Derivatives in Brazil are regulated both as financial instruments and as securities, regardless of whether they reference other securities. This makes them subject to the rules of the Brazilian Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or CVM) and the financial regulators – the National Monetary Council and the Central Bank of Brazil (“Financial Regulators”). There is no functional separation between the types of derivatives and their regulation: all derivatives (whether tied to commodities, credit, equities, or interest rates) fall under both regulators.
A distinctive feature of Brazil’s derivatives framework is the registration requirement for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. Even before the 2008 financial crisis, all OTC derivatives had to be registered with an authorised trade repository overseen by both the Central Bank of Brazil and the CVM. This early adoption of reporting standards gave regulators visibility into the aggregate exposure of banks and corporations, as well as insight into the types of underlying assets and strategies in use. Following the 2008 crisis, registration became a condition for the validity of a derivative transaction – a development that prompted even unregulated counterparties to register their trades.
In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, Brazil adopted bilateral margin rules and revised its capital requirements for banks in accordance with Basel III standards. However, certain post-crisis standards that became widespread in other jurisdictions – such as real-time public reporting and mandatory clearing – have not been implemented in Brazil.
Brazilian law imposes few restrictions on the types of derivatives that may be entered into, and the market accommodates most structures seen internationally. As a general rule, any asset with a publicly available price – or one that can be determined through a methodology independent of the trading and sales functions of the offering institution – may serve as the underlying of a derivative transaction.
There are two notable exceptions. First, credit derivatives are limited to credit default swaps (CDS) and total return swaps (TRS), with additional restrictions on illiquid credit references (such as private credit) and on which counterparties may sell protection for certain risk categories. Second, prediction markets are restricted to “economic or financial events,” effectively excluding derivatives tied to sports outcomes or other non-financial events.
Although derivatives existed in Brazil before 2002, their use was limited by Civil Code provisions that treated them as a form of gambling. This changed when the country’s new Civil Code took effect in 2002, expressly recognising derivatives as valid agreements. Combined with the classification of derivatives as “securities” in 2001, these reforms created a solid legal foundation for the market’s growth. The first major test came in 2008 – not from exposure to credit-linked instruments like CDS or Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), but from leveraged foreign exchange derivatives. Several major Brazilian corporations had taken short positions in the US dollar, and when the global crisis caused the Brazilian Real to drop sharply, these positions led to significant losses. While some disputes reached the courts, judges upheld the enforceability of these agreements, reinforcing legal certainty in the market.
After the 2008 crisis, Brazil adopted several global regulatory standards, including bilateral margin requirements, although it did not implement mandatory clearing. The following decade saw a notable rise in retail investor participation in derivatives markets, drawing increased regulatory attention, particularly from the CVM. At the same time, the Brazilian Central Bank began gradually relaxing certain restrictions on derivatives. Key developments in this liberalisation include:
Another important milestone was the introduction of close-out netting protections in Brazil’s corporate bankruptcy law in 2020.
More recently, the CVM has focused on derivatives marketing and sales practices, as these products increasingly reach retail investors. This remains an area to watch in the coming years, as the regulator and market participants continue to debate how best to oversee a product that, despite its classification as a security, functions quite differently from traditional stocks or bonds.
Another significant development is the entry of new market participants. A new exchange dedicated exclusively to derivatives is preparing to launch, challenging the Brazil Stock Exchange (Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão – B3)’s longstanding monopoly on derivatives trading and clearing in Brazil. This coincides with the expansion of recently authorised OTC derivatives' registrars, fostering greater competition and enabling faster deployment of innovative strategies.
The majority of trading volume in futures and options is concentrated in foreign exchange, interest rate, and inflation-linked products. Brazil’s historically high interest rates, persistent inflationary pressures, and volatile exchange rates have made these instruments the most actively traded on the B3, the country’s sole derivatives exchange as of the date of this publication. A particularly noteworthy product is the “Cupom Cambial” forward contract, which tracks the onshore US dollar interest rate. This instrument reflects the implied yield on US dollars held locally, calculated as the spread between Brazil’s domestic interbank rate (known as DI) and the foreign exchange forward premium.
