases in which courts have refused or modified the enforcement of a final judgment on the grounds of sanctions-related issues.
The MOTIE is responsible for designation decisions related to export controls, while the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Financial Services Commission are responsible for designation decisions related to financial sanctions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for overall co-ordination among government agencies in matters related to sanctions.
Entities are not automatically designated solely by virtue of being owned or controlled by a designated person. However, as explained in 3.2 Future Developments, the amended Anti-Terrorism Act introduced a form of indirect designation of subsidiaries “owned or controlled” by a designated person. It remains to be seen how this provision will be applied in practice. As noted in 3.2 Future Developments, the Enforcement Decree that is intended to provide detailed guidelines about the interpretation of the amended Anti-Terrorism Act has been published in draft form for public comment and has not been enforced yet.
Laws and regulations related to sanctions in Korea do not explicitly penalise the act of seeking to circumvent sanctions. The provisions prohibiting the violation of sanctions regulation is explained in 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions.
As noted in 7.3.1 Prohibiting Provisions, South Korean sanctions-related laws and regulations do not expressly impose penalties for attempts to circumvent sanctions. The criminal penalties for violations of sanctions regulations are outlined in 2.2.2 Breaching Sanctions.
Centropolis B
26 Ujeongguk-ro
Jongno-gu
Seoul 03161
Korea
+82 2 3404 0000
+82 2 3404 0001
bkl@bkl.co.kr www.bkl.co.kr/law?lang=en