Identifying another party’s asset position within the EU can be challenging due to the diverse legal systems and privacy regulations. However, there are several methods and tools available to creditors and other interested parties.
Registers and Databases
Several EU member states have public registers and databases that often prove useful in identifying another party’s assets. By way of illustration, member states may have the following:
European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) Regulation
Regulation No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters (the “EAPO Regulation”) allows for a creditor who holds an enforceable judgment to formulate a request to obtain information on the accounts the debtor presumably holds in a member state. Even if the judgment is not yet enforceable, such a request can still be made if the creditor substantiates that there is an urgent need for the account information because the subsequent enforcement could be in jeopardy. The EAPO Regulation allows a creditor to freeze a debtor’s bank accounts across member states. It can be obtained without the debtor’s prior knowledge, to prevent the transfer or withdrawal of funds.
Domestic Particularities
For domestic particularities (eg, insolvency proceedings, credit reporting agencies, private investigators, and court orders such as asset disclosure orders and freezing orders), please refer to the relevant national chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
In Europe, types of domestic judgments vary by country, but they generally fall into a few broad categories. For the recognition and enforcement of judgments, the following categories are particularly important.
EU Particularities
At the EU level, there are certain instruments that may be used to obtain orders facilitating enforcement, as follows.
Enforcing a domestic judgment within the same domestic state involves using the mechanisms and procedures available within that jurisdiction. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
However, instruments at the EU level have led to certain harmonisation in this field (eg, Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of IP rights).
The costs and time required to enforce domestic judgments will significantly depend on the national jurisdiction in which the judgment is being enforced, primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
Post-judgment procedures for determining defendants’ assets are mainly regulated at the national level. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
However, next to national asset disclosure procedures, the European Account Preservation Order introduced in Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 includes provisions for obtaining information about the defendant’s assets. Creditors can request the court to obtain information about the defendant’s bank accounts.
In the EU, defendants have several avenues to challenge the enforcement of a domestic judgment within their own country, based on national rules. These mechanisms are generally designed to ensure fairness and due process, and the specific procedures can vary from country to country. Such mechanisms may include, for example, an appeal or revision of the enforcement measure itself, an application for a stay or suspension of enforcement pending an appeal of the original judgment, and an option for third parties to reclaim assets subject to enforcement by asserting objections based on their property rights over the property seized.
An appeal or revision of the measure may, for example, be based on substantive grounds (eg, the lack of a current and effective title further to a change in the relationship between the creditor and debtor) or procedural grounds (eg, use of the wrong attachment procedure).
Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
The EU primarily influences cross-border legal matters between its member states rather than purely domestic situations. The enforceability of judgments without cross-border elements is, in principle, governed by the national laws of the member states in question.
Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
There is no centralised register of domestic judgments across all member states. Nevertheless, in Europe, several countries have registers for judgments, which are publicly available.
Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
Enforcement of foreign judgments within the EU is governed by several EU regulations and international treaties.
Recognition and Enforceability of Judgments in General
Depending on the specific regulation or treaty applicable, foreign judgments may be recognised and considered enforceable automatically, meaning that there is immediate access to national means of enforcement in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.
In other instances, recognition may not be automatic, and specific proceedings may need to be followed to obtain access to national means of enforcement. Such proceedings are typically referred to as exequatur proceedings – ie, proceedings geared at obtaining a declaration of enforceability by the competent court.
Even under mutual recognition regimes, there are grounds upon which a member state can refuse to enforce a foreign judgment (see 3.6 Challenging Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).
Applicable Legislation
Multiple legal instruments can govern the enforcement of foreign judgments (eg, domestic law, multilateral conventions, bilateral conventions, EU regulations). In the EU, the principal international treaties/conventions relevant to the enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial matters are:
As for EU regulations, the principal legal instrument governing the recognition and enforceability of foreign judgments is Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (the “Brussels I Recast Regulation”). Other EU regulations are also of particular importance, such as:
Post-Brexit Considerations
Since Brexit, the legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of judgments between the UK and the EU has changed (see 3.2 Variations in Approach to Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).
Recognition and Enforceability of Judgments in General
Depending on the specific regulation or treaty applicable, foreign judgments may be recognised and considered enforceable automatically, meaning that there is immediate access to national means of enforcement in the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.
