Public procurement in Italy is primarily governed by Legislative Decree No 36 of 31 March 2023 (the “Public Contracts Code”, or PCC), which entered into force on 1 July 2023. The PCC was subsequently amended and integrated by the “Corrective Decree” (Legislative Decree No 209 of 31 December 2024), which streamlined several procedural aspects and strengthened protections for economic operators. The PCC transposes EU Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU into domestic law.
The current framework is built upon a “hierarchy of principles”, where the Principle of Result (the successful and timely completion of the contract) and the Principle of Trust (protecting the legitimate expectations of both public officials and bidders) serve as the primary interpretative criteria. Since 2024, the Italian system has achieved full digitalisation. Procurement procedures are conducted exclusively through certified digital platforms interconnected with the National Public Procurement Database (BDNCP) managed by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC). This ecosystem ensures the “once-only” principle, whereby economic operators provide data and documents only once via the Virtual Economic Operator’s Folder (FVOE).
The PCC is supplemented by Annexes, which have replaced many previous secondary regulations, and by ANAC’s resolutions. EU law principles, such as equal treatment, non-discrimination and proportionality, remain directly applicable. Administrative case law plays a significant role in shaping day-to-day procurement practice.
Under the PCC, procurement regulations apply to a broad range of entities classified as “contracting authorities” (the so-called stazioni appaltanti) and “contracting entities” (the so-called enti concedenti).
Public Sector Bodies
This category includes the state, regional and local authorities, and other non-economic public bodies. It also encompasses “bodies governed by public law” (the so-called Organismi di Diritto Pubblico), which are entities possessing legal personality, established to meet specific needs in the general interest (not having an industrial or commercial character), and which are either financed, managed or supervised by a public authority.
Public Undertakings and Special Sectors
Entities operating in the “special sectors” (water, energy, transport and postal services) are subject to the PCC under a specific, more flexible regime. This includes “public undertakings” over which public authorities may exercise a dominant influence by virtue of ownership or financial participation.
In-House Entities
Awards made to “in-house” companies (entities under the “equivalent control” of the contracting authority) may be exempt from competitive tendering under strict conditions. However, these entities must strictly comply with the PCC when they, in turn, act as buyers and award contracts to third-party providers.
Private Entities and Subsidised Contracts
Private entities are subject to procurement rules in specific circumstances, notably:
Qualification of Contracting Authorities
A key 2026 feature is the Qualification System. Not all public entities can autonomously manage tenders; they must be “qualified” by ANAC based on their organisational and technical capacity. Unqualified entities must rely on central purchasing bodies (the so-called Centrali di Committenza) or qualified aggregators.
The PCC applies to four main categories of contracts: public works, supply, service contracts, and concessions.
Contract Definitions
Financial Thresholds (2026–2027)
Italian procurement law distinguishes between “above-threshold” (EU-regulated) and “below-threshold” (nationally regulated) contracts. The following EU thresholds, updated for the 2026–27 biennium, apply net of VAT.
For above-threshold contracts, the PCC aligns with EU procurement standards set by the 2014 directives, namely Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement, Directive 2014/25/EU on utilities procurement and Directive 2014/23/EU on concessions, which establish harmonised competitive procedures across the European Union.
Below-Threshold Regime
For contracts valued below these limits, the PCC mandates simplified award methods to ensure speed and efficiency.
While Italian procurement procedures are grounded in the EU principles of non-discrimination and transparency, access for economic operators varies depending on their jurisdiction of origin.
EU Economic Operators
Operators based in any EU member state enjoy full and unconditional access to all regulated procedures, guaranteed by the TFEU and the PCC. Any technical or financial requirement that creates a disguised barrier to cross-border trade is strictly prohibited.
Non-EU Operators
For operators from outside the EU, access is granted based on international reciprocity. Specifically, the following apply.
Under EU Regulation 2022/1031 (IPI), which is actively monitored in 2026, the European Commission may impose restrictive measures (such as score adjustments or exclusion) on bidders from third countries that maintain protectionist barriers against EU companies.
Since 2023, and with increased scrutiny in 2025–26, bidders must notify contracting authorities of any foreign financial contributions received from non-EU countries (under EU Regulation 2022/2560) if they exceed specific thresholds. This is a mandatory step to prevent market distortion.
Under the PCC, awarding authorities are subject to a more proactive set of obligations.
Key obligations include the following.
Advertisement of Procurement Procedures
Italian law mandates prior advertisement for all regulated contracts to ensure market transparency and fair competition. Since 2024, the system has transitioned to a fully digital model, eliminating paper-based or local publication requirements for legal purposes. This centralised approach allows businesses to monitor all opportunities through a single electronic point of entry.
