The Romanian M&A market has retained similar levels in 2025 compared to 2024, with an estimated total value ranging from EUR5.3 billion to EUR5.7 billion, reflecting a slight decrease in value. However, the deal volume continued the positive trend, increasing by approximately 3% on a yearly basis, with strategic investors continuing to dominate the market. Despite the decrease in deal value, the Romanian market nonetheless presents a wealth of advisory opportunities.

Compared to previous years (such as 2023 which was an exceptionally strong year for the Romanian capital markets due to the record-breaking EUR1.9 billion Hidrolectrica IPO (the largest in the EU, and one of the largest worldwide in 2023)), 2025 was marked by a relatively low number of equity capital markets transactions. However, considering:

• the record increase in the market capitalisation of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (at over RON500 billion, the highest in its history);
• the ongoing implementation of the Financial Surveillance Authority National Strategy for the Development of the Capital Markets;
• the efforts to ensure accession to the OECD; and
• EU measures to be taken to increase competitiveness, including via the Savings and Investment Union there is hope for growth in this area, especially in the medium and long term.

Nevertheless, the authors remain cautiously optimistic in the short term, given the ongoing fiscal reforms intended to curb the budgetary deficit, and lingering geopolitical risks that continue to shape both the domestic and global landscape.

The prevailing trend in the Romanian market continues to revolve around consolidation across numerous sectors. This consolidation trend is evident in most sectors, including renewable energy, real estate, hospitality and construction, advanced manufacturing and mobility, with healthcare and pharmaceuticals standing out as particularly active in terms of transaction volume. Notably, the Healthcare and Life Sciences sector experienced strong momentum, driven primarily by heightened activity in the acquisition of veterinary clinics.

A significant share of the market value was generated by the energy sector, where operational and project-stage photovoltaic and wind assets continued to attract strong investor interest.

While the geopolitical turmoil has presented several challenges for the global community, opportunities for innovation and adaptation in the M&A market were also created, particularly within the technology and renewable energy sectors. The ability to respond to rapidly changing market conditions and navigate complex environments has become increasingly important for companies seeking to develop or remain competitive, with this trend persisting into 2025. The sectors with the most M&A activity in 2025 included renewable energy, real estate, retail and hospitality and construction, while sectors such as advanced manufacturing and mobility and healthcare and pharmaceuticals sustained a strong market presence. This dynamic reflects the ongoing growth of the Romanian market as a strategic hub for diverse investments.

Typically, companies are acquired through the acquisition of shares. However, depending on due diligence findings or the financial situation of the target company (eg, insolvency), transfers of assets are also common and some involve large businesses.

There are no regulators for private M&A activity per se in Romania, but depending on the industry concerned, there may be certain closing conditions (eg, prior approvals of a regulator like the National Bank of Romania or the National Agency for Mineral Resources may constitute closing conditions for a transaction).

However, irrespective of the industry, the involvement of the competition authority (the Competition Council) might be legally required. Additional scrutiny of the Commission for Examination for Foreign Direct Investments (CEISD) might also be required if the industry has a bearing on national security; see 2.6 National Security Review.

There are a few restrictions on foreign investment. For example, foreign nationals outside the EU and EEA cannot acquire land, other than in a limited number of exceptions. Also, a number of investments are subject to scrutiny by the CEISD; see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments.

As an EU member state, Romania is subject to both EU regulations and relevant national legislation, the latter harmonising with the former. Among the details worth considering are the rather low thresholds triggering a merger control requirement.

More specifically, business combinations resulting in a change of control (be it sole or joint) of an undertaking on a lasting basis, are subject to compulsory clearance by the Romanian competition authority (ie, the Competition Council) if the combined turnover of the undertakings concerned is in excess of EUR10 million worldwide, and each of at least two of the undertakings concerned had a turnover in Romania exceeding EUR4 million in the year preceding the transaction.

