Ecuador recognises both judicial adjudication and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Article 190 of the Constitution expressly provides for the use of arbitration, mediation, and other alternative methods for the resolution of disputes in matters that are legally subject to settlement.
In commercial practice, the principal dispute resolution mechanisms are litigation before the ordinary courts, arbitration, and mediation.
Court litigation is the most used mechanism. Arbitration is widely used in higher-value and more sophisticated commercial disputes, especially where parties seek confidentiality, procedural flexibility and a specialised tribunal. Mediation has also grown significantly in recent years. According to the Council of the Judiciary, the number of active mediation centres increased from 84 in 2019 to 190 in 2024, while reported mediation cases rose from 76,464 in 2021 to 95,186 in 2023. In the public sector, arbitration is available subject to constitutional and statutory requirements.
A key trend in Ecuador is the continued expansion of institutional mediation. As stated in 1.2 Choice of Dispute Resolution Method, recent official data shows sustained growth both in the number of active mediation centres and in the volume of mediated cases, which reflects increasing confidence in mediation as an effective dispute resolution method. Arbitration also remains a well-established mechanism for commercial disputes involving matters capable of settlement. At the same time, court proceedings continue to encourage early settlement, as judges are required to promote conciliation.
Ecuador does not provide for a single, uniform limitation period applicable to all commercial claims. As a general rule, the Civil Code establishes that actions become time-barred from the moment the underlying obligation becomes due and enforceable.
In broad terms, executive actions are subject to a five-year limitation period, while ordinary actions are subject to a ten-year limitation period. Once the five-year term applicable to an executive action has elapsed, the claim may only be pursued as an ordinary action for a further five-year period, after which it becomes fully time-barred.
Mortgage actions and other actions arising from accessory obligations prescribe together with the principal obligation to which they are linked.
The law also provides for shorter limitation periods for specific types of claims. For example, claims for the fees of lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers, and other liberal professionals are subject to a three-year limitation period. Claims by merchants, suppliers, and artisans for goods sold at retail, as well as claims for services rendered on a periodic or incidental basis, prescribe in two years.
Limitation periods may be interrupted either naturally, through an acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor, or civilly, by the formal service of the judicial claim.
The Ecuadorian court system is hierarchical. In most matters, proceedings commence before individual first-instance judges with territorial jurisdiction over a canton. Appeals are heard by the Provincial Courts, which sit in specialised chambers and have jurisdiction at provincial level. Final review on points of law is available through cassation before the National Court of Justice, which also operates through specialised chambers and has nationwide jurisdiction.
In certain matters, including tax and administrative disputes, the system provides for a single instance of adjudication, after which cassation may be pursued directly before the National Court of Justice.
Ecuadorian law does not impose a pre-action protocol comparable to those found in some common-law jurisdictions. As a rule, proceedings begin with the filing of the statement of claim, although preparatory proceedings may be sought in advance to identify the proper parties or preserve urgent evidence. Those preparatory measures may include document production, inspection of property, recognition of private documents and urgent witness evidence, among others.
4.2 Requirements to Engage in ADR deals with formal requirements to engage in ADR.
The stages provided for by law in ordinary proceedings are: first instance, appeal, and cassation. In the first instance, the procedural milestones are the complaint, the answer to the complaint, a preliminary hearing to ensure the proceedings are in order and to qualify the admissible evidence, and a trial hearing to produce the admitted evidence and adjudicate the dispute. On appeal, the procedural milestones are the appeal, the response to the appeal, and a hearing, following which a decision is rendered. In cassation, the procedural milestones are the statement of cassation, the decision on the admissibility of the cassation, and, if it is admitted, the response to the statement of cassation, and a hearing, following which a decision is rendered. In practice, first-instance proceedings typically last about 18 months, appeals take about 12 months, and cassation proceedings take about 18 months.
There are no specific categories of disputes that are confidential. Court proceedings are generally public in Ecuador. The Constitution provides that, at all stages, proceedings and judicial decisions are public, except in the cases expressly provided by law. The Centre On Global Energy Policy (COGEP) likewise states that judicial information, hearings and decisions are public, subject only to exceptions strictly necessary to protect privacy, honour, reputation or safety, and in proceedings that the Constitution or the law expressly classify as reserved. Notwithstanding, mediation is confidential by law, and arbitration by parties’ agreement.
Interim relief is available in Ecuador and is frequently sought in commercial litigation, particularly to preserve assets or secure recovery. Preventive measures may be requested before the claim is filed or while the proceedings are ongoing. The most common measures include attachment of assets, prohibition on the transfer of real estate, retention of funds or credits held by third parties.
The main forms of final relief in commercial disputes in Ecuador are monetary awards, specific performance where appropriate, and termination or rescission with damages were permitted by the governing substantive law. Interest and costs may also be awarded. These remedies are broadly available both in court litigation and in arbitration
Damages are assessed under the substantive law governing the dispute, based on the evidence produced in the proceedings. Generally, compensation is available where a party has suffered personal injury or property damage, or where a debtor has breached a contract. Damages are compensatory only: they must reflect actual loss that is the immediate and direct consequence of the harmful act or breach, and punitive damages are not recognised. Recoverable damages typically include both actual loss and loss of profit. In the absence of fraud or wilful misconduct, the debtor is liable only for losses that were foreseen, or could reasonably have been foreseen, at the time of contracting; otherwise, the debtor may be liable even for unforeseeable losses. Where the obligation is to pay money, default generally gives rise to interest under the Civil Code. These substantive standards apply whether the dispute is resolved by a court or an arbitral tribunal, where Ecuadorian law governs the merits.
Arbitration is a well-established dispute resolution mechanism in Ecuador. It is expressly recognised by the Constitution, and the Council of the Judiciary maintains an official nationwide registry of approved arbitration centres. In practice, arbitration is most commonly used for commercial and contractual disputes in high-value business disputes.
