Sanctions 2026 Comparisons

The Dutch Sanctions Act 1977 (Sanctiewet 1977) empowers the Dutch government to implement and enforce sanctions adopted by the EU and the United Nations without the need for separate national legislation. Therefore, the Netherlands adopts sanctions that have been agreed to by the UN or the EU, and does not generally operate an autonomous sanctions regime (although see 1.4.3 Domestic and/or Supranational Measures for some notable exceptions).

The types of sanctions the Netherlands adopts are comprised of:

• targeted sanctions – ie, sanctions targeting individuals through asset freezes and travel bans; and
• sectoral sanctions – ie, economic sanctions that, amongst other effects, prohibit transactions within certain sectors in a sanctioned territory, prohibit the import or export of certain goods, or prohibit transactions with specific listed entities in a sector.

As the Netherlands implements EU sanctions, the general scope of EU sanctions is relevant. These typically apply:

• within the territory of the EU, including its airspace;
• onboard any aircraft or vessel under the jurisdiction of an EU member state;
• to any natural person, inside or outside the EU, who is a national of an EU member state;
• to any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the EU, that is incorporated or constituted under the law of an EU member state; and
• to any legal person, entity or body, in respect of any business conducted wholly or partly within the EU.

Although EU sanctions are not formally extraterritorial in nature, certain provisions do have extraterritorial effects. For example:

• Article 8a of Regulation 833/2014 introduces a “best efforts” obligation, requiring EU operators to ensure that entities they own or control, even if located in third countries, do not engage in activities that undermine EU restrictive measures; and
• Article 12g of Regulation 833/2014 imposes an obligation to contractually prohibit the re-export of certain items to Russia.

The Dutch government does not generally impose sanctions unilaterally. Instead, it implements sanctions adopted by the United Nations or the European Union, based on the view that sanctions are most effective when imposed collectively by a coalition of countries.

Sanctions imposed in the Netherlands are comprised of over 40 different EU regimes, some implementing UN Security Council resolutions, but also a National Terrorism List adopted in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), which can be considered as a unilateral sanctions list. Furthermore, in July 2026, the Dutch government approved the Temporary Sanctions Decree on Unlawful Settlements in the Israeli-Occupied Territories in implementation of the ICJ’s July 2024 advisory opinion and relevant UN resolutions.

Although there is more co-ordination and communication amongst various NCAs, the enforcement of sanctions in the Netherlands is not yet centralised. Different NCAs are responsible for enforcement within their respective areas of competence, as follows:

• the Central Import and Export Service (Centrale Dienst In- en Uitvoer, or CDIU) supervises the import and export of goods and is in charge of issuing licences;
• the Tax and Customs Administration (Belastingdienst/Douane Noord), through the Precursors, Origin, Strategic Goods and Sanctions Legislation team (POSS), supervises compliance with sanctions;
• the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, or DNB) and the Dutch Financial Markets Authority (Autoriteit Financiële Markten, or AFM) oversee compliance with sanctions in relation to financial transactions; and
• the Dutch Public Prosecution Service (Openbaar Ministerie, or OM) is responsible for criminal enforcement of sanctions, and is assisted in its investigations, where necessary, by the POSS and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (Fiscale inlichtingen- en opsporingsdienst, or FIOD).

Other authorities with competence in specific areas (as listed in 2.1 Primary Regulators) are responsible for the enforcement of sanctions within their respective domains. In the Netherlands, interministerial collaboration is essential for the implementation and enforcement of sanctions.

It is important to note that the bill on the International Sanctions Act is proposing to establish a central reporting point for sanctions notifications.

A National Sanctions Regulation (Sanctieregeling), created under the powers provided for in the Sanctions Act 1977 (Sanctiewet 1977), is always enacted in relation to sanctions regimes, and prohibits violations of sanctions regulations. A violation of the relevant National Sanctions Regulation constitutes a violation of the Sanctions Act 1977, which in turn is considered a crime under the Economic Offences Act (Wet op de economische delicten).

Under the Economic Offences Act, breaches of sanctions may give rise to the following penalties.

• For individuals: up to six years’ imprisonment, community service or a maximum fine of EUR110,000. If the value involved in the offence exceeds one quarter of the maximum fine, a maximum fine of EUR1.1 million may apply.
• For legal entities: a maximum fine of EUR 1.1 million or, if the maximum fine is considered insufficient, a fine of up to 10% of turnover in the financial year preceding the judgment or settlement.

Additional measures may also be imposed, including:

• deprivation of certain rights, including exclusion from public procurement;
• complete or partial closure of the business;
• confiscation of unlawfully obtained benefits;
• forfeiture of objects; and
• public disclosure of the sentence.

At present, the Netherlands does not provide for a civil enforcement mechanism in cases of sanctions violations. Enforcement is almost exclusively pursued through criminal law.

