There are sources of publicly available information that may help identify another party’s asset position, upon payment of the prescribed fees. These comprise the following:
Applications may also be made to court to obtain information on the assets of another party under the following circumstances:
Limited information on aircraft, ships and motor vehicles may also be obtained from searches performed with the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore, the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore and the website of the Land Transport Authority of Singapore (known as “OneMotoring”), respectively.
Private investigators are sometimes also engaged to locate and identify the assets of another party. Evidence from such investigations is generally admissible in civil proceedings in Singapore, although the civil courts have the discretion to exclude evidence in circumstances where the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs its probative value. The ambit of such discretion remains unclear ‒ although, developing case law on the subject suggests that unlawfully or improperly obtained evidence may weigh against its admission by the court.
The types of judgments in Singapore may be divided into two categories based on the nature of the reliefs they grant:
Both money and non-money judgments can be granted after a full trial, with the benefit of cross-examination of affidavit evidence, or without a full trial in limited circumstances. Examples of this include the following.
There are several prescribed methods for the enforcement of domestic judgments in Singapore. The terminology for the methods of enforcement and their procedures involved under the Rules of Court 2014 (the “Revoked Rules”) have since undergone changes due to the introduction of the new Rules of Court 2021 (the “ROC 2021”), as well as the new Singapore International Commercial Court Rules 2021 (the “SICC Rules”), both of which came into operation on 1 April 2022.
Under the ROC 2021, a single consolidated application must be filed by the enforcing applicant, regardless of whether that party intends to seek one or multiple types of enforcement orders (Order 22 Rule 2(1) of the ROC 2021). The single application is filed by way of summons, supported by an affidavit that complies with the requirements set out in Order 22 Rule 2(4) of the ROC 2021. It may be filed without notice to the opposing party but cannot be filed earlier than three days after a judgment is served (Order 22 Rule 2(3) of the ROC 2021).
Where multiple methods of enforcement are sought, the application must specify the sequence in which they are to be carried out (Order 22 Rule 6(1) of the ROC 2021). If no such sequence is stated, the sheriff of the court may carry out the enforcement terms in any sequence or concurrently at the sheriff’s discretion (Order 22 Rule 6(2) of the ROC 2021). Only one court order should be drawn up by the party who takes out the application (Order 17 Rule 3(4) of the ROC 2021). This potentially simplifies the process but also means that applicants must take care to consider all available enforcement options before proceeding with the application.
In the UK, there appears to be a more liberal standard, which allows even new parties to be joined after judgment for the purpose of enforcement (see C Inc plc v L (2001), 2 Lloyd’s Rep 459). The Singapore court has not adopted this liberal standard but held that a person may not be added or joined after judgment is granted and expiry of the time for appeal (see Shanghai Shipyard Co Ltd v Opus Tiger 1 Pte Ltd and another and other appeals and another matter (2022), 1 SLR 643 at (11) to (17)).
Types of Enforcement Methods
An enforcing applicant may apply for the following types of enforcement orders:
Order for seizure and sale of property
This mode of enforcement involves the seizure and sale of such property belonging to an enforcement respondent as may be sufficient to satisfy a judgment debt (Order 22 Rule 2(a) of the ROC 2021).
Both movable and immovable property may be seized, except for the following types of property (Section 13 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969):
The sale of seized property must be conducted by an auctioneer and by public auction if the seized property is immovable property or if the estimated value of the seized property exceeds a particular limit. If not, the sale may be conducted by the sheriff and may be by private treaty or by public auction. Different limits apply under the Revoked Rules (Order 46 Rule 24) and the ROC 2021 (Order 22 Rules 7(4) and 7(5)).
Order for delivery or possession of property
An order for delivery or possession (Order 22 Rule 2(b) of the ROC 2021) authorises the sheriff to seize and deliver movable property or give possession of immovable property in the possession or control of an enforcement respondent. Orders of this type relating to immovable property are usually served on a tenant by a landlord, requiring the tenant to leave the premises by a certain time.
Order for attachment of debt
This is an order for a non-party (such as an employer, bank or financial institution) to pay to the enforcing applicant money (not being wages or salary) that it presently owes to the enforcement respondent, whether immediately or at some future date (such as a deposit) (Order 22 Rule 2(c) of the ROC 2021). It effectively places the non-party in the position of an assignee of the enforcement respondent.
This enforcement method does not apply to money standing to the credit of an enforcement respondent in court (see Order 22 Rule 5(1) of the ROC 2021). Instead, a separate summons application may be taken out for such money to be paid to the enforcing party.
Order for committal
An enforcing applicant may apply for an order for committal if an enforcement respondent fails or refuses to perform an act required by an order or judgment (Order 23 of the ROC 2021). The purpose or effect of the order is to penalise or sanction the committal respondent for non-compliance with the judgment, whether by way of a fine or imprisonment. This remedy is grounded in the public interest of protecting and upholding the administration of justice in Singapore.
An application for permission to apply for committal must first be filed by way of an originating application without notice or a summons without notice supported by affidavit evidence (Order 23 Rule 3 of the ROC 2021). If permission is granted, an application for the committal order must also be made through a summons within 14 days and personally served on the committal respondent (Order 23 Rule 4 of the ROC 2021). The application will generally be heard in open court (Order 23 Rule 7(1) of the ROC 2021), and the criminal standard of proof will apply. The court will ultimately retain discretion as to whether to grant the order for committal.
Order for bankruptcy or winding-up
An enforcing applicant may also apply to wind up corporate debtors or to bankrupt individual debtors that fail to satisfy judgment debts. Such proceedings are not technically regarded as enforcement methods as they are not always based on judgment debts. However, they may be effective in persuading a debtor to comply with a money judgment ‒ although applicants should always exercise caution as they may be precluded from pursuing other types of enforcement measures once a bankruptcy or winding-up order is made.
The relevant applications are governed by Parts 8 and 16 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018. In general, bankruptcy or winding-up proceedings may be filed against a debtor if it is unable to pay its debts and is not eligible for any other repayment schemes. A corporate or individual debtor may be presumed to be unable to pay its debts if the debtor fails to respond to a statutory demand requiring payment of a sum exceeding SGD15,000 within 21 days.