Under Ecuadorian law, only disputes involving rights that are capable of settlement may be referred to arbitration. As a result, non-disposable matters that cannot legally be settled by the parties fall outside the scope of arbitration. There are also specific restrictions for public-sector entities: the arbitration agreement must generally be entered into before the dispute arises; if it is signed after the dispute has arisen, authorisation of the Attorney General is mandatory, and the underlying legal relationship must be contractual. In public procurement, the Constitution requires arbitration in law and a prior favourable opinion of the Attorney General, in accordance with the law.
The main perceived advantages of arbitration in Ecuador include procedural flexibility and relative speed. Arbitration allows the parties substantial autonomy to shape key aspects of the proceedings, including whether the tribunal will decide the dispute in law or in equity, whether the arbitration will be institutional or ad hoc, and, to a significant extent, the procedural framework applicable to the dispute.
The Arbitration and Mediation Act (“Arbitration Act”) expressly permits the parties to agree on whether the arbitral tribunal will decide according to legal principles or equity and provides that arbitration may be administered by an arbitral institution or conducted independently. Domestic arbitration is also designed to proceed efficiently: once the substantiation hearing has been held and the tribunal has declared itself competent, it must render its award within 150 days, which may be extended once for an additional period of the same length, where necessary.
Arbitral awards are not subject to appeal and have the effect of a final and binding judgment. In addition, confidentiality is available where the parties have expressly agreed to it, which is often regarded as a further advantage in commercial disputes.
The principal perceived disadvantage of arbitration in Ecuador is cost. Arbitral institutions are required to maintain rules governing arbitrators’ fees, secretarial expenses, and administrative charges, which can be significant in complex or high-value disputes. In addition, the institutional rules of most arbitration centres require the advance payment of arbitral costs, which may represent a substantial upfront financial commitment for the parties.
Among the most renowned and commonly used arbitral institutions in Ecuador are the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Quito Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration and Conciliation Centre of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce, the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Ecuadorian-American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham Quito), and the International Arbitration and Mediation Centre (CIAM) in Quito. All of these appear on the official registry of approved arbitration centres maintained by the Council of the Judiciary.
In domestic arbitration, the statutory framework provides for a relatively compressed timetable on the merits. Once the substantiation hearing has taken place and the tribunal has declared itself competent, the tribunal must issue its award within a maximum period of 150 days, which may be extended once for an equivalent period where strictly necessary.
In practice, however, the overall duration of the proceedings is typically longer, as this statutory time limit does not include several earlier and subsequent stages of the process. In particular, it does not encompass the service of the claim on the respondent, the time allowed for the statement of defence, the mediation hearing, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or any post-award clarification or correction proceedings.
The key legal sources are the Constitution and the Arbitration Act. Article 190 of the Constitution recognises arbitration and mediation for matters capable of settlement and lays down the special rule for public procurement arbitration. The Arbitration and Mediation Law (Ley de Arbitraje y Mediación – LAM) is the principal statute governing domestic arbitration, including the arbitration agreement, arbitrability, constitution of the tribunal, procedure, interim measures, the award, annulment and enforcement. For international arbitration, Article 42 provides that it is governed by the treaties, conventions, protocols and other instruments of international law subscribed and ratified by Ecuador, while also allowing broad party autonomy as to procedure, language, applicable law, jurisdiction and seat. The COGEP is also important for enforcement: it treats both domestic and foreign arbitral awards as enforceable titles without the need of recognition in the case of the latter.
Ecuador is also a contracting State to the 1958 New York Convention.
The courts have a key role in support of arbitration. First, where there is an arbitration agreement, judges must decline jurisdiction and favour referral to arbitration. Second, the courts enforce arbitral awards, which are treated as final judgments for enforcement purposes. Third, courts must assist with the execution of interim measures where the arbitration agreement does not provide for direct assistance by public authorities to the arbitral tribunal.
If court intervention is understood as judicial action that may affect the outcome of the arbitral proceedings, Ecuadorian law provides for very limited circumstances in which such an intervention may occur. In practice, the principal form of substantive judicial intervention is the hearing and determination of an action to set aside an arbitral award.
The Ecuadorian arbitration framework is expressly designed to minimise judicial interference. Courts do not review the merits of the dispute and are generally precluded from intervening during the arbitral proceedings themselves, save for narrowly defined instances expressly permitted by statute. As a result, arbitral autonomy is broadly respected.
In arbitration, all the final reliefs available in ordinary court proceedings are available. Regarding interim reliefs, Article 9 of the LAM and Article 8(1) of its Regulations expressly give arbitral tribunals broad authority to order measures they deem necessary to secure the assets in dispute, to guarantee the outcome of the proceedings, to maintain or restore the status quo pending resolution of the dispute, to prevent ongoing harm, imminent harm or impairment of the arbitral proceedings, to preserve assets or evidence, to guarantee compliance with the obligations at issue, and to preserve the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. The most common interim reliefs that arbitration tribunals grant are attachment orders over assets, prohibitions on disposal or transfer of assets, retention orders over funds or credits held by third parties, measures to preserve evidence, and orders aimed at maintaining the status quo pending the award. If the parties have so provided in the arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal may directly order the execution of such interim measures with the assistance of the necessary authorities. If no such provision exists, the parties may request the competent court to order the execution of such measures.
In addition to arbitration, Ecuadorian law legally recognises the following formal alternative dispute resolution methods: mediation, community mediation, dispute boards for public contracts, and conciliation.
Notwithstanding, Article 190 of the Constitution establishes an open-ended classification to create additional alternative procedures for conflict resolution. In this regard, authorised mediation and arbitration centres in the country may add new alternative methods for conflict resolution, including emergency, expedited, international, social, and statutory arbitration, among others.
