Italian criminal law classifies offences as felonies or misdemeanours. Felonies are punishable by imprisonment, life imprisonment or fines, whereas misdemeanours are punishable by arrest or monetary sanctions.
A criminal offence requires:
All three are constitutive elements; lacking any one of them excludes criminal liability.
Motive is not necessary unless legally specified, though it may affect sentencing and assessment of dangerousness.
Criminal liability for attempted offences is recognised for felonies (Articles 56–57 ICC), but not for misdemeanours, and requires acts that are suitable and unequivocally directed towards the commission of the offence, which fail solely due to extraneous factors.
Financial crimes, like all offences under the Italian Criminal Code (ICC), are subject to constitutional principles and the Code of Criminal Procedure (ICCP), primarily the presumption of innocence: the burden of proof lies with the Public Prosecutor, and any doubt leads to acquittal (in dubio pro reo).
Presumptions are allowed but must respect constitutional guarantees: they must be reasonable, rebuttable, and not invert the burden of proof or impair the right to defence.
Simple presumptions are logical inferences from known, serious, precise, and consistent facts.
In financial crimes, such as self-laundering (Article 648-ter ICC), illicit origin may be inferred from suspicious transactions; in money laundering (Article 648-bis ICC), unexplained large sums may justify a presumption of illegality. In tax evasion, unjustified bank transactions may imply undeclared income; in tax fraud (Legislative Decree 74/2000), behaviours such as issuing false invoices may establish a presumed intent, which is rebuttable by the defendant.
Under Italian criminal law, crimes expire after a period equal to the maximum statutory prison term, which is at least six years for felonies and four years for misdemeanours, starting from the day of the offence (Article 157 ICC).
Limitations may be suspended by procedural acts (Articles 160–161 ICC) and extended by up to one-quarter; for corruption (Articles 318–322-bis ICC), up to double. Certain tax crimes (Legislative Decree 74/2000, Article 17) have a one-third increase.
For attempts, the statute of limitations period begins to run from the end of the criminal conduct, for permanent or continuing offences, from the date of commission of the last act in furtherance of the same criminal intent.
Law No 134/2021 (Cartabia Reform) suspends limitation from first-instance judgment and sets maximum durations: two years (extendable by one) for appeal, one year (extendable by six months) for the Supreme Court, starting 90 days after the filing deadline (Article 344-bis CPP).
Under Decree No 231/2001, corporate liability is time-barred after five years.
Italian jurisdiction over white-collar crime is, as a rule, territorial (Article 3 ICC). Limited extraterritorial jurisdiction exists under Articles 7–8 et seq ICC (most notably for political offences) and, in certain cases, where the offender is present in Italy and statutory conditions are met.
The prevailing model is co-operative rather than extraterritorial: enforcement is achieved through mutual legal assistance and EU instruments rather than unilateral projection of jurisdiction.
Extradition (governed by Article 13 ICC and Articles 662–671 ICCP) may be sought for prosecution or for enforcement. Italian law distinguishes between active extradition (initiated by the Ministry of Justice or the public prosecutor) and passive extradition (incoming requests), which are subject to judicial scrutiny and governmental authorisation. Core safeguards apply: double criminality, speciality and ne bis in idem. Refusal grounds include, inter alia, political offences, the personal status of the requested person, and military or fiscal offences.
Assistance can occur through letters rogatory, either treaty-based or under the ICCP, for actions like serving documents and obtaining evidence, beyond just extradition. Italy also allows the transfer of criminal proceedings (Article 746-bis ICCP) at the pre-trial stage to avoid ne bis in idem and to favour the forum most closely connected to the alleged conduct.
Within the European Union, co-operation is routine and streamlined. The European Arrest Warrant accelerates surrender; the European Investigation Order enables judge-led evidence gathering; and mutual recognition of criminal judgments facilitates cross-border enforcement. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office investigates and prosecutes offences affecting the EU’s financial interests through European Delegated Prosecutors, while Eurojust coordinates complex transnational cases alongside the EPPO.
Operationally, Italian authorities, most prominently the Guardia di Finanza, work through INTERPOL, Europol (including Analysis Projects), SIRENE bureaux, Police and Customs Co-operation Centres, OLAF, and the FIU network. Asset Recovery Offices assist with tracing and freezing proceeds, while the Financial Security Committee contributes to AML/CFT policy. Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 on e-Evidence introduces European Production and Preservation Orders, enabling the collection of data from service providers across borders.
Potential “blocking statutes” on international mutual assistance may arise from applicable treaties or EU law, and commonly concern double criminality, the prohibition of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem), and safeguards against measures that would contravene fundamental constitutional principles.
Corporate Criminal Liability
Legislative Decree No 231/2001 establishes the concept of corporate criminal liability for legal entities. The regime is hybrid: criminal in its trigger – since it arises only upon the commission of a predicate criminal offence – yet administrative in form, as the sanctions (including fines and disqualification measures) are formally defined as “administrative”. Liability is derivative of a natural person’s offence and arises where:
Group Company Liability
As to the potential involvement of other legal entities, the extension of liability under Legislative Decree No 231/2001 to parent companies for offences perpetrated within a subsidiary requires that two cumulative conditions be met, as outlined below.
Mergers and Acquisitions
For the purposes of corporate liability under Legislative Decree No 231/2001, a distinction must be drawn between mergers and acquisitions. In a merger (including by incorporation), Article 29 provides that the surviving entity is liable for offences attributable to the entities party to the merger. By contrast, in an acquisition, the purchaser does not assume liability under the Decree for offences committed within the target prior to completion.
Penalty assessment follows Articles 132–133 of the ICC: judges apply discretion within statutory limits, considering the gravity of the offence and the offender’s conduct. Recidivism increases penalties (Article 99 ICC). Similar principles apply to corporate liability (Articles 11, 14, 20, Decree 231/2001).