Prior to a transaction, acquirers should carefully review individual templates and collective bargaining agreements, and any other arrangements (eg, protocols) between the employer and the trade union/employees’ representatives and/or employees, and HR-related policies and procedures applicable within the target company so as to assess potential non-compliance with the law, certain cost trends that could entail a target company’s liabilities at post-deal closing. These costs may include potential sale bonuses, benefits, severance payments, etc. Acquirers should also consider any other potential implications the transaction might have on the target company’s employees, such as mandatory prior information and consultation requirements.

Depending on the type of transaction, acquirers may also have specific obligations to fulfil. Asset deals are also typically subject to TUPE rules.

The most relevant employment laws and regulations include:

• the Romanian Labour Code (Law 53/2003);
• the Law on social dialogue (Law 367/2022);
• the Law on teleworking (Law 81/2018);
• the Law on the general framework for informing and consulting employees (Law 467/2006);
• the Law on the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts thereof (Law 67/2006);
• the Government Decision providing the minimum gross salary guaranteed for payment at national level (GD 1506/2024);
• the Government Decision on the approval of the procedure for the application of the mechanism for determining and updating the minimum gross base salary guaranteed in payment at national level (GD 35/2025);
• the Law on health and safety at work (Law 319/2006); and
• Government Decision No 1425/2006 on the methodological norms for the enforcement of the Law on health and safety at work.

Mergers and acquisitions that qualify as foreign direct investments (FDI) or EU investments (which also include investments made by Romanian citizens) and meet the relevant criteria under the FDI Romanian legislation are subject to a national security review conducted by the CEISD. The definitions of foreign direct investment and EU investment are broad.

If an FDI or EU investment meets the relevant merger control thresholds, the relevant parties should notify both the CEISD and the Romanian Competition Council. Transactions below the relevant merger control thresholds might still be subject to the CEISD’s scrutiny, depending on their characteristics.

M&A-related litigation is not common in Romania as many investors prefer arbitration and discretion when resolving disputes.

Rules on Security Review and Foreign Direct Investments

Amendments to FDI legislation, from the end of 2024, clarify that investments made by Romanian citizens will be subject to security screening by CEISD.

Furthermore, these amendments stipulate that any natural person holding multiple citizenships, where at least one is from a non-EU country, will be classified as a foreign investor if they have either made, or intend to make, a foreign direct investment in Romania.

The Romanian FDI legal framework remains dynamic and is expected to continue evolving, with further legislative amendments anticipated in the near future. The upcoming changes appear to further extend the scope of investments subject to screening by expressly including investments involving the acquisition of assets of any kind in sensitive sectors, such as critical and advanced technologies, critical infrastructure, the pharmaceutical sector, the defense sector and the defense industry, among others. In addition, the anticipated legislative amendments include increasing the notification threshold from EUR2 million to EUR5 million, as well as reducing the filing fee from EUR10,000 to EUR5,000.

Trade Registry Law/Amendments to the Companies Law

Recently, as part of the government’s bid to increase the tax collection, the Companies Law was amended through the enactment of Law 239/2025, which entered into force on 15 December 2025, and has created new requirements for the transfer of controlling stakes in limited liability companies (LLCs), meant to address the issue of LLCs with outstanding tax liabilities upon the change of control (by the creation of security over such debt by the seller or the LLC itself), resulting in all transfers of controlling stakes over LLCs are now subject to such scrutiny.

Additionally, new share capital requirements for LLCs, linking minimum share capital to their net turnover, and stricter provisions regarding net assets’ value discipline, conditioning distributions to shareholders or reimbursement of shareholder loans to the observance of the minimal net assets value of half of the share capital, were enacted by Law 239/2025.

Public M&A

On the public M&A side, the relevant core capital markets legislation, namely Law 24/2017 on issuers of financial instruments and market operations (the “Issuers’ Law”) was recently subject to a number of amendments, namely (i) via the Emergency Ordinance 71/2024 (EGO 71); (ii) Law 11/2025 (Law 11); (iii) Law 238/2025 (Law 238), the latter introducing new rules related to disclosure under the European Single Access Point (ESAP)The amendments under Law 11 are quite substantial as they aim to strengthen the Romanian capital markets by ensuring that the legislation is further aligned with EU directives, in particular with the Directive (EU) 2022/2464 regarding companies’ sustainability reporting (CSRD Directive) and the Women on Boards Directive (EU) 2022/2381, which promotes equal opportunities between women and men in the management structures of companies. Additionally, the amendments aims to implement certain measures of the FSA National Strategy for the development of the capital markets in Romania 2023–2026 (“Capital Markets National Strategy”), and considers various market participants’ proposals aimed at improving the existing legislation.