Primary Publication Channels
The legal publication of tender notices occurs exclusively through the National Public Procurement Database (BDNCP) managed by the National Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC). All official notices and related documentation are accessible on ANAC’s website. For contracts exceeding EU thresholds, notices are also automatically published in the Official Journal of the European Union via the Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) portal.
Essential Information for Bidders
The advertisement must provide all key data required for a business to assess the opportunity, including the contract’s object, estimated value, and duration. It further specifies the mandatory technical and financial qualification criteria and the deadline for submission. This digital-first system ensures that all operators, regardless of their location, receive identical information simultaneously, facilitating cross-border participation.
Preliminary Market Consultations
The Italian Public Contracts Code expressly permits contracting authorities to conduct preliminary market consultations before launching a formal tender. These consultations allow the public sector to engage with market participants and experts to refine technical specifications and labels. This preparatory tool is essential for aligning public requirements with current market innovations and ensuring that the subsequent procurement is technically feasible.
Legal Safeguards and Neutrality
Consultations are purely preparatory and do not constitute a formal award procedure or a prerequisite for participation in future tenders. To maintain a level playing field, authorities must ensure that no participant gains an unfair competitive advantage. This is achieved by sharing all relevant information exchanged during the consultation with all future bidders and setting appropriate deadlines for the formal tender process.
Strategic Impact for Businesses
For economic operators, consultations provide a transparent platform to contribute technical insights and influence project definitions. While participation does not guarantee success in the final tender, it allows firms to showcase expertise in a regulated environment.
Standard Award Procedures
The Italian Code provides for various award methods, primarily distinguishing between open and restricted procedures. Open procedures allow any operator to submit a bid, while restricted procedures involve a preliminary qualification stage where only invited candidates participate. These methods are the standard for ensuring maximum competition in high-value contracts.
Negotiated and Complex Procedures
For complex or innovative projects, authorities may use the competitive procedure with negotiation or the competitive dialogue. These tools allow for the refinement of technical solutions through interaction with bidders. In specific, urgent or unique circumstances, a negotiated procedure without prior publication may be used, though it remains an exceptional measure subject to strict justification.
Limits on Negotiations
Where negotiations are permitted, they cannot alter the minimum requirements or the award criteria established in the initial tender documents. Authorities must ensure equal treatment by sharing the same information with all participants and documenting every phase of the process. This ensures that the pursuit of a tailored solution does not compromise market transparency or the level playing field.
Criteria for Selecting Procurement Procedures
The choice of procurement procedure is not entirely discretionary and depends on the contract’s value, nature and complexity. For above-threshold contracts, the open and restricted procedures are considered equivalent “standard” options, and authorities can choose between them without providing specific justification. However, moving away from these neutral models to more flexible or simplified procedures requires the fulfilment of specific legal conditions set out in the PCC.
Conditions for Negotiated Procedures and Dialogue
More complex methods, such as the competitive procedure with negotiation or competitive dialogue, are permitted only under defined circumstances. These include the following cases:
The use of these procedures must be motivated by the need for a tailored solution that requires interaction with economic operators.
Exceptional and Below-Threshold Choice
The negotiated procedure without prior publication is the most restricted option, permissible only in extreme cases such as objective technical uniqueness, protection of exclusive rights, or extreme urgency not attributable to the authority. Conversely, for below-threshold contracts, the legislation grants broader discretion, favouring direct awards or simplified negotiations to prioritise administrative speed and the “principle of result”.
Judicial Review and Accountability
Every choice of procedure must be adequately documented and justified within the administrative record. This ensures transparency and allows for judicial review.
Direct Awards Below EU Thresholds
Direct awards are the primary tool for low-value contracts to ensure administrative speed and efficiency. Authorities can award works up to EUR150,000 and services or supplies up to EUR140,000 without a formal tender. While simplified, these awards must respect the principle of rotation, which generally prohibits awarding a subsequent contract to the same incumbent for the same category.
Exceptional Above-Threshold Awards
For contracts exceeding EU thresholds, direct awards are strictly exceptional and permissible only under the “negotiated procedure without prior publication”. This is limited to objective technical uniqueness, protection of exclusive rights, or extreme urgency from unforeseeable events. Authorities must provide a rigorous written justification to prove that no viable competitive alternative exists.
