The Penal Code 1871 (the “Penal Code”) sets out most of the punishable offences in Singapore. These offences are classified into categories, including but not limited to:
White-collar offences covered under the Penal Code include criminal misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust, cheating, etc.
Other white-collar offences are set out in:
Burden and Standard of Proof
Generally, the prosecution bears the burden of proving both the actus reus (ie, the physical element) and the mens rea (ie, the mental element, such as the intention to commit the act) of each offence beyond reasonable doubt before an accused person may be convicted of the offence. An exception to this principle is the case of strict liability offences (eg, littering), where an offender may be convicted after performing a physical act regardless of their state of mind at the time of the offence. This is because Section 26H of the Penal Code expressly states that strict liability offences have no corresponding fault element.
Attempting to Commit an Offence
A person who intends to commit an offence may be convicted once they take a substantial step towards committing that offence. This is the case even when the offence is not eventually committed. Pursuant to Section 511(2) of the Penal Code, an act is a substantial step towards committing an offence if it is strongly corroborative of an intention to commit the offence.
In the absence of any other written law, a person who is convicted of attempting to commit an offence will generally receive the same punishment as is prescribed for that offence.
The presumption of innocence takes centre stage in a criminal matter. This automatic presumption means that the accused person is presumed innocent until they are proven guilty.
In order to secure a criminal conviction, the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the actus reus (ie, the physical element) and mens rea (ie, the mental element) of the offence have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt.
However, in the context of civil penalty enforcement proceedings, the prosecution is only required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the accused committed an offence under the SFA. The court may then make an order against the person for the payment of the civil penalty.
Besides the legal principle of the presumption of innocence, there are operating presumptions contained within certain white-collar offences, such as:
Unlike in civil disputes, where there is usually a limitation period for when a claim may be brought, limitation periods are not applicable to criminal offences under Singapore law.
Therefore, the public prosecutor, who is the Attorney-General, has full discretion on when charges may be brought against an accused person.
Extraterritorial Reach
Unless expressly stated, acts committed outside the jurisdiction of Singapore are presumed to not constitute an offence, even if such an act would have amounted to an offence under that statute had it been committed within the jurisdiction. This has been expressly stated in the Court of Appeal (ie, the highest court in Singapore) judgment of Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2012] 2 SLR 872.
Exceptions
However, there are exceptions to this general rule.
Cross-Border Co-operation
To facilitate the provision and obtaining of international assistance in criminal matters, Singapore has adopted several international conventions into its domestic law, including:
These international conventions allow for the following:
In addition, the regulatory authorities in Singapore work in tandem with other foreign regulatory bodies to achieve cross-border co-operation and assistance. For example, pursuant to a request for assistance by a foreign regulatory authority, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) may transmit information in its possession (Section 172(1) of the SFA).
A fundamental tenet of company law is that a company is a separate legal entity from its members or shareholders. Therefore, the liabilities of the company do not ordinarily attach to its shareholders or officers.
Civil Liability
In an extension of this principle, where a company has committed a tort, its directors are not automatically liable for the tort. An example of when a company’s directors may be liable as joint tortfeasors is where they have “procured or directed” the wrong to be done (Court of Appeal judgment in TV Media Pte Ltd v De Cruz Andrea Heidi [2004] 3 SLR(R) 543).
Criminal Liability
It is entirely possible for a legal entity to be subject to criminal liability.
Threshold to successfully prosecute a legal entity
In the seminal case of Tom-Reck Security Services Pte Ltd v Public Prosecutor [2001] 1 SLR(R) 327, the High Court held that the actions of an employee or agent of the company may be attributed to the company where that person is considered to be the “living embodiment of the company”, or if that person’s actions were performed as part of a delegated function of management. This is not an easy threshold to meet.
Thus, where this “living embodiment” test is fulfilled, it would be a stronger indication of a company’s involvement in the criminal activities conducted (High Court judgment in Prime Shipping Corp v Public Prosecutor [2021] 4 SLR 795).
Should the legal entity or individual be prosecuted?
The decision to prosecute either a legal entity or a natural person, or both, is a question of prosecutorial discretion. Article 35(8) of the Singapore Constitution states that the Attorney General shall have the power, exercisable at their discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence. This discretion is exercised based on the sufficiency of evidence and consideration of what is in the public interest.
An instance where a natural person was prosecuted instead of a legal entity was in Abdul Ghani bin Tahir v Public Prosecutor [2017] 4 SLR 1153, in which a company director was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment where the use of the company’s bank accounts in connection with money-laundering offences was attributed to his neglect.
The High Court in Abdul Ghani cited the English case of Huckerby v Elliot [1970] 1 All ER 189, where it was decided that a director has consented to the commission of an offence by his company when he is “well aware of what is going on and agrees to it”, whereas a director has connived at the offence committed by the company when he is “equally well aware of what is going on but his agreement is tacit”. In other words, a director who connives at an offence is “not actively encouraging what happens but letting it continue and saying nothing about it”.