Some key amendments aim to simplify the process of raising capital through share capital increases. This involves shortening certain legal timeframes, notably reducing the period for exercising preference rights from the previous 30 days to a window of 10 to 14 days. The changes also introduce greater flexibility in the organisation of general shareholders’ meetings (GSMs), with new provisions, for instance, allowing the board of directors to supplement the meeting agenda. Furthermore, the amendments seek to speed up the publication of relevant GSM resolutions in the Official Journal. Additionally, certain new rules have been brought in to strengthen the rights of minority shareholders, specifically regarding the election of board members through the cumulative voting procedure.

The capital markets legislation was subject recently to several important changes referred to in 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments. The Issuers’ Law is generally in line with Directive 25/2004 on takeover bids (the “Takeover Directive”). The more recent changes to the Issuers’ Law introduced in 2025 by means of Law 238 include certain amendments related to the making information available through the European access point in the case of takeover bids (see 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments for details).

As mentioned in 3.1 Significant Court Decisions or Legal Developments, the Issuers’ Law was subject to recent amendments,.

It is expected that the relevant Romanian securities legislation will continue to be impacted by the adoption of new legislative changes at the EU level. Notable examples are the Listing Act Package which comprises a proposed directive on multiple-vote shares, which is expected to impact the Romanian legislation once the relevant provisions the directive are implemented (which must be implemented locally by end of 2026).

Stakebuilding is not prohibited in Romania; however, in practice, its use seems to be rather limited for various reasons, including the low liquidity of the Romanian capital markets, the impact of stakebuilding on the price to be offered where the bidder is subject to a mandatory takeover bid requirement or where he or she wishes to make a voluntary takeover bid to acquire control over the company.

There are also implications for market abuse rules as certain safe harbours applicable to public takeovers and mergers do not apply to stakeholding (the EU Market Abuse Regulation being directly applicable in Romania).

The notification requirements regarding the acquisition or disposal of major holdings laid down in the Romanian legislation implement to a large extent the provisions of the Transparency Directive 2004/109 (as amended). As such, disclosure of material shareholding applies where a shareholder acquires or disposes of shares of an issuer listed on a regulated market and to which voting rights are attached, if the percentage of the voting rights held following the acquisition or the disposal concerned, reaches, exceeds or falls below one of the 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 33%, 50% and 75% thresholds.

The disclosure obligation also applies where the relevant thresholds are reached either directly or indirectly by holding financial instruments of similar economic effect to holdings of shares and entitlements to acquire shares, whether or not they give the right to a physical settlement.

The notification must be made to the issuer and to the FSA (if Romania is the home member state of this issuer) in Romanian or a widely recognised international financial language, within four trading days. The issuer must make the notification public within three working days of its receipt.

Where the 33% threshold is exceeded, either on an individual basis or together with other persons acting in concert, the obligation to launch a mandatory takeover bid may apply in connection with issuers listed on a regulated market, unless the bidder can rely on an exemption (see 6.2 Mandatory Offer Threshold).

Issuers are prohibited from determining thresholds in their constitutive acts other than the ones laid down by law. See 4.1 Principal Stakebuilding Strategies in relation to general stakebuilding hurdles.

Dealings with derivatives are not prohibited under Romanian law. However, transactions with derivatives are taken into account to determine whether shareholding disclosure obligations apply if the relevant thresholds, indicated in 4.2 Material Shareholding Disclosure Threshold, are reached.

The filing/reporting obligations under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), a European regulation on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, apply, as EMIR is directly applicable in Romania.

In the case of a takeover bid, the bidder is required to disclose in the offer document the plans for continuing the business of the target company, for example, including any significant change in working conditions, in particular the bidder’s strategic plans for the two companies, if any, and possible repercussions for the jobs and business locations of the companies.