Ecuadorian Law sets forth certain formal requirements for parties to engage in ADR procedures other than arbitration.
In regard to mediation, which is the most important ADR procedure (excluding arbitration), those requirements are:
Some mediation and arbitration centres have provisions in their regulations that establish additional formal requirements for conducting ADR.
The general consequence of failing to comply with the formal requirements of ADR is the rejection of the case.
Where ADR results in a full settlement, the proceedings conclude with a settlement agreement covering the matters resolved. If a partial settlement is reached, the trial continues to resolve the issues on which no agreement was reached. Such an agreement has res judicata effect and carries the same legal force as a final judgment, thereby definitively resolving the dispute in whole or in part.
Where the mediation is entirely unsuccessful, the parties retain their right to continue the judicial proceeding. Any court process may be initiated or resumed at the stage at which it was previously suspended, without prejudice to the rights of either party.
Accordingly, participation in ADR does not restrict or waive a party’s right to litigate or arbitrate but rather operates as a complementary mechanism within the Ecuadorian dispute resolution framework.
Under Ecuadorian law, the general rule is that ADR mechanisms may be engaged either by mutual agreement of the parties or by judicial decision, ex officio or upon the request of a party.
Additionally, Ecuadorian legislation expressly provides in certain cases that ADR may be triggered by statutory mandate.
Engaging in ADR does not stop limitation periods running.
Under Ecuadorian law, mediation is confidential and all other ADR proceedings may be confidential if the parties so agree. Notwithstanding, authorised arbitration and mediation centres in the country have their own rules regarding the confidentiality of ADR proceedings.
The parties are free to agree on the allocation of costs arising from ADR mechanisms. In the absence of such an agreement, they shall be subject to the rules established by the arbitration and mediation centres to which they resort. In Ecuador, the principal arbitration and mediation centres’ regulations generally provide that the party initiating the ADR mechanism shall bear the corresponding costs.
Under Ecuadorian law, courts are required to respect the ADR mechanisms chosen by the parties. Accordingly, once the existence of an ADR agreement entered by the parties is verified in a dispute, the judge must decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to the agreed-upon ADR mechanism.
In Resolution No 12-2017, the National Court of Justice clarified that the existence of an ADR mechanism constitutes a non-curable prior exception. If upheld, it must be resolved by means of a final ruling, resulting in the termination of the judicial proceeding. Consequently, judges are required to recuse themselves and refrain from analysing the merits of the dispute where an ADR agreement exists.
Furthermore, the Ecuadorian legal system recognises that once a dispute has been resolved through an ADR mechanism, ordinary courts must respect that outcome and refrain from hearing new claims on the same matter and recognise the res judicata effects of the agreement, thereby avoiding a violation of the principle of non bis in idem and ensuring legal certainty.
In accordance with the principle of party autonomy and the Federation of Ecuadorian Attorneys Act, the legal fees can be agreed upon the client and their attorney.
If no legal fee has been expressly stipulated, the judge will regulate the fee, considering certain rules set forth in the law.
Ecuadorian legal provisions or regulations do not address third-party fundings. In this regard, pursuant to Article 1465 of the Ecuadorian Civil Code, in general, payment of obligations by third parties is allowed.
There is no specific legal provision governing contingency fee arrangements in this jurisdiction. However, they are available pursuant to the principle of the autonomy of the parties' will. In practice, Ecuadorian attorneys enter contingency fee arrangements (for example: success fees, percentage of recovery, etc).
Insurance coverage is available in Ecuador for litigation, arbitration and other ADR proceedings. Such policies typically cover the costs and expenses associated with legal defence, including legal fees and related disbursements, incurred in civil, arbitral, criminal or administrative proceedings arising from a company’s commercial or operational activities.
Regarding recovery of dispute resolution costs, the general rule is that the allocation of legal costs can be agreed by the parties. If no such agreement exists, a party may only be required to pay all the legal costs when a party litigates in an abusive, malicious, reckless manner, or with procedural disloyalty. In such cases, the party shall be ordered to pay the State and the opposing party, where applicable, the expenses incurred, including all judicial costs arising from the proceedings, among others, attorneys’ fees of the opposing party’s counsel, expert witness fees, the cost of required publications, and the payment for copies, certifications, or other documents.
The legal costs described may be claimed from the opposing party in the following cases:
Generally, the allocation of costs is determined by the principle of freedom of contract, that is, the agreement between the parties concerning the distribution of the court costs. If no such agreement exists, a party may only be required to pay all the legal costs to the party who litigates in an abusive, malicious, reckless manner, or with procedural disloyalty. The factors taken into consideration for the allocation of costs include the expenses incurred, encompassing all judicial costs arising from the proceedings, among others, attorneys’ fees of the opposing party’s counsel, expert witness fees, the cost of required publications, and the payment for copies, certifications, or other documents.
The most common interim reliefs are the attachment of assets, prohibition on the disposal of real estate, and the withholding of funds or credits held by third parties.
With respect to arbitration, the Arbitration Act provides arbitrators with the authority to order and enforce interim measures. However, this legal capacity must be understood in two stages:
With respect to other ADR mechanisms, Ecuadorian law does not expressly provide for the granting of interim measures by judges.
Interim measures may be requested before filing a lawsuit and during the proceedings.
Under Ecuadorian law security of costs is not available.
In general, courts in Ecuador may grant interim relief in a limited manner, as they may only order those measures expressly provided in the COGEP, namely:
However, pursuant to Article 9 of the Arbitration Law, arbitral tribunals have broader authority, being able to order any interim relief or injunction necessary to secure the assets subject to the dispute or to guarantee the outcome of the proceedings.