Regarding the sentencing process in proceedings other than those conducted under ordinary trial procedures, the Italian legal system places significant emphasis on plea bargaining (Article 444 ICCP).
It allows accused individuals to negotiate penalties with the prosecutor and allows reduced penalties (up to one-third) if imprisonment exceeds two years, excluding ancillary penalties and costs (except confiscation, Article 240 ICC). The offence extinguishes after five (crimes) or two (misdemeanours) crime-free years. Plea agreements have no evidentiary value in other proceedings (Article 445 CPC). The Cartabia Reform allows for a conditional plea as an exemption from accessory penalties.
For prison sentences of four years or less, judges may impose alternatives, including semi-custody, home detention, community service, fines and promoting rehabilitation.
White-collar crimes often involve legal entities to which Legislative Decree No 231/2001 is directly applicable. In such cases, sentencing may consider corporate culture, compliance programmes, co-operation and remediation as mitigating factors.
Article 17 exempts from disqualifying sanctions if, before trial, the entity:
Legal Grounds and Competent Courts
According to Article 185 of the ICC, any offence that causes harm gives rise to an obligation on the part of the offender to provide compensation. From a procedural standpoint, an injured party may seek redress by participating in the criminal proceedings as a civil party, in accordance with Article 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or by bringing a civil action for damages before the civil courts.
Class Actions
Class actions are relatively new in the Italian legal system and, moreover, the various forms of collective action introduced in Italy (eg, Articles 840-bis et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure) are not specifically aimed at securing compensation for victims of white-collar offences, but rather address, more generally, cases of unlawful conduct – not necessarily of a criminal nature – that affect a large number of people (eg, unfair commercial practices).
In Italy, the main authorities addressing white-collar crimes (eg, tax fraud, corruption, money laundering, corporate offences) are the following:
Italian law provides complementary criminal, civil and administrative remedies in economic crime cases.
Civil liability may arise alongside criminal sanctions, allowing injured parties, including public administrations, to claim both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages via standalone civil actions or as civil parties in criminal proceedings (Articles 74 et seq ICCP).
For offences such as market abuse, tax violations, accounting irregularities, and unfair commercial practices, administrative sanctions (including monetary fines and disqualifications) are imposed by sectoral regulators: CONSOB, AGCM (for competition), and ANAC (for public procurement).
Criminal and administrative proceedings may coexist, raising concerns about ne bis in idem. The ECtHR, in Grande Stevens v Italy, scrutinised such dual proceedings under the ne bis in idem principle and found that CONSOB sanctions for market abuse were of a criminal nature. However, in A. and B. v Norway, the Court upheld dual-track systems when criminal and administrative proceedings are sufficiently closed in substance and time.
Italy has no specialised judges or courts for white-collar crimes (Article 102 of the Constitution) and ensures judicial independence, preventing political interference in the application of law, given the separation of powers and the autonomy of the judiciary.
In Italy, white-collar investigations are opened and directed by the Public Prosecutor (Pubblico Ministero), a judicial officer independent of the Government and bound only by law.
The rules governing the initiation and conduct of investigations are outlined in the Code of Criminal Procedure and its implementing provisions.
A notitia criminis relating to white-collar matters may reach the prosecutor through multiple channels: oral or written complaints by anyone aware of an offence (stating the essential facts), mandatory reports by public officials where ex officio crimes come to light in or because of their duties, and institutional referrals from supervisory and enforcement authorities (eg, Court of Auditors, Revenue Agency, CONSOB, Bank of Italy, etc).
Consistent with Article 112 of the Constitution (mandatory prosecution), receipt of a sufficiently specific and credible notitia criminis triggers the Public Prosecutor’s duty to enter the matter in the register of crime reports under Article 335 ICCP, recording the facts, time and place, and, if known, the suspect.
From that moment, the Prosecutor directs the investigation and may delegate the judicial police to carry out investigative acts (document collection, witness interviews, technical assessments, and so on).
In Italy, investigative authorities have broad powers to detect white-collar crimes during preliminary investigations, as governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure and special laws.
The Public Prosecutor, either directly or through the judicial police, may compel the production of corporate documents, including sensitive or secret ones, if the evidentiary relevance is proven and the secrecy claims are unfounded (Article 256 ICCP).
With legal prerequisites, the prosecutor may, by reasoned decree, order searches and seizures of corporate or private premises, including forensic imaging, subject to judicial oversight (Article 247 ff. CCP).
Interrogations of executives, employees, or third parties may occur as witnesses or suspects. Witnesses must testify unless they risk incriminating themselves, while suspects have the right to remain silent and to consult counsel.
Seizure of digital devices is a highly intrusive measure. Currently, a legislative reform (Bill No C.1822) is pending, aiming to amend the ICCP to better balance investigative needs with fundamental rights.
Due to the use of digital assets in economic crimes, some prosecutors have traced, frozen, and seized cryptocurrencies and virtual instruments as criminal proceeds or tools; however, some Supreme Court rulings have reversed orders due to legal classification issues.
In Italy, judicial police may employ atypical investigative tools, including AI and advanced digital technologies, provided their use pursues legitimate procedural aims and respects fundamental rights.
For some time now, investigations have utilised so-called Trojan malware: surreptitiously implanted into devices, it enables remote data extraction or ambient interception. Decree-Law No 161/2020 regulates its use for proceedings after 31 August 2020: judicial authorisation for the use of such a tool must be reasoned, establishing the existence of serious indications, the indispensability of the measure and its temporal and spatial limitations.