In other instances, recognition may not be automatic, and specific proceedings may need to be followed to obtain access to national means of enforcement. Such proceedings are typically referred to as exequatur proceedings – ie, proceedings geared at obtaining a declaration of enforceability by the competent court.
Even under mutual recognition regimes, there are grounds upon which a member state can refuse to enforce a foreign judgment (see 3.6 Challenging Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).
Enforcement of judgments varies depending on the type of judgment and the legal instruments governing its recognition and enforcement.
Generally, final judgments (decisions on the merits of the case) benefit from broader recognition and enforcement under international conventions and regulations (the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the Lugano Convention, the Hague Choice of Court Convention, and the Hague Judgments Convention).
The situation is more complex for judicial decisions ordering provisional measures.
Judgments may of course only qualify for recognition and enforcement under the European and international enforcement regimes if they fall within the substantive scope of application. The instruments applicable in civil and commercial matters (which typically exclude, for instance, tax matters or administrative matters) are discussed herein. The European and international instruments include grounds allowing member states to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment (see 3.6 Challenging Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).
Furthermore, some types of foreign judgments do not qualify for recognition and enforceability under the European and international regimes. Notably, under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the regime for interim measures is stricter than for final judgments, as the regime for the recognition of interim measures requires that the court issuing interim relief also has jurisdiction for the main proceedings on the merits. Interim measures will not benefit from the Brussels I Recast Regulation’s recognition regime if they were ordered without the defendant being summoned to appear, unless the judgment containing the order is served on the defendant prior to enforcement.
The actual enforcement of foreign judgments will be governed by the law of the member state involved, so domestic law applies in this regard.
As for the recognition and enforceability that precede actual enforcement, the main element to verify is whether a party seeking enforcement is required to initiate specific proceedings to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. This differs depending on the European or international instruments, as follows:
If there is no applicable regulation or convention, the domestic laws of each country where enforcement is sought will govern the question of recognition and enforceability. They will typically provide a requirement to initiate specific proceedings to obtain recognition and/or enforceability.
Like domestic judgments (see 2.3 Costs and Time Taken to Enforce Domestic Judgments), the costs and time required for the enforcement of foreign judgments will depend significantly on the national jurisdiction in which the judgment is being enforced ‒ primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
Where recognition or enforceability is granted automatically under a European regulation or international instrument, this naturally reduces the costs and time required. Instruments such as the European Payment Order Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006) and the EAPO Regulation aid further in reducing the burden of enforcement.
Where European and international instruments such as the Brussels I Recast Regulation, the Lugano Convention, the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention facilitate enforcement, they each provide a limited list of grounds on which the jurisdiction where enforcement is sought may refuse recognition and enforcement.
Under the Brussels I Recast Regulation, recognition may be denied if:
The Lugano Convention, the Hague Choice of Court Convention and the Hague Judgments Convention provide similar refusal grounds, with some slight variations.
Please refer to the national sections of this Global Practice Guide for a detailed outline of the issues that could arise when enforcing arbitral awards in the respective national jurisdictions.
One of the key legislative instruments limiting issues regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”). The New York Convention is adopted by numerous jurisdictions, including the member states of the EU. Enforcement can only be refused on a limited number of grounds at the request of a party or by the competent authority where enforcement is sought (see 4.6 Challenging Enforcement of Arbitral Awards).
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”) constitutes a basis for the harmonisation and improvement of national legislation concerning international commercial arbitration. However, please refer to the national chapters of this Global Practice Guide on whether and to what extent national jurisdictions have implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law.
A distinction must be made between “domestic” or “national” awards and “international” or “foreign” awards, respectively rendered in and outside the state where enforcement is sought. For purposes of enforcement, some countries may treat these awards as equal, whereas other countries may provide for a separate set of rules for each type.
As for foreign arbitral awards, the New York Convention greatly facilitates recognition and enforcement, owing to the large number of countries that have ratified it.