Mergers and acquisitions
In the context of a merger or acquisition, the starting point is that each company is a separate legal entity and is thus not criminally responsible for the conduct of another. However, depending on the factual matrix of the case, a successor entity may be held liable for offences committed by the target entity.
For example, a person who fraudulently transfers property with the intention of preventing the property from being taken in satisfaction of a fine is guilty of an offence under Section 206 of the Penal Code. In this scenario, both the individuals and companies involved in the fraudulent transaction (including the acquiring company) could be held criminally liable.
Sentencing in the Criminal Courts
In the criminal courts, the appropriate penalties are generally decided at the discretion of the judge, based on the gravity of the offence, the harm caused and any mitigating and aggravating factors, subject to any minimum and/or maximum sentences laid down by statute.
To promote consistency in sentencing, the courts sometimes set out sentencing frameworks and guidelines. For example, prior to October 2022, the sentencing framework for private sector corruption offences under Sections 6(a) and 6(b) of the PCA was set out in the High Court judgment of Takaaki Masui v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] 4 SLR 160. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal of Singapore declined to endorse the sentencing framework, having observed that the framework was “complex” and “likely to be of little assistance to sentencing courts”.
Thereafter, in October 2022, a three-judge coram led by the Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon sitting in the General Division of the Singapore High Court set out a revised two-stage, five-step sentencing framework for sentencing such private-sector corruption offences (Goh Ngak Eng v Public Prosecutor [2023] 4 SLR 1385).
Under the revised framework, the court would consider the following:
In developing this revised framework, the High Court cautioned that sentencing frameworks are only intended as a guide and are not precise mathematical formulae for the court to use to arrive at an exact sentence.
Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences
In August 2024, the Sentencing Advisory Panel, comprising members from the judiciary, ministries, the Singapore Police Force, the Attorney-General’s Chambers and the Bar, published the Guidelines for Scams-Related Offences (the “Guidelines”), to provide clarity in sentencing several new offences under the CDSA and CMA that had been introduced in 2023.
Among other things, these new offences make it criminal for persons in Singapore to relinquish control of their bank accounts and disclose their Singpass credentials to others. The Guidelines set out the recommended starting sentences and offender- and offence-specific factors to consider and the appropriate increase to the starting sentence that each factor may justify. The Guidelines seek to strongly deter perpetrators, setting out starting sentences ranging from six to 18 months’ imprisonment and providing that fines, probation and community sentences are generally inappropriate.
At the time of publication, the new guidelines have been considered in one case, Public Prosecutor v Cheah Bernice [2024] SGDC 220. In that case, the 21-year-old offender, who disclosed her Singpass credentials to an acquaintance, was sentenced to eight weeks’ imprisonment. The prosecution had not initially objected to the calling of a probation suitability report, but thereafter changed its position to object, after the publication of the Guidelines.
Other Sentencing/Non-prosecution Options
In 2018, Singapore introduced deferred prosecution agreements for non-individuals; see 2.6 Deferred Prosecution.
If the prosecution is of the opinion that certain offences have been committed but nevertheless decides not to prosecute the offender, it may issue stern warnings and/or conditional warnings in lieu of prosecution.
The prosecution and defence may also negotiate and attempt to reach an agreement as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed on an accused person. There are no firm guidelines or rules, but such an agreement is ultimately subject to the purview of the court, which decides on the appropriate sentence. Accused persons who plead guilty are generally also entitled to some reduction in sentence (see 4.3 Plea Agreements, Co-operation, Self-Disclosure and Leniency).
Section 359 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) allows the court to order the offender to compensate the victim where it is appropriate to do so. In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, the court may take the following non-exhaustive factors into consideration:
For corruption offences, victims may recover debt owed from the person who gave the gratification or their agent by commencing a civil suit (Section 14 of the PCA).
Representative Proceedings
Where numerous persons have a common interest in any proceedings, such persons may sue or be sued as a group, with one or more of them representing the group. However, such proceedings are only applicable in civil suits and not in criminal proceedings.
The Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) of the Singapore Police Force is the principal white-collar crime investigation agency in Singapore, and investigates both commercial and financial crimes.
The other key regulatory authorities that investigate and/or prosecute corruption and corporate misconduct in Singapore include the following.
In Singapore, investigations are generally commenced after a police report, also known as a First Information Report, has been made. This police report may be made by the victim or a third party.
The CPC governs which procedure should be followed, depending on whether the alleged offence is an arrestable or non-arrestable offence.
In the context of white-collar investigations, the relevant authorities may collaborate during investigations to streamline the process. For example, since March 2015, the MAS and CAD have adopted a joint investigations arrangement to allow the agencies to pool their resources and expertise together. In particular, the MAS’s role as a financial regulator and the CAD’s intelligence-gathering capabilities allow potential offences to be detected and investigated swiftly.
This joint investigations arrangement was formed to cover offences such as insider trading and market manipulation, and came about following the largest market manipulation case in Singapore’s history – ie, the October 2013 penny stock crash involving three Singapore-listed companies: Asiasons Capital Ltd, Blumont Group Ltd and LionGold Corp Ltd.
Prior to March 2015, both the MAS and CAD would investigate financial offences independently, based on an initial assessment of whether the offence was likely to be a civil penalty or a criminal prosecution case. Further to the joint investigations, the decision on whether a case is subject to a civil penalty action or criminal prosecution is only made at the close of investigations.
Investigative authorities are given a wide scope of powers to facilitate conducting their investigations. Generally, the investigative powers of the police are contained within Part 4 of the CPC.
In the context of white-collar crime, additional investigative powers are contained within Part 4 of the PCA and Part 9 of the SFA.
The powers that may be exercised include the following.
Generally, there is no mandatory requirement for entities to conduct internal investigations into any suspected wrongdoing.
However, the MAS requires:
Internal investigations are generally conducted by interviewing relevant employees, management and directors, with the aim of collecting and reviewing documentation and traces of the proceeds of fraud.
Where the investigation reveals that the representative has committed said misconduct, they may be liable to one or more of the following types of disciplinary action:
As discussed above in 1.3 Statute of Limitations, the Attorney-General has absolute prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to bring a charge against an individual and/or company.
Article 35(8) of the Singapore Constitution states that the Attorney-General shall have power, exercisable at their discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence. This discretion is exercised based on the sufficiency of evidence and consideration of what is in the public interest.
The provisions governing deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) are set out in Part 7A of the CPC.
A DPA is an agreement entered into between the public prosecutor and a corporate body that has been charged with, or whom the public prosecutor is considering prosecuting for, an alleged offence (ie, an offence that is specified in the Sixth Schedule of the CPC), under which:
Examples of offences that qualify for a DPA include corruption, money laundering and the receipt of stolen property. Notably, the offence of cheating does not qualify for a DPA.
This formal framework allows corporate offenders, and not individuals, to enter into an agreement with an investigating or regulatory authority in exchange for a deferment or avoidance of prosecution. This agreement is on the condition that the corporate offender complies with specific terms in relation to its conduct and/or monitoring arrangements. Such conditions and/or specific terms could include the payment of a financial penalty, providing compensation to the victim, the disgorgement of profits, co-operation in investigations, etc.
When Is a DPA Appropriate?
There are no guidelines on when a DPA is appropriate. Much like the bringing of a charge, the decision on whether to enter into a DPA is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
In a February 2022 parliamentary speech, the Minister for Law, Mr K Shanmugam, provided insight into when a DPA may be entered into. In particular, a DPA “may be more suitable for more complex arrangements, because these are clearly provided for under the statutory framework”. On the other hand, a conditional warning may be more suitable in cases “where the entity had sufficiently addressed the wrongdoing, made restitution or substantial reparations, and had co-operated with law enforcement authorities”.
In March 2024, it was announced that the Attorney-General’s Chambers had entered a DPA with Singapore-listed Seatrium (formerly known as Sembcorp Marine), in connection with alleged corruption offences in Brazil. Under the terms of the DPA, Seatrium was to pay a total fine of USD110 million.
A wide variety of criminal company law and corporate fraud offences are recognised in Singapore, including:
General Corruption-Related Offences
The most commonly committed offences in the PCA fall within Sections 5 and 6.
Section 5 of the PCA makes it an offence for someone, by themselves or in conjunction with any other person:
Section 6 of the PCA makes it an offence if:
The punishment for contravening Sections 5 and 6 is a fine not exceeding SGD100,000, and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
These sections are broad enough to cover instances of bribery between private parties. See also the sentencing framework for Section 6 offences set out in 1.6 Sentencing and Penalties.
Public Sector Corruption
Section 7 of the PCA provides that the maximum punishment for offences under Sections 5 and 6 of the PCA that relate to a contract/proposal for a contract with the government, a government department or any public body, and a subcontract to execute any work comprised in such a contract, is enhanced to a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
Once proven that gratification was paid or given to, or received by, an employee of the government, a government department or a public body, by or from someone who has or seeks to have any dealing with that government department/public body, a rebuttable presumption of corruption arises pursuant to Section 8 of the PCA.
In addition:
Each has a maximum punishment of a fine not exceeding SGD100,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
The bribery of foreign public officials is also prosecutable. Section 37(1) of the PCA extends the PCA such that it applies to offences committed by Singapore citizens outside of Singapore; see 1.4 Extraterritorial Reach and Cross-Border Co-operation. However, as the recent case relating to Keppel Offshore & Marine demonstrates, there may also be evidential difficulties in prosecuting such offences.
There is no legislation explicitly or specifically mandating the implementation of a compliance programme. However, there are a few voluntary management standards and frameworks that organisations are encouraged to use.
ISO 37001/SS ISO 37001
The Singapore Standard (SS) ISO 37001 on anti-bribery management systems is a voluntary standard published by Enterprise Singapore. It is designed to help companies establish, implement, maintain and improve their anti-bribery compliance programmes.
To meet the ISO 37001/SS ISO 37001 standards, organisations need to be certified by accredited certification bodies.