Recent developments in this area include contracts tied to macroeconomic indicators such as gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation, which represent the permitted form of prediction markets in Brazil, as well as futures and options on cryptocurrencies – introduced in 2024 – currently covering Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana. Both traditional and newly launched derivatives are subject to the same regulatory framework, trading rules, and market oversight.
The type of underlying asset does not determine which regulator has authority over a derivative in Brazil. All derivatives are regulated by both the CVM and the Financial Regulators. There is no rule requiring that a certain type of derivative be traded in a particular way, such as under specific agreements, exclusively on an exchange, or subject to clearing. Brazilian regulation takes a more general approach to derivative products, with the exception of credit derivatives and events' contracts, and regulatory differences emerge primarily when comparing cleared derivatives with over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.
As a general rule, OTC derivatives can be freely traded with any counterparty as long as:
Any asset with a publicly available price or one that can be determined through a methodology independent of the trading and sales functions of the offering institution may serve as the underlying asset of a derivative transaction.
The notable exceptions are credit derivatives and prediction markets. For credit derivatives, only financial institutions (such as banks and credit unions) and professional investors may act as protection sellers (risk receivers). For illiquid credit underlyings, such as private loans, the protection buyer must own and hold the underlying credit for the entire term of the derivative. For prediction markets, the National Monetary Council has recently restricted event contracts to those linked to financial or economic events, effectively prohibiting derivatives tied to sports, elections, and other non-financial events.
For listed derivatives, the main distinguishing requirement is that any new contract must be approved by the CVM before trading begins, whereas OTC derivatives are not subject to the same level of prior oversight.
Forwards are not treated differently from other derivative transactions.
Substantially the same requirements apply to all listed and OTC derivatives. The main difference is that listed derivatives must be previously approved by the CVM, while OTC derivatives are reviewed and approved by the trade repository that checks whether it complies with the broad requirements set out by the regulators.
For both listed and OTC derivatives, the bulk of the market consists of interest rate and foreign-exchange transactions. As described in 2.1 Futures and Options, Brazil’s historically high interest rates, persistent inflationary pressures, and volatile exchange rates have made these instruments the most actively traded. These conditions have attracted both hedgers and speculators, creating a highly liquid and dynamic derivatives market.
Nevertheless, recent years have shown increased interest in equity-linked solutions for both individuals and companies. Individual investors are now trading derivatives strategies such as collars and call spreads, or using derivatives to gain exposure to equities traded abroad or to a broad basket of assets simultaneously. On the corporate side, the use of derivatives as financing strategies (such as collar loans) or as tools to gain significant exposure to publicly traded companies has increased in recent years.
One market that remains underdeveloped is the credit derivatives market. Until 2022, the National Monetary Council greatly restricted who could act as a protection seller and the types of underlying assets permitted under the regulations. Recent reforms have significantly expanded the possibilities for using credit derivatives, and market participants are now working through the Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets Association (Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais – ANBIMA) and with the Central Bank to standardise documentation and practices for these products. This market is expected to grow in the coming years.
Another restriction relates to prediction markets. The National Monetary Council has clarified that only financial and economic underlying assets may be used in derivatives. Event contracts tied to sports, elections, or other non-financial outcomes cannot be structured as derivatives and must instead be offered through approved betting companies.
The two main exceptions are deliverable foreign exchange transactions and commodities – both on the financing side and in physical commodities trading. Regarding foreign exchange regulations, both spot and forward deliverable transactions are governed exclusively by the foreign exchange (FX) rules. While Brazil allows free convertibility of currency and capital flows, the FX rules are designed to enable regulatory and tax authority oversight of foreign-exchange transactions. These rules include reporting obligations, requirements to explain and document the origin and destination of funds and the underlying transaction between the currency buyer and seller, and the requirement to use only authorised FX banks for any foreign-exchange transactions. It is worth noting that forward deliverable transactions involving Brazilian Reais are not regulated or treated as derivatives. Although commodity forwards can be traded under derivatives regulation and documentation, several products serve an equivalent purpose without being regulated as derivatives. The main example is the Cédula de Produto Rural, a financing agreement commonly entered into by banks with agribusiness clients that allows for both physical delivery and financial settlement of commodities. In this arrangement, the bank pays an upfront amount and receives either the physical commodity or its financial equivalent at a future date.