The time required to enforce a judgment may typically range from two to eight months, depending on the number and type of proceedings that are taken out, and whether they are contested or heard over multiple rounds of hearings. More time will also be required if there is little to no information on the assets available for enforcement.
The following types of costs may be involved in the process:
Part payment of such costs may be recoverable from the enforcement respondent if the enforcement applications are granted, although this will usually be a fraction of the actual costs incurred.
The effectiveness of the enforcement process of a money judgment depends heavily on the types of assets held by the enforcement respondent, while non-money judgments are often enforced through committal proceedings.
If an enforcing party wishes to find out what assets an enforcement respondent has before taking out an enforcement application, it can seek an order for the examination of the enforcement respondent (EER) (Order 22 Rule 11 of the ROC 2021). This is an order requiring the enforcement respondent to appear before the court (on a date to be fixed) and be questioned under oath as to the assets that the respondent has and where these assets are located. Alternatively, the court may require the enforcement respondent to make an affidavit disclosing what these assets are or may require the enforcement respondent to do both.
If the order for EER is granted, it must be personally served on the enforcement respondent together with a list of questions the enforcing party wishes to ask. The enforcement respondent will have to complete answers to the questions and provide all supporting documents via affidavit or a statutory declaration prior to the scheduled hearing date. The enforcing party may ask further questions at the hearing and may also request that the hearing be adjourned for the enforcement respondent to produce further documents in support of the answers given. If the enforcement respondent does not attend the hearing, the enforcing party may apply for a committal order to be made against the enforcement respondent.
There are several ways in which a defendant may challenge enforcement of a domestic judgment. By way of example, the defendant may dispute the following.
The defendant may also take one of the following additional steps:
In general, to obtain a stay of enforcement, the defendant must demonstrate special circumstances that render it inappropriate to enforce the judgment or order immediately (Order 22 r 13(1) Rules of Court 2021; Lee Kuan Yew v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin (1990), 1 SLR(R) 772 at (6); see also Axis Megalink Sdn Bhd v Far East Mining Pte Ltd (2024), SGHC 47 at (8) and (25); Strandore Invest A/S and others v Soh Kim Wat (2010), SGHC 174 at (7)). The existence of an appeal does not of itself warrant the grant of a stay, as the courts do not generally deprive a successful litigant of the fruits of litigation or lock up funds to which a successful litigant is prima facie entitled to. On the other hand, the court ought to see that any appeal ‒ if successful ‒ is not rendered nugatory. A stay may be granted if the defendant can demonstrate that there is no reasonable probability of getting back any costs or damages paid if the appeal succeeds. The court’s power to grant a stay is ultimately discretionary and may be exercised subject to such conditions as the court thinks fit to impose.
No specific domestic judgments are excluded from recognition and enforcement, save that where a judgment orders costs to be taxed (ie, assessed by the court), those costs must first be taxed (Order 47 Rule 2 of the Revoked Rules). However, it may not always be commercially viable to pursue enforcement where the costs are disproportionate to the judgment sum.
An enforcement applicant should always consider whether it is worthwhile to pursue enforcement, as time and effort will be spent to make the necessary applications and there is no guarantee that there will be actual recovery from the enforcement respondent.
Taking into account the issues above, the Ministry of Law announced in its initiatives for 2022 that it would study proposals to make the enforcement of civil judgments simpler and more streamlined in order to benefit SMEs that may find the current processes too expensive, especially where lower-value judgments are concerned. There have been no concrete measures announced to date. In the Committee of Supply Debate 2025, the Ministry of Law stated that possible future changes to the enforcement regime may entail:
The Ministry of Law also added that the proposed changes are novel and depart from the existing framework for enforcement. The Ministry is currently still studying and evaluating them and consulting with stakeholders and interested parties, including members of the Bar and the Judiciary.
All cause papers (including judgments and orders) are filed with the Singapore Court Registry, and it is possible for interested parties to apply to inspect these cause papers, subject to permission of the court being obtained.
There are also private service providers who can perform litigation searches, to trace records of past proceedings.
As such, it is not likely that a debtor can apply to remove or expunge a judgment from the Registry once it has been satisfied. Instead, any judgment debtor who has satisfied a judgment debt should apply to the court to record the satisfaction of the judgment (Order 22 Rule 3 of the ROC 2021).
Legal issues with the enforcement of foreign judgments often arise owing to confusion as to the scope and applicability of the various enforcement regimes in Singapore.
At present, there are both common law and statutory regimes for the enforcement of judgments in Singapore. The common law method essentially involves the filing of a fresh action on an implied debt. The statutory regimes have undergone several recent changes, which can be summarised as follows.
Prior to 1 March 2023, the statutory regimes consisted of the following.
However, the RECJA has since been repealed by the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments (Repeal Act) 2019 (the “RECJA Repeal Act”), which took effect from 1 March 2023. The purpose of its repeal was to simplify and streamline the existing statutory framework for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the REFJA. Recognition of countries under the RECJA is now effected under the REFJA, which presently governs the enforcement of judgments from the HKSAR, the UK, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Brunei Darussalam, Papua New Guinea, and India (Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (United Kingdom and Commonwealth) Order 2023).
As a general rule of thumb, the common law route should be pursued only if none of the statutory regimes applies. However, the latter are to some extent mutually exclusive. The REFJA does not apply to judgments that may be recognised or enforced under the CCAA (Section 2A of the REFJA). Additionally, where the REFJA applies, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced through the common law at all (Section 7(1) of the REFJA).
There may be further changes to the local enforcement regime, with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (concluded on 2 July 2019) being billed as a game-changer for cross-border dispute settlement. However, this convention has yet to be adopted under Singapore domestic law.
As mentioned in 3.1 Legal Issues Concerning Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, there are both statutory and common law regimes for the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Singapore courts.
Common Law
The common law method of enforcement involves the filing of a fresh action on an implied debt. As such, to be enforceable under the common law, a foreign judgment must have the following characteristics (see Chen Aun-Li Andrew v Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased) (2023), 1 SLR 341 at (9)).