PACT
The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau has also published A Practical Anti-Corruption Guide for Businesses (“PACT”). PACT is intended to be a simple, easy-to-use four-step guide for organisations looking for practical ways to prevent corruption.
The failure to implement a compliance programme is not a specific criminal offence. However, it may be considered a relevant factor in determining liability for corruption-related offences. If an organisation demonstrates a lack of adequate anti-corruption measures, it may be viewed unfavourably during investigations or court proceedings.
The main banking and finance-related offences, such as insider trading and market abuse, are generally found within the SFA.
Insider Trading
The sections in the SFA relating to insider trading may be found in Division 3. The main offence-creating provisions are in Sections 218 and 219.
In both sections, if a person (“A”) knows or ought reasonably to know that certain information is not generally available and would be expected to have a material effect on the price or value of specific securities, securities-based derivatives contracts or collective investment scheme (CIS) units, it will be an offence for A to:
Generally available information
For information to be considered “generally available”, it must fulfil one or more of the following criteria:
Material effect on price or value
Information that would be expected to have a material effect on price or value refers to information that would, or would be likely to, influence a person’s decision to subscribe for, buy or sell those securities, securities-based derivatives contracts, or CIS units. It is such information that is considered significant enough to impact an investor’s judgement regarding the investment’s potential risks and rewards.
Section 218 (connected persons)
Section 218 concerns a situation where A, being a person connected to a corporation (“C”), possesses information concerning C that is not generally available and that, if generally available, would likely have a material effect on the price or value of the securities, securities-based derivatives contracts or CIS units of C.
A will be considered a connected person to C if A:
If A is a person connected to C, as long as it is proved that at the material time A possessed information concerning C that was not generally available, a rebuttable presumption forms that A knew at the material time that the information was not generally available, and that if it were so, it might have a material effect on the price or value of the securities or securities-based derivatives contracts of C.
Section 219 (other persons)
Section 219 applies to persons who are not connected persons within the meaning of Section 218.
Penalty
As set out in Section 221 of the SFA, the maximum penalty for insider trading under Sections 218 and 219 is a fine not exceeding SGD250,000 and/or a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years.
Other Forms of Market Abuse
Other forms of market abuse are also criminalised under Part 12 of the SFA. Prominent examples include:
Tax fraud is a serious offence. Depending on the context of the fraud , it may constitute offences under, among others, Part 20 of the Income Tax Act 1947 (ITA) and Part 9 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1993.
Fraudulent Income Tax Evasion
Tax evasion is defined in Section 96 of the ITA. To be regarded as an offence, it must be proved that a person did the following, wilfully and with intent to evade tax:
Section 96A applies where fraud is involved in the tax evasion, such as where there was:
In this situation, a tax fraudster is liable to pay a penalty of four times the amount undercharged or obtained, and is liable to a fine not exceeding SGD50,000 and/or imprisonment not exceeding five years. Repeat offenders face mandatory minimum imprisonment terms.
Prevention of Tax Evasion
There is no legislation explicitly mandating the prevention of tax evasion. There are a few voluntary frameworks prepared by the Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, which organisations are encouraged to use. These include:
The main offences related to financial record-keeping are governed by the CA.
Accounting Records
Section 199 of the CA requires companies to keep proper accounting and other records, to ensure their financial transactions are properly recorded, as this will allow the companies to sufficiently explain their transactions and financial position and enable true and fair financial statements, as well as any documents to be attached to those records.
Section 199 also imposes certain requirements related to access to these accounting records. They also must be retained for not less than five years from the end of the relevant financial year.
Failure to comply attracts a maximum punishment of a fine not exceeding SGD5,000 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, and a default penalty for the company and every company officer who is in default.
Financial Statements and Consolidated Financial Statements
Section 201 of the CA provides an extensive list of requirements with which a company’s financial statements must comply. For example, Section 201(2) provides that a company’s financial statements must comply with the Accounting Standards made or formulated by the Accounting Standards Committee.
Breaches of Section 201 are prosecuted under Section 204 of the CA, with directors and companies both liable. Depending on the exact contravention, the maximum punishment for a breach attracts a maximum fine of between SGD10,000 and SGD250,000, and a maximum term of imprisonment of between two and three years.
Where there has been a breach with the intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for a fraudulent purpose, the punishments are increased.
The main criminal and administrative offences relating to cartels and criminal competition law are outlined in the Competition Act 2004 (“COMA”), and include the following.
The sanctions that can be imposed include criminal penalties decided by a court and administrative penalties decided by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCCS).
The CCCS has the authority to, among other things:
Under the COMA, a court generally has the authority to impose a fine not exceeding SGD10,000 and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months.
The key provisions relating to consumer protection laws may be found in the Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act 2003 (CPFTA), which sets out certain rights consumers have against unfair consumer practices, and consumer rights in respect of non-conforming goods.
The CPFTA is not inherently criminal. However, the CPFTA grants courts the power to, among other things, grant an injunction restraining suppliers from engaging in unfair practices upon application by the CCCS. The failure of a supplier to comply with such an injunction amounts to contempt of court, which may result in a maximum fine of up to SGD100,000 and/or a maximum imprisonment term of up to three years, pursuant to Section 12 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016.