Derivatives regulation is shared between the CVM and the Financial Regulators, ie, the Central Bank of Brazil and the National Monetary Council
The Financial Regulators, as Brazil’s main banking regulators, establish rules governing which products may be entered into by Brazilian banks, as well as prudential safeguards such as margin and capital requirements. They set the standard for which derivatives can be entered in Brazil, reporting requirements, bilateral margin rules and capital requirements.
Because all derivatives are considered securities in Brazil, the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) also has authority over them. The CVM focuses primarily on offering rules for derivatives marketed to individuals and companies, establishing disclosure requirements and conduct standards to prevent conflicts of interest, insider trading, and market manipulation.
There is no mandatory clearing of derivatives in Brazil. However, most of the OTC derivatives can be voluntarily cleared at the B3.
There is no mandatory trading of standardised derivatives in Brazil.
For derivatives traded or cleared in Brazil, the CVM requires the clearing to set out positions' limits per investor for risk-management purposes. Those position limits are set according to the product type and the client risk profile. There are no exceptions to this risk control.
However, there is no regulatory position limit on how much a single contract can be concentrated by a single investor.
In Brazil, all over-the-counter derivatives must be registered with an authorised trade repository. This registration is not merely a regulatory formality – it is a legal prerequisite for the contract’s validity and enforceability. Notably, there are no exemptions for intercompany transactions or commercial end-users. While the registering bank typically bears regulatory responsibility for completing this process, both parties have a vested interest in confirming that registration occurs, given its direct impact on the contract’s legal standing.
The scope and content of applicable business conduct standards vary depending on the type of counterparty. Most business conduct rules originate from the CVM, which uses its authority over securities and securities intermediaries to treat any entity offering OTC derivatives as a securities intermediary. The CVM’s rules impose different requirements based on the counterparty’s level of sophistication, distinguishing among retail, qualified, and professional investors, with each category representing a higher level of sophistication and correspondingly less regulatory oversight.
The following is an overview of key business conduct requirements:
Brazil does not have an exemption framework for “commercial end users”, unlike other jurisdictions, where non-financial entities that use derivatives primarily to hedge commercial risk are generally exempt from mandatory clearing and, in many cases, from initial margin requirements. This is largely because the exemption addresses regulatory requirements that Brazil has not adopted. In particular, Brazilian law does not impose mandatory central clearing or mandatory exchange trading for OTC derivatives comparable to other regimes. As a result, there has been no need to establish a formal “commercial end user” exemption from such requirements.
The closest parallel to a commercial end-user exemption is found in Brazil’s bilateral margin rules under CMN Resolution No 4,662/2018. Under this framework, companies and individuals may exclude transactions entered for hedging purposes from their annual Average Aggregate Notional Amount (AANA) calculation. This is significant because the bilateral margin requirements apply only when both the financial institution and its counterparty exceed specified AANA thresholds. However, if a company crosses the AANA threshold based on non-hedging derivatives, it becomes subject to the bilateral margin rules for all covered transactions, including its hedging portfolio.
There are no state or local level regulators in Brazil.
The ANBIMA (Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais) is the Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets Association, operating as a private self-regulatory organisation for the Brazilian financial and capital markets. In the derivatives space, the ANBIMA regulates the negotiation of OTC derivatives through its Code of Negotiation of Financial Instruments and associated Rules and Procedures, which establish mandatory requirements for participating institutions, including client classification (suitability), derivative product categorisation, internal controls, and risk disclosure standards. The ANBIMA works closely with the Brazilian Central Bank and the CVM, either by receiving delegated authority or through agreements with the regulators to promote change and faster regulatory oversight. While the ANBIMA is technically a private self-regulatory body, virtually the entire Brazilian banking and broker-dealer market – including all relevant banks and brokers – are members or adherents to its codes, making its rules effectively industry-wide in scope.