Another difference in enforcement for different types of arbitral awards concerns the enforcement of interim awards. Since the New York Convention only applies to final awards, this would not serve as a solution for the enforcement of interim awards. The UNCITRAL Model Law, however, provides for specific rules for the enforcement of interim awards. These rules do not differ much from the rules regarding the enforcement of final arbitral awards, but several conditions have been added, such as that the interim award cannot have been overruled. Of course, this depends on whether national law has implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law, or otherwise provides specific rules relating to interim awards.
National law determines the process to be followed for enforcing an arbitral award. Apart from requiring certain formalities (such as providing the original or duly certified copy of the arbitral award and arbitration agreement), the New York Convention itself does not provide procedural rules. Please therefore refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
As mentioned for judgments (see 2.3 Costs and Time Taken to Enforce Domestic Judgments), the costs and time required for enforcing arbitral awards will also significantly depend on the national jurisdiction in which the arbitral award is being enforced ‒ primarily depending on the specific legal procedures and the court system in general. Please refer to the national enforcement options and procedures set out in the other chapters of this Global Practice Guide. Where the New York Convention applies, this naturally reduces the costs and time required.
For the avenues under domestic law to challenge enforcement, please refer to the national chapters of this Global Practice Guide.
Where the New York Convention applies, recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may still be denied based on a limitative list of refusal grounds, including that:
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Enforcement of Russian judgments in the EU
The enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards within the EU has long relied on a stable legal framework – anchored in the Brussels I Recast Regulation, alongside multilateral conventions and domestic law. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, however, that legal framework has faced extraordinary pressure. The EU has adopted an unprecedented series of sanctions packages, and a critical new front has opened regarding whether Russian court decisions and arbitral awards should be recognised and enforced within the EU. The 2025–2026 period covered in this contribution has proved particularly active as two successive sanctions packages further reshaped the framework governing the recognition and enforcement of Russian judgments and arbitral awards in the EU, with key proceedings pending before both EU and Russian courts.
EU sanctions packages
The 15th package (16 December 2024)
Since their adoption in 2020, Russia has made extensive use of Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the Russian Arbitrazh Procedure Code to assert exclusive jurisdiction over sanctions-related disputes and to issue anti-suit injunctions (ASIs) – that is, orders prohibiting parties from initiating or continuing proceedings before non-Russian courts, against European parties. Russian courts have applied these provisions over 200 times, exposing European companies to penalties up to EUR14.3 billion. In response, the EU’s 15th sanctions package introduced two targeted prohibitions: EU member states may neither (i) recognise or enforce Russian court decisions issued under these articles, including ASIs; nor (ii) give effect to financial penalties imposed for non-compliance with such decisions.
The 18th package (18 July 2025)
While the 15th package focused on protecting private EU companies, the 18th sanctions package – in force since 20 July 2025 – shifts the emphasis to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims brought by Russian-designated parties against EU member states under bilateral or multilateral investment treaties. High-profile examples include Mikhail Fridman’s USD16 billion claim against Luxembourg, ABH Holdings SA’s threatened USD7 billion claim against Cyprus, and Rosneft’s USD7 billion claim against Germany, which was filed on 30 March 2026 before a Berlin court.
To address this risk, the EU has introduced three interlocking measures:
The recitals to the 18th sanctions package clarify that compliance with EU sanctions forms part of the EU’s public policy, requiring domestic courts to raise a public policy objection ex officio. The practical significance of this qualification is considerable: under the New York Convention, public policy constitutes one of the few grounds on which recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused, and the only ground domestic courts may raise ex officio. As a result, any arbitral award conflicting with EU sanctions will be refused recognition and enforcement across the EU, irrespective of its merits or the parties’ procedural conduct, and regardless of any conflicting decision from an arbitral tribunal or non-EU jurisdiction.
The 20th package (23 April 2026)
The 20th sanctions package addresses two remaining gaps: costs awards against sanctioned claimants, and the ability of EU companies to seek relief against Russian proceedings asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.
It introduces a target exception to asset freeze, allowing competent authorities to release frozen funds to satisfy an arbitral costs award. This is permitted where the arbitration has been initiated by the sanctioned party after its designation, and the award favours a non-sanctioned respondent. Recoverable amounts are limited to tribunal fees, institution fees, and reasonable legal costs, excluding principal amounts, damages, or interest. In practice, respondents should identify whether the sanctioned claimant holds frozen assets within the EU and be prepared to act swiftly once a favourable award is rendered.