Computer Misuse Act
The main offences in relation to cybercrimes and breach of company secrets may be found in the Computer Misuse Act 1993 (CMA), including the following:
There is no need for the offending act to be directed at any specific program, data or computer. Higher penalties apply for subsequent convictions or if any damage is caused.
Recent amendments to the CMA (and the CDSA) also set out the following new offences:
Guidelines have also been set out for the sentencing of these offences. See 1.6 Sentencing and Penalties.
Penal Code
The Penal Code is applicable where the creation of false electronic records is concerned. Section 463 makes it an offence to make a false electronic record with intent to cause damage or injury to the public or any person, to support a claim or title, to cause a person to part with property, to enter into a contract (express or implied), or with intent to commit or enable fraud. Sanctions include imprisonment for a term of up to four years and/or a fine.
The United Nations Act 2001
Section 5 of the United Nations Act 2001 gives the Singapore government power to make regulations to give effect to decisions of the United Nations Security Council. This includes the United Nations (Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations, which prohibit, among other things, the sale, supply, export, shipment or transfer of arms and related materials to terrorists. The punishments for a breach of these regulations are:
The Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002
Part 2 of the Strategic Goods (Control) Act 2002 criminalises the transfer and brokering of certain strategic goods, such as military goods or dual-use goods (goods capable of being used for both a military and non-military purpose). Sanctions for a first-time offender include a fine, being the greater of SGD100,000 or three times the value of the strategic goods, and/or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. An increased punishment applies for repeat offenders.
The Customs Act
Part 15 of the Customs Act criminalises a wide variety of customs-related offences, including:
The concealment of benefits from criminal conduct is prosecuted under Section 54 of the CDSA. It is an offence for someone (“A”) to conceal or disguise any property, including its nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership, that directly or indirectly represents A’s benefits from criminal conduct.
A will also be liable if they conceal or disguise the property of another person (“B”), despite knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that said property represents B’s benefits from criminal conduct.
For concealment, the sanctions are as follows:
The CDSA applies to any serious offence or foreign serious offence, as listed in the Second Schedule of the CDSA. Given that the fact of a serious offence leads to the applicability of the CDSA, a person can be held liable for both the predicate offence and the offence of concealment. The predicate offence is separate from the concealment offence. An individual can therefore be charged and convicted for both if the elements of each offence can be proved.
A person who conspires with, instigates, or intentionally aids another to commit a corporate offence (an “abettor”) can be held liable along with the main offender. Generally, Chapter 5 of the Penal Code covers the law on abetment, although there is specific legislation in certain instances (see, for example, Section 12 of the CMA).
The specific sanctions incurred depend on the nature of the corporate offence committed and the applicable laws governing that offence. Generally, an abettor will be liable for the punishment for the offence they abetted. However, there are some unique situations where this is not the case. Examples include cases where:
In Singapore, the main offences related to money laundering are found in Part 6 of the CDSA (see 3.11 Concealment). Money laundering occurs when a person engages in certain activities involving the proceeds of an illegal activity or property, intending to conceal the true origin of the proceeds or property, or to avoid prosecution for that offence.
There are positive obligations on financial institutions to prevent money laundering. The MAS maintains a collection of notices regarding AML and CFT regulations, which are given force of law by Sections 15 and 16 read with Section 192 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022.
The failure of a financial institution to comply with the requirements set out in those notices may result in a fine not exceeding SGD1 million for each offence. For a continuing offence, the institution will be subject to a further fine of SGD100,000 for every day or part of the day after conviction that the offence continues.
The competent enforcement authorities for the prevention and enforcement of money-laundering offences include the CAD and the CPIB. For more information, see 2.1 White-Collar Enforcement Authorities.
The defences for white-collar offences are typically provided for in the same statutes that provide for the relevant offences.
Money-Laundering and CDSA Offences
When it comes to the offence of assisting another to retain benefits from criminal conduct under Section 51 of the CDSA (see 3.13 Money Laundering), it is, among other things, a defence for an accused person to prove that they did not know and had no reasonable grounds to believe that an arrangement was:
Insider Trading
As for insider trading (see 3.4 Insider Dealing, Market Abuse and Criminal Banking Law), Section 231 of the CDSA provides parity of information defences for where a person is charged with insider trading. Generally, it is a defence if the information came into that person’s possession solely as a result of it being made known in a manner that would, or would be likely to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in securities of such kind that the price or value might be affected by the information, or if the other party knew or ought to have known of the information.
Effective Compliance Programme
The existence of an effective compliance programme may be a specific defence in some situations. For example, if an employee gains knowledge or belief that an arrangement entered into in the course of their employment relates to criminal conduct, Section 51(4)(d) of the CDSA specifically makes it a defence if that employee discloses their knowledge, in accordance with the procedure established by their employer for making such disclosures.