REFJA
Only the following types of judgments could be registered and enforced under the REFJA, prior to the REFJA(A).
By contrast, after the REFJA(A) came into force, a broader scope of judgments may potentially be enforced under the newly amended REFJA as follows.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it should be noted that the REFJA operates solely on the basis of reciprocity or agreement between Singapore and the individual countries gazetted under it. As such, not all judgments of the countries gazetted are immediately registrable under the REFJA. Only the specific judgments described in an order made by the Minister for Law under Section 3(1) of the REFJA are registrable under the REFJA (see Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased) v Chen Aun-Li Andrew (2023), 3 SLR 283 at (51)).
At the time of writing, the only types of judgments from the UK and other Commonwealth states that may be enforced under the REFJA are “money judgments that are final and conclusive as between the parties to it” (see Schedule 1 of the Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (United Kingdom and the Commonwealth) Order 2023).
Likewise, the only judgments from the HKSAR that may be registered under the REFJA are money judgments. This is because, to date, no orders have been made under Section 3(1) of the REFJA to extend Part I of the REFJA to non-money judgments of any description from the HKSAR (see Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased) v Chen Aun-Li Andrew (2023), 3 SLR 283 at (52)).
The High Court in DGX v DGY (2024), 4 SLR 1486 at (13) cited Singapore Parliamentary debates in which it was stated that the precise scope of enforceable judgments must be negotiated with each state individually. Hence, there is a possibility that there could be an expanded or variable range of enforceable judgments in the future.
CCAA
To be recognised and enforced under the CCAA, a foreign judgment from a court of a contracting state to the HCCCA need only satisfy the following two basic requirements.
The CCAA is not confined to money judgments. However, it will not apply to judgments concerning certain matters, including but not limited to (Section 9 of the CCAA):
The CCAA currently applies to judgments obtained in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the UK.
Judgments that do not meet the criteria of the various common law and statutory enforcement regimes cannot be enforced in Singapore. By way of example, any default judgments obtained without any determination on the merits of the case may face enforcement difficulties in Singapore.
Two specific areas merit special mention:
Interim and Final Injunctions
At present, interim injunctions (eg, interim freezing orders and interlocutory prohibitory or mandatory injunctions) granted by a foreign court will only be enforced under the REFJA if an order is made under Section 3(1) of the REFJA to extend Part I of the REFJA to such judgments from the relevant country. This is because they are not final or conclusive in nature.
If no such order is made, a party will instead have to obtain an interim/interlocutory injunction from the Singapore courts (Section 4(10A) of the Civil Law Act 1909; Section 18(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969). This will require the actual commencement of legal proceedings in Singapore, though it is possible for such local proceedings to be stayed as a matter of case management (in the case of freezing orders, see Bi Xiaoqiong v China Medical Technologies, Inc (2019), 2 SLR 595; in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctions, see Virsagi Management (S) Pte Ltd v Welltech Construction Pte Ltd (2012), SGHC 207, upheld on appeal in Virsagi Management (S) Pte Ltd v Welltech Construction Pte Ltd and another appeal (2013), SGCA 50).
Final injunctions may potentially be enforced only under the REFJA or the CCAA (if they are not anti-suit injunctions), as they are non-money judgments. Where the REFJA and the CCAA do not apply, there is case law suggesting that a judgment creditor may seek the grant of a freestanding injunction from the Singapore courts without having to commence substantive legal action in Singapore. In Sulzer Pumps Spain, SA v Hyflux Membrane Manufacturing (S) Pte Ltd and another (2020), 5 SLR 634 (at (75) and (91) to (93)), the High Court held that it has the power to grant freestanding injunctions (as opposed to interlocutory injunctions) where doing so is necessary to prevent injustice in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction. Although the decision was cited with approval in Tanoto Sau v USP Group Ltd and another matter (2023), 5 SLR 909 at (73), the High Court in Gazelle Ventures Pte Ltd v Lim Yong Sim and others (2024), 4 SLR 1066 at (66) to (72) disagreed with both cases. It remains to be seen whether the decision in Sulzer Pumps Spain, SA v Hyflux Membrane Manufacturing (S) Pte Ltd and another (2020), 5 SLR 634 will be endorsed by the court of appeal.
Divorce and Family-Related Orders
Although a foreign divorce decree or judgment may potentially be recognised in Singapore (see Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene (1994), 2 SLR 316; UFN v UFM and another matter (2019), 2 SLR 650), ancillary orders to the divorce relating to the custody of children, maintenance and the division of assets may not be enforceable if they are amenable to variation or involve rights in immovable property that is located outside of the jurisdiction. This can be problematic for divorcing couples who have decided to live in separate countries and have assets located in different jurisdictions.
The state of the law with regard to foreign divorce and family-related orders may be summarised as follows.
Custody orders
Generally, the law does not recognise foreign custody orders unconditionally because the court has an overriding duty to have paramount regard to the child’s welfare (TSH v TSE (2017), SGHCF 21 at (50), followed in XLK v XLJ (2025), 2 SLR 317 at (35)). A fresh application for custody would thus have to be filed in the Singapore courts ‒ although it may be challenged on grounds of forum non conveniens.
Division of assets
Foreign orders for the division of matrimonial assets are typically unenforceable for two reasons:
To address these issues, Sections 121A to 121G of the Women’s Charter 1961 empower the courts to grant financial relief consequent to the termination of a marriage by a foreign decree or judgment. However, the court will only agree to do so if it would be appropriate in all the circumstances of the case (Section 121F(1) of the Women’s Charter 1961).
Maintenance
With the repeal of the RECJA, foreign maintenance orders now have limited enforcement channels within Singapore. Only final orders of lump sum maintenance or accrued arrears may be enforced under the common law regime or the REFJA. Orders for periodic maintenance must be enforced by registration under the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1975 (MO(RE)A), but this only applies to judgments from Australia, the HKSAR, New Zealand, the UK, and Manitoba. MO(RE)A orders can be registered under Division 4 of Part 3 of the Family Justice (General) Rules 2024 (the “FJR 2024”) read with Section 6 of the MO(RE)A. The registration and enforcement of MO(RE)A orders under the FJR 2024 is a change that was introduced in the newly amended Family Justice Rules. These changes enable Family Court-Appointed Maintenance Enforcement Officers to obtain information about the parties’ assets and means from banks and government agencies (Part 3, Rule 30 of the FJR 2024). This could lead to more effective maintenance outcomes.