The ANBIMA’s self-regulatory framework promotes market standardisation through principled codes and detailed Rules and Procedures that establish uniform conduct standards, including ethical principles, fair competition rules, transparency requirements, and procedural uniformity across regulated activities. To enforce these rules, the ANBIMA maintains a dedicated Market Supervision structure (Supervisão de Mercados) that monitors compliance, conducts supervisory reviews, issues recommendation letters, and can apply automatic fines for non-compliance. More serious violations are referred to disciplinary councils and are subject to penalties under the ANBIMA’s Code of Processes, including warnings, fines, and temporary prohibition from using ANBIMA seals, with decisions publicly disclosed. While the ANBIMA’s supervision is limited to its own codes and does not extend to official regulatory rules imposed by the Central Bank or CVM, participating institutions expressly agree that their regulated activities exceed mere compliance with statutory regulation and must also adhere to the ANBIMA’s higher standards.
The BSM (BM&FBOVESPA Supervisão de Mercados) is the self-regulatory branch of the B3, responsible for supervising and monitoring trading activities in all markets where the B3 acts, including OTC derivatives (as a trade repository), cleared derivatives and listed derivatives. The BSM oversees compliance with the B3’s rules, investigates potential violations, and has the authority to impose sanctions on market participants. It operates under the oversight of the CVM and plays a critical role in maintaining market integrity for listed derivatives.
Both the ANBIMA and the BSM are subject to oversight by federal regulators. The ANBIMA’s activities fall under the purview of both the Central Bank of Brazil and the CVM, depending on the specific activity being regulated. The BSM operates under CVM supervision as part of the exchange’s self-regulatory obligations.
The local standard is called Contrato Global de Derivativos, or “CGD,” which is a Brazilian law adaptation of the 2002 International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) Master Agreement. It was developed in 2003 by the Brazilian Federation of Banks (Febraban) and works similarly to the ISDA framework, with a master agreement and a schedule negotiated by the parties. However, adoption of the CGD is not as widespread as the ISDA Master Agreement. Many banks and firms prefer to use their own templates, as the CGD was drafted over two decades ago and does not benefit from the protocols issued by the ISDA or any equivalent mechanism for keeping pace with regulatory and legal developments. Regardless of the master agreement used, all confirmations are bespoke. There is no standardisation, since the local market does not adopt the ISDA definitions booklets.
Although master confirmation agreements do exist, they are not standard practice. In most cases, counterparties agree on a confirmation template and sign a new confirmation for each trade, rather than relying on a master confirmation with general terms applicable to multiple transactions.
Brazilian Margin Rules are based on the Basel standards, but the agreements implemented in Brazil differ substantially from the documentation used in other jurisdictions. Two main factors explain this. First, Brazilian trades do not rely on ISDA documentation, and Financial Regulators did not permit the use of the ISDA SIMM (the Standard Initial Margin Model). Second, collateral in Brazil does not commingle with the collateral taker’s assets and cannot be rehypothecated. As a result, even the variation margin is segregated from the pledgee, eliminating the need for separate agreements for initial and variation margin or for special third-party custody arrangements to ensure margin segregation.
Before the margin rules came into effect, the market used a Credit Support Annex (CSA)-equivalent agreement prepared by the ANBIMA in 2011. This agreement was primarily used between banks, while each bank applied its own template when requesting margin from clients. The CSAs in place between banks already substantially complied with variation margin requirements, including zero threshold and daily margining. In 2020, when variation margin requirements took effect for most of the interbank market and only a handful of banks were subject to initial margin requirements, relatively little work was needed to adapt existing Brazilian Law CSAs.
To prepare for the second wave of implementation, when all other covered banks would become subject to initial margin requirements, the ANBIMA published a new version of the Brazilian law equivalent of the CSA in 2021. This version addresses unregulated margin, variation margin, and initial margin in a single agreement, with applicability depending on the elections made by the parties.
Because most of the affected banks participated in the ANBIMA working group that designed the new CSA, little additional negotiation was required once it was finalised.
Beyond derivatives, market adoption of other trading agreements, such as GMRAs (Global Master Repurchase Agreements) and their Brazilian equivalents, remains limited. The ANBIMA created a Brazilian version of a repurchase agreement (repo) master agreement, but it was not broadly adopted, as most banks preferred to use their own templates. Document standardisation in these markets was never a priority, given their limited size. Most repo activity involves Brazilian government bonds, which many banks trade even without a master agreement, because those transactions are registered by both parties in the Special System for Settlement and Custody (Sistema Especial de Liquidação e de Custódia– SELIC), a depository for government bonds where any transaction with government bonds must be registered. Until recently, repos involving private bonds were subject to a mandatory clearing requirement unless the buyer was restricted from reselling them (ie, no short selling), which significantly reduced use of the product.