In the context of a civil penalty for a corporation that fails to prevent or detect certain contraventions of the SFA, Section 236C(7) expressly states that a court is to consider whether that corporation had adequate policies and procedures for preventing and detecting market misconduct, and whether it has consistently enforced compliance.
More generally, the implementation of an effective compliance programme may, in certain situations, suggest a lack of mens rea on the part of an accused person. It may also be considered as a mitigating factor by the court when determining the appropriate penalty or sentence for an offence.
General Exceptions
The Penal Code provides for certain general exceptions, including a de minimis exception in the form of Section 95, which states that nothing is an offence if it causes, is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause harm that is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
The breadth of the Penal Code means that this applies to white-collar offences in Singapore, although it appears less relevant in the context of corruption. In 2019, a forklift operator was famously fined and imprisoned for accepting bribes of SGD1.
There are also numerous specific exceptions set out in the same statutes that provide for the relevant offences.
Insider Trading
For example, Sections 222 to 230 of the SFA provide for the following exceptions to insider trading:
Limited Exemptions
Certain regulatory frameworks may provide for limited exemptions from specific statutory regulations. For example, the Securities and Futures (Exemption from Requirement to Hold Capital Markets Services Licence) Regulations provide exemptions from Section 82(1) of the SFA, for persons who meet the conditions set out in Regulation 3.
The COMA also provides for block exemptions to Section 34, which would otherwise prohibit agreements, decisions or concerted practices that prevent, restrict or distort competition within Singapore, subject to the agreement meeting the criteria set out in Section 41.
Plea Agreement
A plea bargain refers to an agreement between the accused person and the prosecution. The plea-bargaining process in Singapore is informal and is not governed by legislation.
Essentially, after charges are brought against an accused person, the defence counsel may engage in discussions with the prosecution with the aim of seeking a favourable plea offer for the accused. The form of discussion may include but is not limited to:
Generally, in the plead-guilty context, the defence counsel may request that the prosecution exercises its prosecutorial discretion to achieve one or more of the following:
In August 2023, the Sentencing Advisory Panel of Singapore published guidelines on the reduction in sentences for guilty pleas. Under the guidelines, if an accused person were to plead guilty between the first mention and 12 weeks after the prosecution informs the court that the case is ready for the plea to be taken, the court may consider reducing the accused person’s sentence by a maximum of 30%. The percentage by which the court may reduce the sentence drops to 5% if the accused person decides to plead guilty on or after the first day of trial.
Co-operation and Self-Disclosure
Self-disclosure and co-operation with investigators and authorities are typically mitigating factors. Other common mitigating factors that the Singapore courts take into consideration include an early plea of guilt and, where applicable, full restitution for the damage caused.
In certain contexts, self-disclosure may amount to a full defence. Under Section 51(4)(c) of the CDSA, if a person intended to disclose their knowledge, belief or any other matter relating to the arrangement to an authorised officer but failed to do so, it is a defence if they provide a reasonable excuse for their failure. This implies that if a person voluntarily discloses the relevant information to the authorities before any illegal act is committed or as soon as it becomes reasonable to do so, it would be considered a full defence.
Leniency
One leniency measure in the context of the COMA is the CCCS Guidelines on Lenient Treatment for Undertakings Coming Forward with Information on Cartel Activity 2016, which provides, among other things, total immunity for the first party to come forward before an investigation commences, and up to 100% reduction in financial penalties for the first party to come forward after it commences.
There is no general whistle-blowing legislation in Singapore. In the context of corruption-related offences, Section 36 of the PCA provides safeguards for whistle-blowers reporting corruption-related offences. Among other things, it prohibits the disclosure of the name, address or any information that might lead to the discovery of an informer in any civil or criminal proceeding.
Although encouraged, there are no requirements for organisations to implement internal procedures to protect whistle-blowers, unless that organisation is listed on the SGX. In that event, the SGX RegCo requires issuers to state in their annual reports that they have a whistle-blowing policy in place.
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eugene@thuraisingam.com www.thuraisingam.comTightening of Singapore’s Anti-money Laundering Regime
Singapore has always adopted a strict stance against money-laundering activities. However, despite its robust laws, a money-laundering scandal in Singapore recently hit the news, both locally and internationally. Stemming from an island-wide raid on 15 August 2023, ten foreign nationals were arrested and prosecuted in a money-laundering probe, with more than SGD3 billion in assets seized as the proceeds of illegal online gambling. The investigations arose after suspicious transaction reports (STRs) were filed by financial institutions (FIs), which alerted the Commercial Affairs Department (CAD) to the suspicious activities. Consequently, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) worked closely with CAD to facilitate investigations, resulting in the arrests and prosecution.
The ten individuals have since pleaded guilty to money-laundering offences under the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1992 (the “CDSA”) and forgery offences under the Penal Code 1871 (the “Penal Code”). Approximately SGD3 billion in assets were seized in total in relation to the investigations, with an estimated SGD2 billion’s worth of assets seized from 17 suspects who remain out of Singapore’s jurisdiction.