The steps required for enforcement under the various regimes are briefly outlined as follows.
Common Law
This involves the filing of a fresh action for the judgment debt in Singapore (Order 6, Rule 1 of the ROC 2021). To expedite matters, the enforcing party should apply for summary judgment on the basis that there is no defence to the claim (Order 9, Rule 17 of the ROC 2021). If the judgment debtor is not in Singapore, the enforcing party must also apply for permission to serve the originating process out of the jurisdiction (Order 8, Rule 1 of the ROC 2021).
The application must be made within six years from the time the foreign judgment became final and conclusive under foreign law (Section 6(1)(a) Limitation Act 1959; see Sang Cheol Woo v Charles Choi Spackman (2024), 4 SLR 66 at (19)).
REFJA
Enforcement under the REFJA operates by way of registration. Once a foreign judgment is registered under this regime, it may be enforced as if it were a domestic judgment. The registration procedure is set out in Order 60 of the ROC 2021 and involves, amongst other things, making an originating application without notice and the filing of an affidavit exhibiting the duly authenticated judgment and its certified translation in English, and evidence as to the enforceability of the judgment by execution in the country of the original court.
Under the REFJA, the application must be filed within six years after the date of the judgment, or if there is an appeal against the judgment, after the date of the last judgment given in respect of the appeal (Section 4(1) REFJA, Ha Chi Kut (suing as the sole executrix of the estate of Khoo Ee Liam, deceased) v Chen Aun-Li Andrew (2023), 3 SLR 283 at (24)). The enforcing party may also be required to furnish security for costs (Order 60, Rule 4 of the ROC 2021). If the application is successful, the enforcing party will have to extract the order of registration and arrange for personal service of both the order of registration and notice of registration on the judgment debtor. Execution on the foreign judgment will only be permitted after expiry of the period allowed for the judgment debtor to set aside the registration.
CCAA
Registration is not required under the CCAA and there is accordingly no procedural time limit. However, an enforcing party must still file an originating application without notice for enforcement to the High Court (Order 37 of the ROC 2021; Section 13(1) of the CCAA). This application must be supported by an affidavit exhibiting:
The application may be made at any time so long as the judgment is enforceable in the state of origin (Section 13(2) of the CCAA).
The costs and time it takes to enforce foreign judgments will vary depending on the number of enforcement orders required to be sought and whether the applications are challenged. If contested, the entire process will likely take several months, even if no appeals are filed.
In general, registration and enforcement under the statutory regimes is faster than the common law method of enforcement as the process is more straightforward. Under the common law regime, there is a risk that the opposing party will try to challenge its enforceability in Singapore.
The following types of costs issues may be involved, in addition to the costs highlighted in respect of domestic judgments:
On this note, it is worth highlighting that Singapore deposited its instrument of accession to the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters on 16 May 2023. This convention facilitates and streamlines the process for the service of court and related documents in civil and commercial matters overseas, thereby ensuring that Singapore judgments may be recognised or enforced outside Singapore and ‒ in turn ‒ providing greater legal certainty for Singapore litigants to enforce their rights in foreign jurisdictions. The terms of the convention came into force in Singapore on 1 December 2023 through amendments to the ROC 2021 and the SICC Rules. This is expected to lead to overall reductions in cost and delays.
The common defences to enforcement across both the statutory and common law enforcement regimes (Section 5 of the REFJA; Sections 14 and 16 of the CCAA) are that:
Under the CCAA, there are other discretionary grounds on which the court may refuse to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment (Section 15 of the CCAA). Two of the more notable grounds are:
That said, the CCAA expressly provides that the Singapore courts cannot review the merits of the foreign judgment nor challenge any findings of fact on which the court assumed jurisdiction unless the judgment was given by default (Section 13(3) of the CCAA). However, a finding that a choice of court agreement is valid would be binding on the Singapore courts, regardless of whether or not the foreign judgment was given in default (Section 15(1)(a) of the CCAA).
The Arbitration Act 2001 (AA) governs the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards, while international arbitration awards are recognised and enforced under the International Arbitration Act 1994 (IAA).
The AA applies to any arbitration where the place of arbitration is Singapore and where Part II of the IAA does not apply to the given arbitration. Under Section 5 of the IAA, an arbitration is international in nature and governed by the IAA where:
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”) has force of law in Singapore, subject to modifications and exceptions in the IAA. However, Chapter VIII of the UNCITRAL Model Law (on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards) is expressly excluded under Singapore law by Section 3(1) of the IAA.
A domestic arbitration award is enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Singapore court, under Section 46 of the AA. An international arbitral award made in Singapore is also enforced in Singapore as a court judgment under Section 19 of the IAA.
Generally, the seat of an arbitration determines where the award is made. The IAA distinguishes between an award made in Singapore and an award made in another state. Section 29 of the IAA deals with the recognition and enforcement of an award made in another state and gives effect to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in 1958 by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration (the “New York Convention”).
Foreign awards made in the few jurisdictions that are not parties to the New York Convention are excluded from the enforcement provisions of the IAA by Section 27(1) thereof. Such awards are conceivably enforceable under Section 46 of the AA. Section 46(3) of the AA provides that an arbitration award may be enforced as a Singapore court judgment “irrespective of whether the place of arbitration is Singapore or elsewhere”.