Explicit information will also be provided regarding the bidder’s plans on a potential winding-up, changing the object of activity and withdrawing from trading on a regulated market.

In public M&A deals, disclosure requirements dictate that the application of an inside information disclosure regime must be considered in line with the EU Market Abuse Regulation. Therefore, the target must make a case-by-case analysis and decide at what stage of the deal the relevant non-public, price-sensitive information is accurate enough to qualify as inside information subject to disclosure obligations.

As a rule, the issuer must disclose any inside information as soon as possible, but no later than 24 hours after the event or after the date when the information is brought to its attention.

If information is made public through the press or an online post not initiated by the issuer in the context of its reporting requirements, or in the case of a market rumour explicitly referencing privileged information at the issuer’s level, the issuer must immediately publish that information under the EU Market Abuse Regulation. This is required if the information is sufficiently detailed to indicate that its confidentiality is no longer assured. The publication must be carried out using the same conditions and mechanisms as those used for communicating inside information, ensuring an ad hoc announcement is published as soon as possible.

Per the recent amendments to the EU Market Abuse Regulation, the rules of delaying disclosure of inside information have been slightly amended. Under such new rules, applicable as of 5 June 2026, the issuer may delay, at its own responsibility, disclosure of inside information to the public, subject to the observance of certain conditions (eg, immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interest of the issuer; the information for which a delay of disclosure is requested must not contradict the issuer’s latest public announcement on the same matter (as opposed to the previous condition related to the delay not misleading the public) and the issuer can ensure the confidentiality of that information). ESMA has launched a public conclusion on MAR guidelines related to the delay in the disclosure of inside information.

Implementation of the amendments included in the Listing Act to the EU Market Abuse Regulation will alleviate some of the disclosure burden, as it exempts intermediate steps in a protracted process: immediate disclosure will no longer be required for intermediate steps in a protracted process where those steps are connected with bringing about or resulting in particular circumstances or in a particular event. Currently, ESMA, the EU’s financial markets regulator and supervisor, has launched a consultation to gather feedback following changes to the MAR, including feedback on a non-exhaustive list of the protracted process and the relevant moment of disclosure of the relevant inside information.

Considering the severe sanctions applicable in connection with breaches related to disclosure and misuse of inside information, the normal market practice on timing of the disclosure should not differ from the legal requirements. Even so, there may be cases of legal uncertainty as regards the exact moment when the disclosure obligation arises.

In public M&A deals, due diligence is typically made on the basis of publicly available information only. In some cases (eg, takeover or merger deals), it may be possible to have access to some additional non-public and price-sensitive information, subject to compliance with the EU Market Abuse Regulation as well as the obligation to ensure that investors have equal access to relevant information about the issuer prior to the deal.

Disclosure of non-public and potentially price-sensitive information should be treated with great care, considering the severe applicable sanctioning regime, including criminal sanctions, with strict compliance with the legal provisions.

The changes to the EU Market Abuse Regulation made in 2024 by the EU Listing Act clarified the optional nature of the market soundings regime. Market participants that carry out a market sounding in accordance with the safe harbour requirements benefit from full protection against the allegation of unlawfully disclosing inside information. Conversely, the market sounding that does not meet the safe harbour requirements is not automatically presumed unlawful. The revised regime allows each market participant to decide whether or not to follow the safe harbour regime. This simplified compliance offers more flexibility for market participants in capital markets transactions.

When scoping due diligence exercises for private M&A deals, some factors are of particular relevance, such as the deal structure (eg, share or asset deal), the sector experience of the party commissioning the due diligence (ie, the vendor or the buyer), any ongoing investigation on the target entity, as well as the size of the deal.

As a rule, however, nowadays there are more due diligence exercises limited in scope (usually covering title-related matters, material contracts, regulatory, employment, and litigation), than those covering all aspects of a company’s business. For example, where a vendor commissions a due diligence exercise to put its company up for sale (commonly known as a “vendor due diligence” or VDD), typically encountered in sizeable deals, while the buyer may still (legally) rely on the VDD findings, it often elects to conduct a supplementary review (top-up) departing from the VDD findings, aimed at identifying and filling potential “gaps”.