Verification and Accountability
A direct award does not exempt the authority from verifying the contractor’s legal and professional requirements. The selection must be based on documented market prices and the operator’s proven experience. All direct awards remain subject to transparency obligations and can be challenged before Administrative Courts if the legal prerequisites for bypassing a competitive tender are not met.
Simultaneous Digital Access
All procurement documents, including technical specifications and the draft contract, must be available electronically and free of charge from the moment the contract notice is published. This ensures that bidders have immediate access to the full tender dossier. Under the current digital framework, the availability of these documents on certified platforms is a prerequisite for the legal validity of the procedure.
Minimum Deadlines for Tenders
The PCC establishes specific timelines for the publication of procurement documents, which also determine the deadlines for the submission of bids. Minimum time limits vary depending on the procedure and the contract value. In open procedures above EU thresholds, the standard deadline is 30 days from the dispatch of the contract notice. In restricted procedures, the process is divided into two phases (see 2.7 Time Limits for Receipt of Expressions of Interest or Submission of Tenders).
Mandatory Time Limits for Above-Threshold Contracts
The PCC establishes specific minimum deadlines to ensure market transparency and fair competition. In open procedures, the standard minimum period for submitting bids is 30 days from the transmission of the contract notice. For restricted procedures, the process is bifurcated: candidates have at least 30 days to submit requests to participate, followed by a further 30-day period for shortlisted firms to submit their final tenders.
Mandatory Extensions
Authorities must extend deadlines if significant changes are made to the tender documents or if mandatory site visits are required. This ensures that the push for administrative speed does not undermine the quality or fairness of the competitive process.
Reductions and Urgency
These statutory deadlines can be shortened under specific legal conditions, such as the prior publication of a “prior information notice” or cases of duly substantiated urgency, ensuring that the reduction does not compromise market access or effective competition. In such instances, the tender submission period in an open procedure can be reduced to 15 days. The mandatory use of certified e-procurement platforms since 2024 is a prerequisite for applying these accelerated “digital” timeframes, as they significantly reduce the time needed for document access.
Flexibility for Below-Threshold Contracts
For contracts below EU thresholds, the PCC grants authorities broader discretion to set deadlines that are “proportionate to the complexity and value of the award”. While there are no rigid statutory minimums for these smaller contracts, the “principle of result” dictates that time limits must still afford economic operators a genuine opportunity to prepare competitive bids.
Eligibility and Selection Criteria
The Public Contracts Code (PCC) mandates three categories of requirements for participation, ensuring that only reliable and capable operators access public tenders. All criteria must be proportionate, non-discriminatory and strictly related to the contract’s object.
Financial and Technical Suitability
Economic operators must be legally established and authorised to perform the relevant economic activity, typically demonstrated through registration in professional or commercial registers. For works contracts exceeding EUR150,000, eligibility is strictly tied to the SOA qualification system, where specialised certification bodies attest to a firm’s technical and financial capacity. For services and supplies, authorities may require specific turnover levels, previous experience, or technical certifications (eg, ISO), provided they do not exceed twice the estimated contract value.
Integrity and Mandatory Exclusion Grounds
The legislation distinguishes between two types of exclusion grounds.
Participation can be restricted to a limited number of qualified suppliers in procedures involving a pre-selection phase, such as restricted procedures, competitive procedures with negotiation, and competitive dialogues. This allows authorities to manage complex tenders by inviting only those operators who demonstrate the highest levels of suitability.
Basis for Shortlisting
The selection of the shortlist must be based on objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria (eg, turnover, previous experience, technical equipment) clearly defined in the contract notice.
Minimum Number of Candidates
The Code mandates a minimum number of invited candidates to guarantee genuine competition.
Tenders are evaluated based on pre-established criteria to ensure objectivity and transparency. The Italian Code identifies two main methods.
Qualitative Evaluation Factors
Under the MEAT criterion, authorities evaluate various qualitative elements, such as the following.
Abnormally Low Tenders
Regardless of the criteria, authorities must verify “abnormally low tenders” that appear insufficient to cover costs. In below-threshold procedures using the lowest price, the Code provides for automatic exclusion based on mathematical formulas to prevent predatory bidding, provided at least five valid offers are received.
Awarding authorities must exclude tenders to protect the integrity of the procurement process. Under the PCC, exclusion is mandatory in the following cases.
Limits on Exclusion
The Italian system follows the principle of “preservation of administrative acts”. Authorities must allow bidders to remedy formal deficiencies or missing documentation, provided these do not relate to the economic or technical offer itself. Failure to pay the participation fee or missing signatures are typically remediable, whereas altering the price or the technical characteristics of the bid after the deadline is strictly prohibited.