However, the bill on the International Sanction Act, proposed by the Dutch government to reform and modernise the Dutch sanctions system, suggests more possibilities for administrative enforcement in addition to criminal law and improved foundations for information exchange.

Key criminal enforcement actions in the Netherlands in the last three years include the following.

• 17 October 2024 Rotterdam Case (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2024:11106) – the District Court of Rotterdam convicted a Russian national residing in the Netherlands for supplying and exporting dual-use goods and technology, restricted luxury goods and goods capable of enhancing Russia’s industrial capacity to companies in Russia. The court imposed a custodial sentence of 450 days, 344 days of which were suspended, with credit for time spent in pre-trial detention. The sentence also included a probation period of two years and a community service order of 240 hours or, alternatively, 120 days’ imprisonment.
• 22 November 2024 Rotterdam Case (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2024:11674) – the District Court of Rotterdam convicted a natural person for supplying aviation components to a company in Russia through circumvention routes through Turkey, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates and Kyrgyzstan. The court imposed a prison sentence of 300 days, 195 days of which were conditional, with credit for time spent in pre-trial detention. The sentence also included a probation period of two years and a community service order of 240 hours or, alternatively, 120 days’ imprisonment.
• 28 November 2024 Amsterdam Case (ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:4195) – the District Court of Amsterdam convicted a company for providing goods and services related to the construction of the Crimean Bridge. The sanctions violation concerned Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014, which imposes restrictions on the import of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol into the EU, in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol. The court imposed a fine of EUR120,000 on the company. On 19 June 2025, the court also ordered the confiscation of EUR1,013,956, representing the gross revenue derived from the sale of goods and provision of services in breach of the sanctions.
• 20 May 2025 The Hague Case (ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2025:945) – the Court of Appeal in The Hague ruled that the suspect, as the de facto manager of a company, is criminally liable for establishing and executing a scheme to export dual-use electronic goods, as well as goods that could contribute to military reinforcement, to companies established in Russia, primarily via the Maldives, in violation of EU sanctions. The sentence imposed was 18 months’ imprisonment and the forfeiture of the seized items.
• 10 July 2025 Rotterdam Case (ECLI:NL:RBROT:2025:8322) – the District Court of Rotterdam convicted an individual for supplying controlled information from semiconductor companies ASML and NXP to Russia, and for providing technical assistance to individuals in Russia. The court imposed a prison sentence of three years, with a deduction for the time the defendant spent in custody and pre-trial detention prior to the conviction.
• November 2025 Damen Shipyards Case – the Dutch Public Prosecution Service started proceedings against Damen Shipyards for potentially violating the Sanctions Act 1977 by exporting restricted goods to Russia in 2022. This is the first case to involve a company in the defence industry being prosecuted for an alleged breach of sanctions. If the company is convicted, it could be restricted from entering into public contracts, in addition to fines being imposed and imprisonment for its directors. Shortly after the beginning of the sanctions violation trial, the home house of a former Damen CEO was raided by the FIOD.
• May 2026 Stark Industries Solutions – the FIOD arrested two individuals investigated of violating the Sanctions Act 1977 by indirectly making economic resources available to EU-sanctioned entities. The investigation traces back to Stark Industries, a web-hosting company established in February 2022 and sanctioned by the EU in May 2025. Around the time of designation, much of the sanctioned company’s technical infrastructure was transferred to a newly incorporated Dutch company, WorkTitans, which the FIOD found to be operating as a cover for the sanctioned entity, with a second Dutch company, Mirhosting, providing the internet connectivity for the first’s servers. Danish authorities allege that WorkTitans has been linked to attacks by the pro-Russian hacktivist group NoName057(16), known for distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

EU Directive 2024/1226, as implemented in the Netherlands, provides that when an offender supplies the competent authorities with information they would not otherwise have been able to obtain, assists in identifying or bringing other offenders to justice, or helps to gather evidence, such co-operation shall be considered a mitigating circumstance.

The Ministry of Justice and Security clarified that Dutch judges already have the discretion to consider all relevant mitigating factors in criminal proceedings, including those explicitly referenced in the Directive.

The OM provides further measures through the Guidelines on Self-reporting, Co-operation and Self-investigation (de aanwijzing zelfmelden, medewerking en zelfonderzoek). Under these guidelines, companies that voluntarily, fully and promptly report potential criminal offences and provide full co-operation during the ensuing criminal investigation may be eligible for a reduction of up to 50% on the total fine that the OM would otherwise impose if such self-reporting or co-operation did not occur.

Under the Sanctions Act 1977, all violations of the national sanctions regulations constitute a criminal offence if committed intentionally, or a misdemeanour if committed unintentionally.