Summary judgment does not exist in Ecuadorian law. However, there is a situation with similar effects, specifically, when a defence based on the statute of limitations, legal blockade of the action due to lapse of time, res judicata, or settlement is raised, the judge must issue a ruling after hearing the parties’ arguments at the preliminary hearing and, if the defence is accepted, dismiss the case without further proceedings.
Ecuadorian law does not recognise class actions.
Ecuadorian law does not recognise class actions.
Ecuadorian law does not recognise class actions.
Class actions do not exist under Ecuadorian law. Nor does Ecuadorian Arbitration Act recognise class arbitration a specific procedural mechanism. However, mass claims may be pursued in arbitration in the form of multi-party or consolidated proceedings between identified parties.
Some institutional rules do provide mechanisms allowing disputes involving multiple parties or contracts to be heard together, as well as the consolidation of arbitrations. The Rules of the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the Quito Chamber of Commerce expressly regulate consolidation of proceedings, multi-party arbitration, multiple contracts and third-party intervention; the CAM AMCHAM Rules provide for consolidation of arbitrations, and the arbitration rules in force at the arbitration centre of the Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce provide for joinder of parties and consolidation of arbitrations.
There are no clearly developed trends in Ecuador in relation to mass claims as an autonomous procedural category. Disputes involving multiple affected parties are usually channelled through ordinary procedural mechanisms, such as joinder of parties and consolidation of proceedings.
Ecuador does not follow a common law-style disclosure or discovery model. There is no general duty on parties to disclose all relevant documents, including documents adverse to their own case. Instead, document production is primarily party-driven and tied to the parties’ evidentiary burden and to the specific documents on which they intend to rely.
As a rule, a party must file, with the claim, defence, counterclaim or reply, the documentary evidence previously in its possession or that could reasonably be obtained by it. If a party does not have access to documentary evidence or expert’s reports, it must identify the material, describe its content, indicate where it is located and request the measures necessary for its incorporation into the proceedings. The court may also order the opposing party or third parties to produce or facilitate documents or information that are not in the parties’ possession where judicial assistance is required to obtain them.
Ecuadorian procedure also allows targeted pre-action and in-proceeding mechanisms to obtain documents. Preparatory proceedings may be sought before the claim is filed, and inspection measures may allow the judge to examine documents directly; persons required to participate in a judicial inspection must co-operate, and the court may compel compliance with the assistance of the police if necessary.
Ecuadorian legal framework does not recognise a single, self-contained doctrine of privilege as in the common-law sense. Instead, protection for certain communications and information is addressed through professional secrecy and specific statutory rules allowing a witness to refuse to answer or penalising improper disclosure.
The clearest procedural rule is found in the COGEP: a witness may refuse to answer questions that would breach a duty of confidentiality or secrecy arising from their status, office, employment, profession, trade or an express provision of law. In that sense, the system does recognise protections functionally similar to privilege, although not through the usual common-law categories.
These protections include professional secrecy in a broad sense and, most importantly, lawyer-client confidentiality. The Comprehensive Organic Criminal Code (Código Orgánico Integral Penal – COIP) criminalises the disclosure of secrets learned by reason of a person’s status, office, employment, profession or trade, and excludes the duty to report where knowledge of the facts is covered by professional secrecy. The Constitution also expressly protects professional secrecy and source confidentiality in the communications sector.
There is also a specific rule in mediation that is consistent with its confidential nature: a person who has acted as mediator may not later intervene in the same dispute as arbitrator, counsel, adviser, representative or witness, nor may that person be compelled to testify about the dispute in court.
Accordingly, documents or communications may be withheld where their disclosure or use in court would violate a legal duty of secrecy or confidentiality. That said, the system does not develop doctrines equivalent to privilege logs, work product or without prejudice privilege in the common-law sense.
On the other hand, Ecuadorian law does not set out a general and detailed doctrine of waiver. The clearest statutory example arises in mediation, where the parties may, by mutual agreement, waive confidentiality; outside that context, professional secrecy is strongly protected, but the circumstances in which it is deemed waived are not systematically regulated.
The legal framework recognises limits on disclosure on grounds of confidentiality, but not as an absolute right to withhold evidence from proceedings. Rather, confidentiality operates mainly as a limit on publicity, access to information and dissemination of certain categories of material, particularly where personal data, privacy, reserved information or legitimate commercial interests are involved.
The clearest categories of protected information are found in special legislation. The Organic Law on Social Transparency recognises confidential and reserved information; data protection legislation imposes confidentiality duties in relation to personal data and limits access to it, and the securities regime recognises both reserved information and privileged information subject to strict secrecy obligations.
There are, however, recognised exceptions to duties of confidentiality. The clearest are data subject consent and disclosure authorised by law. In addition, the Constitution allows access-to-information claims even where the refusal is based on the allegedly secret, reserved or confidential nature of the information, and it prohibits public bodies from withholding information in cases involving human rights' violations. The Organic Law on Social Transparency also requires partial disclosure where only part of a document is protected, through redaction or dissociation. Finally, habeas data guarantees the data subject’s right to access, rectify, delete or annul personal data, and in telecommunications any recording or interception requires prior judicial authorisation.
Witness evidence is mainly taken orally at the trial hearing or, in simplified proceedings, at the second phase of the single hearing. Parties must identify their witnesses in advance and specify the facts on which they will testify; witnesses are served in advance and, if they fail to appear without justification, they may be compelled to attend with police assistance. They may also testify by video conference or similar means of communication.
There is no system of witness depositions in the common-law sense. The closest equivalent is the use of preparatory proceedings to preserve urgent evidence, including advance witness testimony where there is a risk that the evidence may be lost, for example because of old age, serious illness or imminent departure from the country.
As to examination, the system is oral and adversarial: witnesses are subject to cross-examination.
