The EU maintains tailored sanctions regimes targeting over 40 different countries, territories and non-governmental organisations. The past year’s developments in the EU were driven primarily by the ongoing war in Ukraine. This includes stricter restrictions on financial trade, services, energy, technology and other sectors deemed critical to the Russian economy, as well as the further development of sanctions targeting Belarus. Further, geopolitical situations and human rights concerns have prompted the EU to also implement additional sanctions regimes or expand the existing ones throughout the world.

In parallel, the EU has significantly stepped up its focus on implementation, enforcement and circumvention risks, including through dedicated anti-circumvention measures in recent sanctions packages against Russia. In this context, the EU has also listed multiple individuals and entities in third countries such as China that it considers to be involved in facilitating, supporting or enabling the circumvention of EU sanctions against Russia. These efforts are complemented by guidance for operators and humanitarian actors to support compliant conduct while mitigating unintended impacts of sanctions on legitimate activities.

The European Commission’s (the “Commission”) horizontal guidance on the provision of humanitarian aid in compliance with EU sanctions remains a key reference point for organisations, banks and other intermediaries. This guidance builds on earlier documents addressing the provision of humanitarian aid in sanctions environments affected by EU counter-terrorism measures and regimes concerning Iran, Nicaragua and Venezuela, including questions arising in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It clarifies how humanitarian exceptions and derogations should operate in practice and reiterates that impartial humanitarian organisations and beneficiaries of aid are not the target of EU sanctions.

Over the past 12 months, the EU has adopted multiple additional sanctions packages against Russia. These measures include further export restrictions and new listings of Russian individuals and companies, as well as designations of actors in third countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates and certain financial and commercial operators in Central Asia considered to be facilitating or supporting the circumvention of existing EU sanctions.

In addition, the EU has used its existing Iran sanctions regime to list two individuals and one entity linked to actions undermining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. These listings, which target those involved in running a toll and control system for commercial vessels, illustrate the EU’s readiness to apply sanctions to protect critical maritime routes and global energy and trade flows.

Moreover, the EU has renewed most of its existing sanctions regimes, while repeatedly updating the Russia and Belarus frameworks; it has also expanded several horizontal regimes, including counter‑terrorism and the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime – for example, the recent listings of entities and individuals linked to extremist Israeli settler violence.

The sectors most impacted by EU sanctions regulations vary depending on the specific sanctions regime. However, some sectors tend to be more frequently targeted than others. The following sectors are currently targeted by the EU in its Russia Sanctions Regulation.

• Financial sector and services: restrictions on transactions with banks, insurance companies and investment institutions to limit their access to international capital and financial resources.
• Energy: restrictions on fossil fuel imports into the EU or limitations on the technology needed for energy production. 
• Transport: sanctions are targeting airlines, shipping companies and logistics firms, as well as restricting access to the EU market or transit through the EU.
• Technology: restrictions on technology exports to limit access to the advanced technologies needed for various industries and to impede economic development.
• Defence: sanctions may target specific military equipment or technology, limiting the ability to modernise military capabilities. In addition, the EU has a strict framework that controls the exportation of goods that have a potential military application (so-called dual-use goods).

Sanctions are adopted at EU level. They are generally agreed by consensus within the Council of the EU, following proposals from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Discussions take place in the relevant Council working groups. Restrictive measures are specified in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Council decisions. If these decisions involve economic or financial measures, they must be implemented through a Council regulation.

The High Representative and the Commission, primarily led by the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (DG FISMA), then present a joint proposal for a regulation. This joint proposal is reviewed and discussed by the appropriate Council working groups before adoption. The CFSP Council decision and the Council regulation are adopted simultaneously to ensure they are effective at the same time. The primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing EU sanctions lies with the competent EU member state authorities, while the Commission, as the guardian of the treaties, oversees their proper implementation and enforcement across member states.

In the EU, the framework for reporting obligations concerning sanctions is designed to ensure adherence to, and effective oversight of, restrictions imposed on certain individuals, entities or countries. These obligations are set out in different sanctions frameworks and vary across different sanctions. 

The obligations are primarily directed at financial institutions, credit institutions, national central banks, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, central security depositories and other entities or individuals that might come into contact with sanctioned parties.

