Sweden, a member state of the European Union (EU), has been a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1995. As with all EU member states, Sweden is also party to international trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the Government Procurement Agreement and the Trade Facilitation Agreement.

As Sweden is an EU member state, it does not independently negotiate free trade agreements. Instead, member states participate in the preparation of trade agreements, while the EU, as a whole, conducts negotiations with various countries and regions. According to Article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), Sweden is obliged to ensure that any agreements concluded before joining the EU in 1995 are compatible with EU law. However, very few of these pre-existing agreements remain in effect today.

As mentioned in 1.2 Free Trade Agreements, Sweden does not enter into trade agreements as a contracting party. However, there are regional arrangements such as the Helsinki Treaty establishing the Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers. These arrangements have to be applied in conformity with EU law.

The EU is currently negotiating agreements with Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and India, among others. Further, agreements with Kenya, Mercosur, Nigeria and others are in the process of being adopted or ratified. For further information about this, see the EU chapter of this guide. 

Key developments regarding EU trade policy in the prior twelve months mainly concern the new conditions for trade due to the war in Ukraine, and the related development of the sanctions regime, as well as initiatives regarding “de-risking” of trade relations with China and sustainable development. In addition, the long-serving Slovak Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič has been nominated to become the Commissioner on Trade and Economic Security. Lastly, the first dawn raids, ex officio investigations, and the conclusion of the first in-depth investigation of a concentration in the Emirate telecom case were carried out under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation.

The sixth ministerial meeting of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, held in Leuven, Belgium, in April 2024 resulted in agreements to advance cooperation in AI, 6G, and semiconductor supply chains, sustainable trade, and defence of human rights in the digital environment. Key outcomes included a new AI Dialogue, a common 6G vision, extended semiconductor arrangements, and joint principles on gender-based violence online.

On the world stage, it should also be noted that the 16th BRICS summit was held in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024, under the chairmanship of the President of Russia. It marked the inclusion of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE as new members. The summit focused on “Strengthening Multilateralism for Fair Global Development and Security”, and introduced, among other things, the BRICS Pay payment system, which is meant to serve as an alternative to SWIFT. The event also included a plenary session in the BRICS Plus/Outreach format, with the participation of leaders and delegations from the CIS and a number of Asian, African, Middle Eastern and Latin American countries, as well as several international organisations, emphasising the global significance of the BRICS framework.

Trade policy developments in the EU for the next twelve months, as indicated by the mission letter to the Trade Commissioner, are likely to be characterised by the geopolitical situation with an emphasis on trade security and strategic autonomy. Additionally, the upcoming US elections will undoubtedly have a significant impact on EU-US trade relations. The ambition to finalise the ongoing negotiations on updated and new trade agreements remains. Concerning new legislation, an EU regulation, the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), helping member states to protect themselves from economic coercion by third countries, has entered into force. In addition, we will surely see more decisions and actions taken by the European Commission under the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation, which entered into force during the second part of last year. 

The Swedish Customs (Sw. Tullverket) is the administrative authority responsible for customs duties, import/export charges, and rules on entry and exit restrictions.

Decisions taken by the Swedish Customs may be subject to appeal to the administrative courts, the administrative courts of appeal and, in rare cases, the Supreme Administrative Court. Leave to appeal is required for both the administrative courts of appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court.

Further, the Swedish Customs has a person appointed by the Swedish government, known as the Swedish Customs’ General Representative (Sw. Allmänna Ombudet), who is authorised to appeal decisions taken by the Swedish Customs concerning customs duties, import/export charges other than customs duties, interests, customs surcharges and late payment fees. The Swedish Customs’ General Representative may also appeal decisions by the administrative courts and the administrative courts of appeal, as well as plead a cause in the Supreme Administrative Court.

The National Board of Trade Sweden (Sw. Kommerskollegium), which is the authority for foreign trade and policy, decides on some customs-related matters, such as applications for duty suspensions and export licences.

The agency with the primary responsibility for administration and enforcement of customs laws and regulations is the Swedish Customs, with the assistance of the Police Authority and the Swedish Coast Guard when needed. In case of possible criminal liability, cases may also be referred to public prosecutors.

Swedish businesses may notify the National Board of Trade Sweden about barriers restricting trade in other countries, relating, inter alia, to:

• documentation and labelling of products;
• tariffs;
• taxes and fees;
• burdensome customs procedures;
• import and export bans;
• public procurement; and
• licences and barriers to services and investment.

The National Board of Trade Sweden investigates such matters in collaboration with the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the European Commission, Swedish Embassies and industry groups. For barriers relating to the EU’s internal market, as well as the EFTA states Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, businesses may also report their inquiry free of charge via the European Commission’s platform Solvit, which, with regard to Sweden, is administered by the National Board of Trade Sweden.

In addition, the National Board of Trade Sweden offers a one-stop information centre tasked with facilitating developing countries’ trade with Sweden, named Open Trade Gate Sweden. Open Trade Gate Sweden offers assistance to exporters in developing countries, collaborates with business support organisations and provides open access market studies as well as targeted information to exporters.

In September 2024, the Sweden Against Organised Crime (Sw. Sverige mot organiserad brottslighet, SMOB) initiative was launched with the purpose of strengthening Sweden’s ability to fight organised crime, with a particular focus on the criminal economy. The initiative is a partnership between several Swedish authorities, including the Swedish Customs, the Tax Authority and the Enforcement Authority (Sw. Kronofogden). SMOB is co-funded by the EU.