In relation to expert evidence, the COGEP expressly provides for examination and cross-examination under the same rules applicable to witnesses, which confirms an adversarial structure of questioning at the hearing.
In arbitration, the Arbitration Act allows the tribunal to hear witnesses, experts and the parties, but it does not lay down a detailed regime for witness statements, depositions or cross-examination. Those matters are left largely to party autonomy, the applicable institutional rules and the tribunal’s case-management powers, consistent with the contractual and flexible nature of arbitration. The COGEP rules apply on a supplementary basis within arbitrations in law.
Expert evidence is expressly permitted. The COGEP defines an expert as a natural or legal person who, by reason of scientific, technical, artistic, practical or professional knowledge, is able to assist the judge on facts or circumstances relevant to the dispute. In ordinary court proceedings, expert reports are generally issued by experts accredited by the Council of the Judiciary; if no accredited expert exists in a particular field, the judge may request that the Council of the Judiciary obtain a shortlist of professionals for that specific case.
In practice, expert evidence is usually introduced by the parties, although the judge may also order a further expert report or appoint an expert in exceptional circumstances. Experts owe duties of objectivity and impartiality; they must submit their reports on time, comply with the minimum legal and regulatory requirements applicable to the report, appear at the hearing, explain and support their conclusions orally, and answer questions as to their qualifications, impartiality and conclusions. Unjustified failure to attend deprives the report of evidentiary value and may lead to loss of accreditation.
In arbitration, the regime is more flexible. The Arbitration Act allows the tribunal to hear experts but does not regulate in detail either their appointment or their duties. Those matters are left largely to party autonomy, the applicable arbitral rules and the tribunal’s case-management powers, consistent with the contractual and flexible nature of arbitration.
In Ecuador, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced directly. It must first be recognised through a recognition proceeding, and, once recognised, it is enforced in accordance with the ordinary enforcement rules of the COGEP.
Jurisdiction to recognise a foreign judgment lies with the Provincial Court of the domicile of the party against whom enforcement is sought. Enforcement itself is then carried out by the first-instance judge of the defendant’s domicile with subject-matter jurisdiction. If the defendant has no domicile in Ecuador, jurisdiction lies with the courts of the place where the assets are located or where the judgment is to take effect.
For recognition to be granted, the Provincial Court must verify, among other things, that the foreign judgment is authentic, final and has become res judicata under the law of the state of origin, that the supporting documents have been legalised, that a translation has been provided where necessary, and that the defendant was properly served so that their rights of defence were respected. The application must also state the place for service on the party against whom the judgment is to be relied upon.
The respondent has five days to oppose the application and produce supporting evidence. The chamber must decide within 30 days from service and, if a substantiated objection is filed and the complexity of the matter so requires, it may hold a hearing. The decision can only be challenged before the same court, but it cannot be appealed before a superior-level court.
Ecuadorian courts do not review the merits of the foreign judgment. Once recognised judgments have the force granted to them by the applicable international treaties and conventions, they are enforced in the same manner as any other enforceable title under Ecuadorian procedural law.
Regarding the enforcement stage, once recognition has been granted, the foreign judgment becomes an enforcement title and is enforced under the ordinary execution rules of the COGEP. Execution is limited to the concrete implementation of the title. As a first step, the first-instance judge in charge of the enforcement appoints an expert to calculate capital, interest and costs; before that, the creditor has five days to file supporting evidence of recoverable costs. Once the calculation is received, the judge issues the enforcement order, requiring the debtor to pay or comply within five days, failing which compulsory enforcement follows.
The debtor may oppose the enforcement order only on the limited statutory grounds set out in the COGEP, such as payment, settlement, remission, novation, confusion, set-off or loss of the thing due, and only if the relevant event occurred after the judgment became enforceable. Opposition does not stay enforcement and is decided at the enforcement hearing. The debtor may also propose a payment formula, but this does not suspend the proceedings unless accepted by the creditor and, where applicable, by any third parties.
If the debtor does not comply, the court orders publication of the enforcement order for the benefit of interested third parties, attachment of the debtor’s assets, and valuation by an expert. The valuation is then discussed at the enforcement hearing, which must be held within a maximum of 15 days after notification of the expert report. If enforcement continues after that hearing, the judge orders the judicial sale of the attached assets, generally through the electronic auction platform of the Council of the Judiciary, unless the law provides for direct delivery to the creditor or the parties agree on another permitted method of sale. The proceedings end once the obligation has been fully extinguished.
Foreign arbitral awards have the same effect as domestic awards and are enforced in the same manner, without prior recognition. In judgment No 3232-19-EP/24, the Constitutional Court held that requiring prior recognition and a certificate of finality as a condition for admitting enforcement of a foreign award amounted to an unreasonable barrier to access to justice and involved the application of rules that are no longer in force. That position was later confirmed in judgment No 6-22-IN/25, in which the Court gave a binding constitutional interpretation to Article 363(5) of the COGEP, holding that foreign arbitral awards are enforcement titles that do not require recognition.
In turn, domestic arbitral awards are likewise enforced in the same manner as last-instance court judgments. Enforcement commences by filing a written application before the competent ordinary civil judge, namely, the first-instance civil judge of the debtor’s domicile or of the place where executable assets are located, together with a copy of the award. Once filed, the request proceeds under the ordinary enforcement rules described in 9.1 Enforcement of Judgments. The same applies to foreign arbitral awards, except that no prior recognition, certificate of finality, legalisation or other additional formality is required.
There is not a single typical timeframe for enforcement proceedings in Ecuador.
The legislation provides some short procedural deadlines applicable only at early steps of the proceedings: the claimant has five days to submit proof of costs after the court opens the proceedings; after that, a court-appointed expert shall calculate capital, interests, and costs within the term decided by the court (typically seven days); then the court must order the debtor to pay the relevant amount or to oppose that order within five days.