Regarding the use of blockchain-based investigative techniques and crypto-assets, Bank of Italy’s Occasional Paper No 893 links decentralised finance to money laundering and terrorist financing risks. It concludes that the technological architecture underpinning decentralised systems lacks the capacity to replace the active role of financial intermediaries in AML compliance, given the public visibility of smart contract code.
As for the general legal framework, Italy follows Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 on AI, especially high-risk systems.
On 17 September 2025, a national AI law was enacted, introducing immediately applicable provisions. AgID, ACN, and financial regulators (Bank of Italy, CONSOB, IVASS) were designated as competent authorities under Article 74(6) EU Regulation.
No specific laws regulate the use of AI in white-collar crime investigations; however, digital forensics, big data, and financial monitoring are commonly used. All practices must comply with constitutional principles, legality, privacy rights, GDPR, and national data protection regulations.
In Italy, internal investigations are not generally mandatory; nonetheless, they can be crucial for corporate self-protection by identifying perpetrators and demonstrating governance and prompt response, thus aiding co-operation with authorities and possibly mitigating liability under Articles 6 and 7 of Legislative Decree 231/2001.
When conducted properly, inquiries that respect the Code of Criminal Procedure and data protection laws – such as independent audits and thorough documentary collections – are preferred by prosecutors and courts.
Furthermore, financial institutions and intermediaries, under Legislative Decrees 231/2007 and 231/2001, are required to perform internal controls and investigations on suspicious transactions and to adopt organisational models to prevent offences, including money laundering.
In any event, private companies have no obligation to report internal findings to the authorities. In contrast, public or quasi-public entities may be subject to reporting duties, as public officials have reporting obligations and are required to bring to the attention of the competent authority the existence of any offence prosecutable ex officio.
Multiple laws regulate corporate internal investigations, notably the GDPR (Reg. 2016/679), the Italian Data Protection Code, Legislative Decree 24/2023 on whistle-blowing, and the Workers’ Statute (Law 300/1970). The latter restricts employee surveillance and inquiries into personal beliefs or unrelated matters.
If conducted under a lawyer’s direction within a criminal law framework, such investigations fall under Articles 327-bis and 391-bis et seq ICCP, allowing the defence (among other things) to obtain documents from public authorities. These activities require no prior judicial authorisation and may be carried out preventively upon mandate. Moreover, the lawyer benefits from legal professional privilege (Article 200 of ICCP) and all defence investigative acts are protected by professional confidentiality (Article 327-bis et seq ICCP).
Criminal prosecution is mandatory for the public prosecutor where the facts amount to a criminal offence. As said, the public prosecutor has no discretion not to proceed, unless it is determined that no offence has been committed or that there is insufficient evidence to support the charges.
Regarding legal entities under Legislative Decree No 231/2001, prosecution occurs if offences are committed in their interest or advantage by senior personnel or persons under their direction. In such cases, the public prosecutor has discretion to commence proceedings against the entity. For further details, see 2.2 Initiating an Investigation.
Italy lacks instruments fully analogous to deferred or non-prosecution agreements, but it provides alternative procedural mechanisms to resolve criminal proceedings without trial, primarily through plea bargaining (for more, see 1.6 Sentencing and Penalties).
Nevertheless, the following instruments must not be disregarded:
Moreover, pursuant to Legislative Decree No 231/2001, adoption or enhancement of organisational compliance models, active co-operation, and damage compensation by legal entities significantly influence liability and penalty mitigation (Article 17 of Legislative Decree No 231/2001). For further details, see 1.6. Sentencing and Penalties.
There are several categories of offences that fall within the scope of economic criminal law, such as corporate crimes (see section 3.6 Financial Record-Keeping), environmental crimes (see section 3.14 ESG-Related Offences), tax offences (see section 3.5 Tax Fraud), banking offences (see section 3.4 Insider Dealing, Market Abuse and Criminal Banking Law), and offences against the Public Administration (see section 3.2 Bribery, Influence Peddling and Related Offences), among others. These categories of offences are typically included within the notion of “economic criminal law” or “corporate criminal law.” However, many “ordinary” offences may also be committed in the context of business activity, such as fraud or money laundering.
Public Sector Bribery
Under Article 318 of the ICC, a public official who accepts or agrees to accept an undue advantage in connection with their functions commits a criminal offence, regardless of whether the act itself is unlawful; acceptance alone suffices. The penalty is imprisonment for three to eight years.
Article 319 increases the sanction to six to ten years when the bribe is tied to the omission or delay of an official act, or to the performance of an act contrary to duty. If judicial activity is involved, Article 319-ter provides for a term of six to twelve years, which can rise to 20 years in cases where corruption results in an unjust conviction.
Article 319-quarter introduces the separate offence of “inducement” (induzione indebita a dare o promettere utilità), where a public official exploits their position to press a private party into offering a benefit. The official faces six to ten years and six months’ imprisonment, while the private party may be punished with up to three years, or up to four years if EU financial interests are affected.
Liability of the Bribe-Giver and Attempted Bribery
Italian law makes clear that the giver is as blameworthy as the taker. Article 321 provides that the payer or promisor is liable to the same penalty as the official. Even unconsummated bribery is criminalised. Under Article 322, the mere offer of an advantage which is not accepted, or the solicitation of a bribe which is not taken up, attracts a penalty reduced by one-third.
Trading in Influence
Article 346-bis criminalises the conduct of anyone who exploits existing relationships with a public official to obtain benefits, either to remunerate that official or to carry out illicit mediation. The offence carries a sentence of between one year and six months and four years and six months’ imprisonment, with aggravation where judicial activity is affected or where the intermediary is themselves an official.