Who Must Report

Financial institutions such as banks, insurance/reinsurance companies and other providers of financial services are required to report specific dealings that may involve sanctioned parties or are subject to periodic reporting requirements. Additionally, any company or individual that may possess assets or engage in transactions with sanctioned entities must comply with reporting requirements.

To Whom Reports Must Be Made

Reports must generally be made to the national competent authorities of each EU member state, which are typically the financial regulatory bodies or ministries of finance. Such national competent authorities will usually themselves report this information within the Commission.

Reporting Circumstances

Entities must report the freezing of funds or economic resources belonging to sanctioned individuals or entities. Legal professionals must ensure that their services to sanctioned parties are compliant with sanctions regimes and may need to report their activities, especially if they suspect a breach of sanctions. In specific sanctions regimes, such as the one targeting Russia, reporting must be done regarding the management of reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian National Wealth Fund. Credit institutions must also report deposits exceeding EUR100,000 being transferred out of the EU by Russian nationals or entities owned by Russian nationals or entities. 

Legal Framework

The EU regulations that outline specific reporting obligations are spread across diverse sanctions or may arise from member states’ national regulatory or prudential rules. Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 setting out sectoral sanctions vis-à-vis Russia contains specific reporting requirements. Such requirements are also envisaged under the sanctions regimes for Belarus, Haiti and Iran.

Since the proliferation of EU sanction regimes, particularly those targeting Russia and Belarus, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in sanctions matters has become more complex. 

CJEU Rulings on Sanctions and Due Process

The CJEU is continuously strengthening its position that individuals and entities listed under sanctions must have their rights protected. In practical terms, EU sanctions must adhere to the principles of due process, meaning that individuals and entities targeted by sanctions have the right to be informed of the reasons for their listing and have access to effective legal remedies.

Recently, in Gutseriev v Council (Case T 286/25, May 2026), the General Court annulled the sanctions listing of Mikail Safarbekovich Gutseriev, holding that the Council of the European Union failed to demonstrate, on an updated and sufficiently solid factual basis, that at the time of the listing Gutseriev still benefited from or supported President Lukashenko’s regime. Moreover, it held that the Council could not rely on Gutseriev’s business interests in the commercial property sector to conclude support or benefit from the Belarusian regime as that would amount to a presumption that would apply to any businessperson in Belarus.

Similarly, in Chevtsov v Council (Case T 528/24, April 2026), the General Court held that Mr Chevtsov’s role as honorary consul of the Philippines in Belarus did not suffice to substantiate that Mr Chevtsov supported the Belarusian regime. Moreover, the Court found that his alleged involvement in Reshenie Bank and, indirectly, in the Dudutki museum complex, and his alleged benefiting from the Belarusian State budget, was also insufficiently substantiated.

In Ignatova v Council (Case T 601/24, June 2026), the General Court held that an “immediate family member” is any person with family ties to a leading businessperson of such a degree that they could be used to disperse that businessperson’s assets to evade sanctions, irrespective of whether the tie is based on blood, adoption or marriage. Thus, the Court held that Anastasia Ignatova, the daughter of the wife of listed businessman Sergei Chemezov, was a sufficiently immediate family member. 

By contrast, in Abramovich v Council (Case T 313/22), the General Court upheld the listing of Roman Abramovich, confirming the existence of a clear and material link with entities supporting the Russian government. The General Court confirmed its finding in Abramovich v Council (Case T 1105/23, October 2025), dismissing Mr Abramovich’s action for annulment of the maintaining acts. The Court held that he remained an “influential businessman exercising activities in Russia” and a businessman active in sectors providing substantial revenue to the Russian government, primarily on the basis of his 28.64% shareholding in Evraz – one of Russia’s largest taxpayers.

Recently, in Traugott Ickeroth (Case C 67/25, July 2026), the Court of Justice found that the Commission’s Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on sanctions regulations cannot alter the scope of restrictive measures contained in a regulation or be decisive for the purposes of interpreting such a regulation. Specifically, the Court held that the FAQs had been unduly lenient in narrowing the scope of the concept of “operator” to operators engaged in an activity of an economic nature, whereas Regulation 833/2014 itself imposed no such limitation.

Moreover, in Belaruskali and Others v Council (Joined Cases C 816/24 P, C 817/24 P and C 818/24 P, June 2026), the Court of Justice upheld the General Court’s judgments and confirmed the validity of the appellants’ inclusion or maintenance on the EU restrictive measures lists. The Court rejected the argument that the concept of the “Lukashenko regime” was insufficiently clear and precise and therefore contrary to the principle of legal certainty. Additionally, the Court found that the General Court did not err in considering, based on an accumulation of facts, that Belaruskali and Mr Golovaty benefited from the Lukashenko regime, within the meaning of criterion (b).

These decisions underline the courts’ insistence that sanctions listings must rely on verifiable, individualised evidence and cannot be maintained based on vague affiliations or outdated assumptions.

EU Blocking Statute

In the EU, a blocking statute was first adopted by way of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 in response to US sanctions against Iran, Cuba and Libya having extraterritorial effects. This Regulation was updated in August 2018 to shield EU individuals and entities aiming to do business in Iran from legal consequences in the USA resulting from US extraterritorial sanctions. 

In Case T-8/21, IFIC Holding AG v Commission, the EU General Court confirmed its position regarding the EU Blocking Statute protecting EU companies from complying with US sanctions on Iran. This specific case involved a German company, IFIC, which challenged the Commission’s decision to allow a bank (Clearstream) to withhold their dividend payments due to US sanctions. The General Court ruled in favour of the Commission, finding that:

• the Commission does not need to consider the interests of companies on the US sanctions list (such as IFIC);
• the Commission does not have to explore less harmful options before granting permission to comply with US sanctions;
• companies on the US sanctions list do not have the right to be heard in the authorisation process; and
• the authorisation to comply with US sanctions only applies from the date it has been granted, not retroactively.

In Case T-518/23 (December 2025), the General Court confirmed that the EU blocking statute does not provide the third parties targeted by the restrictive measures any procedural role, meaning that their interests are not taken into account and that they are not involved in the procedures conducted. In contrast, in this case the Court found that the authorisations did have retroactive effect and were exceptionally permissible since the purpose – preventing serious damage to the interests of the EU or the applicant resulting from non-compliance – justified the retroactivity and the legitimate expectations of those concerned were duly respected. 

Claims for Damages

In its decision of February 2023, the CJEU rejected a claim by Oleksandr Klymenko, Ukraine’s former revenue minister. Mr Klymenko sought financial compensation because he was placed on the EU’s sanctions list. While the Court acknowledged that the EU made mistakes, they were not serious enough to warrant financial payout. Though the Court found the EU’s actions in 2021 could be considered a reason for compensation, Mr Klymenko could not prove enough damage or a clear connection between the sanctions and his losses.

Similarly, in its decision (Case T-602/24) of 10 June 2026, the General Court rejected a claim by Gennady Nikolayevich Timchenko, a Russian listed businessman, seeking EUR1 million in provisional compensation for alleged moral harm due to the adoption and maintenance of the restrictive measures. The General Court recalled that the EU can only be held responsible where the alleged breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals is sufficiently established, damages have actually been suffered and a causal link between the two is established. However, the Court found that Mr Timchenko had merely asserted that the Council’s allegations and the listing itself had serious consequences for his reputation, without providing any evidence of the existence or extent of the alleged harm.

Legal Services and Advisory Bans

The General Court and CJEU have also recently clarified the scope of the EU’s prohibitions on the provision of legal services to Russian entities.

In Jemerak (Case C 109/23, September 2024), the CJEU ruled that notarial services do not fall within the scope of the advisory services ban imposed under Article 5n of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014. The Court distinguished between legal representation in judicial proceedings, which remains permitted, and general legal advice, which is prohibited where it may support sanctioned actors. In the Commission’s guidance (which is not legally binding) as regards EU sanctions targeting Russia, it is specified that notary services do not fall within the scope of legal services in legal systems where a notary, acting with complete independence and impartiality and with a legal obligation incumbent on them, authenticates a contract for the sale of immovable property owned by a legal person established in Russia without providing, besides that authentication, any legal advice intended to promote the specific interests of the parties.

In joined cases T 635/22, T 644/22 and T 494/22 (September 2024), the General Court upheld the Council’s restrictions on legal advisory services, finding them proportionate and compatible with the fundamental rights of both EU lawyers and sanctioned entities. Additional challenges by Bar associations were similarly rejected (see T 797/22, T 798/22, T 828/22). The General Court did however specify in these cases that the provision of legal advice in the context of pre-litigation procedures is permitted.

Circumvention

EU sanctions are binding within the EU’s jurisdiction. The EU refrains from adopting sanctions having extraterritorial application, however, and prohibits “circumvention” of existing sanctions regimes. Circumvention has been generally defined as “activities in respect of which it appears, on the basis of objective factors, that, under cover of a formal appearance which enables them to avoid the constituent elements of an infringement of [...], none the less they have, as such or by reason of their possible link to other activities, the aim or result, direct or indirect, of frustrating the prohibition” (judgment of the CJEU, 21 December 2011, C-72/11, Afrasiabi, EU:C:2011:874, paragraphs 60 and 62).

In the 14th sanctions package targeting Russia, the EU’s wording of the prohibition on circumvention contained in Article 12 of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 has been expanded, with the following:

“It shall be prohibited to participate, knowingly and intentionally, in activities the object or effect of which is to circumvent prohibitions in this Regulation, including by participating in such activities without deliberately seeking that object or effect but being aware that the participation may have that object or effect and accepting that possibility.”

Arguably, this update should make EU persons additionally cautious. 

Relatedly, the new Article 8a of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 requires EU persons (both individuals and legal entities) to use their best efforts to ensure that third-country entities that they own or control do not “undermine” EU sectoral sanctions against Russia. 

Articles 12f to 12gb of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 introduced a suite of circumvention restrictions aimed at preventing the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia through third-country operators and intermediaries. These provisions prohibit persons and entities from participating in arrangements, whether directly or indirectly, that are designed to circumvent the prohibitions established under that Regulation, including by routing transactions or asset transfers through third parties or jurisdictions outside the EU. Operators subject to Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 are also subject to enhanced due diligence obligations and are required to ensure that contractual counterparties undertake not to facilitate circumvention, with particular emphasis placed on the role of professional intermediaries, financial institutions, and traders in closing evasion loopholes.

The EU response to the war in Ukraine will likely dominate its sanctions agenda in the coming year. Further tightening of existing sanctions and new packages targeting the Russian economy, individuals and entities are anticipated, with a particular focus on maintaining and expanding restrictions on the energy sector, closing remaining channels for Russia‑related cryptocurrency and digital‑asset transactions, and broadening measures directed at Russian financial institutions and payment channels.

The Council of the EU and the Commission will continue prioritising sanction enforcement and focusing on anti-circumvention policies. This could involve tightening current loopholes, such as introducing personal sanctions against individuals and companies from third countries that facilitate the circumvention of sanctions against Russia, strengthening enforcement mechanisms at the level of the EU member states and co-operating with international allies.

Global developments or internal political shifts within the EU could lead to unforeseen sanctions targets or changes in the regimes.

Individuals or legal entities subject to EU sanctions have the right to contest their designation. The initial step normally involves submitting a request for de-listing to the Council of the EU and/or the European External Action Service (EEAS). This request should be accompanied by supporting evidence that challenges the reasons for designation. The Council reviews the submission and determines whether to uphold or revoke the designation.

Another recourse that might be explored in parallel with the application to the Council is to bring the matter before the CJEU courts in Luxembourg. The General Court is the first instance where one can file a case, and decisions made there can be appealed at the Court of Justice. Legal challenges have often resulted in the annulment of sanctions, with the courts citing various grounds such as lack of sufficient evidence, breaches of due process, imprecise justifications, factual inaccuracies or infringement of the rights of the defence.

It is important to note that the process is governed by strict deadlines and follows a detailed legal procedure. Moreover, legal representation of a sanctioned individual or entity, or the receipt of funds from frozen assets, may necessitate obtaining a licence from the national competent authority in the EU member state concerned. The complexity of these procedures and the legal nuances involved underscore the importance of the issue at hand.

The process of challenging an individual designation involves a legal examination of the reasons and evidence underpinning the initial listing decision. Should the court determine that the listing was not substantiated by the necessary legal standards or was based on insufficient evidence, it has the authority to annul the listing. This annulment effectively invalidates the decision that placed the entity on the sanctions list.

The actual ability to claim damages for the harm caused by an unsubstantiated listing is complex and often depends on the specific legal framework governing the sanctions regime. In many cases, the possibility of claiming damages is limited or excluded, which means that financial compensation for losses such as frozen assets, lost business opportunities or reputational damage may not be readily available.

Upon successful de-listing, the entity would regain control over previously frozen assets, including access to bank accounts and property. This restoration of access to financial resources is a significant step towards normalising the entity’s operations. 

The timeline for de-listing from sanctions can vary significantly based on a multitude of factors, including the specific reasons for the sanctions and the legal and procedural avenues available for contesting them.

Many cases average approximately one to two years from the initiation of legal proceedings to the final decision by the court. This duration is not fixed and can extend beyond the average, particularly in cases that are more legally or factually complex. The intricacies of each case, including the nature of the sanctions, the evidence presented and the legal arguments made, can all influence the time required to reach a resolution.

Trade and export restrictions on services can be complex and are often subject to change due to geopolitical events, international agreements and national security concerns. Countries such as Russia, Belarus, Iran and Libya have been subject to various and long-standing sanctions and restrictions. It is important to note that the specifics of these restrictions can be complex and may require a thorough review of the relevant legal instruments, which can include international sanctions, national laws and regulatory guidance.

Russia and Belarus

In response to the conflict in Ukraine, the EU imposed significant sanctions on Russia and Belarus. These sanctions often include restrictions on the provision of certain services.

The EU has imposed restrictions on services through several legal instruments, including Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions in destabilising Ukraine, and Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 as regards Belarus. These Regulations have been amended multiple times to include various service sectors, such as:

• financial services;
• energy-related services;
• services related to military and dual-use goods;
• crypto-asset wallets;
• accounts or custody services;
• architectural and engineering services;
• IT consultancy and legal advisory services;
• advertising, market research and public opinion polling technical assistance;
• brokering or financial assistance (in relation to the maritime transport of Russian oil);
• intellectual property rights or trade secrets (in relation to goods and technology covered by other sanctions);
• software for the management of enterprises and software for industrial design and manufacture; and
• broad categories of goods that may contribute to Russia’s or Belarus’s industrial or military enhancements.

Iran

The EU has taken a firm stance on issues concerning Iran by implementing sanctions that are specifically targeted at the nation’s nuclear programme and the human rights concerns within its borders. These sanctions encompass a broad array of restrictions, particularly in the financial services sector, where there is a comprehensive ban on the provision of financial services, including insurance and reinsurance. The energy sector is also significantly affected, with explicit prohibitions on offering services that are connected to the exploration and production of oil and gas. The legal framework underpinning these sanctions is encapsulated in Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012, which serves as the principal legal instrument governing the scope and application of the restrictive measures imposed by the EU on Iran.

Libya

The EU’s response to the situation in Libya has been to enforce sanctions through financial restrictions on transactions with certain Libyan entities and prohibition of the provision of military-related services and equipment, as delineated in Council Regulation (EU) No 204/2011 and its subsequent update, Council Regulation (EU) No 2016/44. 

Trade and export restrictions are regulatory measures imposed by countries or international bodies to control the flow of goods to and from specific countries for various reasons, including political, security, economic or social concerns. Countries such as Russia, Belarus, Iran, Libya and Syria have been subject to various trade and export restrictions, often due to geopolitical tensions, human rights issues or concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the wake of Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and Belarus’s support for these actions, a multitude of import and export restrictions and export control measures have been implemented. These sanctions encompass a broad range of goods, targeting the following categories:

• dual-use goods;
• goods and technology that might contribute to military and technological enhancement;
• firearms, their parts and essential components and ammunition;
• certain equipment and pipes for the extraction of fossil fuels (including oil and gas), oil refining and liquefaction of natural gas goods;
• goods and technology suited for use in aviation or the space industry;
• maritime navigation goods and technology;
• luxury goods; and
• goods that could contribute in particular to the enhancement of state industrial capacities. 

The EU has codified controls on dual-use items in Regulation (EU) 2021/821.

The EU’s legal landscape is characterised by a nuanced approach when it comes to the interplay between sanctions compliance and contractual obligations. The courts are tasked with the delicate responsibility of ensuring that the enforcement of sanctions is consistent with the rule of law while also maintaining fairness within contractual engagements. It is equally important to recall that the governing law of a particular contractual relationship has a significant impact on this interplay with EU sanctions. 