After that, the overall duration depends on whether the debtor resists enforcement, the existence and location of executable assets, and whether valuation, attachment and auction measures are required.
In the case of foreign judgments, resistance may arise at two stages. First, the respondent may oppose the recognition application by showing that one or more of the statutory recognition requirements has not been met, including lack of authenticity, lack of finality or res judicata in the state of origin, defects in legalisation or translation, or lack of proper service and due process. Secondly, once the judgment has been recognised and enforcement has commenced, the debtor may oppose the enforcement order on the limited grounds set out in Article 373 of the COGEP, provided that the relevant event occurred after the judgment became enforceable.
For foreign arbitral awards, the grounds for resisting enforcement are narrower. Since such awards no longer require prior recognition, resistance is concentrated at the enforcement stage. Under the current regime, the award debtor may oppose enforcement only by producing documentary evidence that the obligation has already been performed, that enforcement has been stayed by a competent authority, or that the award has been set aside by a competent authority.
In Ecuador, there is currently no comprehensive statute or procedural regime expressly regulating the use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in dispute resolution. A draft law on the regulation and promotion of artificial intelligence is still under discussion since 2024.
In any case, the absence of AI-specific dispute resolution rules does not mean that AI use is legally unconstrained. Any such use would still have to comply with Ecuador’s broader legal framework, especially related to due process, transparency, reasoned decision-making, and the right of defence.
So far, there is no systematic data on the impact of AI on dispute resolution in Ecuador. Available evidence is largely anecdotal and suggests that its use remains concentrated in support functions rather than in adjudicative decision-making itself.
Ecuadorian courts have not formally embraced AI to improve efficiency. However, it is reasonable to expect a gradual adoption, primarily in support functions – such as research, document processing, and case management.
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Ecuador
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marosemena@coronelyperez.com coronelyperez.com
Ecuador: A Pro-Arbitration Jurisdiction
In recent years, Ecuador has positioned itself as an arbitration venue very favourable for both domestic and international users.
Through a combination of legislative clarity and a consistent line of Constitutional Court decisions, Ecuador has steadily moved toward a model that strongly favours arbitration as a preferred mechanism for dispute resolution. Under the current legal framework, arbitration agreements are respected from the outset, arbitral tribunals are entrusted with the authority to rule on their own jurisdiction and conduct the proceedings with broad discretion, and judicial intervention is confined to exceptional circumstances, both at the stages of review and enforcement.
This framework – and related developments – will now be examined in greater detail.
Deference to Arbitral Tribunals and the Role of Ordinary Courts
A defining feature of Ecuador’s arbitration framework in recent years has been the consolidation of a highly deferential, arbitration-supportive judicial model, paired with a deliberately restrained role for ordinary courts when arbitration agreements are involved. This development has been driven primarily by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (hereinafter, the “ECC”), which has consistently recognised arbitration as a constitutionally protected dispute resolution mechanism, entitled to minimal judicial interference.
At the core of this model lies the ECC’s firm embrace of the Kompetenz Kompetenz principle, under which arbitral tribunals are vested with exclusive – and broad – authority to determine their own jurisdiction, including any objections related to the existence, validity, scope, or applicability of the arbitration agreement. This principle entails, therefore, a dual obligation:
It should be noted that the ECC has given this principle a particularly robust interpretation. In a consistent line of cases – now exceeding eight decisions – the ECC has held that, when an ordinary judge is confronted with a preliminary objection based on the existence of an arbitration agreement, the judge’s role is strictly limited to verifying prima facie whether such an agreement exists. If it does, the judge must immediately decline jurisdiction and refer the parties to arbitration, without engaging in any assessment of the agreement’s validity, scope, enforceability, or the arbitrability of the dispute. Any judicial inquiry beyond this threshold has been deemed incompatible with the constitutional rights to be tried by a competent authority and to legal certainty.
Such a pro-arbitration approach is clearly reflected in rulings such as Decisions No 1758-15-EP/20 (November 2020), No 707-16-EP/21 (December 2021), No 1010-18-EP/23 (November 2023), and No 2342-18-EP/23 (December 2023), among others. In these rulings, the ECC has reiterated that ordinary judges may not even assess the arbitrability of the dispute, or the scope or alleged nullity of the arbitration agreement, as these matters fall within the exclusive domain of arbitral tribunals.
Arbitration and Public Entities
Ecuador’s Constitution expressly recognises arbitration as a valid mechanism for solving disputes involving the public sector, subject to certain statutory safeguards. Most notably, in the case of international arbitration, prior authorisation from the Office of the Attorney General (Procuraduría General del Estado) is required for the inclusion of an arbitration clause in the relevant agreement. This requirement does not apply to domestic arbitration, for which such prior authorisation is not necessary.
In this context, the ECC has clarified that arbitration is not incompatible with public law, but rather a legitimate forum for resolving contractual disputes involving public entities. In Decision No 74‑21‑IN/25 (February 2025), the ECC confirmed that administrative acts issued within the framework of a contractual relationship – that is, acts adopted by public entities in their capacity as contracting parties – may be submitted to arbitration, provided they are connected to an arbitrable contractual dispute. This includes disputes arising from contract termination decisions, penalties, performance measures, or enforcement actions adopted by public authorities in the course of contract performance.
At the same time, the ECC has made it clear that arbitration does not displace the general judicial review of the legality of administrative acts as such. These matters fall outside the scope of arbitration and must be brought before the ordinary courts in accordance with the Organic General Code of Processes (Código Orgánico General de Procesos – COGEP).
In Decision No 74-21-IN/25, the ECC has also endorsed the application of non-signatory theories to public entities. Where a public entity has played an “active” and “decisive” role in the negotiation, execution, performance or termination of a contract, or where its administrative actions are inseparably linked to the underlying contractual dispute, arbitral jurisdiction may extend to that entity, even in the absence of a formal signature.