Furthermore, the EU has, in recent times, raised its climate ambitions to prevent carbon leakage, which occurs either when EU companies move their carbon-intensive productions to third countries with less rigid climate policies or when more carbon-intensive imports replace EU products. Therefore, the EU has introduced the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), according to which some product categories are subject to a climate duty upon import to the EU from third countries, with the exception of the EFTA and EEA states and Switzerland. The CBAM has been introduced to ensure that there is a fair price on the carbon emitted during carbon-intensive productions of products being imported to the EU and to encourage cleaner industrial manufacturing in third countries. CBAM will be gradually phased in during a transitional phase, between 1 October 2023 and 31 December 2025. Initially, the product categories subject to the climate duty are iron, steel, aluminium, fertilisers, cement, electricity, and hydrogen. However, the goal is to extend the scope to include more product categories in the future.

One hot topic relates to the modernisation and digitalisation of the customs system at the EU level. On 17 May 2023, the European Commission put forward proposals for an ambitious and comprehensive reform of the EU Customs Union with the key goal being the establishment of an EU customs authority that would oversee a new customs data hub. The European Parliament’s first reading position was adopted with 486 votes in favour, 19 against and 97 abstentions. The latest news was that the file would be followed up by the new Parliament after the 6-9 June European elections. The reform would, inter alia, entail a new approach to e-commerce by placing greater responsibility on web platforms to submit information to EU customs authorities concerning goods that will be shipped to the EU, enabling a better overview of incoming shipments. Further, companies and traders agreeing to submit themselves to various checks and controls would get a trusted trader status, enabling customs to focus on traders not having such a status.

Another hot topic is the large amount of narcotics seized by the Swedish Customs in recent times; during the first six months of 2024, the Swedish Customs seized 5 tonnes of narcotics and, during the same period last year, 5.3 tonnes, both figures being historically far higher than previous years. Further, during the first half of 2024, the Swedish Customs seized 4.1 million narcotic pills, which is nearly twice the amount of pills seized during the entire year of 2023. This has underscored the importance of the role of the Swedish Customs in combating organised crime. As a result, the Swedish government has put forward a proposal for a new law giving the Swedish Customs additional powers in relation to its monitoring and law enforcement operations.

The Swedish Customs also plays a key role regarding recent initiatives taken by the Swedish government to combat circumvention of the sanctions against Russia and Belarus. Co-operation between the Swedish Customs and other agencies such as the Swedish Security Police and the Prosecutor’s office is expected to increase.

Sweden does not impose its own sanctions. Instead, Sweden enforces sanctions established by the United Nations (UN) and the EU. 

As mentioned in 3.1 Sanctions Regime, Sweden does not impose sanctions on its own but instead imposes sanctions adopted by the UN and the EU. Regarding both UN and EU sanctions, they can become applicable in Sweden if incorporated into Swedish law through an ordinance by the Swedish government. The applicable legislative procedure is set out in the Act on Certain International Sanctions (Sw: lagen (1996:95) om vissa internationella sanktioner). As regards EU sanctions, when laid down in an EU regulation, they are directly applicable in Sweden.

There is no general sanctions authority in Sweden. However, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the overall responsibility for the co-ordination of sanctions policy in Sweden. In addition, there are a number of government agencies with the responsibility for overseeing and enforcing sanctions. These are:

• the Swedish Public Prosecutor’s Office (Sw: Åklagarmyndigheten), especially its branch the National Security Unit, as well as the Swedish Security Services (Sw: Säkerhetspolisen), which investigate sanctions breaches and are responsible for criminal enforcement;
• the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (Sw: Inspektionen för Strategiska Produkter, ISP), which has a control function with regard to dual-use products and military equipment, including granting export authorisations in relation to such products;
• the National Board of Trade Sweden (Sw. Kommerskollegium), which processes applications for exemptions from sanctions relating to export licences and the freezing of assets for legal entities; in addition, it also manages matters under the EU Blocking Statute, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96;
• the Social Insurance Agency (Sw. Försäkringskassan), which is responsible for granting exemptions from asset freezes concerning natural persons;
• the Financial Supervisory Authority (Sw. Finansinspektionen), which collects information regarding frozen accounts provided under reporting obligations imposed on companies; and
• the Swedish Customs, which monitors both imports and exports to ensure compliance with sanctions regulations.

The responsibility of the respective agency is normally described in an ordinance pertaining to the relevant sanctions within the agency’s area of expertise.

The Act on Certain International Sanctions applies to sanctions violations committed by Swedish nationals abroad as well as all sanctions violations committed within Swedish territory. Hence, for the scope of Swedish jurisdiction, there is no extra-territorial application of Swedish law.

EU sanctions, on the contrary, apply within EU territory, to all EU nationals both within the EU and abroad, to companies and organisations incorporated under the law of a member state and to business carried out in whole or in part within the EU. Thus, the jurisdiction of EU sanctions is broader than Swedish sanctions.

Sweden does not administer a sanctions list of its own. Instead, the Swedish government refers to the consolidated sanctions lists provided by the UN and the EU.

A person or entity listed on one of the EU’s sanctions lists can send a de-listing request to the Council of the European Union (the “Council”). Furthermore, the Council’s decisions can be challenged before the General Court of the European Union and, on appeal, to the EU Court of Justice.

A listing by the UN can be challenged by way of a de-listing request to the United Nations organisation, and if such a listing is related to the ISIS (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, the request can also be sent to the UN ombudsman.

The Swedish government has, in some instances, assisted Swedish citizens in challenging sanctions listings. However, there is no obligation on the Swedish government to do so and there is no formal procedure in place.

As mentioned in 3.1 Sanctions Regime, Sweden only applies the sanctions imposed by the EU and the UN. At the time of writing, the most comprehensive sanctions or embargoes maintained by these sanctions regimes are against Russia, Belarus, the separatist regions of Ukraine, Syria, Iran and North Korea.

In total, Sweden currently has 36 sanctions regimes in place, both geographical and thematic (cyber-attacks, chemical weapons, human rights, and terrorism), all of which have been imposed by the EU or the UN.

Notably, in 2022, the Swedish Dockworkers’ Association imposed a ban blocking vessels sailing from Russia, vessels carrying Russian cargo and vessels operated by Russian interests (as well as vessels flying the Russian flag) from calling at Swedish ports. The ban went further than what the then-applicable sanctions regime provided for, and the Swedish Labour Court subsequently held that the ban was unlawful.

Sweden does not impose secondary sanctions – ie, it does not impose prohibitions on transactions that do not involve Swedish jurisdiction. However, the EU’s 11th sanctions package against Russia, issued on 23 June 2023, has, to some extent, a “secondary sanctions effect” by establishing a mechanism to prevent the use of exports to third countries to evade sanctions. Further, the provisions in Article 3s.2(f) in Council Regulation 833/2014 and Article 3.1(h) in Council Regulation 269/2014 could also be considered secondary sanctions. The purpose of those articles is to combat circumvention by imposing sanctions against vessels, natural or legal persons, entities or bodies that participate in the circumvention of sanctions regimes.   

In Sweden, a sanctions breach is a matter of criminal law and under Swedish law, only natural persons can be subject to criminal liability. Therefore, legal persons cannot, formally, face criminal liability in Sweden.

The criminal provisions are found in the Act on Certain International Sanctions, according to which only intentional and grossly negligent acts are subject to criminal liability. Further, there is currently no liability for inciting, aiding and abetting or attempting to commit a sanctions offence. The penalty for an intentional violation of a sanctions provision ranges from a small fine to imprisonment for up to two years, or four years if the breach is gross. If the breach is instead committed with gross negligence, the penalty ranges from a small fine to imprisonment for up to six months.

In principle, there are no administrative penalties for companies that have breached sanctions laws. Nonetheless, under Swedish law, a company may be subject to a corporate fine (Sw. företagsbot), constituting a so-called special legal effect of a crime (Sw. särskild rättsverkan av brott).

The corporate fine is contingent on the crime being committed in the exercise of the company’s business activities (Sw. näringsverksamhet) and can be issued in relation to all crimes under Swedish law that can be committed in the exercise of such activities. A prerequisite for a corporate fine is that a company has failed to take reasonable preventive measures, or that the crime was committed by a person who held a leading position or had a special supervisory or control responsibility in relation to the company. Hence, a company can be subject to a corporate fine without any particular individual having been convicted or found guilty.

In general, the corporate fine is tried under the same criminal court procedure as the liability of a company representative or employee who has been charged with committing a criminal act. The maximum corporate fine in Sweden is SEK500 million.

In addition, businesses could also be subject to regulatory penalties by a supervisory authority, for instance the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, if a sanctions breach or incident entails a breach of a regulatory obligation (eg, an obligation to have proper procedures in place to mitigate sanctions risks).

There is no Swedish regime for civil penalties due to a sanctions breach. 

Some of the EU sanctions regimes contain the possibility to apply for authorisation regarding activities otherwise prohibited by sanctions. In Sweden, applications for export licences and exceptions from asset freeze provisions are made to the National Board of Trade Sweden. Applications regarding the release of frozen funds are, depending on the circumstances, made to either the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, or the Swedish Social Insurance Agency.

Sweden has not adopted any regulations in addition to those adopted by the EU regarding the possibility of obtaining licences to authorise otherwise sanctioned actions.

Sanctions compliance has become a focus area in Sweden not least because the EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus contain express obligations for companies to maintain compliance programmes. 

Historically, there has not been much interaction between the government and industry regarding sanctions compliance. However, following the significant number of sanctions issued by the EU against Russia and Belarus, and the insight that non-compliance with sanctions will strengthen Russia’s military which, in turn, poses a potential threat (as stated by some agencies) to Sweden’s national security, industry interaction has increased. In addition, the EU has produced numerous sanctions compliance documents which have been endorsed by Swedish agencies.

There is no indication in the proposed new Swedish sanctions law, nor the EU Directive which triggered the drafting of the new law (see 3.15 Pending Changes to Sanction Regulations) that the existence of a compliance programme could be a mitigating factor when deciding a penalty. 

There is no general reporting requirement for individuals or companies in Sweden. However, the EU Sanctions Regulations contain a general obligation to report any information that would facilitate compliance with financial sanctions. All natural or legal persons, entities or bodies are subject to the obligation. Further, there is a reporting obligation regarding frozen funds in Sweden, which should be reported to the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority.

Notably, there is no obligation to self-incriminate in Sweden. To the contrary, there is a right to remain silent. Likewise, it is generally not a crime to make untruthful statements to, for example, an agency making a sanctions inquiry unless the statement is given under oath. Under the new sanctions law (see 3.15 Pending Changes to Sanction Regulations), however, it is proposed that government agencies be obliged to report suspected sanctions crimes to the law enforcement authorities.

The EU Blocking Statute, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, applies in Sweden. The aim of the statute is to shield EU individuals and companies from the extra-territorial application of third-country laws. The Blocking Statute has never been applied by Swedish courts.

Besides the EU Blocking Statute, Sweden does not have any anti-boycott regulations or other restrictions prohibiting adherence to the sanctions of other jurisdictions.

During the first half of 2024, the EU issued two additional sanctions packages against Russia, containing further restrictive measures with a focus on the effectiveness of sanctions and on combatting circumvention, the most recent being the 14th sanctions package that entered into force on 24 June 2024. Further, in October 2024 the EU Council established a framework for sanctioning Russia for malign hybrid activities against EU’s independence, integrity and security.

Additional sanctions have also been imposed on Belarus in the past year, some with a focus on targeting trade, services and transport. The purpose is to mirror the sanctions against Russia. 

Further, in May 2024 new sanctions against Iran were imposed by the EU. 

During 2024, the Swedish government has taken several steps to enhance sanctions enforcement, particularly regarding circumvention. 

Moreover, in January 2024, the Swedish Act on freezing of assets entered into force. The Act imposes sanctions on terrorism with the aim of preventing and counteracting the financing of terrorism in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).

As an export-oriented nation with a strong presence in industry and technology, which are areas commonly subject to sanctions, sanctions are expected to have an increasing impact on Sweden and Swedish companies. 

In June 2024, a government inquiry proposed a new Swedish sanctions law. The proposal was a response to EU Directive 2024/1226, on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures, which entered into force in May 2024 and should be implemented by member states by 20 May 2025.

Under the proposed new Swedish law, inciting, aiding, abetting and attempted sanctions offences will be criminalised and there will be more severe penalties for recurring offences. Furthermore, reporting obligations for agencies are introduced as well as the possibility to forfeit property. Notably, there will be no particular provisions in the Directive pertaining to corporate liability, since Sweden’s current system of corporate fines is considered to suffice. 

Sweden’s export control regime includes the Military Equipment Act (Sw. lagen (1992:1300) om krigsmateriel), and the Military Equipment Ordinance (Sw. förordningen (1992:1303) om krigsmateriel), which regulate and list products intended for military use, and the EU regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items, which is set out in Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of 20 May 2021 (the “EU Dual-Use Regulation”), regulating products designed for civilian use but with a possible military function.

The EU Dual-Use Regulation reflects commitments agreed upon in key multilateral export control regimes such as the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. It also contributes to the EU’s Global Strategy and the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of WMDs. The EU Dual-Use Regulation is complemented by the Swedish Act on Control of Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance (Sw. lagen (2000:1064) om kontroll av produkter med dubbla användningsområden och av tekniskt bistånd) and the Ordinance on Control of Dual-use Items and Technical Assistance (Sw. förordningen (2000:1217) om kontroll av produkter med dubbla användningsområden och av tekniskt bistånd).

The Swedish legislation sets out slightly more stringent provisions than the EU Dual-Use Regulation regarding, inter alia, notice requirements pertaining to dual-use products. To this end, it may be noted that the Commission’s recent White Paper on export controls further stresses the importance of fully implementing the Dual-Use Regulation to enhance transparency and oversight across the EU.

In Sweden, the legal and administrative authority for export controls is primarily the ISP, which controls exports of military equipment and dual-use products.

While the ISP is the Swedish authority responsible for enforcing export controls (see 4.2 Administrative Authorities for Export Controls),it must also continuously co-ordinate with relevant authorities on issues such as security of supply and sensitive technologies.

The persons or items that are subject to Sweden’s export controls are persons that manufacture, sell, transfer or export products and technology that are classified as dual-use goods or military equipment, or provide software, technology or technical assistance related to such products and technology, as well as those who receive such products and technology from abroad. There is no extra-territorial application of Swedish export control laws.

Neither Sweden nor the EU maintain any list of restricted persons for export control purposes. However, the EU sanctions regimes imposing restrictions on certain persons, entities or countries obviously apply.

Sweden does not list any other sensitive exports in addition to those mentioned in 4.1 Export Controls.

Sweden maintains non-list-based export controls, in particular a general clause (catch-all) mechanism, which allows the ISP to impose export licence requirements on non-listed dual-use products and technology that may be intended for use in connection with the production of weapons of mass destruction, military use in a country subject to an arms embargo, or as components of military equipment that have been exported from the EU without a licence.

The penalties that can be imposed on natural persons are fines and imprisonment for up to six years. The standards of liability are based on either intent or gross negligence. Further, businesses may also be subject to corporate fines. A prerequisite for a corporate fine is that the trader concerned failed to take reasonable preventive measures, or that the crime was committed by a person who held a leading position or had a special supervisory or control responsibility in relation to the trader. The corporate fine is a minimum of SEK5,000 and a maximum of SEK10 million, and in severe cases SEK500 million (see 3.9 Penalties for Violations). In addition, the ISP may impose administrative sanctions, such as revoking or suspending export licences, prohibiting the use of general licences, or imposing administrative fines (Sw. sanktionsavgifter) for certain breaches of reporting or notification obligations.

There are various licences available that authorise activities otherwise prohibited by Sweden’s export controls, depending on the type, destination and end use of the products and technology. For dual-use goods, an exporter may, for example, apply for individual licences, or a global licence following the adoption of an internal compliance programme. It is also possible to apply for export licences for products listed as military equipment, in which case information on the agreement with the buyer and details of the end use have to be provided to the ISP.

Products subject to export control are in focus regarding EU sanctions against Russia. Hence, compliance expectations of export control regulations have recently increased in the same manner and for the same reason as the sanctions compliance expectations (see 3.11 Compliance). 

There are reporting requirements related to export controls, such as the obligation to declare the value of exported or transferred dual-use or military equipment and technology to the ISP for the purpose of annual fees, the obligation to notify the ISP of the use of EU general licences for dual-use products and technology, and the obligation to register the transfers of military equipment and technology within the EEA.

Sweden became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 7 March 2024. The Swedish government has launched an inquiry to review the export control framework, the Military Equipment Act (Sw. lagen (1992:1300) om krigsmateriel), and the Military Equipment Ordinance (Sw. förordningen (1992:1303) om krigsmateriel), in light of Sweden’s NATO membership. The focus is on ensuring that strict controls of the export of military equipment are maintained while adapting the rules to the new security situation. This includes clarifying the regulatory framework in accordance with NATO’s collective defence obligations under Articles 3 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The review will also address the licensing of defence subcontractors and international co-operation in military production. The inquiry shall report no later than 30 November 2024.

A development in the harmonisation of export control rules occurred on 26 October 2023, when the European Commission published its first compilation of EU member states’ national export control lists. This will enable co-ordinated export controls at the EU level with regard to sensitive technologies that are not covered by multilateral agreements. The publication opens the door for member states to co-ordinate their export control actions and will be updated whenever member states notify new or amended national export control measures to the Commission.

In addition to the implications of NATO membership, more stringent application and enforcement of Swedish export control laws are expected. 

Sweden does not impose its own anti-dumping or countervailing duties, as it is a member state of the EU. For further details, reference is made to the EU Chapter of this guide.

Companies wishing to file complaints concerning dumping and subsidies are referred to the European Commission, which conducts such investigations. Nevertheless, the National Board of Trade Sweden can assist companies in Sweden when filing complaints before the Commission.

The National Board of Trade Sweden contributes to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ preparations for meetings with the EU Committee for Trade Policy Protection Instruments, recommending and analysing the European Commission’s proposals for the adoption of trade protection measures against imports from third countries. It also carries out advocacy work aimed at EU institutions, other member states and WTO members with regard to trade policy protection instruments, through inquiries and analyses, and it consults with companies and industry organisations.

The EU trade defence instruments in this field consist of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the EU (the “Anti-Dumping Regulation”), Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the EU (the “Anti-Subsidy Regulation”), as well as Regulation (EU) 2015/755 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2015 on common rules for imports from certain third countries and Regulation (EU) 2015/478 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on common rules for imports, which deal with safeguard measures.

It is the European Commission that is primarily responsible for monitoring and surveillance of AD/CVD measures. However, the Commission is dependent on the member states for monitoring. In Sweden, the Swedish Customs is responsible for reporting infringements and violations to the Commission, and is mandated to carry out raids, inspections and collection of AD/CVD duties.

The European Commission may open an investigation after having received a complaint or initiate an investigation on its own initiative.

Companies can petition the European Commission on an ad hoc basis.

As a general rule, after the publication of the initiation of an investigation by the European Commission, a company has 15 to 21 days, following the European Commission publishing the initiation of an investigation, to register as an affected party and request the right to receive the special questionnaires that then form the basis of the Commission’s investigation. The definition of affected party includes any party directly or indirectly affected by the measure in question.

Anti-dumping

One day prior to launching an investigation, the European Commission provides a notice of initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), stating which products and which countries are to be examined. It also sets out the rights and obligations of the importers, subcontractors and consumers that are affected by a possible anti-dumping duty.

Following the expiration of the time limit indicated above (see 5.5 Non-Domestic Company Participation), and within 30-45 days from the start of the survey, the questionnaires must be filled out and submitted to the Commission. Subsequently, the Commission’s investigators may visit the company. Only information received according to this procedure is taken into account in the investigation.

No later than nine months after the Commission has initiated the investigation, the Commission must present its preliminary conclusions, in which it may impose provisional anti-dumping duties for a maximum period of six months. Thereafter, all interested parties have 30 days to provide comments on the decision. This may be followed by definitive measures, which remain in force for five years. These are published in the OJEU.

The Council decides on definitive anti-dumping measures, on a proposal from the Commission, no later than 15 months after the investigation was initiated. The decision is published in the OJEU.

The day after publication in the OJEU, the imposition of definitive anti-dumping measures enters into force. During the time the anti-dumping measures are in force, various types of reviews may be carried out. These can affect product scope, the exporters concerned and the level of anti-dumping duties.

The anti-dumping measures can be extended for further periods of five years if complaining EU producers submit requests three months before the measures expire and the Commission finds the requests sufficiently substantiated to initiate a review. In the event of a review at the end of the period of application of the measures, the measures are automatically extended for the duration of the investigation, regardless of the outcome of the investigation.

Anti-subsidies

An anti-subsidy complaint is filed with the Commission by or on behalf of the EU producers of the product concerned, either directly or via the authorities of an EU member state. The Commission examines within 45 days the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided to determine whether there is a sufficient basis to justify initiating an investigation.

Anti-subsidy measures may be imposed on imports of the product concerned into the EU if the Commission, based on its investigation, considers that subsidisation causing injury has occurred. These measures generally take the form of:

• an ad valorem duty: a percentage of the import value of the product concerned;
• specific duties: a fixed value for a certain amount of goods – eg, EUR100 per tonne of a product; or
• a price undertaking: a commitment by an exporter to respect minimum import prices.

Provisional measures, if any, must be imposed no later than nine months after the investigation has begun and may remain in place for a maximum of four months. This may be followed by the imposition of definitive measures, which remain in force for five years. The duties are paid by the importer within the EU and, in Sweden, they are collected by Swedish Customs. After five years the measures lapse, unless an expiry review concludes that if the measures were to expire, subsidisation and material injury would likely continue or recur.

The European Commission and the Council publish their findings in the OJEU in the form of regulations, either imposing provisional or definitive anti-dumping/anti-subsidy duties or terminating the proceedings without duties being imposed.

The Commission also publishes the Annual Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the EU’s Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard Activities and the Use of Trade Defence Instruments by Third Countries Targeting the EU (last published on 24 September 2024).

The EU may, in principle, impose anti-dumping/countervailing duties and safeguards in relation to all third countries (ie, countries that are not members of the EU). However, trade agreements entered into by the EU may contain deviations in relation thereto – eg, under the EEA Agreement, the use of anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and measures against illicit commercial practices are excluded in relation to Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. Further, under the CETA Agreement between the EU and Canada, a party adopting global safeguard measures shall endeavour to impose them in a way that least affects bilateral trade.

Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures expire automatically after five years, unless the European Commission, following an expiry review, determines that the measures should remain in force. During the final year that measures are in force, the Commission publishes a notice of impending expiry in the OJEU, stating that the measures will expire on a given date, in order to allow for EU producers to request prolongation of the measures.

The European Commission may extend measures for further five-year periods following an expiry review initiated upon the request of EU producers complaining of injury, provided the request is submitted at least three months before the measures expire. In the event of a review at the end of the five-year application period, the measures are automatically extended for the duration of the investigation.

The Commission may also conduct interim reviews in relation to anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures.

Measures adopted by the Commission may be challenged before the EU Courts – ie, the General Court as first instance and on appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union, pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. Further, a decision by the Swedish Customs regarding, for example, a penalty duty, can be appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. If so, the parties may ask the court to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 267 TFEU.

The Commission Decides on Countervailing Duties on BEV Producers from China Following an Anti-Subsidy Investigation

On 4 October 2024, the Commission proposed to impose definitive countervailing duties on imports of battery electric vehicles from China. The proposal follows a decision on provisional countervailing duties adopted by the Commission three months earlier. As a result of the ex-officio anti-subsidy investigation that was launched nine months earlier (the first-ever ex officio anti-subsidy investigation by the Commission), the Commission has concluded that the battery electric vehicles (BEV) value chain in China benefits from unfair subsidisation, which threatens to cause economic injury to EU BEV producers. The proposal for countervailing duties has received the necessary support from member states to be adopted. The duties will be applied individually to some producers, while a weighted average duty will be applied to a group of producers that co-operated in the investigation. The measures will be in force for five years and extendable upon substantiated request and subsequent review. Consultations with the Chinese government are still ongoing.

There are no major pending changes to AD/CVD measures to report during the last 12 months.

The FDI Act

Sweden has recently enacted a law on screening of foreign direct investments (Sw. lagen (2023:560) om granskning av utländska direktinvesteringar) (the “FDI Act”), which is applicable as of 1 December 2023. The act applies to investments made by all investors, including Swedish investors and investors from other EU member states. However, only investments made by a non-EU investor, and which fall within the scope of the FDI Act may be subject to a decision to prohibit the investment or to impose conditions.

A transaction that falls within the scope of the FDI Act may not be closed without prior written approval from the ISP. If required for reasons of national security, public order or public safety, a foreign investment may be prohibited by the ISP. If the transaction has already taken place, such prohibition will render the transaction null and void. Where the investment is made in a listed company or in real estate, a prohibition will be combined with an injunction to divest the relevant undertaking or real estate.

The ISP’s decision to prohibit an investment or to impose conditions may be appealed to the Swedish government. Injunctions and administrative fines may be appealed to the Stockholm Administrative Court.

Upon receipt of a complete notification, the ISP shall decide within 25 working days whether an in-depth review is necessary following an inquiry. If an in-depth review is required, the ISP shall issue a final decision within three months. However, that period can be extended to six months under specific circumstances.

The PSA

In 2021, The Swedish Protective Security Act (PSA) (Sw. säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)) was amended in order to establish a screening system concerning the sale of certain so-called security-sensitive activities. With regards to strategic considerations, there is no guidance regarding the screening mechanism under the PSA. In addition, any details of such strategic considerations by the authorities are likely to be classified.

The PSA refers to “Sweden’s security”, but there is currently no legal definition of this term. In the preparatory works to the PSA (Government Bill 2017/18:89), the Swedish government has stated that the term is intended to cover both external and internal security interests, national sovereignty as well as the internal security of Sweden’s democratic constitution.

In our experience, “straightforward” matters regarding the application of the PSA take about two to three weeks for the supervisory authority to resolve. For more complicated matters, we are informed the timeline could be two to three months.

The same transaction could trigger filing requirements under both the FDI and PSA legislation – ie, two review procedures.

The FDI Act is administered by the ISP, acting as the screening authority of the Swedish FDI regime, while there are 13 different supervisory authorities under the PSA, including the Swedish Transport Agency, the state-owned enterprise Affärsverket, Svenska Kraftnät, the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Energy Agency, the Swedish Radiation Authority, and four different County Administrative Boards.

The FDI Act

The FDI Act applies to investments in target companies that conduct activities eligible for protection. Activities within the following sectors shall be considered eligible for protection:

• essential services (Sw. samhällsviktig verksamhet), including critical infrastructure;
• security-sensitive activities (Sw. säkerhetskänslig verksamhet) in accordance with the PSA;
• prospecting, extracting, enriching or selling of critical raw materials, or of strategic metals or minerals;
• processing of sensitive personal data or location data in or through goods or services;
• manufacturing, developing or supplying military equipment, conducting research relating to military equipment, or providing technical support for military equipment;
• manufacturing, developing or supplying dual-use items, conducting research relating to dual-use items, or providing technical support for such items; and
• researching or supplying products or methods relating to emerging technologies or other strategic technologies eligible for protection, or activities capable of manufacturing or developing such products or methods.

The FDI Act applies to investments resulting in the investor acquiring (directly or indirectly) voting rights equal to or exceeding 10, 20, 30, 50, 65 or 90% in a target company performing activities eligible for protection, or influence over the management of the company. No turnover or deal value thresholds apply save for if the activity relates to essential services. Specific thresholds apply to investments in other legal entities (eg, limited partnerships or trusts) and to greenfield investments. Certain types of issuances of new shares are exempted.

One feature of the Swedish FDI Act that seems to distinguish it from similar legislation in most other member states is that it applies equally to investors from Sweden and other EU member states. However, only investments made by a non-EU investor can be subject to a decision to prohibit the investment or to impose conditions. One other peculiar feature, which also seems less common, is that restructurings within a group of companies are caught by the Act. 

The PSA

Transactions involving “security-sensitive activities” are subject to filing requirements according to the PSA. However, the legislation lacks a detailed definition of what constitutes a “security-sensitive activity”.  Pursuant to the PSA, security-sensitive activities are either (i) activities of importance for Sweden’s security; or (ii) activities that are covered by an “international protective security commitment that is binding for Sweden”. An international protective security commitment refers to Sweden’s commitments to other states or organisations, for example protection of airplanes and of information exchanged within the framework of military co-operation, or ship and port facility security.

For activities that are considered security-sensitive based on their importance for Sweden’s security, the first part of the assessment concerns whether the activity affects Swedish national security, including external and internal security interests as well as nationally important societal functions. Only activities that have a qualified need for protection should be covered by the scope of the PSA.

On the basis of what is stated in the preparatory works to the PSA, activities within the following sectors may be considered security sensitive:

• military activities;
• essential services – eg, services related to electricity supply, electronic communication, key civil infrastructure, food and water supply, the financial sector, healthcare, emergency services and transport;
• damage-generating activities – eg, nuclear activities, microbiological laboratories, dams, and industrial activities handling explosives and toxic materials in large quantities;
• the handling of so-called security classified information; and
• any other innovations or products that are of key importance to a security-sensitive activity.

The FDI Act

Under the FDI Act, investments that meet the thresholds and the conditions of the screening mechanism are subject to a mandatory notification obligation (see 6.2 Agencies Enforcing Investment Security Measures). The notification obligation lies with the investor. Approval of the transaction is necessary prior to closing.

The PSA

If a transaction falls within the scope of the PSA, it is subject to a mandatory screening system and the relevant supervisory authority’s approval of the transaction prior to closing (see 6.2 Agencies Enforcing Investment Security Measures). The obligation to notify a contemplated transaction lies with the seller.

The FDI Act

Under the FDI Act, share issuances made pro rata to the number of shares already owned by the investor are exempt from the notification requirement.

The PSA

Under the PSA, real estate and shares in companies that qualify as “public” companies (in principle, those traded on a stock exchange), as well as indirect acquisitions – ie, the acquisition of the parent company of a company carrying out security-sensitive activities, are exempted from the rules in the PSA.

The FDI Act

Under the FDI Act, the ISP may impose a fine for a number of breaches of the legislation, such as breach of the standstill obligation, failure to notify an investment, failure to provide the information requested by the ISP or the provision of false information. The fine shall be set at a minimum of SEK25,000 and a maximum of SEK100 million. Further, an investment falling foul of the provisions of the FDI Act may be declared invalid by the ISP.

The PSA

The supervisory authority may impose an administrative fine if the requirements applicable to a transfer of security-sensitive activities have not been complied with, including failure to comply with the obligation to consult with the supervisory authority, as well as a transfer in violation of a prohibition, or if incorrect information has been provided during the consultation procedure. Such a fine shall be set at a minimum of SEK25,000 and a maximum of SEK50 million. To our knowledge, no administrative fine for a breach of the standstill obligation has so far been imposed. Should an investment fall foul of the provisions of the PSA, the supervising authority may declare the transaction invalid.

There are no fees associated with investment security reviews or filings.

One key development is the revision of the current EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation. On 24 January 2024, the European Commission proposed a new FDI Regulation which, inter alia, would make the introduction of a national screening mechanism for FDI investments compulsory for all member states and introduce certain minimal requirements regarding the national screening mechanisms and obligatory screening in certain areas. An important new feature of the proposal is that the definition of foreign investors will include non-EU investors who, through a controlled company in the EU, invest in a target company in the EU.

The proposed revision of the EU Regulation will require certain modifications of the Swedish FDI regime. Notably, it will strengthen co-operation between member states and with the Commission, and enable both member states and the Commission to initiate procedures on their own initiative if an investment has not been notified through the co-operation mechanism.

In addition, it should be noted that the European Commission in a White Paper also indicates that it will look into the introduction of a review mechanism to screen EU outbound investments.

As a member of the EU, Sweden abides by the EU state aid rules, mainly set out in the FEU Treaty. It is thus only allowed to grant subsidies that comply with those rules and have been approved by the Commission before being implemented.

For further information, see the EU chapter of this guide. 

Standards and technical requirements are generally decided at EU level.

For further information, see the EU chapter of this guide. 

The sanitary and phytosanitary requirements applicable in Sweden are set out in the EU sanitary and phytosanitary legislation.

For further information, see the EU chapter of this guide. 

Sweden does not have any competition policies or price controls that are aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

In Sweden, the state and the municipalities play a significant role as owners of undertakings. Among these, large, fully state-owned enterprises include Systembolaget, the sole retailer in Sweden permitted to sell alcoholic beverages having an alcohol content over 3.5% to consumers. Other prominent fully state-owned companies include Vattenfall, in the energy sector, LKAB, which provides mining and steel production, and the railway operator SJ. In addition to these, there are also major companies in which the state holds partial ownership, such as the Telia Company in the telecommunications field and PostNord, which handles postal and delivery services. None of the state-owned enterprises, the majority of which operate on liberalised markets and thus have to comply with the same rules as their private competitors, are aimed at reducing imports and/or encouraging domestic production.

There are no applicable “buy local” requirements in Sweden.

In Sweden, the rules applying to the protection of geographical indications are governed by and aligned with EU legislation. The Swedish Food Agency maintains a registry of quality products, listing those that are currently under review or have already achieved geographical indication status. Once a product is given a geographical indication, its name is legally protected against potential imitation or misuse, not just within the EU, but also in third countries with which the EU has agreements containing relevant protection provisions.

The EU has introduced a series of new regulations and directives that significantly affect companies operating within its borders. These measures are designed to enhance corporate responsibility, promote sustainability, and address various environmental and human rights concerns.

One of the most comprehensive of these acts is EU Directive 2024/1760, the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D), which will place mandatory obligations on very large companies operating within the EU starting in July 2027. The Directive requires concerned companies to not only perform due diligence on their own business operations but also to ensure compliance throughout their value chains, whether inside or outside the EU, including through the enforcement of contractual due diligence obligations. The CS3D stipulates a risk-based approach to human rights and environmental due diligence and applies to both EU- and non-EU-registered companies. However, for the latter, the turnover taken into consideration has to be achieved within the union, while for EU companies it is the worldwide turnover that applies.

Another significant development is the anticipated adoption of the Forced Labour Regulation by the Council, expected in the second half of 2024. This Regulation will prohibit economic operators from placing or making available products on the internal market – whether produced domestically or imported – that have been made using forced labour. The Regulation aligns with global trends, as demonstrated by a recent event in the USA. In early 2024, US Customs blocked thousands of cars from manufacturers such as BMW and Volkswagen as components were believed to have been sourced from a supplier in China’s Xinjiang province and hence presumed to have been manufactured using forced labour. This incident underscores how EU companies must not only be compliant with the new EU Regulation but also be mindful of comparable laws in third countries that could impact their global operations.

In addition to these overarching regulations, several sector-specific regulations have been implemented, targeting particular industries. The Conflict Minerals Regulation, which has been in force since January 2021, requires due diligence for the importation of tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. Another example is the Deforestation Regulation, which mandates due diligence when importing products such as soy, cattle, palm oil, timber, cocoa, rubber, coffee and derived products to ensure they are deforestation-free. This regulation is set to replace the existing Timber Regulation in 2025. It will enter into force at the end of 2024 unless the Commission’s proposal to delay it for one year is accepted by the European Parliament and the Council.

Further adding to this regulatory framework is the Batteries Regulation, which came into force in August 2023. This Regulation aims to ensure that batteries imported into the EU are sustainable throughout their entire lifecycle, covering design, production, and recycling.

Furthermore, the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which entered into force in May 2024, seeks to reduce the EU’s dependence on external sources for specific critical minerals. It also sets targets for the recycling of minerals already within the union, further promoting sustainability and resource efficiency.

International trade, as always, is in a state of flux, with new regulations and events continuously reshaping the landscape. Consequently, companies involved in global trade must stay informed and proactive to successfully navigate these challenges and opportunities.