Arbitration awards that have been set aside or that are not recognised by the Singapore courts will not be enforced. In PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV (2014), 1 SLR 372 (“Astro”) (at (99)), the highest court in Singapore held that enforcement of a Singapore-seated award may be resisted under the grounds in Article 36(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, despite this Article being in Part VIII of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which is excluded from operation in Singapore (as explained in 4.1 Legal Issues Concerning Enforcement of Arbitral Awards). The case of Astro decided that this was the most efficacious way to give effect to the policy of the UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention, with the following grounds under Article 36(1) being regarded as guidance to the Singapore courts in exercising their discretion over whether to enforce a Singapore-seated award:
The enforcement of foreign awards made in a New York Convention state other than Singapore may be refused on the grounds set out in Section 31(2) or 31(4) of the IAA (Aloe Vera of America, Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd (2006), 3 SLR(R) 174 at (46); see also South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation) v Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd (2026), SGHC 8 at (32) and (42)).
Generally, there are two stages involved in the enforcement of an arbitral award.
First Stage
An application is made by the award creditor to the court for permission to enforce the award
At this stage, the award creditor applies (without notice to the award debtor) for permission from the court under Section 46 of the AA or Section 19 or 29 of the IAA (depending on whether it is a non-foreign or foreign award) to enforce the award. The application must be supported by an affidavit (under Order 34, Rule 14 or Order 48, Rule 6 of the ROC 2021, whichever is applicable) that:
Upon permission to enforce being granted by the court, the order granting permission to enforce is served on the award debtor.
Within 14 days of service of the order (or such other period fixed by the court), the award debtor may apply to set aside the order granting permission to enforce. An award cannot be enforced until after the expiry of the period fixed by the court. If the award debtor does not contest the order, the award creditor can proceed to enforce the award like a court judgment, after the expiry of the applicable time limit.
If the award debtor applies to set aside the order granting permission to enforce within the time stipulated in the order, the second stage of the enforcement process is engaged, which entails substantive arguments over whether there are grounds for resisting enforcement.
Second Stage
The court considers whether there are grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement
At the second stage, the award debtor must show that one of the grounds for resisting enforcement exists (as stated in 4.3 Categories of Arbitral Awards Not Enforced). The standard of proof is that of a balance of probabilities (Beijing Sinozonto Mining Investment Co Ltd v Goldenray Consortium (Singapore) Pte Ltd (2014), 1 SLR 814 at (48); see also South of England Protection and Indemnity Association (Bermuda) Ltd (in liquidation) v Pacmar Shipping Pte Ltd (2026), SGHC 8 at (36) and (37)). At this stage, if the challenge to enforcement is jurisdictional in nature, the court will conduct a de novo review of the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the question of jurisdiction. The court would otherwise not interfere with the tribunal’s decisions on the merits of the dispute (Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels v Global Gaming Philippines LLC (2020), SGHC 113 at (65)).
If the court rejects a challenge against enforcement, the award creditor will then obtain a judgment of the Singapore courts in terms of the arbitral award, as provided for under Section 46 of the AA and Sections 19 and 29 of the IAA. That judgment becomes enforceable like a regular Singapore court judgment.
An uncontested application to enforce an arbitral award is a relatively straightforward and quick process. Costs would begin to escalate if the award debtor challenges the order granting permission to enforce the award. The costs of a fully contested application can be quite substantial and may typically be several times the costs incurred for an undefended application to enforce an arbitral award.
The entire process for an uncontested enforcement may take less than six months, depending on the availability of the court’s hearing dates. However, if an award debtor chooses to resist enforcement of the arbitral award, the second stage of the enforcement process will usually result in the award creditor incurring substantial time and costs in dealing with such resistance. If the outcome of the challenge to enforcement is appealed to a higher court, it could take a few years to reach a definitive conclusion of the overall process of enforcement.
Choice of Remedies Doctrine
An award debtor has a choice to pursue an active strategy against enforcement by applying to pre-emptively invalidate the award through filing a setting-aside application at the place where the arbitration is seated. Alternatively, the award debtor can adopt a passive approach of resisting enforcement of the award by the award creditor in a country where its assets may be located. A party is not compelled to pursue the active remedy. Its rights to pursue a passive approach are not waived or rendered unavailable just because the pre-emptive strategy is not pursued.
Nature of the Award
Consistent with Singapore’s reputation as an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction, Section 27(1) of the IAA defines an “arbitral award” very broadly to include “an order or a direction made or given by an arbitral tribunal in the course of an arbitration”. This approach facilitates the enforceability of an award as to interim measures. Policy considerations to develop Singapore as a hub for international arbitration have also given impetus to legislative amendments to include emergency arbitrators within the definition of an “arbitral tribunal” under Section 2(1) of the IAA. This amendment makes clear that awards by emergency arbitrators are enforceable in Singapore courts in the same way as a final award of an arbitral tribunal. This interpretation of Section 2(1) of the IAA was confirmed in CVG v CVH (2023), 3 SLR 1559 at (36) and (37), which affirmed that an interim award issued by an emergency arbitrator in an arbitration seated outside of Singapore was, in principle, enforceable in Singapore. The court held that such an interim award would meet the definition of a “foreign award” under the IAA and would correspondingly be enforceable under the IAA.
Finality of the Award
Section 19B of the IAA provides that an award is final and binding when it is made by the arbitral tribunal, signed and delivered to the parties. The widely held view is that an award remains binding notwithstanding the right of appeal. A party challenging enforcement must prove to the satisfaction of the court that the award has not yet become binding on the parties or that the award has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, the award was made. While the highest court in Singapore in Astro took the view that an award that has been set aside would generally lead to the conclusion that “there is simply no award to enforce”, any foreign court decision in Singapore would ultimately only have legal value if it were recognised under Singapore’s private international law rules.
In PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation (2015), 4 SLR 364 at (105), it was held that an interim award enforcing a Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) decision under the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction 1999 is “final and binding” within the meaning of Section 19B of the IAA. This decision of the highest court in Singapore effectively removes any ambiguity as to the enforceability of such interim awards under Singapore’s international arbitration legislation, and was welcomed not only in international arbitration circles but also in the construction industry, as it gave effect to the “argue now, pay later” principle that is crucial to the success of DABs under the FIDIC suite of contracts in ensuring security of payment in large international projects.
Limitation Period for the Enforcement and Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards
A party seeking to enforce an arbitral award in Singapore must do so within six years from the date the award was issued (Section 6(1)(c) of the Limitation Act 1959). An application to set aside an award made under the AA and IAA must be made within three months of the date the applicant receives the award (Section 48(2) of the AA and Article 34(3) of the UNCITRAL Model Law).