Powers of Arbitral Tribunals in the Conduct of Proceedings
Another central feature of arbitration in Ecuador lies in the broad powers granted to arbitral tribunals in the conduct of proceedings. These powers are grounded in the Arbitration and Mediation Act (hereinafter, the “Arbitration Act”) and have been progressively shaped by the case law of the ECC, which has clarified both their scope and their limits in light of the guarantees of due process.
In this regard, two aspects are of particular importance:
Powers in procedural and evidentiary matters
Under Ecuadorian law, arbitral proceedings are governed, primarily, by party agreement. Article 38 of the Arbitration Act provides that arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the rules agreed by the parties, including institutional rules where applicable. Article 37, in turn, clarifies that ordinary procedural rules – such as those set out in the COGEP – apply only on a supplementary basis and in so far as they do not conflict with the nature of arbitration.
In the absence of agreement, however, arbitral tribunals are empowered to determine the procedure. This follows from Article 10 of the Regulation to the Arbitration Act, which recognises the parties’ freedom to define procedural rules and, failing that, authorises the tribunal to adopt those it considers appropriate in light of the circumstances of the case.
One procedural area in which arbitral tribunals in Ecuador enjoy significant discretion is the taking of evidence. Articles 22 and 23 of the Arbitration Act authorise arbitral tribunals to assess evidence requested by the parties and to order additional evidentiary measures, even ex officio, where necessary for the resolution of the dispute. Decisions adopted in this regard fall within the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal and are not subject to review by ordinary judges.
This was clarified in Decision No 2822-18-EP/23 (September 2023), in which the ECC held that evidentiary matters in arbitration are governed, in the first instance, by party agreement – whether directly in the arbitration clause or by reference to institutional rules – and, in the absence of such an agreement, by the rules adopted by the arbitral tribunal, including by reference to generally accepted arbitral practices, such as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence or the Prague Rules. Ordinary judges must, therefore, respect the procedural framework governing the arbitration and defer to the determinations made by the arbitral tribunal.
At the same time, the ECC emphasised that this framework must operate within the guarantees of due process. In particular, it held that the procedural rules governing the taking of evidence – whether agreed by the parties or adopted by the arbitral tribunal – must ensure equality between the parties and a full opportunity to present and challenge evidence. On this basis, the ECC identified three core components of evidentiary activity in arbitration:
Accordingly, while evidentiary decisions fall within the exclusive domain of the arbitral tribunal, they remain subject to constitutional limits – the scope and operation of which will be addressed as follows.
The iura novit arbiter principle
A further dimension of the powers of arbitral tribunals in Ecuador concerns the determination of the law applicable to the case. Although the Arbitration Act does not expressly regulate this matter, the ECC has recently confirmed the applicability of the "iura novit arbiter" principle.
In Decision No 2677-23-EP/26 (February 2026), the ECC held that, by virtue of the supplementary application of general procedural principles, arbitral tribunals may determine and apply the relevant legal framework, even where it has been wrongly invoked by the parties or has not been invoked at all.
In reaching this conclusion, the ECC examined the relationship between the dispositive principle and iura novit curia under Ecuadorian law. It recalled that ordinary adjudicators must decide within the boundaries set by the parties’ claims and defences, while retaining some power to correct certain legal errors and apply the appropriate legal framework, provided they do not alter the underlying facts or grant relief beyond what was sought. In this context, the ECC clarified that iura novit curia – which is adapted as iura novit arbiter – operates with greater flexibility in arbitration, allowing arbitral tribunals to analyse the legal nature of the dispute, assess the evidence, correct legal characterisations, and determine the applicable law. In the ECC’s view, this entails a “slight development” of the aforenoted principle, in so far as it permits a relative relaxation of the dispositive principle, consistent with the flexible nature of arbitral proceedings, and does not, per se, give rise to a violation of due process.
Ex Post Judicial Review
In Ecuador, arbitral awards are not subject to appeal, but only to exceptional mechanisms of ex post judicial review. In particular, Ecuadorian law recognises two principal avenues for judicial control:
The annulment action constitutes the “ordinary” mechanism of judicial review of arbitral awards. Jurisdiction lies with the President of the Provincial Court of the place where the award was rendered, acting as annulment judge, and the grounds for such an action are strictly limited to the following five set out in Article 31 of the Arbitration Act:
These grounds, as is evident, are purely procedural in nature and exclude any form of substantive review. Accordingly, the annulment action does not operate as a mechanism to correct errors in the assessment of evidence or in the legal reasoning of the arbitral tribunal, but rather as a formal procedural control.
ECC case law has further held that the grounds for annulment must be interpreted strictly and may not be raised ex officio by the annulment judge. In Decision No 2727-17-EP/24 (March 2024), for instance, the ECC clarified that Article 31(d) of the Arbitration Act must be confined to ultra petita and extra petita defects, excluding questions relating to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. Likewise, in Decision No 708-22-EP/25 (November 2025), with respect to Article 31(c), the ECC held that annulment judges are limited to verifying the existence of admitted evidence and whether such evidence was taken or, if not, whether its omission was justified. Accordingly, defects in the taking of evidence – namely, cases where evidence was in fact taken but allegedly improperly – fall outside the scope of Article 31(c).
Alongside annulment, the extraordinary protection action operates as a strictly residual mechanism of review. It allows challenges to arbitral awards before the ECC only in cases of serious constitutional violations and, as a rule, after the exhaustion of ordinary remedies – including annulment –, unless the alleged violation falls outside the grounds of Article 31. This may arise, for example, in evidentiary matters not covered by Article 31(c). In such cases, defects in the taking of evidence that may have compromised the right of defence or due process, must be addressed, if at all, through an extraordinary protection action.