Certain EU regulations that are implemented into Dutch law also provide for a “non-liability clause” (see, for example, Article 10 of Regulation 833/2014), under which operators are protected against liability if they did not know or had no reasonable cause to suspect that their actions would infringe sanctions. However, these clauses cannot be invoked if operators failed to carry out appropriate due diligence.

EU sanctions typically provide for derogations, enabling operators to carry out activities that would otherwise be prohibited by restrictive measures. Although their effects are similar, derogations differ from exemptions. While exemptions are automatic and only require a notification of their use to the authorities, derogations are subject to the authorities’ approval. Derogations require an application for authorisation from the national authorities, which benefit from a certain margin of appreciation in determining whether to grant it. An exemption does not require an authority’s approval: its use is subject to conditions, but it is only declared to the authorities.

Typical grounds for derogation are:

• supply intended for humanitarian purposes, health emergencies and other exceptional circumstances;
• supply of goods intended for certain co-operation programmes (space, nuclear programmes);
• supply of goods with the assurance they will not be used by public entities;
• supply of goods intended for diplomatic representations;
• wind-down periods, for entities to adapt and fulfil contracts executed prior to the prohibition;
• divestment from Russia;
• certain specific activities (gas extraction); and
• certain thresholds.

EU Regulation 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine is the only regulations that provides for a legal services ban. However, it concerns not only designated persons but also all legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia. The Netherlands does not issue any general licence for the provision of legal services to designated persons, nor does it issue any general licence for the provision of legal services to the Russian government or to legal persons in Russia.

However, there are exceptions for the provision of services that are strictly necessary for:

• the exercise of the right of defence in judicial proceedings and the right to an effective legal remedy; and
• ensuring access to judicial, administrative or arbitral proceedings in a member state, and for recognising or enforcing a judgment or an arbitration award rendered in a member state, provided that such provision of services is consistent with the objectives of this Regulation and Regulation (EU) No 269/2014.

In addition, the competent authorities may authorise legal advisory services where they are strictly necessary for the setting-up, certification or evaluation of a firewall measure removing the control of a listed person over a non-listed EU entity.

Most EU regulations provide specific prohibitions against participating, knowingly or intentionally, in any activity the object or effect of which is to circumvent the prohibitions of the particular provision in which it is mentioned. In addition, similar circumvention prohibitions are provided in general terms in some regulations, such as those related to Russia (Article 12 of Regulation 833/2014 and Article 9 of Regulation 269/2014).

The Russia sanctions regime also contains a specific anti-circumvention tool. Under Regulation 833/2014, Article 12f(3), the EU may list certain high-risk goods and technologies, together with specific third countries, in Annex XXXIII where those countries have systematically and persistently failed to prevent the re-export of such items to Russia. Once activated, this allows the EU to prohibit the sale, supply, transfer or export of those listed items to the listed third country. This mechanism has now been activated for the first time (see 1.2 Key Trends).

In addition, in the particular case of Russia sanctions, a “best effort” clause provides that “Natural and legal persons, entities and bodies shall undertake their best efforts to ensure that any legal person, entity or body established outside the Union that they own or control does not participate in activities that undermine the restrictive measures provided for in the [Russia Sanctions] Regulations”. Consequently, EU operators must ensure that the entities they own or control do not participate in EU sanctions circumvention activities.

Various EU sanctions regulations include a prohibition against circumvention – for example, Article 12 of Regulation 833/2014. A violation of circumvention prohibitions is a violation of the relevant National Sanctions Regulation, which is in turn a violation of the Sanctions Act 1977, which is a crime under the Economic Offences Act.

As a result, persons charged with circumvention face the following penalties.

• For individuals: up to six years’ imprisonment, community service or a maximum fine of EUR110,000. If the value involved in the offence exceeds one quarter of that maximum, a fine of up to EUR1.1 million may be imposed.
• For legal entities: a maximum fine of EUR1.1 million or, if that amount is considered insufficient, a fine of up to 10% of turnover in the financial year preceding the judgment or settlement.
• Additional measures may also be imposed, including:
1. the deprivation of certain rights, including exclusion from public procurement;
2. the complete or partial closure of the business;
3. the confiscation of unlawfully obtained benefits;
4. the forfeiture of objects; and
5. the public disclosure of the judgment.

Article 13 of the Sanctions Act 1977 stipulates that “Dutch criminal law applies to any Dutch citizen who commits an offence punishable under or pursuant to this Act outside of the Netherlands”. This provision seemingly serves as a mechanism within the Sanctions Act 1977 to prevent and address potential circumvention of sanctions.

As a general principle, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service does not have jurisdiction over Dutch citizens who commit offences abroad if the act is not considered a criminal offence in the country where it occurs. However, pursuant to Article 13 of the Sanctions Act 1977, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service is authorised to investigate and prosecute Dutch citizens for violations of the Act committed outside the Netherlands – even if such conduct does not constitute a criminal offence under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction.