Sanctions 2026 Comparisons

The Swedish sanctions landscape has shifted considerably over the past year. The most notable legislative development is the new Swedish Sanctions Act implementing Directive 2024/1226. The legislation materially strengthens the enforcement framework:

• maximum custodial sentences have been raised to three years for standard offences and six years for aggravated or repeated violations;
• fines have been removed as a standalone sentencing option; and
• new provisions criminalise attempts, instigation and complicity.

A misdemeanour offence carrying up to six months’ imprisonment has also been introduced. Agencies are also obliged to refer suspected breaches to the relevant enforcement authorities, and forfeiture powers have been extended to cover property not belonging to the offender. Because these rules are recent, their practical application has yet to be tested in the courts.

Enforcement activity in Sweden has also become significantly more prominent. The March 2026 police raid on the Kubal aluminium producer (the country’s sole aluminium producer, under ultimate control of a Russian group), with the arrest of two senior executives for allegedly channelling approximately SEK940 million in dividends to a sanctioned person, represents a steep change in domestic enforcement visibility. Concurrently, the Swedish Coast Guard has conducted boardings of five suspected shadow fleet vessels, invoking grounds such as unseaworthiness, statelessness, falsified documentation and environmental violations. New rules applicable since 1 July 2025 require proof-of-insurance checks for vessels transiting Swedish territorial waters or its economic zone.

At the EU level, regulatory activity has intensified markedly. Four further Russia sanctions packages – the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st – have been adopted during the past 12 months, with measures progressively tightening. Key developments include:

• reductions to the crude oil price cap;
• full transaction prohibitions on certain pipeline operators;
• successive port-access and services bans now covering more than 790 shadow fleet vessels;
• an outright EU import embargo on Russian LNG;
• expanded banking, payment system and crypto-asset restrictions; and
• broadened export controls.

Additional targeted measures have addressed domestic repression, the unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children, the Russian military-industrial complex, hybrid threats, the shadow fleet ecosystem and third-country circumvention networks. Restrictive measures against Belarus have likewise been reinforced, with expanded controls on trade routes and dual-use goods.

Overall, compared with 12 months ago, the sanctions sector is characterised by a considerably more robust legislative framework, faster adoption of EU sanctions packages, and a noticeably more active enforcement posture by Swedish authorities.

Legislative Strengthening and Criminalisation

The foremost trend has been the overhaul of Sweden’s sanctions enforcement framework through the new Swedish Sanctions Act. By raising maximum penalties, eliminating fines as a sentencing option, criminalising ancillary forms of participation and imposing reporting duties on agencies, the legislation signals a clear shift towards treating sanctions violations as serious criminal conduct.

Escalating EU Measures Against Russia

The continued adoption of sanctions packages – four in the space of roughly a year – reflects an acceleration of EU restrictive measures against Russia. Key focal points have included countering the Russian shadow fleet (with port-access bans now extending to over 790 vessels), restricting energy trade (notably the LNG import embargo and lowered oil price cap) and limiting financial channels through transaction bans and payment system restrictions.

Broadening of Russia Sanctions Beyond Russia

The expansion of EU restrictive measures against Iran – including listings for military support to Russia and Russian sanctions circumvention – illustrates a widening of the sanctions agenda beyond the Ukraine conflict. Similar “secondary sanctions” have been imposed against actors in Central Asia, China and Thailand, among others.

Heightened Domestic Enforcement

The Kubal investigation and the arrest of senior executives (see 1.1 Sanctions Market) indicates an increased ambition to enforce sanctions and to pursue high-profile, complex cases, signalling that corporate actors face genuine prosecution risk. The boardings of multiple suspected shadow fleet vessels in Swedish territorial waters and the application of new insurance verification requirements for transiting ships also underscore a more proactive maritime enforcement by Sweden, which aligns with broader EU and member state efforts to disrupt the illicit transportation networks sustaining Russian oil exports.

Judicial Clarification of Asset Freeze Scope

The CJEU’s 2026 rulings in Cases C-483/23 T Trust and C-84/24 EM SYSTEM have clarified the scope of the asset freeze provisions in EU sanctions regimes, endorsing a broad, functional interpretation of the notion of “control”. In the T Trust case, the Court confirmed that trust assets may fall within the scope of asset freezes where the listed person retains de facto influence over the trust’s assets or trustee decisions. In the EM SYSTEM case, the Court affirmed that a 50% capital stake creates a presumption of control over the subsidiary’s assets, which is why a subsidiary’s assets may be frozen on behalf of a listed parent even if the subsidiary is not designated. However, the Court stressed that this presumption must be rebuttable and is subject to judicial review. These two cases are important decisions providing essential clarification on the notion of “control” under EU sanctions law.

A large share of Swedish trade passes through the Swedish shipping industry, meaning this industry is particularly affected by the multiple EU sanctions directed at trade. Moreover, Sweden has a comparatively large industrial output, with several global actors based in the country, making sanctions compliance essential, as multiple industrial goods are caught primarily by EU sanctions against Russia. The same applies to actors within Sweden’s large mining and forestry sectors.

Unlike some jurisdictions with a centralised sanctions authority, Sweden distributes this responsibility among multiple government bodies. Matters concerning arms embargoes, dual-use goods, prohibitions on internal repression equipment, and the release of frozen funds fall under the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (Inspektionen för strategiska produkter). The National Board of Trade (Kommerskollegium) manages licence requirements arising from sanctions, as well as controls on the export of goods and services.

Several other agencies also play enforcement and supervisory roles within their respective areas, including the Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) and Swedish Customs (Tullverket). When new restrictive measures are adopted, government ordinances assign competence to specific agencies. Until such a designation is made, the Government Offices (Regeringskansliet) act as the competent authority, through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), including in respect of granting derogations. The Ministry also serves as the co-ordination point for Swedish sanctions policy.

There is no general, blanket reporting obligation under Swedish sanctions law, although several specific duties exist.

• First, a licence granted by a competent authority (see below) may be made conditional upon the fulfilment of particular reporting requirements.
• Second, any party holding frozen funds – such as a financial institution – is obliged to notify the Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) of that holding.
• Third, and notably, the Swedish Sanctions Act introduced a new institutional reporting duty. A number of Swedish government agencies are now required to report any suspicion that a sanctions breach has occurred under the Act to the Police Authority (Polismyndigheten) or the Prosecution Authority (Åklagarmyndigheten).
• Fourth, at the EU level, the sanctions regulations themselves typically contain a general – albeit broadly worded – obligation requiring all natural and legal persons, entities and bodies falling within the scope of those regulations to report any information that would “facilitate compliance” with financial sanctions.

Sanctions-related personal data processing is also subject to recent regulatory developments. In November 2024, a new ordinance issued by the Swedish Authority for Privacy Protection (Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten) came into force. This ordinance removes the prior requirement for entities in the financial, security and defence industries to seek advance authorisation from the supervisory authority when conducting screenings against non-EU sanctions lists, so long as the data processing is governed by the applicable sectoral rules. For organisations active in other fields, a case-by-case GDPR assessment may still be necessary.

As mentioned in 1.1 Sanctions Market and 1.2 Key Trends, Sweden has seen significant developments in recent years, but there have been no court decisions directly related to sanctions in the past three years.

On the EU level, three important case law developments can be mentioned. Aside from the notion of “control” cases, as discussed in 1.2 Key Trends, the CJEU judgments in Cases C-109/23, Jemerak, and C-351/22, Neves 77 Solutions, are of particular interest.

In the Jemerak case, the CJEU was asked whether German notary and translation services in relation to an immovable property sale were covered by the prohibition to provide legal advisory services to a Russian legal person under Regulation 833/2014. The Court answered the question in the negative, emphasising that the independent functions of a notary in the German legal system distinguished such notary services from the services that a legal counsel would perform. The notary services in question would thus not fall under the EU sanctions on the provision of legal services, nor would related translation services.

In the Neves 77 Solutions case, the CJEU confirmed its jurisdiction to interpret EU Council sanction decisions directly in cases not covered by EU regulations implementing the sanctions. In the case at hand, a Romanian company had brokered a transaction with Russian military radio equipment in violation of a prohibition in a 2014 Council decision adopted in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which at the time had not yet been implemented in Regulation 833/2014; however, the prohibition had been enshrined in Romanian law. In the national proceedings, the Court was asked to interpret the decision. While several parties claimed that the Court lacked jurisdiction to interpret the decision as the Council had failed to implement it into a regulation, the Court held that this failure did not impair its jurisdiction to interpret the underlying decision. Although Council decisions are normally implemented directly into directly applicable regulations, this judgment clarifies that the CJEU can provide a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of a measure of general scope in an act adopted within the CFSP.

Several developments are anticipated in the near term.

The EU anti-money laundering package, adopted in 2024, is set to harmonise the framework for preventing the misuse of the financial system for money laundering and terrorist financing across the Union. It comprises the Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD6) and the Regulation establishing the new EU anti-money laundering agency (AMLAR). The package will enter into force on 10 July 2027, at which point the regulations will start applying and the directive should be transposed into national law. With the new framework, the anti-money laundering compliance rules for private actors are transferred to the AMLR, whereas the Sixth AML Directive regulates the organisation of national anti-money laundering authorities. The new AMLR will require “obligated entities” (ie, the institutions and actors with extended AML/CFT obligations under EU law) to manage risks for non-implementation and evasion of EU and UN financial sanctions, include such sanctions in their business-wide risk assessment, and integrate sanctions screening into their customer due diligence, beneficial ownership checks and ongoing monitoring.

Reforms to Sweden’s military equipment export controls are forthcoming. In light of amendments passed in 2026, the Swedish export control framework for military equipment has been aligned with the country’s NATO membership, and the government can now legally grant exemptions from licensing obligations to suppliers of parts to licensed manufacturers. Notably, two key exceptions apply to exports carried out by the Swedish Armed Forces and to exports conducted under EU or NATO programmes. These changes take effect on 1 August 2026 and are expected to enable more streamlined defence industry collaboration within the Alliance.

A challenge to an EU sanctions designation can be made before the EU General Court, by lodging an action to annul the listing in the Regulation. Before taking legal action, a request to delist can be submitted to the General Secretariat of the EU Council. It is also possible to challenge a listing in the framework of national court proceedings, although this would require the national court to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on the validity of the listing.

A United Nations delisting request should be submitted to the United Nations secretariat. Delisting requests regarding the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list may also be submitted to the United Nations Ombudsman.

Successful EU and United Nations delisting challenges can result in either removal from the list or amendment of the designation, depending on the order sought.

It is possible to obtain damages for an illegal EU sanctions listing. In a few cases, the CJEU has both considered and upheld claims of damages, and left open the possibility of receiving compensation for both material and non-material damages. Illustratively, in Case C-45/15 P, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, the Court of Justice upheld a judgment of the General Court awarding the Iranian plaintiff a sum of EUR50,000 for non-material damages for an improper listing under EU sanctions against Iran. However, the Court of Justice also dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for several million euros worth of damages relating to claimed economic injuries, as the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently demonstrate that these were a result of the listing. For example, while accepting the fact that the plaintiff suffering the termination of a contract with a major supplier was a direct result of the sanctions listing, this did not itself give rise to damages; the plaintiff also needed to demonstrate the impact of the termination on its financial results.

Whereas the timeline for the processing of a delisting request to the EU Council or United Nations Secretariats will vary depending on the circumstances in the case, a court challenge is almost certainly a longer procedure. Annulment proceedings in the EU General Court will normally take well over a year, often longer, as will appeals proceedings in the Court of Justice.

Trade and export restrictions regarding services are adopted by the United Nations and the European Union. As noted in 1.4.1 Types of Sanctions, Sweden does not maintain any sanctions regimes adopted at national level, and this principle extends to trade and export sanctions. Where applicable, trade sanctions on services are specified within the relevant sanctions framework.

For example, EU Regulation 2022/355, containing export and import restrictions against Belarus, and Regulation 833/2014 concerning Russia prescribe such measures, and Regulation 2022/263 concerns export of services from the occupied territories of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk and Luhansk.

There are multiple trade and export restrictions regarding goods. These restrictions are regulated in the same manner as those pertaining to services, meaning that sanctions regimes established by the United Nations and the European Union, where applicable, specify prohibitions on the export or import of goods within the relevant regulatory framework.

For example, the EU regulations mentioned in 5.1 Services all include multiple prohibitions relating to the export and import of goods, ranging from military and dual-use items to industrial and luxury products, and similar prohibitions can be found in other EU sanctions regulations. United Nations import or export bans are enshrined in UN Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1747 (2007), which prohibits the procurement, import or transport of arms and related materiel of all types from Iran. This prohibition is implemented through several Swedish transposition measures, such as the Military Equipment Act (Lag (1992:1300) om krigsmateriel).

As far as is known, the Swedish courts have made no recent decisions assessing sanctions compliance as a contractual breach.

Swedish law affords parties broad freedom of contract, and parties are generally free to agree whether, and to what extent, the imposition of sanctions is to constitute a force majeure event or otherwise relieve a party from performance. In the absence of an express sanctions clause, the interpretation of any agreed force majeure wording will govern the outcome, and the parties’ allocation of risk will as a basic rule be respected. Where the contract is silent, the position is governed by general Swedish contract law principles. Force majeure is not expressly defined in a Swedish statute, but it is a well-recognised principle of contractual interpretation in Swedish law. When confronting force majeure defences, Swedish law often draws on the closely related control liability principles mainly enshrined in Sections 27 and 57 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act (köplagen (1990:931)) and Article 79 of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, although force majeure and statutory control liability should not be treated as identical concepts.

On that basis, Swedish law allows for sanctions to constitute force majeure where they make performance unlawful or practically impossible, or in exceptional cases are considered objectively to be so burdensome that performance cannot reasonably be required. In line with the principles of Sections 27 and 57 of the Swedish Sale of Goods Act, a party would – in theory – need to show that the imposition of sanctions was outside its control, could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of contracting, and could not reasonably have been avoided or overcome, including by using alternative lawful means of performance or seeking available licences or exemptions. Whether these conditions are met depends on an assessment of the facts in the specific case; sanctions already in force, or clearly foreseeable, when the contract was concluded thus seem unlikely to liberate a party from contractual liability.

As far as is known, the Swedish courts have made no recent decisions that directly determine how the enforcement of a judgment should be handled where sanctions issues arise. In Sweden, the enforcement of judgments is handled primarily by the Swedish Enforcement Authority (Kronofogden), whose decisions are subject to judicial review.

Generally, EU sanctions law prohibits the satisfaction of claims connected with contracts or transactions whose performance is prohibited under EU sanctions. An example of such a prohibition to satisfy sanctioned claims can be found in Article 11 of Regulation 833/2014. Directed at judicial and regulatory authorities, this prohibition also applies to Swedish enforcement authorities, prohibiting the Enforcement Authority and the courts from taking measures to satisfy sanctioned claims.

An unresolved issue is the question of whether Swedish courts and the Enforcement Agency should examine the risk of satisfying sanctioned claims of their own motion. In Case C-802/24 Reibel, the Svea Court of Appeal referred questions to the CJEU on whether a national court must examine of its own motion whether an arbitral award under its review gives effect to a claim in violation of Article 11 of Regulation 833/2014. The forthcoming decision is expected to clarify the approach that should be taken by national courts and authorities, including Swedish courts and, by extension, the Enforcement Authority, where enforcement measures would risk contravening EU sanctions.

Sweden does not maintain its own sanctions list; the sanctions designations that apply in Sweden stem solely from EU or UN decisions.

Under EU sanctions law, designation decisions are made by the Council of the European Union. The Council adopts restrictive measures under Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union in the framework of the CFSP, which requires unanimity. Where measures have economic or financial effects, such as asset freezes or trade prohibitions, they are implemented through Council regulations under Article 215 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with qualified majority. EU designations are thus directly applicable in Sweden with no implementing measures required, with few exceptions.

United Nations sanctions designations are decided by the UN Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. UN sanctions are implemented in Sweden in accordance with the procedure in Sections 15–17 of the Sanctions Act. Through this procedure, the Swedish government will issue an Ordinance implementing new UN sanctions, which needs to be approved by Parliament within two months to remain in force.

EU designations can have indirect effects on non-designated entities, mainly in two ways.

• Firstly, EU asset freeze regimes usually apply to funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons. This means that when a designated person or entity controls another entity, the assets of the second entity can also be frozen. As to the notion of “control”, the list of control indicators in Article 1(j) of Regulation 269/2014 provides a useful starting point. The European Commission has also issued several opinions on what constitutes control for this purpose, available on the European Commission’s website. Finally, the CJEU has also decided important cases on this topic; see 1.2 Key Trends.
• Secondly, EU prohibitions on trade or transactions with designated persons often apply to both direct and indirect provisions. Under these prohibitions, a provision of funds, goods or services to a non-designated entity may be construed as an indirect provision to a designated person, depending on the circumstances in the case. The CJEU clarified in Case C-168/17, SH, that an indirect provision to a designated person is at hand when “it is possible for the [funds/goods/services] to be passed on to that person or for that person to have the ability to dispose of them, in the light, inter alia, of the existence of financial or legal links between the beneficiary … and such a person”.