In public M&A deals, standstill agreements imposing obligations on the bidder are in some cases concluded, but they are uncommon. In the context of a mandatory takeover bid, the law prohibits the shareholder and persons acting in concert from acquiring shares in the issuer prior to carrying out the bid in question. Also, in voluntary takeover bids, the bidder or the persons acting in concert with it may not launch, for a period of one year from the closing of the previous takeover bid, another public takeover bid targeting the same issuer.

Typically, in private M&A deals, exclusivity is agreed upon for the buyer’s benefit through term sheets or similar documents. This restricts the vendor for a specific period, which is estimated to encompass all the main milestones of the transaction process, such as due diligence, negotiation, and up to the tentatively scheduled signing date of the definitive transaction documents. This arrangement effectively sets a time limit on the deal itself. As a result, the seller benefits, as they may walk away from the deal with that particular buyer simply due to the passage of time, unless an extension is mutually agreed upon.

The terms and conditions offered within a bid are commonly documented in definitive agreements.

Further, in public M&A deals, the terms and conditions of any takeover must be included in the bidder’s offer document, which is made public to ensure that the offer is addressed to all the shareholders. The offer is irrevocable for the entire duration of the takeover bid.

In public M&A deals, the process is highly regulated (eg, the norms provide for a minimum of ten working days and a maximum of 50 working days for the takeover bid) and involves obtaining approvals from the competent authority (the FSA) and compliance with publicity requirements.

Timeframes

The timeframe for the acquisition/sale of a business in non-public M&A deals may depend on a series of factors – eg, whether a share deal or asset deal is envisaged or, in the case of a share deal, whether the target company is a limited liability or a joint-stock company, the acquisition structure, whether it is subject to merger control (and if only phase I or phase II), and whether it is subject to the CEISD’s scrutiny. Any debt registered in the Romanian investor’s tax record (“cazier fiscal”) could further impact the timeframe of the transaction.

In addition, certain other prior clearances may be legally required with respect to a particular transaction that would naturally expand the process (eg, in the area of certain natural resources).

While in-person meetings saw a significant increase within in M&A activities starting with 2023 compared to pandemic levels, online meetings remain a key element of transactions in 2025, offering greater efficiency and minimising logistical challenges.

Share Deal v Asset Deal

In terms of a share deal versus an asset deal, while an asset deal may prove beneficial for the buyer in terms of liability inheritance, which, generally, does not follow the transferred assets but remains with the seller (ie, the company owning the transferred assets), the transfer process may prove cumbersome and time-consuming. This is because certain licences may need to be renewed or reissued to the new owner, and individual re-registrations may be required for registrable assets, as well as the assignment of contracts, among other things.

Mandatory takeover requirements apply when a person or persons acting in concert, acquire securities that entitle them, directly or indirectly, to more than 33% of the voting rights of the issuer, whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market. In such cases, these persons are required to launch a public offer addressed to all securities holders at a fair price and covering all their holdings, as soon as possible but no later than two months after they reach that holding threshold.

However, the requirement to conduct a mandatory takeover bid does not apply if the holding reaching the above-mentioned threshold is the outcome of an “exempt transaction”; ie:

• the acquisition of shares in the process of privatisation;
• the acquisition of shares from the Ministry of Public Finance or from other legally empowered entities, in the process of budgetary claims enforcement;
• transfers of shares between a parent company and its subsidiaries or between subsidiaries of the same parent company; or
• a public voluntary takeover bid addressed to all those securities holders and covering all their holdings.

If over 33% of the issuer’s voting rights are unintentionally acquired, the holder of such a position must, within three months:

• carry out a public offer, under the conditions stipulated under the Issuers’ Law; or
• transfer a number of shares, for the purpose of losing the position unintentionally acquired.