Securities' lending is conducted primarily through the exchange under the intermediation and clearing agreements described in 4.2 Clearing Documentation. In the rare instances where private lending of securities has occurred, it has typically been in the context of structured and complex transactions, and no industry standard has been developed.
Brazilian clearing brokers are required by regulation to sign a clearing and custody agreement with their clients. The content of this agreement is determined by both the CVM and the B3, the country’s sole clearing house as of the date of this publication. The mandatory provisions already grant clearing brokers the right to call margin at their own discretion or to reduce the exposure of any client. As a result, there is very little room for negotiating these topics in Brazilian law clearing agreements – an area that is typically one of the greatest concerns in any negotiation.
It is also worth noting that the content of the clearing agreement does not vary depending on the type of derivative. Both listed derivatives and cleared derivatives are subject to the same terms and conditions and are usually governed by the same contract.
Brazilian regulators do not require external legal opinions from law firms for any financial product. Instead, they accept internal assessments for matters such as netting and collateral enforceability.
Enforcement priorities in Brazil have shifted toward preventing fraud, money laundering, and criminal activities in the capital and financial markets. Recent high-profile scandals revealed that the rapid growth of fintechs and lesser-known financial players had, in some cases, been exploited for illegal purposes. Both the CVM and the Central Bank of Brazil are now working to close regulatory gaps and strengthen their supervisory capabilities.
On the regulatory front, both regulators remain committed to their innovation agenda, which has been ongoing for several years. Brazil has seen remarkable expansion in market structures, with new entrants challenging established players and new regulations easing longstanding restrictions. As previously mentioned, recent developments include a new derivatives exchange preparing to launch in Brazil, relaxed restrictions on credit derivatives, the use of cryptocurrencies as underlying assets for derivatives, and a clear regulatory path for the use of derivatives in prediction markets.
Both the CVM and the Central Bank of Brazil regularly share their regulatory priorities with the public. Both institutions have indicated that they will continue to focus on innovation-related topics such as tokenisation and open finance.
With respect to derivatives, the following upcoming rules and discussions are particularly noteworthy:
Ed. Seculum II – Rua José Gonçalves de Oliveira
No 116, 5th floor, Itaim Bibi
Sao Paulo
Brazil 01453-050
+55 (11) 3150-7000
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The CVM’s Business Conduct Requirements
The Brazilian Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores Mobiliários, or CVM) is one of the primary regulators of all derivatives, regardless of whether those are referenced in stocks, bonds, commodities, or foreign exchange. The reason is that derivatives are legally defined as securities in Brazil, which places them under the full authority of the CVM.
As a securities regulator, much like the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and its international peers, the CVM has mostly been involved in regulating brokers, regulated markets (exchanges and over-the-counter markets), and issuers to ensure market stability and proper disclosure standards. Historically, its focus has never been on derivatives, which until a decade ago were restricted to trading on exchanges and to highly sophisticated companies and banks trading in the over-the-counter (OTC) market.
In the last decade, the use of derivatives has become more widespread among retail investors. New market players, such as fintechs and brokers, revolutionised the investment landscape by offering the broader public new types of investments outside the traditional banking system, playing an important role in expanding capital markets to other segments of the population. However, as retail investors gained exposure to riskier products in a highly volatile market, losses increased, and reports emerged of abusive sales tactics and complex products being offered without proper disclosure, suitability or appropriateness checks. This new scenario prompted the CVM to review its approach to derivatives.
In recent years, rather than continuing its previous practice of including express carve-outs for derivatives whenever issuing new rules that could be interpreted as applying to derivatives as securities, the CVM has changed its approach. It now takes the position that OTC derivatives should generally be subject to the same regulatory framework applicable to securities, such as shares. Under this view, a bank offering an OTC derivative is deemed to be acting as a securities intermediary and, accordingly, is expected to comply with the same duties and obligations imposed on a broker-dealer distributing shares issued by another company.