Every exclusion must be:
Italian law imposes a strict obligation on contracting authorities to disclose all evaluation parameters before the procedure begins. This ensures “predictability” and prevents ex-post manipulation of the results.
Selection Stage (Bidders)
The requirements for professional suitability, economic standing and technical capacity must be explicitly detailed in the contract notice or the tender specifications (the so-called disciplinare di gara). Authorities must specify:
Award Stage (Tenders)
For procedures using the Most Economically Advantageous Tender (MEAT), the disclosure obligation is even more granular. The authority must publish the following.
Awarding authorities are strictly required to notify any candidate or bidder of their exclusion from the procedure. This notice must include the specific legal and factual reasons for the decision. Under the new digital framework, this communication must be sent immediately (usually within five days) via the certified e-procurement platform to allow the excluded party to challenge the decision before the Administrative Court.
Award Notification and Transparency
For candidates who were not excluded but simply did not win (the “unsuccessful bidders”), the obligation to notify arises at the award stage. The authority must communicate the award decision simultaneously to the winner and all unsuccessful participants.
Digital Access to Documents
A major innovation of the 2023 Code is the automatic digital access. Once the award is communicated, the bids of the winner and other participants (excluding trade secrets) are often made directly available to all bidders on the platform.
Means of Communication
All notifications must be transmitted through certified digital platforms integrated with the National Public Procurement Database (BDNCP). These systems provide a legally certain timestamp for the receipt of the notice, which is essential for calculating the “standstill period” (the mandatory waiting period before the contract can be signed).
Notification of the Award Decision
Once the final award (the so-called aggiudicazione) is approved, the contracting authority has a mandatory obligation to notify all participants. This notice must be sent without undue delay of the award decision via the certified e-procurement platform used for the tender.
Required Content of the Notification
The notification must be comprehensive to allow unsuccessful bidders to evaluate the legitimacy of the process. It must include the following:
Digital Transparency and Access
Under the current “digital-first” framework, the notification usually includes a direct link to the tender’s technical and economic documents. This automatic access ensures that bidders do not have to file separate transparency requests to view the winner’s offer (excluding parts protected by trade secrets), thereby accelerating the judicial review timeline.
The Italian procurement system does not require a formal adversarial hearing phase during the evaluation and award process, in line with the procedural structure of the procurement rules of the European Union.
However, the principle of due process may require the contracting authority to provide the interested economic operator with an opportunity to submit clarifications or justifications in specific situations. This is particularly relevant where the authority intends to adopt an exclusion decision based on irregularities, abnormally low pricing or alleged professional misconduct.
Key Circumstances for Prior Hearing
The key circumstances are as follows.
Means of Communication
All interactions are strictly digital and written. The authority sends a request via the certified e-procurement platform, and the bidder must upload their response within the set deadline. Oral hearings are exceptionally rare and usually reserved for highly technical competitive dialogues – but even then, the outcome must be documented in writing.
The Standstill Period
A mandatory “suspension” period applies between the notification of the award and the formal signing of the contract. This interval ensures that unsuccessful bidders have an effective window to seek judicial protection or an injunction before the contractual relationship begins.
Exceptions to the Standstill Requirement
The standstill period is not absolute and does not apply in the following cases:
Judicial Review: TAR and Council of State
The review of procurement decisions falls within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The process is characterised by high speed (accelerated procedures) and strict deadlines.
Non-Judicial Review: ANAC Pre-Litigation Opinions
A unique feature of the Italian system is the pre-litigation opinion issued by the ANAC.
Judicial Remedies
Economic operators can seek protection before Administrative Court (TAR) through three main types of actions.
Interim Measures
Interim measures are a cornerstone of the Italian procurement litigation system, allowing the Administrative Court to freeze a tender before irreparable harm occurs.
Requirements for Relief
To obtain an injunction, the petitioner must demonstrate:
A crucial feature of the Italian system is that filing an appeal with a request for interim measures against an award decision triggers an additional suspension of the authority’s power to sign the contract. This prevents the authority from “rushing to sign” while the court evaluates the request.
Types of Measures
The following types of interim measures are available.
Collegial ordinance granting or rejecting interim measures may be appealed to the Council of State, ensuring a multi-level system of judicial protection within the administrative jurisdiction.
The suspension may affect the continuation of the award procedure or, where the contract has not yet been signed, prevent its execution pending the outcome of the proceedings. If the contract has already been concluded, interim relief may concern its performance, although stricter conditions apply in light of the public interest in continuity.