The acquisition is considered “unintentional” if it is the result of operations such as:

• the reduction of the capital through the buy-back by the company of its own shares, followed by their cancellation;
• the exercise of the preference right, subscription or conversion of the rights originally granted, as well as the conversion of preference shares into ordinary shares; or
• merger/de-merger or succession.

According to the Issuers’ Law, the FSA must suspend mandatory takeover bids in certain cases specifically laid down under the law, including when the issuer’s shares are suspended from trading due to the initiation of insolvency proceedings or if the issuer is subject to a reorganisation plan, confirmed by a bankruptcy judge, provided certain conditions are met. Should the circumstances that led to the suspension no longer apply, the FSA will issue a decision mandating the public takeover offer within 30 days of ascertaining that these circumstances have ceased.

Generally, in public M&A deals, the preference is for cash consideration, although the norms regulating takeover bids allow for the bidder to offer cash, or a combination of cash and securities. In the latter case, the bidder of a public exchange offer must also propose a cash alternative for the securities offered in exchange, so that the investors can opt to receive either cash, securities or a combination of the two.

Likewise, in non-public business combinations, the consideration is typically cash or, sometimes, shares swap.

Valuing companies in the current global climate can present challenges, particularly in certain sectors, making it more difficult to bridge the valuation gap. Despite this added complexity and the challenges posed by higher inflation, deals have continued to regain a higher degree of predictability over the past year.

In public M&A deals, the relevant regulations may not explicitly address the use of conditional takeover offers. However, through interpretation, in practice, in connection with voluntary takeover bids, conditions such as achieving a minimum threshold in a voluntary takeover bid or securing clearance/approval from the appropriate competition authorities may be considered acceptable. Nevertheless, it is advisable to consult the competent authority for the most recent interpretations regarding the permissibility of submitting conditional offers in such deals.

The key control thresholds in Romanian public companies are as follows.

• The 33% Threshold – this triggers the bidder’s obligation to launch a mandatory tender offer; the threshold is also relevant for a voluntary takeover bid where the bidder intends to acquire more than this percentage of the voting rights in the target (see 6.2 Mandatory Offer Threshold).
• The 75% Threshold – if, following a takeover bid, the bidder holds 75% or more of the capital carrying voting rights, no restrictions on the transfer of securities or on voting rights, nor any extraordinary rights of shareholders concerning the appointment or removal of board members provided for in the articles of association of the target company shall apply.
• The 90/95% Threshold – this enables the bidder to initiate the squeeze-out procedure (see 6.10 Squeeze-Out Mechanisms).

In public M&A deals involving a takeover bid, the offer cannot be conditional upon obtaining financing, as the offer document to be submitted to the competent authority for approval must include either proof of a deposited guarantee representing at least 30% of the total offer value in a bank account of the bidder’s broker (the amount to be blocked for the entire period of the offer), or a guarantee letter issued by a credit institution in the European Union or by a non-banking financial institution registered in the special register kept by the National Bank of Romania covering the entire value of the offer, issued in favour of the bidder’s broker and valid until the settlement date of the transaction related to the offer.

A non-public business combination may be conditional on the bidder obtaining financing, although the condition usually consists of requiring the bidder to prove the financial capacity to ensure the payment of the consideration, whether or not with additional financing. Furthermore, for obvious reasons, sellers take a cautious approach to bidders who have not yet secured financing.

During the bidding phase, buyers typically do not have the opportunity to utilise deal security measures. However, there are frequent attempts to negotiate break-up fees and matching rights.

With respect to managing the “pandemic risk” during the interim period, parties generally exclude pandemic-related causes from activating hardship, force majeure, and material adverse change/event clauses. This is because the pandemic is no longer considered the unforeseeable “wild card” that it was initially; instead, the responsibility for such risk is generally borne by the buyer.

Beyond its shareholdings, a party may seek additional safeguards within the company’s decision-making process by ensuring representation for its appointee(s) on the managing bodies. This allows them to actively participate in decisions that could negatively impact the appointer’s interests. Pre-agreeing on the selection of company auditor(s), among other things, can further enhance this protection.

In companies listed on the regulated market, the members of the board of directors can be selected by applying the cumulative voting method, at the request of a significant shareholder. The cumulative voting is a means to strengthen the possibility of minority shareholders electing a director.