Foreign Public Officials
Under Article 322-bis, the provisions on bribery, inducement, instigation and liability of the payer extend to European Union officials, members of international organisations or courts, and foreign state officials exercising functions comparable to those of Italian public officials. Italy, therefore, expressly criminalises the bribery of foreign public officials, in line with international anti-corruption conventions.
Private-to-Private Bribery
Article 2635 of the Civil Code targets directors, managers, auditors, liquidators, and certain employees who request or receive advantages to act in breach of their duties, and equally punishes those who offer or promise such advantages. The sanction is imprisonment for one to three years, with an increase when listed companies are involved. For subordinate staff, the maximum sentence is one year and six months. Confiscation of the illicit benefit is mandatory.
Furthermore, Article 2635-bis addresses instigation to private bribery. Even where the offer or solicitation is not accepted, the offence remains, subject to a penalty reduced by one-third.
Ancillary Sanctions and Corporate Liability
Article 322-ter of the ICC requires confiscation of the price or profit of the offence, or equivalent value, where direct confiscation is not possible. There are also disqualifying measures, including incapacity to contract with the public administration.
In addition to individual liability, entities themselves may be held responsible under Legislative Decree 231/2001 if the offence was committed in their interest or to their advantage. Companies may face substantial monetary fines, as well as interdictive measures such as bans on contracting with public authorities, suspension of activities or exclusion from public subsidies. The catalogue of predicate offences includes both public-sector corruption and private-to-private bribery.
Bribery and influence-peddling prevention rules differ for public and private entities.
Public Sector
Law 190/2012 requires the implementation of a three-year Anti-Corruption and Transparency Plan and the appointment of a responsible officer. The plan must assess risks, introduce safeguards, ensure transparency, provide training, and facilitate reporting. Failure is not a crime, but can trigger administrative, disciplinary and accounting liability under ANAC oversight. Public officials are required to report offences (Articles 361–362 ICC), while Decree 24/2023 mandates administrations to maintain whistle-blowing channels, with ANAC imposing fines for breaches.
Private Sector
Legislative Decree 231/2001 makes the “231 Model” the sole defence against liability for bribery or influence peddling. It must identify risks, set controls, empower a supervisory body and include whistle-blowing systems. A lack of a model is not an offence, but it leaves companies exposed to sanctions. Decree 24/2023 separately requires whistle-blowing channels, and sectors covered by AML Decree 231/2007 must file suspicious transaction reports, with administrative fines for non-compliance.
The offences are partly criminal and partly administrative, aiming to safeguard the integrity of markets, investors’ trust, and the stability of the financial system.
Insider Dealing
The key provision is Article 184 of the Consolidated Law on Finance (TUF, Legislative Decree 58/1998), which punishes anyone who, by virtue of their position (issuer, shareholder, director, auditor, employee or other professional role), uses inside information to trade in related financial instruments. It also covers unlawful disclosure or recommendations based on inside information. Penalties range from two to twelve years of imprisonment and fines between EUR20,000 and EUR3 million, which may be increased to three times or ten times the illicit profit, depending on the seriousness of the offence.
Market Manipulation
Closely related is Article 185 TUF, which prohibits market manipulation, including disseminating false information, carrying out sham transactions, or using other artifices that are specifically capable of producing a significant alteration in the price of financial instruments. The manipulation can occur through trading practices (“trade-based manipulation”) or through information (such as false or misleading news).
The sanction is imprisonment for two to twelve years and a fine of EUR20,000 to EUR5 million, again subject to multiplication by up to three times or ten times the illicit profit.
Criminal Banking Law Offences
Italian law also punishes the unlawful conduct of banking and financial activities. The main offences deriving from the Consolidated Law on Banking (TUB, Legislative Decree 385/1993) have been outlined below.
Ancillary Sanctions and Corporate Liability
For both insider dealing and market manipulation, the confiscation of profits (or their equivalent value) is mandatory, and disqualification from managerial roles in financial companies may also apply. Under Legislative Decree 231/2001, companies themselves may be held liable if the offence benefits them, facing heavy financial penalties and interdictive measures, such as suspension of activity or bans on public contracts.
Tax offences are governed by Legislative Decree No 74/2000, which sets out the following offences: fraudulent tax return through the use of invoices or other documents for non-existent transactions (Article 2); fraudulent tax return through other artifices (Article 3); inaccurate tax return (Article 4); failure to file a tax return (Article 5); issuing invoices or other documents for non-existent transactions (Article 8); concealment or destruction of accounting records (Article 10); failure to pay certified withholding taxes (Article 10-bis); failure to pay VAT (Article 10-ter); unlawful set-off (Article 10-quater); and fraudulent evasion of tax payments (Article 11).
Among these offences, the most significant and frequently applied are:
It should be noted that the criminal offences set forth in Legislative Decree No 74/2000 will be fully repealed as of 1 January 2026 (see Article 101, paragraph 1, letter z, Legislative Decree No 173/2024).
In the Italian legal system, many provisions impose reporting obligations in the tax field (eg, the duty to file income tax returns, the obligation for financial intermediaries to report suspicious transactions, etc). From a criminal law perspective, the obligation for companies to prevent tax evasion is set out in Legislative Decree No 231/2001, as companies are required to prevent the commission of tax offences following the 2020 inclusion of several such offences among those giving rise to corporate liability.
The main criminal offence related to corporate accounting is “false corporate reporting”/”false accounting” (Article 2621 of the Civil Code).
This offence punishes the conduct of directors, general managers, statutory auditors, and liquidators who, with the aim of obtaining an undue profit for themselves or others,
The applicable penalty is imprisonment from one to five years.
Article 2622 of the Civil Code provides for a similar offence, but specifically concerns false accounting committed within listed companies, for which a higher penalty is provided: imprisonment from three to eight years.