Following the operation, Singapore’s parliament and regulatory authorities have sought to strengthen Singapore’s anti-money laundering framework and applicable laws. This has resulted in recent amendments to Singapore’s legislative and enforcement regime, which are reflected in the nation’s approach to asset recovery, enforcement and the more stringent anti-money laundering framework applicable to both FIs and non-FIs.
Updates on Singapore’s Money-Laundering National Risk Assessment (MLNRA)
The trends in money-laundering risks in Singapore were updated in the MLNRA published on 20 June 2024. The MLNRA addresses trends in money-laundering risks observed by law enforcement agencies, Singapore’s Financial Intelligence Unit (the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office), feedback from private sector entities and counterpart foreign authorities.
The MLNRA observed that the most common money-laundering scheme involves the rapid pass-through of funds in bank accounts, particularly involving cross-border transactions and generally through third-party mules. Shell companies are also often misused for laundering illicit funds, through layering or concealment of ownership of illicitly obtained assets. Another common scheme is the placement of illicit proceeds through the purchase of high-value assets including real estate, precious stones and precious metals.
The banking (including wealth-management) sector has been assessed as posing the highest money-laundering risk in Singapore. Banks have higher exposure to such threats and are more susceptible to exploitation due to their role in facilitating large volumes of transactions in the financial system and servicing customers who are a high money-laundering risk.
Corporate service providers also pose higher money-laundering risks given their role in providing upstream services such as incorporation of companies. Other designated non-financial businesses and professional sectors which pose higher risks include real estate, licensed trust companies, casinos and the precious stones and metals sectors.
Within the financial sectors, a higher risk sector to note is digital payment token (DPT) services providers (or virtual assets service providers). It has been observed that there has been an increase in reported cases involving DPTs. It has also been noted that DPTs can be exploited in a variety of ways. Other sectors within the financial industry that pose higher money-laundering risks are payment institutions providing cross-border money transfer services (including remittance agents), and external asset managers.
Update on Singapore’s National Asset Recovery Strategy (NARS)
On 26 June 2024, Singapore published its NARS, which sets out the approach towards the recovery of illicit funds and assets from criminals, and the forfeiture of these assets or their return to victims.
NARS focuses on four pillars, namely:
1) to detect suspicious and criminal activities by tracing illicit funds;
2) to deprive criminals of their ill-gotten proceeds through prompt seizure and confiscation;
3) to deliver maximum recovery of assets for forfeiture and restitution to victims; and
4) to deter criminals from using Singapore to hide, move or enjoy their illicit assets.
Even before the publication of NARS, the Singapore parliament had already taken steps in line with these four pillars. In October 2023, Singapore’s parliament announced the setting up of an inter-ministerial committee to review Singapore’s financial systems and anti-money laundering regime. The whole-of-government approach is further supported by strong public-private partnership.
Singapore also adopts a victim-centric approach towards asset recovery. When identifiable victims are present in a criminal investigation, the priority is to return the confiscated assets to the rightful owners. However, in instances where no identifiable victims exist, forfeiting the criminals’ illicit gains to the state is prioritised, in order to deprive criminals of the fruits of crime.
Legislative and Enforcement Enhancements
Amendments to the CDSA
As early as April 2023, a bill was passed for the amendment of the CDSA, which imposed greater accountability on bank account owners. The amendments to the CDSA serve a dual purpose in addressing the rise of scam cases through money mules, and complements Singapore’s heightened efforts to combat money laundering. When using their payment accounts to receive and transfer monies, owners are expected to take reasonable steps to verify the source of the money.
With effect from 8 February 2024, new offences under the CDSA now include the offences of rash and negligent money laundering. A person can be liable for rash money laundering if they proceed to carry out a transaction even though they have some suspicions about the transaction, but do not make further enquiries to address those suspicions. A person can also be liable for negligent money laundering if they continue with a transaction despite the presence of red flags or suspicious indicators, which would be noticeable to an ordinary, reasonable person. The new offences apply to persons acting as directors of companies and operating corporate accounts.
The CDSA was also amended so that a person can be held liable for assisting another to retain benefits from criminal conduct in the following circumstances:
COSMIC (Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing (ML/TF) Information & Cases)
On 1 April 2024, the MAS launched COSMIC (Collaborative Sharing of Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing Information & Cases), the first centralised digital platform to facilitate sharing of customer information among prescribed financial institutions (“Prescribed FIs”) to combat money laundering, terrorism financing, and proliferation financing globally. With the launch of COSMIC, the Prescribed FIs in the initial phase (expected to last for approximately two years after COSMIC’s launch) currently consist of the six major banks that co-developed COSMIC together with the MAS (namely, DBS, OCBC, UOB, Citibank, HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank).
COSMIC focuses on three key financial crime risks in commercial banking: (a) misuse of legal persons; (b) misuse of trade finance for illicit purposes; and (c) proliferation financing. Under COSMIC, FIs can securely share with one another information on a “relevant party” who exhibits multiple “red flags” that may indicate potential financial crime concerns along the lines of (a) to (c), if stipulated conditions and thresholds are met. A “relevant party” is a person who is, or who seeks to be, or who has been, a customer of a Prescribed FI, and who has been prescribed as such under subsidiary legislation.