Standing to challenge decisions adopted in a public procurement procedure is granted to economic operators that have a direct and concrete interest in the annulment of the contested act. As a general principle, only those operators who have participated in the procedure and whose legal position has been adversely affected by the decision are entitled to bring proceedings before the competent Administrative Court.
Tenderers who have submitted a bid may challenge exclusion decisions, the award decision or other acts capable of prejudicing their chances of obtaining the contract. Likewise, candidates excluded at the selection stage have standing to contest the exclusion measure. In certain circumstances, an operator that did not submit a tender may also have standing, provided it demonstrates that it was prevented from participating due to allegedly unlawful clauses in the tender documents and that it would have had a genuine interest in competing.
Standing requires proof of a specific and current interest, not merely a general interest in legality.
Time Limits for Judicial Challenges
In Italy, procurement litigation is governed by “special rules” (the so-called rito speciale appalti) characterised by extremely short deadlines to ensure legal certainty and the continuity of public works.
The starting date depends on the nature of the act being challenged.
The 30-day period is closely linked to the automatic availability of documents on the digital platform. If the authority grants immediate digital access to the winner’s bid, the bidder cannot claim “lack of knowledge” to extend the deadline.
Procurement disputes are handled through an accelerated procedure. According to official data for 2025, the average duration is approximately 107 days at first instance (TAR) and 157 days on appeal before the Council of State. Interim relief is permitted, with decisions within 20–30 days, or even 24–48 hours in urgent cases.
Public procurement litigation remains a significant component of administrative justice in Italy. In 2025, the number of new filings increased, particularly at first instance, reflecting the impact of major investment programmes. According to official data, approximately 63.8% of procurement cases decided on the merits at TAR level are upheld, while the success rate on appeal before the Council of State is around 27.7%.
Challenging a contracting authority’s decision entails both court fees and legal representation costs. Proceedings are subject to the special regime applicable to procurement disputes, which provides for a fixed court fee (the so-called contributo unificato) higher than applicable to ordinary administrative cases. The amount varies depending on the value of the contract and the nature of the claim, but in procurement matters it typically amounts to several thousand euros at first instance (between EUR2,000 and EUR6,000).
The General Rule: Immutability of the Contract
Under Italian law, the primary principle governing public contracts is their immutability. Once a contract is awarded based on a specific bid, its terms are fixed. This ensures that the competitive balance established during the tender is not distorted afterwards. Any amendment that significantly alters the original terms is considered a new contract and, as a general rule, requires a new tender procedure.
Strict Exceptions to the General Rule
Modifications are only permissible as derogations to this principle, provided they fall into one of the following specific categories.
The New Duty of Renegotiation
A specific innovation of PCC is the introduction of the “Principle of conservation of contractual equilibrium”. This is not a “free pass” to modify the contract, but a mandatory mechanism to handle extraordinary and unforeseeable events. If the economic balance is severely disrupted, the parties are obliged to negotiate in good faith to restore the original value of the bargain, ensuring the public interest is still met without providing an unfair advantage to the contractor.
Termination for Breach
The awarding authority can terminate the contract if the contractor commits a serious breach (grave inadempimento). Key grounds include:
Termination for Legal Infringements
The authority is obliged to terminate the contract in the following circumstances.
Termination for Convenience/Public Interest
The awarding authority retains a unilateral right of withdrawal during contract performance, based on a reassessment of the public interest. This power must be exercised in accordance with applicable provisions and subject to adequate notice, as provided by law or by the contract.
Contractor’s Right to Terminate
The contractor’s right to terminate is more restricted. While they can seek termination for “excessive onerousness” or “force majeure” (under the Civil Code), the PCC prioritises the principle of conservation over termination. The contractor generally cannot stop performance unilaterally without a court order, unless the authority’s breach (eg, non-payment) is extreme.
Termination Procedure
The authority must follow a strict adversarial procedure.
1. The authority issues a “notice to perform” setting a deadline (usually 15 days).
2. The contractor has the right to submit counter-arguments.
3. If the breach persists, the authority issues a formal termination decree, which is immediately enforceable.
The PCC recognises a number of special prerogatives in favour of the contracting authority, reflecting the public law nature of the contract and the need to safeguard the public interest. Public contracts are governed by private law during performance, but remain subject to certain public law powers that distinguish them from purely private contractual relationships.
Key prerogatives include the following.
These prerogatives are balanced by principles of proportionality, good faith and legality, and their exercise remains subject to judicial review before the administrative courts.