This approach meant that banks would have to comply with best execution standards when entering into an OTC derivative in which they take the credit risk of their counterparty and the market risk associated with managing the derivative exposure. Supervisory audits required banks to enter into brokerage agreements setting forth all the mandatory language set out by the CVM to trade OTC derivatives, and they threatened regulatory action when banks failed to present such an agreement and offered to present the derivatives' master agreement.
Since the CVM changed its approach to derivatives, market participants have engaged the regulator to argue, first, that derivatives are fundamentally different from other securities and, second, that the role of market players is different from that of stock issuers or traditional brokers. While an issuer must disclose information about itself, the payout of a derivative depends much more on the underlying asset than on the financial health of the bank offering the transaction. Likewise, while a broker sells a stock or bond issued by a third party, its role is to connect a seller and a buyer of the security and not to be a counterparty to the contract itself.
The CVM and market participants are now discussing how to regulate this market better without affecting large corporates that need hedging transactions and do not require the same level of protection as retail investors. They are also considering the differences in how derivatives work compared to more traditional securities like stocks or bonds. There is more to come on this front, and much to learn from both sides, until this matter is settled.
Close-Out Netting
Brazil has long recognised that close-out netting is a cornerstone of a functioning derivatives market. Law No 11,101, the Brazilian Bankruptcy Law enacted in 2005, already contained an express provision safe-harbouring netting agreements from the effects of bankruptcies. When Law No 11,101/2005 was amended in 2020 through Law 14,112, the legislature took the additional step of clarifying that netting agreements and financial collateral arrangements would not be affected by judicial recovery proceedings, reinforcing what most market participants understood to be the pre-existing legal position.
The controversy arose not from the statutory text itself, but from the creative use of preliminary injunctions, specifically the so-called pre-insolvency injunctions (tutela cautelar antecedente), filed immediately before or alongside requests for judicial recovery. In a handful of high-profile cases, debtors sought and obtained emergency court orders that expressly prohibited their financial counterparties from exercising early termination rights and enforcing close-out netting.
The courts that granted these injunctions reasoned that allowing banks to terminate and net derivatives portfolios would strip the debtor of essential credit, hedging positions or liquidity assets, potentially dooming the restructuring effort before it could even begin. In practice, these orders froze open derivative positions in place, leaving financial institutions exposed to ongoing mark-to-market risk on portfolios they could neither hedge nor terminate – an outcome that the statutory safe harbour was specifically designed to prevent.
The decisions sent shock waves through the Brazilian derivatives market. Financial institutions found themselves in the paradoxical situation of holding registered master agreements that complied with every regulatory requirement and an express safe harbour in the law, and yet subject to lower court decisions that indefinitely suspended their contractual termination and netting rights.
The cases exposed a tension between the bankruptcy court's equitable powers to preserve the debtor's estate and the policy objectives that animate netting legislation. They also revealed a degree of unfamiliarity, among certain courts, with the systemic implications of blocking close-out netting.
This judicial trend has not gone unnoticed by regulators and industry bodies. The Central Bank of Brazil has publicly signalled its concern that judicial interference with netting enforceability undermines a pillar of the financial infrastructure it is charged with safeguarding. Market associations have engaged in advocacy efforts aimed at educating the judiciary and, if necessary, proposing further legislative clarification. The discussion has also attracted the attention of international bodies and global counterparties assessing Brazil's netting enforceability for purposes of cross-border documentation and regulatory capital relief.
Looking ahead, the market will be watching closely how appellate courts address the tension between the safe harbour and the broad injunctive powers exercised in restructuring proceedings. If the current case-law trend solidifies, it may prompt a legislative response. For now, the controversy serves as a reminder that statutory safe harbours are only as strong as the judicial system's willingness to uphold them, and that, in emerging derivatives markets, legal certainty remains a work in progress.
Credit Derivatives
Since credit derivatives restrictions were relaxed in 2022, the market has been undergoing an effort to standardise documentation for this product. In Brazil, there is little standardisation in the confirmation universe, since local practice does not rely on International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) definitions booklets and templates. Each player uses its own template, while trying to follow global market practices and standards.