Appealing an Order for the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award
Any appeal against a decision of the General Division of the High Court in the exercise of its original or appellate civil jurisdiction that arises from a case relating to the law of arbitration is made to the court of appeal (Sixth Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969).
Judicial Attitude Towards Challenges to Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
In order to give effect to the New York Convention, which seeks to promote arbitration and eschews curial intervention, the grounds for resisting enforcement are generally construed narrowly. In CKG v CKH (2021), 5 SLR 84 at (7), the Singapore International Commercial Court held that the courts must be satisfied that the challenge against an award falls squarely within the grounds for resisting the enforcement and that ‒ in its assessment of the award ‒ the court will not be overly technical in its interpretation thereof.
For instance, to succeed in a challenge to enforcement of an arbitral award on the grounds of public policy, the award must “offend against our basic notions of justice and morality” or there must be “exceptional circumstances to justify a refusal of enforcement” (Galsworthy Ltd of the Republic of Liberia v Glory Wealth Shipping Pte Ltd (2011), 1 SLR 727 at (17), cited in CDI v CDJ (2020), 5 SLR 484 at (31)). These high standards are driven by notions of international comity and the spirit of the New York Convention.
In CEF v CEH (2022), 2 SLR 918 at (36), the court of appeal held that Article 41 of the ICC Arbitration Rules 2012 – which provides that an arbitral tribunal “shall make every effort to make sure that an award is enforceable at law” – only created a duty for the tribunal to ensure that procedural requirements for enforcement are met. As long as a tribunal has used every effort to ensure enforceability of the award in places where it could reasonably be expected to be enforced, the tribunal would have met its obligations under Article 41. The court of appeal held at (38) and (39) that an arbitral tribunal was not expected to predict or guarantee the outcome of any enforcement proceedings with respect to the award it makes. It also held that there is no implied term in every arbitration agreement that any award made shall be in a form that is enforceable in the same manner as a court judgment.
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How Courts Are Applying the Amended Procedural Rules on Enforcement of Judgments in Singapore
Building on last year’s discussion of Singapore’s transition from the Rules of Court 2014 (“ROC 2014”) to the Rules of Court 2021 (“ROC 2021”), this article examines further judicial developments in the enforcement of judgments under the new procedural framework.
The cases discussed below shed light on how courts are approaching procedural questions under the ROC 2021, clarifying how the revamped rules operate in practice.
Categories of movable assets subject to enforcement proceedings expanded under the ROC 2021
Cryptocurrency
The authors previously discussed the High Court’s decision in ByBit Fintech Ltd v Ho Kai Xin (2023), SGHC 199, which affirmed that cryptocurrency is expressly recognised as property capable of enforcement under O 22 r 1 of the ROC 2021. The court noted that procedures for serving a notice of seizure on persons controlling movable property (O 22 r 6(4)(b)) or registering ownership of intangible movable property (O 22 r 6(4)(g)) are logically applicable to digital assets.
While the legal foundation for pursuing cryptocurrency in enforcement proceedings has become more settled, significant practical obstacles remain. Digital assets are often held in decentralised wallets secured by private keys rather than through identifiable institutions, and blockchain transactions are pseudonymous and can cross borders instantly. Parties therefore face real difficulties identifying, locating, and seizing such assets.
Practitioners should note the emerging judicial approach to determining the jurisdictional location of cryptocurrency – a threshold issue for enforcement. In Cheong Jun Yoong v Three Arrows Capital Ltd (2024), 4 SLR 907, the High Court held that a cryptoasset’s location is “best determined by looking at where it is controlled” (at paragraph 60). The residence of the private key holder is treated as the situs of the crypto-asset (at paragraph 62). Cryptocurrency controlled by a Singapore-resident debtor may therefore be treated as situated in Singapore, regardless of where the blockchain network’s nodes are located.
A related challenge is valuing cryptocurrency for damages. The High Court addressed this in Fantom Foundation Ltd v Multichain Foundation Ltd (2024), SGHC 173 (“Fantom”) and Kalen, Alexandru v World Exchange Services Pte Ltd (2026), 3 SLR 1094 (“Kalen”). Both decisions confirm that data from cryptocurrency aggregators such as CoinMarketCap and CoinGecko may be used as reliable evidence of market value.
A key issue is the appropriate valuation date. In Fantom, Mohamed Faizal JC (as he then was) observed that “[g]iven the volatility of cryptocurrencies, the breach date rule may not always represent the best assessment methodology” (at paragraph 42). In Kalen, Lee Sieu Kin SJ clarified that the valuation date is linked to mitigation: “the date of valuation should be at the time when a claimant is reasonably expected to mitigate their losses” (at paragraph 39). Notably, the court declined to adopt the New York “highest intermediate value” rule (Diamond Fortress Technologies Inc v EverID Inc, 274 A.3d 287), holding that this approach “gives the claimant the benefit of perfect hindsight and therefore risks unfairly giving him a windfall” (at paragraph 40).
Practitioners should be prepared to adduce expert evidence on valuation and act promptly to mitigate losses, whether by demanding return of assets, commencing proceedings, or purchasing substitutes, to avoid arguments that damages should be assessed at an earlier date.
Membership in clubs and societies and other intangible property
The expanded definition of “movable property” under the ROC 2021 now includes “membership in clubs and societies” – a notable shift from the ROC 2014, where it was arguable that intangible assets such as club memberships could not be seized for enforcement.
In KLW Holdings Ltd v Straitsworld Advisory Ltd (2017), SGHCR 11 (KLW), the court considered whether a writ of seizure and sale under the ROC 2014 could issue in respect of a transferable club membership. The plaintiff highlighted that the law had recognised such memberships as:
Although the court acknowledged that the membership was a chose in action (at paragraph 10), it concluded that a writ of seizure and sale could not issue because such writs were historically confined to tangible personal property, immovable property, and securities (at paragraph 30(c)). The ROC 2014 contemplated seizure by physical taking and sale by public auction – inapplicable to club memberships (at paragraph 30(d)). Nonetheless, the court noted that such memberships were “highly marketable luxury good[s]” that “ought to be capable of being taken and sold in execution”, an approach that “would comport with modern reality, where intangible personal property has become the principal repository of wealth in the 21st century” (at paragraph 33).