The judicial year 2025 marked the “maturity phase” of the new Public Contracts Code. The Administrative Courts have pivoted from a formalistic approach to a substantive one, centred on the principle of result and the principle of trust.
Non-Automatic Exclusions and the “Result” (Judgment No 8661/2025)
The Council of State clarified that, under the new Code, exclusion is no longer automatic in the presence of formal irregularities. Contracting authorities must assess whether the defect actually affects the substance of the bid, in line with the principle of result. Minor omissions or non-essential formal issues do not justify exclusion, which is now considered an extrema ratio. The focus is on selecting the best contractor rather than sanctioning purely formal errors.
The Four Pillars of the So-Called Soccorso Istruttorio (Judgment No 1425/2025)
The Council of State further developed the mechanism of soccorso istruttorio, moving beyond the traditional distinction between remediable and non-remediable defects. It identified four functions:
This reflects a more flexible and co-operative approach aimed at preserving competition.
Privacy Versus Defence: The End of Automatic Access (Judgment No 10430/2025)
Following recent EU case law, the Council of State limited the scope of access to tender documents. Access is no longer automatic, especially where trade secrets are involved. A bidder must now demonstrate that the requested information is strictly necessary for the exercise of their defence. This marks a shift towards a more balanced approach between transparency and the protection of confidential business information.
At present, no further legislative amendments are under consideration, particularly given that the PCC is still relatively recent.
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The End of the Promoter’s Pre-Emption Right in Italian Project Finance
A landmark 2026 ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has fundamentally altered the landscape of Italian project finance. The Court has struck down the “right of pre-emption”, a long-standing mechanism that allowed initial project promoters to match the best bid in a tender. This decision marks a significant shift towards stricter competition standards, casting doubt on traditional Italian procurement habits.
Project finance is a vital tool for developing Italian public infrastructure, allowing private firms to propose projects to the state. In this “unsolicited proposal” model, a private operator submits a feasibility study and a financial plan for public evaluation. If the administration approves the idea, a public tender is launched to select the final concessionaire. Historically, the original proposer – the “promoter” – was granted a safety net to encourage this costly preparatory work.
Under the previous legal framework (Article 183 of legislative decree 50/2016), the promoter held a powerful right of first refusal. If a competitor submitted a better offer during the tender, the promoter could simply match that offer to win the contract. To compensate the displaced bidder, the promoter only had to reimburse a small fraction of the costs, capped at 2.5% of the investment value. While this encouraged private initiative, it often discouraged third-party bidders who felt the “game was rigged” in favour of the initiator.
The European Commission and various market players have long criticised this structural advantage as a barrier to the internal market. Directive 2014/23/EU requires that all concession awards follow the principles of equal treatment, transparency and proportionality. Article 49 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) serves as a cornerstone for cross-border business. It guarantees that economic operators established in different member states may access national markets on terms that do not distort competition. Critics argued that the Italian system allowed promoters to “wait and see”, tailoring their final commitment only after seeing their rivals’ cards. This asymmetry was seen as a deterrent to foreign companies considering entry into the Italian infrastructure market.
The conflict eventually reached the CJEU in Case C-810/24, originating from a dispute over a public contract in Milan. The case concerned a project for automated public facilities where a competitor had outbid the promoter, only to lose the contract when the promoter exercised the pre-emption right. The Italian Council of State asked the European Court to determine if such a “second chance” for promoters violated the core tenets of EU law.
In its judgment of February 2026, the CJEU ruled that the Italian pre-emption mechanism is incompatible with European law. The Court emphasised that the principle of equal treatment requires all bidders to be on the same footing when they submit their offers. Allowing one player to revise their bid after the tender ends destroys the integrity of the competitive process. Consequently, the promoter can no longer be allowed to “align” its offer with the winning bid to snatch the contract.
The CJEU also highlighted that this mechanism restricts the “freedom of establishment” within the EU. International operators are unlikely to spend resources on Italian tenders if they know their best efforts can be neutralised at the last moment. By removing this barrier, the Court aims to foster a more genuine cross-border competition for large-scale Italian concessions. The ruling confirms that policy goals, such as stimulating private investment, cannot override the fundamental requirement of transparency.
While the CJEU case focused on the 2016 Code, its logic applies directly to the current Legislative Decree No 36/2023 (PCC). The new Code had attempted to preserve the promoter’s advantage to maintain the flow of private investment in public works. Following this ruling, the Italian government will likely need to amend the PCC to remove or significantly dilute these preferential rights. Legal practitioners now anticipate a wave of litigation regarding ongoing tenders where pre-emption rights were originally advertised.