Antitrust law is primarily governed by Law No 287/1990, which provides for administrative sanctions for anti-competitive conduct, but does not establish criminal offences, such as cartels. Certain criminal provisions are instead set forth by the ICC, which punishes particularly serious behaviours affecting free competition. The main offences have been outlined below.
Italian consumer criminal law is centred on offences that punish fraud in trade and protect consumers from deception in the marketplace, supplemented by administrative rules that ensure fairness and product safety.
From the criminal perspective, the most relevant provision is Article 515 of the ICC, which punishes the sale of goods that differ in origin, quality, or quantity from what has been promised, with penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to EUR2,065. Moreover, Article 517 addresses the marketing of industrial products with false or misleading signs – such as brands, marks, or labels – that deceive consumers as to their origin, quality, or genuineness, punishable with up to two years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to EUR20,000. The common thread in these provisions is the element of deception, designed to preserve consumer trust and the integrity of commercial transactions.
On the administrative side, the Consumer Code (Codice del Consumo) reinforces this framework. Articles 20–27 prohibit misleading or aggressive practices, empowering the Competition Authority (AGCM) to impose fines of up to EUR10 million. Article 112 of the same Code requires that only safe products be placed on the market; failure to comply constitutes a misdemeanour punishable with a fine of up to EUR50,000 or imprisonment for up to one year.
The main offences are as follows.
Customs sanctions are governed by Legislative Decree 141/2024, which criminalises smuggling and fraudulent declarations, such as failure to lodge paperwork or misstatements on quality, quantity, origin or value. The basic penalty is a fine equal to 100%–200% of the duties evaded, with imprisonment only in aggravated cases: three to five years if the offender is armed, acts in a group, links the conduct to other felonies, joins a contraband association, or where a duty component exceeds EUR100,000; up to three years if it exceeds EUR50,000. Less serious infringements are dealt with administratively through fines and confiscation.
Alongside the customs regime, trade sanctions apply to embargoed goods and sensitive technologies. Law 185/1990 covers the export of military equipment, while Legislative Decree 221/2017 implements the EU framework on dual-use items. In both cases, the core offence is the export, supply or brokering of goods without the required authorisation or in breach of the relevant regulations. These are criminal offences, attracting imprisonment, heavy fines often linked to the value of the goods, and confiscation.
Finally, financial sanctions – namely, asset freezes and prohibitions on making funds or economic resources available to designated persons – are enforced on an administrative footing under Legislative Decree 109/2007. Breaches mainly result in monetary fines and administrative confiscation, rather than criminal prosecution.
The crime of concealment (“ricettazione” under Article 648 ICC) occurs when an individual purchases, receives, conceals, or otherwise facilitates the use of money, goods, or other benefits derived from any crime, with knowledge of their illicit origin. The predicate offence can be any crime capable of producing unlawful proceeds, such as theft, fraud, corruption or any other white-collar crime. Crucially, concealment applies only to third parties: the perpetrator of the predicate offence cannot be convicted of concealment of the same proceeds. Sanctions include imprisonment ranging from two to eight years and a fine of EUR516 to EUR10,329. More sophisticated conduct aimed at disguising or reinvesting illicit assets may fall under the related offences of money laundering or self-laundering under Article 648-bis and Article 640-ter 1 (see 3.13 Money Laundering).
Anyone who contributes to the commission of a corporate offence can be held liable through the general rule on participation in crime set out in Article 110 of the ICC (concorso di persone nel reato). The contribution may take the form of material co-operation (direct involvement in the act) or moral participation, such as instigation, encouragement or agreement that strengthens the decision of others to commit the offence. The offence requires:
The rule stipulates that all participants are subject to the same penalty as the principal offender, unless their role is minor, in which case the court may reduce the sentence (Article 114).
The main offences related to money laundering are as follows.
The primary legislation on anti-money laundering is Legislative Decree No 231/2007, which imposes a number of significant prevention obligations on certain categories of entities (eg, financial intermediaries, professionals, etc).
From a criminal law perspective, the key provision is Article 55 of Legislative Decree No 231/2007, which includes several criminal offences. For example, it punishes the conduct of anyone who, being obliged to comply with the customer due diligence requirements under the Decree, falsifies data and information relating to the client, the beneficial owner, the executor, the purpose and nature of the ongoing relationship or professional service, and the transaction, or uses false data and information. The applicable penalty is imprisonment from six months to three years and a fine ranging from EUR10,000 to EUR30,000.
The authorities competent to enforce anti-money laundering regulation, and therefore empowered to impose sanctions in case of violations, are the criminal courts (with regard to offences) and the Bank of Italy and CONSOB (with regard to administrative sanctions).
Environmental offences are set out in both the ICC and the Codice dell’Ambiente (Legislative Decree 152/2006). The ICC punishes conduct that causes serious harm to air, soil, water or ecosystems. Causing environmental pollution can lead to imprisonment for two to six years and a fine of up to EUR100,000, while creating an environmental disaster – that is, irreversible or very extensive damage – can result in a sentence of five to fifteen years in prison. The Codice dell’Ambiente contains more specific rules on waste and emissions: carrying out waste management without the required authorisations, organising illegal waste trafficking, or discharging pollutants into rivers or the atmosphere are all criminal offences, punishable with sanctions that range from a few months to several years of imprisonment, depending on how dangerous the conduct is.
On the social and governance side, the ICC sanctions slavery, trafficking in persons and forced labour (Article 601) with terms of imprisonment from eight to twenty years, while Article 603-bis punishes labour exploitation through unlawful recruitment (caporalato) with one to six years of imprisonment, increased where violence, threats or minors are involved.