The expanded definition under the ROC 2021 directly addresses what KLW identified as a procedural lacuna. However, certain asset classes remain outside the express definition, including IP rights, digital memberships, and loyalty rewards. How courts will approach these assets remains to be seen.
The reform arguably signals that “movable property” should not be construed restrictively for enforcement purposes, particularly for intangible assets with realisable economic value. As ByBit demonstrates, courts will facilitate enforcement in a sensible and practical manner – a welcome development.
Attachment of debts
Proceedings for the attachment of debt, previously “garnishee proceedings” under Order 49 of the ROC 2014, are now governed by the consolidated enforcement regime in Order 22. While there has yet to be comprehensive judicial analysis of the applicable legal principles, the procedural distinctions between the two regimes are already evident.
The authors previously considered DBS Trustee Limited v Lite BB Pte Ltd (2024), SGDC 310 (“DBS Trustees”), which provided guidance on applications to release an attachment of debt under the ROC 2021.
The court confirmed that the ROC 2021 preserves the two-stage structure from the ROC 2014: an ex parte application for an attachment order, followed by an inter partes hearing if disputed, with determination on affidavit evidence (at paragraph 61). A key procedural difference is that under the ROC 2021, the objector must formally initiate objection by filing a Notice of Objection, followed by an application for release (at paragraph 72). Under the ROC 2014, the court convened a “show cause” hearing once a provisional garnishee order was served; no formal application was required from the objector.
On burden of proof, the enforcement applicant continues to bear the burden of proving the debt exists where disputed (at paragraphs 67–70). The court distinguished Art Ask Agency SL v Person(s) Unknown (2023), SGHCR 14, which placed the onus on the objector – clarifying that Art Ask Agency was confined to situations where the debt’s existence was undisputed, with disagreement only on the objector’s entitlement to retain the debt as security.
The court confirmed that it retains the power to order a full trial rather than resolve an attachment dispute summarily, notwithstanding that the ROC 2021 (unlike the ROC 2014) does not expressly provide for this. It laid down a two-tier test: first, whether an arguable defence exists in fact and law; and second, if so, whether ordering a trial is (i) necessary to do justice or prevent abuse of process, (ii) consistent with the ROC 2021’s Ideals, and (iii) not otherwise prohibited by law.
Under the ROC 2014, the judgment creditor had to establish a prima facie case, after which the garnishee had to demonstrate a “fair or reasonable probability” of a “real or bona fide defence” that was at least “arguable” or “not hopeless” (see Telecom Credit Inc v Star Commerce Pte Ltd (2017) SGHCR 3 at paragraph 5). Bare assertions were insufficient. In Telecom Credit, a trial was ordered because the evidence required testing by cross-examination (at paragraphs 17–18) and there were assertions of bad faith (at paragraph 20).
It is arguable that this requirement under the ROC 2014 finds expression in the first limb of the secondary threshold under the ROC 2021 that a trial will only be ordered where “necessary to ensure that justice is done or to prevent an abuse of process”. In DBS Trustee, the court held that “circumstances may arise where a summary determination based only on affidavit evidence would not be appropriate” and that the concern under the ROC 2014 that summary determination is only appropriate where the defence is “hopeless” will “continue to apply” under the ROC 2021 (at paragraphs 108–109).
The second and third limbs appear to be fresh requirements. On the second limb, the court observed that “in many cases” the outcome will align with the primary threshold, but “in certain unique circumstances” a holistic assessment of the Ideals may make it inappropriate to order a trial even if there is an arguable defence – for example, “a low value case that involves an arguable (but relatively confined) question of fact” (at paragraphs 110–113). The third limb “does not pose an obstacle to the making of an order for trial” (at paragraph 115).
In Mitsui E&S Power Systems Inc v Neptun International Pte Ltd (2024), SGHCR 3 (“Mitsui”), the court provided guidance on attachable debts. The claimant obtained judgment and applied to attach monies in the defendant’s bank account. The bank objected, arguing that a CAD (Commercial Affairs Department) direction prohibiting dealings with the monies meant there were no “debts due or accruing due” when the notice of attachment was served, or alternatively that any debt was contingent.
The court explained that O 22 of the ROC 2021 is a simplification of O 49 of the ROC 2014, with the law on attachment of debts in substance the same (at paragraph 18). Common law principles concerning O 49 r 1(1) continue to apply (at paragraph 18).
The Court observed that a debt is attachable where there is a present and existing obligation to pay a sum of money, whether now or in the future, such that a creditor–debtor relationship exists between the enforcement respondent and the non-party (at paragraph 22). A contingent debt, by contrast, cannot be attached, as no obligation exists between the enforcement respondent and the non-party until and unless the contingency occurs (at paragraphs (23) to (24)). Accordingly, contingent debts cannot be garnished under O 49 of the ROC 2014, and remain equally incapable of attachment under O 22 of ROC 2021 (at paragraphs (23) to (24)).
The court dismissed the bank’s application. The CAD direction merely prohibited the moneys from being dealt with; it did not extinguish the enforcement respondent’s legal entitlement (at paragraphs 39–40).
The court also rejected the argument that the debt was contingent upon lifting of the CAD direction or the outcome of disposal proceedings. The debt already exists; while proceedings may result in the moneys being paid to someone else, an obligation exists now and the monies are not “merely hypothetical”.
Drawing on O 22, r 13 of the ROC 2021, which allows an attachment to be maintained while the Sheriff is directed to take no further action, the court held the attachment in abeyance pending the lifting of the direction or the outcome of disposal proceedings, rather than releasing the moneys (at paragraphs 53–60).
Critically, the Assistant Registrar (AR) distinguished between attachment and release. Although commonly understood as a single process, attachment proceedings may be analysed in two stages (at paragraphs 53–55).