For companies listed on regulated markets, shareholders can grant a valid proxy – general or specific – to their representatives. A general proxy may be granted for a maximum of three years (unless a longer period is expressly agreed upon) to vote on matters pertaining to the general meeting of shareholders (GMS) of a specific issuer or a category of issuers. General proxies can only be granted to an authorised intermediary or a lawyer.

In non-public companies, voting by proxy is permitted, subject to certain limitations prescribed by law or the by-laws of the company in question (eg, power of attorney is granted for a single and specific shareholders meeting; the proxy may not be a member of the company’s managing bodies; and publicity rules must be observed).

Squeeze-out procedures are regulated in Romania and to date have been applied quite often in respect of publicly traded companies.

Following a tender offer addressed to all shareholders and for all their shares, the bidder can compel those shareholders who have not subscribed to the offer to sell all their shares at a fair price, if one of the following conditions is met:

• the bidder holds at least 95% of the total number of shares with voting rights and at least 95% of the exercisable voting rights; or
• the bidder has acquired, within the takeover offer, shares representing 90% of the total number of shares with voting rights and at least 90% of the voting rights targeted in the offer.

Current regulations stipulate a maximum three-month period from the completion of the tender offer for the “supermajority” shareholder to exercise their squeeze-out right.

Sell-out procedures are also governed by regulations and apply when the bidder meets one of the conditions described above. Under a sell-out procedure, the minority shareholder who did not subscribe to the takeover bid is entitled to ask the bidder to buy its shares at a fair price.

Despite some recent precedents. practices such as obtaining irrevocable commitments to tender or to vote by the target company’s principal shareholders are less frequent in Romania.

In the case of a voluntary takeover bid, the bidder must submit a preliminary announcement to the competent authority (the FSA). Following approval by the FSA, the announcement must be sent to:

• the target company; and
• the regulated market in which the securities are traded; it must be published in at least one central and one local newspaper within the issuer’s local area.

According to the recent amendments to the Issuers’ Law starting 10 January 2030, companies must simultaneously submit all information related to a public takeover bid – specified in the relevant legal provisions or established by the FSA – to the local collection body (ie, the FSA) so it can be made available through the European Single Access Point (ESAP); information relating to the price and any changes thereto during the course of the public takeover bid must also be made available to the local collection body.

Following the publication of the preliminary announcement, the bidder must submit an offer document and related materials to the FSA within 30 days. The FSA will make a decision on whether to approve the offer document within ten working days.

Where the bidder issues shares as consideration for the offer, the offer document must be accompanied either by the offer prospectus relating to the relevant securities or by a document providing information about these securities. These documents are subject to the FSA’s approval/review including as regards compliance with the provisions of the Prospectus Regulation. Additionally, the offer document must include the exchange report by the independent valuer, as well as the cash value of the securities offered in exchange.

In the case of voluntary or mandatory takeovers, the offer document and preliminary announcement must contain economic and financial data pertaining to the bidder in line with the latest approved financial statements (eg, total assets, total equity, turnover and result of the financial exercise).

If part of the offer is to be settled in securities, a prospectus (in line with the Prospectus Regulation and the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/980) or an offer document, as the case may be, must be included.

In public M&A, the terms and conditions of the transactions are included in the offer documentation. This is made public and there are no requirements to disclose other transaction documents. However, full disclosure of some transaction documents to the competent authority may be required (eg, the underwriting agreement) and the competent authority does have the power to request the bidder to provide additional information and documents (including the to request additional information in the offer document to ensure investor protection).

As the principal duty of directors is to manage the company, their attention is all the more required where the company is involved in an M&A process – eg, to assess the findings of due diligence procedures; to consider and decide on the transaction structure; and to ensure that all the necessary formalities are followed.