The removal of the pre-emption right does not mean promoters lose all their advantages. The original proposer still benefits from an “informational edge”, having designed the project and understood its financial complexities long before the tender starts. They are naturally better positioned to submit a highly optimised and aggressive bid from the outset. However, they must now win the contract on the merit of their first submission rather than relying on a legal safety net.
Looking ahead, the Italian market will need to find new ways to reward private innovation. We may see a shift towards “bid stipends” or higher cost-reimbursement caps to protect the early investments made by project promoters. For global investors, Italy is becoming a more transparent and competitive market, though the risks associated with being a “first mover” have undeniably increased. Reconciling private initiative with European competition standards remains the defining challenge for the next decade of Italian infrastructure.
Public Procurement and Third-Country Products: Italian Courts on the Exclusion of Non-EU Tenders
EU public procurement law rests on the premise that competition within the internal market is secured through open and transparent award procedures. Yet the growing exposure of procurement markets to global competition has raised difficult questions regarding operators from jurisdictions with different regulatory conditions. Determining where market openness begins to undermine fair competition has become a pressing concern for businesses and authorities alike.
The legal framework addresses this challenge through a combination of international commitments and EU secondary legislation. Central to this is the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), concluded under the World Trade Organization. The GPA establishes a multilateral regime for cross-border procurement trade based on reciprocal undertakings among its parties. In EU law, it serves as the principal yardstick for determining the treatment economic operators from third countries may claim.
The procurement directives give effect to this approach by requiring contracting authorities to treat operators from GPA signatory states no less favourably than EU counterparts. Underlying these provisions is the notion that access to EU procurement markets is conditional upon reciprocal commitments from the third country concerned. This creates a “level playing field” intended to protect the integrity of the internal market.
Italian law transposes this framework through Article 69, PCC. This article provides that works, supplies, services and operators from countries bound by international agreements with the Union are entitled to the same treatment as EU operators. This ensures that the Italian market remains open to global partners who adhere to shared competitive standards.
Alongside this general rule, EU law provides specific measures for cases where goods originate from countries that do not afford comparable market access. Under Directive 2014/25/EU, contracting entities in the utilities sector may reject a tender where more than half the product value originates in non-GPA countries. This is a critical tool for authorities managing procurement in sectors like energy, water and transport.
Under this rule, the provenance of the products offered matters more than the nationality of the tenderer. The concern is that producers outside the Union may operate free of the social, environmental and economic standards that bind EU manufacturers. The resulting cost advantage can distort competition and disadvantage compliant local bidders.
The Italian PCC transposes this mechanism in Article 170 for procurement in the utilities sectors. Under this provision, a contracting authority may reject a supply tender where more than half the total value originates in third countries. Should the authority choose not to reject such a tender, it must provide specific, documented reasons for that decision.
The Italian Council of State recently considered these rules in Judgment No 3721 of 2 May 2025. The dispute involved a procurement procedure for the supply of electric buses for regional public transport. The tenderer intended to rely on the technical capacity of an auxiliary undertaking established in China.
The contracting authority excluded the tenderer because the auxiliary undertaking was based in a country that had not acceded to the GPA. On appeal, the tenderer argued that neither EU nor national law lays down a blanket prohibition on third-country participation. They further contended that the procurement documents contained no express restriction to EU-based operators.
The Council of State dismissed the appeal, stressing that market openness operates within a framework built on reciprocity. The court held that access by operators from third countries is not guaranteed in the absence of international agreements. Consequently, the exclusion was deemed consistent with the rules governing admission to public procedures.
A related question came before the court in Judgment No 9575 of 4 December 2025 regarding water distribution infrastructure. The contracting authority rejected a tender after the bidder disclosed that more than half the product value was of third-country origin. This triggered the protective mechanisms outlined in the utilities procurement rules.
The excluded tenderer argued that the authority should have assessed the technical merits of the offer before deciding on exclusion. The Council of State disagreed, clarifying that Article 170 establishes rejection as the default rule for such tenders. Under this interpretation, it is the decision to retain the tender that constitutes an exception requiring an express statement of reasons.
Taken together, these rulings clarify how Italian administrative courts are applying rules to third-country operators and products. While EU law champions international competition, these decisions point to a more assertive use of reciprocity to shield the market. For clients, this highlights the vital importance of auditing supply chain origins before submitting a bid in the Italian utilities sector.
Algorithmic Administration and Public Procurement
Over the past two decades, public procurement has shifted from a paper-based activity to a highly digitalised regulatory environment. In this evolving context, artificial intelligence and algorithmic tools are increasingly deployed to support the exercise of public powers. A key emerging trend is the growing judicial scrutiny regarding how such tools are integrated into administrative decision-making. The central question for administrative law is no longer whether these technologies may be used, but on what terms their implementation remains consistent with established legal principles.
Beyond efficiency gains, digitalisation also serves a vital market-integration function. By reducing informational asymmetries and transaction costs, it lowers barriers to entry for foreign operators and facilitates broader participation in procurement procedures across jurisdictions. The Italian legal system has confronted this evolution with notable directness through its legislative framework. The new PCC addresses the use of algorithmic and automated processes across the full life cycle of public contracts.
The sheer scale of contemporary procurement creates a strong incentive to introduce tools capable of flagging anomalies and accelerating verification. However, greater reliance on such tools also sharpens concerns about transparency, accountability and the preservation of procedural safeguards. Article 30 of the PCC responds to these tensions by laying down a principled framework for automation in procurement. This provision encourages contracting authorities to adopt technological solutions wherever feasible to enhance efficiency and process management.
In particular, Article 30 seeks to reconcile innovation with the following core principles:
The resulting design embodies a dual logic where automation is promoted as a means of improving performance while remaining embedded within a system of legal guarantees. Under this framework, authorities are expected to treat automation as a legitimate instrument for carrying out complex procurement tasks. At the same time, the use of these tools is conditioned on requirements designed to prevent systems from displacing human responsibility.
These safeguards include obligations relating to the intelligibility of algorithmic processes and the availability of meaningful human oversight. The overarching aim is to forestall situations in which decisions become effectively inscrutable due to technological complexity or proprietary restrictions. The challenge is not simply to regulate technology as such, but to determine how classical legal principles function when public decisions are assisted by automated processes. The Italian Council of State addressed this challenge in Judgment No 4857 of 4 June 2025.
This case arose from a tender procedure managed through an electronic platform that handled the submission and verification of bids. Economic operators were required to generate a digital fingerprint identifying their relevant files before final submission to ensure document integrity. During verification, one operator was excluded after the system detected a mismatch between the original fingerprint and the uploaded document. The operator subsequently challenged both the exclusion and the authority’s refusal to grant access to the platform’s source code.
The dispute raised a question of wider significance regarding whether the algorithm itself formed part of the administrative decision-making process. In its reasoning, the Council of State drew a conceptual distinction that has since become central to the debate on algorithmic administration. The court distinguished between algorithms that merely assist administrative activity and those that effectively determine the outcome of a procedure. This functional test is increasingly adopted by Italian courts to determine the level of disclosure required.
Systems performing mechanical or verification tasks remain governed by ordinary procedural rules and generally require less disclosure. Conversely, systems that autonomously generate outcomes attract heightened obligations of transparency and oversight under the Public Contracts Code. The significance of this distinction is further illustrated in Judgment No 4546 of 2025 by the Regional Administrative Court for Lazio. This dispute concerned the use of artificial intelligence by economic operators rather than the contracting authority itself.
The applicant challenged an award, contending that the successful tenderers had relied on AI tools within their technical proposals for healthcare cleaning services. The court held that incorporating AI tools within a technical proposal does not, by itself, alter the legal framework for evaluating bids. Crucially, these tools were described as instruments assisting operational planning and service optimisation rather than autonomously determining contractual performance. The court found that such use did not undermine the reliability or validity of the offers.
Read together, these two decisions sketch the contours of an emerging judicial approach to artificial intelligence in procurement law. The courts show no inclination to reject algorithmic technologies outright or to treat them as legally disruptive innovations demanding entirely new categories. Instead, their method is granular, identifying the concrete role played by the technology within the procedure. This role is then assessed through the lens of established legal principles such as legality and transparency.
What these decisions convey is a firm restatement of the principles that have long governed public action in Italy. Algorithmic tools are not treated as autonomous actors capable of overriding the duty to give reasons or the right to judicial review. Their deployment instead becomes an occasion to reaffirm that every public decision must satisfy fundamental standards of lawful administration. For practitioners, the message is clear: integrating AI into public procurement does not call for a wholesale reinvention of administrative law.
The emerging judicial approach requires authorities to ensure that algorithmic tools remain transparent, reviewable, and subject to effective human oversight. Digitalisation and algorithmic administration do not erode the foundations of administrative legality; rather, they test and ultimately confirm their resilience. This balanced approach provides a stable environment for both contracting authorities and bidders navigating the 2026 procurement landscape.
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