The most serious ESG violations, such as environmental pollution, environmental disaster, human trafficking and slavery, are not only prosecuted as crimes against individuals or the environment but also fall within the scope of Legislative Decree 231/2001, thereby engaging the direct liability of companies that benefit from them.
In Italy, there are currently no criminal offences specifically targeting the misuse of artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic trading, or automated decision-making in financial or commercial contexts.
Nevertheless, existing provisions may apply. For example, the use of AI to manipulate financial markets or mislead investors may fall under fraud (Articles 640 et seq of the ICC) or market manipulation as regulated by Legislative Decree No 58/1998 (Consolidated Law on Finance).
On 17 September 2025, the Senato della Repubblica approved Bill No 1146/2025 on artificial intelligence, previously passed by the Camera dei Deputati on 25 June 2025. The law introduces several criminal provisions on AI, including a delegation to the Government to create new offences and aggravating circumstances in the ICC.
Crypto-assets were comprehensively regulated for the first time with Legislative Decree No 129 of 5 September 2024, implementing the EU Regulation on Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCAR, Regulation (EU) 2023/1114). The Decree introduced one specific criminal offence (Article 30) and several administrative offences.
Before this, the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation had already classified certain crypto-assets (particularly cryptocurrencies) as “financial products” (eg, shares or bonds), thus subjecting them to the Consolidated Law on Finance and related offences.
Under Legislative Decree No 129/2024, the unauthorised marketing of crypto-assets may constitute an offence under Article 30, which criminalises anyone who, without the required licence:
The penalty is imprisonment from six months to four years and a fine of up to EUR10,329.
Common Defences
The most common defence strategies can be divided into two categories: on the one hand, the “objective” defence, which seeks to have the court recognise that no offence was committed; and, on the other hand, the “subjective” defence, which aims to persuade the court that, even if an offence was committed, liability should not fall on the defendant.
The “objective” defence can, in turn, take different forms:
The “subjective” defence, instead, may consist in attributing responsibility for the offence to someone else (eg, the CEO of a large company attributing responsibility for a serious workplace accident to the plant manager of the relevant production site), or in excluding any personal involvement in the commission of the offence (eg, a non-executive director defending himself by proving his absence from the board meeting in which the approval of a false financial statement was resolved).
Compliance Programmes
Under Italian law (Legislative Decree No 231/2001), companies may avoid corporate liability for certain white-collar offences if they can demonstrate that, prior to the offence, they had adopted and effectively implemented an organisational and management model (“Modello 231”) designed to prevent that type of misconduct. This defence applies only to entities and only for offences covered by the Decree (eg, corruption, corporate crimes, market abuse, money laundering, tax offences). For individuals, compliance programmes have no exonerating effect, serving at most as evidence of the absence of negligence or intent.
The legal provision that best embodies the principle de minimis non curat lex is Article 131-bis of the ICC (“Exclusion of punishability for particular triviality of the act”). This provision indicates that for minor offences, which are punishable by a custodial sentence of no more than two years, punishability is excluded when the harm caused is particularly trivial and the conduct is not habitual. The triviality of the harm is assessed with reference to the manner in which the offence was committed, the insignificance of the harm or danger caused, as well as the defendant’s behaviour after the commission of the offence.
The closest equivalent to the Anglo-American plea bargain is the patteggiamento procedure, governed by Articles 444–448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It allows the defendant and prosecutor to request a court-approved sentence, provided it does not exceed five years’ imprisonment (or consists of a fine, alone or combined with imprisonment). If accepted, the court issues a conviction without trial, and the penalty is reduced by up to one-third. Crucially, patteggiamento is not a form of admission of criminal liability: the defendant does not enter a guilty plea in the common-law sense. The court must still verify that no grounds for acquittal exist and that the agreed-upon penalty is appropriate, but the conviction follows by agreement rather than through a contested trial.
Self-disclosure may also be relevant. In economic and corporate crime, voluntary reporting or substantial co-operation can mitigate liability. In cases of corruption, defendants who mitigate harm, provide evidence, or expose accomplices may see their penalties reduced by up to two-thirds (Article 323-bis). More strikingly, anyone reporting a corrupt act before learning of an investigation, and within four months of the conduct, may obtain full exemption (Article 323-ter).
Co-operation with the authorities is further recognised under Article 62-bis, which provides general mitigating circumstances, and under special statutes that reward assistance in uncovering offenders, proceeds, or criminal groups.
Additional leniency includes conditional suspension of sentence, probationary programmes (messa alla prova), or replacement of imprisonment with community sanctions, particularly for first-time offenders and less serious crimes.
Italy has recently introduced a comprehensive whistle-blower regime through Legislative Decree No 24/2023, implementing the EU Directive and expanding earlier rules. The regime extends across both the public and private sectors, covering breaches of national or EU law, including corruption, financial crime, and corporate misconduct.
Whistle-blowers enjoy strong safeguards: any retaliatory measure is void, the employer must prove its independence from the disclosure, and confidentiality of identity is mandatory, with sanctions for violations. Unlike other jurisdictions, no monetary rewards are offered; the incentive lies in legal protections, such as job security, confidentiality, and immunity from liability, except for limited exceptions (eg, state secrets, medical secrecy).
Companies with at least 50 employees, as well as all entities subject to Legislative Decree 231/2001, must establish secure internal reporting channels, either managed internally or outsourced, ensuring confidentiality, data protection, and anonymous reporting. They must also establish clear follow-up procedures and provide staff with adequate training. In parallel, whistle-blowers may report to ANAC via its fully anonymous platform, or, in certain cases, directly to judicial authorities.
When white-collar matters take on a cross-border dimension, defence strategies must contend with the full range of international and EU co-operation instruments that enable evidence, suspects and proceedings to move across jurisdictions.