Information is shared via three modes:
Prescribed FIs must establish and implement policies, procedures and controls to ensure that the Prescribed FI makes requests, responses, disclosures and listings in a systematic manner with appropriate safeguards implemented. This includes a framework to assess whether the applicable conditions and relevant threshold criteria for a request, response, disclosure or listing are met; and the relevant documentation and record retention policies.
Expansion of the scope of the Payment Services Act 2019
On 2 April 2024, the MAS announced its amendments to the Payment Services Act (PSA) and its subsidiary legislation to expand the scope of MAS-regulated payment services. The amendments also include the imposition of requirements on DPT service providers. These amendments took effect in stages from 4 April 2024.
The PSA came into force on 28 January 2020 and had been established as a single regulatory framework to address the growing confluence of different types of payment services. Entities are required to be licensed if they provide specified payment services under the PSA; and may be designated for supervision under the PSA if their payment system is crucial to Singapore.
With the amendments, the scope of regulation under the PSA was increased to include the following:
To further regulate the digital asset ecosystem and mitigate risks to consumers, the MAS also issued the “Guidelines on Consumer Protection Measures by Digital Payment Token Service Provider”, which came into effect on 4 October 2024. This includes measures such as having an opt-in regime so customers can be treated as accredited investors as opposed to retail customers, the maintenance of a trust account to safeguard customer assets, the implementation of risk control measures such as restricting and controlling the movement of customer assets, and greater transparency to customers through statements of account.
Regulatory regime for Corporate Service Providers (CSPs)
The Corporate Service Providers Bill (the “CSP Bill”) and the Companies and Limited Liability Partnerships (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill (the “CLLPMA Bill”) were passed by parliament on 2 July 2024. The CSP Bill is intended to enhance Singapore’s regulatory regime for CSPs while the CLLPMA Bill seeks to complement the CSP Bill by enhancing the transparency of companies and limited liability partnerships (LLPs).
The CSP Bill focuses on three main areas.
The CLLPMA Bill complements the CSP Bill primarily in two areas. First, it enhances the accuracy of the information contained on the various registers that are currently maintained by companies and LLPs. Second, it enhances transparency around nominee arrangements. Companies will have to provide the full information of nominee arrangements to ACRA.
The new obligations under both bills thus affect all entities providing corporate services from Singapore, regardless of whether they serve local or foreign clients.
First Reading of the Anti-Money Laundering and Other Matters Bill (the “AML Bill”)
The AML Bill was introduced for First Reading in parliament on 2 July 2024 and will have to be debated in parliament through a Second Reading.
It seeks to enhance the following three areas.
1) The ability of Singapore’s law enforcement agencies to pursue and prosecute money-laundering offences
2) The processes to deal with seized or restrained properties linked to suspected criminal activities
The AML Bill also empowers enforcement agencies in relation to the sale of seized or restrained properties. Presently, when seized or restrained property is no longer required for investigations or court proceedings, law enforcement agencies must obtain the consent of all parties involved as to whether they want to obtain a court order to sell the property. If there is no consensus among the parties, the enforcement agencies will have to continue to maintain the property. This incurs significant property maintenance costs and can also lead to the depreciation of the assets. The AML Bill seeks to amend the Criminal Procedure Code and the CDSA to allow the court to order the sale of seized or restrained properties linked to suspected criminal activities, where the police or public prosecutor applies for the sale of the property, even if the consent of all the parties involved has not been obtained.
Further, the AML Bill provides clarity on how seized properties associated with absconded persons may be dealt with:
These amendments are geared to avoid the early release of seized properties while investigations remain ongoing; and to prevent an absconded person from making a successful claim to the seized properties on the basis that investigations have not been able to proceed.
3) Aligning the anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism framework for casino operators with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards
The AML Bill will amend the Casino Control Act to tighten requirements for casino operators to conduct customer due diligence (CDD) checks for the detection and prevention of money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation financing.
Casino operators are currently required to perform CDD checks on patrons, when the casino operator enters a single cash transaction involving SGD10,000 or more; or receives SGD5,000 or more in a single transaction to be deposited into a deposit account. With the amendments, the quantum for when CDD checks is required will be lowered to include cash transactions or deposits involving SGD4,000 or more.
To ensure consistency with the FATF standards in relation to proliferation financing, the amendments will also impose greater regulations against proliferation financing. This includes empowering the Gambling Regulatory Authority of Singapore to issue regulations requiring casino operators to detect or prevent proliferation financing. Casino operators will also be required to consider proliferation financing risks when conducting CDD checks.
Conclusion
These legislative and enforcement enhancements are consistent with the money-laundering schemes and risk sectors identified in the MLNRA; and the increased focus on enhancing asset recovery and restitution to victims.
Singapore remains committed to tightening its anti-money laundering regime. Deterring the flow of illicit assets through Singapore’s financial ecosystem is consistent with creating an environment that welcomes legitimate businesses.
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