The story for credit derivatives may be different. The Brazilian Financial and Capital Markets Association (Associação Brasileira das Entidades dos Mercados Financeiro e de Capitais – ANBIMA), the main self-regulatory organisation which unites all major banks and brokers, is undergoing an effort to standardise documentation for credit derivatives. It has recently released its credit derivatives convention, which was approved by the Central Bank. The ANBIMA convention defines Credit Events: Payment Failure, Bankruptcy, Restructuring, Obligation Acceleration, Obligation Default, Repudiation/Moratorium, and Governmental Intervention, aligned with ISDA 2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions and adapted to Brazilian market practices.
Further work is being done to prepare a standard confirmation, the rest of the required definitions (especially settlement terms) and even set up a derivatives' determination committee in Brazil. If this goes through, it will be the first time that the Brazilian market has had functioning and uniform derivatives definitions.
This may be the first step for a relatively small credit derivatives market to grow and allow novel structures and better risk management.
Predictive Markets
On 24 April 2026, Brazil's National Monetary Council (CMN) issued Resolution No 5.298, fundamentally reshaping the regulatory landscape for derivatives in the country. For practitioners and market participants operating in or looking toward the Brazilian market, this development warrants close attention, not only for what it prohibits, but also for the significant interpretive authority it delegates to the CVM.
The resolution introduces express prohibitions on derivative contracts whose underlying assets relate to real sporting events, virtual online gaming events, and real or virtual events of a political, electoral, social, cultural, entertainment, or other nature that, at the CVM's discretion, do not constitute an "economic-financial reference" (referencial econômico-financeiro). These prohibitions extend to offers made in Brazil for derivatives traded abroad, a point of particular relevance for cross-border structuring.
The resolution provides a definitional framework for what qualifies as an economic-financial reference: price or rate indices, securities and bond indices, interest rates, exchange rates, credit risk ratings, prices of commodities and financial assets traded on organised markets or registered with authorised infrastructures, and, of particular importance, "other references related to variables of relevant economic or financial interest, determined based on consistent and verifiable prices or methodologies". This third category is deliberately broad, and its contours will be shaped by the CVM's forthcoming guidance.
Therein lies the central question for market participants. Article 5 of the Resolution mandates that the CVM adopt the necessary measures for complementary regulation and enforcement. It remains to be seen whether the CVM will proactively establish criteria for classifying permitted underlying assets or take a more passive stance, intervening only when specific products raise concerns. For those advising clients on product development, this regulatory gap creates meaningful uncertainty.
Climate derivatives are instruments that have achieved substantial liquidity abroad and serve as essential risk management tools for agriculture, energy, and insurance sectors. These products derive their value from meteorological variables such as temperature, rainfall, or heating degree days. The economic rationale is evident: weather volatility directly impacts commodity prices, energy consumption, and crop yields. Yet whether a temperature index or precipitation measurement qualifies as an "economic-financial reference" under Brazilian law is far from obvious. These are physical measurements, not prices, and their connection to financial interest, while genuine, is mediated rather than direct. The resolution's requirement of "consistent and verifiable methodologies" can likely be satisfied, as meteorological data is inherently consistent and verifiable, but the threshold question of economic-financial relevance remains unanswered.
This is not merely an academic concern. Climate derivatives represent a growing global market, and Brazilian agribusiness, with its exposure to weather risk, would be a natural participant. If the CVM interprets the economic-financial reference requirement narrowly, Brazil may find itself excluded from an increasingly important segment of the global derivatives landscape. If the CVM takes a more expansive view, recognising that economic relevance can flow from indirect but substantial impacts, these instruments could flourish.
For now, market participants must operate in a holding pattern. The resolution provides the framework, but the CVM holds the interpretive keys. Those advising on new product structures or contemplating entry into the Brazilian market should monitor the CVM's regulatory posture closely. The outcome will determine not only the fate of climate derivatives but, more broadly, Brazil's capacity to accommodate the innovative instruments that are becoming standard fare in sophisticated markets worldwide.
Ed. Seculum II – Rua José Gonçalves de Oliveira
No 116, 5th floor, Itaim Bibi
Sao Paulo
Brazil 01453-050
+55 (11) 3150-7000
bps.mkt@machadomeyer.com.br www.machadomeyer.com.br/en