In the EU, the key innovation is the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), which is competent in Italy for crimes against EU finances, such as cross-border VAT fraud or the misuse of funds. EPPO proceedings may involve parallel investigations in several member states, with foreign material often admissible in Italian courts.
Beyond the EU, Italy relies on mutual legal assistance treaties, Council of Europe conventions and bilateral agreements. Evidence gathered abroad is generally admissible if it is compliant with the law of the requested state, although the defence may contest it where Italian guarantees are lacking. Scrutinising requests and invoking principles like speciality in extradition is therefore crucial.
There is currently no formal pan-European defence mechanism for coordination. In practice, companies and individuals facing parallel investigations will engage teams in each jurisdiction and strive to align their strategies across borders. Italian law allows the use of material disclosed abroad to mount a defence, but strategic choices must be aligned across jurisdictions to avoid inconsistent positions.
There are, however, recognised limits on cross-border co-operation. Requests must respect Italian constitutional guarantees, including the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem). EU law reinforces this: a final judgment in another member state bars fresh proceedings in Italy on the same facts. Data protection rules (GDPR) also apply, and evidence obtained in breach of privacy or defence rights may, depending on the circumstances, be excluded.
In the year ahead, developments in the field of white-collar crime in Italy are likely to be shaped more by the consolidation of recent reforms and increasingly assertive cross-border action, rather than by sweeping new reforms.
On the political side, reform of the justice system remains a topic of debate. The proposal to separate the careers of judges and prosecutors is progressing through Parliament and could be finalised by 2026, following the necessary readings and a confirmatory referendum. This change may also have implications for the conduct of economic crime prosecutions.
At the same time, the Ministry of Justice has convened a technical working group to review the corporate liability regime under Legislative Decree 231/2001, with the aim of updating the catalogue of predicate offences and assessing possible procedural reforms. In parallel, policy discussions on export controls and restrictive measures are ongoing, with closer scrutiny of dual-use goods and compliance with embargoes expected alongside traditional corporate crime enforcement.
C.so di Porta Vittoria 10
20122
Milano
MI, Italy
+39 02 303 7081
g.traghin@pistochinilex.it www.pistochiniavvocati.it/en/Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the Italian legislature and judicial system have transformed the approach to corporate liability. Starting from the need to provide greater protection to citizens against risks arising from companies through the unlawful conduct of their directors and employees, they decided to move away from the principle that criminal liability – traditionally understood as “personal liability” – applied only to natural persons. Instead, they began following practices typical of Anglo-Saxon legal systems, which for years had recognised criminal liability for legal entities as well.
A formal turning point came in 2001 with Legislative Decree No 231/2001, which introduced corporate criminal/administrative liability into Italian law (hereafter referred to simply as “criminal liability”).
Since then, nearly twenty-five years ago, the Italian legislation and judicial system have undergone significant changes, building on the innovative codification of corporate criminal liability. This liability has enabled companies to develop a profound culture of compliance while allowing public prosecutors to structure investigations and litigation strategies differently. Prosecutors have increasingly distinguished between the positions of legal entities and those of natural persons, focusing more on corporate conduct. They understood that targeting legal entities could yield greater benefits, both in terms of compensating damages caused by employees and directors and, through stricter compliance controls, in rebalancing the markets in which the investigated companies operate.
In pursuing this path, the Italian legislature has, on one hand, sought to encourage and enhance compliance monitoring by companies (through the establishment of dedicated regulatory authorities such as Consob and the Bank of Italy for financial companies, ANAC for anti-corruption, and the Revenue Agency and Guardia di Finanza for tax and anti-money laundering offenses), and, on the other hand, adopted measures inspired – once again – by Anglo-Saxon systems, introducing tools of Restorative Justice and creating mechanisms to “replace” custodial penalties for natural persons or interdictive measures for companies (such as the appointment of a judicial administrator or restrictions on contracting with the State, advertising, or selling goods or services) with sanctions of a dual nature: pecuniary, both punitive and compensatory, and “reconstructive,” consisting in activities meant to benefit the community.
In this context, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office – which, through the first major cases on corporate criminal liability, initiated the path summarised above – has established two ongoing lines of investigation, paving the way for an extensive and generalised, though not yet systematic, application of Restorative Justice (prior to its formal introduction into Italian law in 2022 through the Cartabia reform, currently only applicable to natural persons).
The first investigation targeted dozens of foreign banks and financial institutions, while the second focused on numerous logistics and fashion companies. In the first, the alleged offences (virtually identical for all the institutions involved) include money laundering, unauthorised financial activity, permanent establishment, and tax evasion. In the second, the allegations (again largely identical for all the involved parties) include tax evasion for logistics companies and both tax evasion and labour exploitation (“caporalato”) for fashion companies.
In both cases, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office, instead of conducting case-by-case analytical assessments, relied on presumptive and statistical reasoning to persuade the companies to resolve proceedings through settlements with the Revenue Agency and by revising their organisational models, solutions that, though often costly and demanding, were preferable to facing the uncertainties of a trial, with potentially greater reputational and economic damage.
Thus, the choice between the uncertainty of trial and the relative certainty, albeit expensive, of negotiated settlements and organisational reform led nearly all the companies involved to opt for the latter.
This evolution, originating with Legislative Decree 231/2001 and furthered by the development of compliance and the Milan Prosecutor’s strategies, has culminated – almost naturally, though not intentionally – in the emergence of restorative justice as a destination point. This outcome necessitates reflection on the most effective defensive strategies in this context.