The package also establishes a mechanism enabling EU companies to seek protection before EU member state courts by requesting orders that (i) uphold exclusive jurisdiction or arbitration agreements; and (ii) prohibit or terminate proceedings before Russian courts (ie, ASIs), with courts empowered to impose financial penalties for non-compliance, payable directly to the affected party. A landmark 2023 decision of the Berlin Higher Regional Court had already demonstrated that Section 1032 of the German Code of Civil Procedure can be deployed in an extraterritorial context, though German courts did not go beyond the declaratory stage. The 20th package takes this approach further. However, a key question remains as to whether financial penalties could be enforced against frozen assets, which would require an additional exception to the asset freeze.
Judicial challenges and enforcement constraints arising from EU sanctions
Claims over frozen Russian assets
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU and its partner countries froze approximately USD300 billion in Russian reserves. Within the EU, approximately EUR165 billion has been immobilised across Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany and Sweden.
Within the EU, the 18th sanctions package not only prohibits EU member states from recognising or enforcing judgments awarding damages in connection with the freezing of Russian assets, but also affirmatively obliges them to actively resist any recognition or enforcement efforts by raising all available defences.
In parallel, the freeze of Russian assets has given rise to a broader wave of litigation:
Investor challenges to ISDS enforcement restrictions
Some individual investors have also initiated proceedings before the CJEU specifically challenging the EU’s prohibition on the enforcement of decisions in ISDS claims and the related right for EU member states to seek damages from investors who pursue such claims, both introduced by the 18th sanctions package. So far, five actions for annulment under Article 263 TFEU have been filed against these provisions. The grounds invoked include violation of the New York Convention, the ICSID Convention, and the principle of good faith under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, as well as EU constitutional principles such as legitimate expectations and legal certainty. Claimants further contend violations of the ECHR, including non-discrimination and effective judicial protection.
CJEU preliminary reference in Reibel v Stankoimport
Case C-802/24, NV Reibel v JSC VO Stankoimport, concerns the scope of the “no-claims clause”, ie, a provision under EU sanctions law that prevents Russian parties from obtaining satisfaction from claims arising out of contracts or transactions affected by EU sanctions. The dispute arose from a supply agreement between Belgian company NV Reibel and Russian entity JSC VO Stankoimport. In 2017, Belgian authorities refused to grant the required export licence due to EU sanctions, preventing delivery of the goods, whereupon the Russian buyer (who had paid in advance) terminated the contract and sought repayment and damages. A Stockholm arbitral award issued in 2021 ordered repayment of the advance, concluding that it fell outside the “no-claims clause”, but Reibel challenged the award before the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm, which stayed the proceedings and referred three questions to the CJEU on the interpretation of Article 11 under Article 267 TFEU, with direct implications for the enforceability of awards linked to sanctions-affected transactions.
Advocate General Biondi’s Opinion of 26 February 2026 rests on three key conclusions:
If followed by the CJEU, this approach would further restrict the enforceability in the EU of arbitral awards obtained by Russian parties. Even awards granting repayment of advance payments may be refused enforcement or set aside on EU public policy grounds. This would confirm a more restrictive trend, where national courts are required, even ex officio, to scrutinise such awards and deny any relief that satisfies claims covered by the “no-claims clause”. As a result, while arbitration proceedings may still be be permitted, the practical value of any resulting award in the EU could be significantly curtailed where it relates to transactions affected by EU sanctions.
Takeaways
Traditionally, enforcement within the EU relies on a structured approach under instruments such as the Brussels I Recast Regulation, and the New York Convention. Since 2022, however, enforcement has become increasingly sensitive to sanctions-related considerations. EU measures introduce targeted limitations on the recognition and enforcement of certain Russian judgments and awards that are designed to circumvent EU jurisdiction in the context of sanctions. Going beyond passive limitations on Russian proceedings, the EU also equips member states with practical enforcement tools – such as EU court-issued ASIs and forms of asset freeze – reflecting a clear intention to project EU legal authority beyond its borders.