EU sectoral sanctions programmes include standard non-liability clauses dismissing any claims in connection with any contract or transaction whose performance has been affected, directly or indirectly – in whole or in part – by the sanctions regime in question. The EU’s sanctions regime vis-à-vis Russia specifically provides that no claims in connection with any contract or transaction that has been affected by EU sanctions shall be satisfied when made by any Russian person or entity, with the burden of evidence that the conduct is not prohibited by EU sanctions having shifted to the claimant.

EU courts have approached the enforcement of judgments involving sanctions by prioritising the rule of law and ensuring adherence to EU regulations, including those pertaining to sanctions. This process involves a careful balancing act considering legal principles, international obligations and the unique circumstances of each case presented. The courts meticulously evaluate each case to ensure that the enforcement aligns with both the letter and spirit of the law while respecting the overarching framework of EU sanctions.

Any sanction proposals, including reviews aiming for the repeal of a measure or insertion of an exemption clause, are first drafted by the relevant working groups of the Council of the EU. These proposals are then referred to the Council for action. The key Council working group on EU sanctions is the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX). The EEAS assists the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in fulfilling their mandate, and has a key role in the preparation, maintenance and review of sanctions, as well as in the communication and outreach activities concerning them in close co-operation with EU member states, relevant EU delegations and the Commission.

In the legislative process regarding sanctions, the EEAS deals with preparation of the High Representative’s proposals for a decision, and with the Commission’s proposals for regulations that are subsequently reviewed and adopted by the Council. Regulations are directly applicable within the EU and are binding on individuals and entities, including economic operators. For its part, the Commission presents proposals for regulations jointly with the High Representative. 

DG FISMA prepares proposals for regulations on sanctions for adoption by the Council and represents the Commission in sanctions-related discussions with member states at the Council Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors.

DG FISMA is also in charge of monitoring, on behalf of the Commission, the implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions across all member states. DG FISMA increasingly supports member states in their efforts to apply sanctions by answering questions pertaining to interpretation raised by national competent authorities, as well as economic and humanitarian operators. 

Lastly, as noted in the foregoing, competent authorities of member states are primarily responsible for the implementation of all sanctions within their national jurisdictions. They work in close co-operation with the EEAS, the relevant EU delegations and the Commission towards the implementation of sanctions.

In the EU, asset-freeze measures cover all funds and economic resources belonging to or owned by designated persons and entities, as well as those held or controlled by such persons and entities. 

They are equally extended to entities owned or controlled by designated persons, as clarified in various guiding instruments, including the EU best practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures or the EU’s guidance on the implementation of restrictive measures vis-à-vis Russia. This ensures that sanctions are effectively enforced and that designated persons cannot easily circumvent the measures by operating through intermediaries or related entities.

According to the EU best practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures, ownership is defined as the possession of more than 50% of the proprietary rights of an entity or having a majority interest in it. If this criterion is satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is owned by another person or entity.

To assess the control criterion, it is necessary to consider whether a person or entity has the right or power to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of such legal person or entity, and: 

• has been appointed solely as a result of the exercise of the voting rights of a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of a legal person or entity who have held office during the present and previous financial year; 
• is controlling alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or members of a legal person or entity, a majority of shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in that legal person or entity;
• has the right to exercise a dominant influence over a legal person or entity, pursuant to an agreement entered into with that legal person or entity, or to a provision in its memorandum or articles of association, where the law governing that legal person or entity permits its being subject to such agreement or provision;
• has the power to exercise the right to exercise a dominant influence referred to in the foregoing bullet point, without being the holder of that right;
• has the right to use all or part of the assets of a legal person or entity;
• manages the business of a legal person or entity on a unified basis, while publishing consolidated accounts; and
• shares jointly and severally the financial liabilities of a legal person or entity or guarantees them.

If any of these criteria are satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is controlled by another person or entity, unless the contrary can be established on a case-by-case basis. It is crucial to point out that these criteria are not exhaustive; however, fulfilment of one of them will lead to a presumption of control, which can be refuted on a case-by-case basis.