The Turning Point: Legislative Decree 231/2001
Before 2001, the prevailing idea was that societas delinquere non potest (a company cannot commit a crime). If a manager or employee of a company committed an offence, they were the only ones who could be held criminally liable and punished, even if the offence was strictly intertwined with the company’s mindset and strategy. Until the law on corporate criminal liability came into force, companies could only be held civilly liable for damages (pursuant to Articles 2043 et seq. of the Civil Code) on the basis of “culpa in eligendo,” but nothing more.
Decree 231 radically changed this perspective. By introducing criminal liability, it transformed companies’ internal structures – from tools designed primarily to protect themselves against debtor insolvency – to mechanisms intended to protect citizens from the risks created by corporations themselves.
However, corporate liability arises only under specific conditions:
The model is not inherently exculpatory; adopting it alone is not enough. It must be implemented effectively through ongoing monitoring and staff training, with responsibilities assigned to the OdV.
Consequently, the OdV, as well as the organisational, management, and control models (Modelli di Organizzazione, Gestione e Controllo, MOG), have become key instruments for companies in managing liability and ensuring overall corporate compliance.
Recent case law assesses the adequacy of such models, emphasising risk management, notably in terms of functional separation, and the implementation of specific protocols subject to effective OdV oversight.
Compliance and Restorative Justice: From Defensive Tools to Strategic Levers
Compliance
As noted, the enforcement of Decree 231 by public prosecutors, along with the de facto requirement that companies adopt and effectively implement suitable compliance models, has heightened corporate attention to compliance in order to mitigate the risk of incurring any criminal liability.
A “paper model” is not enough: the model needs to be implemented and become operational. Large corporations have thus integrated compliance into their organisational strategies, not only to mitigate criminal risk but also for reputational, sustainability, and stakeholder-related reasons, and thus for the purpose of consistency throughout the entire system.
Thus, a law originally aimed at redefining corporate criminal responsibility has, through judicial application, extended its principles, particularly the centrality of compliance, beyond strictly criminal domains.
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the Milan Prosecutor’s Office has recently launched numerous investigations into companies operating in the logistics, distribution, and fashion sectors, industries with complex subcontracting chains that are subject to high exposure to risks such as tax evasion, price dumping, labour exploitation, etc.
Regulatory authorities (Bank of Italy, Consob, ANAC, etc) have also begun imposing increasingly stringent compliance standards, requiring systematic and timely corporate responses.
Restorative Justice
The growth of compliance is not the only outcome of Decree 231/2001. It also laid the groundwork for another development, the substantive application of restorative justice to corporations.
Restorative justice formally entered Italian law only with Articles 42 et seq of Legislative Decree 150/2022 (the Cartabia Reform) and currently applies solely to physical persons.
Why, then, claim that restorative justice for corporations (currently not provided for entities) hails from Decree 231/2001?
Because, as in life, the more significant the changes, the smaller the formal steps are in their direction. And more often than not, small formal steps are followed by large, substantial steps.
This process can be summarised as follows:
Investigative Practice and the Milan Prosecutor’s Strategy
For years, Milan and its Prosecutor’s Office have served as Italy’s main “laboratory” for investigations into multinationals and complex financial and industrial groups. From the early 2000s cases, such as Parmalat, to more recent probes involving international banks, Milan remains at the forefront.
Current inquiries, one into banks and financial institutions (nearing conclusion) and another into logistics and fashion companies (ongoing), share common features, as outlined below.
Use of presumptive, probabilistic reasoning based on statistical and behavioural indicators to build a criminal case, for example:
Application of Decree 231/2001, of ne bis in idem, of tax settlement mechanisms with the Revenue Agency, and of mandatory organisational and compliance reform.
A substantially presumptive/probabilistic approach (undoubtedly favoured by similar operational contexts that represent potential repetitions of the same offences ascertained in the initial investigations on a sample basis), through which the Prosecutor:
Corporate responses involving internal due diligence on governance and organisation, to identify and correct operational flaws, enhance the control systems, and reform governance, organisation, and personnel.
A further strategic element has been the deliberate and strategic separation of corporate and individual liabilities – an approach consistent with, though not mandated by, Decree 231/2001.
Separating Natural and Legal Persons: Practice and Grounds
This strategy serves several purposes:
As a result, many companies have preferred plea bargains or settlements (which may also lead to the application of ne bis in idem with the result of avoiding conviction) rather than opting for the uncertainty of trial, with the risk of incurring a criminal conviction and even higher financial sanctions, with an exponential increase in reputational risk.
Defensive Strategies: The Multidisciplinary “Round Table”
In such a complex scenario, facing investigations of this kind requires more than a strong criminal lawyer. It demands an integrated team in which each professional (who carries a specific expertise) is free and independent to support the lead criminal lawyer with specialised input to shape the optimal defence strategy.
A “crisis table” should therefore include:
Such a “crisis table” ensures a coherent, effective, and coordinated defence strategy.
Critical Issues, Limitations, and Future Scenarios
Challenges and limitations
Future outlook and conclusions
In a context that is still weakly regulated, where the pure application of law increasingly gives way to pragmatic justice aimed at closing cases before trial, leveraging companies’ “fear of the unknown” (a company’s fear that challenging the judiciary in a trial could bring increased criminal, financial and reputational risks) multinational corporations facing criminal proceedings in Italy cannot improvise their defence. They must promptly establish a multidisciplinary crisis team led by an experienced criminal lawyer, working closely with experts in all areas that are directly (or, potentially, may be) involved in the investigation (compliance, tax, labour, and administrative).
In this new landscape, prevention makes the difference: well-designed organisational models, combined with the ability to quickly implement restorative measures, a credible negotiation strategy, and a clear and realistic understanding of investigative dynamics, are key to achieving effective and sustainable defence outcomes.
Via Fontana 4
20122
Milan
Italy
+39 02 599 2101
segreteria@studioisolabella.it www.studioisolabella.com/en/home-eng