The CAD direction affected only the release stage – it did not render the moneys unattachable, but prevented their release pending further order (at paragraphs 56–57). Maintaining the attachment in abeyance was consistent with the Ideals in the ROC 2021.
Examination of the enforcement respondent
The examination of a judgment debtor, previously under O 48 of the ROC 2014, is now conducted as the examination of an enforcement respondent under O 22, r 11 of the ROC 2021. In Third Eye Capital Corp v Pretty View Shipping SA (2025), SGHCR 16 (“Third Eye”), the AR confirmed that the principles under the ROC 2014 apply with equal force.
As observed by the AR, the two regimes correspond in the following respects:
The court rejected the contention that a judgment creditor is entitled to an EJD (Examination of Judgment Debtor) order as a right; it remains a discretionary relief (at paragraph 66).
The court clarified the threshold for examining the same examinee a second time. Because an examination gathers information (which may or may not lead to recovery) rather than itself being a mode of enforcement, a creditor’s entitlement is not unqualified (at paragraphs 65 and 67). Where an examinee has already been examined, the creditor must demonstrate new circumstances or a change in circumstances making it likely that further information could be obtained (at paragraph 72).
The threshold is not onerous. The creditor need not prove an actual change in finances or that assets were concealed; it need only point to credible information suggesting further information is likely (at paragraph 78). On the facts, an inconsistent payment following the first examination established the requisite change in circumstances (at paragraph 81).
Stay of enforcement of judgments and orders
Under O 22r 13(1) of the ROC 2021, a party liable under any court order may apply for a stay of enforcement if a “special case” exists. This recognises that immediate enforcement may sometimes cause undue hardship or injustice.
The equivalent provision under the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) Rules 2021 is O 24 r 2(1), which does not explicitly require a “special case”. In Renault SAS v Liberty Engineering Group Pte Ltd (2024), SGHC(I) 22, the SICC clarified that special circumstances must still be established. Specifically, the court ought to see that the appeal, if successful, is not worthless. Thus a stay will be granted if it can be shown by affidavit that, if the damages and costs are paid, there is no reasonable probability of getting them back if the appeal succeeds, or that there is some other consequence of enforcement which cannot be readily undone if the appeal succeeds (at paragraphs 15–17).
In COSCO Shipping Specialized Carriers Co Ltd v PT OKI Pulp and Paper Mills (2024), SGHC 273 (“COSCO Shipping”), the High Court addressed whether a lower court can stay an enforcement order issued by a higher court. The applicants had obtained an anti-suit injunction from the Court of Appeal; the defendants applied to the High Court for a stay. The High Court held that it had jurisdiction: the Court of Appeal exercises only appellate jurisdiction, while an application for an interim stay does not fall within appellate or incidental appellate jurisdiction (at paragraphs 14–17). Further, nothing in O 22 r 13 restricts stay applications to courts of the same level (at paragraph 19).
In MBF Northern Securities Sdn Bhd v Purwadi (2025), SGHC 184 (“MBF Northern Securities”), the defendant applied under O 22 r 13 of the ROC 2021 to stay enforcement of Malaysian judgments registered under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth Judgments Act 1921, pending impeachment proceedings in Malaysia.
The court observed that O 22 r 13 confers a general power to stay enforcement; it is not concerned specifically with stay pending appeal (at paragraph 29). The principles developed for stay pending appeal need not apply automatically – the range of factual scenarios under O 22 r 13 is very wide, and not all of these scenarios would be analogous to those concerning a stay pending appeal (at paragraph 30).
However, some scenarios will be analogous to stay pending appeal, and the principles may apply with modifications (at paragraph 31). Stay pending disposal of foreign impeachment proceedings is one such example.
The court allowed the application in part, rejecting the argument that Singapore courts should not stay enforcement when the Malaysian courts have not. The court reasoned that there is no practical utility in requiring the applicant to seek a stay in Malaysia where no enforcement is being pursued there (at paragraph 62). It clarified that Tan Hock Keng v Malaysian Trustees Bhd (2021), SGHC(A) 18 did not lay down an inflexible rule that a stay must not be granted if there is no stay in the originating jurisdiction (at paragraph 61).
This is a sensible approach. In many cases, a creditor may only be pursuing enforcement in Singapore, and there is no utility in requiring the debtor to seek a stay abroad when no enforcement is being sought there. Practitioners representing debtors should nonetheless consider whether seeking a foreign stay might strengthen their position where grounds for challenge exist.
Stay or dismissal of appeal on grounds of non-payment of costs
Under O 21 r 2(6) of the ROC 2021, the court may stay or dismiss any application, action or appeal if a party refuses or neglects to pay costs ordered within a specified time, whether in the present or related proceedings.
In Owner of the vessel(s) “CHLOE V” v UBS AG (2026), 1 SLR 107 (“CHLOE V”), the Court of Appeal considered the principles governing stay of appeal for non-payment of costs.
The respondent must first show, on a prima facie basis, that the appellant has “refused or neglected” to pay outstanding costs. This threshold is low – the mere fact of non-payment suffices (at paragraph 31). The burden then shifts to the appellant to provide a good reason why a stay should not be granted; only the appellant knows the true state of its finances (at paragraph 32). It is no answer for the appellant to allege that third-party funding was voluntary and limited to the pursuit of claims; costs arose from that funding, and there is no reason why funders should not be required to pay outstanding costs if they wish to proceed with the appeal (at paragraph 33).
If the appellant cannot provide a good reason, a stay should ordinarily be granted (at paragraph 32). Any stay should be time-limited; if costs remain outstanding beyond that period, the appeal is deemed struck out automatically, ensuring appeals do not remain pending indefinitely (at paragraph 32).
If the appellant genuinely lacks financial resources to pay, the failure may not be regarded as refusal or neglect. The court should ordinarily allow the appeal to proceed, unless plainly hopeless (at paragraph 35).
The approach in CHLOE V is welcome: it prevents litigants with financial means from proceeding with appeals while disregarding costs orders made below. A respondent faced with an appellant who refuses to comply with costs orders without valid reason should thus consider applying for the appeal to be stayed or dismissed.
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