If the CJEU follows the AG’s opinion in Reibel v Stankoimport, national courts will be required to review compliance with the “no-claims clause” ex officio, further curtailing the practical value of awards obtained by Russian parties within the EU.
Simultaneously, enforcement restrictions create pressure within the EU, as: (i) investors’ claims over frozen assets challenge sanctions’ compatibility with property rights; and (ii) BIT-based ISDS proceedings expose EU member states to liability.
Transposition of the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive (2024/1069)
Background
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) refers to abusive civil proceedings weaponised to silence journalists, activists, NGOs and researchers. In response, the Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of 11 April 2024 (the “Anti-SLAPP Directive”) establishes a harmonised EU framework to protect participants in public debate against manifestly unfounded or abusive claims. Its cross-border safeguards are of direct relevance for the broader European civil enforcement landscape.
Protection against third-country judgment
Articles 16 and 17 of the Anti-SLAPP Directive provide strong protection against abusive proceedings originating in third states (non-EU jurisdictions):
Implementation in national legislations
While EU member states were required to transpose the Anti-SLAPP Directive by 7 May 2026, only nine did so by the deadline (France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden). Belgium has now joined this group, having enacted its transposition law on 30 May 2026. Most member states missed the transposition deadline and are still in the legislative drafting or parliamentary review stages, making the practical application of the Directive’s safeguards uneven for the time being.
Implications
The Anti-SLAPP Directive introduces an additional layer of control over the recognition and enforcement of third-country judgments within the EU. Its two-core mechanisms (mandatory refusal of recognition and a right to damages before EU courts) are aimed at deterring third-country litigation involving public participation when used as an enforcement strategy against EU-based actors. The uneven state of transposition, however, implies that in practice the availability of these protections is fragmented, at least for now.
The Anti-SLAPP Directive reflects a recent trend in EU law towards selective enforcement, where access to the EU enforcement market increasingly depends on compliance with core EU policy objectives.
EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation
Background
The EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation or FSR (Regulation (EU) 2022/2560), in force since 12 January 2023 and applicable from 12 July 2023, empowers the European Commission to investigate and address distortions in the EU internal market caused by foreign financial contributions (FFCs) – defined broadly as any form of direct or indirect value transfer from non-EU governments or any public or private entity linked to a non-EU country, including direct grants, state-owned bank loans, tax incentives, R&D funding, government contracts, and grants of exclusive rights without adequate remuneration. The FSR operates through three procedural mechanisms: mandatory notification for qualifying M&A transactions, mandatory notification for large EU public tenders, and broad ex officio investigative powers covering subsidies granted up to ten years before the investigation begins.
Key developments
Two significant developments marked the FSR landscape in the period covered by this contribution:
Takeaway
The publication of the FSR Guidelines and the opening of the first in-depth ex officio investigation under the public procurement module mark a maturation of FSR enforcement. For companies active in the EU that receive non-EU government support, FSR compliance – including in M&A transactions, public tenders and potential ex officio scrutiny – has become an integral part of deal planning and regulatory strategy.
The EU Blocking Statute
Background
The EU’s primary defensive instrument against third-country extraterritorial sanctions is Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (the “Blocking Statute”). It was originally adopted in 1996 in response to US extraterritorial sanctions targeting Cuba, and amended in 2018 to cover re-imposed US sanctions on Iran. It prohibits EU operators from complying with designated foreign measures and enables recovery of resulting damage. Despite its broad scope, no EU member state authority has yet enforced the Blocking Statute in a known case, though it has had significant impact in private litigation, notably in the Bank Melli case before the CJEU.
Key developments: pressure to activate the Blocking Statute against US sanctions on the ICC
The most significant development in this area concerns US sanctions targeting the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the mounting pressure on the European Commission to respond by activating the Blocking Statute. The key developments unfolded as follows.
Takeaway
The ICC episode highlights the growing practical relevance of the Blocking Statute as a defensive instrument against US extraterritorial sanctions, and the political and institutional tensions that its formal activation entails. As of the date of publication of this contribution, no formal decision to activate the Blocking Statute had been taken. Whether and when the European Commission will trigger the mechanism – and the implications for EU operators caught between competing legal obligations – remains an open and closely watched question.
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