The directors’ duties are mainly to the company and its shareholders. However, recent changes in corporate governance best practices, including those laid down in the recently revised Bucharest Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Code emphasise that while the board has a duty of care towards the company and its shareholders, its activity must consider the interest of other stakeholders as well. Under certain circumstances, the directors may be liable to other stakeholders. Yet, even in this instance, a third party having suffered damage as a result of an action or omission of the director, should normally sue the company, not the director, to the extent that the director acted within the apparent limits of his or her powers as a director. If the director acted outside his or her powers as a director, a third party could directly file a claim against the director based on his or her personal tort liability.

The rules regarding firms in difficulty may also need to be considered, depending on circumstances.

The establishment of ad hoc committees is not common in business combinations in Romania.

In Romania, courts of law rule on the legality of matters and not on opportunity or business-related aspects. In principle, pursuant to the business judgement rule as regulated under the Romanian Companies Law, directors are deemed to have complied with their duty of care and are exempt from liability if, when adopting a business decision, they reasonably believe that they are acting in the best interests of the company and on the basis of adequate information.

In more complex business combinations, particularly those involving the retention of the target company’s management team post deal closure, it is customary for legal, financial and tax advice to be sought on behalf of the managers.

The legislation contains specific provisions in respect of shareholders and directors and potential conflicts of interest, and there have been disputes on such matters – eg, involvement in the decision-making process despite existing conflicts of interest.

Romanian law does not distinguish between hostile and friendly offers. Consequently, the rules with respect to the conduct of takeover bids will apply accordingly.

Romanian legislation has implemented the board neutrality rule and consequently, from the takeover announcement until the closing of the offer, the board of directors cannot take actions that would affect the possible takeover – ie, they are prohibited from taking any measures that may affect the assets or the objectives of the takeover bid, except for ordinary administration measures.

The board neutrality rule prevents the board of directors from taking any adverse action (except for measures taken in the course of ordinary business) without the specific post-bid approval of an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) of shareholders.

However, directors may seek out another more favourable bidder (or “white knight”) and attempt to build a defence by expressing a negative opinion of the strategy to be implemented by a bidder, or the potential consequences of this strategy, thereby attempting to convince the shareholders to resist the hostile takeover bid. The opinion of the board of directors must be sent to the competent authority, the bidder and the regulated market.

The most common defensive measure when facing a hostile takeover bid is probably for the EGM of shareholders to empower the board to search for an alternative bid.

Since directors must comply with the board neutrality rule, their primary duties are to comply with applicable legal requirements in cases of takeover bids seeking to obtain control of the target company. For example, the board’s should express its opinion within five working days of the receipt of the preliminary offer announcement and may consider convening the EGM of shareholders to inform the shareholders of the board’s opinion and to seek approval for the implementation of defensive measures.

In taking these measures, the general duties of the directors apply, including observance of the legal prohibition against abuse of their position as directors by using disloyal or fraudulent measures, which may prejudice the shareholders.

Directors may not take measures aiming to affect a hostile bid without a decision of the EGM of shareholders. However, they can present a well-founded opinion to the shareholders and potentially prevent a business combination by persuading them of the adverse effects of the proposed transaction.

In Romania, litigation is not common in connection with M&A.

M&A-related litigation is not common in Romania.

Parties generally try to avoid actual disputes regarding broken deal scenarios. The degree to which this is achievable depends on the clarity of the conditions precedent and any pre-agreements that may be in place. It is crucial for companies involved in negotiations or deal signings to be cautious of the possibility of unforeseen and atypical situations that may impede the closure of the deal.

In this regard, it may be more effective to focus less on listing additional force majeure events and similar provisions and more on being meticulous when defining material adverse change events. An approach that takes into account the potential impact on the deal, rather than a specific cause of change, may be more appropriate.

While shareholder activism is not a universal phenomenon, it has become increasingly prevalent in recent times. Activist shareholders still face significant hurdles, including the challenge of accessing adequate resources and sufficient information. In this context, activist shareholders tend to concentrate on examining intra-group and related-party arrangements, directors’ responsibilities towards the company, and potential conflicts of interest at the level of the main shareholder.

Activists seek to encourage companies to enter M&A transactions as they look for opportunities to exit or consolidate their position.

Activists do occasionally seek to interfere with the completion of announced transactions, but this is uncommon in Romania.