The ECC has emphasised that its role in this context is not to review the legal correctness of arbitral decisions, but only to verify arbitrariness or manifest violations of due process. Accordingly, constitutional review through an extraordinary protection action does not alter the deferential approach to arbitral tribunals but operates as a residual safeguard for exceptional cases.
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
In parallel to the restrictive configuration of ex post judicial review, arbitral awards in Ecuador are enforced under the same terms as judicial decisions, without any substantive review. Opposition to enforcement is limited to grounds related to payment or extinction of the debt, as well as others expressly provided for in the COGEP, such as settlement or the loss or destruction of the thing due. This reinforces the logic of minimal judicial intervention at the post-award stage.
The regime for foreign arbitral awards, on the other hand, has evolved notably in recent years. When the COGEP was enacted in 2015, such awards were subject to prior “homologation.” This was a judicial process akin to exequatur and was required before enforcement. A legislative reform in 2018 reversed this approach by excluding foreign arbitral awards from the homologation regime and equating them with domestic awards, which, as noted, are enforced as judicial decisions. However, due to a shortcoming in the reform, Article 363(5) of the COGEP retained a reference to homologation of such awards. This created uncertainty and, in practice, was used as a basis to ask for homologation as a precondition for their enforcement.
This ambiguity was resolved by the ECC in its recent case law. In Decision No 3232-19-EP/24 (May 2024), it held that homologation constitutes an “unreasonable barrier” to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, contrary to the rights to legal certainty and effective judicial protection. This position was reaffirmed in Decisions No 34-23-CN/24 (September 2024) and 6-22-IN/25 (May 2025), consolidating the view that foreign arbitral awards are directly enforceable under conditions equivalent to domestic awards and without additional formalities.
As a result, the Ecuadorian system now tends toward a convergence between domestic and foreign awards at the enforcement stage, although some debate remains regarding the scope of admissible defences. In particular, the discussion focuses on whether opposition to the enforcement of foreign awards should be limited exclusively to the narrowly circumscribed grounds provided under domestic law – those set out in the COGEP and the Regulations to the Arbitration Act – or whether it may also encompass the grounds for refusal set out in Article V of the New York Convention, which are comparatively broader.
Treaty-Based Arbitration
Most recently, the ECC addressed Ecuador’s position on international investment arbitration. In Opinion No 19-25-TI/26A (March 2026), it declared the Investment Agreement between Ecuador and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) constitutional, subject to a specific condition related to the arbitral clause, as explained as follows. In doing this, the ECC departed from its prior decision in Opinion No 2-23-TI/23, which had adopted a restrictive interpretation of Article 422 of the Constitution. In that earlier opinion, the Court effectively treated Article 422 as completely precluding investor-State arbitration.
In its recent opinion, the ECC adopted a more precise approach by distinguishing between contract-based claims and treaty-based claims. On that basis, it clarified that Article 422 does not establish a general prohibition of arbitration, but a limited restriction that applies only in contractual or commercial disputes between the State and private parties where arbitration entails a transfer of sovereign jurisdiction.
Applying this interpretation, the ECC held that arbitration under the Ecuador-UAE treaty is confined to breaches of international obligations arising under the treaty, such as fair and equitable treatment or unlawful expropriation. These claims concern the international responsibility of the State and do not involve the enforcement of contractual obligations.
At the same time, the ECC recognised that certain treaty clauses may blur this distinction, particularly “umbrella clauses” or broadly drafted dispute resolution provisions, which may extend arbitral jurisdiction to contractual commitments, and may therefore fall within the prohibition of Article 422. For that reason, the ECC required a clear delimitation of the arbitral clause and held that the treaty must exclude any interpretation that would extend jurisdiction to contractual or commercial disputes. On this basis, it upheld the constitutionality of the treaty, subject to the incorporation of an express exclusion of purely contractual and commercial disputes.
Opinion No 19-25-TI/26A marks a shift in the ECC’s approach to treaty-based arbitration, establishing that investor-State arbitration is constitutionally permissible, in so far as it is confined to treaty-based claims.
Conclusions
Ecuador’s arbitration framework reflects a clear and consistent direction. Arbitration is treated as a constitutionally protected mechanism of dispute resolution, including in disputes involving public entities. Judicial intervention is limited. Arbitral tribunals are afforded broad authority.
This approach is visible from the outset. Arbitration agreements are respected, and ordinary courts must decline jurisdiction once the existence of such an agreement has been prima facie verified. Questions concerning the validity, scope, or arbitrability of the dispute are reserved to arbitral tribunals, in line with a robust understanding of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. The same logic extends to the conduct of proceedings. Arbitral tribunals exercise broad procedural and evidentiary powers, including the authority to determine the applicable rules, assess and order evidence, and apply the law beyond the parties’ arguments under the iura novit arbiter principle. This framework extends to disputes involving public entities, where arbitration operates as a forum for resolving contractual controversies without displacing judicial control over the legality of administrative acts.
Judicial control exists, but in a confined form. The annulment action is limited to strict procedural grounds listed in the law and does not permit a review of the merits. Constitutional review operates as a residual mechanism, available only in cases of manifest violations of due process and does not alter the deferential structure of the system. The enforcement regime follows the same pattern. Arbitral awards – both foreign and domestic – are enforced under the same terms as judicial decisions, without substantive review and with limited grounds for opposition.
In the context of investment arbitration, the ECC has departed from its prior restrictive precedent, clarifying that investor-State arbitration is not prohibited, but must remain confined to treaty-based claims, to the exclusion of contractual or commercial disputes.
Taken together, these elements define a coherent model: a pro-arbitration system that prioritises the effectiveness of arbitral decisions and confers broad powers on arbitral tribunals.
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